71 STUDIES IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

From Revolutionary Theater to Reactionary Litanies

Gustave Hervé (1871–1944) at the Extremes of the French Third Republic

Michael B. Loughlin

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From Revolutionary Theater
to Reactionary Litanies

Studies in Modern European History

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Vol. 71

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I would like to dedicate this book to my father Thomas and to my recently departed mother Harriet, who took increasing satisfaction at the impending completion of this incredibly long-term production. I would also like to dedicate this book to my two children, Patrick and Kelly, and their children, Katie and Cameron, whose very existence gives my life much greater meaning. Of course, I deeply appreciate the love and encouragement of my wife Deise, who has accompanied me to France on several occasions and has helped me learn another language, understand another culture, and see another viewpoint.

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Abbreviations

A.I.A.	Association Internationale Antimilitariste des Travailleurs
A.N.	Archives Nationales
A.P.P.	Archives de la Préfecture de Police
A.R.A.C.	Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants
B.N.	Bibliothèque Nationale
C.A.P.	Commission Administrative Permanente
C.D.S.	Comité de Défense Sociale
C.E.F.R.	Comité d'Entente des Forces Révolutionnaires
C.G.T.	Confédération Générale du Travail
C.R.A.	Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire
F.C.A.	Fédération Communiste Anarchiste
F.O.P.	Fédération Ouvrière et Paysanne des Anciens Combattants et Mutilés
F.R.	Fédération Révolutionnaire
G.H.	Gustave Hervé
J.G.R.	Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires
L.B.S.	La Bataille Syndicaliste
L.G.S.	La Guerre Sociale
L.T.S.	Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne

M.A.	Miguel Almereyda
M.I.	Ministre de l'Intérieure
M.J.	Ministre de Justice
M.S.N.	Milice Socialiste Nationale
N.S.D.A.P.	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
P.C.F.	Parti Communiste Français
P.O.S.R.	Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Révolutionnaire
P.G.	Procureur Général
P.P.	Préfecture de Police
P.P.F.	Parti Populaire Français
P.P.Y.	Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne
P.S. de F.	Parti Socialiste de France
P.S.F.	Parti Socialiste Français or Parti Social Français
P.S.N.	Parti Socialiste National
P.S.U.	Parti Socialiste Unifié
R.E.P.	La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire
R.P.	Représentation Proportionnelle
S.F.I.O.	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
S.P.D.	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
S.S.R.	Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire
U.N.C.	Union Nationale des Anciens Combattants

Introduction

"The writers of history organize the events of which they write according to, and out of, their own private necessities and the state of their own selves."[1]

In *The Banquet Years*, Roger Shattuck's fascinating account of the Parisian avant-garde, the author employed several prominent iconoclastic French artists from various fields to exemplify his themes even though they were never considered the leading figures. By focusing on lesser lights or marginally important artists, Shattuck thought he could better comprehend the phenomenon of the Parisian avant-garde since the fame and importance of the most well-known innovators of the era could easily skew the rich texture of the avant-garde.[2] A study of Gustave Hervé may offer a parallel possibility for politics during the Third Republic. Even though Hervé was an important figure, especially before the Great War, he had much less stature and played a relatively minor role compared to men like Jaurès, Clemenceau, Briand, Blum, or Pétain. In hindsight, what may be most interesting about him is not his prominence before the Great War but the trends and problems which a study of his career can bring to the fore. Hervé "was a third-rate political theorist, but he was a first-rate activist"[3] and polemicist. He was not a seminal thinker on the extreme French Left nor did he ever come close to attaining the political power that he apparently sought. However, the simple ideas that he espoused, the striking episodes which involved him, and ephemeral

organizations that he sponsored throughout his colorful career may help to illustrate trends and patterns that might be missed in studies which focus on more prominent individuals of the era. To borrow an image made famous by Claude Lévi-Strauss, the career of Gustave Hervé may be useful for thinking about the political ideas, forms, and pathways of the Third Republic.

Like many youngsters who grew up in the aftermath of World War II, I became fascinated by Nazism and Hitler. Eventually the term fascism became an object of curiosity and study. At some point the puzzling career of Mussolini attracted my attention and I soon soon became intrigued by those fascist leaders like him who seemed to radically and sometimes rapidly shift their perspectives from one political pole to another. After studying several of those renegades who became leaders of various fascist movements, William B. Cohen, my graduate advisor, suggested the political and journalistic career of Hervé as a possible topic of inquiry in 1980 because at the time there was no published study exclusively devoted to him. That gap was ably filled in the 1990s and after by the scholarship of Gilles Heuré and by the work of several other scholars who published articles on Hervé or situated his career within a broader context of research. As my study progressed, one thing seemed especially striking about the transformation of Hervé which guides the present work. Despite a glaring, yet fairly gradual, transformation before World War I, the structure of Hervé's ideological shift was largely a reverse image of his earlier ideas as a revolutionary. In the case of Hervé, if in no other, it was almost as if the very structure of political discourse itself had generated the possibility of such a reversal. Such a development may imply something important about the apparently constrained limits of political thought at that time.

This study of Hervé is no random or accidental choice. The Belgian historian Rita Lejeune has pointed out how biographical endeavors always entail an "inevitable partiality" because "no one has written the life of another person for the pure interest of knowledge."[4] Given this "preferential" focus, this study began with an interest in what might be called the confluence of the political extremes, sometimes explained in terms of the political extremes touching, such as in the obvious commonalities involving anarchism and libertarianism or the old Cold War (though still relevant for some?) notion of totalitarianism. In some ways Hervé seemed to fit the profiles of several other French and European political leaders who were prominent in the origins and development of fascism. The present work was motivated by an interest in individuals like Benito Mussolini, Hendrik de Man, Roberto Michels, Sir Oswald Mosley, Henri Rochefort, Maurice Barrès, Édouard Berth, Hubert Lagardelle, Georges Sorel, Georges Valois, Marcel Déat, and Jacques Doriot, who seemed to shift from the extreme Left to the extreme

Right of the political spectrum and sometimes the reverse. For many scholars such reversals have seemed to be crucial in understanding the origins of fascism.[5] Such phenomena ought not to be construed as an attempt to promote Hayekian categories blaming socialism for fascism or to revisit the concept of totalitarianism, however interesting, pertinent, or heuristic such efforts might seem to some.[6] Rather than documenting the "leftist origins of fascism" or seeing fascism as "neither Left nor Right" like Zeev Sternhell,[7] this study assumes that fascism was an ideological amalgam that was both Left and Right. If ideas help us to understand something about Hervé's radical transformation, so do questions of personality and psychology, though this study does not purport to be a psycho-history.

This volume arose from an interest in what some might call political reversals or "convergences of the political extremes" at least at the leadership level which seemed to characterize the *fin-de-siècle* and post-World War I era. Although the name Gustave Hervé came to my attention during the course of graduate studies, his political trajectory was not a topic of keen interest until Cohen wondered whether I would be interested in doing research on him. A year later, when the Society for French Historical Studies met at Indiana University, Cohen arranged for a brief elevator ride in Ballantine Hall with Eugen Weber whose doctoral student, Michael Roger Scher, had worked extensively on Hervé, but who had been a victim of a drug overdose during the 1970s while beginning his teaching career at the University of Illinois. After Weber's apparent *imprimatur* and once serious research on Hervé had begun, Scher's work proved extremely helpful. In fact, an earlier doctoral dissertation from the 1950s by Maurice Rotstein, as well as the studies of many French students from the 1960s and 1970s including Jean-Claude Peyronnet, Marie Duchemin, and Catherine Grünblatt also proved to be indispensable for research here and in Paris. Once the work of Gilles Heuré became available, it proved to be very helpful in discovering additional sources and provided valuable insights for the present work. Before beginning his graduate studies in Paris, Heuré had worked as a journalist, and his family happened to have ties to Hervé at the beginning of the twentieth century while the budding socialist activist and professor of history was in the Yonne at Sens. Even though Heuré began his research on Hervé well after my study had begun, he had several advantages, thus producing an immense *doctorat d'état*, at least seven major articles, and a very good biography of Hervé in 1997. About five years ago I made contact with a young Dutch scholar named Daniel Knegt who sought advice on pertinent reading over Hervé. After giving him information, including suggesting that he contact Heuré, I had several exchanges with Knegt and received his fine study on Hervé during the interwar era. Obviously, anything the current study has to say about Hervé owes

much to these scholars. Whatever disagreements remain are generally matters of nuance and emphasis, but this study does attempt to push some arguments further. Certainly disagreements, debates, and alternate viewpoints are not avoided here, even if they are not central.

When research for this biography began, Hervé's career had not yet been fully or adequately covered. Today, one cannot make that claim because the work of Gilles Heuré has put the life of Hervé on display in an insightful, fascinating, and subtle manner. Other scholars including Jean-Jacques Becker, Madeleine Rebérioux, Eugen Weber, James Friguglietti, Zeev Sternhell, Robert Soucy, Pierre Milza, Serge Berstein, Paul Mazgaj, Philippe Burrin, Michel Winock and most recently Daniel Knegt as well as Jonathan Almosnino have touched on or delved deeply into aspects of Hervé's career or some of the militants in his entourage. Certainly earlier scholars opened the topic up to Heuré and others. Various often unpublished French and American scholars mentioned above have been important sources for anyone looking at Hervé's life and the milieus associated with him. Despite a vast amount of published and unpublished material on Hervé, the present study is warranted because there are themes and events which even Heuré's multiple studies have not fully explored.

Gustave Hervé first gained notoriety following a 1901 newspaper article in which he appeared to plant the tricolor in a dung pile.[8] Once French workers and militants discovered that their defense of the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair had yielded little, some of them began to promote Hervé as the heir to the unfulfilled revolutionary tradition.[9] The antimilitarist movement known as Hervéism gradually emerged. Hervéism was a quixotic crusade which attempted to use antimilitarism to unite revolutionary socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists in order to prevent war, promote socialism, and, presumably, incite revolution.[10] By the time French socialists unified in April 1905, the *Hervéistes* or *Insurrectionels* were an influential minority. In December 1906 Hervé founded a weekly newspaper, *La Guerre Sociale*, as a rallying point for his ideas. Over the next five years press campaigns, political trials, posters, books, brochures, *images d'Epinal*, meetings, demonstrations, support for non-lethal sabotage, rhetorical calls for assassination of government leaders, strike activities, conspiratorial organizations, a revolutionary secret counter-police (the *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire*), and a paramilitary formation (the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*) maintained Hervé's flagrant profile and sold newspapers. Ironically, *La Guerre Sociale* advertized conspiracies and insurrection, which suggests revolutionary theater more than practical politics.[11]

As revolutionary theater Hervéism might have been successful entertainment, but the actors and some of the audiences often confused revolutionary art with

political reality. Among Hervé's rivals on the French left, such theatrics often generated resentment and jealousy. By 1911, after his movement had been labeled as demagogic, revolutionary romanticism, or statist authoritarianism by many members of his prospective revolutionary coalition, the rather ingenuous Hervé felt betrayed. The former history professor perceived his failure to unite the extreme Left as a rejection; this began an evolution, which the war and some of the pre-war crises would accelerate, toward increasing identification with the nation as well as its traditional Catholic faith. Besides the increasingly tense international situation, one crucial determinant in Hervé's transformation from Insurrectional socialism to a French national socialism sympathetic to fascism involved the perpetual rivalries within the French Left. But neither the divisions on the Left nor the transformation of Hervé can be separated from the persistence of an anachronistic revolutionary tradition which was increasingly at odds with French social, economic, and political realities.

The political developments of *La Belle Époque*, including the evolution of Gustave Hervé, can be summarized by means of Michel Winock's pithy yet all encompassing remark at the opening of his lively account of that era. "After having resisted the attempts at authoritarian subversion (monarchism, Boulangism, nationalism), the republican regime neutralized the rise to power of the revolutionary working class movement in the years 1906–1910, before, some years later, entering into war, fortified by the national union."[12] Growing up under a fragile Republic, Hervé became an outspoken critic of both the state and its supposed enemies, but because he alternately identified with various opponents of the government on both the extreme Left and the Right, he was eventually rejected by almost everyone. Because France, or his ideal version of it, remained a fundamental inspiration, the antipatriot could become a patriot who looked to a transformed state to provide the peace, order, and harmony that he invariably sought.

Hervé was hardly ordinary, but he was not deviant.[13] If most scholars refuse to explain Hervé's shift simply in terms of abnormal psychology, even a well established scholar like Michel Winock was content to connect his *retournement* to a "*psychologie particulière*."[14] Such remarks do not seem very precise or helpful. Neither can his remarkable shift be explained away simply as a pragmatic or cynical attempt to gain power, money, or supporters. Certainly, Hervé had an interest in keeping his newspaper and political formations afloat, but he was the opposite of an opportunist in his inveterate refusal to compromise and in his disinterest in political office and wealth.[15] In fact, Hervé's pre-war shift cost him readers, supporters, and status on the extreme Left.[16] During the interwar era his controversial foreign policy stances favoring reconciliation with Germany often led

to similar problems on the Right. Going "against the grain" for its own sake and pursuing the impossible are better descriptions of Hervé's career. As Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, once phrased it, "*Hervé tire des pétards pour faire retourner les passants*."[17] Victor Méric, a columnist at *La Guerre Sociale* and one of the associate editors, knew well Hervé's penchant for shocking the bourgeoisie, but Méric also saw Hervé as a man in search of a faith, much like Eric Hoffer's "true believer."[18] Gilles Heuré's recent biography justifiably describes Hervé as a *provocateur*, but one must not forget that ardent beliefs invariably generated Hervé's rhetorical excesses.[19]

Many scholars refuse to believe that idealism had anything to do with Hervé's shift. Madeleine Rebérioux is probably the most prominent scholar to dismiss the significance of Hervé's transformation by associating it with base personal or material motives. In addition to implying a connection between Hervé's transformation and the persistence of Jacobin nationalism by way of Neo-Blanquist activism, Rebérioux ascribed Hervé's shift to three "possible" motives. (1) In prison since 1910 for press violations, he might have altered his views to get an amnesty in 1912. (2) He may have been paid by someone unknown.[20] (3) His transformation may have resulted from a grudge over some old affront.[21] Not only are such conjectures undocumented, they seem superfluous given Rebérioux's own insights concerning the fluctuating forces of French antistatism. Before 1905 hostility to the state among the diverse French socialist formations was quite limited.[22] Yet traditional distrust of the state remained among French artisans and peasants. The new industrial working classes, who found little but indifference from the bourgeois Republic, were also affected by antistatist views. The reemergence of antistatist currents within socialism coincided with unification in 1905 and temporarily created an opening for Insurrectional Socialism.[23] Hervé's transformation cannot be separated from the international arena, but Rebérioux's analysis of the decline of antistatist forces after 1911 fits the present analysis because it connects the decline of Hervéism and the transformation of its founder to structural changes in the French economy, society, and political arena. Why Rebérioux undercut her general analysis with unsubstantiated speculation and a barely veiled conspiracy theory remains unclear.

In fact, there is little evidence for any of these aforementioned charges. Though Hervé was often called the "New Blanqui" for his revolutionary ideas and years of prison martyrdom, unlike Auguste Blanqui himself, there is no evidence that during the pre-World War I era Hervé was ever on cordial terms with or was ever a paid agent of the French police.[24] Though Blanqui came to symbolize socialism and to represent revolution itself, ironically, for all his moral courage

and conviction, it has been said that *L'Enfermé*, unlike Hervé, lacked physical courage despite his more than thirty-three years in prison. Both men, however, despite their violent ideas, shied away from actual violence and found it almost impossible "to harm a fly." Both men were called megalomaniacal by various authorities, but Hervé was as stable as an oak if regular sleep, a bourgeois lifestyle, and an absence of vices are crucial indications of mental health. Blanqui, on the other hand, was described as puny, sickly, unhealthy, manic-depressive, and paranoid. Despite the verifiable betrayal of his supposedly incompetent revolutionary rivals and associates in 1839 due to fear of execution,[25] Blanqui is still cited in the same breath with Lenin, while Hervé is either forgotten or tied by certain parallels to Mussolini. Gilles Heuré associates Hervé's penchant for prison with a monastic religious motif.[26] One could argue that he inherited an unrequited missionary vocation arising from his Catholic Breton roots. Certainly, his ardent pursuit of his beliefs seems inseparable from a kind of martyr complex and some sort of political Passion script.

Hervé was not the only left-wing revolutionary whose career touched fascism, so his biography may provide insights concerning similar political reversals.[27] This research was prompted by an interest in those paradoxical transformations from the extreme Left to the extreme Right which seemed to characterize many of the leaders associated with the Radical Right, protofascism, and fascism.[28] The careers of men such as Mussolini, Sorel, Lagardelle, Berth, Valois, Déat, Doriot, and Hervé appear anomalous given the traditional conception of the political spectrum which has become the principal paradigm of modern political discourse since the French Revolution. To preserve the power of the political spectrum, it has become customary to explain such transformations in terms of personality idiosyncracies, opportunism, and activism. Such banal explanations solve few of the problems posed by Hervé's transformation, which cannot be explained unless we recognize a certain obvious brand of idealism, however misguided.

The language of the political spectrum certainly exists, and it has acted to structure as well as to describe political reality. The anomalous nature of a case such as Hervé's is inseparable from a political discourse which is defined in terms of the political spectrum. In France the political cultures of the Left and Right, informed as they are by modern political discourse, do exist, and the career of Hervé comes to our attention precisely because of this. The existence of two major political cultures in France is not the question. The transformation of Hervé, with its critical continuities, indicates simply that the language of bipolarity is not an exact analog of political reality. It may be impossible to examine political discourse objectively while we are embedded in it. Or it may be, as some would like to

believe, that Hervé simply changed his mind.[29] Much in Hervé's national socialist appeal to the Left was simply propaganda to give him a place on the Right as he sought to attract disgruntled leftist militants and workers. Yet the essential goals of unity, peace, international brotherhood, a United States of Europe, and even social justice remained more than propaganda, however transformed they may have become.[30] Hervé maintained many of his ideals but came to despair of their attainment on the Left. There are critical continuities in Hervé's career which not only span his transformation but appear to span political discourse itself.

One of the trends associated with some variants of fascism is anti-Semitism. Gilles Heuré confidently describes Hervé as a philo-Semite. The recent Dutch study by Daniel Knegt concurs with that assessment. Older studies by Paul Mazgaj, Zeev Sternhell, Richard Millman, and Pierre Birnbaum provide evidence to the contrary.[31] The present study largely agrees with Heuré and Knegt, but evidence also indicates that Hervé occasionally used anti-Semitic rhetoric and his newspapers sometimes employed individuals or included affiliated groups who were anti-Semitic, such as Victor Méric and Émile Janvion before the war and Marcel Bucard and certain anti-Semitic contingents after the war. Of course, Janvion was merely a brief guest contributor and Bucard was not obviously anti-Semitic in his year at *La Victoire*. The evidence for Hervé's philosemitism is much stronger, so I will employ the words ambiguous and equivocal here.[32]

Gustave Hervé is certainly best known today as the infamous antipatriotic socialist who became ultra-chauvinistic by 1914. As a Breton born in Brest on January 2, 1871, Hervé's childhood was profoundly influenced by the Celtic, peasant, Catholic, and naval traditions of this provincial port. Michael Roger Scher's unpublished study on Hervé's early life described how two childhood traumas deeply affected the young Hervé. In 1881 the local communal school was secularized; the following year his father, a quartermaster in the Navy's bookkeeping corps, died of cirrhosis probably aggravated by alcohol consumption.[33] As a student at the Lycée of Brest, Hervé has been described as both bookish and rebellious.[34] Whatever personal problems the young Hervé experienced failed to prevent him from becoming one of the *lycée*'s best students and maintaining a scholarship. During the next two decades Hervé progressed through the French educational system as a student, tutor, and professor of history, passing the *agrégation* in 1897. A secular socialist faith replaced his childhood Catholicism. Although Hervé later cited Marxist influences during this period, his socialism was highly unorthodox and eclectic. His final academic appointment began in April 1899 at the Lycée of Sens in the Department of Yonne where he became involved in Yonne's Allemanist Socialist Federation as a speaker, agitator,

and journalist.[35] As seen above, his notoriety followed a 1901 article for Yonne's Allemanist newspaper which included an image of what seemed to be the tricolor planted in a dungpile. In fact, his flagrant article in *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne* referred to the flag of the local regiment commemorating a Napoleonic victory. Nevertheless, that reference to *le drapeau dans le fumier* soon came to symbolize the desecration of the flag of France. Instant notoriety generated national prominence, but it cost Hervé a teaching position and would eventually help to sabotage a budding career as an attorney.

As noted above, when French militants realized that their defense of the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair had gained workers few tangible rewards,[36] some of them began to promote Gustave Hervé as the heir to the unfulfilled revolutionary tradition. Though Hervé may not have sought fame, he certainly used his celebrity status to forge a prominent antimilitarist movement. Prior to World War I Hervé was often called the "new Blanqui" because the often imprisoned insurrectional "General" had developed a brand of socialism which included conspiratorial formations and tactics reminiscent of those employed by the insurrectional socialist Auguste Blanqui.[37] By the time French socialists unified in April 1905, the *Hervéistes* or *Insurrectionels* were an influential S.F.I.O. minority, and they held three seats on the party's twenty-two member Permanent Executive Commission. Prior to his transformation Hervé attacked both the growing reformism and the narrow dogmatism within the S.F.I.O. epitomized respectively by the dominant figures Jean Jaurès and Jules Guesde. Hervé's antimilitarist movement also played an integral role in French syndicalism; at one point syndicalists sympathetic to Hervé held a commanding position within the French C.G.T.[38] Hervé's evolution cannot be separated from concomitant developments in French syndicalism and socialism which culminated in the so-called "crisis in syndicalism" and the gradual accommodation to the Third Republic by most elements of the extreme French Left in the years before World War I.

For Paul B. Miller, antimilitarism "never became the self-standing ideology that its leaders hoped it would and that its enemies imagined it was. But it succeeded brilliantly as a rallying cry against social and political inequities on behalf of ordinary citizens … The irony is that the antimilitarist Left had to accept the war in order to sustain its fight against it. But the reality is that in so doing it had, at last, forsaken its own revolutionary ideals, and conceded its place in *la patrie française*."[39] Antimilitarism may have led most revolutionaries to become citizens in France by 1914 as Miller has argued, but citizenship for them no longer was what they would have expected and demanded a few years earlier.[40] The myth of cathartic and creative violence did not end in World War I, but continued to

attract some French revolutionaries for decades to come, buttressed as they were by the Russian Revolution. Hervé was one former revolutionary who rejected Bolshevism but his phase of republican citizenship was rather short-lived; his fundamental tendency was a search for unity, order, and security for France, which often meant the employment of less than democratic means. If the *Sans Patrie* failed to unite French revolutionaries before the war, his national socialist formations would fare no better because they failed to gain traction for his counter-revolutionary program after the war. Significantly, throughout most of his career, even amidst his profound reversal, Hervé espoused, however propagandistically, many of the same values.

Despite the fairly gradual nature of Hervé's infamous transformation, even leftist militants from that era sometimes recollected a sudden *revirement* by the *Sans Patrie* at the outbreak of World War I.[41] Historians even today often do not realize that his ideas began to shift as early as 1910, and, in fact, were constantly evolving at least until World War I, after which they could be said to have largely stagnated. Hervé himself generally called 1912 the year of his transformation, but there is evidence that his views started to change much earlier.[42] Michel Winock has attributed Hervé's shift to some sort of prison mellowing process.[43] This explanation fails to do justice to Hervé's complex and contradictory views from 1910 to 1912. Soon after entering La Santé prison on March 21, 1910, Hervé began to express misgivings about his longstanding goal to lead a *Parti Révolutionnaire* uniting all French revolutionaries.[44] During the spring elections of 1910, he reversed some of his extreme antiparliamentary views. Thus, the origins of his new tactics could well have antedated his prison sentence.[45] Following the collapse of the French Railway Strike in late October 1910, Hervé's antimilitarism evolved even more dramatically. Ironically, Hervé's conspiratorial organizations were at their peak and his newspaper's circulation had never been greater than at the time of his shift. In fact, the "new Hervéism" can be interpreted, at least initially, as a desperate attempt to preserve the chances for (or the illusions of?) revolutionary unity. Hervé realized that a successful revolution demanded organization, discipline, and martial qualities. But his new ideas stressing "revolutionary militarism" and "the conquest of the army" were rejected by most French revolutionaries including many of Hervé's former supporters. They described Hervé's "new course" as authoritarian, demagogic, treasonous, opportunistic, or sensationalistic. For most of the extreme French Left, Hervé's efforts to promote revolution after 1910 had reactionary implications.

Growing reformism in the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. coupled with the persistent rejection of his efforts to unite the extreme Left appeared to lead Hervé to

try to force the pace of revolutionary unity. When these tactics to infiltrate and conquer the army won few adherents, Hervé gradually evolved toward blatant reformism himself.[46] In order to end leftist divisions in the face of threats from the resurgent Right, Hervé increased the ambit of his search for allies. His abandonment of the term antipatriotism and his formal appeals for a "disarmament of hatreds" on the Left in the summer of 1911 were implicitly reformist. His calls for an *entente* among the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., and the rest of the French Left in 1912 soon evolved into formal support for a new *Bloc des gauches* (including the Radical Party) which went well beyond socialist and syndicalist reformism. Even in 1912 Hervé had not yet given up the rhetoric of revolution, but his socialism amounted to an end to class conflict under the inspiration of the French revolutionary tradition and an indictment of German Marxian and materialist socialism as the antithesis of France's idealistic socialism. This analysis changed little before his death in 1944.[47]

Almost total rejection by the extreme Left led Hervé to seek support from elements outside the revolutionary milieu itself. In the process, the immediate goal of unity for revolution evolved into a search for French unity as an end in itself. If Hervé's shift began as an effort to get the extreme Left to act on its revolutionary ideals, it was soon justified as a means to prevent a "Caesarian-nationalist" wave from sweeping France.[48] Since revolution was no longer feasible and the Left itself was threatened, Hervé's tactics evolved into a program for republican defense. If leftist sectarianism was both unsolvable and symptomatic of more serious problems, the antipatriot could then fully embrace *la patrie* to cure the disorder. If the Republic itself were to blame for the materialism which had created mass political apathy, then it, too, could one day be jettisoned in the interest of French renewal. Hervé's antidemocratic assaults on the Republic from both ends of the political spectrum may have been separated by a phase of *défense républicaine*, but his accommodation was brief. Hervé would soon promote a Caesarian-Bonapartist regime of his own to protect France from the heirs of the revolutionary tradition. Whenever Hervé was asked to explain his transformation, he stressed how World War I had destroyed his naiveté and illusions. Nevertheless, what most frustrated him before the war was the perpetual discord on the extreme Left which he believed had sabotaged his movement. The war confirmed the errors of Hervéism, and it reinforced his belief that the Third Republic and the French Left were responsible for the continuing disorder.

Despite the extremism of Hervéism, its founder was more moderate than most of his younger followers. His antipatriotic rhetoric notwithstanding, Hervé never abandoned a genuine concern for the fate of France. Because Hervé's

socialism had emphasized audacity, emotion, and will above economic motives, he, like some other idealistic revolutionaries of this era, was able to transfer his energy from the proletariat to the greater galvanizing possibilities of the nation. During the interwar era Hervé hoped that workers and leftist militants would gravitate to his program for French regeneration. He assumed that his pre-war status could help attract workers to his national socialist program seeking French unity, harmony, and renewal, even though he soon advocated an authoritarian republic rather than a socialist utopia. Such a patriotic appeal to the Left by the former *Sans Patrie* maintained the anti-parliamentary rhetoric of Insurrectionalism, and it continued the assault on the decadence which Hervé now claimed was inherent in the Third Republic. Even though his formations attracted some former leftist militants, few among the rank and file responded. Hervé failed to create a broad-based cross-class movement to regenerate France, and he became a marginalized voice during the interwar era. Though he was increasingly ostracized by the Left during World War I, Hervé's search for a new political home in the post-war era was greeted with suspicion by the Right. Nevertheless, the provocative work of Zeev Sternhell described Hervé's pre-war shift in terms of the origins of the ideology of fascism.[49]

Hervé's failure to unite the extreme French Left was a major factor in his transformation, but this reversal embodied some values which remained fairly constant. Despite such an incredible shift in positions, Hervé's evolving political ideas were structured by critical continuities which indicate the existence of what Sternhell described as an ethical, idealist socialism antedating World War I that was fertile soil for extremism of the Right. Sternhell connects Hervé to the origins of French fascism by means of a revision of Marxism beginning in the late nineteenth century. Three generations of national socialists, including men like Sorel, Hervé, Déat, and de Man, shifted their positions and created the fascist synthesis by combining the political values of the Right with the social values of the Left.[50] Sternhell's thesis postulated that the ideology of the radical Right was a kind of hybrid which combined "certain strains of non-Marxian socialism with currents of radical nationalism, cultural pessimism, and popular anti-Semitism. Precisely how this ideological amalgam came together has been obscured … by the conventional Left-Right dichotomization of political reality."[51] For Paul Mazgaj the revisionist political history on *fin-de-siècle* France by Sternhell and others is best described in terms of a "dual paradox." As mainstream socialism became increasingly more Marxian, it was becoming steadily less revolutionary as it adapted to democratic politics and as it moved to the center to defend the beleaguered conservative republic. Such a perspective assumes that certain non-Marxian

revolutionaries, unable to fit into the evolving Left and fearing the effects of modernization as well as "national decadence," responded to the profound social, economic, and political changes of *fin-de-siècle* France by contributing to the origins of the radical Right.[52]

Several works have become especially important sources of inspiration as well as information in augmenting and revising topics that are central to understanding the career of Hervé. Edward Berenson's *The Trial of Madame Caillaux* is a fascinating volume offering an incisive look at the *fin-de-siècle* French press which proved to be especially helpful in situating Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* in the context of *fin-de-siècle* Parisian journalism.[53] More recently, Paul B. Miller's analysis of pre-war French antimilitarism has prompted this writer to rethink, if not change, his views on Hervéism and the whole question of antimilitarism prior to *La Grande Guerre*.[54] Most recently, the work of John J. Cerullo in his multifaceted account of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, which is a major part of the story of Hervé's prewar rectification, has proven to be invaluable.[55] This study of Hervé, whatever its merits, has only been enhanced by having these works as provocative and scholarly guides. However, the general direction of this study originated in the historiographical debates and theoretical framework dealing with the origins of fascism in France. If this study is essentially biographical, it is largely political, so an initial look at theoretical assumptions associated with French fascism is warranted. Even though my interests have altered over the years, away from both fascism and the shift from the Left to the Right epitomized by Hervé, beginning with an analysis focused on French fascism may be helpful.

Years ago Robert Paxton described several general ways in which scholars have tried to explain the nature of fascism. He singled out three types of explanations and then added what he thought was a better approach. First, he touched on the idea of nominalism—where fascism was simply a name or category, implying that each brand of fascism was, in fact, unique. In this approach only Mussolini deserved the term fascism since he invented the first fascism and his experience was *sui generis*. Second, Paxton recognized that scholars often described and catalogued fascists in a kind of encyclopedia of fascist leaders and groups as if they were best understood through an analogy to a medieval bestiary. Zeev Sternhell's dazzling volumes on French fascism sometimes slip into this pattern, with individuals and groups becoming grotesque caricatures rather than subtle portraits. The third general approach to fascism amounted to uncovering a kind of Weberian ideal type or essence of fascism. This way of understanding fascism has probably been the most popular approach until recently and is far from unproductive as witnessed in the studies of Roger Griffin and the "so-called" fascist minimum of

Stanley Payne. Paxton himself felt the need to add his own innovative approach, an analysis of fascism's five stages of development stressing action over theory and recognizing that the evolution of fascism was an ongoing process even though most fascist movements never got to the later regime stages.[56]

Whether or not Hervé can be labeled a fascist and whether such an approach is the best way to deal with him are underlying themes in this study. Suffice it to say, assigning the fascist label always depends on one's definition. Hundreds of important volumes and articles have been written on this problem simply in the context of the question of French fascism alone. On the one hand, if fascism is essentially totalitarian, violent, racist, and stresses a single party to control the government, then Gustave Hervé was no fascist. On the other hand, if fascism is simply an antidemocratic, antiliberal, anticommunist, and ultra-nationalistic political movement of the interwar era, then Hervé and his many political creations after World War I stand indicted. These two vague preliminary definitions are hardly exhaustive but they, at least, underscore a problem that this study must consider. What began as a search for the "leftist origins of fascism" or the "revolutionary" nature of fascism evolved into a study of the events and the era in which Hervé was an actor, sometimes auditioning for a leading role or at least hobnobbing intermittently on stage with some of the major stars of the era.

Since this work has germinated for decades, it should be rather detached from most traditional debates and fading rancor dealing with French fascism, yet it can still draw on such arguments and perspectives to the extent that they help us uncover the issues pertaining to Hervé. The vitriol that once characterized the important debates among René Rémond, Zeev Sternhell, Robert J. Soucy, and their contemporaries may not yet have completely subsided. Certainly this study has benefited immensely from their research and arguments, but the perspective sought here is not to choose among the disputants but to let the career of Hervé itself speak to the salient issues and arguments. Whatever disadvantage such a perspective presents, at least the current study has no major "ax to grind" with prior biographers or scholars in areas related to the themes embedded in this study.

In French history questions dealing with the possibility French fascism and the nature of the French Right generally return to the arguments of René Rémond whose seminal 1954 *La Droite en France* inoculated French scholars for at least a generation against admitting the existence of a major fascism in France. Embodying deterministic assumptions and the category of temperament from André Siegfried and François Goguel, which echoed ideas from Vacher de Lapouge, Hippolyte Taine, and Maurice Barrès, Rémond postulated three rightist traditions

dating back to the end of the French Revolution which so molded and circumscribed political possibilities in France that a genuine French fascism was precluded.[57] For Rémond, "There was no French fascism because it would have been difficult for anything of the sort to establish itself in France. Despite appearances, public opinion in that country was [supposedly] peculiarly resistant to the appeal of fascism."[58] Robert J. Soucy and William D. Irvine have associated Rémond's ideas with "the consensus school of French historiography" which apparently relegated the importance of fascism in France. However, such an association tends to confuse and blend historians who dismiss the significance of French fascism with those who stress its critical importance. If we focus on the extent and importance of French fascism, the notion of "consensus" is not always helpful.[59]

One book that clearly illustrates the problems associated with French fascism and analyzes its historiographical treatment is Brian Jenkins' *France in the Era of Fascism* of 2004 which includes seminal essays by six of the leading scholars in the field. For Jenkins, France's proverbial immunity to fascism, which Michel Dobry termed "the immunity thesis", rested on a French version of exceptionalism that was first exploded by Robert Paxton and Zeev Sternhell, two historians from America and Israel respectively, countries with their own grandiose exceptionalisms.[60] There is a growing recognition by scholars, including those included in Jenkins' study, that France encountered fairly similar interwar problems as those often cited to explain the success of Italian fascism and German Nazism. One must admit "that France was implicated in developmental processes that transcended national frontiers, and that in such a context the rather parochial distinction between indigenous (rooted, authentic) ideologies and imported (alien, imitative) ones is artificial and misleading."[61] Recognizing that comparable interwar conditions existed throughout Western Europe does not make the problems of definition or assigning labels any simpler or less loaded, but it ought to short-circuit some of the exceptionalist rhetoric and the extreme versions of national uniqueness. Dobry and others argue for a more open-ended family of political ideologies and formations related to fascism, an almost kaleidoscopic array or distribution of associated ideas, influences, and trends which transcend or originate outside any single political type or category.[62] Questions about French fascism and whether Hervé ought to be described as a fascist are interesting, of course, but they must be seen in terms of this larger context.

One scholar working in the field of French fascism and included in Jenkins' collection of essays is Kevin Passmore, whose work has not concentrated on definitional issues. Not only does Passmore strongly reject the "immunity thesis", he argues that fascism cannot be viewed solely within a national context because pan-European

patterns and trends were obvious. While he seeks to downplay arguments about national uniqueness and exclusivity, Passmore stresses the social diversity and the internal divisions in France, both material and ideological, among the social groups upon which fascism and the extreme Right in general were based. Complexity and diversity characterized the clientele on the extreme Right which was also noted for being quite fragmented and ill-disciplined. Their alliances and strategies as well as the variable contexts in which they operated were critically important in understanding the various manifestations of the extreme French Right. For Passmore, fascism had both reactionary and revolutionary aspects which are often exaggerated by scholars who debate the topic. Thus, Passmore's definition of fascism could be described as "a kind of popular insurrection in the name of order."[63]

Not only did Passmore challenge the Marxist tendency to view the Right in terms of dominant class interests, he also argued that Rémond had oversimplified the situation by conceptualizing "three distinct and coherent ideological traditions or *mentalités*." In addition, Passmore challenged Stanley Hoffmann's arguments about the "stalemate society" by describing that concept as reductionist, tied to functionalist social science, and not particularly original or helpful in explaining developments in France. The so-called French "stalemate society" was supposedly a product of a broad social consensus among the less than "modern" French bourgeoisie, "traditional" small producers, and peasantry. For Hoffmann, the resulting "stalemate" delayed modernization and produced a dysfunctional system that prevented adequate responses to the Depression and the rise of Nazism.[64] The "stalemate society thesis", in Passmore's view, echoed assumptions and prejudices found throughout the history of the Third Republic, and represented "an academic synthesis of criticisms of the republican system current in the interwar years in the mainstream and the Leagues as well as the 'dissidents.'"[65] The "stalemate society" thesis involved not only unverifiable teleological assumptions, it was later even employed to support "the argument that interwar France was unpropitious terrain for the development of fascism."[66] Even historians like Zeev Sternhell, who early on challenged the orthodox view about France's supposed immunity to fascism, borrowed heavily from the "stalemate society" thesis.[67] In fact, during the interwar era there was no single viewpoint regarding the social and political institutions of the Third Republic. There were strong forces in France at that time which favored authoritarianism of various types, and fascism was one of the possibilities.[68] Hervé and his less than dynamic interwar formations must be included among those trends. The former *Sans Patrie* and his interwar formations certainly embodied or subscribed to some of the assumptions of what would later be called the "stalemate society thesis."

For Passmore, the French immunity thesis rests on circular reasoning and contradictory methodological assumptions. For example, France was supposedly spared fascism due to its strong democratic tradition, yet France between the wars was characterized by antiparliamentary and anti-democratic trends which were "dangerous for the institutions of the Republic." "Under the pretense of asking the question 'Was there a significant French fascism?' it is often asking a quite different question, namely: What are the historical explanations for the absence of a significant French fascism? Or even, dare we suggest, 'Why was it historically impossible for fascism to make significant headway in France'? The original question is thus entirely prejudged, and these 'explanations' (France was an old democracy, was victorious in the Great War, did not suffer badly in the Depression, was less fearful of social revolution) are then presented as if they were 'evidence' (rather like using a character reference as 'proof' that someone did not commit a murder)." French historians also use Germany and Italy as examples of fascism, thereby creating a definition of fascism that almost automatically excludes France. To return to Paxton's arguments, one could say that by forgetting the stages, one can conclude that France never reached an ultimate or true fascism.[69]

Several years ago Michel Winock responded to Michel Dobry's 2004 *Le Myth de l'allergie française au fascisme* and Robert Soucy's *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933–1939*, which accused the so-called "consensus historians" of dismissing the importance of fascism in France before World War II. Although Winock admitted that France was indeed penetrated by fascism, in certain circles, especially among some intellectuals, and that there were several prominent French imitators of fascism like Valois, Déat, Doriot, Bucard, Jean Renaud, Henri Dorgères, Pozzo di Borgo, and perhaps François Coty, Winock described that penetration in terms of limits. French fascism was a "marginal phenomenon" and "not a powerful reality." While admitting that the question of French fascism revolves around the possible fascism of Colonel de La Rocque's Croix-de-Feu/Parti Social Français, Winock reiterated his longstanding view that La Rocque was not a fascist but was the leader of France's first mass party on the Right. Using evidence from the La Rocque archives, the contemporary press, numerous witnesses, and published works, Winock could not change his mind about the *Croix-de-Feu/Parti Social Français*. His continuing problems with calling La Rocque a fascist revolve around the definition of fascism which he claims has been so expanded by Soucy and Dobry as to become a catch-all term for all manner of reactionary movements and regimes. If anticommunism, antiparliamentarianism, antiliberalism, paramilitary formations, and authoritarian regimes define fascism, then everyone agrees that France had important fascist groups including La Rocque and the Croix-de-Feu/

Parti Social Français. Winock chose to employ Emilio Gentile's definition which included the idea of totalitarianism to which Winock added the terms revolutionary and the desire to create a new man, though he did not forget the reactionary elements. For Winock, La Rocque was Republican, authoritarian, moderate, and in some ways parallel to de Gaulle.[70]

Soucy and Sternhell began their arguments in the late 1970s with rival interpretations of the career of Maurice Barrès. Both men agreed that France had indigenous fascism but they disagreed regarding its origins, nature, and clientèle.[71] For years the two men disagreed about the nature of La Rocque's *Croix-de-Feu/P.S.F.* because that *ligue* and party failed to fit Sternhell's conception of fascism. In recent years the two scholars have reached a partial meeting of the minds, so that now they regard both La Rocque's *Croix-de-Feu/P.S.F.* and Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français/P.P.F.* as fascist. With that agreement, according to Charles Sowerwine, the essential social connection was made between the ideological mix of the anti-Dreyfusards and that of the Vichy regime. The arguments of Sternhell and Soucy now seemed to reinforce those "of the French historian Pascal Ory: the common assumptions Vichy supporters shared and the circumstances in which they found themselves pushed them close, if not to fascism, at least to a para- or proto-fascism derived from anti-Dreyfusard ideas. These assumptions included absolute loyalty to the leader, subordination of the individual to the nation, anti-materialism, anti-Communism and an exclusionary definition of the nation, usually anti-Semitism or at least hatred of some 'other'." The Vichy National Revolution had to be seen in relation to "the development of 'antiliberal, antidemocratic, and anti-Marxist [thought]' in the half century before the defeat of 1940."[72] Because Hervé's interwar ideas and formations parallel those of La Rocque in many ways and because he seemed to promote as well as foreshadow Pétain as well, the case of Hervé is pertinent to such debates.

Though Soucy and Sternhell now agree on many of the developments in France in that era, they still seem to have radically different conceptions of fascism. Research for this volume began with strong sympathies for Sternhell's argument, but the more that Hervé's interwar formations were studied, it became increasingly clear that Soucy's ideas about the essentially right-wing nature of fascism best fit Hervé's interwar P.S.N. and M.S.N. which could certainly be called variants of French fascism. The portrait that Sternhell painted of Hervé in his earlier volumes was a caricature of a man who is, in fact, not easily pigeonholed. However, there is clearly a salient point in Sternhell's argument about fascism that cannot be finessed.[73] On both ends of the political spectrum, Hervé

betrayed an idealism and an anti-materialism that transcended traditional political dichotomies.

Sternhell was probably the first prominent scholar who used the fascinating case of Hervé, in some ways comparable to the shifts of other prominent men of the Left, to verify a considerable affinity between the political extremes.[74] However, French fascist leaders arising from the extreme Left never took power, even if some did join Vichy or support the Nazis more directly. In fact, ideas about the presumed "revolutionary" nature of fascism, the "immunity thesis," and the "consensus school" do not line up consistently, far from it. Critics of the "immunity thesis" like Soucy and Irvine certainly reject the notion that fascism was somehow revolutionary.[75] Another critic of the immunity thesis, Robert Paxton,[76] despite including a first stage in his "five stages of fascism thesis" which took seriously the radical antibourgeois and anticapitalist ideas and rhetoric of early fascist movements, was still highly skeptical about the eventual revolutionary nature and the supposed "modernism" of fascism. Paxton certainly rejected any idea that France's exceptional history inoculated it against the affliction of fascism.[77] Soucy, Irvine, and Paxton generally dismiss both the revolutionary nature and the importance of left-wing support for fascism. These scholars have developed a virtual "neo-traditionalist" interpretation, harkening back to Marxist arguments[78] during the interwar era and more recent scholars like John Weiss[79] and Arno J. Mayer[80], because they describe fascism as anti-modern, counter-revolutionary, or right-wing extremism. This interpretation assumes that fascists are able to channel the anger of threatened conservative groups and classes in order to support traditional elites and the status quo.

How one defines fascism is obviously critical in determining who is labeled fascist. A few years ago Dietrich Orlow revisited many of the issues and conundrums surrounding the study of fascism. For Orlow the debates about nearly all aspects of fascism continue because there has been such difficulty in "agreeing on an all-encompassing definition of the phenomenon." István Déak cogently summarized the problem. "[The] day still seems far off [when] someone will … formulate a universally acceptable definition of fascism."[81] The problem of definition also prompted the famous quip from Walter Laqueur who was certain that a fascist "essence" exists, but he admitted that it is indefinable. Fascism, for Laqueur, "resembles pornography in that it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to define in an operational, legally valid way, but those with experience know it when they see it."[82] Another insightful comment on the same issue came decades ago from Gilbert Allardyce who realized that: "Through an escalation of ideological concepts fascism became identified with Nazism, Nazism became identified

with totalitarianism, and totalitarianism became identified with terror and concentration camps. Put more directly: fascism equaled mass murder."[83] Obviously, such an escalation of demonization does not lead to much clarity or objectivity. Another long-forgotten heuristic point can be found in Eugen Weber's seminal 1964 study *Varieties of Fascism* and some of his other works regarding the distinctions that could be drawn between what he called fascism and national socialism. The latter variety of fascism is characterized by greater racism, totalitarianism, and extremism. Such an insight helps to explain crucial differences among fascist movements as long as we keep in mind that the term national socialism can also be a mere label often employed by "ordinary" potentially fascist parties like Hervé's Parti Socialiste National (P.S.N.).[84]

If the debates have not ceased, the polemics may be fading, and some may think that a new consensus is not only possible but already present. However, there is still much disagreement regarding the supposed revolutionary nature of fascism and the so-called "leftist origins of fascism". Part of that debate is semantic: people simply differ on what revolution means. If we define revolution in Marxist terms, then fascism seems inherently counter-revolutionary. If revolution can be seen in more rhetorical or metaphorical terms, then the content of the revolution could vary considerably. Roger Eatwell argues that fascism had a truly revolutionary nature which distinguished it from conservative or reactionary forces and movements, but he admits that fascists stressed and interpreted revolution is various ways.[85] A violent mass movement sponsored or supported by threatened, angry, and fearful elite, middle class, or formerly conservative elements, could be seen as radical and even revolutionary to the extent that drastic changes such as war, terror, or genocide occurred or that traditional patterns were drastically altered. Even though most scholars reject the contention about the revolutionary nature of fascism, the young Raymond Aron once described totalitarian regimes as "'authentically revolutionary' while 'the democracies are essentially conservative.'"[86]

For Robert J. Soucy, fascism cannot be described as revolutionary in any usual sense of the term. For years, critics of Sternhell like Soucy did not question either the reality or the importance of French fascism, but they never doubted that it was essentially a right-wing phenomenon. Soucy convincingly argued that fascism failed to attain power in France not because of any inherent immunity but because France differed from Italy and Germany in several important ways.[87] In his studies on the "Two Waves" of French fascism, Soucy dismissed the importance of leftist leaders, militants, and their proletarian followers who became fascists by explaining their motives in terms of personal grievances, monetary reward, job

prospects, thwarted ambition, opportunism, and political ignorance.[88] For Soucy, "the ideologies of France's largest fascist movements were not revisions of Marxism but revisions of conservatism."[89] Like those scholars who most vehemently reject the term "revolutionary" as it has been applied to fascism, Soucy documents the conservative, regressive, threatened, and traditional elements, especially middle class elements, which joined fascist groups.[90] Rather than proving that fascism originated on the Left, many scholars seem to assume that dramatic shifts in perspective, such as Hervé's, prove only the insincerity of such *transfuges* who must have always been "closet fascists." In order to maintain the dualistic notions of the political spectrum, some scholars fastidiously police the boundary between the Left and the Right. This enables them to claim or imply that leftist leaders who appeared to shift dramatically were never true socialists, much less Marxists.

If "consensus historians" tend to exclude conservatism from their definition, thereby creating a circular argument which underscores the limited appeal of French fascism according to Soucy, one could argue that "neo-traditionalists" employ their own circular argument by defining fascism as "a more dynamic form of conservatism" or "a new variety of conservatism and right-wing nationalism."[91] Since problems in assessing fascist strength and assigning the fascist label originate with the question of definition, we seem to be right back where we started. If Sternhell was guilty of "artificially separating fascist ideology from fascism itself"[92] and initially neglecting the social reality of fascism, Soucy's studies on the "two waves" of French fascism attempted to remedy such deficiencies by stressing social history, "especially the relation between fascist ideology and its major financial backers and political constituencies." While Soucy admitted that "some former leftists went over to fascism in the interwar period," such anomalies are easily dismissed as "small in number and renegades from socialism."[93] Without relinquishing either the excellent research of Soucy or the provocative insights of Sternhell, a "new consensus" demands a bridging of whatever remains of the gap between these two scholars. If we admit that fascist movements needed conservative allies and supporters if they hoped to attain power, why should we minimize the critical role played by revolutionary elements in the origins and evolutions of many fascist movements? The political spectrum and its binary terminology hinder an accurate assessment of complex hybrid movements like fascism which often included an amalgam of disparate and contradictory elements. One of Sternhell's books on French fascism was misleadingly titled *Ni droite Ni gauche*, yet fascism seems to have been both Right and Left. As Roland N. Stromberg succinctly noted long ago, fascism, like post-war Gaullism, included traditional and conservative elements as well as elements "restlessly oriented toward change."[94] Echoing that

insight, Samuel Kalman's recent studies of the extreme Right in interwar France may not solve the definitional conundrum, but by uncovering multiple strands of traditional, modernist, conservative, reactionary, technocratic, radical, and fascist elements among various manifestations on the extreme French Right, the author seems to have cut at least part of that Gordian knot.[95]

If scholars have been looking for a new consensus for quite some time, most of them either failed to mention Hervé or did not seem particularly interested in his interwar formations, for some obvious reasons. One scholar who offered a remedy for what he called "the days of ritual breast-beating about the unresolved fascist conundrum" as well as the "repeated jeremiads about its intrinsic resistance to definition, so common only a decade ago, [which] now seems strangely archaic," was Roger Griffin.[96] That remedy amounted to a definition of fascism as "a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism".[97] For Griffin fascist ideology had three core components: "(1) the rebirth myth, (2) populist ultra-nationalism and (3) the myth of decadence".[98] He described fascism as "a genuinely revolutionary, trans-class form of anti-liberal, and in the last analysis, anti-conservative nationalism" built on a complex range of theoretical and cultural influences. During the inter war era an elite-led but populist "armed party" opposed socialism and liberalism by means of radical politics which sought to rescue the nation from decadence.[99] For some time Griffin has argued that a "new consensus" was emerging regarding "generic fascism" or a "fascist minimum". His "new consensus" definition is described as an heuristic, Weberian, and ideology centered "ideal type". This "new consensus" separated essential features (heterogeneity, core myth of perceived decadence and degeneracy which sooner or later were to give way to rebirth and rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order) from accidental ones (World War I, a fascist era, the Depression, a mass movement, the imminence of national rebirth, war and military values, and populism).[100] Although Griffin recognized that his hopes may have been premature, he believed that his generic definition of fascism as "palingenetic ultra-nationalism" was becoming increasingly recognized by scholars if not generally through the use of such an awkward phrase.[101]

Rather than viewing Hervé's career itself as a worthy topic of inquiry, most studies of fascism neglected him. Whenever he was mentioned, it was often simply to lend support in the debate about the reactionary or revolutionary nature of fascism. Historians who see fascism essentially as an extreme right-wing phenomenon assume that Hervé's approach to fascism resulted from an obvious shift to the Right; those who stress the leftist components of fascism assume that there were important characteristics in Hervé's socialism which predisposed him

to move in the direction of fascism. Since both interpretations provide valuable insights concerning Hervé's shift, the political calculus used to discuss French fascism even today often seems quite paradoxical. Because fascism was a complex, eclectic, and often contradictory political phenomenon which entailed a synthesis of concepts from varied sources, it is not surprising that scholars hold conflicting views about its origins, nature, and meaning.[102] A closer look at Hervé's career may help to resolve these issues.

Hervé began his political career on the revolutionary Left, but his Insurrectional phase was ambiguous, romantic, and often seemed to promote "revolution for the sake of revolution" even if Hervé himself was often less extreme than his youthful antimilitarist followers. During the interwar era Hervé's militant right-wing formations openly admired fascist unity and dynamism, and this has been cited as evidence of his fascism. Nevertheless, Hervé was troubled by fascist excesses and violence, and he abhorred Nazi anti-Semitism and its assaults on religion. As Hervé increasingly praised fascism in the interwar era, his own formations seemed unable to emulate fascist dynamism. Despite Marcel Bucard's ten-month affiliation beginning in November 1932 and some evidence of blatant anti-Semitism among supporters of *La Victoire* later in the 1930s, Hervé's interwar formations often appeared moderate compared to other French and foreign extremists on the Right. To the extent they opposed all forms of violence except in self-defense, sought political change through accepted channels, respected Republican legality, supported the League of Nations (however skeptically and episodically), called for world peace by means of a United States of Europe, hoped to maintain the social status quo, and were ardent in their support of traditional religion, Hervé's interwar formations included few of those essential characteristics of fascism described by Stanley G. Payne. Despite the ominous sounding names which he attached to his national socialist creations, Hervé's interwar formations could be described in terms of "conservative authoritarian nationalism," the most right-wing face of Payne's "three faces of authoritarian nationalism," rather than the "radical right" or fascism.[103]

Most historians who considered Hervé's interwar activities have been content to describe them in terms of the traditional authoritarian Right. Michel Winock never even mentioned the term fascism in his brief account of Hervé's shift from a revolutionary to a nationalist faith.[104] French scholars such as Catherine Grünblatt,[105] Alain Deniel,[106] and Jean-Jacques Becker, undoubtedly influenced by Rémond's arguments, described Hervé's interwar political formations in terms of clerical Neo-Bonapartism or authoritarian Christian nationalism.[107] For Becker, Hervé's national socialism represented a total rejection of his pre-war ideas, and

it strongly resembled a kind of clerical Neo-Bonapartism rather than a form of French fascism.[108] Of course, claiming that Hervé's interwar formations were Neo-Bonapartist rather than fascist leads to crucial questions which Soucy and Irvine have legitimately raised concerning the relationship between Bonapartism and fascism. If the distinction between Bonapartism and fascism revolves around the traditionalism or conservatism of Bonapartism versus the radicalism of fascism, such a differentiation is not universally accepted.[109] Since fascism is nearly impossible to define or to distinguish from Bonapartism, how can we expect to clarify Hervé's interwar politics with such categories? One wonders whether Soucy's term "republican fascism" helps to resolve these issues or simply adds another paradox to the confusion. Though this volume on Hervé will not resolve all the issues raised above, it should add something to the debates.

Although this introduction has stressed problems associated with French fascism along with many questions dealing with political transformations and the so-called convergences of the political extremes, because such issues help to illuminate the career of Hervé, this volume explores many other associated themes and fascinating episodes which further elucidate his complex political trajectory. This study certainly tries to review some of the most prominent events and personalities of the Third Republic from an altered perspective, but it also deals with several intriguing affairs which usually do not make it into French history texts. This political biography of Hervé also seeks to help the reader better understand the history of France under the Third Republic and Vichy. Though that history is generally well-known, it is hoped that the aspects emphasized here are novel, interesting, and insightful at times.

Two decades ago Tim Mason wondered "whatever happened to fascism?" because the analysis of a generic fascism seemed to have become submerged "by an avalanche of specialized studies that threatened to bury the study of fascism from a generic and comparative perspective."[110] In addition, fascism seemed to be fading in importance as an existential problem because the E.U. appeared to be leading Europeans toward a postmodern identity even while the studies of specific examples of fascism proliferated. Then something unexpected happened. Economic problems, changing demographic patterns, multiculturalism, Islamism (or Islamo-Fascism?), and the War on Terror helped to regenerate the latent forces of right-wing nationalist and xenophobic movements and parties, a trend which seems to demand another look at fascism. Perhaps examining Hervé's political trajectory during the Third Republic can help us refresh our memories, reconsider our current situation, and ponder our future.



Figure 1. Gustave Hervé (1871–1944) and *La Guerre Sociale*. Look & Learn.

1

"Un Breton de Bretagne Bretonnante"[1]

The Breton writer Ernest Renan, a former religious student and author of the iconoclastic *Vie de Jésus*, defined the limits and limitlessness of Breton consciousness in his memoirs in this way. "My race, my family, my native town, the particular milieu where I grew up, closing me off from all bourgeois goals and rendering me absolutely useless for all that did not involve a pure commitment to things of the spirit, made of me an idealist, closed to all the rest."[2] Renan's insight about the Breton character with its mixture of Celtic and French Catholic cultures became an underlying theme and the point of departure in Michael Roger Scher's unpublished 1972 account of young Gustave Hervé.[3] If Renan's idealism led his scholastically trained mind, logically but with great difficulty, to doubt the truths of an all embracing Christianity,[4] Hervé seemed to slide, as he matured, from the all embracing faith of his childhood to religious agnosticism, if not complete atheism, and a rather eclectic socialism before his infamous *rectification* after 1910, his gradual shift toward a French national socialism by 1916, and an even more gradual reconversion to Catholicism in the mid-1930s. Certainly, Hervé's transformations were not without tensions, ambiguity, and apparent contradictions.

Hervé's career and his Breton roots were described and connected in the *Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement Ouvrier Français* by characterizing him as *un Breton de Bretagne bretonnante*.[5] "If obstinacy and stubbornness are truly

the characteristic traits of a Breton, the ardor that G. Hervé applied to conquer a social position and the exclusive and excessive passion with which he held and defended his convictions, made him a typical representative of his province."[6] Even though André Siegfried's categories and assumptions have come in for much critical comment in recent decades, they may provide some clues regarding how the Bretons saw themselves. For Siegfried, the Bretons remained unconquered since they had never submitted to their masters or superiors whether they were nobles, priests, or the French state. "Under the appearance of feudal hierarchy and clericalism, *Bretagne bretonnante* is essentially egalitarian and almost everywhere (except for Léon) anticlerical. Although Bretons perpetually demand the support of the central government, they have a rather limited notion of what the modern state implies."[7] Many things which were imposed from the outside remained external to Bretons according to Siegfried. Thus, social discipline remained largely a veneer which was neither internalized nor fully accepted. The same held true for Christianity which barely covered up an ever present paganism. Even more than the typical Frenchman, the Breton misinterpreted and reacted against centralized government organization. Siegfried characterized the Bretons in general as idealistic, yet they were often lacking in subtlety and nuance, changeable and given to extremes yet quite sincere and passionate, selfless in collective pursuits, yet highly individualistic and so without discipline that they constantly verged on anarchy. "Freed from external discipline that [they] … submit to without accepting, one truly must ask oneself whether this race has the balance necessary for living."[8]

Despite such general traits, Siegfried did not fail to speak of nuances within the stereotype. He noted that there were four major Breton dialects corresponding to four distinct political, religious, and psychological temperaments. For Siegfried these temperaments correspond in politics to the four main geographical/cultural divisions of the Armorican Peninsula.[9] Though he argued that Celts in general did not freely consent to social discipline, Siegfried was able to focus his characterizations to particular Breton locales and occupations.

> "Other races have an innate sense of public interest. [The Breton] …, left without a guide, gravitates toward anarchy. This is true of all Bretons but especially the fishermen. They respect sanctions, fear the gendarmes, and obey the government officials who know how to make themselves feared. But the idea of law escapes them. They always remain a bit like pirates, not wanting to admit that the sea could have laws. They consider it as an immense empire of fantasy where the social order does not exist, where the individual does what he wishes, without anyone able to call him to account. If the State slackens its surveillance or loses the authority which causes the laws to be respected, this is a milieu which, in itself,

> does not possess the ability to discipline itself. Political life in maritime Brittany oscillates between these two poles: the tendency of Celtic anarchic individualism and the discipline imposed by the French State."

When they accept State service and discipline, Celts may becomes great heroes, excellent soldiers, and dedicated functionaries, but "no one, in effect, is more revolutionary, more anarchic, than an emancipated Breton!"[10]

Francis Jourdain, an artist, furniture designer, writer, and activist within pre-World War I Parisian avant-garde circles, opened his reminiscences by admitting that an anarchist type did not exist simply because "no one is exactly like anybody else."[11] Jourdain could not explain the shift of the *Sans Patrie* in terms of an anarchic Breton temperament, but that did not mean that he failed to employ a related argument. Having little contact with Hervé before his shift, Jourdain could not explain that volte-face in any detailed fashion, and, in fact, he had failed to concern himself much with Hervé's political evolution because:

> "the man was not of such quality that one paid much attention to his changes in temperature. The only worthy qualities able to be ascribed to him (incorrectly, as one would soon see), were the qualities that people ascribe to all Bretons without distinction: tenacity, the patience to plow a furrow completely, and once finished, never to let any difficulty become disheartening. Hervé, himself, never remained at the handle of the plow, that I saw him pull. He was not very intelligent, but one was almost glad of his limitations due to what one believed could be expected from a limited and continuous effort."[12]

If Renan's insights and other more general notions about the Breton character cannot be dismissed in examining the career of Gustave Hervé, neither can Jourdain's more limited version as well as his disclaimer concerning character types. Hervé's determination and "lifelong search for truth" seem to fit the "Breton character" as described here, but there was always something singular about the man. Renan's idealism, unlike Hervé's, remained skeptical and critical throughout his life. Despite his rhetorical and polemical gifts as well as what Gilles Heuré, Hervé's biographer, called his shrewd political sense, Hervé seemed to demand an unambiguous truth around which his views could be grounded and structured.

Whenever Hervé evoked his Breton childhood, it was never done fortuitously according to Heuré. In interviews and reminiscences in 1908, 1913, and 1935, his Breton origins were often summoned at just the right moment in order to support his current position or to palliate the severity of his latest political shift. In 1908 his early years were recalled to verify his revolutionary credentials as well as to soften his violent image. In 1913 at the French socialist congress held in Brest, the former Insurrectional socialist, who had shifted tactically so often

after 1910, now sought local and national support for his current diplomatic solution to the Alsace-Lorraine dispute by recalling his Breton roots. In 1935 the Christian national socialist and authoritarian Hervé finessed the question of his political reversal by implying a natural evolution centered on a unifying personality which bridged the half century between his youth and old age. If we must beware of Hervé's use of the trope of Breton roots, Heuré himself demonstrated how "many of the components of the political and intellectual performance of Gustave Hervé [from 1899 until his death in 1944] … are located in the period that stretched from his early infancy to the threshold of his adulthood."[13] In considering the impact of Hervé's heritage, one is struck by the multiple yet shifting jurisdictions which channeled his experience before the age of 20. His ancestry and family, the Catholic Church, the port of Brest, the department of Finistère, the region of Brittany, the city of Paris, the Republican educational establishment, and the French nation, separately or in combination, molded and differentiated the values, character, and temperament of Hervé. If Hervé's life was a kind of prism which filtered multiple yet shifting elements, should we assume, as Scher apparently did, that he was saturated indelibly by a Breton Christian coloring? Caution is demanded when dealing with imprecise themes such as political temperament, regional identity, religious influence, and national character, but can we avoid them?

Some have argued that the very notion of Breton Christianity itself contains a certain ambiguity. Despite Brittany's traditional association with fanatical Catholicism, its rural population was considered by the Church as late as the seventeenth century to have been quite "ignorant of the rites and doctrines of the Catholic religion."[14] Popular religious practices and beliefs of Celtic origin were still being grafted onto the main stem of official Roman Catholicism well after the Medieval era. In his travels through Finistère after the French Revolution, Jacques Cambry described how "religion has guided man in this region even more than in the rest of the country. The theocratic government of the Druids, the millions of spirits that inhabit the elements, the power of wise men over nature, all the dreams of the otherworldly, the cult of trees, of fountains, were not destroyed at all by the apostles of Catholicism."[15] A more recent witness, the Breton native and "pioneer in the field of religious sociology", Gabriel Le Bras, analyzed the Breton religious complexity in this way. "To speak of the traditional faith of the Bretons is to simplify excessively the historical realities" because "there has always been in Brittany a coexistence of primitive beliefs …" and "… orthodox Catholicism."[16]

Throughout the nineteenth century Brittany was generally characterized as a predominantly rural, poor, uncivilized, culturally backward, anti-republican,

and economically underdeveloped region, isolated from markets by distance and impassable roads, where an uncouth peasantry was dominated by the reactionary views of local clergy and nobility. Brittany even included areas where the French language had barely penetrated, regions from which several of Hervé's immediate ancestors originated. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Breton language and Brittany's regional culture, latently associated since the Revolution with federalism, clericalism, religious fanaticism, and counterrevolution, were being attacked by the Third Republic in the name of progress, national unity, and republican values.[17] Despite its description as a "supreme fortress of the *ancien régime*," there remained "in the Breton soul an ancient penchant which was fundamentally egalitarian and republican."[18] In contrast to the French speaking areas of Eastern Brittany, which remained stationary politically from 1876 until 1910, *Bretagne bretonnante* was changing markedly in a democratic direction. There were many other areas just outside Brittany, such as Normandy and Anjou, which could be described politically as conservative or feudal respectively in this era, but not most of the regions of Western Brittany.[19]

Although Brittany, as a whole, could certainly be distinguished from the rest of France due to its late agricultural revolution around 1850,[20] its unique demographic patterns, and its distance from major markets, the region had changed much since 1789 and was well integrated into the national economic system by the time Hervé was coming to maturity. By the beginning of the twentieth century, assessments of Breton backwardness were belied by trends toward agricultural specialization and commercialization, growing land clearance and changing tenures, gradually increasing crop yields, the coming of the first railroads in the 1860s, new domestic and foreign markets, the growing importance of individual peasant proprietors in certain regions,[21] changing political orientations, a syndicalist movement which increasingly mirrored most national trends,[22] the declining position of the nobility, as well as efforts by some local clergy to challenge the Church hierarchy and noble elite, accept the republican system, and yet mediate regional interests.[23] Population pressures, increased competition from abroad, a declining local textile industry, increasing emigration after 1850,[24] and assaults by a threatened Republic against the Breton heritage certainly meant that Brittany at the turn of the century experienced many crosscurrents in its increasing integration into the French nation. Hervé may have been unaware of and only indirectly affected by such trends and forces, but such changing patterns must be set alongside the more legendary aspects of the Breton heritage to better situate Hervé's early experiences. Andre Siegfried himself has stressed how one must be careful in using stereotypes and generalizations when analyzing Brittany.[25]

It has often been assumed that following the French Revolution religious authorities and landed nobility in various "backward", rural departments so controlled peasant populations that they prevented the development of national and republican loyalties and values. "Brittany has been characterized as a region dominated by large landed estates and an intransigent aristocracy whose social and economic supremacy remained virtually unchanged in rural society until the beginning of the twentieth century. However, in the department of Finistère, where most of Hervé's ancestors originated, "only a handful of communes consisted of large landed farms in the nineteenth century."[26] The baneful influence of the Church was changing rapidly as the local clergy in certain areas separated not only from the aristocracy but from their own hierarchy.

Hervé was not simply Breton by birth; he was a native of the port of Brest in the department of Finistère, *Pen Ar Bed* ("end of the earth"), which lay at the extreme western tip of the French hexagon. The formation of new administrative units like Finistère in 1790–1791 during the French Revolution was meant to help efface the vestiges of the Ancien Regime.[27] In the early nineteenth century, Finistère, like the other two departments comprising Lower Brittany, was characterized by poverty, low life expectancies, an inferior diet, the short stature of the citizens, and higher illiteracy rates than most of the rest of France. "From 1825 to 1832 Finistère had the lowest life expectancy in continental France (29 years), and Morbihan and Côtes-du-Nord [the two other Breton speaking departments] were not far behind with life expectancies of 32 and 33 years, respectively."[28] Demographically, Brittany was an anomaly from the nineteenth into the early twentieth century.[29] In the nineteenth century Finistère's population grew so rapidly that it became one of the most densely populated departments in France, yet it was one of the least urbanized. Nearly three-fourths of the department's population was still rural in 1901. The large families of Finistère and much of Brittany were no longer typical of rural France in general, but family size was partially offset by high mortality rates and low life expectancy. Since it lacked significant immigration and whatever newcomers it received failed to keep pace with growing Breton emigration after 1850, the population growth of Finistère is undoubtedly connected to the department's relatively high birth rate. The elevated birthrates were coupled with high death rates due to contaminated water and infectious diseases.[30] Demographic takeoff in Finistère's was a double-edged sword according to Catherine Ford because it "both stimulated agricultural development and aggravated social conflict."[31] One can certainly argue that the characteristics that set Brittany apart were much more pronounced in Finistère. Yet even within that department there were marked differences in political temperament, historical development, and economic structures.[32]

As a Breton from the department of Finistère, Hervé's experience was not necessarily typical of the region because his native city, the great port of Brest, was unique in many respects. It was urban, industrial, proletarian, republican, and dominated by the French state, especially its naval administration. Most cities in *Bretagne bretonnante* were local centers due to geographical factors and the attraction of the sea. Brest and Lorient were unique in their importance basically due to the external intervention of the French State. These were French as well as Breton cities.

> "It was for reason of state that they [Brest and Lorient] were created; they were located there, with their forts and arsenals, to situate the maritime power of France at the end of the Breton peninsula. By their origin, their purpose, and their conception, which created them at the edge of the continent, they are French cities. But they are also Breton cities: they are Breton in their population of workers and sailors, recruited almost exclusively from the surrounding areas; they are also Breton due to the atmosphere which covers, penetrates, and marks them with its color. From that, [there existed] an immediate contact, which nothing cushions, between the French State—with its heavy and formidable administrative organization—and the Armorican civilization—with everything which is amorphous, eccentric, and elusive. On one side there is the heavy and uniform discipline of a centralized and modern government. On the other side, the indisciplined individualism of a people who are the least hierarchical as could be."[33]

Brest was created "especially by the central and distant government" and became a military rather than a commercial city, and that underscores its uniqueness and rather artificial nature.[34] Such a situation helps to explain the nearly complete absence of brakes upon its internal social struggles. "Brest was like an immovable functionary who ran no risk of being revoked." It had little economic influence on the surrounding countryside, and its growing socialist nature would only influence those points where proletarian stirrings were becoming possible in other Breton cities. Without the presence of these arsenal workers, the jealous Breton individualism rendered patriarchal by history could not have changed into a spirit of protest against the current social discipline and established hierarchies. "From this, one gets the painful impression of incorrigible eccentricity and, one must say, irremediable political disequilibrium as the final summation of this democracy in Brest."[35] From the time of Richelieu and Colbert, three centuries of military presence in ports like Brest transformed Brittany economically, socially, and politically because the military port and arsenal had attracted rural Bretons who had become dependent on the military apparatus for funds, jobs, and social discipline. Yet, the unusual concentration of newly arrived peasants, who soon became French speaking workers, politicized and radicalized the newcomers who soon mirrored the social and economic aspirations of French workers elsewhere.

In Brest the middle class seemed almost absent at first glance. The most important social groups were the military and the arsenal workers. The military hierarchy faced a mass of five to six thousand perpetually recalcitrant arsenal workers. Up until 1904, when socialists won over the city, the generally turbulent workers were largely indifferent to politics and were led by Radical or moderate parties and their bourgeois officials. The agitation arising from the Dreyfus Affair and the founding of a popular university in 1899 helped to awaken Brest's generally amorphous workers. Until 1902 the city's abstentionist rate in elections was 50%; in 1885 it had reached 71%. In fact, Siegfried characterized the workers of Brest as largely apolitical and exhibiting a natural, rather than ideological, anarchist temperament as opposed to a socialist or Marxist militancy. The edge of the city and its urban suburbs was starkly different from rural Finistère. Naïve, cynical, eccentric, and quick to rebel yet easily swayed by superior force and determined authority; such was Siegfried's description of Brest's workers.[36]

Brest, as the largest urban center in Finistère—tripling its population between 1821 and 1901—was also the most literate area in the department. In 1899 only the Breton island of Ouessant shared Brest's distinction of having no illiterate conscripts. Illiteracy rates from 10 to 30 percent were quite common in more rural cantons since knowledge of Breton was not considered truly literate by French national standards.[37] In 1871, the year of Hervé's birth, Finistère voted solidly for the conservative and monarchist list during elections for the new national assembly, while Brest voted overwhelmingly (80 and 91 percent in the election and a supplementary runoff) for the republican list led by Léon Gambetta and Jules Favre.[38] The reasons for such a discrepancy lay in the anomalous nature of Brest within the Breton region. Brest historian Georges-Michel Thomas described late nineteenth century Brest as *Brest la Rouge* due to working class suffering, strikes, and confrontations with the authorities throughout the last half of the nineteenth century. In 1871 the arsenal workers were in the process of organizing a *Comité républicain* which soon developed ties to the *Union républicaine* founded in 1872. As early as September 1869 a Brest native named Constant Le Doré organized a section of the First International. On October 1, 1870, six months before the Paris Commune, he instigated a stillborn uprising taking advantage of the turmoil caused by the presence of almost 180 American *Voluntaires de la Liberté* who had arrived to fight the Prussians that very day from New York. This bizarre episode was sometimes referred to locally as "The Commune of Brest." A generation earlier Brest had received 1000–1200 prisoners from the Revolution of 1848. From May 1871 until June 1872 it temporarily housed some 12,000 insurgents from the Paris Commune under deplorable conditions in batteries at the docks

and on prison ships before their embarcations to Algerian and Nouméan prisons. After being amnestied, many of the prisoners returned to France by way of Brest during 1879–80.[39] Before and after the Commune, the city had been the home of the socialist and Neo-Malthusian Paul Robin, who had once been a student and tutor at the Lycée of Brest. Before the Commune, Robin helped renew the International section in Brest after Le Doré's abortive uprising, but Robin soon emigrated to England where he was received by Marx as a brother before becoming an enemy.[40] The influence of Robin's Neo-Malthusianism on Hervé can be documented.

The Brest of Hervé's youth was a city of narrow, winding, and often steep streets, whose well-worn cobblestones glistened from the seasonally persistent moisture created by a marine climate and the mercurial sea. Rather than an idyllic seaside port, late nineteenth century Brest was a gray and drab naval center, especially in the areas bordering the working class districts and military arsenal. "The workers of yesteryear, who strolled down la Grand Rue or la Rue du Carpon at four in the morning during the summers 'with their mess tins …' worker's caps, and hobnailed *sabots* reverberating on the streets …, are no more." Even if such workers were anarchistic malcontents rather than committed socialists, their legacy of improved material conditions cannot be overrated according to Thomas.[41] Since the allied bombing destroyed more than 90 percent of Brest's structures during World War II, the present city with its straight, wide, and aerated streets, its quaint shops, bistros, pubs, and cafés, and its "appealing and bright facades" is far removed from the city of Hervé's youth.[42]

Poverty, scarcity, illegitimacy, and infectious disease were frequently the lot of Brest's workers in the nineteenth century. Like most European lower classes before the agricultural and transportation revolutions, Brest's workers could quickly experience dearth and death if poor weather occurred along with attendant harvest failures and epidemics. In 1847, following a drought the year before, a potato failure and grain crisis took place resulting in an increase of 326 deaths. An illegitimacy rate of 17 percent and an abandonment rate almost as high the same year were hardly surprising. If the 1848 Revolution had little effect on daily life in Brest, the subsistence crisis may not have abated because 506 people died in Brest during a cholera epidemic in 1849.[43] Cholera-Morbus was quite common in late nineteenth century Brest with major epidemics in 1849—550 dead, 1852—500 dead, 1866—477 dead and 2144 afflicted, 1885–86—37 dead, and 1893—322 dead. In November 1870 there was an outbreak of smallpox. Typhoid caused 142 deaths in 1876 and recurred in 1880 and 1887 when it was necessary to close the Naval Academy.[44] Such conditions directly affected Hervé's immediate

ancestors and must have troubled his own parents who lost two infants to more extended illnesses in the 1870s.

The city possessed a huge floating population of vagrants and itinerants, especially the sailors and soldiers whose comings and goings often responded to external events. In 1866 the population of Brest was 79,847 which included a floating population of 19,298: 5,505 in Brest proper and 13,793 across the Penfeld River in Recouvrance. In 1886 the floating population may have doubled even those extreme totals. Perhaps such demographic idiosyncrasies help to explain the series of infectious diseases that struck the city in the late nineteenth century. Periodic crop failures, scarcity, higher prices, malnutrition, and poor housing conditions in the late nineteenth century were hardly unique to Brest's working classes. Even middle class areas were described in austere terms. Many bourgeois families had "homes of one or two floors, with dark stairways, rooms which led into one another … and generally, without toilets. One got water at public fountains, cooked with charcoal, and used oil for lighting. Even candles had not disappeared.



Figure 2. The Port of Brest at the Penfeld River with the medieval Tour Tanguy to the left, Recouvrance behind it, and the Château de Brest to the right. (Library of Congress, Free Access)

At night, watchmen walked the streets, striking the ground with solid bludgeons, as they chanted the hours." The new century did not bring immediate relief. In 1910 a third of Brest's deaths were caused by tuberculosis which a local doctor attributed to an "insufficiency of food, overcrowded housing, famine salaries, and alcohol consumption which exacerbated everything." Into the early 1930s some apartments had only two to three rooms, no toilets, and gas for lighting. Refuse, including human waste, was still being thrown into the streets in 1931. No wonder epidemics continued to strike the city.[45]

Rather than residing in Brest proper, the Hervé family lived across the river to the west among the steep hills of the working class district of Recouvrance above the Marine Arsenal which set the rhythm for the city. If most of Brittany and nearly all of Finistère were dependent on agriculture, Brest was inextricably tied to the French navy. "Large scale industry in Brest … was linked to French naval activity, or [was] dependent on state contracts and capitalization."[46] It is ironic that the future leader of antipatriotism was born in Brest on January 3, 1871, at a time that the Breton population was anticipating a Prussian invasion. His place of birth in Recouvrance bordered the Brest's military arsenal, which employed five to six thousand workers since its founding in 1704. Compared to the agricultural hinterlands of Finistère and much of the rest of Brittany as well, Brest was a unique place. The city was largely created and subsidized by the French government which had long recognized Brest's potential as a harbor and shipbuilding center. As has been seen, the city's close ties to the French state meant that no important commercial or industrial middle class developed in Brest since its commerce and industry were monopolized by the Naval Arsenal which was closely directed from Paris. The lack of a vibrant middle class meant that Brest would not create a moderate Republican leadership which could offer Arsenal workers a viable Republican alternative to socialism.[47] The basically military character of the city isolated it from the surrounding countryside. According to Scher, "the absence of any middle class to buffer tensions between workers and naval officials made Brest a city of political and psychological extremes. The city, built primarily to support foreign adventures, was inflamed from within by an incessant social war which touched the lives of every resident."[48] The Recouvrance district of Brest was the largest and most influential proletarian area of the city. Nearly half of the active workers of the district worked at the arsenal which imposed its schedule on everyone. "The only industry, the sole factory towards which everyone turns, is the Arsenal," claimed André Siegfried in his important political geography of the region. "… To forget this for a single instant is to expose oneself to constantly misunderstand the strange psychology of its population, which was military by

purpose, anarchist by temperament."[49] A long history of workers' activism had often led to local revolts.[50]

Hervé's boyhood schoolmate, the anarchist writer and Breton advocate, Émile Masson,[51] described the people of Recouvrance in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as composed of:

> "coarse speaking men and women with eyes pale as the sky or blazon as the sun … [who] toiled in unhealthy factories, arid fields, miserable hovels, and tempest haunted ports. They labored for famine salaries … lived on narrow, crowded, putrid streets, in blackened buildings, [by] the deserted countryside, or near untamed tides … Oh! The winter Sundays, the nights after being paid, or the return of the fleet! The screams of pirates, the cries of small children, the curses of the wives of peasants, sailors, or day laborers. The fiery intensity, the blood! The fights among roughnecked soldiers, among drunkards; the din of the accordions coming from the taverns, the horrible whining of the Breton bagpipes through the gusts of wind …"[52]

A youth shared in Brest, years of friendship as aspiring teachers and then activist writers, and Hervé's support for the sickly Masson from 1909 to 1911 helped to preserve Masson's warmth for Hervé long after the antimilitarist "General" seemed to have rejected their shared social ideals. In fact, Hervé had long been one of Masson's contemporary heroes, those audacious Nietzschean individuals who supposedly create themselves and attain freedom and mastery in battle against chaos, social slavery, and lies. Though Hervé's shift in views upset Masson deeply, he remained attached to his memory long after the Breton firebrand seemed to walk away from him during the war.[53]

Although it was not unusual for families in Brest to have relatives in the French navy or working at the Naval Arsenal, it may be significant that the formative years of France's most infamous antipatriot were spent in the shadow of a military arsenal among a family with a military tradition.[54] Hervé certainly never forgot the military parades and naval reviews in the harbor experienced when he was a boy.[55] Arsenal workers, naval officers, seamen, as well as peasants and priests abounded among the Hervé clan as was typical of many families in Brest. In an interview in July 1935 with Charles Chassé, a reporter for *La Dépêche de Brest*, the former *Sans Patrie* proudly recalled the variegated Breton heritage of his family. "My entire genealogy is full of sailors and Breton peasants with, here and there, priests and other religious vocations. And also, some pirates! One of whom was killed on an English ship."[56] His mother's family had come to Brest from the nearby peasant district of Léon, one of the most clerical areas in all of Brittany. The department of Finistère, itself, was the Breton region which most

closely maintained an almost pure Celtic culture and a widespread use of the Breton language. Hervé's mother was the first generation of her family to have lived away from the countryside, and her family remained rooted in the peasant culture of Léon. His mother's family, Le Goualches, like many others of Brest, "determinedly retained and passed on their rural folk traditions." Families having recently arrived from the countryside often resisted assimilation to urban routines according to Scher. Though superficially submitting to the quasi-military discipline of Brest, peasants-turned-workers often gave up religious practice, as would Hervé's mother, yet they generally retained Christian morality. Cultural tensions might be as important as economic deprivation and social conflict in explaining the character of a military port like Brest set within a unique provincial region.[57]

Hervé's maternal grandfather, Jerome Le Goualch, came to Brest from the rural district of Léon near the city of Lesneven 15 miles northeast of Brest, where the family had lived for generations. In this region with few aristocrats and large numbers of medium and small proprietors, the population was the most traditional, submissive, unchangeable, and Catholic in all of Brittany. "All Bretons are religious; the Léonard, himself, is clerical. Léon is a theocracy."[58] With a hint of admitted exaggeration André Siegfried claimed that, "Except for Léon and part of the Vannetais, the majority of the Bretons are anticlerical."[59] After leaving Léon for Brest, Jerome became a tailor and a clothes cutter. Then he married Jeanne Riou, a twenty-four year old domestic originally from the small rural village of Saint-Servais near the port town of Morlaix, around 35 miles northeast of Brest. With such ancestors, it is not coincidental that Hervé would never exclude peasants from his socialist message and goals. Hervé's maternal grandparents had eight children, four of whom died at birth. Their oldest child was Anne Victorine, the future mother of Gustave Hervé. One of her brothers, Father Théotine, became a renowned preacher and eventually found his way as a missionary to Canada. One of Hervé's cousins became a missionary to Santa Domingo. So religious idealism and missionary vocations were part of Gustave Hervé's family heritage. Another of Anne's brothers, Victor Le Goualch, became an officer in the French navy. At the time of his daughter's marriage, Jerome Le Goualch was assigned the job of making naval as well as tricolor flags at the arsenal.[60] It is ironic that "*l'homme du drapeau dans le fumier*",[61] the notorious *Sans Patrie*, was the grandson "of a *pavillonneur*, that is to say, a maker of flags."[62] Given such religious and military connections among his ancestors, one could never predict Hervé's future. Nevertheless, the core of his values could hardly have been unaffected by such a background.

Hervé's paternal ancestors, the Guillemots and the Hervés, had, on the other hand, lived with the sea for centuries. His paternal grandfather, Mathias Hervé,

was a chief petty officer of great bravery, and at the time of his son's marriage into the Le Goualch family, he had been promoted to master sailor, a non-commissioned officer status. Mathias's father had been a skilled blacksmith and shipbuilding carpenter in the port of Lorient to the southeast in the Breton department of Morbihan. As a young man Mathias had been apprenticed to a sea captain and later was decorated with a military medal for his skill at trimming the sails. At the time of the French Socialist Congress in Brest in 1913, Hervé reminisced about his grandfather before a gathering of local socialists. "He [Mathias] was an old sailor, as we all have among our naval and colonial families, whose life, full of honor and abnegation, constantly recalls, even to the most antimilitarist among us, that neither the uniform of a soldier nor that of a sailor has ever prevented the development of certain private and civic virtues."[63] It seemed natural, then, that Mathias's sons would follow in his steps. Three sons became naval officers; two of them were decorated for their service. Hervé's father, Joseph, joined the navy even if he was scarcely tempted by sailing itself. Joseph has been described as a "gentle man" with bushy sideburns who loved nothing more than to settle into a café with a good pipe, a mug of cider, and close friends with whom he could swap stories. By the time of his marriage, Joseph Hervé had attained the position of quartermaster sergeant in the navy.[64]

Gustave Hervé's mother, Anne Victorine Le Goualch, only had a primary education, with no special skill or trade. Her situation was rather typical of rural Breton families and women at that time. His mother's character, as described by Scher, was harsh, strong, and intelligent with a sharp temper and an inflexible will. Scher assumed that his mother's character was important in understanding Gustave Hervé, not only because she had more influence on her son than most mothers have, due to the early death of her husband, but because her relations with him paralleled his political transitions at several crucial junctures. Before her marriage to Joseph Hervé, Anne rejected the Church after an argument with a priest. She never went to Mass again, yet she continued to read the Bible daily and to lead a very moral life. This break with the Church may have occurred from a personal schism typical of many religious Bretons, who left the Church yet remained deeply religious. It may also have become accentuated due to the sickness and personal worries of the Hervé family and/or the need to keep a certain distance from the Church given Joseph's job as a government employee.[65]

In 1867 Anne married Joseph Gustave Hervé. The marriage appeared to be a typical Breton match; sailor and peasant families had been merging for centuries in Brittany. The marriage bore six children, two of whom died in infancy after lengthy illnesses. The first born child was Anna, two years older than Gustave,

the eldest boy; then came Gaston and Victor, the youngest. The Hervé home at 5, Rue de Pont in the drab working-class quarter of Recouvrance was small, and there were few diversions from work and the care for the young and sick children. Joseph was away much of the time, and when he was home, "he did not help Anne very much with either the children or the household chores." This was certainly not the only family problem because Joseph's heavy drinking evidently contributed to the cirrhosis of the liver which eventually caused his death on June 9, 1882. The abuse of alcohol may not have affected his work because a short time before his death he had been promoted to Sergeant-Major in the Navy's bookkeeping corps. The navy provided a pension for Anne, but it was meager for a family with three children already in school. His grandfathers were available for emotional support, at least, and Joseph's brother, Alfred, promised to aid the family. Still, the burden was great for Hervé's mother. Gustave was eleven when his father died, so he grew up in a climate where women—his mother and older sister Anna—dominated the household, even if "it was to Gustave … that one looked to increasingly assume responsibility for the family."[66]

In his 1935 interview with Charles Chassé, Hervé, then editor-in-chief of the increasingly moribund *La Victoire*, described his early education in Brest in the following manner.

> "As soon as I was able to go to school, I was sent to the good Sisters who conducted the Communal school on the Rue Vauban … The schools of the Commune were not yet secularized. I had as my first teacher, Mère Perpetue, who had me wear the elder's cap … at the time of a celebration given in the religious schools at Brest. Nevertheless, I waited impatiently to reach the age of six because then I would have the right to enter the Communal school for boys which was run by the Brothers of Christian Doctrine on the Rue de la Communauté. The day I turned six I became a pupil of the Brothers".[67]

His schooling had begun at age four at the Communal School near his home where he was under the regimen of nuns. Two years later he attended school under the direction of the Christian Brothers, where teaching was based on memory, but intermingled with it were exercises of religious piety. At each hour the students recited a short prayer. Hervé later recalled translating Latin manuscripts as part of his early education.[68] Soon after entering school with the Brothers, the six year old Hervé was recognized as a boy with intellectual promise. In the religious schools specialization was unknown, knowledge was assumed to be interconnected, and "the goal was, above all, to teach the ideals of a moral life which … would always be present to influence one's choices."[69] Though he was enrolled in local religious schools at an early age, the young Hervé had few friends outside of class. By age

five impaired vision forced him to wear thick-lensed glasses which led his mother to forbid him to ever play rough games. "What was for a longtime diagnosed as severe myopia was actually opaque spots [leucoma] of the eye."[70] Rarely with his peers due to this undiagnosed condition and his mother's concerns, Hervé spent much of his time studying and reading at home. He later explained: "Like all people with poor vision, I became a little monster on competitive examinations."[71]

The most influential event of Hervé's youth, other than the death of his father, was probably the secularization of schools in Brest in 1881 when he was ten years old. Yet young Gustave was not immediately affected because he was probably not yet aware of just what the change implied.[72]

> "I was shooting marbles in the courtyard when I realized that the Brothers were no longer present. The presence of teachers in secular garb did not prevent me, between the sounds of the first and second bells, from taking my second turn in the shooting. Then I entered the class with the new teachers without having the least thought of gratitude concerning the Brothers who, nevertheless, had been so good to us. (Children are such ungrateful creatures!)"[73]

When the Brothers later opened a private religious high school in 1882, they wanted him to enter, and he threw his worst tantrum in order to go to the school. But his mother opposed the move, believing that the Brothers' school was too far away and that Gustave would have to cross the largest bridge in Brest which was buffeted by icy winds all winter[74] Both parents, apparently, claimed that the school's distance was the problem. In fact, he suspected that his father's job at the Arsenal made it mandatory that the son of a civil servant go to a secular school.[75] Toward the end of his life, Hervé wondered whether attendance at the Brothers' school would have pushed him to the seminary and a missionary vocation like his uncle and cousin.[76] His mother might have let him join the Catholic school instead of the new *lycée* if all had been well at home, but a woman with four children and a dying husband could not permit the luxury of a religious education for her eldest son according to Scher, who assumed that Gustave had increasing responsibilities at home then.[77]

Years later Hervé seemed to hold contradictory attitudes about his experience with secularization. Sometimes he downplayed its significance, but at other times he recalled the time as one of abrupt change.[78] In 1927 while discussing the evils inflicted on France by de-Christianization, he recalled his childhood experience. "Personally, I was de-Christianized at the age of nine by the free-thinking secular schools. This led me toward revolutionary mysticism because people have a need for faith and mystical beliefs. If you take away their Christian faith, they will run

to the new faith of the twentieth century, the faith and mysticism of revolutionaries."[79] Months before his death Hervé vividly recalled how the crucifixes were taken out of the schools at the time of laicization in 1881.[80] In his 1935 interview with Chassé, Hervé displayed a rather ambivalent view about this childhood experience.

> "I do not know how it happened; I did not have the impression of receiving a biased education. The tone must have been rather different since almost immediately we became furiously anticlerical. It is true that the atmosphere of the city had completely changed. I was a witness to the complete transformation of the city of Brest. Suddenly the troops no longer joined the processions. Then the processions themselves were outlawed. I saw the cult of the Republic delineate itself as a replacement religion. It was not the Fête-Dieu which attracted all attention and concentrated all enthusiasms; it was Bastille Day with its parade. The military displays, which sometimes served as a pretext for anticlerical demonstrations, now became prominent. When a military column passed through the Rue d'Aiguillon beside the fashionable district, all the workers sang: 'The Jesuits on a platter! The Jesuits will be served up!' That was repeated when the march passed before the Maritime Préfecture. What a celebration for the distribution of the new flags in 1882–1883!"[81]

Herve's experience with secularization was far from unique. In the 1880s the laws concerning new republican school "dwarfed other political issues" according to Gordon Wright.[82] The new Republic was convinced that a healthy modern state depended on fostering habits of participation in a democratic society among the youth of France in order to create "rational citizens freed from religious superstition. The best known of the republican reforms were the so-called Ferry Laws (1881–1882), which declared primary school mandatory for children between the ages of six and thirteen, and also made public school free and secular for children of both sexes."[83]

In one of his socialist and antimilitarist history texts written over a decade before World War I, Hervé explained how "the Republic strived, without stifling anyone's conscience, to end the Church's role in the teaching of young people." For the pre-war revolutionary, such an educational program was eminently progressive.[84] In his revised history of France written during the interwar era, the authoritarian advocate of a French version of national socialism was still religiously skeptical, but he was now ardently seeking God because he had come to believe that religion and patriotism were necessary cements for social solidarity. In the latter volume he explicitly blamed secular education for his bout of revolutionary mysticism as well as most of the other ills then besetting France.[85]

For Scher, the close temporal proximity of the death of Hervé's father in 1882 and the experience with secularization could have been traumas with reinforcing effects.

> "The death of the father and the abrupt death of innocence in youth are never easy events to integrate into one's life. Occurring together, they can be catastrophic for the emotional development of a young boy. When Gustave insists that he became 'furiously anticlerical' after only six months and yet he did 'not quickly recover' from the shock of dechristianization, both statements can be taken as true. In the first place, the struggle between Gustave's mother and the Brothers had been decisively resolved in Madame Hervé's favor. The son enrolled and succeeded in the secular high school. The larger struggle, however, the one between the spiritual values of Gustave's youth and the political values of the Third Republic, would last until the day he died."[86]

One could interpret Hervé's reversals or transitions in terms of a gradual integration of the spiritual values of his youth with the political values of the Third Republic and the revolutionary heritage. Certainly, his accommodations were far from complete even in his last book, *The Epistles of Gustave Hervé to Believers and Unbelievers*, a work posthumously published by his friends and former associates. His final volume can be described as self exculpatory, pretentious, and banal or it could be seen as a sincere, measured, if not quite convincing, attempt to merge the idealisms of religion and politics. If the latter, then one may read Hervé's political reversals or transformations as virtually epiphenomenal to the imperfect merging of apparently contradictory value systems.

His mother's role was described by Scher as very important in encouraging the academic efforts of her children whose professional achievements were impressive. Her sense of purpose undoubtedly was instilled in her family. Each of her children received scholarships to attend high school in Brest, and all were able to pursue professional careers despite the family's poverty. As a remarkable student at the communal school, Hervé attracted the benevolent intentions of a neighbor who happened to be the Deputy Mayor of Brest. His support was instrumental in helping Hervé get a scholarship to the Lycée of Brest, where he excelled for the next several years.[87] After years as a student, *pion*,[88] and teacher at various levels of academic life, he eventually became a professor of history. His mother also encouraged his sister Anna to become a primary school teacher. When the girl became depressed after being ridiculed for her poverty, she was pulled out of the Lycée and sent to a school for primary teacher training. Her mother's severity, prudery, and dominance are illustrated by her successful efforts to ward off the girl's suitors judged undesirable and to censor Anna's reading material even at age forty-five. Hervé's favorite brother, Gaston, had a career in the military as an artillery officer,

serving in colonial operations in Madagascar, China, and Tonkin before dying on the Somme in 1916. Despite their rather opposed career choices, the brothers remained devoted to one another. Whenever the nationalist press or mass dailies sought to embarrass Hervé with the obvious juxtaposition, the brothers stressed their mutual affection, cut the conversation short, and refused to be baited.[89] When Gaston was preparing to enter the Naval Academy, his older brother gave him lessons in military strategy, a lifelong fascination for the future antimilitarist. His youngest brother Victor became a military physician who wrote warmly to his infamous brother while he was in prison.[90]

In many ways the family remained closely knit despite their separate career paths. Before the war the four children would often gather during the summer at Victor's home at Pen-Be on the Breton coast some 150 miles south of Brest. Gaston in uniform visited Gustave in prison at Santé and Clairvaux, while the antimilitarist Gustave went to the barracks to see his brother whenever possible. When Gaston died at the Somme in 1916, Gustave assumed responsibility for his brother's wife, Isabelle, and her five small children. For the next twenty years, whenever he could manage it, Hervé traveled either to Bordeaux or to Brittany to visit his sister-in-law and her children. He even assumed all the educational expenses for each child. On the very day of Gaston's death, his children were made heirs of Gustave Hervé's assets and Isabelle was placed on the payroll of *La Victoire*.[91]

Gustave attended the Lycée of Brest from 1882 until 1889, an era when the school was a major preparatory school for French military academies, especially the Naval Academy and Saint Cyr. In a school where discipline was harsh according to Hervé, it is surprising that an honor student was confined to his room most Sundays for some disciplinary infraction.[92] Despite his academic success, Hervé once described his experience at the Lycée of Brest, with his attendant disciplinary problems, as a "dreary internship" in which he worked little due to the constant rowdyism and the poor lighting of the classrooms. "I scarcely worked at the Lycée of Brest … The real reason was that the gas lights were placed too high in our study rooms, and since my vision was so bad, I was obliged to lean over my books and the shadow projected prevented me from reading."[93] Given that explanation, the account presented in Jean Maitron's *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français* seems a bit hyperbolic. "With the attitude of a *frondeur* and rebellious against all rules, [Hervé] was at odds with the strict discipline. His intellectual development was not harmed by this because at age eighteen he received his '*Bac*' with a notice of '*Bien*', and he was admitted to the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris in Liberal Arts."[94]

Despite the visual and disciplinary problems at the Lycée of Brest, in his first year 1882–1883 he won the second prize for overall performance; in his second year he received the first prize. During the next four years Hervé obtained two first and two second place awards, and at his graduation he received high honors for all work completed there. He did well in all his subjects, including math, the physical sciences, history, geography, and languages: English, Greek, Latin, and French. If grades are any indication, history and English were his best subjects. High praise was generally reserved for teachers who taught his favorite subjects, such as his eloquent yet solemn history professor, Langeron. Almost half a century after leaving the Lycée, Hervé recalled how Langeron "… once gave Pope Gregory VII a severe going over." Apparently, Langeron complemented his severe anticlericalism with an adulation of the virtues of democratic Republican rule, and Hervé was his best student, winning the first prize in contemporary history during his last year at the Lycée.[95] Hervé's high grades and his respect for anticlerical, republican professors certainly do not indicate personal problems for the young man at school, but they were not necessarily signs of emotional adjustment to the new Lycée according to Scher. Except for his close friend, Emile Masson, his classmates remained acquaintances.[96]

This complex and ambiguous childhood, filled as it was with tragedy, drastic change, academic excellence, and some indications of adjustment problems, was the context in which Scher attempted to rebut Victor Méric's explanation for Hervé's pre-war reversal. Méric, Hervé's former associate on *La Guerre Sociale*, whose fascinating recollections include valuable insights on the pre-war Parisian revolutionary milieu, claimed that Hervé always "needed to have a faith." With him "the goals … espoused are not the same as yesterday, but his extreme methods of achieving them have not varied."[97] Scher believed an opposite view was closer to the truth. "The goals never vary but the methods always do."[98] Certainly the religious metaphor has its limitations. What Scher failed to realize or to admit was that Méric's idea about Hervé's "need for a faith" was strikingly similar to his own conception of Hervé's constant goal "to seek his reality of truth." One can argue that the need or search for a faith or truth gives a fundamental unity to Hervé's life, yet such a general argument is of little value in explaining Hervé's specific reversals. If Hervé at some level sought to combine Republican and Catholic values and ideals in a constantly evolving reality, such an explanation remains both vague and speculative. Given these disclaimers, there is some merit in Scher's argument. "The material of history became for … [Hervé] a new means and a new context within which he could continue to seek his reality of truth. At other times, teaching, socialism, law, agitation, conspiracy,

revolution, nationalism, and finally the Church itself would serve as vehicles in the same quest."[99]

Yet, more concrete questions remain. Why did Hervé often change his assumptions in altering his faith or seeking his reality of truth? Was it simply that the context was always evolving and thus new means and truths were constantly emerging? Hervé's explanation to Charles Chassé on July 12, 1935 regarding his difficulty to return to Christianity after World War I may be insightful. The former *Sans Patrie* claimed he could not prevent a mind formed with the ideals of the rationalist Enlightenment from judging critically a Catholic Breton faith inherited from Celtic and Medieval France.[100] Perhaps a mind formed in the certainties of faith never adjusted completely to the uncertainty of reason. For most of his life, then, the shifting idealism of Hervé rested on the twin pillars of faith and reason, which for most "modern" minds demand separation.

There were other circumstances in Hervé's youth that were unusual. In his early life Hervé's associations with women were largely confined to those in roles of authority. Even before his death, Hervé's father was often away so his mother and sister were dominant at home. The first of two Communal schools he attended in Recouvrance was taught by nuns with separate classes for the boys; the second, taught by the Brothers of Christian Doctrine, included only boys. In the secular Lycée the professors as well as the students again were exclusively males. His mother and sister did not encourage Gustave to socialize with the opposite sex.[101] How important or unique this experience was is uncertain. It may be fair to say that Hervé's family, childhood, and Breton heritage could have presented some unique aspects.

Nothing is known about Hervé's relations with women outside his own family until he met the woman with whom he was to spend the rest of his life. Sometime in the 1890s through his sister Anna, who taught at a private religious school in Recouvrance, Hervé became acquainted with Marie Marguerite Céline Dijonneau, the owner and director of the school.[102] Marie Dijonneau was a married woman with several children at the time, and she was nine years older than Hervé.[103] They had become acquainted when Hervé came to pick up his sister after school. After her husband died in 1891, Marie soon became Gustave's constant companion whenever he returned to Brest from Paris or the provinces during his years as a university student, *pion*, and history teacher. Apparently, Hervé told his mother almost immediately that he was in love with the widow, wished to live with, and, some day, marry her. Scher believed that Marie moved her family to Paris sometime between 1895 and 1900, and rented an apartment across from Gustave's. Yet, during these years Hervé was rarely in Paris. It is uncertain exactly

when they first resided in Paris. What is certain is that most of their lives were spent at the same address at 89, Rue de Vaugirard near Saint-Sulpice and the Luxembourg Gardens until their deaths only a few days apart in October 1944.[104]

One of the most illuminating, though hardly surprising, aspects about the relationship between Hervé and Mme. Dijonneau was the reaction of Gustave's mother. When she found out about the situation, supposedly sometime in 1891 or 1892 according to Scher, Anne felt that the union was illicit as well as scandalous, and she acted accordingly. Until 1912 Gustave and his mother practically ceased all communication. One wonders about this situation since he was reported to have sent much of his meager salary as a study hall monitor home during these years. In 1909 a French police official from Brest explained that Hervé's reluctance to hold meetings there was because he did not wish to trouble his mother and sister then living in Lambézellec on the north side of Brest.[105] Perhaps there was more to it than that. Hervé's release from his long confinement in Clairvaux prison in July 1912, in the midst of his political transition, witnessed a reconciliation with his mother during his weeks of convalescence in Brittany. In the early 1890s, however, the Hervé domestic scene must have been tense.[106]

According to Scher, "Marie's age, maturity, and Catholic background made her both safe and appealing to the inexperienced Gustave." She may have "represented … the unchanging world in which Gustave had been most secure as a child." The recent deaths of one of her children as well as her husband could have aroused a nurturing instinct in Hervé and appealed to his sense of duty. "Marie Dijonneau's situation made it possible for him to fulfill a responsibility while satisfying his own desires."[107] The calm and tolerant Dijonneau may have been an excellent woman for Hervé. She certainly stood with him during a most turbulent career even though few people knew of her existence.[108] Of course, one could view the relationship of an inexperienced young man with an older woman as provocative on several levels. Madame Dijonneau seems to have been largely apolitical, and it is unlikely that she shared any of Hervé's revolutionary ideas. She told *Le Petit Parisien* on February 8, 1906 at the time of *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair and Hervé's first incarceration that: "he was an extremely good man in his private life, [but] she did not agree with his ideas at all. In fact, she detested them." After describing the former history professor as a lodger, she explained her relationship with him simply "as a Breton and friend of the Hervé family."[109] That did not prevent her inclusion in various police reports on Hervé. After their first decade together, only the jaundiced eye of a police informer, who detected her rare presence accompanying Hervé on a trip to Sens, could find anything suspicious in the relationship. "M.Hervé arrived in Sens Saturday evening at six

thirty accompanied by a woman dressed in black, known in Sens as his long-time mistress."[110] Another report during World War I, in describing Hervé's simple and inexpensive habits, claimed that Madame Digeonnea (sic) cost him a lot.[111] Ironically, Hervé, the anti-bourgeois revolutionary, a man whose fame arose out of scandal, and an individual labeled psychopathological by one scholar, seems to have led a stable, mundane, bourgeois, and possibly monogamous existence, not a particularly Bohemian or provocative background, but undoubtedly enviable even by the most straitlaced standards.

In 1889, well before his involvement with Marie Dijonneau, Hervé left for Paris for the first time after seven years of academic excellence at the Lycée of Brest. He was admitted to the Lycée Henri IV in liberal arts[112] and had some vague notions about preparing for the École Normale Supérieure.[113] He told Charles Chassé in 1935 that at the Lycée Henri IV he had been a classmate of Léon Blum, Mario Roustan, a well-known scholar of French literature, and Paul Lapié, the author of *Logique de la volonté* of 1902, and it was among them that his anti-Bonapartist education, begun at Brest, was crowned by his initiation into Marxism. "A comrade brought us some socialist brochures which came from the Familistère de Guise in the Aisne.[114] Thus, at the same time as Léon Blum, I became intoxicated with Marxism. We were ripe for that intoxication. Was not my generation the first one to have been de-Christianized?" In the polarized atmosphere of the 1930s Hervé sarcastically described the socialist leader Blum in his student days as "a new Pico de la Mirandola, able to speak on everything accessible to human knowledge and a few others as well."[115] Gilles Heuré doubted that Blum had become a socialist by 1889–1890 since his later association with Lucien Herr is generally credited for that conversion. Hervé's supposed "initiation in Marxism" by 1890 was for Heuré an "expression too marked by the [politically polarized] tones of the interwar era to be taken at face value." Nevertheless, the roots of Hervé's anti-Bonapartism could well have been his year at the Lycée Henri IV or in a "rough and uneven" form earlier in Brest. It is quite possible for a young provincial like Hervé to have been so impressed by his illustrious professors and brilliant classmates that he became consumed by a thirst for knowledge. He certainly lacked both the funds and the aptitude necessary for a life of dissipation in the French capital.[116] For others with similar experiences, including his friend Émile Masson, existence at a Parisian Lycée presented a rather "banal life, monotonous on the exterior, by toiling and poverty-stricken students."[117]

After one academic year at the Lycée Henri IV, Hervé was forced to leave in order to help support his family. In October 1890 he arrived at the Lycée of Laval in Mayenne where he became a trainee study hall monitor or *pion*.

"Fundamentally, the *répétiteur* [or *pion*] is the enemy of the schoolboy. Spied on by the administration, scorned by the professors, he is there to keep order, and the best intentions change nothing about it." Hervé's boyhood friend and fellow *pion* Emile Masson described his plight: "My power as master humiliated them and filled them with resentment … They knew that I was paid to be against them. Because, despite everything, what am I? Indeed, I would have become, a *Pion*!"[118] Victor Méric described this as a difficult period in Hervé's life by noting that the job of a *pion* was not exactly a sinécure, and the conditions at the Lycée of Laval were especially difficult. Hervé had to sleep in a dormitory and had only four hours a day free, just two hours on Sundays. Apparently, Hervé was so busy and lived so frugally that he was still able to send more than half his meager salary home.[119] The next year he was promoted to head study hall monitor, so he must have adjusted to the situation and applied himself to the job. At the end of his second year at Laval, he passed the examination for his *licence*, the equivalent of an American Bachelor of Arts degree in history, without the benefit of courses or professors to assist him. In October 1892 he was transferred to the Lycée of Quimper, located in the capital of Finistère, where he was again assigned work as a study hall monitor. He was so successful here that his salary nearly doubled after six months. Seen as an excellent, hard-working addition to the Republican teaching corps, Hervé soon was assigned to fill a vacancy as Professor of History at Lesneven in the Léon district of Finistère which meant that he would be just twenty-seven kilometers north-east of Brest.[120] That was the birthplace of his maternal grandfather who had taken Hervé for frequent walks there.[121]

The Collège Saint-François de Lesneven was a highly respected secondary school in the profoundly clerical Léon region. "The school began as a religious institution with a teaching corps made up entirely of priests until the moment it was sold to the city of Lesneven in 1848. Around 1890, when Hervé arrived, the school was '*mi-laique, mi-ecclésiatique*.' The director of the Ecclesiastical College of Lesneven was always a man of the Church, however, and religious classes continued as before. The only prerogative that the Ministry of Education reserved for itself was the right to name an unreserved Republican and patriotic professor of history in each semi-religious public school."[122] When the 22 year old Hervé arrived at the school on April 11, 1893, the report on his installation described him a "master study hall proctor at the Lycée of Quimper named to the Chair of History as a replacement for M. Le Téo who was named to the Lycée d'Evreux."[123]

In 1935 Hervé claimed that he had received the position because he had the reputation of being a strict disciplinarian. "I was scarcely involved in politics at that time; I was sent to Lesneven because I had the reputation of being a strict

disciplinarian."[124] Pace Scher, apparently his reputation as a passionate Republican and anticlerical had little to do with the appointment. And ever since his failure to get Anne's approval to enter the new religious school of Brest in 1882, he had stopped going to Church altogether, so his new post must have been initially disconcerting.[125] Writing to Chassé from the Concièrgerie in 1912, Hervé undoubtedly exaggerated his political awareness. "I was a revolutionary and militant. Can you imagine me falling into a nest of priests?"[126] After a cordial welcome by the venerable director, abbé Roull, who would soon move on to become curé at Saint-Louis in Brest and become something of a social activist,[127] Hervé said:

> "Ah! Dear Reverend! I must tell you that there has been a misunderstanding. Someone evidently has played a trick on you in sending me here to teach history, unless they wanted to play the trick on me. I believe that, as far as ideas are concerned, we are at opposite positions. Send me back where I came from."
>
> "Wait a minute!" abbé Roull responded. "No, sir! Since they sent you here, it's because you possess all the qualities of tact ..."[128]

In future years few commentators would repeat that assessment. The director ought to have known that Hervé would not be easy to domesticate because the day after his arrival, the new professor caused a sensation. A lunch was held in his honor with both students and colleagues present. During the benediction, as he faced abbé Roull himself, Hervé placed his hands at his back making it clear to the 200 faculty and students gathered that the recent arrival was a nonbeliever.[129] Whatever scandal his introduction had caused, it did not prove to be an immediate problem. Though no dire consequences occurred then, few soon forgot the occasion.

In fact, the doubting Hervé was considered a strong disciplinarian in class, but that did not prevent him from chatting amiably once the lessons were over. He was viewed as serious, strict, eloquent, and sympathetic by his students. Though some students said that his ideas were tinted with socialism,[130] many former students had fond memories of him, one of whom described him as "impartial, charming, fair, [and] very friendly."[131] "As for my colleagues, I was the school's infidel but still a good guy. After class I generally walked outside along a lane where dear Sarcey had once paced. I spent hours there in meditation. At such times my ecclesiastical colleagues would come looking for me when they needed a fourth for *boules*. Each time, I complied. When I threw, I called on the heavens to bless my toss: 'Blessed Virgin! Let me dislodge abbé Kerboul!'"[132] The "nest of priests" proved to include men who were "wise, friendly, and tolerant ... As good confessors, they knew how to read people's hearts, and they soon saw in the

professor of history, who had come to them from afar, someone who, though he may have appeared quite revolutionary, was not, all things considered, as far away from them as one would have believed."[133] Despite his clearly radical views and troubling pedagogical methods, the priests thought of him as a black sheep who would one day re-enter the fold.[134]

The ambiance of Lesneven pleased Hervé from the first day. As he gradually became familiarized with the routines of the Collège and experienced the openness and tolerance of the religious teachers, a sense of interior peace apparently came over him. Often when he was sought around the school, he could be found strolling with his hands behind his back and his head tilted forward in deep meditation.[135] "When classes were not meeting, I walked for hours down the nearby lane … I spent hours there in meditation."[136] At first no one at the school seemed to know that Hervé was originally a Catholic from Recouvrance since he did not speak Breton or, evidently, volunteer information concerning his background. Yet it was not long before Hervé began "to smell the crêpes from Recouvrance. With a glass of cognac for the driver, he could, on Thursdays or Sundays, at a very early hour, make the trip [to Brest] on a cartload of cauliflower or artichokes from Roscoff."[137] Living in a small rooming house called Les Trois-Piliers directly across the street from the school, his simple wood paneled room was almost identical to the austere rooms of the school's priests. A metal bed, a table, a chair, a wash basin, and a small mirror sufficed for the ascetic professor who spent most of his time studying on the Collège grounds or visiting his colleagues.[138] These were not the first nor would they be the last of Hervé's nearly monastic accommodations and routines.

Despite their different perspectives, Hervé got along quite well with his ecclesiastical colleagues. Méric often heard him recall the fond memories of his stay at Lesneven. "Even today, Hervé does not recall, without deep feeling, the delightful lane clothed in green where he played interminable games of *boules* with the priests."[139] In 1912, while he was at the Concièrgerie awaiting a new trial, Hervé took the time to describe his experiences at Lesneven. At a period when he was supposedly disillusioned and depressed, Hervé said: "The Collège de Lesneven! One of the most beautiful days of my life! It was a day that would last a year and a half! This was my debut in actual teaching because until then, as a *pion*, I had taught only silence and sleep."[140] In 1933 when Hervé returned to Lesneven for the school's centenary, he said that he had been received very warmly into the school's family. "Abbé Roull embraced me as a member of his family and took me in as a brother."[141]

During his year and a half stay at Lesneven, Hervé's teaching career really began, so it might be illuminating to recall in some detail his innovative pedagogical

methods. Given the general expectations that teachers at religious schools be pious, steady, and rule governed, that they not offend students' sensibilities and not excite an unhealthy curiosity, Hervé's manner and methods must have been perceived as singular, no matter how conciliatory he attempted to be, according to Gilles Heuré.[142] Hervé taught history and geography to students of the fifth, fourth, third, and second years. He also taught a class in philosophy and rhetoric which should have extended over two years. His reputation for strictness and knowledgeability in class did prevent him from being friendly with students and discussing other topics outside class. As he would do later in teaching and in his history texts, Hervé emphasized social over political history and preferred a thematic approach above a chronological narrative. His exams and grading may have been more difficult than those of his colleagues, but his grading was not questioned by his superiors.[143] When Hervé wrote to abbé Colin from the Concièrgerie in January 1912, he described his experience at Lesneven as "one of the best memories of my life" and he asked the abbé to give "the fondest regards to all his former colleagues, to all his former friends at Lesneven, and to abbé Roull, who was the best of all university principals and headmasters."[144]

If Hervé often tried to be diplomatic, he was not willing to compromise his own ideas. "In class, the young professor could … offend those who heard him … In a general sense, Gustave Hervé seemed to understand religious history in a rather unorthodox fashion."[145] Several students complained to the priests that Hervé spoke disrespectfully about Joan of Arc because he had described her faith in terms of hallucinations rather than miracles. When one student openly challenged Hervé's interpretation, he was given an assignment demanding that he prove the historical validity of Joan's visions. One of his superiors, abbé Colin, suggested discreetly over a glass of wine that Hervé's lessons on the origins of Christianity and the saints be omitted from his class in Roman history. Hervé told the abbé that he could not comply because it was a question of principle. "This dear priest could have asked for the moon, and I would have given it to him if I had been able to unhook it. The moon, yes; but not that! I earnestly explained to him why this shocking subject was a question of honor for me. I simply promised to redouble my tact."[146] For Hervé, tact in teaching the life of Christ involved using a double method. At first he exposed the topic gravely by using the catechism, and then he used Renan. It was up to the students to choose between the two explications.[147] Today, with the multiple voices of postmodern discourse, such a binary view seems rather quaint. In an earlier era, such relativism on moral and religious issues could lead to trouble. His term at Lesneven was, in fact, cut short due to his manner in presenting Christianity. His inability to compromise

cost Hervé his teaching position at Lesneven in September 1894. Several years later, when he came before the Academic Council of Dijon in 1901 under charges of improper conduct by a professor, he was able to read his final evaluation from his superiors at Lesneven who reported that he was "a good professor but with opinions too advanced for this area."[148]

Did the experience at Lesneven provide any significant clues regarding Hervé's future endeavors? Knowing his later trajectory, Gilles Heuré felt that there were several instructive points to be made. Hervé was able to adapt his behavior to an environment which did not correspond to his own ideas and practices. He learned to control his ardor, to manage his provocations, and, "most importantly, to concentrate his energy on intellectual activity." Though Heuré cautioned against employing standard portraits of the Breton character to uncover facile correspondences with Hervé's personality and career, he, nonetheless, discovered several significant traits which the young teacher would continue to exhibit in the future. At Lesneven, Hervé displayed "a capacity to detach himself from his environment and a propensity to devote himself, whether in the library, at his office, or on solitary walks, to intellectual effort. In any case, the young man was not afraid of solitude."[149]

After Hervé was removed as professor at Lesneven in 1894, he was obliged again to become a study hall monitor, this time at the Lycée of Saint-Brieuc in the Côtes-du-Nord. He told Charles Chassé in 1935 that at Saint-Brieuc he was no more involved in politics than he had been at Lesneven since it was there that he prepared for the *agrégation d'histoire*. Later Hervé felt that this time of preparation on historical studies had been his foundation for his writing and speaking for the rest of his life![150] The idea that two years of intense study somehow provides a foundation for one's life seems rather telling. At any rate, studying for the *agrégation*, the nationwide written and oral examination mandatory for the teaching profession, seems to have taken up all of Hervé's free moments. Preparing for the *agrégation* without a university-directed program was practically unheard of, but the aspiring academic had no alternative due to his financial condition and his determination to do it on his own.[151] His boyhood friend Émile Masson, also a study hall monitor at Saint-Brieuc at that time, described their dreary routines which included: reprimands to disruptive students, isolated study in their bleak dormitory, obligatory relations with colleagues, inveterate boredom, the temptation to alcohol, and many other stultifying aspects. It took an active imagination or a remarkable determination to transcend the monotony. They succeeded because of their friendship in Masson's opinion.[152] Once he obtained his *license* in Philosophy, Masson recalled his experience at Saint-Brieuc as a virtual prison

sentence. At that time Herve's fellow *pion* was in love with a religious young woman who was also something of a social climber. Though he struggled in his own religious torment, Masson found Hervé to be a jolly atheist without hang-ups who comforted him by raising his glass high to the sun and saying, "*Le Bon Dieu? ... Tiens! le v'la!*"[153]

With his year at Saint-Brieuc completed, in October 1895 Hervé transferred to the Lycée Lakanal near Sceaux just south of Paris where he continued to work as a *pion.* His salary was now two hundred francs a month, but it was still unsatisfying work. "The Lycée itself was recently built in the southern *banlieue* on a parcel of land detached from the vast and magnificent domain of the House of Trévise, formerly owned by the Duchess of Maine, the daughter-in-law of Louis XIV and Madame de Montespan. It was erected majestically at the edge of a well-forested forty acre park. This park was its finest ornament and, it is true to say, as incredible as this may be, it was only that, a decor, a publicity attraction for dazzled parents."[154] The historian Jules Isaac, who was a student at several *lycées* where Hervé worked, left a volume of reminiscences that sketched the rustic surroundings and the nearly military discipline of the Lycée of Lakanal with its uniforms, drums, barracks-like architecture, Napoleonic heritage, and regimen of virtual silence. For Isaac, the proximity of the gated park next to the nearly monastic conditions at the Lycée was a perpetual torment of Tantalus.[155] The mediocre, outdated, and archaic curriculum and academic methods were not exactly cutting edge pedagogy in Isaac's view. For the diminutive, sickly, affection-starved, precocious, and homophobic Isaac, the Lycée of Lakanal was more like a prison with its austere conditions, limited hygiene routines, and blatant homosexuality. However, even a docile and compliant student like Isaac would eventually rebel. Despite the somber atmosphere at the Lycée, several famous Frenchmen attended at that time, including Charles Péguy, the Dreyfusard idealist and socialist turned nationalist, Albert Mathiez, the historian of the Revolution, and Albert Lévy, a renowned scholar of Germanic Studies. Isaac claimed that "some of our proctors acted like veritable martinets."[156] Nevertheless, there was "nothing to indicate that Hervé was among the latter," in the opinion of Gilles Heuré, "above all [because he was] ready to jump at the first chance to return to teaching."[157]

By January 1896 Hervé had applied for and received a temporary opening as a History Professor at the Lycée of Sens in the department of the Yonne, which Scher described as "the most violent, revolutionary area in France before 1914."[158] As usual, Hervé quickly settled into the new post and may have made contacts with advanced political circles there. Within a month his name entered Interior Ministry files in a matter regarding a teacher named Hervé who was in contact

with a purported anarchist named Perron, then the subject of an inquiry by the Prefect of Maine-et-Loire. On February 12, 1896 the Office of the Minister of Public Education responded to the Minister of the Interior regarding that inquiry: "Two officials named Hervé currently serve within system of public secondary education. One is a professor of the elementary class at the Collège of Meaux; the other, accepted for the agrégation in history, is teaching classes at the Lycée of Sens."[159] Hervé's name on Interior Ministry reports verifies nothing because no Sens activities were involved in the police inquiry, and the Hervé in question probably referred to his namesake at Meaux. Be that as it may, for ten months, from January until October 1896, Hervé fulfilled his teaching duties in an unfamiliar city while continuing to prepare for the *agrégation*. That meant that he should have had little time for political activities in Sens.

His transfer to the Lycée Henri IV in Paris during the academic year 1896–1897 again reduced him to the status of *pion*.[160] Jules Isaac, who was at the Lycée Henri IV then, described his year there as "infinitely more humane and flexible" than his experience at the intolerable Lycée of Lakanal.[161] During this era when the Dreyfus Affair was exploding, one may logically assume that Hervé got involved or at least took a stand. Several years later, just as he was gaining national notoriety and losing all chance for a university career, Hervé was undoubtedly the subject of an Interior Ministry report which alluded to his tenure in Paris as a *pion* in 1896–1897. "If the recently dismissed Professor Hervé at the Lycée of Sens is, in fact, the same person I knew at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris a few years ago, you may be sure you are dealing with a dedicated and implacable fellow."[162] Masson was also in Paris on leave from the Lycée of Saint-Brieuc from 1896 to 1897,[163] and he and Hervé were able to get together for several months just prior to their summer vacations in Brest in 1897.[164]

Madeleine Rébérioux's entry in the multi-volume biographical dictionary of the French working class movement stated: "During these difficult years, Hervé, spurred on by the mediocrity of his condition, prepared for the *agrégation* in History with the obstinate perseverance of a Breton, and he attained it in 1897."[165] The oral and written examinations for the *agrégation* were taken in the summer of 1897. On August 31, 1897 he was named *agrégé* in history and geography, having finished in seventh place, two positions behind Albert Mathiez. He was soon appointed Professor of History in the south of France at the Lycée of Rodez in the Aveyron on October 20, 1897.[166]

According to Victor Méric this appointment was to witness the beginning of Hervé's political career. "It was at the beginning of the Dreyfus Affair in 1897, and already Hervé was showing signs of subversive opinions. During his summer

vacation in Brest, he was seen frequenting anarchist circles. Even before Zola's *J'accuse*, he published a letter which caused a sensation and was reproduced everywhere. The scandal was unprecedented at Rodez where Hervé, as the only Dreyfusard of the city, soon aroused uproar among Catholic circles. He had to pack his bags and leave for Alençon."[167] Hervé himself wrote a veiled account of his Rodez experience in *Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne* on June 22, 1901 in which he claimed to know "a professor in the south of France who had the unlikely idea, even before the letter *J'accuse* was published, to intervene in the Dreyfus Affair by signing his name to a veritable appeal to arms … they treated him as a Jew and as a Prussian." According to Hervé, demonstrations by local Catholics became so threatening that the police had to guard "this timid [professor] friend."[168]

In trying to verify these accounts of an "unprecedented scandal" aroused by this signed article, the more Scher delved into this episode, the more he found a good bit of inventiveness in the account cited by Méric in 1908. Scher examined the local press of Rodez but found no such reactions and no such article as the one described above. On May 7, 1897 *Le Réveil*, a local republican paper, did publish a Dreyfusard article written before Zola's "*J'Accuse*" and signed "A Teacher". This article appeared before Hervé arrived in Rodez, and it was not signed with Hervé's name, but with a pseudonym. The only mention of Hervé in the Rodez press concerned his appointment and transfer.[169] Heuré's account of this episode either misstates Scher's analysis or contradicts his facts, because Heuré assumes that Hervé was indeed the anonymous author.[170]

Throughout July 1898 the anti-Dreyfusard and anti-Semitic *Croix d'Aveyron* attacked a Dreyfusard Professor of Rhetoric named Sarthou who taught at the same lycée as Hervé. After Sarthou was transferred to the Lycée of Alençon, Hervé's request for an identical transfer was most likely an act of solidarity. In mid-August, once both transfers became known, the *Croix d'Aveyron* in capital letters bid both professors: "BON VOYAGE, MESSIEURS."[171] Even if Scher's explanation is inaccurate, his charges do fit a recurrent pattern with Hervé of exaggeration and selective memory.[172] However, a charge of deliberate fabrication is probably too strong an accusation in reference to any of Hervé's boasts. The new professor may well have taken a courageous position in defense of Dreyfus while he was in Rodez. Later exaggerations can be explained as natural attempts to accentuate the revolutionary credentials of a former teacher who had become the leader of his own socialist faction and was being touted as "the new Blanqui."

With his transfer request granted, Hervé left the edge of the Massif Central for Normandy where he took a post teaching history and geography in the Faculty of Classical and Modern Arts at the Lycée of Alençon in the Orne on

October 3, 1898.[173] Besides Sarthou, another colleague at Alençon was Gustave Téry, who would soon to become a journalist and political extremist himself. Téry later recalled that Hervé was not content simply to teach a full schedule at the Lycée but also taught at the city's Popular University.[174] Recognizing the need for a center where workers could congregate for social and political purposes and with no one else willing, Hervé opened the city's first Communist Association.[175] In testimony before the court at Auxerre at the time of Hervé's trial for a 1901 article in *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*, Sarthou recalled this era.

> "At Alençon, I got to know him better … Upon arriving, he lodged himself as simply as possible. Finding that dining at a hotel, when ordinary people were starving to death, was unnecessary, he cooked for himself, reducing his expenses to a bare minimum. As far as his attire, that was never a concern for him. Oh! He did everything with the most honorable of intentions! Why did he act like this? Not to save money. His entire salary was used for good works. I saw him borrow money to help his needy comrades … As a professor, I have never met anyone more conscientious. He worked prodigiously: he was the most loved among us. One could say that his students would kill for him."[176]

Méric's account of Hervé's stay at Alençon makes him seem quite out of place.

> "Alençon was a sleepy Norman city without a political life and without disturbances, but Hervé did not wait long before becoming legendary. His modest life and poverty, his attire, his reputation as a revolutionary, and his professed Dreyfusard beliefs made him seem a bizarre individual to the peaceful Norman townsfolk. Happily, he was able to change jobs. When a Dreyfusard professor at Sens found himself in an untenable position, Hervé took his place."[177]

Hervé later claimed that this return to Sens in 1899 as Professor of History was his first complete plunge into politics.[178] As Scher dramatically put it, "At Sens the man became the center of a political movement. At Sens, Hervéism was born."[179]

Hervé's political development was far from complete in 1899, and, in many respects, his journey was just beginning, yet there were basic traits, qualities, and values already in place that would be affirmed or refashioned as events unfolded, conditions changed, and new opportunities presented themselves. They would seldom be annulled. By 1899 Hervé could be characterized as a Republican, an anticlerical Dreyfusard, a socialist, and perhaps an antimilitarist, as well, yet his Catholic Breton roots had not been erased.

Most people who have written about Hervé have argued that the zeal of his new beliefs owed something to his original faith. Perhaps it makes some sense to recall that when Renan left the Church, he claimed that he never renounced his vows. "I left spirituality in order to concern myself with ideality."[180] "At the

bottom of my existence, I sense that my life is still governed by a faith which I no longer have. Faith has that odd characteristic which means that even when it has disappeared it continues to operate."[181] There were several clues or indications from Hervé's youth and educational experience, according to Gilles Heuré, which help "to illuminate certain constants in his personality: an interest in military questions, the longing for a life of the most simple kind, and, more generally, an underlying religious presence."[182] Hervé, himself, did not wait for future historians to describe his frugal monkish habits, his "perpetual martyrdom" at the hands of the judiciary, prison guards, angry readers, and heckling crowds, his various prison sentences which he often described as a "return to the monastery," and his barely missed religious vocation. Were the tropes of martyrdom and faith revelatory or obfuscatory? Were these convenient metaphors exculpatory rather than explanatory? Could such banal autobiographical images veil as well as bear witness to a deeper psychological significance?

The ironies of his life struck many of Hervé's contemporaries. Even French police officials detected them.

> "With Hervé, everything is contrast: he abominates officers, yet dresses like one, and whistles or sings military tunes. He is an anticlerical, yet when he speaks of his native region, he calls it 'my parish' and whistles or sings canticles. He cannot bear that anyone harm the least worm, yet he preaches social war and he advocates the use of hobnailed boots and attacks against scab workers … In sum, outside of his social ideas, which I would call crazy since they do not amount to much, Hervé is an eccentric but dedicated man. He is honest and selfless. [He is] naive even, very proud when his bluster wins him success. But I must say that he often acts like a coward who screams to give himself courage. He is not as brave as people think."[183]

There was one fundamental trait that few people noticed in his youth: a complicated and enigmatic extremism which was seldom what it seemed. His revolutionary zeal was sarcastically mocked by Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, when he noted that, "*Hervé tire des pétards pout faire retourner les passants.*"[184] Victor Griffuelhes, C.G.T. Secretary from 1902 until 1909, often labeled the antics of Hervéism as "revolutionary romanticism."[185] Yet it was Jaurès who dissected that extremism more subtly at the Socialist Congress of Nancy in August 1907 when he pointed out how the firebrand and iconoclastic "*casseur d'assiettes*" (dish smasher) sometimes acted like a mild and bourgeois "*raccommendeur de faïences*" (pottery mender).[186] In his reminiscences of their days at Santé prison, Victor Méric was often amused by the seriousness, bourgeois habits, and established routines of the notorious antipatriot, who was accustomed to regular sleep, normal hours, and perpetual hard work. Hervé constantly displayed a marked prudery compared to

his more Bohemian followers. The life of Hervé was more bourgeois or monkish than it was eccentric or avant-garde.[187] Although he was never married, his relationship with Madame Dijonneau was apparently as normal as any traditional middle class marriage. Invariably, when he was not in prison or traveling to some political meeting, Hervé was home for dinner every evening despite the promptings of his associates to finish the day at a local café. The "new Blanqui" was generally violent only in print, yet he had become the symbol for dangerous extremism itself. Such theatrical and ambiguous extremism could never fit the likes of Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, or Hitler.

While the legendary Breton cider and crêpes, which Hervé was so fond of, can still be bought at the foot of the Pont de Recouvrance on the Rue de la Porte, the predominant scents coming from many of the small eateries there are those of merguez and couscous. If contemporary Brest is modern and bright after postwar reconstruction, the same cannot be said for contemporary Recouvrance.[188] Except for the Middle Eastern cuisine available in the small shops along its streets, the area of Recouvrance where the Hervé family lived did not appear to be that dissimilar from the descriptions of the drab working class district of his youth when it was visited by the present writer almost sixty years after Hervé's death. No obvious memorial to the former *Sans Patrie* exists in either the Recouvrance district or in Brest proper; he certainly has not been given his chapel akin to the hundreds of local, solitary sanctuaries to the half-pagan, mythologized Celtic saints dating from the Early Middle Ages which were barely tolerated by the official Church.[189] Still, the several dozen Hervés listed in the local *bottin* attest to some level of ancestral continuity for the childless one-time Neo-Malthusian who came to fear French depopulation just before the Great War. What Gustave Hervé would think, if he were alive today, of the North African eateries, the Portuguese hotelkeepers, the Irish beer, the British ales, and the Spanish cuisine so prevalent in Recouvrance or across the river in Brest along the Rue de Siam and up the Rue Jean Jaurès, is difficult to say. Always an advocate of some sort of a United States of Europe and world peace even in his most chauvinistic and sometimes nearly xenophobic utterances, Hervé might have been pleased with the globalization and the open borders of the E.U., but one suspects that he would be quite troubled by the growing materialist culture that has reached all the way to his Breton birthplace.

Catherine Ford's seminal study reconceptualizing the problem of nation formation in post revolutionary France focused on the political acculturation in Finistère from 1890 to 1926. Many of the social, economic, political, and cultural trends uncovered in Ford's fascinating study affected Hervé. On the surface

Hervé's family and educational experiences seemed to fit into the traditional pattern of republican integration from the center to the periphery through social advancement by means of the state's educational bureaucracy. Yet, under the surface one wonders whether his apparent early inculcation of a republican ideology did not remain permeated with more typically Breton patterns. Hervé could be seen as a typical Breton who atypically made his way in the Third Republic through educational advancement, absorbing several variants of the republican ideology, including an international socialist subset. His modification, if not complete rejection, of that socialist ideology into a national socialist variant came with a return to his Breton and French roots, thus challenging many of the republican precepts themselves. Or his life could be viewed as a prism through which many of the era's forces and currents passed. His constant acceptances, rejections, and modifications of political ideas can be read as necessary and evolving personal negotiations and adaptations to the larger world which everyone, not just Hervé and other Bretons, experienced.[190]

The parallel that Scher saw between Renan and Hervé is pertinent, but such a comparison can only hint at an explanation for his later transformations. The life of Hervé, if not his ideas, seems much more complex. His various faiths were in transformation until well into the interwar era when they finally coalesced and apparently stagnated. Or did they? A life united by a search for truth still demands reasons for so many truths or paths to truth. Was Hervé torn by conflicting Catholic and Enlightenment ideals or did these ideals become blended, however confusedly, within him?[191] Was Hervé a typical "true believer" or was he a more quixotic figure somehow unleashed in modernizing France? This man who looked for truth could sincerely lie to himself or "bend the truth" if higher truths demanded it. Hervé, the anticlerical socialist, could sympathize with priests and later, as a reconverted Catholic, hope for support from Communist idealists. The grandson of a flagmaker would seek or accept fame as "the man who planted the tricolor in a dungpile", and later as a national socialist, he would never lose sight of an apparently socialist inspired United States of Europe. The obvious contradictions must not blind us concerning the reality of certain basic consistencies. The personality of Hervé and many of his most fundamental ideals appear to have remained largely the same, however impossible that might appear to be true at first glance.

2

"Le Drapeau dans le Fumier"

On April 11, 1899 Gustave Hervé was appointed professor of history at the Lycée of Sens in the department of Yonne, one of the most rural in France. Sens, itself, was one of the few urban centers in this primarily wine growing region. Hervé had been employed in the educational institutions of the Third Republic since 1890 as a *pion* and professor. He had previously taught at the *lycée* in a temporary position from January until October 1896. By 1899 his socialist ideas of a reformist and conventionally *Blocard* variety were clearly in evidence but that was soon to change. The faculty at the *lycée* was split between clericals and Republicans; administratively, it was a secular institution, but, in fact, the *lycée's* curriculum was strongly influenced by the clergy of the area.[1] Apart from his classroom duties teaching the largely middle class students of Sens and the nearby regions, Hervé also set up a Popular University for workers in Sens. In 1912 he recalled the episode in this manner. "After having instructed the sons of the bourgeoisie, I considered it not only my right but my duty to instruct workers and peasants who had not had the means to avail themselves of facilities at the *lycée* … The Popular University of Sens was one of my chairs."[2]

Victor Méric described this period at Sens as a sort of double life for Hervé.

> "A few weeks after his arrival, the classes were split into two groups. Half of the students were on the side of the Dreyfusards, while the other half opposed Dreyfus. Nevertheless,

> Hervé as a professor had no problems. He taught with no political bias. His method was simply to expose the two different versions of historical events and then let the students conclude for themselves the correct version. It was only outside of class that Hervé was swept away by politics. He was then transformed. The benevolent and smiling professor became a terrible fighter, preaching the impending ruin of society, the abolition of capitalism, the suppression of property, and the end of the world as it was."[3]

Two possible versions of history! For Hervé such a binary, moralistic, and Manichaean perspective would characterize his teaching, writing, and speaking throughout his life.

If the cliché that trends often began in Paris and were gradually disseminated to the provinces at the time of the Dreyfus Affair has merit, Hervé's efforts in Yonne challenged that pattern. Within two years of his arrival, much of the nation would be stunned by events in Yonne.

> "A routine disciplinary action at the Lycée of Sens became a national scandal and was referred to as 'the Dreyfus Affair of the French educations system.' Yonne, long known for its antiwar sentiments, became the center of a nationwide antimilitarist movement, and Parisian newspapers debated the meaning of patriotism and antipatriotism as defined by the Yonne revolutionaries. At center stage stood Gustave Hervé. He was the principal character in the Lycée of Sens Affair, the department's sole antimilitarist theorist, and the force behind the radical direction taken in Yonne. By the end of 1901, the confusing program of reform and revolution which Hervé succeeded in making so quotable was piled into and under the rubric Hervéism. The French government responded to the dissenting voices in Yonne with severe sanctions and the Hervéists declared war."[4]

The birth, development, and impact of Hervéism in the Department of Yonne were not fortuitous. Hervé was already familiar with the region in which he had chosen to teach. Yonne had long been characterized by an undeniable tradition of violently challenging governmental authority. This tradition touched every class in the district and dated at least as far back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were reports of antimilitarist acts in the department during the nineteenth century, especially after 1870.[5] One contemporary report on French antimilitarism characterized Yonne after 1870 as "the center of this social conflagration."[6]

Yet a tradition of antimilitarism was not the only stimulus to Hervé's political activism in Yonne. This department has been described as one of the main areas where the new republic penetrated deeply and where its political and pedagogical reforms made some of their most indelible marks. Raymond Grew and Patrick Harrigan ranked "the Yonne as one of the most 'anticlerical' and 'de-Christianized' departments in France in 1886." It also had one of the lowest Catholic school

enrollments in the country at the late nineteenth century. The famous dancer, writer, and general celebrity, (Sidonie-Gabrielle) Colette, was born in the village of Saint-Sauveur-en-Puisaye in 1873, in the vicinity of Auxerre. Her father was a strong advocate for secular schools, and she would employ her educational experiences in her later titillating, popular novels. Colette's career has been interpreted as a complex product of the young republic's educational system and the changing values of the *fin-de-siècle.*[7] Hervé's presence in the Yonne was preceded by trends which had dramatic effects on individuals like Colette and would certainly help to facilitate his message.

If the Yonne proved ripe for republican values, it was also prone to more extreme reactions to the accelerating changes of the era. Social, economic, and demographic patterns there also played a major role in radicalizing him. "The impact of industrialization in Yonne created no less than a social and demographic revolution."[8] Great changes began in Yonne around 1851. Declining population after 1851 is associated with railroad development which combined with new sources of information regarding opportunities elsewhere. Thus, the short trip to Paris became cheap, easy, and sensible. However, emigration was not always permanent, nor was it necessarily an uprooting experience. The completion of the Paris-Lyon Railroad in mid-century created inexpensive daily service to Paris. Yet many people were pushed as well as pulled from Yonne. The switch from timber to coal by iron producers created increased unemployment there because Yonne's many small iron companies often found it beneficial to relocate. Nevertheless, the department's population decline is not totally explained by industrial changes, railroad development, and popular education. Population losses in wine-growing areas averaged between forty and fifty percent after 1880 and this was largely connected to the phylloxera epidemic. Undoubtedly, other social and psychological factors also influenced population and emigration patterns since the birth rate was already declining markedly by midcentury. Most population losses took place in small communes averaging between one and two thousand inhabitants. The major urban centers of Yonne actually increased in population even though the department itself was losing people. Such a trend accelerated traditional rural-urban tensions.[9]

Working in a region undergoing such transformations, tensions, and dislocations helps to explain both Hervé's radicalization and his impact on Yonne's already recalcitrant peasants. One of the basic tenets of Hervéism would be that traditionally conservative peasants under social and economic hardships could become radicalized. In order to make his message understood, Hervé learned to speak to peasants in their own language. His technique was to address their harsh

conditions rather than their class identification. Yonne's peasants would have to be approached in terms which spoke to their particular problems: field work, soil conditions, the weather, price fluctuations, rising costs, etc. Fancy speeches would not convince ordinary laborers.

> "It was necessary to awaken the 'Jacques' which slept in all workers. But he needed to be diplomatic; if he made demands, he also had to provide as instruction; if he used violent rhetoric, he also had to demonstrate *savoir-faire* in his explanations. What was his main argument? Small-scale agriculture cost too much since it involved expenses which no single individual could handle. What was necessary was for smallholders to group together in associations."

Peasants also knew that nationalism and patriotism created a bottomless pit of never ending taxes. Armies also took away sons from rural areas for three years, while bourgeois boys only served ten months because they were permitted to continue their schooling.[10] Hervé soon realized that antimilitarism and peasant socialism were complementary. Why? French peasants and small town voters often hated military service and were suspicious of the army and its officers.[11] If Yonne was unique in many ways, it also seemed to fit some larger national patterns. Hervé's experience in Yonne led to his growing appreciation of social complexities; increasingly he affirmed that the urban proletariat was not alone in possessing revolutionary potential.

Just after his arrival in Sens in 1899, Hervé joined Yonne's Allemanist Federation of Socialist Workers. The roots of socialism in France were deep, but as an organized political force, it was relatively recent in origin. The repression of the Commune in 1871 set back the growth of organized socialism in France for almost a decade, yet repression actually strengthened Marxian socialism at the expense of native non-Marxian Proudhonian and Blanquist variations. With rival socialists in exile or underground, Marxists led the way in evangelizing the working class. When the first Socialist Workers' Congress met in 1879, the Marxist convert from anarchism, Jules Guesde, took a leading role in the formation of the Federation of Socialist Workers. Although that Federation made important concessions to anarchists and Blanquists, divisions soon occurred. By the 1880s, several different socialist parties existed in France.[12]

Jean Touchard described five separate tendencies in late nineteenth-century French socialism: the dogmatic Marxists of Jules Guesde, the Blanquists led by Édouard Vaillant, the Possibilists of Paul Brousse, and the Independent and basically reformist socialists led successively by Benôit Malon, Alexandre Millerand, and Jean Jaurès, as well as the Allemanists.[13] The same kinds of resentment against

Marxist authoritarianism that troubled the First International re-emerged among French socialists. Other factors promoted divisions as well. The restraints against socialist propaganda and militant trade unionism after 1871 combined with the successful consolidation of the parliamentary Republic which encouraged the emergence of an evolutionary, nonviolent approach. Poor showing in the 1881 legislative elections by Marxists led to resentment against Marxist and German ideas by socialists like Brousse and Malon, who emphasized French traditions and local needs. When Brousse's *possibilistes* won a majority at the Saint-Etienne Congress of 1882 making the Federation of Socialist Workers obviously reformist, Guesdists broke away and founded what later became the *Parti Ouvrier Français*. This was not to be the last division within French socialism. The Allemanists separated from the Broussists in 1890 because the latter group had become too reformist. Then the Allemanists, led by the typographer and former Communard Jean Allemane, created the *Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Révolutionnaire* which Hervé joined in 1899.[14]

Hervé's views were often in flux, but it is fair to say that his membership in Yonne's Allemanist Federation of Socialist Workers in 1899 affected him immensely. Because Yonne's socialists followed the Bakunist or Jurassien International after 1871, they were less likely to be as disciplined, hierarchical, or reformist as other French socialists. They resented the Marxist idea that revolution would be directed from above, and they rejected both parliaments and revolutionary central committees as mechanisms of repression and bureaucracy. So it was understandable that Yonne's socialists joined the Allemanist *Parti Ouvrier Socialist Révolutionnaire* (P.O.S.R.) from the time of that party's Congress of Paris in 1891, a year after it had broken with the Possibilists.

> "Just as the Jurassiens had told Marx and as the Possibilists had told Guesde, now the Allemanists were telling Paul Brousse that revolution could only be planned and made by an organization which emphasized local initiative and national federalism. The Allemanists criticized Brousse for strapping the party apparatus into a rigid hierarchical framework which funneled all decision-making processes to the top. Yet they mocked Brousse for his inability to discipline party members who believed that election day was a mandate to collaborate with Radicals, conservatives, or reactionaries."[15]

Allemane felt that Brousse's Paris centered party was cut off from rural areas as well as provincial urban centers. It could thus neither offer nor receive energy from those sources. Allemane's P.O.S.R. drew its principal strength from Paris as well as those departments which had originally supported Bakunin's Jurassien Federation: Doubs, Jura, Côte D'Or, Ain, and Yonne.[16]

Despite his initial adherence to Allemanism, Hervé would soon be called the "new Blanqui" for reasons which will soon be obvious. After the death of Auguste Blanqui in 1881, Blanquism evolved. The culmination of the Boulanger Crisis of the late 1880s witnessed the virtual disintegration of Blanquism as one faction followed former Communard Édouard Vaillant along a path leading to socialist unity, while a larger faction led by Ernest Granger eventually became associated with anti-Dreyfusard nationalism. Vaillant's *Comité Révolutionnaire Central*, which became the *Parti Socialiste Révolutionnaire* in 1898, had a program of synthesis that tried to integrate Marxism with Republican socialism. Partisans of an *action totale*, they defended the needs of the socialist movement for parliamentarianism as well as syndicalism, for the general strike as well as for municipal socialism. In his seminal work on French Blanquism, Patrick H. Hutton described Vaillant as closer to Édouard Bernstein, the German revisionist, than to Marx. The current study indicates that the demise of the Blanquists in the 1890s did not witness the dissolution of the cult of the revolutionary tradition. Aspects of it continued on within Hervéism, syndicalism, and perhaps anarchism. If "the myth of the revolutionary tradition" was not directly conveyed to the Hervéists, many, though not all, of the elements of traditional Blanquism reappeared in Hervéism, such as: ritual, sacred times and places, the division of the world into sharply drawn camps of good and evil, comradeship, the myth of the Commune, ceremonial revolutionary exercises, anachronistic insurrectional tactics, and others.[17] Although the Blanquists were close to Jaurès, during the Dreyfus Affair they allied with Guesde in refusing to form alliances with bourgeois parties. The Independent Socialists were largely unorganized, repudiating internal socialist quarrels and doctrinal disputes. They believed that syncretism of conflicting ideas and programs was the only means to attain socialist success.

Though Allemanism arose from Possibilist reformism, the Allemanists were skeptical about reformist tactics. Touched by the anarcho-syndicalist background of Jean Allemane, the P.O.S.R. entailed a daring approach to socialism which included federalism, antiparliamentarianism, electoral discipline, anticlericalism, agrarian programs, the general strike, syndicalism, *ouvrièrisme*, direct action, and antimilitarism. The Allemanists were also the first socialists to propagate the idea of the general strike or to question the guilt of Dreyfus.[18] The Allemanists were so connected to anarcho-syndicalist elements that "one sometimes called them 'Allemanarchists' and F[ernand] Pelloutier was able to say that their party was 'a breeding ground of anarchism'".[19] Significantly, the Allemanists were "not noted for their love of intellectuals"[20] and they distrusted the bourgeoisie, expecting workers "to win their own emancipation by their own efforts" even though they

were "unable to discover a method of bringing about practical reforms without polluting … [themselves] in the mire of the existing system."[21] Allemanists rejected revolution from above with the masses subservient to an authoritarian organization. Instead, they proposed revolution from below because the P.O.S.R. believed in the emancipation of workers by themselves. Hervé's appeals to all progressive elements and classes as well as his perpetual refusal to become a political candidate probably reflected his Allemanist experience.[22]

The party also looked to immediate control of local government, legislation requiring higher wages and reduced hours, the creation of worker cooperatives and unions, and a program for expanding socialist propaganda in the countryside. The Allemanists, too, were "profoundly conscious of the need to create a program of agrarian socialism which would touch the particular needs of small peasant landowners."[23] Their agrarian program postulated the common ownership of land, but individual small plots were not to be touched immediately. Individual smallholdings would revert to the collective organization only at the moment of death or emigration of the owner.[24] "Above all, the Allemanists were concerned with immediate social action at the lowest levels of village, commune, and municipal government. Rejecting Guesdist and Broussist demands for centralized control of the Party, and equally ignoring Blanquist propaganda for revolution at a single stroke, the men of the P.O.S.R. created a federalist organization which permitted local initiative and encouraged new approaches to socialist propaganda."[25] If Yonne's artisans and peasants were receptive to such a program, Gustave Hervé would be ready to reap the advantages.

Michael Roger Scher believed that the most controversial part of Allemanism was its antimilitarism. Going far beyond Possibilist, Guesdist, Blanquist, and Independent Socialist ideas which usually advocated "the general arming of the people" if France were threatened, the fifth article of the Allemanist Charter demanded "the suppression of permanent armies" as a prelude to arming the workers. Yet the Allemanists did not refuse to defend France against invasion. They mainly assailed aggressive imperialism and wars of revenge. The need for local militias was never denied. Allemanist antimilitarism was a device to create a revolutionary consciousness since social and economic complexities were considered poor catalysts for popular enthusiasm. They tried to associate capitalism with the causes and effects of militarism in order to arouse popular emotions. Allemane's plans to familiarize the people with his ideas involved sending dynamic teams of propagandists into the most apolitical and antisocialist hamlets of France. Scher argued that by the late 1890s the Allemanists became the most feared socialists in France.[26] Since Yonne was one of their largest federations, the

ground was well-prepared before Hervé's arrival. The *Dictionnaire Biographique Du Mouvement Ouvrier Français* noted that Hervé increased the radiation and the intensity of antimilitarist ideas in Yonne to levels heretofore unknown.[27]

Yonne's socialists had been without a local newspaper since Jean Allemane's *La Réforme Sociale de l'Yonne* had ceased publication in 1895 due to the lack of funds.[28] On April 4, 1900 a new weekly socialist newspaper, *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne*, began circulation. Though he was uninvolved with its creation, Hervé immediately began to collaborate on the regional hebdomadaire as well as on the associated publication, *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*, launched in February 1901 and published twice yearly when draftees were called to the colors. Like certain special editions of the syndicalist *La Voix du Peuple* and the Guesdist-Blanquist *Le Conscrit*, *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* called on recruits to not lose touch with their proletarian origins, to reflect on their actions, and to maintain their self-respect. Though "*Le Pioupiou de 'Yonne* achieved neither the circulation nor the universality of *Le Conscrit*, … its notoriety would be far greater."[29]

From the first issues of *Le Travailleur Socialiste*, Hervé's articles on patriotism, socialism, syndicalism, and antimilitarism integrated Yonne's history, the principles of the Jurassien Federation, and Allemanist assumptions. Hervé agreed that federalism with national decentralization at every level of French social life was necessary. He attacked the parliamentary state as an authoritarian and irresponsible monopoly of power, and he criticized the central role of Paris since it was "outside the area and control of diverse local regions."[30] For Hervé the commune was a model for a Republican federalist France which would be defended if France were attacked.[31] More specifically, however, it was in challenging patriotism that *Le Travailleur Socialiste* found its constant theme. All men and parties who preached patriotism, waved the flag, or supported the military were assailed by Hervé, who flagrantly signed his articles *Sans Patrie*. Social revolution could not occur until men became aware of the ethics which bound them to the defense of their internal class enemies.[32] It is important to realize that Hervé's critique of the patriotic and secular myths and lessons being inculcated by the Third Republic were coming from a man who was part of the first generation to "benefit" from those national unifying themes.[33] The paper's antimilitarist and antipatriotic themes fit the growing polarization common in French politics at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, yet Allemanist editorials against priests and religion also fit general Republican anticlerical patterns of the epoch.

It was not surprising that an Allemanist paper in a rural department devoted an entire page each issue to the agrarian question. As a federalist and antiparliamentary socialist, Hervé, too, became interested in the question of agrarian socialism.[34] His

articles appealed to the sense of loss and frustration of rural dwellers in an age torn by political, social, and economic dislocation. He talked of a future which would exhibit a new sense of unity and wholeness. He assumed change could begin with local communes but eventually would embrace the world. What prevented reform in his view was mainly the myth of patriotism. "We *sans patries* love the villages where we were born and grew up with our mothers and fathers, but we are without any degree of love for the artificial French *patrie* ... We do not necessarily love cities and people that we do not know simply because they are French, and we will not fight wars for ancestors and traditions which are not our own."[35] For him, race and language could not unite the French soul because France was made up of different races and language groups such as German, Flemish, Breton, Provençal, Italian, and Basque. The *Sans Patrie* stressed that nothing was sacred about the constantly changing ideas, institutions, and constitutions of France. He told peasants how their *patrie* was limited to their immediate personal world: the life, history, and traditions of their local milieu. To be truly free and to perceive their common interests with others, peasants should listen to the *Sans Patrie* and reject chauvinism.[36]

The format of *Le Travailleur Socialiste* developed from the first issues. The main theme was presented as a lead editorial which was then developed in nearly every article of that issue. Hervé, as the *Sans Patrie*, was always the author of the lead articles. Only in the summer of 1901 would the public learn the author's identity.[37] In the second issue Hervé began a series titled "Neither Nationalists, Nor Patriots."[38] An inveterate pedagogue, Hervé explained how social injustice and class oppression were related to the development of nation states in Western Europe. He examined the learning process by which the "cult of the nation" provided solace for peace and strength for war. "The religion of the nation," he wrote, "is inculcated, as in all religions, before the reasoning ability of the child has been developed and even before the catechisms of patriotism can be understood or questioned."[39] It is interesting to see how the budding socialist acolyte at this early date self-consciously compared patriotism to religion.

Against a patriotic tradition heightened by defeat in 1871, the *Sans Patrie* proposed practical and idealistic alternatives which drew on socialist, syndicalist, and anarchist ideas. He was against wars of revenge to retake Alsace-Lorraine as well as colonial expeditions. He favored international arbitration treaties requiring compliance, the enforcement of strict sanctions, and a national militia system to replace France's permanent army. Each week the *Sans Patrie* referred to his program by relating it to events which threatened to instigate European war. He gave special attention to the French army, describing it as "the capitalist fist against Africans and Asians" in France's colonial empire and "the elite's watchdog

against dissenting workers at home." He echoed familiar antimilitarist themes in describing the army as "the strike-breaker, the shield of social and economic exploitation, the jailer of protest, and the disciplinarian of the youth called to fill its ranks."[40] The army was responsible for the *coups d'états* which brought two Napoleons to power and for other threats against the Third Republic such as: the May 16 Crisis, the Boulanger Crisis, and the Dreyfus Affair. For him, social revolution was impossible until the army was destroyed. Only decentralization of the army by way of a militia system could make decentralization of the state possible. With the army as the enemy of the people neutralized, national and international federalism, such as existed in Switzerland, would be possible.[41]

Hervé recognized that not even revolutionaries were free from the prejudices of patriotism. Though he attacked the symbols of the nation, he realized that care had to be taken in assailing the nation itself. "It is not the nation, not France, which we must destroy but rather '*la patrie actuelle*' … Our nation is still an ideal which will only be realized when a socialist society has been created."[42] In bifurcating the French nation into the real and the ideal, Hervé remained in a position to transfer his idealism to France. His articles in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* were replete with accommodations as they untangled the ambivalent feelings about patriotism experienced by an increasing number of Frenchmen. Hervé's demands for restructuring national institutions were extreme, but they were often coupled with even harsher criticism of Germany. Wars of aggression were condemned, but pacific efforts to regain Alsace-Lorraine were not to be abandoned. Though permanent armies were rejected, the need for a defensive militia system was stressed.[43] If socialist demands were met, "the socialists, the *Sans Patrie*, would be at the front of the great republican army" in order to defend France against attack.[44] His rhetoric may have been quite extreme, but his ideas seldom escaped ambiguity and paradox.

Although Hervé joined an Allemanist Federation in 1899, his antimilitarism developed pragmatically rather than as an existing system of thought. He perpetually vacillated between the revolutionary elite and the spontaneous "masses" as agents for revolution. Because he sought a wide range of support, Hervé looked beyond party labels and sectarian battles. His program was eclectic because he sought a revolutionary collaboration of socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists. Since he even looked to Radicals for support, some commentators later described Hervé's ideas at this stage as little more than advanced Radicalism. "When the Federation of Yonne voted to declare its independence from Allemane's *Parti Socialiste Révolutionnaire* in May 1900, the Federation, echoing the *Sans Patrie*'s reasoning, insisted that efforts to unify the Left would be limited by affiliation

with a partisan group."[45] Yonne then became an autonomous socialist Federation but would, like most Allemanist groups, soon join Jean Jaurès's new *Parti Socialist Français* in opposition to the centralized Guesdists.

The experience of Yonne probably reflected what Bernard H. Moss has described as the loss by the P.O.S.R. of its "former vitality and strength." The party could not combine electoral action with its revolutionary program. The Allemanists were too narrowly based, both socially and organizationally, to become an effective socialist party. Based largely on Parisian skilled workers, who subordinated themselves to trade unions, and unable to compete electorally with independent socialists, the Allemanists came to have less and less appeal for the middle classes, the peasants, and even many industrial workers. Most workers rebelled against parliamentary socialism, and they were beginning to channel their energies into the independent syndicalist movement.[46] "By subordinating the party to the trade unions, the Allemanists became dependent upon the growing syndicalist movement. Losing their capacity to guide this movement, they also lost some of their best militants to it."[47] The need for a mass base in a largely rural department helps explain the changed status of the Yonne Federation and the evolving role of its principal activist, Gustave Hervé.

On October 23, 1900, Hervé as the *Sans Patrie* wrote an article in *Le Tavailleur Socialiste* entitled "*Aux Conscrits*" which aroused sufficient governmental response that it can be said to have initiated his sudden notoriety. The article also illustrates Hervé's journalistic technique quite well. As in many of his other articles, this one was written in dialogue form. If a conversation between two stock characters provides an appealing propaganda device as Scher suggested,[48] it must also be admitted that most issues require multiple not contrasting perspectives. Such dualistic simplicity and perhaps naiveté in argument may provide moralistic propaganda and rhetorical power, but such a technique undoubtedly represented a profound intellectual limitation as well. Hervé's dialogue was a closed debate and purely didactic, rather than an open inquiry.

"*Aux Conscrits*" began with an unnamed interrogator posing a question to a young draftee.

> "*Petit conscrit*, child of the people, why are you joining the army?"
>
> "I am afraid of the *gendarmes* who would send me to Biribi[49] if I refuse to join."
>
> "*Petit conscrit*, why do you evade the army?"
>
> "Because it disgusts me to let myself be dressed up like a clown; because I do not like to have to act like a puppet in the streets and squares; because I am afraid that I could not

> bear the insults of a foul-mouthed officer without flinching and without riposte; because I have other more useful things to do than to serve as a flunkey, a groom, a driver, a stableman, a cook, a furniture mover, or a good buddy to my officers and their wives; because it displeases me to be the fool who does three years' service while the rich boys, who have had the means to sit on their hind ends on school benches until they are twenty-six years old, only serve one year; because I know that at our door, in Switzerland, an understandable economic and social organization has succeeded in organizing a solid army of citizen soldiers which asks of everyone six to eight weeks of military service at the most; because I realize that with such an organization we would be unable to wage any offensive war. That is exactly the kind of war I do not want. Still, we must remain fearsome in order to defend the Republic and our meager liberties against an unjustified aggression from a neighboring despot. These are the only things I have decided to defend. Finally, I hate the army because one day, if I am in the sad need of using a rifle, I want to be able to use it against my real enemies. Above all, what I hate is to become a machine that kills on command."[50]

The general effect of the article was a rather violent antimilitarism which included veiled ideas of turning the guns of draftees against the class enemies of the people, but it also included an unmistakable, if mitigated, defense of the Republic and its liberties if it were ever attacked by an aggressive neighbor. The military was not to be outlawed, but it was to be reorganized on the Swiss model. One can undoubtedly see in this antimilitarist and antipatriotic article self-conscious ambivalence necessary for propaganda effect with the "masses," deliberate provocation to draw attention, or genuinely contradictory ideas and feelings. Even in Hervé's own mind things were never as simple as his rhetoric often implied. The ability to hold contradictory ideas was not unique to Hervé. The modern world seems to demand such ability. What was so striking about Hervé was his tendency to use extreme rhetoric, which seemed to reduce contradictions, in order to arouse the public and draw attention to him.[51] Hervé's ideas certainly remained more moderate, complex, and ambiguous than his rhetoric implied.

In February 1901 *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* reprinted Hervé's "*Aux Conscrits*." On March 19, 1901, *Le Garde des Sceaux*, the Keeper of the Seals (the Minister of Justice), acting on a prior request from the Minister of War, General André, instructed *Le Procureur Général* to prosecute *Le Pioupiou* for the article. "The nation's chief legal officer responded that such instructions were inconsistent with the press legislation of July 19, 1881, which established a three-month statute of limitations for libel prosecutions. Court interpretations of the 1881 law held that the statute began to run from the date of the original publication, which in the present case was October 23, 1900, and that republication did not renew the limitation period."[52] If this were true, then the statute of limitations had already expired. The *Procureur Général* also claimed that no violation had been committed

since conscripts not yet sworn into the military were still civilians. The Minister of Justice, however, ignored the legal advice and on April 4, 1901 ordered the government's attorneys to begin legal proceedings.[53]

Why was the article "*Aux Conscrits*" to be prosecuted at this late date? For both Scher and Gilles Heuré, the catalyst was Hervé himself. "The explanation appears to be that between October 23, 1900, when "*Aux Conscrits*" was first published, and March 19, 1901, when the charges were originally proposed, important developments had taken place in Yonne which made prosecution seem essential."[54] Scher believed that influence by Archpriest[55] Emile Olivier of Sens, the most important religious leader of Yonne, might have affected the decision of the Ministry of War.[56] In late 1900 Hervé as *Le Sans Patrie* and Olivier had engaged in a debate in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* that aroused the local populace. Heuré argued similarly, that after seven months of tireless efforts using antimilitarism to try to incite the population of Yonne, Hervé decided to go a step further by means of a "journalistic coup" which could excite the local press and maybe even gain national attention. "This gamble was going to succeed thanks to a judiciously orchestrated polemic against a high ranking cleric."[57]

Local custom dictated that a high mass be performed at the famous Saint-Etienne Cathedral at Sens preceding the induction of the latest class of military conscripts. As part of this tradition seeking the Lord's protection for the local conscripts, the archpriest generally delivered a sermon. However, on November 10, 1900, the day before the expected sermon, *Le Travailleur Socialiste* produced what was billed as an advance of the text. The tenor of the message was startling because the "Sermon of the Mount" had become transformed into a blistering antimilitarist jeremiad.

> "'In truth, I say to you, the job of the soldier, the occupation of killing men, is incompatible with the status of a Christian. It is necessary to repudiate the Gospel and your God, or refuse military service.' And the forger concluded: 'If Monsieur the Archpriest does not make fun of me and the readers of the *TSY*, if he actually delivers the simple and courageous allocution that I have reproduced above, his fellow clergy are going to feel, for the first time, that which they have undoubtedly never suspected, the revolutionary scope of early Christianity, at a time when it had not yet become the stupefying fetishism of today's Catholicism.'"[58]

Abbé Emile Olivier immediately took the bait and replied in *La Croix de l'Yonne*. Obviously, he denied authorship of the "sermon," and he responded in kind to the insolence and mirth of *Le Sans Patrie*. Claiming that he knew the identity of the author of the so-called sermon, Olivier wondered how many local revolutionary

socialists were so well-versed in Latin citations and references. Heuré argued that the pseudonym *Le Sans Patrie*, so frequently used as an epithet during the Dreyfus Affair, was employed by Hervé as a provocation, not a shelter. He sought to challenge his adversaries, not hide from them or the authorities. "Let anyone prosecute me and they will see that I will never lie low." Hervé soon got his wish as the authorities and the local population increasingly got involved. The Sens district showed signs of agitation, rumors were rampant, the principal of the Lycée of Sens received complaints, the Inspector of Schools was on the alert, the national press soon got involved, and everyone wondered about the identity of the provocative socialist writer. "In any case, the duel with the archpriest produced its effects. *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire* and Charles Péguy's *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine* reproduced the texts. In jest, the latter even commented 'that it was never a good idea to get into a fight with your priest.'"[59]



Figure 3. Sens, Yonne and the new bridge in 1900. (© CAP/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

A local problem in a rural department then became a government issue that attracted attention in the Parisian press. "A young professor, a state employee, was suspected of distorting national goals in a *lycée*, of subverting them in a Popular University, and of proposing alternatives to them in not one but two 'anarchist'

newspapers. The most abrasive aspect of the story was that the accused party dared to call himself *Le Sans Patrie*. The villain had to be unmasked and punished."[60] Soon reactionary Parisian papers such as *La Libre Parole*, *Le Gaulois*, *La Croix*, *La Patrie*, and *L'Autorité* joined in calls demanding that the identity of *Le Sans Patrie* be revealed. Hervé, however, continued his antipatriotic attacks in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* and actually increased his lecture schedule at the Popular University.[61] Banquets were organized in support of *Le Pioupiou* on September 21, 1901 at Sens and on November 4, 1901 in the 13th *arrondissement* of Paris. On December 10, 1901 a large meeting was organized at Dijon to protest Hervé's condemnation by the Academic Council there two weeks before. Such support worried the police who even feared that Hervé's impending appearance before the Superior Council in Paris in early December 1901 might increase support for the young professor if he received even harsher treatment.[62]

Abbé "Olivier's influence apparently reached as far as the Ministry of War"[63] because charges launched against *Le Pioupiou* in the spring of 1901 eventually led to actions against three people on the staff. According to the law the editors had to assume primary legal responsibility for any lawsuits against a paper. That meant that the editor's home as well as the offices of the paper would be searched by the police. When an administrator named Monneret had his home raided, no evidence turned up revealing the identity of *Le Sans Patrie*, and the police got no information from the resident. The police also heard from M. Germain, the Director of the Lycée of Sens, who thought that Hervé's ideas and style of writing fit articles of *Le Sans Patrie*. Yet the target of the indictment could not be charged because rumors concerning his identity were not admissible evidence. Handwriting analysts also failed to connect *Le Sans Patrie* and Hervé.[64]

After the first request on March 15, 1901 by the Minister of War for an indictment against *Le Pioupiou*, administrative repression began to move against Hervé. When he was eventually subpoenaed for questioning by the local prosecuting attorney at Auxerre, he refused to disclose anything until he was first indicted. The local prosecutor "was completely thrown by the calmness of Hervé's reply, because he wouldn't deny or admit anything. Alas! On June 25, 1901 the *Procureur Général* informed the Minister of Justice that a lack of evidence demanded a dismissal of charges against Herve."[65] Meanwhile, the Minister of Public Instruction, the eloquent Progressist Georges Leygues, a precocious *ministrable* and former Minister of the Interior, known for his conservative and anti-socialist views, was watching the situation in Sens quite closely. Leygues received reports from Charles Adam, the rector of the Academie of Dijon, concerning Hervé and various articles in the *Le Travailleur Socialiste* and local press.[66] When Adam, as a

member of the Academic Council in Dijon, was ordered by Leygues to interview Hervé regarding his authorship of *Le Sans Patrie* articles, Hervé refused to respond to that question and declared that no one had the right to ask him such a question. So no identification was possible.[67] In early June 1901 the Minister of Public Instruction again ordered Hervé to appear before a new academic investigating committee. Again, Hervé "insisted that his behavior outside his classroom was not subject to University control."[68] Professor Hervé claimed that a civil trial was necessary if he were suspected of violating press laws. Leygues later recalled: "I warned M. Hervé that his refusal to respond would be taken as an admission of guilt."[69] Due to his non-cooperation, Hervé was relieved of his functions at the *lycée* on June 11, 1901. "Following the academic chain of appeals, he petitioned the Council of Disciplinary Action at Dijon."[70]

The trial date for *Le Pioupiou* defendants, excluding Hervé, was set for August. However, even before the trial could take place, Hervé created another scandal. If his duel with Abbé Olivier had been quite a propaganda coup, a new article in Yonne's socialist newspaper included an image which would make Hervé immediately infamous and then be employed against him for the rest of his life.[71] Just a few weeks after Hervé had been eliminated in *Le Pioupiou* case, *Le Travailleur Socialiste* on July 20, 1901 included a devastating editorial by *Le Sans Patrie* entitled "The Anniversary of Wagram."[72] That article referred to a purely local event, the recent commemoration in the Yonne of Napoleon's 1809 victory at Wagram.[73] The article was based on an account of the battle presented in the *Mémoires de Marbot* by the actual field commander. That account reported how the fires in the farm fields after the battle actually roasted alive as many soldiers as the battle itself had killed. Hervé also utilized Thiers' history for an account of the orgy and carnage after the battle. The editorial lamented how young soldiers were united not by the color of their uniforms but by their screams of agony. The blood and gore so disgusted the *Sans Patrie* that his editorial demanded a more fitting and symbolic way to remember such ignominious events.[74] "*L'Anniversaire de Wagram*" is far too long to be quoted completely but the essentials are clear. *Le Sans Patrie* said that Wagram was a Napoleonic victory. It was a victory of the man who strangled the First Republic which the soldiers of the Third Republic recently glorified in a ceremony at Auxerre by the army regiment there. For the Third Republic to celebrate such carnage, such roasting of wounded and dead, and such destruction of the harvest was the equivalent of forcing the sons of peaceful workers and peasants to honor a Napoleonic bloodbath. Ceremonies like the one at Auxerre sustain and perpetuate the cult of the sword. Obviously, France must be corrupt to the core. "There was only one worthy and symbolic fashion to celebrate such a victory" according to Hervé.

> "As long as there are barracks for the edification of the soldiers of our democracy, serving to dishonor militarism and wars of conquest in their eyes, I demand that all the excrement and dung [*ordure et fumier*] be gathered in the main square of the district. Then, in the presence of all the troops dressed in parade attire and with the military music playing, the colonel in full finery must solemnly plant the flag of the regiment in the dung pile."[75]

This article made Hervé instantly notorious; from now on he would be known as "*l'homme du drapeau dans le fumier*." The image created of a flag planted in a pile of dung was bound to shock sensibilities, but were the effects of the article as unexpected and unprecedented as Scher believed?[76] Throughout his career Hervé would take great pains to explain how *le drapeau dans le fumier* referred to the Napoleonic and regimental flags, not the tricolor. In September 1909 in the wake of Briand's accession to the position of Prime Minister, Hervé wrote: "This was a republican and anti-Napoleonic article, not antipatriotic. It was reactionaries who created the legend of the flag in the dungpile …"[77] A 1912 collection of Hervé's most provocative speeches and editorials titled *Mes Crimes* began with his Wagram article. That volume was gathered together and published while he was in prison and well into his famous *revirement.* In the volume's preface Hervé claimed that the Wagram article was written in anger against the Minister of Public Instruction for trying to revoke his teaching credentials. He situated the article as the time just before his appearance before the Cour d'Assises, when the whole nationalist and reactionary pack was demanding legal action against him for "*Aux Conscrits*." "The image [*le drapeau dans le fumier*] was questionable in its style but the article in itself was simply anti-Bonapartist. It took all the skill of the clericals to manipulate and truncate the texts, and all the spinelessness of the republican and avant-garde press, which did not dare to re-establish the truth in citing the complete text, so that the legend which everyone knows about could be created." Even though the article was never tried in court, as his friends reminded him: "That did not matter! It was because of the article that you have received so many years of prison. In reality, it's that article which is judged each time you are dragged before the judges."[78]

Perhaps Hervé was torn by the realization that he had become an instant celebrity due a misunderstanding. It seems hard to believe that he was not inviting scandal, and even Scher admitted that Hervé "masterfully exploited the events which occurred in Yonne."[79] The syndicalist and anticlerical historian Maurice Dommanget's claimed that the legend of the flag in the dung pile could not have occurred without Hervé's equivocal formula which lent itself to diverse interpretations. Dommanget explained the affair in terms of a triple complicity of Republicans, socialists, and Hervé himself. "One must believe that the attention given to

Hervé did not displease this almost unknown militant. Despite the entreaties of his friends, he allowed the legend to gain credence, and the bomb reverberated all over France … Hervé was very severe with others but was rather indulgent with himself … his complicity is undeniable."[80]

Socialist historian Alexandre Zévaès made similar observations in several of his books. Zévaès admitted that the image of the flag in the dung pile had been taken out of context and was loudly exploited against Hervé. It really was just a question of the Napoleonic flag. Hervé had simply used a scandalous image to stress the most appropriate way to celebrate the Napoleonic victory at Wagram. Nevertheless, Zévaès claimed that Hervé had refused to explain the meaning of his article; he had allowed the legend to stand and a scandal to develop. Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, had hit the mark according to Zévaès when he claimed that Hervé simply shot off fireworks to startle the onlookers.[81] Victor Méric called the whole episode "*un véritable bateau*," a genuine hoax. Méric recalled how Hervé always found the episode most amusing. To win notoriety so quickly due to a misunderstanding was, evidently, not at all displeasing to Hervé. "I still can see his amusement, … dressed in his military tunic as he rubbed his hands joyously together. 'The imbeciles … they will finally believe their own words.'"[82]

Hervé could easily have ended the misunderstandings on a national level as he had done locally in Yonne according to Dommanget. He could have sent the Parisian press the same kinds of clarifications which he placed in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* on August 3, 1901.[83] In his 1935 interview with Charles Chassé, Hervé justified his behavior by saying that once he realized that he had been misquoted, he responded to the Parisian press. However, a Yonne conservative had sent *L'Echo de Paris* a truncated passage of the infamous article. Hervé argued that this version, not the article itself, was picked up by the rest of the Parisian press, and he found himself a scapegoat and the symbol for French antipatriotism.[84]

The reactions of the editor of *L'Œuvre*, Gustave Téry, combined invective, polemics, and an amazing perspicacity in his dissection of contemporary French politics. Though he had defended Hervé in print and would testify for him in court in 1901, by 1907 Téry was violently hostile to his former teaching colleague. "There are people who have the talent to use a pleasing manner to get the most outrageous paradoxes accepted. There are others, like Hervé, who have the talent to make the most reasonable ideas appear loathsome. Téry cited the October 27, 1900 article "Aux Conscrits" to show that Hervé's July 20, 1901 image of the flag in the dung pile was created at a time when Hervé believed in the need to defend the Republic against possible aggression by Germany. At a time when Hervé established an indissoluble association of ideas including him,

the flag, and the dung pile, he also believed in the armed defense of France. What caused Hervé to move toward such extreme expressions when his ideas themselves were not nearly so explosive? As Téry saw it, Hervé passionately sought fame and notoriety. The editor of *L'Œuvre* accused Hervé of getting the editors of *La Petite République* and *L'Aurore* to adopt his cause and allow him to write and edit articles in their newspapers.[85]

Hervé would have been invented had he not existed, according to Téry, because the reactionary press used his "extremism" to paralyze the Left. The editor of *Le Temps*, Adrien Hebrard, supposedly invented Hervé in order to erect a "great red collectivist scarecrow," thereby stopping the advance of socialism. Despite Téry's obvious exaggeration and perhaps his incipient anti-Semitism, Hervé was a ready-made symbol easily utilized by the forces of reaction. Though Jaurès defended him by citing freedoms of press, speech, and thought, Téry plausibly charged that Hervé's popularity on the Left had led Jaurès to embrace him. Téry did not deny that, next to the cultured Jaurès, Hervé was a philistine and a megalomaniacal study-hall proctor with a penchant for assaulting the bourgeoisie.[86] The example of Hervé provided Téry with "proof" that Jaurès was guilty of pure demagoguery in his need to utilize the crowds excited by Hervé's foolishness. To explain Jaurès's actions in this era in terms of a need to upstage Hervé seems a rather gross distortion, but to see Hervé as a willing creation of the "media" may not be inaccurate. Ironically, Téry labeled Hervé a shameless nationalist and a frantic militarist. In Téry's view, the fiercest anticlericals were clericals reacting against their previous values. Hervé prepared a civil war in peacetime for lack of a foreign war in the defense of France. The significance of Hervé's military clothing was obvious to Téry.[87]

The notoriety of Gustave Hervé was a critical element in what was probably the most original contemporary account of the Dreyfus Affair. The author of that account, Charles Péguy, stated that he created the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* on January 5, 1900 as an independent socialist revue at the symbolic dawn of the new century. He thereby intended to speak freely outside of any official party lines, to question everything in complete liberty, and, thereby, to dare to imagine what a future society might look like.[88] Hervé had subscribed to the *Cahiers* by May 31, 1900 and met Péguy several times in Paris. When Hervé was suspended from teaching for eighteen months and fined by the Academic Council of Dijon on November 27, 1901, Péguy became interested in the Hervé Affair as a challenge to the political freedom of teachers and professors under the Third Republic.[89] For Péguy, "It was a question of knowing whether functionaries were deprived of part of their rights as citizens, in particular the right to express and propagate their political opinions; it was a question of knowing whether the educators of the

youth of this country, which flatters itself as being a Republic, and the masters, who have as a mission to form free citizens, must themselves be slaves in political matters."[90]

Péguy believed that Hervé's sudden prominence was inextricably bound to the metamorphosis of the Dreyfus Affair. In the 1909 volume *Notre Jeunesse*, a sort of idealization of the Dreyfus Affair before its noble motives were supposedly undermined and manipulated, Péguy echoed the charges made by Téry, though both men had been early supporters of Hervé. Péguy's iconoclastic analysis of Hervé was more eloquent, more nuanced, and less polemical than Téry's. According to Péguy's famous aphorism, the Dreyfus Affair began in *mystique*, the defense of republican and Christian ideals, but it ended in *politique* as the Affair was manipulated for electoral demagoguery. The idealistic founders came first, but in Péguy's view they were soon followed by the profiteers like Hervé. Yet the chief culprit in the loss of an already won battle was his former idol, hero, and father figure, Jean Jaurès, who was increasingly cast in the role of ultimate demagogue by Péguy. The decomposition of Dreyfusism was essentially a refusal to sanction any of the guilty in order to make political gains. The combat for power displaced the combat for justice. Jaurès supposedly made use of Hervéism for his own electoral purposes, and thereby allowed the Dreyfusards to appear to be an anti-French *parti de l'étranger*. For Péguy, it was Jaurès who made antipatriotism, antimilitarism, and anti-Christianity synonymous with the Dreyfusards even though this was a betrayal of deeply French impulses of the original defenders of Dreyfus. "In the eyes of Péguy, no one had done more to destroy the dreams of his youth than Jaurès, no one had done as much to banalize, 'parliamentarize', the meaning of the great words revolution, liberty …"[91]

In his psychologically perspicacious biography, Marc Tardieu documented Péguy's love of purity, his search for absolute justice, his uncompromising idealism, his destructiveness, and his idiosyncratic inwardness. Péguy gradually grew disillusioned with socialism because parliamentarianism seemed to be a sellout of an earlier idealism. The same words, rhetoric, and themes meant something completely different because they had become part of crass political maneuvering and behind-the-scenes dealing. Péguy, who valued questioning and freedom above all, now freely questioned Jaurès. The culminating event in Péguy's general disillusionment and his disappointment with Jaurès undoubtedly sprang when his 1903 request to write for *L'Humanité*, then being staffed and funded by the socialist tribune, was rebuffed. If Péguy was becoming disabused of his naïve faith in heroes at that time, he still had the tendency of finding heroes among his friends, who no longer included Jaurès and certainly never really included Hervé.[92] It is a bit ironic

that Péguy assailed Hervé for having helped to desecrate the spiritual foundations of the Dreyfusard cause, for having turned the sacred aesthetics of the holy cause into quotidian politics, yet one can read Hervé's political evolution as a rather mundane rejection politics, as such, in a naïve effort to create some sort of eternal unity and harmony described in language both pedestrian and grandiose. It may be even more ironic that Péguy's own "aesthetization of politics" and spiritualized nationalism would be cited as inspiration by both collaborationist intellectuals and members of the French Resistance.[93]

In 1905, after the First Moroccan Crisis and the fall of Foreign Minister Theophilé Delcassé, Péguy published *Notre Patrie* "so that it may be a direct and brutal response to Hervé's book."[94] Tardieu described Péguy's volume as an affirmation of an identity and a signal that the writer had emerged from a long quest which represented a change of conscience. "At a certain level, Péguy's *Notre Patrie* was a response to Hervé's *Leur Patrie*." Not that Péguy's socialism had ever rejected his country, but now, at the time of the Kaiser's salvo at Tangier, Péguy, whose father was a victim of the Franco-Prussian War, admitted his own dormant bellicosity and prepared for war. *Notre Patrie* embodied a rediscovery of a collective identity signified by the word "*notre*".[95]

Though Péguy admired Hervé's courage in going to prison for his convictions, he rejected his assumptions and inconsistencies. But his main target was Jaurès who sanctioned Hervéist demagoguery through his negotiations and compromise with the *Sans Patrie*. Jaurès's capitulation before Hervé gave the Breton firebrand the same moral, political, and social authority of both socialism and Jaurès himself. Without Jaurès, Hervé was nothing. Jaurès authorized and authenticated him. It was Jaurès who gave Hervé the authority to change the debate about Dreyfus, thereby transforming the Affair.[96]

> "Founded on the same postulate, starting from the same postulate, we spoke the same language. The anti-Dreyfusards said, 'treason by a soldier is a crime, and the soldier Dreyfus has betrayed.' We said, 'treason by a soldier is a crime, and Dreyfus has not betrayed.' Since Hervé came, all that has changed. In appearance, the same conversation goes on; the affair continues. But it is not the same affair, the same conversation … It is something infinitely other, because the basis of the debate has shifted. Hervé is a man who says, 'one must betray.'"[97]

The great fault of Dreyfus was not to be a traitor when one must be one! This is what Péguy implied was the essential meaning of "*le drapeau dans le fumier*" and the whole Hervéist movement which issued from it. Logically, Péguy felt that Hervé ought to have been an anti-Dreyfusard. In fact, Péguy attacked Hervé not

so much for his demagoguery, because Jaurès was responsible for that, but for his caution! Hervé ought to have proclaimed himself the real traitor, the true Dreyfus! Yet Hervé did have the merit of being true to his convictions. Jaurès betrayed all: Dreyfus, socialism, and Hervéism, too. In Péguy's less than objective view, the one thing that Jaurès never betrayed was Combist anticlericalism. In the end Péguy described Hervé as a profiteer and a parasite who used the groundwork laid by the founders of the Dreyfusard cause for his own purposes. Otherwise, he could never have attained such fame overnight. Hervé profited from and hence abused Dreyfusard idealism. His political demagoguery turned *mystique* into *politique* for his own advantage and notoriety, and this would have been impossible without the complacency of Jaurès.[98] Péguy called Hervé a mere epiphenomenon or excrescence of the mentality of Jaurès. Hervéism was described as a particular case of intellectual infirmity and duplicity, a kind of pragmatism much like Jaurèsism. Péguy did not believe that Hervé was crazy, as some thought, but he was a criminal. Hervé was a poor imitation of Jaurès, his model, who supposedly used high ideals for material gain and social position.[99]

The Hervé phenomenon elicited a similar perspective from writer Georges Suarez, who viewed Hervé's rise to prominence as an aspect of the popularization and simplification of scholarly ideas emanating from eminent men such as Lucien Herr, the Marxist librarian at the École Normale Supérieure. Heretofore, such notions had been systematic and limited to a highly cultured elite; Hervé's role had been to "grossly interpret" the ideas of men in whose intellectual shadows he lived. At a time when academics at all levels were enjoying greater prestige, Suarez observed how pedanticism, cloudy mental constructions, and the people who used them had attained new status. Hervé's exhibitionism, which was a product of youth and ardor, publicized his ideas and raised his status, yet that showmanship did not cause Suarez to doubt his sincerity and courage.[100] For Maurice Agulhon all this could be translated as follows: "One starts with Bernard Lazare and Lucien Herr, pure apostles, and one ends up with Émile Combes. It is known that Péguy never forgave his former friend Jaurès for having accepted the fellowship of the last-named [the flagrant anticlerical *Président du Conseil* Émile Combes] after having known that of the other two [Lazare and Herr]."[101]

The scandal created by "The Anniversary of Wagram" certainly made Hervé an instant celebrity as "the man who planted the French flag in a dung pile." His days of relative obscurity were over after July 20, 1901. That infamous article, although never subject to legal action, was "probably the one which earned Hervé all his prison sentences."[102] The image created had been so powerful that it "was irrevocably cut into the French mind" and Hervé came to symbolize antipatriotism

and antimilitarism for the French people. The phrase "*le drapeau dans le fumier*" entered the national language repertoire of famous phrases, and now became part of the French language.[103] L.O. Frossard, the socialist/communist activist and historian, claimed that the doctrine of Hervéism was forged around the insane paradoxes of the article, which turned international socialism into antipatriotism.[104] In Victor Méric's opinion, "L'Anniversaire de Wagram" was "… the point of departure for all Hervé's squalid notoriety …" "The indignation created by Hervé's article attained enormous proportions. The entire press was aroused."[105]

Given his *Blocard* strategy advocating alliances with other sympathetic leftists and his concern to lead hesitant audiences to greater awareness of social and national issues, Scher claimed that at this time Hervé did not want to be known as an extremist who would mix the flag with excrement.[106] That assessment differs markedly from those of most of Hervé's contemporaries. Actually, Hervé's polemical journalism used ambiguity and dialogue which invited alternative explanations. The provocation inherent in his image was clear even if the logic of the article was more moderate. The provocative rhetoric struck his readers so forcefully that a careful analysis of content ought not to have been expected. If Hervé's notoriety could not have been predicted, he should not have been surprised by his readers' reactions. Hervé's fame may have been an accident, but the need to shock the public became the core of his technique. Whether Hervé sought fame or simply used it, one could argue that he did not employ it for money, political office, or the perquisites of power. Rather, he used fame in the service of his ideals. The reverse image of the attack on the nation and its army was peace, brotherhood, and universal harmony. Provocative rhetoric could be justified by noble ideals just as fame and notoriety could be sanctioned by the cause they served. The Hervé phenomenon was clearly media driven, and he was exceptionally skilled at using them. Because his message was so shocking one forgets that it was produced by and for the various changing media. Was that the deeper message?[107]

In a recent review of Antoine Lilti's *Figures publiques: L'Invention de la célébrité*, Robert Darnton's summary may help to place the Hervé phenomenon in a wider context. Rather than being a very recent phenomemon, the modern concept of "celebrity" took shape during the Enlightenment "when the media acquired unprecedented power." The modern usage began to be found in dictionaries by 1720 and was in widespread use after 1750. Rather than being a specific idea, "it was a new element in the mental landscape shared by an entire population", a new way for ordinary people to think about everyday experiences. Sociologists and others would soon invent terminology such as public, public opinion, public

space, and collective consciousness to help grasp the gradually changing situation which was being formed, according to Darnton, due to urbanization, increased wealth and leisure, an expanding economy of consumption, and the rapid growth in the culture industries, especially in the printed media. The notion of celebrity can be situated:

> "between two older notions: on the one hand, reputation, a judgment attached to a person by others in relatively close contact with him or her, and glory, a renown earned by great deeds that extends far beyond the range of individual contacts and outlasts the life of the celebrated person. Like reputation, celebrity tends to be ephemeral. Like glory, it reaches many people, moving in one direction: a celebrity is known to a broad public, but he or she does not know them. The knowledge, however, is superficial. It is attached to an image of the person conveyed by the media, whether printed pamphlets and crude woodcuts or films and Facebook. Also, celebrity tends to be double-edged. It may be desirable, but once achieved, it can produce painful aftereffects, such as a sense of imprisonment within one's public self while suffering damage to one's true self."[108]

There is no indication that Hervé was ever troubled existentially about his newfound celebrity status, but sudden notoriety came at a long-term price. Besides losing his teaching position, eventually sending him to prison, and sabotaging a budding legal career after 1905, *l'homme du drapeau dans le fumier* would be tainted by his reputation for the rest of his life. Notoriety made Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale* possible, but when he later shifted his views, everyone would know it and never forget. Few would forgive.

The sudden fame provided Hervé with many new allies in his confrontation with a system in need of reform. Students in Yonne, teachers throughout France, writers in Paris, and socialists of various stripes sympathized with Hervé's message. As the subject of increasing press coverage, Hervé's ideas were supported and quoted by the leftist press, and they influenced other antimilitarist papers then being created. The image of *le drapeau dans le fumier* turned Hervé into a political celebrity who would gradually forge the eponymous movement Hervéism as an essential part of the larger kaleidoscope of French politics. The structure of politics and the matrix of political ideas in the Third Republic were recrystallized once Hervéism became an important political element. If anarchists remained skeptical about the antimilitarist credentials of any socialist who distinguished between flags of Wagram and Valmy, socialists like Guesde and Jaurès might now appear more moderate to others on the Left. Reactionaries could now find obvious "proof" of the dangers presented by socialism due to its apparently increasing penetration by the forces of antimilitarism. Moderates now had clearer benchmarks from which to orient their political maneuvers.

Years later Hervé claimed that he "was like any good Dreyfusard of the epoch … very critical of the army command." However, as mentioned above, he claimed that a local conservative, in order to magnify the importance of the affair and get it denounced by the major newspapers as rapidly as possible, sent "a truncated version of the article" to *L'Echo de Paris*. "I became, from one day to the next, the scapegoat of antipatriotism."[109] Scher argued that Hervé, in fact, tried to stop the misrepresentations of his article by sending letters of protest to *Le Figaro*, and *Le Temps* after *L'Echo de Paris* had reprinted the truncated article. When these efforts failed to impress the Parisian press, he printed a "humble retraction" in the August 3, 1901 issue of *Le Travailleur Socialiste*. "Whatever the format, his statements in the letters and in the editorial constituted a retreat—nothing less than an apology for his indiscreet language."[110] Heuré agreed. *Le Sans Patrie* lamented his bad luck in appearing to have outraged the national flag, because he thought he was defending the tricolor whose essence was defiled by the recent celebration of the Battle of Wagram. He insisted that there was nothing to be upset about.[111] Nevertheless, the image created by Hervé had been too powerful for this attempt at self-exoneration to work, however strong or sincere it may have been.

The same August 3, 1901 issue of *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne* with his "humble retraction" also included an insolent and satirical article by Hervé which revealed himself as *Le Sans Patrie* in an open letter to the chief prosecutor [*Le Procureur de la République*] of Auxerre. In it he accepted authorship for the incriminating articles but challenged the government to find a jury which would convict the accused for having the wit to demand that the Republic actually have a republican army. He preferred to face the dangers head on rather than experience the humiliation of doing nothing while articles in which he put the best of himself were attacked. As a teacher who told his students to never fear defending justice and truth, he had long believed in teaching by example. Whatever he had lost in prestige by appearing to recant from the Wagram article, he tried to regain by a dramatic self-revelation. Soon after learning that he was not indicted with the editors of *Le Pioupiou*, Hervé demanded to be tried alongside them. Scher called this effort to be tried for "*Aux Conscrits*" an attempt to defend "*L'Anniversaire de Wagram.*"[112] He may also have simply wanted to remain in the limelight. Hervé rejected the argument that he was playing into the hands of the enemies of socialism by depriving the Federation of Yonne of its leading militant. "The real interest of the Socialist Party is to renounce as soon as possible the opportunism towards which it is slowly sliding." He thanked the comrades who had claimed to be *Le Sans Patrie* in an effort to help him, and he asked his friends not to wonder whether his motives were laced with political ambition or a taste for theatrics.[113]

Self-disclosure undoubtedly enabled Hervé to publicize his antipatriotic and antimilitarist message.[114] For Gilles Heuré, "The objective was attained: to be recognized, even by the national press, as a troublemaker."[115]

The *Procureur Général* became incensed after the disclosure because now Hervé would have to be indicted, and that would push the August 5, 1901 trial of *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* back until mid-November 1901. The *Procureur Général* virtually apologized to the Minister of Justice because he found nothing in the Wagram article which attacked the army of the Third Republic. The *Procureur Général* certainly recognized the provocative intent of the article. So, to be tactful, cooperative, and careful, he promised to refer the matter to the Minister of War. The latter hoped to prosecute "The Anniversary of Wagram" article along with "*Aux Conscrits*," but he failed to get the Ministry of Justice to approve. The Ministry of War was informed that "… there is hardly any sign of offense to the army of the Republic. The criticism is directed especially against the armies of the First Republic."[116]

Hervé's articles from August to November 1901 in *Le Travaileur Socialiste*, now signed with his own name, were almost exclusively concerned "with the difference between the Republic exemplified by the democratic spirit of Valmy and the Republic as it presently existed—*la république actuelle*." If Hervé's anti-Republican Republicanism seems a bit contradictory, it did succeed in obfuscating the apparent polarity: nationalism-internationalism. Living in the real yet striving for the ideal can give one clearly contrasting choices or wide latitude for maneuver and compromise. In 1901 Hervé used the dichotomy of the real versus the ideal republic to soften his notorious image and at the same time to continue his offensive.[117] His distinctions were aimed at the populace, not the government because Hervé wanted a trial.

In order to obtain expert legal advice concerning his situation as both a professor and a journalist, on several occasions in 1901 Hervé met with Aristide Briand, the eloquent socialist attorney and fellow Breton then in the process of a meteoric rise to the highest positions of political power. For Maurice Agulhon, Briand would soon be seen "as the archetype of socialists who had turned renegade through pushiness and opportunism." But in 1901, although Briand's ideas were rapidly evolving, he was still a socialist who had once advocated the use of the general strike and was also known to have been a friend of Fernand Pelloutier, the famous syndicalist organizer. At the time: "All that could be seen was a brilliant [nearly] forty-year-old bachelor, somewhat Bohemian and indolent, with a casual hairstyle, cigarette in hand, but sure of having such superiority of eloquence, talent and charm over his colleagues that he would never lack a leading role."[118]

When he met Briand at the offices of the Radical paper *La Lanterne*, Hervé must have known that his attorney had championed revolutionary syndicalist views a few years before. In his laudatory biography of Briand, Georges Suarez claimed that the socialist attorney was obliged to defend Hervé due to party discipline. Apparently, Briand's own ideas had already moderated considerably by 1901. If Suarez is correct, there was something incredibly naïve and gullible about Hervé which attracted Briand to him, not any similarity in views at that time. In their initial meeting Suarez described the indicted journalist as a bit intimidated.

> "Hervé mumbled in an empty and ridiculous fashion. He uttered stupidities with a smile, [replete with] his weak silly remarks … He was timid, self-conscious, twisting his goatee in telling his story with whispered and confidential inflections. He employed manners, which were unctuous, outmoded, almost ecclesiastical, rolling his fingers into one another or crossing his arms over his chest. He was frightfully myopic, barely waving his hands to feel his pockets, vest, or glasses. You could say he was afraid of losing sight of his limbs in moving them away from his body. Briand was astonished to find this tranquil priestly type in the rough and tumble world politics. This gentleness, so strange in a rebel, seduced and troubled him. Did Hervé take the words, sentences, and epithets literally?"[119]

It is possible that Briand simply used this sensational affair to dramatize his own career. In a brochure written in 1909 titled "*Aristide Briand dit Aristide le Cynique*", which was a supplement of *L'Œuvre* of April 15, 1909, Gustave Téry described Briand as a black sheep and a frenzied *arriviste.*[120] In 1895 Fernand Pelloutier's mother told socialist-anarchist writer Augustin Hamon that "Briand is capable of anything."[121] At the S.F.I.O. Congress of Nîmes, Hervé would lump Millerand, Viviani, and Briand together as renegades even though Briand managed to remain friends with most socialist deputies after attaining power and abandoning his former revolutionary views.[122] Briand once told Aristide Jobert: "You will never be an orator because you say what you think. It is not necessary to say what you think, rather you should think about what you are going to say."[123]

When the trial began at Auxerre on November 13, 1901, Hervé entered the court accompanied by Briand who wore a coat and donned a top hat.[124] Gilles Heuré claimed that it was not exactly a fair fight because the prosecution had much less training for such confrontations than did the antimilitarists and their attorneys.[125] "At 11:00 a.m. the courtroom was full, the stands were crammed, and in the press section sat several colleagues from the great Parisian papers; several press agency correspondents and the local and departmental press was naturally all there."[126] Excitement was in the air and "some expected a riot. The military and

gendarmes were armed and ready to deal with the restless crowd which encircled the area around Palais de Justice. Peasants, workers, sympathizers, but also local businessmen and artisans were in the streets shouting the name Hervé. Some of them even brandished bludgeons which they threatened to use if the defendants were not freed from the courtroom." Among the accused, Hervé was alert and vigilant according to one local journalist. "His moustache and goatee were almost red, in contrast to his brown hair, his eyes were myopic, blinking behind his indispensable pince-nez. Hervé tilted his head forward in order to better hear. Naturally, he did not get rid of his perennial smile and air of calm goodness, which anyone who knew him would be astonished not to see on Hervé's face." Briand appeared pallid once he had changed into his black robes. A young lieutenant gave the accused a dirty look, yet the judge was seen trembling in fear beneath his robes.[127]

The judge first questioned the other indicted editors who admitted their involvement with *Le Pioupiou*. When Hervé was questioned, the judge asked him if the term *Sans Patrie* was his pseudonym. When the judge spoke to Hervé without using his Christian name, Hervé reciprocated by referring to the judge as President with no mention of the judge's last name. The audience laughed, assuming that this impertinent air was intentionally disrespectful. For the moment Hervé simply admitted to being *Le Sans Patrie*, the author of "*Aux Conscrits*," and a history professor, but his impolite method of address to the judge had already scandalized the court.[128]

The prosecution witnesses did not amount to much. A few intimidated gendarmes came to explain how *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* was distributed to recruits. There was also a pharmacist, who for a long time was erroneously thought to have informed against the accused, yet he admitted that, as a healthcare professional, many of his clients got their shameful ailments while they were in the army. On the other hand, the defense witnesses evoked a quiver of pride among the audience because the list included the entire local elite, mayors, and Radical notables. Among the defense witnesses were some of the elite of the French university system such as Professor Sarthou, a scholar of rhetoric at Angoulême. Sarthou recalled that Hervé was a beloved teacher who lived a life of great simplicity and had an arduous work ethic. Gustave Téry, an *agrégé* in philosophy and former colleague of Hervé, praised his outstanding demeanor. Another *agrégé* named Milhaud, a professor of history from Saint-Quentin, also sat as a character witness. In the face of such intellectual luminaries, the public prosecutor Michel gave a mediocre response, topping it off with an egregious error. He actually read one of the incriminated articles, "The Ten Commandments of the Soldier," which "fostered a curious complicity or unleashed utter hilarity" in the courtroom.[129]

When Briand spoke to the jury, he demanded an acquittal of the accused who had simply wanted France to become a nation of reason, justice, and liberty instead of a land of chauvinism, militarism, and clericalism. He stressed how sad it was, after thirty years of a Republic, that such trials, limiting freedoms of speech and the press, could still exist.[130] Years later, Briand explained his courtroom technique at the time of the trial as an intentional identification with the ideas of the accused. Yet at the time, he presented Hervé as a defender of a certain conception of the nation while comparing the trial to that of Dreyfus. "How could the army be harmed when *Le Pioupiou* calls Esterhazy a procurer and a forger?" Briand said he was not just defending Hervé out of his duty as an attorney but as a friend who was in complete agreement with the ideas of the accused. "I associate myself with the noble words of a man in whom the spirit of French Revolution lives on."[131] The eloquent Briand claimed to be amazed that this case had ever been allowed to go forward and told the jury he did not doubt they would acquit the accused. The audience, clearly enraptured by the eloquence of Briand, erupted in frantic applause when he finished, which forced the judge to call for order. All could now see that the battle was over.[132] According to Suarez, Briand came to distrust this technique of identifying with his clients' views after 1901, and he would later label the ideas of Hervé as "casuistry for Iroquois." Despite his earlier extremism, Briand was not associated with antipatriotic ideas like those of Hervé.[133]

When Hervé took the witness stand, his two hour plea to the expectant courtroom was less a defense of himself than a sermon or lecture on education, militarism, imperialism, and patriotism. Though he asked for an acquittal, Hervé promised to continue to write provocative articles as long as standing armies had not been replaced by militias.[134] He responded to the questions of the presiding judge with revolutionary slogans such as "*Plûtot que de tirer en cas de grève sur les frères, la crosse en l'air!*"[135] and "Long live universal peace! Down with War!" Such rhetoric stirred the audience into numerous cries of "Bravo!" So the judge threatened to clear the courtroom of visitors.[136]

> "Blending the logic of a professor with the rude language of a peasant, Hervé had turned the courtroom into his classroom, his meeting hall, his popular university. He had come to be judged and he concluded by judging. He had unnerved the judge and prosecutor because of his disregard of their protocol. He had won over the spectators because of his identification with their cause. The discourse itself had been Hervé's supreme performance to date. The general acquittal which followed after only twenty minutes of deliberation was less important than the mood which the *Sans Patrie* had created. An overwhelmingly bourgeois jury had decided that Hervé and his friends were impassioned Republicans not subversive revolutionaries."[137]

Besides exonerating the defendants, the jury warmly congratulated them and donated their trial compensation for the next issue of *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne.* And that very evening the defendants, their lawyers, and much of the audience gathered at the Salle des Charmilles in Auxerre to celebrate the event, which soon became a ritual after such acquittals.[138]

Life did not slow down for Hervé. The Academic Council of Dijon announced that in late November it would hear Hervé's appeal concerning his suspension from the Lycée of Sens. The central question before the Council was whether the rights of national teachers were compatible with those of private citizens. In Hervé's testimony to the Council, he stated his view that teachers outside the classroom ought to have the same privileges enjoyed by other citizens. He claimed to be the first professor ever dismissed for writing an article which the courts could not prosecute. He believed that his case represented a threat to the entire Republican educational system. The final decision of the Dijon Council announced on November 27 was an eighteen month suspension, including a reduction of pay by two-fifths, contingent on his reinstatement as a professor within the same period. So, Hervé appealed to the Superior Council of Public Instruction in Paris.[139]

The day after the Dijon Council's decision a huge banquet in support of Hervé was organized in Paris at the Salle Vantier on the Avenue de Clichy. Among the five hundred guests, who included teachers, famous writers, and prominent politicians, was Jean Jaurès. Even though the banquet was not requested by Hervé, the idealistic Péguy advised him to avoid allowing himself to be manipulated and used by the luminaries on the Left for their own less than noble political ambitions. When Hervé refused to comply on the grounds that he did not wish to cause another scandal by letting his friends down and appearing ungrateful, Péguy saw this as a sign of weakness, demagoguery, eagerness to please, and a lack of seriousness by Hervé who soon came to epitomize the publicity seeking, popularizing, and self-promoting tendencies so anathema to Péguy. Hervé's penchant for self-promotion seemed even less idealistic because it came at a time when the *Cahiers* were losing precious subscribers by publishing Hervé's first articles. Rather than ceding to the sirens of renown, Péguy expected Hervé to devote himself to fighting for the political freedom for which he was revoked by the government.[140] "It was not just a question of saving Hervé, but of saving, through Hervé, our common liberties. If Hervé wanted to commit suicide juridically, he had no right to cause the death of liberty."[141] The fact that "The Hervé Affair" was increasingly being compared to that of Dreyfus was bound to offend Péguy, who "made of this episode [the banquet at the Salle Vantier], the symbol of imposture. From this moment he believed that Hervé revealed a deplorable propensity to

defend his cause by means and company that he [Péguy] judged as harmful."[142] Hervé responded in a letter telling Péguy that he was overly sensitive and that it would be improper to reject an offer by his most ardent supporters. If the defrocked professor credited Péguy with "a certain intellectual and moral value", he also wondered about the "obsessive agitation" displayed by the editor of the *Cahiers*. In fact, the dispute with Péguy was just beginning.[143] The police were disturbed by the Salle Vantier gathering for different reasons. At least one agent predicted that the wayward professor would soon gain a seat in the Chamber as a consolation.[144]

Just before Hervé was to appear before the Superior Council of Public Instruction in Paris, Briand, who was again his attorney, made a disclosure regarding a secret dossier that had been illegally sent to the Academic Council of Dijon regarding Hervé's case. The three documents in the dossier concerned Hervé, though none mentioned him by name. Briand was upset by the accidentally uncovered papers because article 11 of paragraph 5 of the University Law of February 27, 1880 stated that any documents consulted in such academic disciplinary cases could not be hidden from the accused.[145] The leftist press would soon echo Briand's charges.

On December 6, 1901, the Superior Council of Public Instruction met at the Ministry of Public Instruction on the Rue de Grenelle and began to consider Hervé's appeal. The fifty-one men on the Council included Georges Leygues, the key minister in the situation, as the presiding official even though he had never participated in any of its prior hearings. This was obviously not a jury of Hervé's peers since most members were Directors, Deans, Rectors, and Academy members with only ten professors and one primary school teacher (*instituteur*) included.[146] Adhémar "Esmein, [a professor at the Paris law faculty] the court reporter, acknowledged Hervé's virtues: a 'most honorable career', his 'great merit' of having prepared for the *agrégation* on his own, and 'the esteem and praise of his superiors [who] all agreed in recognizing his intelligence, his love of work, [and] his free and clear speech.'"[147] The Superior Council heard a history of the case along with the charges. Briand told the Superior Council that the Hervé Affair appeared to be a new Dreyfus Affair, and he stressed how the secret dossier had been influential in the Dijon conviction, which Hervé had lost by only two votes. Though the Council decided to annul the Dijon judgment, Briand became furious when the Superior Council decided to retain primary jurisdiction in the case instead of sending it back to a lower Council. Briand believed that the Code of Civil Procedure gave Hervé the right to two degrees of jurisdiction: one judging the facts and the other insuring the proper application of the law. The Minister of

Public Instruction overruled Briand's objection and said that the Superior Council, though it was "a board of appeal, would rule on both fact and law."[148]

At a later session, Hervé and Briand each spoke for hours stressing the need for civil rights outside the classroom. Rather than defending his own actions, Hervé indicted the interlocking French authorities: military, government, Church, and university. After making a distinction between professional duties and citizens' rights, he defended his earlier articles, blamed Boulangism on the republic's faulty educational system, and argued that he could never praise a bloodthirsty dictator like Napoleon. Briand again denounced "the secret dossier and the Superior Council's assumption of primary jurisdiction" and defended Herve's rights outside the classroom as a citizen. Following a tumultuous debate behind closed doors, the Council returned a verdict. Again, by two votes Hervé was dismissed as a professor, but this time his entire salary was terminated.[149]

Almost immediately *Le Travailleur Socialiste* compared this dossier to the secret documents used in the Dreyfus Affair. "The clerical leaders of the university have used the same tactics in the Hervé Affair that the Jesuits of the military establishment used in the Dreyfus Affair."[150] On December 8, Briand's *La Lanterne* echoed the same point: "… this affair could well be as fatal for the university jurisdiction as the Dreyfus Affair was for military justice."[151]

Only one recourse remained. Hervé would have to appeal to the Council of State, which had the right to hear cases dealing with jurisdictional abuses. Hervé's loss of a job was less important than the propaganda value obtained. An official blunder, the communication of a secret dossier, had created another scandal. Briand continued to argue that "this affair could well be as fatal to the authority of the university as the Dreyfus Affair was to military justice."[152] "*L'Affaire Hervé*" received daily page one treatment in the socialist *La Petite République*, the Radical newspapers *L'Aurore* and *La Lanterne*, as well as the Opportunist *La République Française*. The President of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, Francis de Pressensé, assailed the decision by pointing out the foolishness and hypocrisy of forbidding professors to express their views freely. That would lead to a new reign of censorship and restricted thinking. The politically acceptable would simply change with each ministry, turning tyranny into anarchy. Pressensé pointed out that professors and scholars seeking to advance were constantly spouting off political views which were deemed acceptable and which might get them recognized and promoted.[153]

On December 10, 1901 an important meeting involving 800 people took place in Dijon with Jean Allemane as the main speaker. After castigating clerical machinations and comparing Hervé's case to that of Dreyfus, Allemane called the embattled teacher "a victim … a comrade in the struggle attacked by the bourgeoisie."[154]

However, even among Hervé's defenders, men like Jaurès quickly realized that it was far easier to defend freedom of speech than the extreme rhetoric of Hervéist antimilitarism.[155] A long report by the sub prefect of Sens years later would claim that "the antimilitarist propaganda and state of mind dated from the protest movement provoked by Hervé's revocation."[156]

The Hervé Affair now changed arenas because an interpellation[157] date in the French Chamber of Deputies was set for December 13, 1901. With all the public furor unleashed by the case, socialist deputy René Viviani had demanded an interpellation of Leygues the day of the decision by the Superior Council of Public Instruction because of the "flagrant violation of the law and the suppression of rights guaranteed to the defense before the Academic Council of Dijon."[158] The day of the interpellation, the gallery was packed with spectators magnificently attired as if they were attending a parliamentary gala. Viviani challenged the faulty procedures as well as the issue of academic freedom in the case. He argued that extreme and even outlandish language should not cancel academic and press freedom. "'From now on, all members of the university, in their turn, who have to appear before Academic Councils,' cannot fail to recall the specter of the Dreyfus Affair."[159] However, *La Lanterne* reported that a nationalist deputy and then Leygues himself managed to switch the debate from the purported illegal procedures in the Hervé Affair to the provocative articles which appeared in the socialist press of Yonne.[160] "In his response the minister quickly left the procedural terrain in order to get to the political question: 'It is impossible to forget that the doctrines defended by M. Hervé are incompatible with the role of educator. M. Hervé wishes to have the right to say or write anything. That's fine. But he must leave the university ... This would be the end of the university, this would be the end of France, if the idea of the nation and the devotion that one owes to it, are ever denied.'"[161] Leygues's dramatic and flawless speech, which answered almost all of the specific charges of the interpellation and was repeatedly interrupted with applause, had made him a conquering hero for the majority of Deputies. The Chamber even voted to have his speech turned into a poster. A session called to censure the minister had wound up praising him.[162] Inevitably, the Council of State rejected Hervé's appeal of the prior decision by the Superior Council of Public Instruction and dismissed him without pay from teaching.

Though the nation's representatives and academic establishment rejected Hervé's ideas, their very hostility became propaganda and publicity for his cause. Despite the failure of the interpellation, there can be little doubt that the furor over his ideas reinforced Hervé's status as a political celebrity.[163] Even though he had lost his academic position, Hervé could still discuss the situation with his

inveterate optimism. He compared his present situation to looking for a job at age eighteen. After years working to become a professional historian, he was impelled to make a new beginning. He wanted neither a newspaper position in Paris nor a sinecure as a politician. He "… would rather saw wood for 25 *sous* a day than be a Deputy making 25 francs." Instead, he decided to become "a visiting professor of socialism" or a kind of "traveling salesman of socialism." Beginning in January 1902 he would travel, listen, and speak in hundreds of Yonne's communes in order to learn socialism while living and visiting with the peasants and workers of the department. "Modestly" comparing his new mission to that of Jesus and the apostles, the socialist and self-proclaimed atheist anticlerical dismissed any loss of income as unimportant.[164]

Hervé, the socialist martyr, might have been on his way to the Yonne wilderness, but as the symbol of antimilitarism and antipatriotism, he would remain on center stage. This provincial wilderness was, after all, just a short train ride to Paris. His return to Yonne, after he had attained overnight national recognition, might indicate Hervé's idealism, his lack of ambition, and his rejection of opportunism as Scher postulated. He may also have believed that a revolution in France would have to be "seeded and nourished outside Paris."[165] Undoubtedly he could have exploited his notoriety and immediately established a political and journalistic career in Paris. However, Hervé never showed much of an inclination to hold public office. If he rejected immediate newspaper jobs in Paris, he did not refuse to write for several Parisian publications. Perhaps he did not yet feel prepared to fully enter the Parisian arena as Scher postulated. He must have realized that his base in Yonne would enable him to influence both French socialism and Parisian politics. His motivations for returning to Yonne were undoubtedly multiple. If he were intimidated by his new fame, he did not shrink from using and enhancing it in order to further his antimilitarist cause. Sincerity and idealism need not exclude ambition and histrionics as aspects of Hervé's rise to prominence. If he did not seek material gain or public office, he still wanted to influence events and depended on controversy to try to accomplish that. The theatrical nature of Hervéism can be demonstrated by its need to shock in order to attract attention. Perhaps on almost any level dichotomies such as idealism versus realism, pragmatism, and opportunism must be false or misleading. Such oppositions undoubtedly tell us much more about how our language is structured than they do about complex human psychology. Hervé's idealism, ambition, and theatrics are as much a valid if contradictory constellation as is his combination of realism, selflessness, and sincerity. This does not mean that Hervé was all things or that other individuals were as complex and

contradictory. If we wish to understand Hervé, we cannot rule out *a priori* some apparent contradictions and anomalies.

In the *Pages Libres* in April 1902 Émile Masson responded to the question of whether professors like Hervé should lose their teaching jobs for proposing such critical and subversive ideas outside class. Masson actually embarrassed the publication a bit by saying that men should be able to say what they think wherever they are, in class, on the job, in public, or at home. When Hervé lost his teaching post and became a traveling salesman for socialism in Yonne, Masson was one of the people who supported him financially. The young professor from the Lycée in Saumur was amazed by Hervé's constant optimism and his ability to cite maxims from Saint Francis, even though he was an avowed atheist, in response to what most people would see as real material concerns. "'This serenity, this manner of making light of events appeared to Masson to be the very essence of freedom. And Hervé, frugal, eternally dressed in the same threadbare jacket, seemed truly to live the air of the time."[166]

Self-promotion by way of suffering for his ideals may have arisen partly from Hervé's religious heritage.[167] He seemed to want to become a martyr according to Scher. The two idealisms, religious and political, at certain levels were interchangeable for him, and his later *revirement* has all the aspects of another martyrdom. Hervé realized that "a movement which identified social and political change with the sacrificing spirit of a crusade would have an electrifying appeal."[168] His repeated "failures" may have been predetermined by the nature of his quest or they could have been the necessary "stations of the cross" in some form of political Passion script necessitating suffering as proof of validity.

Hervé's self-proclaimed role as martyr, his attacks on abuses, his striving for reforms, and his need to shock also seemed to fit composite traits which exemplified the avant-gardes in general, both political and cultural. A kinship of political and aesthetic avant-gardes can perhaps be found in the life of the non-artistic Hervé if we recall the romantic image of the artist as seer and prophet whose validation comes through pain and suffering.[169] The loss of traditional religious values led artists and some politicians to provide an alternative transcendence. That they preserved some traditional religious ideals ought not to be surprising. Nor is it surprising that some members of the avant-garde would return to their religious traditions if they became disillusioned by their new faiths.

3

"Un Commis Voyageur Du Socialisme"[1]

Hervé's 1901 article "The Anniversary of Wagram" made him notorious as "*le homme du drapeau dans le fumier*". This sudden fame created a national exposure and opened many new avenues, but it cost him a position at the Lycée of Sens. After losing his chance to become a professor, Hervé seems to have fleetingly pondered using his recent notoriety as a stepping stone to Paris. If he never relinquished his Parisian contacts, one of his immediate goals was "to create a popular socialist and antimilitarist movement in Yonne which would be controlled by activists within the department."[2] Obviously aware of the excitement he had generated, he may not yet have known exactly what to do with it.[3] It soon became clear that actions in Yonne could be imitated throughout France. In his 1912 collection of his most provocative articles and testimony, *Mes Crimes*, Hervé glossed over whatever anger or disappointment he may have felt in late 1901. "Not embittered by the severe measure—at the least disproportionate to the crime—which, at thirty years of age, threw me out on the street without a penny and with my painfully acquired diplomas having become suddenly useless, I limited my vengeance by traveling one by one to the four hundred communes of the department in order to spread the pacifist and socialist views of *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* to all our republican peasants ..."[4]

He might have been relieved in losing his teaching post because the strictures and daily grind of the academic system, recently described by his friend Émile Masson, could have become confining and unbearable for an idealistic activist like Hervé.[5] Others might have followed the path that lay open and remained in Paris with a view toward elected office, a journalistic career, or job security as a socialist functionary. He certainly had the right contacts for such eventualities. However, in pondering his options in December 1901, he rejected a permanent move to Paris as a journalist. "The very rare newspapers where I could enter had complete staffs, and the others either were obligated to resort to live from financial schemes that I disapproved of or paid too little. As for Radical newspapers which are able to pay their editors, I could not join them, not being a Radical, unless they offered me a free hand such as the one Briand had at *La Lanterne*, where I would be able to explain our socialist ideas in complete independence … Now, I am not close to finding that rare bird."[6] Nor was he tempted by a traditional career as a deputy, though he claimed to have had offers from five districts.

> "I would rather saw wood at twenty-five *sous* a day than be a Deputy at twenty-five francs … What should be done then? I found it. I would make myself an itinerant professor of socialism or, if you wish, a 'traveling salesman of socialism'. I would give an antimilitarist conference here, an anticlerical sermon there, and a bit everywhere [sell] some subscriptions to the TSY. When socialist groups, workers or farmers unions, Masonic lodges or the socialist Free thinkers of Yonne call, I will hurry with my merchandise. Not being an outstanding speaker, I still flatter myself in thinking that I can find a buyer."[7]

The two decades between 1890 and 1910 were crucial for the development of socialism in Yonne according to Gilles Heuré. While the first decade was a time of preparation, the second saw Yonne's various socialists audaciously come together and stress an antimilitarism which would soon give the department a national reputation. "In this evolution, the role of Gustave Hervé was, without a doubt, determinant. He was one of the most well-known and active of all the militants." He drew the attention of what we today describe as the "media" even if he was not responsible for all of Yonne's socialist activism. That explains why his name became synonymous with the antimilitarist movement called Hervéism. If he did not construct a party, to borrow Heuré's image, he did become the energizing dynamo for a web of interests, currents, and energies with many lines and circuits radiating out. He promoted, provoked, and received energy from diverse sources. The movement he helped bring to life attracted many followers, and became a center of revolutionary activism. For Heuré, Hervé was the "sergeant recruiter" and "central circuit" of Yonne socialism, attracting "the disillusioned, the curious, the rebels,

and those primed for another way to break the mould."[8] Using traditional yardsticks, it is impossible to measure Hervé's influence because his speeches, articles, books, and especially his reputation defied any exact accounting. The impact of his agitation was "more of a symptom of the malaise that troubled the workshops and fields" of Yonne rather than the direct cause.[9] Everyone spoke about Hervéism but the phenomenon was impossible to zero in on. If Hervé was forever at the center, the movement was, above all, plural in its manifestations. If his doctrine was uncertain or ambiguous, its coherence came from the violence and extremism with which the ideas were expressed.[10]

Because of Hervé, antimilitarism appeared to be a greater force than it yet was, and local antimilitarists appeared to be much more numerous and organized, even before the *Sans Patrie* had "a well furnished body of troops."[11] Rather vaguely, the police reported that Yonne was marked by an undeniable Hervéist penetration. Though officials could never measure the exact limits of antimilitarism, they tried to find ways to discover its influence. Yonne officials investigated future conscripts who had taken part in antimilitarist activities as well as hardened militants or suspected sympathizers. Almost all of those listed were described as subscribers to *Le Pioupiou*, signatories to the antimilitarist posters coming after the *Affiche Rouge* of 1905, "very violent" militants, "partisans of direct action", or "members of Hervéist groups." Some were viewed as personal friends of Hervé.[12] In one dossier compiled by the Ministry of the Interior which counted antimilitarists in France in 1907–1908, out of 2157 known antimilitarists, 67 were from Yonne. That indicates a level of antimilitarist activism two and a half times greater than average, if such things can be so calculated.[13] One 1913 Interior Ministry inquiry, directed toward local police concerning notorious revolutionary and antimilitarist recruits, yielded 13 names in Yonne, most of whom were described as disciples of Hervé, his ideas, or members of groups tied to him. Most had been prosecuted and were assigned to North African garrisons.[14]

In February 1906 *L'Echo de Paris* ran a series of articles dealing with all the antimilitarist agitation in Yonne. In fact, their correspondent, Henri de Noussane, described the department as experiencing a social conflagration. Despite Yonne's reputation as "*un départment-volcan*" not everyone was completely convinced. The Prefect of Yonne actually told de Noussane that one should not pay too much attention to all the talk about Yonne being a revolutionary or antimilitarists center. He claimed that the citizens of Yonne were not anarchists, but peaceful folk, who knew each other and generally gave everyone the benefit of the doubt, thus tending to acquit their friends of antimilitarist crimes. The local military commander claimed that recent desertions simply affected weak and troubled

characters easily exploited by a few known anarchists.[15] However, in late October 1907 the Sub-Prefect of Yonne also believed that the repressive measures enacted since the revocation of Hervé from teaching had increased antimilitarist contamination rather than halting it. "[The Hervéists] only want one thing, to be pursued, thereby creating popular sympathy and enabling them to pose as martyrs. In the Yonne, to pursue the antimilitarists is to anticipate their ambitions and enhance their propaganda."[16]

Even after he began to live and work in Paris permanently by 1905, he would continue to closely follow events there. He made his resounding debuts there, represented it as a delegate, and continued to collaborate on *Le Travailleur Socialiste* until after the war. He had political influence, important allies, and other close friends there, such as Luc Froment (Lucien Leclerc),[17] who remained a friend until Hervé's death. Some of those friends would willingly spell him whenever he became a prisoner.[18] Between 1900 and 1910 the department was a center of Hervéist activism until his shift in views after 1910. Despite the advice of the C.G.T., which increasingly distanced itself from Hervéism after 1908, the local *Bourses du Travail*, especially at Sens and Auxerre, continued to work closely with Yonne antimilitarists.[19] In 1904 Hervé wrote: "Five years ago our department was Radical and anticlerical, but it was militaristic, chauvinistic, and frightened by socialism. Today, it remains anticlerical and Radical but it has become antimilitarist and internationalist. And, if it has not yet been won over to socialism, collectivism is no longer a scarecrow: [Yonne] is beginning to understand what socialism is all about."[20] A year later he repeated that assessment in *Leur Patrie*: "Five years ago, the peasants of Yonne were ardent patriots, almost nationalists. Today, they are, for the most part, clearly antimilitarists and internationalists."[21] As the official organ of the *Ligue de la Patrie Française*, *L'Echo de Paris* continued to be obsessed with the antimilitarist menace threatening France throughout 1906 and 1907, especially the Yonne, describing the department in dire terms.[22] After interviewing local personalities who explained the revolutionary climate there, de Noussane wrote with obvious exaggeration:

> "All by itself, [Yonne] makes more noise than the others. The *Bourse du Travail* of Auxerre already inspires and governs the *Bourse du Travail* of Paris and the Federation of Workers. The government is prosecuting the poster containing 2317 signatures, repeating, approving, and aggravating the one sentenced at the trial of the antimilitarists. Who conceived this poster? Who started the petition? Citizen Lorris, Secretary General of the *Bourse du Travail* of Auxerre, now incarcerated. He leads a quartet of apostles, some fifty disciples, and two to three thousand catechumens who are preparing to liberate humanity from the chains of poverty ... by destroying the social structure."[23]

During his survey of Yonne, de Noussane met with the Archbishop who connected anticlericalism to antimilitarism with a striking image, even though he also claimed that the situation was not yet too alarming. "From the hatred of the cassock to the hatred of the soldier's jacket, there are only fifty centimeters of cloth."[24] For the chief magistrate of the court of Auxerre in 1906, the connection was geographical, psychological, and gastronomic. "You are now in wine country. Wine creates rogues and rebels. Anticlericalism has definitely prospered among wine growers." However, the chief magistrate believed that a peasant could be an anticlerical but he was never a collectivist.

> "He listens to agitators, he amuses himself in following them 'to see' [what will happen]. But if words become deeds and unite the proprietors, to equalize the vineyard of Paul with that of Peter, the 'converted' would soon bring the convertors to their senses. No one more than the Burgundian is more attached to his property. We have proof of that in court, where the juries have no pity for the vagabonds, the robbers or arsonists, and for the corrupt lawyers."[25]

In *Les Hommes du Jour* in 1908 Victor Méric wrote that after his suspension and revocation from teaching in November and December 1901,

> "Hervé was free to give himself entirely to revolutionary propaganda. For four years he crisscrossed the Communes of Yonne on foot, his walking stick in hand, sometimes covering thirty kilometers a day. He slept in the homes of the peasants whom he had come to visit, and he spoke in the simplest language whenever he presented his socialist and antimilitarist ideas. It was during these *tournées* in Yonne that Hervé's antipatriotism was born."[26]

Hervé's career was now characterized by incessant motion, involving multiple themes and activities.

> "As the *Commis Voyageur du Socialisme*, Hervé met with groups of farmers two to seven days a week. Though he was constantly on the move, he continued to write lead articles for *LeTravailleur Socialiste*. At least once a week he carried or mailed his copy to the newspaper's office in Sens. During the two periods each year when young men were conscripted into the army, Hervé worked nights to direct publication of the infamous *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. He also remained the most influential personality in the department's active Socialist Federation. At the 1902 and 1903 Congresses of the *Parti Socialiste Français* in Tours and Bordeaux, Hervé was the representative of Yonne's affiliated socialists."[27]

Hervé's journalistic career also expanded to Paris from 1902 to 1905. In 1902 he began to write two weekly columns for *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire*, an influential national education magazine. From late 1902 to early 1903, he

was listed along with Jean Jaurès, René Viviani, and Aristide Briand on the editorial staff of *La Petite République*.[28] In April and May 1903, Hervé contributed occasional articles to *L'Action*, a leftist opposition paper of modest importance.[29] Also by 1903, he was writing for the Radical *L'Aurore* and for the anarchist *Le Libertaire*. In December 1903 Hervé was a delegate at the Congress of Free Thought, but was accused of being a reactionary because he defended the rights of private religious schools. At a time when he was being seen as a conspiratorial source of social dislocation, "Hervé had not declared war against all of France's hallowed institutions."[30] By late 1904 or early 1905, he took part in publishing an ephemeral antimilitarist newspaper called *L'Avant-Garde* in Paris. When his history textbooks began to appear in 1903, controversy continued to follow. He also began to study law and would temporarily become an attorney in 1906 and 1907 before the legal system again turned on him. Solidly based in Yonne with new projects in Paris, Hervé's influence from 1902 and 1905 also began to reach beyond France. For Gilles Heuré these years were a period of preparation.[31]

After 1901 Hervé no longer concealed his identity. He now had so many roles to play it was impossible to keep track of them all. Over the next four years Hervé acted as a *commis voyageur* of socialism, journalist, socialist delegate, textbook writer, courtroom celebrity, leader of Hervéism, member of the socialist Unification Commission, and liaison man for the organization of socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists. It took incredible dexterity to fulfill all those roles. If Hervé's views evolved drastically between 1902 and 1905, he continued to stress antimilitarism as the key to both international peace and the coming of socialism. By the end of 1903 he also began to create a revolutionary antimilitarist movement with himself as the principal propaganda agent in the various roles he had fashioned for himself. That created the impression of a movement in motion well before the Hervéist movement truly existed. "He used the noise he created instead of troops, the publicity offered by his enemies instead of money, and the debate aroused by his ideas instead of a national campaign … Everyone knew that Hervé was behind it all … He was Hervéism."[32]

With the abnegation of a missionary, Hervé routinely traveled the back country, doing preliminary research for his conferences and subsequent articles, stressing two crucial themes: the people of the countryside and his expanding ideas on antimilitarism.[33] He soon grasped various connections between antimilitarism and collectivism. What Hervé intended to do was to work the ground which had already been sown with seeds of discontent by the new socialist publications. Venturing into Yonne's hinterlands, he expected to learn about rural issues which were not his forte despite his Breton peasant ancestry. To be convincing

to farmers, he needed to understand agricultural questions. He soon realized that traditional distinctions between property owners and impoverished workers had to be abandoned because Yonne's small proprietors were both. He sought data regarding: diet, salaries, living and working conditions, seasonal rhythms, as well as political and religious affiliations, information helping him gauge the political potential of country folk.[34] To win over ordinary farmers for the socialist vision of general well-being, Hervé realized he had to abandon rigid formulas and employ a simple language which explained how socialism did not threaten farmers but would help bring "effective and lasting relief for the difficulties they faced."[35] This was no rural retreat, but a bridgehead to be fortified. Rather than an irresponsible zealot or a romantic revolutionary, in this he displayed the capacity for patience and leadership. He was not yet the Hervéist "General" but was the "sergeant recruiter" of antimilitarism according to Gilles Heuré.[36]

Hervé claimed to have visited around 400 of Yonne's 480 communes between 1902 and 1905.[37] His first *tournée* began in November 1901 in the commune of Mélisey, about forty kilometers east of Auxerre. Trips like this became the basis for a series of articles in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* from November 1901 until October 1902 titled "*Chez les ruraux*." Before arriving at a meeting, Hervé studied the local conditions so well that his audiences were usually impressed with his knowledge.[38] Factoring local conditions into his discussions, the chief themes at his *tournées* were antimilitarism, collectivism, agrarian socialism, and internationalism. Since the French usually had strong feelings on these issues, meetings were often tense and excited.[39] The first number of *Le Travailleur* assumed that international socialism would be explained to the rural masses by means of "antimilitarism and internationalism" rather than socialism.[40] Economic analysis would be indispensable in linking antimilitarism and collectivism, which became an ever more important theme throughout his *tournées*. Both farmers and workers had to realize that socialist ideas on antimilitarism were not unrealistic, bizarre, and dangerous fantasies, but responded to actual rural and urban problems.[41]

In his Yonne *tournées* from November 1901 until May 1905, he traveled more than six thousand kilometers, presenting nearly 230 lectures and discussions. The gatherings were free, public, and open to debate. On average he travelled seven months of the year, concentrating his trips between October/November and May when agricultural work lessened. During the rest of the year, when speaking engagements took place, they usually happened on weekends. Generally from June through October he took some time off, most often resting, preparing for future *tournées*, or conducting other business in Paris.[42] Using the railroads to move quickly during *tournées*, he was especially interested in getting away from

urban centers and into the countryside, although some cities and regional centers received more than one visit. His *modus operandi* was to take a train from Paris or Sens, sometimes with a change at Laroche-Saint-Cydroine; then he travelled to the general area where his meetings would be held. When he wasn't traveling alone, he could be accompanied by the secretaries of local socialist groups or by friends from Sens such as Ismaël Poulain, a socialist, noted activist, and anticlerical bookstore dealer, Louis Hinglais, an antimilitarist pharmacist whom he met during his days as a tutor at Saint-Brieuc,[43] or François Duporc, a former typographer and one of the pioneers of Yonne socialism who was in charge of *Le Travailleur Socialiste*. Occasionally, the ageing Communard Zéphirin Camélinat went with him. Once he arrived at the regional station, he would follow the "horse trails" into the countryside. Bad weather, poor roads, and outdated railroad schedules were always factors causing problems, delays, or cancellations of his meetings.[44]

Despite Hervé's frantic pace, the lack of personnel at his disposal, and the fluctuating finances of the federation, the *tournées* were carefully organized. Planning for a meeting generally occurred two or more weeks before an appearance date. Generally, requests for an appearance had to be sent to the newspaper office in Sens. Sponsoring groups were then informed about their responsibilities to publicize the event and arrange for a meeting hall. If financial problems occurred, money could be drawn from a special purpose fund. Because local groups often lacked experience, they got advice about organizing the *tournées*. Hervé usually brought an ample supply of socialist literature for distribution and sale. Complimentary copies of Yonne's socialist newspapers, along with subscription blanks, were presented following the meetings.[45] Before 1905 he rarely conducted *tournées* outside of Yonne because his plan was to create a personalized Yonne organization as his "experimental center". "Hervéism was handmade—piece by piece and face to face—by Gustave Hervé."[46] Similar arrangements remained in place for *tournées* in other *departements* when Hervé was the editor-in-chief of *La Guerre Sociale*, if he were not incarcerated.

Hervé generally embarked for the gatherings either Friday nights or Saturday mornings. The trips were often long, especially if he had to pass by way of Paris. The trip from Paris to most Yonne sites took between two and a half and three and a half hours depending on whether he could catch or afford an express.[47] He was generally met at the train station, and was then taken by wagon or walked to the meeting site. After the gatherings, if he were not spending the night, he might make his way back to the station by cart or alone on foot in the dead of night, often under inclement conditions. He generally got back to Sens or Paris the same day. Occasionally hitches occurred and a meeting might be delayed or cancelled.

Sometimes sites were unavailable when local authorities decided to try to prevent meetings at local city halls.[48] Once he arrived at the meeting sites, the gatherings could prove to be rather informal affairs, held in small meeting rooms, cafes, or the local *mairie*. The meetings generally began in the early evening, but sometimes at mid-afternoon. Obviously, he tried not to interfere with his audience's workday. Rather than deliver formal lectures, the sessions often became conversations, of one, two, or even three hours, in front of heterogeneous groups, not just farmers.[49] Audiences ranged from forty or fifty all the way to several hundred people or more. He preferred to meet in the local city hall more to avoid local squabbles rather than due to problems over seating capacity or convenience. In February 1904 at Fontenoy, two cafe owners bickered over which one would host a gathering. Because his conferences were free, public, and open to debate, those who disagreed were free to show their disapproval. At Bassou on January 15, 1902, several retired military officers led fifty clericals and nationalists protesting the gathering; one of the officers even challenged Hervé to a duel, which he parried. Ridicule and even indifference were probably greater dangers because there was generally no violence. Disturbances were rare, usually nothing more than catcalls.[50] Yonne's reactionary press reported any jeers and savored accusations about Hervé having bored everyone.[51]

Following the meetings they became subjects of reports in *Le Travailleur Socialiste*. The feature called "*Carnet d'un Commis Voyageur en Socialisme*" or a similar feature would remain a constant instrument throughout Hervé's journalistic career whenever he traveled to deliver his message. The *carnets* were almost always written by Hervé and covered the greater part of one of the paper's four pages. These articles were not mere resumés of meetings but were veritable local histories, covering the politics, personalities, demography, industrial patterns, geography, and agricultural conditions of the areas visited. The social structure was analyzed, church influence was charted, and the economic relationships between the local area and the outside world were examined. Hervé even conducted his own informal polls and surveys as well as interviewed local residents in order to ascertain the particularities of each situation. His columns were detailed, dramatic, and often witty, and they generally showed an excitement about the new area visited, but his *carnets* often used local conditions to illustrate ideas that he had long held.[52]

The purpose of these *tournées* was not just to spread the socialist message or to learn about local conditions. They were also expected to organize new socialist groups, encourage existing groups to action, and canvas for new subscribers to *Le Travailleur Socialiste*. Perhaps to maintain its image of selfless dedication, the paper was quite detailed about costs and earnings from its conferences.[53] The *tournées*

depended on the propaganda fund created for *Le Pioupiou* as well as subscriptions which enabled the weekly paper to pay the railway fares from Paris and between Yonne's communes several times a week. Even though costs varied from week to week, the *tournées* had to make money, not for the speaker so much as for the newspapers and the Yonne Federation.[54] During one week in late January 1902, Hervé gathered seventy five new subscribers; the following month he picked up one hundred and fourteen. That led him to joke: "If the Minister of Public Instruction … doesn't hurry to rehire me, we are capable of overtaking *Le Petit Journal* [with its five million subscribers]." But not every *tournée* was that productive.[55] Costs were always a concern and Hervé did everything he could to keep them to a minimum. Whenever possible, he ate and slept at the homes of local friends and militants. He would sometimes hitchhike a wagon ride rather than pay, yet he would seldom hesitate to give money to needy friends or strangers. Hervé's salary from *Le Travailleur Socialiste* is not known though it is probable that he was able to send part of what he earned to Mme. Hervé in Recouvrance as well as to Mme. Dijonneau in Paris. Most witnesses characterized Hervé's lifestyle, especially in this epoch, as bordering on asceticism.[56] In Sens he lived in a "wretched rooming house with a sloping roof" according to a later wartime letter from one of his friends.[57] In Paris his simple apartment on the Rue de Vaugirard was described by Hervé's niece in 1971 as "*une cellule d'un prêtre*".[58]

Even though Hervé devoted much time and energy to canvassing the rural hinterlands of Yonne, provocative writing and resultant prosecutions did not cease. At the conclusion of the trial of *Le Pioupiou I* on November 13, 1901, the second issue of the paper was on its way free of charge to all the conscripts from Yonne. Free distribution to the conscripts was possible because registries of potential draftees were available at each city hall.[59] The timing was intentionally insolent and did little to please the government. After an initial inquiry on November 16, a second preliminary investigation was begun against *Le Pioupiou II* on December 24, 1901, even though most of the articles on the first two pages had appeared in the first issue.[60] By mid-December the Minister of Justice decided to proceed against several members of *Le Pioupiou*'s editorial staff. Yonne's socialists immediately organized a protest meeting at which Hervé and others spoke. The Assizes of Auxerre met on February 6, 1902, with Briand again the defense attorney. Hervé was not among the defendants despite having written to the Prosecutor of Auxerre begging to be indicted. The government had no desire to turn Hervé into a martyr. His article "*Vengeance au Pioupiou*" was not subject to legal proceedings because it had already appeared in *L'Aurore* in September 1901 but had elicited no complaint by the defamed officer.[61] The

same day the acquittal was handed down, February 6, *Le Pioupiou III* appeared, reproducing "almost every article which had appeared in issue number one."[62] There was, again, a gathering at the Salle des Charmilles the next evening.[63] The authorities were embarrassed by their prior failures and the Minister of Justice was especially wary about attempting another prosecution. Since most of the articles that appeared in *Le Pioupiou III* had already been found blameless by a Yonne jury, it was decided not to prosecute. When that decision became known, six hundred socialists again held another fête at the Salle des Charmilles to celebrate the lack of prosecution. At that gathering Hervé, Camélinat, and others spoke.[64] One wonders what the real effects of such provocative newspapers actually were. While the writers of *Le Pioupiou III* reported that 5,000 copies had been sent to the conscripts, one conscript claimed that most conscripts were patriotic and either destroyed the newspapers or gave them to their parents.[65] By 1902 *Le Pioupiou* had become "part of the department's political landscape, and the influence that it exercised on a good number of socialist voters was noticed by the Radicals." If the Radicals had to be prudent about supporting an antimilitarist newspaper, sometimes the socialists refrained from putting up candidates who might challenge their Radical friends and allies. In November 1902 the fourth issue of *Le Pioupiou* was not charged.[66]



Figure 4. Auxerre, Yonne 1890—The bridge on the Yonne and Churches. (© LL/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

If the government had learned its lesson, it proved short lived. While the third and fourth issues were not prosecuted, *Le Pioupiou V*, which appeared sometime in early 1903, saw the legal carnival reenacted. On November 24, 1903 Thomas, Monneret, Lorris, and Hervé were joined in court at Auxerre by Parisian journalist Urbain Gohier. Georges Suarez later described the scrawny, ascetic Gohier and Hervé as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.[67] Seven articles were named in the indictment including Hervé's "*Conseils aux Conscrits*" which called for a mutiny of French troops in the event of war. Although the *Sans Patrie* had advised against desertion in this article, he counseled workers in uniform to resist degradation and to reject both colonialism and strike breaking. The article included an attempt to reassure French farmers that socialists were not wild eyed extremists. In fact, socialists were quite reticent on the question of desertion the effects of which could be devastating to young men who would have to give up family and friends for all the uncertainties of foreign exile. Not only did Hervé advise rural recruits about the dangers of alcohol and prostitution, he told them to remain vigilant in the army, be patient with strikers, be active but discrete in preventing military confrontations, and help educate more backward conscripts concerning antimilitarism, socialism, and critical thinking to counteract their nationalist and clerical prejudices. Their time in the army might eventually facilitate the replacement of standing armies by defensive militias.[68]

At the trial Briand was far from reticent in representing Hervé and several other defendants. This would be the third and final occasion for the ascending Breton attorney to defend *Le Sans Patrie*, though their paths would cross again several times in slightly different contexts. Rather than a fiery confrontation, the trial became rather friendly as "Hervé talked to the jurors, judges, and audience … [and] made the courtroom his forum and his tribunal."[69] Witnesses like Professor Chauvelon from the Lycée Voltaire described Hervé as "a hero!" who had "a chivalrous spirit".[70] Once the acquittals came in, the usual congratulations, banquet, and speeches at the Salle de Charmilles ensued. The fiery activist was becoming an expert at using the media and the government's own repressive machinery to generate attention. With his antimilitarist movement now developing in Yonne, Hervé could envision an offensive throughout France and beyond. He would later claim that before *Le Pioupiou V* trial he was a patriotic, "pacifist" Republican who acknowledged the need to defend France in case of invasion. By the end of the trial, Hervé's ideas were evolving to an insurrectionalism which did not distinguish between offensive and defensive wars. For Scher this meant that Hervéism was gradually being formed.[71] For Heuré, at this point Hervé was still an antimilitarist who had not yet evolved to antipatriotism; that threshold

would be crossed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. On this Scher and Heuré essentially agree.[72]

Before the war, the authorities believed that *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* was a symptom of the antimilitarist epidemic which would have to be eradicated.[73] Like *La Guerre Sociale* after 1906, it is difficult to judge the exact readership because the paper was constantly recirculated. On March 24, 1905 *Le Figaro* sarcastically noted that French police could at least make sure that *Le Pioupiou* was sold rather than distributed so that fewer people would read it. *Le Figaro* was annoyed that the Yonne paper was being given away near the Hôtel de Ville and could easily be found lying around on the Metro.[74] The paper's first issue reached 2–5000 issues before the first trial, and 8–10,000 additional issues following it. By 1905 the paper's circulation was 20,000. By the fall of 1905 the police reported that the paper published between 25 and 30,000 issues, which it never surpassed but did equal. Evidently, *Le Pioupiou*'s voice traveled beyond French borders because in 1912 deserters living in Brussels collected funds for the paper.[75] By 1913 *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* was so out of breath it could not even be revived by the turmoil over the Three Year Law. Hervé's shift in views, his first serious friction with some socialists of Auxerre, and the repercussions on the Left due to rising international tensions signaled the end for *Le Pioupiou*. By issue number seventeen subscribers were becoming harder to find, and some former friends even called it too tepid.[76] *Le Pioupiou* was issued eighteen times before the war; between 1901 and 1912 the paper was tried eight times and received acquittals until issue number 16 in August 1912.[77] Hervé always acknowledged that "*Le Pioupiou de L'Yonne* would have had much less effect if the Minister of War had not done his utmost to give us such resounding publicity."[78]

Each issue of *Le Pioupiou* became a veritable ritual performance replete with publicity, censure, professions of faith, trials, martyrdom, and celebratory meetings where the speeches and conversations of acquitted defendants, militants, and sympathizers culminated in a victory processional and a large celebratory gathering at La Salle des Charmilles in Auxerre. These episodes were monitored by increasingly embittered police agents who then drafted reports to their superiors in Yonne and Paris.[79] Gilles Heuré stressed that the turbulent publications of *Le Pioupiou* help to explain much about Hervé's ideas and methods. The paper was a veritable pyrotechnic operation which conformed to the journalistic dictum concerning the need to grab the public's attention. The paper became a means for Hervé to remain at center stage in order to spread his message. The lessons and methods learned would guide him when he launched *La Guerre Sociale* in December 1906.[80]

Beginning in late September 1902 Hervé published a weekly series of forty-two primary school history lessons in *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire*, a publication which achieved a circulation of 20,000 by 1912. Even though *La Revue* was not typically socialist, a Ministry of the Interior report labeled it thus.[81] The favorable acceptance of his lessons, which praised internationalism and attacked current patriotic education, led to a regular position on the *Revue* on March 1, 1903. Those articles inspired several history texts, the first of which appeared in August 1903 under the title *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe, l'enseignement pacifique par l'Histoire* published by his friend Ismaël Poulain. The book was intended for primary and upper primary school students, but Hervé was under no illusions about the chances for state adoption. Still, he hoped the book would be of use, if not to students, at least to their progressive parents and teachers, "who knew the types of history books which infested secular, republican schools" and were ready to counter the militarist and nationalist propaganda being spread.[82]

La Revue included three major aspects or functions: (1) a corporative part for the teaching profession, (2) a pedagogical part dealing with teaching techniques, and (3) a general and critical part. The first two parts were usually written by teachers, who had less status and intellectual clout, while the third part came from writers who could be described as intellectuals. Teachers were still the base of publications like the *Revue*, and their role in conveying ideas was strongly appreciated by socialists like Jaurès and Hervé. Until July 2, 1905 Hervé was in charge of the rubrique "International Questions", at which time he was replaced by Jaurès. For Christophe Prochasson such publications helped initiate the role of intellectuals as guides and experts in a hierarchical and, often, one-way exchange between the learned and the profane, presumably typical of the era before 1910.[83]

The *fin-de-siècle* has been described as an authentic cultural revolution engineered by the French state. "The school and the army, the first more than the second, shaped consciousness which was more controlled than it had ever been …" Texts on grammar, with dictations and recitations, along with chapters on history and geography became the foundation of citizen unity in support of the regime. Mass education and nationally advertised published works inculcated a set of shared middle class and peasant values throughout the entire nation. All were expected to affirm values which included: the love of order, thrift, hard work, patriotism, and deference to leaders. "Patriotic and revanchard ideology was dominant." Even though the massification of the culture did not suppress all differences, ideas like strikes, syndicalism, socialism, women's suffrage, free thinking, and Free Masonry were not part of this consensus and were marginalized. With

the apparent rise of antimilitarism after 1900, the Right and the authorities could blame the Republican teaching corps for the disturbing criticism of the status quo. But in assailing someone like Hervé, they were mistaking an isolated twisted tree for the bucolic, tranquil forest to use the image of Jean-Yves Mollier and Jocelyne George. Hervé was a stand-in target for the vast educational base which was actually dominated by a patriotic and revanchard ideology. The press assailed what was clearly a minority position, however prominent the profile of its symbolic chief advocate. The founders of the Third Republic had fulfilled their mission, especially through the educational system. "The integration of citizens was one bit of evidence, while the violence of national passions in the political terrain masked this march toward consensus."[84]

Scholars who have studied Hervé describe the methodology of his history texts as innovative because he included only the most important names and dates and presented alternate political perspectives to induce critical thinking by students. It could be argued that he introduced views and themes not found in standard textbooks which sought to create a national consensus. His 1903 text included an anticlerical analysis of Greek religion, and he explained Roman Republican social history in terms of "class struggle". Such arguments could be considered simplistic as well as ahistorical, but the book was far from inconsistent according to Heuré. It did not shy away from contemporary history and objectively dealt with reforms under the Third Republic. Hervé certainly did not fail to present socialist and internationalist ideas. He even differentiated revolutionary from reformist socialism and explained how both differed from anarchism.[85] Obviously, such a book had no chance of being adopted in a country seeking increasing linguistic, cultural, and ideological uniformity.

The idealism represented in his early histories undoubtedly owed much to his Breton Catholic roots, his secular Republican education, and his evolving socialism. His histories stressed how he had "discovered" an idealistic key to the contemporary world. "At the dawn of the twentieth century, the dream of all free spirits in all nations is to work for the intellectual emancipation of all men and women and for the coming of social justice and international peace."[86] Hervé's histories were never specialized studies of particular subjects or eras but "covered a vast and general sweep of time." The historian became for Hervé "the seer of social change" and "the teacher of morals."[87] "Real history is not the registry of kings, courts, battles, treaties, genealogies, and dates," he wrote. "Such history totally forgets the greater part of humanity, the people who work and who suffer. We have preferred to interest ourselves with the masses who have no names rather than with the actors most in view. On the one hand, we have tried to show the

efforts of the oppressed to better their fates; on the other hand, we have tried to describe the efforts of their oppressors to maintain them in servitude."[88] In Hervé's view, written history served mainly to prepare the masses for action. For Scher, all Hervé's journalistic endeavors, his speeches, and his courtroom addresses were, in one sense, didactic vehicles for teaching history.[89]

Today, Hervé's histories seem superficial, moralistic, and, hence, often one-dimensional.[90] In whatever period in his life that he wrote history, Hervé gathered his facts and presented events from a preconceived political and moral perspective. If his early histories were an advance over earlier dynastic narratives and chronicles of battles, they were still largely counter images to the patriotic texts then in common use. Rather than seeing history from a fresh perspective, using a new methodology, or uncovering new empirical data, Hervé's histories were the counterarguments or the rebuttals of earlier standards. Hervé's early histories were utopian and naively idealistic. His phenomenal output as an historian from 1903 to 1910 is quite misleading because his textbooks often duplicated his essays for the *Revue* from 1902 and 1903. One could almost say that Hervé wrote only one history textbook his entire life, his *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: L'Enseignement Pacifique Par l'Histoire* of 1903. His *Histoire de France à l'Usage Des Cours Elémentaire et Moyen*, written in 1904 with Gaston Clemendot[91], was certainly something of a derivation from the first textbook even though it was supposedly meant for pre-lycée students. Despite its iconoclastic aspects, the book sought to conform to the official syllabus of January 4, 1894 because the authors wanted their text adopted, especially in multi-grade rural schools. Included in its thirty-nine chapters were narratives, illustrations, summaries, and questionnaires. The authors employed an "easy to read" style, which dispensed with the often dull anecdotes burdening other textbooks. Especially controversial was the treatment of Christianity, which was described as a symptom of ignorance and mass credulity. Yet, the idealized image of Joan of Arc as a courageous and popular peasant leader barely differed from standard accounts.[92] The book stressed technological and military superiority to explain the Roman conquest of the Gauls and the European subjugation of colonial peoples. The career of Napoleon allowed the authors to touch on the horrors of war. The Commune was regarded as patriotic, and no attempt was made to project any socialist character of the uprising. With the exception of French colonialism, the Third Republic was depicted positively, as in his earlier book, and socialist international and pacific ideals were underlined. For Heuré, "this book represented a well-mannered antimilitarism, but it did not yet lapse into any violent antipatriotism."[93] His later general histories before World War I were largely replicas of his first textbook. After the war his

revised general history as well as his French history were polemical counterarguments to his pre-war conceptions.[94]

Hervé's rise to prominence must be set against the general situation facing the French Left in the *fin-de-siècle*. "As late as October 1898, at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, [the] unification [of leftist groups and parties] still seemed possible." A Federated Socialist Alliance, which formed in Paris in December 1899 at the Salle Japy Congress under an impulse to defend the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair, was an uneasy coalition which failed to endure despite a compromise resolution on the question of socialist ministerial participation, which many doctrinaire socialists opposed. This issue had become crucial in June 1899 with the participation of the socialist Alexandre Millerand in the new Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry which included General Gallifet, known as the "Butcher" of the Commune. This incipient unity disintegrated as the dangers to the Republic receded, as controversy over ministerialism increased, and as many socialist Deputies came to fear the dictatorial pretentions of the General Committee of Federated Socialists. When the Second International met in Paris in September 1900, French socialist problems were not resolved since the Kautsky Motion virtually abdicated the International's authority on the issue of ministerialism by permitting socialist alliances with bourgeois parties under "exceptional circumstances" if performed "with an extreme prudence."[95]

When Yonne socialists left the rapidly dissolving Allemanist P.O.S.R. and formed an Autonomous Socialist Federation by 1900, they mirrored Hervé's view that unity on the Left was hampered by affiliation to a partisan group. In June 1901 certain Allemanists, including Hervé, having grown impatient with Allemanist strictures, demanded the collaboration of socialists, syndicalists, anarchists, as well as certain Radicals. The prospects for unity obviously were fading fast. The issue of ministerialism accelerated the disintegration of the Socialist Alliance and resulted in the creation of two new socialist parties in France which took sides over the issue. The orthodox Marxian Guesdists left the Alliance in 1900 and the Blanquists under Vaillant followed in 1901, setting the stage for the creation of a new revolutionary and centrally organized antiministerial party, the *Parti Socialiste de France* (P.S.de F.) at Ivry in November 1901 and at Commentry in September 1902. Like most groups with origins in Allemanism, Yonne's new Autonomous Socialist Federation soon sought unity within Jaurès's new, largely-reformist, federally organized *Parti Socialiste Français* whose founding had coalesced at the May 1901 Lyon Congress of Socialist organizations, but the party's program and organizational statutes were not adopted until the Tours Congress of March 1902, which is generally regarded as the founding date of the

P.S.F.[96] At Tours the reformists from the Socialist Alliance who had supported Millerand again gathered in Jaurès's finally consolidated P.S.F. Delegates at Tours sought to formulate rules of organization, but their principal task was to define reformist socialism. The recent disintegration of the Alliance coupled with the ongoing alienation of the anarchists and syndicalists meant that reformists at Tours might have bourgeois elements as their chief allies.[97] "In the general elections of 1902 … it was the latter [the P.S.F], the more government orientated, [rather than the P.S.deF.] who collected the greater number of votes and elected members, one sign amongst others of the very popular character which republican defense had retained."[98]

The Tours gathering was Hervé's first appearance at a Socialist Congress. Although Yonne had the second lowest membership of the thirty Federations there, the two delegates from Yonne were Hervé and Adolphe Lenormand. However, the *Sans Patrie* was not about to restrain himself. Yonne's duo had come to the Congress to protest against ministerialism, to support Jaurès's efforts to strengthen existing unity, and to ward off further doctrinal tensions generally ascribed to the Guesdists.[99] Drawing on lessons learned from his *tournées*, Hervé argued that socialist analysis had become too rigid and simplified. After witnessing fractures among the bourgeoisie, the idea of "class war" seemed to lack nuance because part of the bourgeoisie sometimes identified with socialist aims. He also stressed communal autonomy and rural reforms. Not forgetting his antimilitarism, Hervé told the assembled delegates that he represented "a Federation which has made itself a specialist of antimilitarist and international propaganda." His speech ended by demanding opposition to all colonial wars and wars of revenge. In case of international conflicts he urged international arbitration. Finally, Yonne's two delegates submitted a motion demanding that all socialist ministers obtain prior socialist approval.[100]

At Tours both Hervé and Briand[101] defended related themes such as antimilitarism and the general strike. Although there was no formal alliance between them, both men hoped to balance reform and revolution within French socialism, but there were few other delegates who thought such conflicting approaches were compatible. Jaurès was much more moderate, calling for a rapport between socialism and Republicanism and hoping to avoid "revolutionary declarations which are only a sort of perpetual diversion." In the ensuing years, Jaurès would strive to include Hervé's views within the umbrella of socialism. If he could bring unity out of discord and confusion, he might prevent Hervé and his followers' ostracism from the unified party. However, at Tours Hervé, and, of course, Briand were still evolving.[102] The three men along with eleven others were elected to the drafting

committee, but the P.S.F. statement of principles was a reformist document. Key antimilitarist issues were not even raised. The most pressing issue for the congress, ministerialism, was largely postponed until the P.S.F.'s Congress of Bordeaux in 1903.[103]

Ministerialism, which was one aspect of the reformist-revolutionary dichotomy within Marxism, kept the P.S.F. hopelessly divided.[104] "Since Tours, opposition to Jaurès's reform leadership had grown. The great socialist orator had defended Millerand, struggled to preserve the *Bloc*, and insisted that socialism could be voted into existence. For all his efforts to build a unified movement, accessible to both anarchists and syndicalists, Jaurès was a crucial factor in creating a shambles of his own goals" according to Scher.[105] Even Harvey Goldberg's laudatory biography admitted that "Jaurès would support the *Bloc* too uncritically; without the comradeship of the revolutionaries, he would be trapped by illusion, underestimating the Ministry's commitments to the bourgeoisie; persuaded of its sincere desire for social reform; even convinced that European governments, already swept up in the race for arms and colonies, would arbitrate disputes, disarm, and federate."[106]

The question of ministerialism came to a head in mid-April 1903 at the P.S.F. Congress of Bordeaux. For Heuré the Congress was a further occasion for the enhancement of Hervé's stature as a rising luminary in the party. Its antiministerialists wanted no part of the electoral and authoritarian tactics of Guesdists and Blanquists in the P.S. de F., and they rejected anarchosyndicalist electoral abstentionism. They also "wanted to remain within a viable socialist organization" and hoped to halt the P.S.F.'s drift to the Right. The Millerand question, which had destroyed the fragile unity of the Federated Socialist Alliance, was still pivotal for those socialists who remained. Anti-Jaurès and anti-Millerand forces in the P.S.F. wanted to prevent the *embourgeoisement* of the party. They believed that the P.S.F. needed to take measures against Millerand in order to better balance reformist and revolutionary tactics.[107]

Though socialists like Jean Longuet and Pierre Renaudel had more stature, leadership of the left-wing antiministerials at Bordeaux fell "to a hopelessly nearsighted, almost meek looking schoolteacher, who nervously stroked his goatee as he whispered his words. It was Gustave Hervé who, though he hardly looked the part, would soon become the *enfant terrible* of French socialism."[108] Hervé sought Millerand's exclusion, but he wanted to avoid abstract questions about ministerialism, reform, and revolution in order to offend as few potential supporters as possible and to gain the support of *Blocard* federations compromised by Millerand's actions. Hervé "sensed that Millerand had finally become a liability for many

moderates who concealed their conservatism behind Jaurès's eloquent prose, but who were embarrassingly exposed by Millerand's evolution to the Right." Hervé also spoke of a changed mood within the working class, a factor he hoped would influence delegates to support more extremist positions.[109]

Hervé's reactions at Bordeaux have been described as an attack on Millerand for his reformism which "… did not allow for the possibility of revolutionary action in the class struggle" which was bound to eventually destroy "the revolutionary élan of socialism."[110] Scher argued that Hervé was trying to win over reformists even more than revolutionaries at Bordeaux. His opening statement was directed at Millerand.[111] "The reformers are more enraged than the revolutionaries in demanding your exclusion, because it is the reformist method which they ascribe to you and which you compromise."[112] What Hervé was attacking was not reformers but reformism that had gotten out of control. Millerand had to be dealt with because he had betrayed the spirit of reformism. From Hervé's perspective, Millerand was trying to create an abyss between reformists and revolutionaries. So the *Sans Patrie* took on "the role of a distressed moderate." He certainly needed to maintain his support on the Left, but keeping the balance between the extremes was not easy. Some delegates accused him of becoming too moderate while others believed that his attack on Millerand had been too strong. "With the Left and Right snapping at his heels, Hervé concluded one final plea for unity among socialists and between socialists and anarcho-syndicalists."[113]

Because each departmental federation was autonomous, the Millerand question should have been considered by the socialist minister's own Federation of the Seine. Moderate socialist Gustave Rouanet was skeptical about making ministerialism a central topic at the Congress, and he argued that established procedure had been knowingly ignored by the Federation of Yonne in demanding Millerand's exclusion. The Congress of Bordeaux risked falling into the very trap the Congress of Tours had sought to avoid when it granted autonomy to the federations. The Congress of Bordeaux threatened to renew scissions arising among socialists. Rouanet's accusation was a barely veiled attack on Hervé, who was accused of rejoicing at the chance to exclude Millerand and thereby reducing the influence of reformist socialism in favor of revolutionary tendencies.[114]

Hervé's second address at the congress was doubly important because it defended positions for which he was becoming the spokesman and responded to criticism from reformists like Rouanet. His speech was met with applause and varied interruptions when he ironically described himself as a distressed prosecutor compelled to present a case before a political tribunal. Hervé said he had "no personal animosity" against Millerand despite his own trial, acquittal, and

subsequent loss of a teaching position during his ministry. He even claimed to have been "just about the last to defend him" within the Yonne Federation.[115] Rather than employing a superficial contrast between reformist and revolutionary methods, Hervé claimed to be like most socialists who were reformist as well as revolutionary. "We are reformists in this sense that we do not believe, like the old Marxists, that our society is made up, on the one hand, of the proletariat and, on the other hand, large capital …" He also reiterated what he had said at Tours about the dogmatic nature of ideas on the class struggle. Some delegates may have known that a few days before congress, Hervé had foreshadowed his argument by citing Benoît Malon's trenchant phrase: "Reformist always, revolutionary when it is necessary." Be that as it may, applause and interruptions came while he made these distinctions.[116] In confirming what he had said at Tours about the obsolescence of socialist formulas, Hervé again relied on insights concerning social complexities gained from his *tournées* in the Yonne countryside. If he sought to display a realistic appreciation of reformist methods, the defrocked professor was unwilling to discard revolutionary ones.[117]

In speaking directly to Millerand, he said that reformist methods alone could never guarantee socialist success. Socialists should be ready and willing to work with the Radicals, but if the latter reject socialist goals, then socialists should be unafraid of revolutionary action. "We admit that through legal means one can obtain drastic reforms, but we also know that violence has long been the midwife of society, and unfortunately it will probably remain so." He went on to show how ministerialism hurt socialism by tying Millerand to the Radical Party. Reformists favored Millerand's exclusion even more than did revolutionaries, Hervé argued, because the socialist minister had done so much to discredit reformist methods. Yonne's citizens sometimes pointed out that Millerand sat in the same government that the local Radical deputy Doumer supported. "At least the Radicals waited to get power before changing their stripes, you don't even wait to get power before doing what Doumer has done." Hervé also charged Millerand with contradictory views since he accepted government indictments against the *Bourses du Travail*, antimilitarist newspapers, and syndicalist brochures like *Le Manuel du Soldat*, yet did not show an equal zeal for the Separation and acquiesced to military connections to Catholic circles. How could a socialist sitting in a Republican government fail to defend freedom of the press? Millerand seemed to have changed his ideas after joining the ministry. Was he trying to create an abyss between reformists and revolutionaries? At this point Jaurès tried to interrupt, but Hervé forged ahead.[118] Eventually, Millerand defended himself by pointing out that General Louis André, the current, anticlerical Minister of War, had to respond to indiscipline in the army or risk playing into the hands

of the nationalists, and he doubted that General André had encouraged soldiers to visit Catholic groups. In Heuré's view, this was an obvious victory for Hervé because a sitting minister felt compelled to respond to such charges.[119]

If Millerand's defense was too self-serving, Jaurès responded to the various charges on a more theoretical plane by tying antimilitarist goals to the social reforms obtained through parliamentary means. He assailed both dogmatic socialists, who were restricted by their class struggle ideas, and anarchosyndicalists, who supported desertion. Neither position was very effective in altering social realities. For Jaurès, the military had to be won over from within or a socialist militia would never exist. He then took aim at Hervé by reversing his argument: revolutionary rather than reformist tactics threatened to get out of hand. "In our propaganda we must abstain from these excessive, imprudent, and false generalizations, which are likely to affect men whom tomorrow you will be happy to enlist in the ranks of your popular, socialist militias."[120] "Just as Hervé had urged the reformists to bring about order within their own ranks, Jaurès urged the revolutionaries to discipline their own forces. If Hervé warned that reform tactics were endangered by the move to the Right, Jaurès warned that revolutionary tactics were approaching anarchy."[121] Jaurès was unwilling to sacrifice either of the dual forces united in socialism: its revolutionary ideals and its legal methods. Though Jaurès's final appeal to censure but not exclude Millerand carried the day by 109 to 89 votes, at least Hervé had participated in a crucial debate.[122] In Goldberg's view "Jaurès had won no real victory at Bordeaux."[123]

However, in *L'Action* the day after the Congress, Hervé admitted defeat and blamed it on "the atmosphere of parliament [which] weakens morals and renders Deputies [accessible to pressure from] … their colleagues." Now the P.S.F. was "exclusively reformist and anti-revolutionary" according to Hervé, who predicted that "it was only a matter of days" until the extreme Left of the P.S.F. would be forced to leave the party.[124] After the Congress Hervé attacked reformism and parliamentarianism even more blatantly. For him the Congress was a disaster, though it did make militants aware of the dangers of seeking revolution by legal means.[125] Yet Hervé continued to grapple with the practicalities of the reformist-revolutionary split in socialism, and sometimes this led to apparent casuistry. In Hervé's view, "The reformists remained revolutionaries, while their leaders who had lapsed into Millerandism were antirevolutionary reformists."[126] Such rhetorical legerdemain might satisfy some but it could not finesse the obstacles still facing French socialism.

By the end of 1903 the Federations of the Yonne and the Somme had left the P.S.F. in reaction to events at Bordeaux and because they each wanted to guarantee

their independence. Soon rumors began concerning the aforementioned federations joining the Guesdist P.S. de F. The adoption of an antiministerial motion by the P.S. de F. at its Reims Congress in September 1903 as well as the failure of the P.S.F. to solve important questions at Bordeaux eventually made it possible for Hervé to consider a move toward the P.S. de F.[127] Once his federation had left the P.S.F., Hervé was on the outside of two socialist parties, yet he continued observing, learning, and oscillating. One lesson learned at Bordeaux was that forces existed which expected the revolutionary program to give way to parliamentary means. That led him to an exaggerated attack on reformism along with a hope for the creation a revolutionary faction; he now began to speak of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* which would be dedicated to achieving collectivism. Guesdism, too, seemed to be at an impasse because it could never attract its intended audience. Instead of winning over the masses, Guesde's rigid socialism frightened them. This made Hervé's position somewhat awkward. Fearing isolation above all and understanding that socialism must appeal to the populace at large, he realized that socialist success depended on unity. Perhaps, that was why in October 1903 he said that even "reformism has some good."[128]

Hervé believed that Millerand had been seriously damaged at the Bordeaux Congress, and he was both relieved and satisfied when the accused reformist was finally excluded from the P.S.F. in December 1903. The *Sans Patrie* then became committed to forge a new socialist *Bloc* because with Millerand gone, the two parties' ideas in essence were similar.[129] In mid-January 1904 he conceded that reformism had its own strategies for dealing with the social question without violence or bloody revolution and that the government must be supported in its anticlerical and secular education program, even though he was not ready to give up his revolutionary tactics. Five tendencies in French socialism had become two new parties and a group of isolated autonomous federations including that of Yonne. However, the Yonne Federation was riven by divergent views. In December 1903 several groups from the Yonne Federation seceded and joined the Guesdists. For Hervé this meant three possible courses of action: (1) return to the P.S.F., (2) remain part of an autonomous group while waiting for a socialist *Bloc*, or (3) rally to the P.S. de F. Initially, Hervé wanted to stay clear of the organizational disorder in order "to become an acting delegate of some sort of arbitrating federation, while still playing the revolutionary card."[130] With the winds blowing the Yonne Federation in different directions, Hervé attempted to tack. To preserve socialist unity in Yonne, to outcompete a rival local socialist newspaper, to keep his options open prior to the impending International Congress in Amsterdam, and to gain a strategic position from which to support socialist unity, Hervé decided to support the P.S.de F.[131]

To remain a prominent voice at the highest levels of French socialism and to participate directly in impending national negotiations, Hervé sought to solidify his position as a socialist thinker. To accomplish that task he wrote a series of articles for the T.S.Y. beginning in late May and continuing until November 1904 titled "What is Collectivism?" which became a long brochure titled *Collectivism: Remarks by a Revolutionary Socialist* which Gilles Heuré called an overly simplistic tract as well as Hervé's first incursion into the domain of socialist doctrine.[132] *Le Collectivisme* integrated Hervé's experience among Yonne's rural communes with an eye toward future debates preceding unification. If the brochure was meant to be an innovative theoretical treatise, its dialogue format, which was often used in Hervé's articles and speeches for Yonne's workers and peasants, failed to provide the *gravitas* a theoretical exercise presumably demanded. The brochure was an extended discussion between a skeptical farmer and a convinced socialist worker. It reflected standard socialist arguments about how social and economic conditions, including private ownership of the means of production and exchange, not human nature per se, determined the fate of men.[133] *Le Collectivisme* expressed a rather rigid, simplistic, and utopian vision of an industrial society that was hierarchically arranged yet where workers managed the vast, publicly owned factories themselves, operating them for the benefit of all. Such a traditional socialist vision was not surprising. Nor did his explanation of collectivist agriculture stray far from these standard socialist ideals. Though he promised to allow individual farmers, who worked the land themselves without exploiting anyone, to keep their small plots, he naively assumed that the instinct for private property would eventually give way to a collective vision.[134]

Did Hervé actually accept such a superficial presentation? He certainly was far from naïve in his skepticism about the ability of the majority under a democratic system to refrain from making counterproductive choices. It seems difficult to believe a Breton with peasant roots could assume that a magical revolution could instantaneously create social and economic harmony through violence. Certainly, Hervé constructed no original theoretical analysis. The dialogue was a fitting device for propaganda, not theory; the socialist/peasant format lent itself to simplistic arguments while theory called for clear and incisive analysis. In Heuré's opinion, Hervé seemed rather bored with extolling the infallibility of dogma. If this had been intended as a crowning achievement in socialist theory, it proved to be no masterpiece. Certainly, Hervé could always produce a pithy phrase or a juicy anecdote, but this work rather uncharacteristically rushed forward without seriously bothering to answer the critics of collectivism. The ardor with which Hervé evoked the revolution showed him to be among the revolutionary destroyers

of the old order, in Heuré's view, not one of the theoretical builders of the future society. His thinking was more pragmatic than speculative and his focus was the tireless preparation for the "hour of anger and energy" which would incite the inevitable and liberating revolution. It was far from an imaginative and thoughtful attempt to plan and depict the collectivist utopia itself, an exercise which motivated theoreticians like Jaurès. "But Hervé was not Jaurès. He could hope for but not quite envision the new world his revolutionary zeal was beckoning. The 'hour of anger and energy' was his only horizon ..."[135] The anger and the energy of Hervéism would lead to excitement, scandal, and notoriety rather than a socialist Elysium. Jaurès along with his vision would be cut down on the eve of a war which would generate several revolutions which would eventually annul almost all revolutionary illusions.

In *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire* on January 24, 1904 near the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Hervé first suggested the impossibility of differentiating an aggressor from a defender at war's outbreak. Apparently he did not press this idea nor did he specifically apply it to France. The change was clear, however. When war between Russia and Japan came in February 1904, Hervé's views were seen in multiple publications in Yonne and Paris which "catapulted him into the position of being France's most extreme radical." He now advocated a refusal of reservists to march if they were called to active duty in the event France mobilized against Japan. If the Chamber would not explain the 1894 Treaty with Russia, if France refused arbitration at The Hague, and if *la patrie* engaged in an offensive war, then a reservist strike was justified.[136]

Hervé wanted socialists to consider his ideas and government leaders to ponder the domestic implications of war. He hoped to present his views at the next Congress of Yonne's Socialist Federation as well as at the 1904 Amsterdam Congress of the Second International. If the French government tried to silence him, that would "launch his idea with great reverberation."[137] The Russo-Japanese War was the first international conflict which Hervé would witness, and it obsessed him. He observed a process by which a local conflagration rapidly assumed larger proportions. Here was a real time display of "the relationship between war fever, entangling alliances, colonialism, press distortions, patriotic feelings, and the influence of even a weak antiwar movement."[138] His editorials analyzed the repercussions of the war, attacked the military value of the Russian Alliance, warned of the dangers of future Russian loans, and predicted imminent revolution in Russia. He knew the war must be combated internationally but recognized the futility of uncoordinated antimilitarist agitation and the failure of international socialism to prepare an antiwar strategy. Fascinated with the efficiency with which European

governments used the press, schools, military, and bureaucracy in order to arouse the people, Hervé, without a national or international organization and with few resources, hoped that antiwar rhetoric could suffice to counter governmental propaganda. Even during the worst phases of the Russo-Japanese War, he was never totally committed to the concept of an international insurrection against war. He hoped that the mere threat of resistance to war would suffice to prevent war. For the moment, insurrections appeared to be impossible during wars. "Underlying all of Hervé's ideas about preventing war … was the recurring theme of organization. Nothing could be accomplished, nationally or internationally, without coordinated action. The fractionalization of left-wing parties within nations and the conflict over socialist tactics between nations condemned the socialist movement to indolence if not impotence."[139]

Hervé's internationalist ideas were attacked by other French socialists who assumed that German socialists would defend their country whether war were offensive or defensive, thus guaranteeing a German victory. The German S.P.D. (*Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands*) would remain Hervé's nemesis for the next decade, but in 1904 Hervé defended his German comrades.[140] He hoped to push the S.P.D. toward a more militant antiwar attitude because he believed that only then would such ideas become rooted in Europe. Attendance at the summer 1904 Congress of the International in order to confront the Germans was Hervé's goal, but to attend the meeting Yonne socialists had to be affiliated with a party recognized by the Second International. That helps to explain Hervé's proposal, mentioned above, that the Yonne Federation abandon its autonomous position and join Jules Guesde's *Parti Socialiste de France*.[141] Another reason for joining the P.S. de F. was an unexpected answer to the problem of socialist disorganization. Hervé had left the P.S.F. in mid-1903 because he disagreed with the party's failure to expel Millerand and because he hoped to become an independent agent reconciling Jaurèsists and Guesdists. The outbreak of war in 1904 made that plan seem less important now that Hervé risked missing the International's debate over war and peace. He would not go back into the P.S.F. because it was "too timid" and was rife with disputes. A rival Guesdist Federation had been created in Yonne, so Hervé's move to join the P.S. de F. was also an attempt to create socialist unity within Yonne. The Autonomous Federation of Yonne met on April 16, 1904 at Auxerre, but Hervé's motion for union with the P.S. de F. was defeated. Rooted in the Allemanist tradition, the Yonne Federation had always hoped to unite all factions of the Left. Since Guesde generally rejected anarchists, syndicalists, and even non-Guesdist socialists as dangerous revisionists, collaboration with the P.S. de F. threatened the very nature of the Yonne Federation. Hervé amended his motion

in an attempt to satisfy critics, but the amended motion was never seriously considered.[142] When the Yonne Federation narrowly chose to remain autonomous and not join the P.S. de F. in August 1904, Hervé did not lose face, as Heuré saw it, because the Federation soon reunited and a permanent rupture was avoided. However, that meant that he was ineligible to present his antimilitarist ideas at the impending Congress of the Second International.[143]

With other avenues available, Hervé accepted the decision of Yonne's socialists and moved on to other activities. At this time he needed to prepare his case against an interpellation of his recent history textbook, *L'Histoire de la France et de l'Europe, l'Enseignement Pacifique par l'Histoire*, which was set for June 3, 1904 in the Chamber of Deputies.[144] Despite the growing criticism of the book even before the interpellation, Hervé had assumed that it was not his place to respond. "It is for the democratic and socialist teachers to defend the book in the republican departmental newspapers if they think that it is appropriate."[145] The interpellation, ten months after the text was published, instigated a new scandal. At that time, Ferdinand Buisson, a Radical Socialist deputy and educational reformer, wanted teachers to be able "to choose their own books and to engage in political activities outside the classroom." A conservative and former anti-Dreyfusard deputy, Georges Grosjean, targeted Hervé's book to underline the supposed deplorable state of French schools. The Minister of Public Instruction, Joseph Chaumié, agreed with Grosjean that the book be banned. For Chaumié, the text was "not a history book but a polemic" which should never be allowed in French schools.[146]

Speaking toward the conclusion of the interpellation, Jaurès criticized censorship without promoting the antimilitarist critique of the educational system. He would not ban the text because the criticism had taken passages out of context and created an inaccurate picture of the book's contents. Present in the Chamber gallery, Hervé had seen for himself what he considered to be a paltry socialist reaction to a three-hour nationalist and conservative mangling of his internationalist ideas. He seemed especially hurt by the failure of Briand to rise up in his defense. This led to biting exchanges with Jaurès at the beginning of the following week in *L'Humanité*, the recently founded socialist daily. The tone of the exchanges indicate that the mutual criticism hit home. Hervé said he knew that Jaurès did not like his manner of explaining his ideas, yet he exclaimed sarcastically how much he "admired" Jaurès and the other socialist Deputies' "courageous" defense of the text, accusing such parliamentarians of having two doctrines of internationalism: a respectable one for the bourgeoisie in parliament and a revolutionary one for "the rabble" at rallies. Jaurès responded with unusual severity claiming that Hervé's history "did not have the value of a Bible." The

P.S.F. leader argued that his intention had been less to defend any particular phrase in any particular book than to support the freedom to teach a socialist version of history with its ideals of international arbitration, universal peace, and gradual but concerted disarmament. The Deputy from Tarn accused Hervé of thinking in personal and egotistical terms rather than general and altruistic ones. Unmollified, the injured tone of Hervé's reply did little to undermine Jaurès's point. Jaurès's brief response to Hervé's second letter betrayed serious annoyance with the obstreperous Breton antimilitarist. The socialist leader refused to back down and accused Hervé of quibbling with supposed procedural slights by socialists during the interpellation and of being angry at not getting the publicity he had expected. In response, Hervé wondered whether a simple militant could ever criticize the socialist pope and his cardinals without being insulted in *L'Humanité*.[147] Back in Sens friends came to his defense. The antimilitarist pharmacist Louis Hinglais refuted Jaurès's charge of vanity: "We know Hervé, we see with our own eyes his apostolate each day out in the countryside of Yonne." Ismaël Poulain in the T.S.Y. praised the book as one of the best truly Republican history books, while his faithful friend François Duporc, who directed the Yonne newspaper, lauded Hervé's sincerity, selflessness, and dedication, and described Jaurès's portrayal as venomous insults.[148]

The interpellation in the Chamber associated Hervé directly with the terrible state of patriotism in French schools. Rather than analyzing his history text in detail, conservative and nationalist Deputies blamed Hervé for what they perceived as a general crisis in French education.[149] Outside the Chamber, one prominent teacher, editor, and critic named Émile Bocquillon deplored the supposed "crisis within French public schools" which he associated with the growing antimilitarist and antipatriotic penetration of French schools. Bocquillon assailed Hervé's role in infecting all levels of the French educational system with his treasonous ideas.[150] Not all attacks came from the Right. Even socialists worried that Hervéism could undermine French patriotism. It is not surprising that socialists with electoral concerns lamented the identification of their ideas with Hervé's.[151] Legislative interpellations, judicial prosecutions, and police surveillance created an image of Hervé as a dangerous conspiratorial agent despite the embryonic nature of Hervéism. Teachers who discussed Hervé's ideas were accused of having sold out to Hervéism. Any defense of the textbook was branded antipatriotic and extremist. However, pacifism, antimilitarism, free-thinking, internationalism, and class antagonism had affected the French and their educational system well before Hervé's textbooks and columns for the R.E.P. began to appear.[152] "Gustave Hervé was simply not the all-powerful conspiratorial agent he was made out to

be."[153] Regardless of what he had written elsewhere, Hervé's textbooks favored Republicanism, internationalism, and social justice.

Years ago Jacques and Mona Ozouf's study on patriotism in pre-war primary level history books ironically used Hervé's books to make their case about the profoundly patriotic assumptions of all French history texts in that era. "We have … utilized those [books] by Hervé … Though hardly distributed and constantly criticized by the university authorities, they appeared important to us; not so much because they are constantly used as targets by the Right and considered, for better or worse, as reflecting the spirit of the secular school, but rather because if it is possible to show that these works themselves continue to express a certain preference for the French *patrie*, the demonstration shall suffice, *a fortiori*, for other books [by different authors]."[154] At the time, others also noted that Hervé's extreme antipatriotism contained patriotic elements. Since Hervé's histories were seen as extremist when they were written, we may again have an example of rhetoric and form going well beyond the ideas presented.[155]

Because the Hervéist movement lacked formal organization, it needed publicity to create the appearance of strength. Thus, Hervé invited the government to try to silence him, and they responded. On June 4, 1904, the day after the interpellation, when Hervé and *Le Pioupiou* may have seemed especially vulnerable, the Minister of War, who had final jurisdiction in questions of libel against the army, ordered the reluctant Ministry of Justice to begin immediate prosecution against *Le Pioupiou VII*. Throughout 1904 on sixteen straight occasions the Minister of War had rejected trials involving antimilitarism because such cases only served "'to give added publicity to attacks which most often fail to stimulate an echo of a response.'"[156] Dossier number seventeen relating to the latest issue of *Le Pioupiou* was different because the Minister of War saw this as an opportunity to eliminate the paper altogether. Of course, Hervé was delighted.[157] Meanwhile, other events preoccupied the *Sans Patrie*.

At the International's Amsterdam Congress in August 1904, Émile Vandervelde, chairman of the International Socialist Bureau, had called on Jaurès and Guesde to shake hands, wondering whether they were more at war than Russia and Japan whose delegates managed such a friendly gesture. Jaurès discovered that the cost of socialist unity was a split with the progressive bourgeoisie and a weakening of the left-wing *Bloc* majority in the French Chamber.[158] Hervé was encouraged by the results of the Congress, even though he did not attend, because the gathering attacked both the moderation of French socialists and their refusal to create a united party. Although Jaurès had been the principal object of attack, Hervé disagreed with Guesde's ideas for excluding ministerial socialists from the new party.

Jaurès and his supporters would certainly be necessary for socialist unity. Hervé hoped the attack on revisionism and factionalism would lead the International to stress antimilitarism. The Amsterdam decision to oppose any extension of the Russo-Japanese War "by all means" seemed to indicate that the European Left might move in a positive direction. Although the Congress rejected the general strike as a tactic in the socialist arsenal, Hervé hoped that a greater emphasis on antimilitarism could promote syndicalist and socialist cooperation.[159] Jean-Pierre Hirou's study of socialist and syndicalist relations describes how the Amsterdam Congress sought to achieve a balance between reformism and revolution. Even on the question of ministerialism, there was much ambiguity. If socialist ministers were no longer possible, unique circumstances were to be considered. The Kautsky motion of 1900 had alluded to "exceptional circumstances," and it was not unambiguously abrogated at Amsterdam. The existence of socialists in Parliament seemed to open up almost all socialists to the charge of facilitating bourgeois rule and harming working class action. For Hirou, the issue of nationalism versus internationalism was finessed rather than solved at Amsterdam.[160]

Never forgetting that the Yonne Federation had been unable to participate at Amsterdam, Hervé continued to promote membership in Guesde's P.S. de F. while socialists awaited unification. He understood socialist fears that unification would cause the breakup of the leftist parliamentary *Bloc* and alienate many voters, but he hoped it would increase antimilitarism and antipatriotism in a unified party which had become an inevitability. Since most reforms were already being pushed by the Radicals, socialists could avoid parliamentary activities and still act as a revolutionary pressure group.[161] Hervé wanted a unified party to stress cooperation with syndicalists and anarchists in order to train revolutionary groups to spread "collectivist, antimilitarist, and international propaganda."[162] Since parliamentary socialists were to be included in a united party, Hervé accepted electoral politics, at least temporarily. However, ministerial participation and permanent collaboration with bourgeois groups were rejected. For Hervé, reformism and revisionism were doomed, so socialists and anarcho-syndicalists eventually would have to merge in a united revolutionary front. Such a sanguine perspective arose not only from the Amsterdam Congress but from the French C.G.T.'s September 1904 Congress of Bourges, which appeared to demand revolutionary direct action to bring social changes. Reformism appeared doomed to others on the Left as well.[163]

The week after his positive reactions to the C.G.T. Congress of Bourges, Hervé discussed three bases on which socialist unity should be supported. (1) A united socialist party should include a national council where both French socialist parties had equal representation; (2) Parliamentary socialists should vote as a bloc;

(3) Either *L'Humanité* or *Le Socialiste* should become the official daily socialist newspaper under the direction of the national council which would name the editor-in-chief.[164] A recent Radical and Radical-Socialist Congress further convinced him that socialism had to transcend the Radical program of reforms which could never end exploitation or unemployment, however progressive that program was. His passing comment, that Radical views differed from those of Jaurès only by the "thickness of a hair", did not bode well for unification when it did come.[165] Rather than having a parliamentary socialist party, Hervé wanted to let the Radicals perform all manner of progressive tasks, while socialists organized collectivist groups and mobilized revolutionaries. The risks of parliamentarianism were too great: *arrivisme*, corruption, fear of toppling the governments, and *embourgeoisement.* If a war occurred between France and Germany, socialists would have to employ their weapons against their class enemies at home. Yet the same voice who openly called for revolution defended clerical officers who were subject to "vile governmental surveillance and repression."[166]

By mid-October 1904, five of the groups in Hervé's Yonne Federation, which formerly had rejected merging with Guesdists, now changed their views. The Guesdist Federation in Yonne ended its hostility to Hervé, and now began to work toward unity with the Hervéist Federation. A formal merger with either the P.S. de F. or P. S. F. was unnecessary since a National Unifying Commission representing all French socialist groups was soon created with Hervé as a representative of the Autonomous Federations of Brittany, Herault, Nord, Somme, and Yonne. By the end of 1904, Hervé had other good reasons to be optimistic. The trial of *Le Pioupiou VII* on November 30, 1904 ended in a fourth acquittal. He had re-emerged as the main socialist leader in Yonne and was poised to take his anti-war crusade to national and international congresses since unification was assured and restraint no longer demanded. Hervé "was prepared to reassume his role as socialist *provocateur par excellence.*" Rooted first in Yonne and then throughout much of France, Hervé could now work to spread his ideas throughout Europe. All he needed was "the propitious moment."[167]

For both Scher and Heuré, 1905 was a watershed for both France and Hervé. The latter's own assessment seems to support that contention. "It was between 1904 and 1905 that the French political and social situation had profoundly changed. This change was caused by the rapid breakup of the *Bloc* between Radicals, socialists, and revolutionaries, whose combined forces at the time of the Dreyfus Affair had permitted victory over the clerical, nationalist, and monarchist bloc."[168] In *La Guerre Sociale* in 1913 he stated that Hervéism arose in 1905 as a logical development of ideas presented at the Amsterdam Congress.[169] Using

self-flagellation to maintain his own relevance at the time of his transformation, Hervé blamed Hervéism itself as an important source for the dissolution of the *Bloc* in 1905 because he was convinced by 1913 that a new *Bloc* was the only way to avert the new nationalist clerical Caesarism which he believed was about to sweep France. In the interwar era Hervé recalled how "it was especially in 1905 that I recommended insurrection in the event of war." He connected his increasing radicalization to the Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905, and later admitted that revolution could only succeed at a time of war. In 1905 he seemed unaware of the paradox because he appeared to advocate insurrection to avoid war, to end war, and presumably to create a revolution during war.[170]

Certainly, the war in the East triggering domestic turmoil in Russia, the Kaiser's visit to Tangier on March 31, 1905, the breakup of the parliamentary *Bloc*, the creation of the S.F.I.O. in April 1905, the Separation of Church and State, the reduction of military service from three to two years, the revival of the nationalist movement, and the concomitant intensification of revolutionary antimilitarism and antipatriotism on the extreme Left seem to make 1905 a pivotal year. Hervé now saw how alliances themselves caused wars to lead to other wars, and this became an operative principle for him. War and patriotism were clearly connected. So a war against war by way of antipatriotism and antimilitarism had to parallel or precede the struggle against capitalism. This became Hervéist dogma. He seemed to have evidence that revolutionary situations could draw together peacetime rivals. Violence, antimilitarism, and revolution were not ends in themselves but were expected to lead to peace, unity, as well as social justice and harmony, but few others agreed. If the notions of a critical period, turning point, or watershed are not too hackneyed to be useful, then 1905 can be seen as such an era. Internal and external events in 1904 and 1905 so radicalized Hervé's ideas that it seems valid to see the era as a valid turning point both for him and Europe. Hervéism was fully formed in a year when France and Europe were more threatened than ever. Yet many of the events and trends seen above were certainly the culminations of long-standing developments.[171] And future events would alter many of those assessments and expectations.

On December 12, 1904 a meeting of the National Unifying Commission, which included the P.O.S.R., the P.S.F., the P.S. de F., and several autonomous federations including the Yonne, was held in Paris on the Rue de Saintonge. As a member of that commission, Hervé was mandated by the Yonne Federation to push for unity, to support communist *libertaires* and syndicalists, and to demand that socialist deputies and newspapers be placed under the control of a national council. Even before unity was completed, Hervé never doubted that the new

party had to prepare for revolution through activism rather than traditional politics. He was under no illusions that four years of Millerandism, Jaurèsism, and opportunistic reformism could be remedied quickly.[172] As a member of the six-man subcommittee to the Commission for Unification, Hervé helped draft the Pact of Union on December 30, 1904.[173] While working for unity, Hervé called on socialists to be more firm in foreign affairs, to rise up against the "peaceful penetration" of Morocco, and to monitor the ramifications of the war between Japan and France's ally, Russia.[174]

In January 1905 Hervé was part of an enormous crowd which accompanied the body of the former Communard Louise Michel from the Gare de Lyon to the Cimitière of Levallois-Perret. For historian Maurice Agulhon the excitement generated by the death of *La Pétroleuse* illustrated how "reformist … socialism had not absorbed the entire capacity for mobilization and fervour on the part of the people … Her popularity uncovered forces of social protest which even the most left-wing of Republics could not completely channel. That constant, though diffused, revolutionary pressure from the extreme left rendered the defense of Combism more difficult, like that of Millerandism a little earlier."[175] Clearly, it would not be easy even for the united socialists to satisfy the entire French Left. By 1905 Hervé was beginning to sound much like the future Director of *La Guerre Sociale* according to Heuré. After a *tournée* in the Somme in March 1905, he showed some sympathy for a group of anarchist thieves who robbed the chateaux of the region.[176] When Jaurès described him as differing from the anarchists by only the "thickness of a hair" Hervé retorted that anarchists rejected voting while antiparliamentary socialists tolerated it because they recognize that bourgeois democrats were preferable to bourgeois reactionaries. Yet Hervé was counting on unleashing the social revolution.[177]

On April 23, 1905 the various parties and autonomous federations of the French socialist Left opened their unification Congress in Paris at the Globe Hall on the Boulevard de Strasbourg. Hervé, who was one of Yonne's five delegates at the Congress, arrived early in the morning to check the delegates' credentials and to hand out their individual entrance cards. The afternoon session was reserved for the creation of the parliamentary group and nominations to the *Commission Administrative Permanente*, the new party's most important executive body. Hervé was, in fact, named to the twenty-two member commission, or C.A.P., and he signed the Charter of Unity creating the S.F.I.O. (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*). In the afternoon session of April 25, Hervé made a motion asking the C.A.P. to join with the C.G.T. in solidarity with Spanish socialist forces by responding to the impending visit of the Spanish king.[178]

French socialist unity at the "organizational level did not eliminate serious differences of opinion on questions of program and tactics" as Hervé's speech the evening after the Congress illustrates.[179] On April 26, 1905 at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall auditorium in the 10th *arrondissement* near the Canal Saint-Martin, at least 2000–4000 excited listeners were in attendance to hear what various prominent socialists had to say about the newly unified party. In Scher's words, Hervé used the occasion to declare "war on the socialist edifice which he had just meticulously helped to construct."[180] Most speakers were generally quite moved by socialist unity because it promised to have historic importance. Édouard Vaillant thought that unification was as important for socialism as the Commune. The Belgian Vandervelde, representing the Second International, hoped the creation of French socialist unity would inspire other nations. Hervé, on the other hand, was set on pushing his antimilitarist and antipatriotic ideas onto the socialist agenda. His words may have been extreme but they were far from new. A reservist strike in response to a mobilization order had increasingly become standard ideas for him since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese conflict. He had gradually rejected the idea of a just defensive war during 1904. Though he was just one among twenty other speakers that day, his speech had stood out.[181]

According to Victor Méric's rather theatrical version of the gathering, Hervé's speech was unique.

> "The hall was filled to capacity. Suddenly, everyone saw a short, thick, pudgy man with jovial face stand up at the rostrum, his spectacles ready for combat … [He] spoke with strange inflexions, going from the very shrill to the cavernous depths of a noble base, and began to explain what he meant by antimilitarism … As one would suspect, this incisive declaration, without excess embellishments, provoked some reactions in the audience. But the orator persisted. He would show the operation, such as it had to happen, and he broke it down into three stages: passive resistance, formal refusal, and insurrection. And there it was! Simple and understandable to all. But the following day, what an uproar in the press!"[182]

Even though Hervé was no longer the unknown and bizarre provincial that Méric depicted, one can well believe that he caused a quite stir that day because he was immediately assailed from all sides with accusations of being "a charlatan, a crackpot, a publicity hound, sick, a neurotic, crazy, a phony, etc."[183]

Without the presence of Jaurès, who begged off due to incredible fatigue brought on by the activities leading up to the Globe Congress, *L'Humanité* gave a rather programmatic rendition of Hervé's brief address that evening. Gilles Heuré is undoubtedly accurate in describing Hervé as quite demanding in his expectations at the celebratory meeting the day after unification since he branded official

international socialist responses to the global situation as too timid. The *Sans Patrie* argued that the new party had better listen to the peasants of Yonne on such matters, and he called on the party to support Spanish leftists by protesting the imminent Parisian visit of the King of Spain. He went on to stress that "… whichever government would be the aggressor, we will refuse to give one drop of our blood. We have decided to respond to mobilization orders with a strike by the reservists."[184] No wonder that nationalists and conservatives responded with outrage. Later that year, the nationalist teacher and writer Émile Bocquillon would cite such remarks to prove that a crisis in patriotism was developing in French schools.[185]

In responding to the nationalist outcry, Gérault-Richard, though not present that day, assumed that Hervé had been misquoted because socialism was quite patriotic. Since socialists sought the liberation of all men from subjugation, they had to defend France from an attack. There could be no confusion between internationalism and antipatriotism. "If the speaker at the unity meeting had actually delivered the speech that the nationalist press ascribed to him, he must have been simply following a strong pacifist concern, unless it was some sort of exaggerated egoism or disgusting play-acting. He, thus, would have worked for the destruction of his own ideal, because the most likely means to bring on aggression is to publicize your inability to defend yourself or your systematic resignation to defeat."[186] In *L'Humanité* future minister René Viviani echoed such views without even mentioning Hervé by name. "The entire party is opposed to the ideas expressed at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall and which would tend to maintain that 'whoever the aggressor was, we would respond in case of war, at the call to arms, by a general strike of reservists.' The orator spoke as it suited himself; he only committed himself and no others." For Viviani, socialists clearly distinguished internationalism from antipatriotism and Hervé was a marginal voice. One should not put too much store in the "excesses of an isolated speaker, master of his own thought but not that of others …" An entire socialist tradition must prevail over "the harangue of one orator."[187] Hervé immediately took up the challenge in an article in *Le Travailleur* titled "The Internationalist Patriots" which reaffirmed his antipatriotism and spoke about the growing movement which supported it.[188]

Nothing in the Tivoli speech was new but the timing was critical. The Tivoli speech was given by a man who was now one of the leaders of S.F.I.O., so it embarrassed the new party. Socialists like Gérault-Richard and Viviani attacked Hervé on the grounds that socialism and the defense of the *patrie* were not incompatible. They were especially worried that the nationalist press would use Hervé's ideas to attack socialism. The Tivoli speech was attacked because it seemed to identify the entire S.F.I.O. "with the detestable doctrines of an outcast."[189] Though Hervé

may have had rather unique views about socialist internationalism, he was glad that French socialists were now united. Not all French socialists were happy about unity. Some socialist Deputies like Jean-Victor Augagneur, J.-C. Colliard, and Gérault-Richard even quit the party due to Hervé's extreme antimilitarism.[190] If the increasing number of references to Hervé in the police records in 1905 is any indication, his evolving views and increasing prominence made him seem to be a growing national security threat. Reactions by members of his party and some formerly sympathetic publications also seem to reflect this changing perception. Hervéism was by now a prominent tendency in French socialism as well as an embarrassing challenge to the S.F.I.O. to live up to its "theoretically" antireformist, antimilitarist, and revolutionary ideas. Hervé became increasingly insistent in promoting insurrectional actions to prevent war because he believed that only a fear of revolution would keep governments out of war.[191]

Sooner or later the chief spokesman for reformist socialism was bound to clash directly with the provocative insurrectional leader. On May 20, 1905 Jaurès was the first to throw down the gauntlet. After granting Hervé's right to express himself by invoking the traditional socialist ideal of freedom of thought, Jaurès took a swing at the Yonne firebrand by pointing out that socialists were leaving the S.F.I.O. due to Hervé's absurd paradoxes. The Deputy from the Tarn pointed out that the International itself had long rejected a military strike so no one should take Hervé's "outdated and personal paradoxes" as standard socialist ideas. Jaurès proffered that "even socialists in Yonne cannot long remain the dupes of Hervé's sophisms." He claimed to discover the reasons for Hervé's popularity in "this air of bravado and defiance of prejudices which give the illusion of extreme audacity and liberty." Still, Jaurès saw a silver lining in the Hervéist challenge because it showed governments how inciting wars could provoke revolutionary uprisings of the proletariat.[192]

One month after socialist unification, a face to face confrontation between Jaurès and Hervé finally occurred at the Elysée-Montmartre. The occasion was a meeting on May 27, 1905 sponsored by the Republican-Socialist Committee of Clignancourt over the question of "Socialism and the Nation." Hervé had not originally been invited to speak, but he was urged by supporters to respond to Jaurès even though the meeting had not been designed as an open debate. The committee accepted his request along with that of the eccentric anarchist Libertad. With an anarchist on stage facing a large crowd, Hervé may have assumed that socialist positions would not be the only ones heard. *L'Humanité* described Jaurès's speech as a one-sided, face to face boxing match.[193] Jaurès began by commenting on the reason for the timeliness of this discussion: the ideas of Hervé

regarding the relationship between internationalism and the nation had caused such a stir recently, scandalizing some while being exploited by others. While he accepted Hervé's right to inclusion in the S.F.I.O., Jaurès separated himself from the latter's ideas. "For my part, I think that Hervé's theories, even if they are extreme, even excessive, even false, even dangerous, are only a subject for panic and scandal among weak parties and feeble minds. For strong parties, they are, on the contrary, a natural occasion for … verifying and testing their own ideas." There was nothing surprising about challenges to accepted ideas arising in a revolutionary epoch. If he found Hervé's ideas to be deplorable, it was not because they struck that sacred "idol" called the nation. "For free-thinking people—and no one is a socialist if he is not free to think—there are no 'idols.'" According to Jaurès, instead of clearly analyzing the idea of the nation, Hervé simply aggravated the obscurities and difficulties. So the Deputy from the Tarn felt compelled to clear up the "misunderstandings" not by invoking socialist dogmas but by drawing on the common ideas about social revolution which could be applied as criteria to evaluate any theory.[194]

He asked the audience to imagine the dawning of the socialist millennium. After elaborating a bit on what that would entail, he posed the question:

> "Well then, in this realized human ideal … were nations going to disappear? Certainly nations would disappear as forces of defiance, exclusiveness, and reciprocal oppression, but they would also survive in two ways and under two forms. They would survive first as the accumulation of original genius; the communist paradise of tomorrow would be especially poor if it were monotonous; but it will inherit much in harmonizing the diversity of national genius."

Just as individuals will not lose their uniqueness in the socialist future, the historical individualities called nations will not be dissolved but will continue and affirm themselves under ever more harmonious forms, with their own moral individualities fashioned by history, with their unique languages, literature, sense of life, recollections, hopes, passions, soul, and genius.

> "All of these individualities will constitute the great communist humanity of the future, and the latter will not be like a monotonous desert where millions of dried-out, arid human atoms floated about by chance, buffeted by the wind. This will be a great unity, uneven like the planet, but enveloped like it by a luminous space, where a common thought of fraternal humanity will radiate."

The world is too vast and complicated to be run by a vast centralized global bureaucracy. Even today nations run into such problems. Nations exist and will

be needed in the new socialist age of autonomous action by a diverse federation of nations. Instead of destroying national differences, the goal of socialism was to create a federation of states which would harmonize them.[195]

Jaurès pointed out how Hervé's ideas rejected essential and legitimate elements in anarchism. Anarchist fears that collectivism would crush individual initiative through impersonal bureaucracy and stifling administration would not be resolved by destroying the nation. The disappearance of nations, as Hervé defined them, would create a singularly monotonous, communist society that might be free of the capitalist yoke but it would leave individuals even more exposed to the very centralized bureaucratic hold that anarchists legitimately feared. In fact, nations were necessary for the creation of universal communism with manifold forms of cooperation without regimentation and excessive control. Humanity was an ideal not an institution; it is yet to be realized. But partial organizations of people do exist and they are called nations which are forces for combat and progress. They can be the means to prepare and realize the universal socialist humanity of the future. The famous line of Marx that "workers have no country" was a rhetorical whim based on the desperate and deplorable state of the proletariat. However, didn't the current state of the proletariat, though far from ideal, show evidence of great progress made through working class efforts? For Jaurès, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the universalizing nature of German Idealism, through Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, were national hallmarks of progress which the capitalist bourgeoisie cannot elude. If workers ever forget about the affairs of their nations and national traditions, they would be abandoning their entire histories—in which they put so much energy, intelligence, and heroism—to their bourgeois adversaries.[196]

Though Jaurès credited Hervé for posing the question of how socialists should respond to the issues raised by national versus international and class interests, he was not satisfied with the answer. Not only were Hervé's ideas quite weak, they often contradicted the very history of France. Jaurès was convinced that Hervé had not discovered the best way for socialists to prevent the proletariat from being employed in wars against their class brothers. The socialist tribune explained that he never claimed to have resolved the national/international dilemma, but he sought to analyze and try to conciliate the dilemma of national interests and international duties. All Hervé had done was to suppress one half of the dilemma. In evading rather than resolving the problem, Hervé had provided no solution at all. Jaurès proceeded to dismantle Hervé's sophisms and contradictions by stressing how the working classes of each nation, even as they find common ground with workers of other countries, still work and fight at the national level. The socialist

leader wondered how the *Sans Patrie* could argue that one's nationality did not matter, and then describe the nations of Russia and Turkey as worse than the others. Then, in jest, he said he was not worried about Hervé. "Even if he would not fight the English, Italians, or Bavarians, he was ready to …" The audience supplied the finishing lines "fight the Russians and the Turks." Needless to say, that "brought down the house" in laughter. When someone called out Jaurès for using such a mocking tone, he turned the remark to good use, by wondering if the audience member might wish to turn Hervé into an untouchable idol! For Jaurès, one's nationality was not subject to choice; it did matter. France had a unique culture, ancient traditions, and an exceptional political system which ought to be defended, not destroyed. Despite its shortcomings, the French Republic was the definitive form of democracy. It could and should defend itself. "Hervé may say that his nationality does not matter, but he has no real choice. He is French and so are we. The only way for us to become German is through an invasion." Jaurès then demonstrated another Hervéist inconsistency. If reservists strike during a mobilization, then the army is not meant to defend France from a foreign attack, so the army must be meant only for internal repression or external butcheries. If Hervé were consistent, he would demand a refusal to join the army and its immediate suppression. The antimilitarist "General" ought to be preaching a strike of conscripts not a strike of reservists. Insurrection in the event of war would leave French workers isolated internally and externally. Another inconsistency, according to Jaurès, was Hervé's self-defeating combination of Tolstoyan passive resistance associated with strikes and French revolutionary activism which leads to revolution. If such a revolution succeeds, it will have to defend itself from invasion if that situation arises. Hervé's contradictory ideas could not resolve the dilemmas. For Jaurès, all that could be done was to struggle against war by all practical means at present, but one must be prepared to defeat one's enemies, both external and internal, when the situation arose.[197] *L'Humanité* "knew" the winner in this verbal match even before it concluded, as it described the vigor of Jaurès's arguments exposing Hervé's weaknesses. The socialist daily assumed that the entire audience was won over and simply wondered how Hervé could possibly respond.[198]

Hervé's initial praise of Jaurès's superior skills prepared his severe rebuttal. The fiery Breton accused Jaurès, despite his apparent good intentions, of misinterpreting his ideas. By describing himself as a collectivist and a Marxist rather than an anarchist, a Tolstoyan, or an intellectual, Hervé rejected Jaurès's characterization and displayed his own combative nature. Then he stated: "I would like you to clearly realize that the doctrine I presented at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall did not come from the mind of an academic embittered by some sort of insignificant

university misfortune … or from the brain of an intellectual who loved to play with abstract ideas. No, it came from a better place than that: it arose from the views of workers and peasants of Yonne, fellows who had never read Karl Marx." Someone from the audience then shouted: "But they read your books!" Once the laughter died down, Hervé continued, saying that he was convinced that socialists like Jaurès and those in Germany like Bebel were perfectly willing to defend their nations no matter how outrageous their actions, and he claimed that Jaurès had overly sanguine views concerning a federation of autonomous nations. The need for a European state was obvious to the antimilitarist leader. He was certain that Jaurès contradicted himself by subscribing to ideas about class struggle yet accepting class collaboration in defense of the nation. That meant Jaurès was as much a patriot as any Radical. For Hervé, "patriotism serves only to veil class conflict." Workers had a duty to fight their class enemies not their class brothers. He assailed socialists like Jaurès for failing to comprehend the symbiotic relationship between patriotism, war, and repression. There was an irreducible opposition between internationalism and patriotism which would only lead socialists into wars against each other one day. When socialists argue that they will defend their nation only when it is attacked, they forget that it is impossible to know that for sure. Distinctions between wars of aggression and defense are meaningless since governments never admit to provoking a war. Because governments control information and the wealthy monopolize communications, a defense of *la patrie* only when it is attacked actually means that *la patrie* will be defended in all cases. Most socialists reject such insights simply because "the task of winning elections comes before all else." Wrapping oneself in the tricolor never hurt one's electoral chances. Hervé claimed that socialists employ a rolled up flag showing only red, but whenever Radical voters get skittish, socialists unfold the flag, thereby showing their true colors. He, as an antiparliamentarian, did not worry about election defeats.

For Hervé, all socialists should resist all wars no matter the aggressor but should wage *la guerre sociale* and create revolution in the event of mobilization, either through a military insurrection by the army or a mass desertion by draftees coupled to a reservists' strike involving the takeover of local communities. He claimed that Jaurès misunderstood his ideas about a military insurrection which involved going to the barracks, getting armed, and then revolting en masse, which he admitted was dangerous. When laughter erupted, he told the audience that he thought standard socialist ideas were also laughable. They should at least try to understand what he was saying, then they could laugh. After the diversion, he continued to describe the dangers of an insurrection. Once away from home, friends, job, etc., soldiers found it difficult to not get caught up in all the hoopla

preparing for war. His second possible tactic to prevent war, the reservist strike, had three stages: first, conscripts and reservists who are in the barracks should desert when war is declared and join up with socialist and syndicalist groups in the neighboring cities; second, reservists who do not wish to enter their barracks should stay where they were; third, once the army leaves to die in battle for the "sacred soil of the country" and only the *gendarmerie* remains, remaining workers will engage in the social revolution. As far as the objections of Jaurès and others regarding a French insurrection while the Prussian workers march with their army, Hervé argued that it would not matter because the downtrodden had nothing to lose. Workers will not be massacred or enslaved, just look at Alsace-Lorraine. Workers and peasants will not lose goods and properties that they do not have. And they were even less likely to lose their language. Nor will they lose their political liberties such as freedom of the press. Hervé claimed that his antimilitarist tactics were not about to be applied the day after tomorrow but were meant to give the German socialists something to think about. He thought that three million German socialists would act against war only if French socialists espoused ideas like his. When Hervé finished, he, too, was greeted with wild applause.[199] *L'Humanité* claimed that the audience was courteous but impatient with Hervé because he failed to prove his arguments.[200]

In his brief speech the anarchist Libertad called both Hervé and Jaurès patriots. Despite his sympathy for Hervé, Libertad thought that the *Sans Patrie* did not push his ideas to their logical conclusion, and that Jaurès was more consistent. Like other anarchists, Libertad found patriotic elements even in Hervé's extreme positions. How could Hervé attack war between Germany and France and then praise war against reactionary Turkey and Russia? Libertad told Hervé that he was inconsistent in admitting "the legitimacy of human groups arming against each other." For Libertad, the enemy was not so much governments but capitalism which existed even in peacetime. He agreed with Jaurès's critique of insurrectionalism. "If the reservists' strike is good; the strike by soldiers is better." If Hervé were against war, he should urge conscripts to resist conscription and soldiers to strike or to desert in peace time, not encourage submission to the two-year military service, no matter what the ulterior antimilitarist motives. Since the army taught obedience and deference, above all, it needed to be gotten rid of immediately. Women should teach even newborn children to hate the army. Libertad achieved wild applause when he came out against war, the army, and all the militaristic vanity. After that, in jesting irony Jaurès thanked Libertad for his precious help against Hervé, and he reminded the latter of his inconsistency in counting on German socialists to help France, while French socialists were limited to defending themselves against

French capitalists. He closed by calling the Dreyfus Affair not just a question of capitalism and social justice but individual conscience and universal values which Hervé erred in separating. General applause ended the session.[201]

Jaurès's position on Hervé was complex. Throughout the spring and summer of 1905, he accused Hervé of having "surrendered to the evil temptation to startle, to excite, to create disturbances around his paradoxes, in short, to foment problems and embarrassment for those whom he freely denounced as part of the General Staff [of the S.F.I.O.]."[202] Ironically, Jaurès was often attacked for not repudiating Hervé completely. In a bitter polemic with Clemenceau during the late summer of 1905 concerning the alleged subservience of the S.F.I.O. to Hervéism, Jaurès acknowledged that Hervé's ideas were "reactionary and repugnant". Yet, it was Jaurès's position that "in a great party, freedom of speech, along with its perils, was worth more than a policy of excommunication and exclusion." Hervé would soon stumble according to Jaurès because few socialists were captivated by antimilitarism.[203] According to L.-O. Frossard, "everything in Hervéism shocked Jaurès: the ideas, the form in which they were clothed, the constant desire to 'épater le bourgeois', the theatrical bluffing, the gross exploitation of the least acceptable passions, and the continual excitation of the lowest elements of humanity."[204] In his debate with the nationalist deputy and Hervé critic Émile Bocquillon in August 1905, Jaurès assailed insurrectional arguments. Because Bocquillon used Hervé's ideas and rhetoric to assail socialism, Jaurès felt obligated to skewer the latter's notions as "detestable and absurd paradox", "reactionary or nonsensical", and "contradictory."[205] In the end, he ironically accused both men of simply reversing the logic of exclusive patriotism: Bocquillon argued for France first! While Hervé's paradox, in the name of international solidarity, assumed that French interests must come last! [206]

On June 24, 1905 *Le Travailleur Socialiste*, in announcing the publication of Hervé's *Leur Patrie*, employed phrases like: "a monument of antipatriotism", "a work of terrible irony", "implacable logic", "a masterpiece", "the resounding expression of the revolutionary thought of the proletariat", and "an epoch in the evolution of humanity."[207] For Gilles Heuré *Leur Patrie* was: "More than a book, in his career as a propagandist, it was a 'masterpiece' in the sense of craftsmanship." Certainly, Hervé was familiar with the accusations that he was a buffoon or a fraud, and this undoubtedly led him to try to deliver a genuine theoretical contribution at the formation of the newly united socialist party. He wanted to be taken seriously, but he also sought to incorporate lessons from his four years in the Yonne. "*Leur Patrie* was expected to be a reference, a platform around which one had to discuss, and, above all, one had to be convinced that it was the editorial

tree which sheltered a forest of militants, devoted and resolved to enter the new party in a dynamic way and no longer be resigned to stay on the sidelines." Yet Heuré also called the editing of the book rushed and uneven, despite rhetoric which intentionally enchanted and frightened readers.[208]

For Scher *Leur Patrie* was an inquiry into "the process by which a patriot is made and by which he may possibly be unmade and remade into something else."[209] The first thirteen chapters were devoted to how one's family, schools, state, church, as well as all the means of communication worked to inculcate patriotism by various myths, symbols, and heroic episodes. Such an "education" tied one to a *patrie* which inevitably entailed oppression and war. Hervé scathingly attacked the lies, prejudices, and ritual beliefs that turned reasonable men into fanatic patriots. He dissected the heroic myths of history used to sanction patriotism, then he compared patriotism to the vanquished myth of religion. Both were belief systems accepted without justification or proof. In France, to compare patriotism to religion was to seek to ridicule and destroy it in the minds of many.[210] Hervé was no pacifist since he called for "*la guerre sociale*" in place of foreign wars. "After all, to create a secular society, it was necessary … to clash with religious prejudices just as respectable as patriotism. It is not our fault if a new society which wants to be born only emerges from the entrails of the one which is dying by a painful and distressing birth."[211] The volume may have been a compilation of antiwar ideas developed from 1900 until 1905, as Scher argued,[212] but there had been an evolution as well.

In order to maintain peace and guarantee the advent of an equitable society, Hervé argued that socialism had to discard its contradictory "patriotic internationalism."[213] To demolish the patriotic mythology, the fiery Breton annihilated its arguments one by one, "always by privileging the good and innocent sense of ordinary people who do not think wrongly."[214] He felt it was time to reject traditional internationalist pacifism and the ideas of French socialists who still considered Bastille Day as a day of revolutionary celebration. "Every July 14, in honor of our great ancestors who stormed the Bastille, the French army is displayed in all the public places of all the garrison cities. Hundreds of thousands of citizens get up early to go and fry in the sun, in their carnival-like outfits, in order to watch the national puppet show. And there, they wildly shout bravos when they see interminable lines of men and horses (a formidable mass of flesh ready for slaughter), cannon, and instruments of massacre, parade by amidst clouds of dust."[215] The nation was no longer the "land of French ancestors," "the crucible of the people," "the union created by language," and even less a "community of ideas." To describe his vision of *la patrie*. Hervé employed a striking and recurring image of France as a cruel stepmother, rather than a benevolent mother of a people.[216]

He seemed convinced that even if Germany conquered France nothing much would change because capitalism, military actions, and police beatings would remain. Workers would continue to read their socialist papers, unionize, go on strike, be beaten by the police, and shot by the army. In the event of war, Hervé described two possible tactics. (1) Soldiers should take up their arms, refuse to march to war, yet be ready to seize political power and the means of production. He knew that such a tactic was a bit naïve because it didn't take account of citizens' ideas once they put on the uniform. (2) A second possible tactic seemed a bit more realistic. Soldiers could desert on the day of mobilization. Acknowledging that the S.F.I.O. would have to debate such tactics, he assumed that whatever tactic was chosen would promote success. Workers would have to join a mobilization unwaveringly in order to sabotage it and that tactic would have to be employed on both sides of the frontier in order to be successful. He did not believe that one could distinguish offensive from defensive wars since the rapidity of movements at war's outbreak prevented such distinctions.[217] Such ideas pleased few socialists, including Jaurès, who, over the years, would continue to respond to Hervé's insurrectionalism. In his seminal 1911 *L'Armée Nouvelle* advocating a citizen militia, Jaurès must have had Hervé in mind when he wrote: "It is childishness to say that workers, being the serfs of capitalism, cannot aggravate their servitude through invasion or conquest."[218]

The logic of Hervé's position was clear but social reality was more complex and ambiguous. The abstract patriotic-international dichotomy was alien to human experience, even Hervé's. As he explicated traditional socialist internationalism, Hervé took precautions and made distinctions. "You must try to understand us clearly … We do not claim that the love of one's native village, the patriotism of one's hometown—which is not a national patriotism—is not a natural feeling, quite enduring for many. We who hate countries as they are, we maintain, for the little corner of the earth where we were born, a sort of filial pride. We have never claimed that there are no major differences in character and temperament among today's nations, which race and history have made."[219] Such admissions and realistic clarifications illustrate the difficulties Hervé had in justifying, explaining, or implementing his ideas. His concern with concrete preparations necessary to implement his romantic insurrectionalism certainly makes him a curious figure. His theoretical position seemed rather naïve, yet more than any other contemporary French socialist leader, he seemed to seek practical preparations necessary for his revolutionary theories to succeed. His ideas calling for workers to enter the military to foster what he later called a "conquest of the army", which would cause such commotion on the Left after 1910, were already being bruited by 1905 and not just by Hervé. An insurrection, such as the one Hervé imagined, had little

chance of success in modern France, yet his assessment of the steps necessary for any chance of fulfillment were plausible efforts to implement revolutionary action, however quixotic. It seems a bit ironic that Hervé was labeled a turncoat after 1910, in part, for re-emphasizing a long held idea.[220]

Reactions to *Leur Patrie* were not limited to the French Left. *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire* called on all teachers to not only read the book, but to carefully study it. Obviously, the effects of Hervéism on the teaching corps troubled French nationalists. In *La Revue des Deux Mondes* journalist Georges Goyau described Hervé's volume as promoting the "hatred of the army" which led to a kind of "double desertion" by teachers, who betray the nation and its schools, driven by the infernal ideas of Gustave Hervé. "If you hear it said that students of the École Normale refuse to commemorate the dead of 1870, or that the teachers from the Sedan region say that they would love to be English or Prussians just as much as French, you don't have to look elsewhere for their filiation; their intellectual father is M. Hervé." One writer at "*Le Gaulois* laid out a nightmarish scene of a school where the students 'will be atheists and anarchists,' and *Les Débats* went one better in regretting that teachers allowed the public schools to take sides with antipatriotism."[221] Some commentators on the Left wondered what French socialists would do if German soldiers failed to instigate a military strike and followed official orders by invading France. Hervé reiterated his dual options: a military insurrection or desertion which must have convinced few people who remembered the invasion of 1870. Yet Hervé was sanguine: "The invaders will no more molest the daughter, mother, sister, or wife [of socialist deserters], they would no more massacre their young children than they did in 1870, when individual violence, in total, was relatively rare." He claimed he could not believe that German socialists would march on communes which were flying the red flags of the International.[222]

About the time that the S.F.I.O. was created in the spring of 1905, Hervé's situation at *La Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire* was changing. He may have begun to see himself as a scapegoat and, seeing "the writing on the walls", distanced himself from the R.E.P. because on May 28, 1905 he began to stress that his views were not those of the *Revue*. He had certainly used his forum on international issues at the R.E.P. to denounce his enemies and expound his increasingly provocative views.[223] On July 1, 1905, just after the appearance of *Leur Patrie*, *Le Travailleur Socialiste* reported that Hervé's three year collaboration with the *Revue* was over since its editor had come to fear "that Hervé's extremism would cost the *Revue* subscribers, advertisers, and governmental tolerance."[224] Having worked for the *Revue* for years as his ideas evolved, his antipatriotism gave the publication a perspective that had not been there in 1901. Undoubtedly, his columns for the

R.E.P. increased nationalist and even some republican accusations regarding rising antipatriotism in French education.[225] Hervé was finally forced out and replaced by Jaurès, and this led to anger, hurt feelings, and accusations, but it is difficult to believe the charge that Jaurès somehow orchestrated the dismissal.[226] He may have been pushed out or simply chose to leave, given his increasingly controversial ideas. Certainly, Jaurès vehemently denied the accusations by the T.S.Y. that he had engineered Hervé's dismissal.[227]

Scher described this era in Hervé's career as having "splintered into myriad pieces." In late June 1905, even before he left the *Revue* and about the time *Leur Patrie* was published, the Municipal Council of Paris rejected the revised version of Hervé's first textbook for academic use. On July 1, 1905 *Le Travailleur Socialiste* reported that Hervé "… had just successfully passed his law school examinations",[228] giving him another means to deliver his message. At about this time he formally joined the *Association Internationale des Antimilitaristes* (A.I.A.). In September 1905 two different congresses, one by Free Thinkers and the other involving French primary school teachers, placed Hervé's ideas high on their agendas.[229] A civics textbook, written by Hervé titled *Instruction Civique*, appeared sometime between July and October 1905.[230]

Instruction Civique was meant to complement the interpellated history text and was also intended for primary school children, but it was generally ignored. The introduction displayed the book's tone because Hervé claimed that his text, rather than follow the line of the Church or the present state, would "use the truth as a guide." After recognizing that national differences existed, the author argued that most men acted for personal motives, however misinformed. Rejecting what he assumed was Marxist orthodoxy, he admitted that conflict existed both between and within classes. He also implied that social and political institutions were in perpetual evolution toward perfection.[231] The volume advocated certain specific political reforms such as getting rid of the office of President in favor of a President of the Council of Ministers answerable to the Chamber of Deputies, and he also wanted the Senate abolished. Even though Hervé was suspicious of elections, plebiscites, lobbying, as well as the power of money and the Church, he favored the *scrutin de liste* based on proportional representation because he believed that large lists of candidates would remedy the problem of deputies beholden to local constituencies. The book employed short political/moral lessons at the end of each chapter which used simple dialogues that left no doubt about the author's preferences. Among the causes extolled were: rights for employment, leisure, as well as sickness, accident, and old age insurance; equal rights for women; grants for women with large families; penal reform; an end to capital punishment;

administrative and legal reform to end red tape; the separation of Church and State; secular education; an end to colonial conquests; peace, disarmament, and compulsory international arbitration; a militia to replace standing armies; the settlement of Alsace-Lorraine without war; a graduated income tax; efforts to control the use of alcohol; worker and consumer cooperatives; future nationalization of railroads, mines, and large factories; worker control of the workplace; strikes including a general strike; a refusal by soldiers to attack workers; an eventual social revolution; and a future United States of Europe. Yet he doubted that such reforms could occur peaceably given the concentration of capitalist power.[232] Some of those sought-after reforms would survive his future reversal.

At the first meeting of the National Council of the S.F.I.O. on July 14, 1905, the *Commission Administrative Permanente* responded to Hervé's ideas on internationalism voiced at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall in May. Reacting to comments in the bourgeois press and to debates within the party itself, the C.A.P. said it "could neither approve nor disapprove ideas expressed by individual party members." Article 58 of the party rules stated: "Freedom of discussion is complete in the press for all questions of doctrine and method, but for questions of action, all socialist newspapers and revues must conform to decisions by national and international congresses as interpreted by the party's national council." Writings by Hervé or any other party member were not subject to official assessment unless requests for control were made in conformance with party statutes. Whether such controls were implemented would have to wait upon events. Although the Federations of Isère and Yonne sought to place the "question of the socialist attitude at the time of war" before the next national congress, the National Council wanted to postpone that issue until just prior to the next international congress which would meet in 1907 at Stuttgart. The C.A.P. stressed that socialist unity was dependent on decisions of the congresses of the international, and the issues raised by Hervé were governed by a resolution at the Brussels Congress of 1891. Since the next national congress had much to do already and the International was set to meet in two years, it was decided to postpone the discussion on war. Rather than examining antimilitarism at the next socialist congress to be held at Chalon-sur-Saône in late October 1905, Hervé's friends and foes would have to wait to deal with his controversial ideas.[233] The issues themselves remained increasingly pertinent.

By 1905 Hervé had taken up permanent residence in Paris, which would be the center of his journalism and activism until his death. He was already a hard-working, well known, though controversial, leader with a network of supporters and friends. The thirty-four year old socialist was also a seasoned journalist, both in Paris and Yonne, with experience from the bottom up: editing, writing,

doing research, canvassing, and soliciting funds. He knew how to judge the impact of an article and to circumvent or provoke an official response. This "perpetual motion machine" on the extreme Left had "earned his spurs" as a socialist activist by organizing, inciting, and acting at many levels and in multiple arenas, often simultaneously. Though he had burst onto the national scene through notoriety, he settled into more regular, if not reticent, performances as a delegate at national party congresses and meetings promoting socialist unity. Amidst his activities he developed some controversial ideas that would certainly keep him in the limelight. His experience in the Yonne countryside, initiating conferences and listening to the concerns of ordinary people, had given him practical experience and special credentials. If he had little theoretical flair or interest, he developed a repertoire of interrelated themes, arguments, and rhetoric that would convince those ready to absorb them. If he was no Jaurès at the podium, who was? What Hervé possessed was an ability to size up an audience and use local issues to develop more general themes. He knew how to create striking phrases and unforgettable images that would affect his audiences in various ways. By 1905 the celebrated provincial provocateur had become a man to be reckoned with among the leaders of French socialism.[234]

Poor reception of his textbooks, the loss of journalistic positions, and attacks by fellow socialists were not insignificant developments in 1905. Yet Hervé moved in new directions rather than simply striking back. Not only did he begin to study for a totally new career as an attorney, he also got involved in an international antimilitarist organization. Even though his most recent avenues would not go very far, Hervé and Hervéism were just where they wanted to be—in the center of a national and international assault on war. The manner in which Hervé got to the center of that storm underscores the weakness of the phenomenon. Hervéism was based on rhetoric, hyperbole, theatrics, and constant action. Only such methods could get it attention. Without them, it would have faded. A serious attempt to end war probably had to be *Hervéiste* in some sense because there seemed to be no other way to attract attention. The forces for the status quo even on the Left were far stronger than revolutionary forces. The most devastating indictment of Hervéism would not be that it included excesses, but that excess was almost all there was. If there were never any real hope, much less any possibility, to end war, then Hervéism would stand indicted, not as a failed extremist political movement, but as some sort of *avant-garde* "media happening." Yet, in some paradoxical way, Hervé and the Hervéists truly believed in their cause yet they must have realized that their rhetoric was largely a bluff.

4

L'Association Internationale Antimilitariste[1] and *L'Affiche Rouge* of 1905

Hervé grew up in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, which "was the first moment when the French Left moved from a position of overt antimilitarism (which it had adopted throughout the Second Empire) to one of overwhelming support for a defensive war."[2] However catastrophic defeat was, it "was also the spur to a new beginning" in which both the army and school system were expected to play equal roles in French renewal. That military role was reformulated after 1880 as the day of *revanche* was postponed. Before the Dreyfus Affair, the army continued to epitomize the "French Revolutionary idea of the army as the 'nation in arms'". Except for the most extreme and disgruntled, the army generated great sympathy on the Left in the late nineteenth century.[3] "The patriotic element in the republican message was so strong that, despite the theoretical difference in their premises, the broad mass of patriots on the Left was but a step away from nationalism."[4] Things began to change when traditionalists and legitimists began to enter the army in increasing numbers, and the army eventually became the last stronghold of the Right. Thus, the divide between the Right and Left grew as the Third Republic endured, with nationalism increasingly characterizing the Right. Even though Boulangism began as a Left-wing movement, the charismatic general gradually promoted authoritarian ideas displacing earlier Rightist traditions.[5] As is widely known, the Left was slow to see the Dreyfus Case as anything more

than a matter of bourgeois justice; even Jean Jaurès at first considered Dreyfus a traitor. While most of the Left and Right eventually took diametrically opposite positions, for and against both Dreyfus and the Republic, revolutionaries like Hervé used the Affair to assail the Republic for its violence, militarism, prejudice, and treatment of workers. His rise to national prominence was thus one of the more paradoxical aspects of a larger process in which the French Left, after some reluctance, acted in the defense of the Republic.[6]

"The Affair exalted and permitted the organization of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and militarism. It promoted the association of the Church with the anti-Republican movement and smashed the Ralliement [of Roman Catholics to the republic] to pieces. It reanimated anticlericalism and stirred up antimilitarism in the center of the working class movment."[7] The Dreyfus Affair is sometimes called the high point of antimilitarism, and police reports document rising rates of desertion and insubordination (absent without leave or failing to report) from 1905 until 1911. A reduced two year military service was enacted in March 1905 as part of the Dreyfus legacy. Eugen Weber argued that after 1905 the newly united "Socialist Party had to move steadily toward the extreme left to avoid losing the mass of its followers, whom the extreme antimilitarism and antipatriotism of men like Gustave Hervé seemed to inspire. There was thus a progressive Hervéization of socialism and syndicalism, while Radicals, largely as a reaction to this, moved further to the right." Though police reports at the time and later scholars paint a picture of growing antipatriotism and antimilitarism, a new nationalism was also rising by 1905.[8] In Jonathan Almosnino's recent biography of Miguel Almereyda, Hervé's future chief lieutenant, the author argues that the increase in desertion and insubordination in the era following *L'Affiche Rouge* clearly illustrates the growth of French antimilitarism. "The fear of the influence of this [antimilitarist] movement was not without a connection to reality … Throughout the police archives we are able to verify that from 1906, desertion and insubordination are markedly and durably on the increase in the army, sometimes doubling the numbers of previous years. When the army is sent in against strikers, the soldiers, most often conscripts, are less and less certain to respond to orders …"[9] However, by some measures, one could argue, as Niall Ferguson does, that France was the most militarized society in Europe by 1914 "in the sense of the proportion of the population under arms."[10] What was the impact of the swell of Hervéism? Did it: help instigate a rising tide of antimilitarism, merely reflect that threatening surge, or simply create a false impression about a dangerous antimilitarist tsunami about to sweep France when, in fact, there were only a few rogue waves?

After a belated recognition that their interests were threatened by the anti-Dreyfusards, various spokesmen for French workers rallied to support the Third Republic. The governments of René Waldeck-Rousseau and Emile Combes seemed to create an era of greater stability based on a reform program demanded by a majority of French citizens. The twin dangers to the Republic posed by the Church and the army were gradually, if not calmly, subdued by the Law of Associations in 1901, the Separation in 1905, and the efforts to republicanize the army. The resentments against anticlericalism and the overzealous assault on reactionary forces in the military appeared to be mild tremors in an era of growing national consensus. Waldeck-Rousseau's inclusion of Alexandre Millerand in his cabinet created the impression that progressive parties and emerging classes had become worthy partners in government. Yet, co-optative labor laws, the repression of strikes, and leftist reactions to ministerialism were evidence that defense of the Republic was unable to cancel deeper divisions in France. "Republican defense was a means of protection against reaction as well as progress."[11] Until 1914 the Right would be a perpetual opposition, while various republicans would contest control of the government.[12] The victory of the Radicals in 1899 actually transformed them into defenders of a new status quo. Once their anticlerical and libertarian ideals had been met, many Radicals felt more sympathy for declining moderates than for rising socialists. With their anti-Republican enemies vanquished, the Radicals' rural constituencies prevented the decentralized party from satisfying the grievances of emerging social layers.[13] Despite his flexible and benevolent attitudes toward labor, Waldeck-Rousseau's caution and strict classical liberal economic views led to a rather limited program for social reforms that has been characterized as "a missed opportunity."[14]

When French workers and militants discovered that their defense of the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair had brought few gains, some of them began to promote a man like Hervé as the heir to the unfulfilled revolutionary tradition.[15] In a sense Hervé's pre-war career can be described as an aspect of that larger debate within the republican political heritage between a narrow and rather exclusionary version of republican representation based on universal manhood suffrage and other more participatory (and sometimes violent) aspects of the republican heritage which included "public meetings, journalism, strikes, parades, memorial ceremonies, and even riots" which were still considered by some "as legitimate parts of the republican tradition."[16] Because Hervé's political career originated from what James Lehning described as a more provocative version of the republican heritage, it was bound to confront the forces of order whose archival records will be a crucial source for the present study.

Among the variety of French socialists, the Allemanists were most closely associated with an extreme version of antimilitarism. Soon after his arrival in Yonne, with its Allemanist federation, Hervé's infamous 1901 article "*L'Anniversaire de Wagram*" led to notoriety as "the man who planted the tricolor on the dung pile."[17] Some sympathizers even accused him of allowing a vulgar reference to a regimental flag to be mistaken for the desecration of the French flag in order to gain fame. Certainly, Hervé became an instant "media" celebrity as a symbol of French antimilitarism and antipatriotism. By late 1903 a new French antimilitarist movement was gradually being formed with Hervé as the main actor playing multiple roles he had created. Since each theater was used to defend the others, the illusion of a dynamic Hervéist movement existed well before the reality.[18] If it is counterintuitive today to study antimilitarism before *La Grande Guerre*, the French police saw nothing strange at the time. This chapter analyzes documents on antimilitarism from the Prefecture of Police and the Ministry of the Interior using recent scholarship which did not exist when this research began. Without trying to dispute that scholarship, the evidence presented here, based largely on archival material dealing with Hervé and his pre-war organizations as well as his voluminous published work, adds another dimension to ongoing studies of the French police before the war.

Any study of pre-war French antimilitarism must rely on police data, so it is necessary to understand the police system. Even before the Revolution, French governments were wary of police power, yet they all recognized the special security needs of Paris. Despite growing French centralization, there would not be a unitary police system for the entire nation.[19] Jean-Marc Berlière described the French police system as a "Kafkaesque administrative structure" which created many problems beyond "the permanent rivalries and conflicts that existed between the different types of police organization." Despite a "reputation for excessive administrative centralization, there [were several] ... police service[s] under the Third Republic" which are "best ... explained by the diversity of tasks and functions accorded them." Berlière mentions three main categories of French police in this era: the uniformed police (who preserve order and try to prevent crime), the criminal or judicial or municipal police (often called the *Sûreté*, who investigate crimes already committed), and the political police. French police divisions were incredibly complicated, but the most obvious source of conflict involved the *Sûreté Générale* versus the Paris *Préfecture de Police*, both of which were theoretically under the Minister of the Interior. "The Sûreté Générale, based in Paris, dealt with the whole of France, except Paris and the department of the Seine." It was the government's political police and its budget came directly from the Ministry

of the Interior. Because it appointed the *commissaires de police*, the *Sûreté Générale* had some rights over the municipal police, but since it did not pay them, those rights were largely theoretical. In fact, all the lower ranking municipal police personnel were totally outside its jurisdiction, which is why the *Sûreté Générale* has been called "a state without troops." The municipal police were thus torn between two powers: the Ministry of the Interior and the local authority. *Le département de la Seine* came under the jurisdiction of the Paris *Préfecture de Police*, headed by the *Préfet de Police*, a civil servant directly under the Minister of the Interior. The Paris *Préfecture de Police* employed more police than all the other police forces of France combined, and its budget was far greater than that of the *Sûreté Générale*.[20] Whatever police differentiation there was may be tied to what Jean-Paul Brunet saw as a rivalry and a difference in perspectives between the *Sûreté Générale*, directly under the Ministry of the Interior, and the *Renseignements généraux* of the Parisian *Préfecture de Police*. "The hostility between Prefect of Police Lépine and the Director of the Sûreté Hennion was openly notorious; their informants were totally ignorant of one another and did not act in concert."[21] Henri Buisson argued that: "The [Paris] Prefecture of Police … is a state police due to the powers and prerogatives of its chief. Nevertheless, the Paris police are not state employees, but municipal employees."[22] Was the information gathered by the police suspect due to the differing perspectives, rivalries, and agendas? Scholars seem to disagree, but at least police data provide a glimpse of *fin-de-siècle* police methods and assumptions.[23]

Despite Hervé's sincerity, the need to shock was essential to Hervéism. This can only underline the weakness of French antimilitarism before 1914, which the police seldom stressed. The A.I.A., its *Affiche Rouge*, and the Affair which resulted from it were relatively minor events in the history of the Third Republic. They may have reverberated for awhile but quickly fell into oblivion. Nevertheless, this episode was illustrative of the history of antimilitarism before World War I. Even though the police, the press, and many political groups were obsessed with antimilitarism at various times, *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair and the pre-war career of Gustave Hervé underscore the misleading nature of this overt threat to the established order before World War I.[24]

On the eve of the departure of the new class of conscripts in the fall of 1905, an antimilitarist poster titled *Conscrits* appeared on walls in Paris and other provincial cities. That poster, soon to be known as *L'Affiche Rouge* for its red paper and extreme ideas, was drafted by a group called the *Association Internationale Antimilitariste des Travailleurs* (or A.I.A.), a European antimilitarist group created in Amsterdam the previous year. The poster borrowed heavily from arguments and images created by France's most notorious antimilitarist of that era, Gustave Hervé.

Even though the poster aroused the authorities and created a temporary scandal, it represented the views of a very small minority in France. The information gathered by the police and their reactions throughout this affair help to explain both the weaknesses and the frustrations of antimilitarists before World War I.

Undoubtedly, the poster's greatest impact, however unintended, was on the French police rather than average citizens. The poster called for conscripts to rebel against strikebreaking and war by means of violence against officers, a military strike, an insurrection, and even revolution. The police took such "threats" seriously, a fact which enhanced their stature and that of the revolutionaries, however rhetorical the dangers. In fact, the supposedly dangerous threats to French national security posed by antimilitarism and Hervé's strident rhetoric in an era of impending war belied underlying weaknesses and ambiguities within French antimilitarism. This chapter examines the methods and goals of Hervé's antimilitarism during the *fin-de-siècle*, especially his ties to the A.I.A. before World War I. The nature of those ties and the evolution of that relationship illustrate in microcosm some of the fundamental problems that would plague Hervé before the war and help to explain his transformation.

Ironically, in August 1914, the man whose ideas inspired *L'Affiche Rouge*, Gustave Hervé, volunteered for military duty! The poster, the uproar it created, and the collapse of the organization that sponsored it, presaged several important developments in France: Hervé's notorious transformation from Insurrectionalism to patriotism before the war, the crisis in syndicalism, and the inevitable failure of antimilitarism in 1914. Strangely, police reactions to *L'Affiche Rouge* and later antimilitarist episodes sometimes included an awareness of French antimilitarist weakness as well as an ongoing tendency to see dangerous conspiracies everywhere against the state by some members of the extreme French Left. Several general police reports written between 1907 and 1912 placed Hervé at the very center of a vast conspiracy threatening French national security. The police generally downplayed antimilitarist weakness and greatly exaggerated the dangers of a revolutionary conspiracy. Curiously, Hervé and his organizations were sometimes cited by police officials to confirm their contradictory views.

During the night of October 6, 1905 and the ensuing days, as French conscripts were set to depart, the *Affiche Rouge* was pasted on the walls of Paris and other provincial cities. Here is the text of that infamous poster.

> "Conscrits!"
>
> Now the time has come to pay your debt to *La Patrie*. In a few days you are going to abandon all that is dear to you, your friends and your love, in order to wear an infamous

uniform. You are going to forsake your interests and your work to join a troop of brutal men who are taught the art of killing …

You owe France neither devotion nor obedience.

When you are ordered to unload your guns against your poor brothers, as was done at Chalon, Martinique, and Limoges,[25] workers, soldiers of tomorrow, you will not hesitate. You will obey. You will shoot the decorated mercenaries who dare to give you such orders.

When they send you to the frontier to defend the strong-box of the capitalists against other workers who are as deluded as you, you will not march. All wars are criminal. When the mobilization order comes, you will respond with an immediate strike and by an insurrection …

Young comrades, draftees, do not betray the hopes of the workers. You must not abandon the people to whom you belong. You must not betray the cause of the exploited which is your cause.

The National Committee

Amédée Bousquet, Laurent Tailhade, Clément, Urbain Gohier,[26] Roger Sadrin, Gustave Hervé, Lefèvre, C. Desplanques, Miguel Almereyda, Amilcare Cipriani, Le Guéry, Félicie Numietska, Laporte, Lazare Rogeon, G. Yvetot, Pataud, Louis Perceau, Nestor Bosche, Arnold Bontemps, Le Blavec, Han Ryner,[27] Castagné, Louis Grandidier, Dubéros, Eugène Merle, René Mouton, M. Frontier, Garnery, M. Chauvin, Nicolet, Émile Coulais.[28]

Police found the poster displayed throughout France in the days ahead, and, apparently, 10,000 had been sent to the provinces to be hung there.[29] "Besides the thirty-one names on the *affiche*, there were listed all the sections found in Paris, its *banlieue*, and numerous French cities, towns, and *bourgs* that adhered to the A.I.A. and, in theory, supported its antimilitarism."[30] When conscripts left from the Gare de l'Est for their assigned bases on the evening of October 8, 1905, they were guarded by more than three hundred agents, cavalry, and infantry. After militants demonstrated their hostility toward the army, several arrests followed. Soon the entire spectrum of the press took notice of the posters and protests, while the government focused its immediate attention on the signers.[31] However, reactions by French citizens varied. Some were angered, while others remained indifferent. The conservative press wanted action against the A.I.A. *Le Figaro* spoke about a plot instigated by Hervé's theories. Prefect of Police Louis Lépine ordered the *afficheurs* arrested and the posters removed. The Minister of the Interior and the *Garde des Sceaux* gave similar instructions to their subordinates.[32] In the words of Paul B. Miller, a recent scholar of pre-war French antimilitarism, official reactions were "quick, coordinated, unexpectedly severe, and impressively effective."[33] Earlier attempts to repress antimilitarism had failed, so what created such forceful official reactions in the fall of 1905?[34] By the press law of July 29, 1881, modi-

fied on December 11 and 18, 1893, as well as July 28, 1894 as the infamous *lois scélérats* (villainous laws), the authorities gained expanded powers to prosecute anarchists. Since the poster incited soldiers to disobey officers and was the product of an antimilitarist organization with sections throughout France, the police had sufficient reasons to act.[35]

Miller's scholarship casts doubt about the conventional wisdom that stresses antimilitarist weakness due to internal divisions among the antimilitarists which made it impossible to forge a united front against the republican state. A general corollary of the accepted wisdom is that antimilitarist leaders in 1914 betrayed their principles and their followers by employing the same ideals—patriotism and republicanism—which they had been assailing for years. Thus, rather than sabotaging the mobilization at the start of the war, most antimilitarists marched to defend the democratic *patrie* from the onslaught of Prussian militarism. Miller cleverly reversed the logic of the debate by wondering, not why the antimilitarists had failed to prevent war in 1914, but rather, how such a divided movement ever posed such a strong challenge to the French national security establishment in the first place. Miller argues that anarchists, revolutionary syndicalists, and socialists, despite major differences, succeeded in forging arguments and instigating actions among a wide variety of oppositional forces in the decades before the war that led to severe repression by French police. However, by articulating profound social and political grievances among the working classes of France, French antimilitarists became so embedded in the political culture that by 1914 antimilitarist leaders and their supporters moved to defend the nation when an invasion was imminent. For Miller, antimilitarism was much more rooted into the fabric of French political culture than scholars have been willing to accept. However ironic, Miller concludes that antimilitarists behaved logically in 1914 in defending a society in which their roles were expanding greatly. Miller is correct in stressing how workers were never inherently antipatriotic, and he demonstrates that antimilitarism always functioned within local and regional contexts where particular grievances and immediate socio-economic problems activated workers who were inevitably much less radical than their leaders. Paradoxically, then, antimilitarist arguments worked best when they articulated wider social and political grievances, such as the exploitation of workers or the economic problems of farmers, issues not directly related to war but more concerned with immediate, practical matters. Some revolutionaries may have become citizens, but antimilitarism, like pacifism, generally characterized fairly marginal elements in *fin-de-siècle* French political culture. Thus one reviewer argued that Miller's argument rested on a bit of a conundrum if antimilitarist arguments and actions were far less important

in themselves than they were in inadvertently helping recalcitrant Frenchmen to become engaged citizens.[36]

By 1905 Hervéism was a prominent tendency in French socialism and an embarrassing challenge to the S.F.I.O. to live up to its "theoretically" antimilitarist and revolutionary ideas. Hervé soon duplicated that challenge within the Second International. Another ingenuous Tolstoyan antimilitarist, former pastor, and vegetarian named Domela Nieuwenhuis preceded Hervé in that role, and was excluded for ideas very similar to those proposed by Hervé. In August 1907 at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, many delegates saw a parallel between the manner and ideas of Hervé and the Dutchman. The religious backgrounds of each man influenced their socialist idealism, hence their association of parliaments with corruption and materialism. It is curious how both men shared so many traits. They stated their ideas simply and sincerely, often overstressing their views. Each man's assault on the patriotism of German socialists seemed tinged with xenophobia, and their criticism of German reformism entailed too much candor for the International.[37]

Nieuwenhuis is usually credited with organizing the international congress of antimilitarists in Amsterdam in June 1904, which created the A.I.A., although the general project itself seems to have originated among French anarchists. Certainly the influence of the Dutchman was instrumental in getting "the representatives of the chief schools of world anarchism to find themselves gathered one summer day in a meeting directed by him." That gathering should have made the police wonder about the perceived threat from the antimilitarists. After patiently repeating in multiple languages a bizarre lesson about French and Dutch dogs being more similar than their nation's citizens, Nieuwenhuis managed to exasperate more than one of the delegates. Then general bedlam followed for awhile because of the language problem and the resultant chatter among delegates who could not understand the speakers. Once the decision was made to employ only those languages which most people could understand, the meeting advanced. However, all too soon the recurring debates among French anarchists were repeated on the international stage as "naturalists, the more scientifically-minded, communists, Tolstoyans, Neo-Christians, syndicalists, and integral brawlers" all argued their particular stances. Eventually, the French anarchist and antimilitarist writer Georges "Darien crowned the disorder and stupefaction in impetuously affirming that only war would be able to kill execrated militarism, and that our duty was, therefore, to unleash a conflict as soon as possible …"[38] With such a beginning, one can only wonder what the police forces of Europe were worried about, but the A.I.A. did have other less farcical concerns.

The A.I.A. wanted international cooperation on antimilitarism because it assumed that militarism supported all systems of exploitation. The organization stressed antimilitarism as the key to all other leftist goals. According to a brochure of 1906, the group's main goal was to create an international formation where antimilitarism would be the central consideration, not a peripheral matter as in other leftist groups. With diverse delegates from at least nine countries, the congress expected antimilitarism to forge a united front. Netherlands, France, England, Belgium, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Switzerland had A.I.A. groups, but Germany was significant for its absence, a fact which the French police and courts did not fail to notice. By focusing on antimilitarism as an organizing principle, the groups hoped to appeal to all people ready to create a united antimilitarist front, regardless of political ties. Though the A.I.A. did not demand exclusivity and sought support from moderates, it expected to remain revolutionary.[39] On the last day of the conference Nieuwenhuis was named secretary-general with Darien as his assistant, along with the twenty-one year old Almereyda and syndicalist leader Georges Yvetot. Whatever unity the A.I.A. achieved was superficial and temporary. Despite the promotional activities of Nieuwenhuis as well as the sympathy of Flemish socialists, English trade unionists, and pacifist churches, the A.I.A. remained largely a French organization.[40]

The large French delegation included anarchists, syndicalists, and various avant-garde elements.[41] "The most extreme debates took place between pure pacifists and adepts of revolutionary violence. Some delegates were partisans of Tolstoyan ideas, notably Émile Armand (pseudonym of Ernst Jouin, 1872–1962).[42] But against them, a majority emerged to which Almereyda belonged, that deliberately inscribed antimilitarist action in its revolutionary perspective." Almereyda drafted a resolution which was adopted by the majority of delegates calling on the A.I.A. to organize antimilitarists nationally from various political perspectives and to sponsor a series of conferences promoting the new international. The A.I.A. sought to create local groups with membership cards and dues, mirroring the syndical model, and it assumed that the national federations and their central bureaus would be able to coordinate internationally with a general secretariat which could centralize A.I.A. activities. Local groups were expected to become active agitators "in case of conflicts between nations or between the army and strikers." Almosnino reported that local groups would "give ongoing support to deserters and draft evaders fleeing military service."[43] Despite Hervé's absence from the Amsterdam meeting, there was a large thirty-three member, mostly male, French delegation. Among French delegates were disparate anarchists like Almereyda,[44] Victor Méric, Charles Malato, and even Louise Michel, syndicalists such as Yvetot,[45] Léon Jouhaux, Pierre Monatte,

and Jules Grandidier, and sympathetic artists including Francis Jourdain along with assorted avant-garde elements.[46]

To a large extent the weaknesses of French antimilitarism arose from a Leftist division which antedated Hervé's political emergence. French A.I.A. divisions and animosities reflected that larger reality. Overall the A.I.A. had a heterogeneous membership.[47] Even though there is no consensus in describing the A.I.A. and its members, it seems fair to conclude that A.I.A. weakness reflected the shallowness of the C.G.T.'s commitment to antimilitarism as well as the inability of the antimilitarist forces to overcome the divisions on the French Left.[48] Two anarchist extremists named Georges Mathias Paraf-Javal (1858–1942) and Joseph Albert Libertad (1875–1908),[49] who founded the anarchist individualist newspaper *L'Anarchie* in 1905, refused to submit to the decisions of the congress and soon withdrew because the congress supposedly refused to mandate desertions. The congress was trying to appeal to all kinds of antimilitarists and was bound to take a more general approach.[50] Almosnino reported that after Paraf-Javal and Libertad exited the conference, they maintained a lasting rancor toward Almereyda.[51] Such conflicts among the French at that congress boded ill for the new organization and foreshadowed Hervé's later failures to unite the extreme Left.[52]

A police report of October 27, 1905 described French antimilitarism as neither organized nor well-conceived before the Amsterdam Congress of June 1904 which created the A.I.A.[53] Even though that congress named Almereyda and Yvetot as co-secretaries of the French federation, the former did most of the organizing because Yvetot had syndicalist duties. Hervé's future lieutenant also disseminated materials to the provinces, recruited speakers for meetings as well as conferences, and managed the group's finances due to his reputation for integrity, despite his own continuing poverty.[54] After the National Committee of the A.I.A. was created, Almereyda found a site for its headquarters in Paris at 45, Rue de Saintonge at the Maison Commune of the 3e *arrondissement* where it met weekly. That locale also served as the offices for other unions, socialist groups, and the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*. The National Committee also held informal meetings at the legendary Cafe Jules at 6, Boulevard Magenta and that is where the final decisions on *L'Affiche Rouge* were made on October 5, 1905. Though the committee did not yet include Hervé, future collaborators like Méric and Jean Marestan were members along with Almereyda and Yvetot.[55]

The A.I.A. supposedly recruited sections in each *arrondissement* of Paris and in most major French cities.[56] One A.I.A. report claimed the organization had 93 sections with 5,500 members.[57] However, a later police report dated April 26, 1906 estimated that the organization had no more than 2000 members grouped

in about 50 sections at the end of 1905. In order to make such an estimate, the report's author factored in the evidence that A.I.A. groups often ordered more cards than were necessary. Thus, the police took the registry seized at the residence of Almereyda, referring to 3167 A.I.A. membership cards, with "a grain of salt."[58] Police reports also indicated that *Le Libertaire* was their main source of information for general and section meetings of the A.I.A. Generally the police were very concerned about the A.I.A., but they were skeptical about its strength and importance. Many police reports noted the absence of regular meetings by various Parisian sections of the A.I.A. Most members of the A.I.A. were said to be less than twenty years of age.[59] The youth of its members, the irregularity of meetings by many of the sections, the financial weakness, and the opposition to it even on the Left were the main factors emphasized in police reports which showed the weakness of the A.I.A.[60]

The two principal issues facing the A.I.A. would be the two chief concerns for Gustave Hervé until his transformation. How could one unite the diverse forces of the Left on a common program to prevent war and create revolution? How could individuals and groups which by nature rejected authority and control come to accept organization and direction? Even the A.I.A.'s solution creating a loose collection of almost autonomous national and local groups on the basis of a general idea of antimilitarism was to be a failure. The extremist forces which the A.I.A. recruited were not only a small minority, they included elements that seemed to define themselves by their failure to agree and their inability to tolerate any kind of organization. The reactions of anarchist individualists to the A.I.A.'s efforts to organize antimilitarists were simply the latest aspect of a larger pattern of differentiation and conflict on the French Left, however clichéd that idea has become. That pattern would plague Hervé's efforts to create organizations to prevent war and instigate revolution, but the excitement generated at least helped Hervé to sell newspapers.[61] For Paul B. Miller, "antimilitarism had widespread support as a vehicle for voicing working-class rights, but threats of violence and murder were further than most needed, or were willing, to go."[62]

Hervé's role at the origins of the A.I.A. is sketchy.[63] His first reference to the A.I.A. was possibly an article in *Le Travailleur Socialiste* on July 16, 1904 in which he seemed especially disturbed that Germany was not among the nations represented on the A.I.A. General Committee.[64] Then, on August 13, 1904, Hervé attacked Yonne's socialists for their failure to send delegates to the Congress founding the A.I.A.[65] The exact date of the creation of an A.I.A. section in Yonne is unknown,[66] and documentation regarding Hervé's role in the early stages of the A.I.A. implantation in France is sparse. Even though activities by other

A.I.A. militants are more readily verified, the details of the A.I.A.'s development in France seem contradictory.

Jonathan Almosnino cited a September 15, 1904 meeting at the *Salle des Sociétés Savantes* where Almereyda spoke before a diverse crowd of 600 people as proof of a serious interest in the new organization. That November, Almereyda along with Jourdain undertook a series of conferences in Lyon, Saint-Etienne, Firminy, Anduze, Alais, Marseilles, and Toulon, where they were met by various provincial anarchist groups when they got off the train.[67] Police reports also documented a series of conferences on bicycle by Almereyda, Merle, and Grandidier in April 1905 at Bourges and Moulins. But Paris remained the center of the organization where Almereyda's leadership and oratory helped create A.I.A. sections in the 13th, 17th, and 18th *arrondissements*, and he was a regular speaker in several sections in the 5th and 14th. Sometimes he ventured into the *banlieue* for meetings in places like Puteaux.[68]

Details on A.I.A.'s development in France seem contradictory because recruitment drives had mixed results.[69] Marseilles was described as an A.I.A. stronghold with a newspaper titled *L'Action Antimilitariste* founded by Eugène Merle. In 1905 the A.I.A. created another short-lived paper called *L'Internationale*. Both of these ephemeral publications eventually came under the direction of the Marseillais Victor Méric, who was an A.I.A. member by way of anarchism and whose father was a Senator. A police report on October 29, 1904 called Méric the author of a violent antimilitarist brochure *Lettre á un soldat*. In late 1904 and early 1905 Méric as well as Miguel Almereyda, Henri Fabre, Jules Grandidier, and Francis Jourdain successfully proselytized for the A.I.A. in Paris and the provinces.[70] Méric's six-month recruitment and publicity *tournée* "took him from Montargis in the Loiret Department to Montluçon in the Allier, to Marseilles, Toulon and Nice in Provence, to Perpignan in the Pyrenees, and even to Geneva, Switzerland."[71] He claimed to have recruited hundreds of members and founded many groups in cities such as Manosque, Oraison, and Valensole in Provence, as well as in parts of the Cevènnes, in Alais in the Gard, and as far afield as Collet de Dèze in the hills of Lozère.[72] However, by the end of his propaganda tour, Méric described the A.I.A. as failing due to a lack of funds, enthusiasm, and recruits arising from growing indifference and problems associated with the division of the French Left.[73] "Unfortunately we faced the hostility of the socialist and anarchist leaders. They claimed that antimilitarism was only one part of their programs and did not wish to become circumscribed by such a narrow theme."[74] In 1911 Méric called the beginnings of the A.I.A. in France a painful experience.[75] Studies on antimilitarism in the Var and Languedoc by Jean Masse and Roland Andréani describe workers as more absorbed in day to

day problems and local conditions than they were in any altruistic crusade to end war. For most workers antipatriotism and insurrection were options of last resort.[76]

Though socialists were not prominent at the founding of the A.I.A., their lack of cohesion on antimilitarism became a constant concern for Hervé. Unlike English and German socialists, French socialists were organized separately from the unions or syndicalist movement.[77] After unification, French socialism generally included three different positions on antimilitarism. At first glance Hervé's minority position appeared to reject all wars and employed the most extreme methods to prevent war including a general strike by workers and peasants as well as an insurrectional military strike. On second glance, Hervé was willing to use armed force because he admitted the need to send troops to protect the Russian Revolution of 1905. The standard Marxist position of Jules Guesde, another minority view, assumed that it was non-socialist to try to prevent war separately from an attack on capitalism since war and militarism were effects of capitalism. The majority position championed by Édouard Vaillant and Jaurès was contradictory in blending the antiwar, Marxist, and patriotic sentiments of most French socialists. It employed multiple means to prevent war including parliamentary action, popular demonstration, a general strike, and even insurrection. Yet the majority view also spoke of the need of "the nation and its working class … to defend their independence and autonomy" under the threat of invasion. On antimilitarism as on other issues, socialist reformism and patriotism were cloaked with revolutionary rhetoric. Thus, Hervé's extremism could not be totally rejected, however embarrassing it was to most socialists.[78]

The most intransigent antimilitarists were undoubtedly the anarchists. Anarchist groups and newspapers proliferated after the amnesty of 1880, but their extreme individualism and indifference to organizational cohesion left them generally fragile, constantly dissolving and reappearing.[79] From 1892 until 1894, anarchism entered a phase of terroristic violence which appeared to be a major threat to stability, resulting in *les lois scélérates*, which soon affected much of the French Left even if few anarchists had been terrorists. The repression, which followed, almost completely disorganized anarchism.[80] Until the end of the nineteenth century, antimilitarism was simply one theme among the dazzling variety of general anarchist concerns. The very nature of anarchism entailed such individualism that agreement was all but impossible. Anarchism included a wide range of issues within its ambit and may have seemed like the "lunatic fringe" to most people. Antimilitarism and antipatriotism must have seemed even more dangerous and bizarre when they were presented in the company of nudism, free love, Neo-Malthusianism, sex education, abortion, feminism, vegetarianism, primitivism, hostility to both state

and religious control of education, antitechnology, communal utopias, illegalism, temperance, Esperanto, and hostility to both tobacco and traditional orthography.[81] Some anarchists, including Almereyda, hoped that the use of Esperanto might help revolutionaries better understand one another. They also assumed that an exchange of children between countries could help awaken an international consciousness.[82] His experience with the anarchists of the A.I.A. would be one of Hervé's first failures to organize those Frenchmen most resistant to organization.

Anarchist reactions to the creation of the A.I.A. were actually more diverse than Méric had indicated above. *Le Libertaire* included many writers who joined the new organization. *Les Temps Nouveaux* had mixed reactions, but in general the A.I.A. was attacked for using a single issue approach as a means of unity. This was seen as a false and detrimental conception. *L'Anarchie* called Hervé a neo-patriot, who was absurd in joining the A.I.A. *L'Anarchie* attacked even the loose organization of the A.I.A. because it still included rules, dues, membership cards, and other organizational trappings which suppressed spontaneity. In the October 19, 1905 issue of *L'Anarchie*, individualist anarchist André Lorulot claimed that the A.I.A was a socialist organization, hence authoritarian and repressive by nature. For those who perceived the A.I.A. as socialist, it could be charged with constraining individual choices on issues like desertion and sabotage. Since the individualist anarchists at *L'Anarchie* especially rejected any appeal to socialists, their hostility to Hervéist goals would be constant.[83] For Gilles Heuré, one cannot fully understand the inveterate anarchist prejudice against Hervé unless the experience of the A.I.A. is kept in mind.[84]

The third revolutionary force which Herve hoped to attract to his antimilitarist coalition was syndicalism or the trade union movement, which generally meant the C.G.T. or *Confédération Générale du Travail.* Syndicalist antimilitarism was originally a vague and general theme directed against the army as a strikebreaker and an école de crime corrupting proletarian conscripts.[85] There had been earlier diverse antimilitarist groups, both moderate and revolutionary, which included syndicalists, but they were apparently ephemeral, weak, and sometimes subject to intense personal rivalries. By 1902, syndicalists like Yvetot promoted an intensified antimilitarist campaign and became involved in fledgling and largely unsuccessful efforts to organize antimilitarists. One of those groups was the *Ligue Internationale Antimilitariste* which played an important role in helping Nieuwenhuis to organize the aforementioned International Antimilitarist Congress in Amsterdam in June 1904.[86] Syndicalist antimilitarism began timidly at the 1897 C.G.T. Toulouse Congress and was generally limited to relations between the *Bourses du Travail*[87] and workers in uniform. Only when Yvetot became head of the *Federation des*

Bourses du Travail did antimilitarism become increasingly important and extreme among syndicalists.[88] After a gradual gestation, a self-conscious revolutionary syndicalism emerged at the C.G.T. Congress of Amiens in 1906 whose Charter of Amiens was the veritable "act of birth of a new movement …"[89]

Syndicalist antimilitarism has been the subject of many studies, but standard accounts stress its limited nature. The weakness of pre-war French syndicalism reflected the decentralized and diminutive nature of an industrial sector which was characterized by many small family firms. Before World War I the C.G.T. was a minority movement that "never surpassed the roughly 350,000 members which it had attained by 1908."[90] Syndicalists in the C.G.T. were a distinct minority because France had a working population of twelve to fifteen million, only a third of whom were industrial workers. In 1906 half of French industrial workers were employed in shops with five workers or less, while only ten percent worked in firms with 500 workers or more. Another source of antimilitarist weakness was the hostility between syndicalists and socialists.[91] Jacques Julliard described the years 1900 to 1906 as an era of corporative antimilitarism which focused on the army's strike-breaking actions but syndicalist antimilitarism "progressed slowly and prudently." The years from 1906 to 1909 were an era of "total antimilitarism", yet Julliard noted the weak, differentiated, ambiguous, and illusory aspects even at the peak of syndicalist antimilitarism. There was no unanimity for the antimilitarist motion at the Congress of Amiens, and the peak of Hervéist ascendancy over the C.G.T. at the Congress of Marseilles in 1908 included an anti-war motion which appeared to say more than it did. This era of total antimilitarism was followed by what Julliard described as a *rectification de tir* of antimilitarism in the C.G.T. from 1909 to 1914 in which Hervé's "outmoded" insurrectional antics were displaced by more "realistic" tactics. Despite his aversion to Hervéism, Julliard's studies of the syndicalist movement inadvertently connected Hervé's *revirement* to that of syndicalism and to "the crisis in syndicalism." This crisis is generally viewed as an attempt by syndicalism after 1909 to leave the mists of revolutionary theory in order to adapt to new realities which would hasten revolutionary changes. From this perspective, Hervé was a revolutionary romantic whose antimilitarist antics were archaic residues which actually hindered the development of syndicalism.[92] A more objective assessment by Paul Mazgaj noted that "the disparity between syndicalist ideology and prevailing social and economic patterns not only formed the basis for the crisis in syndicalism but was the underlying cause for the factionalization of the syndicalist leadership."[93] The same factors which led to the crisis in syndicalism cannot be separated from the divisions and weaknesses associated with syndicalist antimilitarism which constantly undermined Hervé's efforts to unite the revolutionary Left.

Any attempt to unite diverse antimilitarists had to confront the problems posed by the relations of anarchism to syndicalism. Many anarchists remained aloof and were suspicious of syndicalist organizations. Hervé had trouble alleviating anarchist fears of organization and authoritarianism, especially among anarchist individualists.[94] He never overcame anarchist suspicion of syndicalism, and he himself soon aroused jealousies among syndicalists. Such factors help to explain his so-called *revirement* after 1910. Anarchist and syndicalist conflicts over organization antedated Hervé's arrival on the political scene, and they would become a constant preoccupation at *La Guerre Sociale*.[95] The failure of the anarchist terrorist wave made syndicalism appear to be an ideal means to win over workers and to prepare a social revolution. Its loose organizational nature plus its acceptance of syndicalist activity should have been the perfect means for the A.I.A. to attract anarchists as well as syndicalists. Nevertheless, because some anarchists rejected all organizations as well as syndicalism, the A.I.A. would not succeed in forging revolutionary unity.[96]

Longstanding studies on French antimilitarism by Julliard, Jean-Jacques Becker, and Madeleine Meyer-Spiegler stressed the geographical and occupational limitations of French antimilitarism before 1914. The C.G.T. federations of *métaux* and *bâtiment*, as well as the transportation workers of the Seine were strong proponents of antimilitarism. Antimilitarism was clearly connected to the geographical implantation of the *Bourses du Travail*. The North of France was not seriously affected by antimilitarism nor were the East and Southwest. Yet the center of France around the department of Cher, the area around Lyon and Saint-Étienne, Paris and the nearby regions, the Mediterranean regions of the Midi, the Maritime Alps, and the Eastern Pyrenees, the large naval ports like Toulon and Brest, Hervé's birthplace, as well as much of Brittany were all centers of antimilitarism. If there were regions and industries with strong concentrations of antimilitarists, most workers' groups were fairly moderate on questions of antimilitarism and antipatriotism.[97] This was, after all, a time of "nationalist revival" in France, however complex and nuanced it was.[98] Though antimilitarism was limited in scope, it had a major impact on the evolution of the French Left and the perception of the French administration.[99]

After the founding of the A.I.A. in the summer of 1904, the new organization sought to spread the word in Paris and throughout France, and they were soon adept at using events of the day to garner attention and support. After the death of Louise Michel during a propaganda tour in Marseilles in early January 1905, the A.I.A. helped organize several meetings and a march commemorating her life on the day of her internment. During the trip to Paris by the King of Spain in the summer of 1905, Almereyda and the A.I.A. were at the center of the agitation

against that visit. In fact, Almereyda was arrested and jailed for a week for striking a policeman during a demonstration against the king. A.I.A. campaigns against militarism continued throughout the rest of the year. "After the strikes at Limoges, flyers were posted in numerous locations, in which one could read: 'The last victory of the French Army: Limoges, April 17, 1905. Down with the Army'. The A.I.A. also regularly addressed the young conscripts heading into the army."[100]

From July 14–16, 1905 Hervé was a delegate at the French National Congress of the A.I.A. which met at Saint-Etienne to discuss questions on membership, organization, and tactics.[101] When he finally joined the A.I.A. in 1905, police reported that Hervé considered the group to be some sort of an *organisation de combat* made up of socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists who should be ready for violent, insurrectional direct action if need be, involving a strike of reservists and insubordination by soldiers. Such an organization would draw greater and greater attention from the police in the years ahead.[102] At this point the *organisation de combat* was simply a phrase that Hervé slipped into a speech, but for the police it would soon come to symbolize a dangerous conspiracy on the Left orchestrated by Hervé and others.[103]

At Saint-Étienne the A.I.A. also agreed to publish an antimilitarist poster based on Hervé's ideas. According to a Ministry of the Interior report of 1905, "after three days of debate, the A.I.A. Congress voted 'to write a poster which approved of Hervé's theories.'"[104] Despite Hervé's increasing influence over the A.I.A. leadership at this time, his role in the actual drafting of the poster was limited, and police sources support Méric's claim that he and Almereyda collaborated on the poster with Yvetot and his syndicalist colleagues placing the finishing touches.[105] Almosnino called the poster "probably the fruit of a collective effort."[106] The Saint-Étienne Congress was one of Hervé's first encounters with Almereyda, and it was becoming clear by then that the latter's ideas were much closer to Insurrectional socialist ideas than to those of the pure anarchists whom Almereyda battled during the conference. Like the Hervéists or Insurrectional socialists, Almereyda rejected individual desertion as a virtual guarantee of police repression, and both men combated the tendency to turn the A.I.A. into an agency of desertion. The *libertaires* in Almereyda's ambit were increasingly hostile to anarchist sectarianism and individualism, and it was the *libertaires* who garnered the majority of votes at the conference.[107]

According to Michael Roger Scher, the poster *Appel aux Conscrits* or *Conscrits*, better known as *L'Affiche Rouge* for its red paper and revolutionary ideas, closely resembled the ideas and form of Hervé's 1900 article "*Aux Conscrits*" which was prosecuted in 1901.[108] The sensationalist intent behind such an incendiary poster was later implied in Hervé's 1912 work, *Mes Crimes*. "When one does not have

access to a large circulation newspaper, it is necessary to carry on in the manner of a poster painter who seeks to make his work effective by the opposition of tones and the exaggeration of strokes."[109] *L'Affiche Rouge* was intended to arouse the public, cause an uproar in the press, push reluctant and divided working class militants to consider methods to prevent war, make political and economic leaders realize that war could lead to revolution, and provoke a government response which would resuscitate a moribund A.I.A.[110] If the French police and press performed to Hervé's expectations, the French Left did not. Unfortunately for Hervé, a notorious poster would have no more success in overcoming the flaws of the A.I.A. and the division on the extreme Left than would the extremism of his weekly newspaper *La Guerre Sociale* created one year later.

The Ministry of the Interior reported that *L'Affiche Rouge* had been controversial even within the A.I.A. Just days before the poster was printed there was a violent argument at the Maison Commune between Almereyda and Émile Janvion, who was then an editor at both *Le Libertaire* and *Les Temps Nouveaux*. Janvion renewed his idea for a *Pioupiou de la Seine* modeled on *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*, a paper published with the intent of affecting a new class of military recruits in that department and beyond, but Almereyda was much against this, preferring instead a violent poster signed by militants. Janvion then accused Almereyda of trying to control the antimilitarist forces. The friends of each man soon got involved, and the argument became so violent that Janvion drew a revolver, threatening Almereyda and his followers.[111]

Obviously, such an incendiary poster and such violent meetings indicate that antimilitarism was not the same as pacifism. Jonathan Almosnino describes Almereyda's motive in promoting the poster as an attempt to end the A.I.A. isolation with a sensational event.[112] Almereyda's rivals wondered where he got the money for the poster. Some thought it could have been a payment from the Prefect of the Seine to try to disrupt the C.G.T.! They were also perplexed about Almereyda's immunity(!) from police harassment during the King of Spain's recent visit when even innocent Spaniards had been bothered. Within a few years the mercurial Janvion would be on the payroll of *L'Action Française* as it tried to get workers on the side of the "magic king."[113] Whatever the merit of these rumors, charges, and accusations, there is little doubt about the impact of the poster itself.

Two days after the placement of the posters, the examining judge M. Flory requested information from the Prefecture of Police about the signers. When Hervé was summoned on October 13, 1905, he told the judge what he had said in earlier indictments, that the poster was legal because it addressed conscripts not regular soldiers. That argument failed to move the judge and the case proceeded.[114] The

information on the indicted antimilitarists was finally presented to the *Juge D'Instruction*, M. Flory on November 1, 1905, almost two months before the case was to be tried. There are some discrepancies in these reports when compared to other official and non-official sources, but the data presented seem extremely detailed and as balanced as one could expect given the nature of the A.I.A. and the tone of its poster. A cursory view of the thirty-one reports over the alleged signers does provide some interesting information about the chief militants of the A.I.A.[115]

Events in Hervé's life continued despite an impending trial. After obtaining his license to practice law in late June 1905, and taking his oath in the first chamber of Parisian Court of Appeals on October 18,[116] he was denied admission to the bar on November 18 due to his subversive opinions. The bar association had already rejected his request for admission on the advice of the reporter M. Alfred Droz.[117] In late October 1905 at a Socialist Congress at Chalon-sur-Saône, Hervé assailed electoral cooperation with Radicals, and called on the International to intervene in the Russian Revolution against a foreign threat. He also justified his participation in the A.I.A. because of his concern "to have socialists and anarchists come together and bring the latter to socialist doctrines."[118] Despite efforts to oust him, the Congress re-elected Hervé to a party office.[119] On November 17 *Le Matin* published Hervé's open letter to the Parisian bar recounting his efforts in earning a living by teaching, writing, and practicing law which were blocked simply because of his political opinions. The letter concluded with a promise to use his painfully gained notoriety to redouble his revolutionary efforts.[120] In December Jaurès became exasperated in responding to parliamentary charges that the S.F.I.O. was imbued with Hervéist antipatriotism.[121] By the end of 1905 "… Hervé was forced to depend more on his critics than his friends to draw attention to his cause. Unlike his supporters, his detractors almost always had money, influence, communications outlets, and constituencies."[122]

Before the trial, the defendants met in Paris on two occasions to debate strategy and to "rehearse their performances." Some defendants advocated prudence to reassure the jury and gain an acquittal. They wanted their attorneys to handle the case, even though militants like Hervé expected to use the situation to promote antimilitarism, no matter the risks.[123] Almosnino reported that the signers met several times at the offices of *Le Libertaire* at the instigation of Almereyda who also wanted to use the trial to indict the government and spread the antimilitarist message.[124] Tensions increased among the defendants once they discovered that the police had prior knowledge of the poster and had planned a dragnet operation. Now, police spies, betrayals, and plots became serious concerns. Since the antimilitarists' strategy involved efforts to publicize the trial, Hervé took to the

road, until just before the trial, on a provocative speaking tour including stops in the Yonne, Nord, Marne, Cher, Aude, and Isère.[125]

The *Affiche Rouge* trial began in the Parisian *Cour d'assises* on a cold, foggy Tuesday, the day after Christmas in 1905.[126] The description of that court and its proceedings by Edward Berenson in discussing an even more sensational "trial of the century" on the eve of the war bears repetition.

> "The conduct of the *Cour d'assises* itself created a theatrical atmosphere that helped make press accounts even more compelling. Defendants, attorneys, witnesses, and even the presiding judge himself were allowed to make long soliloquies that enabled them to appeal beyond the jury to public opinion at large. And in making their appeals, they were hindered by few legal or procedural restraints. Not only did French defendants have the opportunity to explain themselves at great length … but they possessed the right to respond to the testimony of any other witness. Moreover, the defense lawyer, the public prosecutor, as well as the attorney for the aggrieved individuals enjoyed, in the words of the legal theorist Eugene Sice, 'the most absolute latitude,' 'the broadest rights' to introduce evidence and question witnesses in any way they deemed necessary, short of outright defamation of character. Attorneys were not required to alert opposing counsel, or even the presiding judge, before introducing new evidence in a trial; lawyers for the defense commonly highlighted their closing statements with documents and exhibits unknown to the other side. Since the defense attorney's statement concluded the trial, the prosecution could not respond to the new evidence, however questionable it might be."

The presiding judge at the *Cour d'assises* possessed such vast powers that he could interrogate defendants and witnesses as long as he wanted, and he could say almost anything to any principal in court.[127] For Henri Bergson the *Cour d'assises* was "more like a theater than a place where decisions of life and death must be made. With its dramatic oratory, its robed magistrates, its noisy audience, the Paris *Cour d'assises* produced a dramatic spectacle not unlike the drama of the real theater or the accounts of murder and mayhem in the penny press."[128]

A reporter from *L'Intransigeant* described the scene as glacial when, just before noon, the twenty-eight defendants clad in black slowly filed into the courtroom.[129] Just after the proceedings began, an argument erupted between the accused and the gendarmes regarding spectator seating. Once order was reestablished the judge questioned each defendant about their actions in signing the notorious poster. In their generally brief responses, the defendants assailed militarism, war, conscription, and patriotic education, rather than answering the question directly. Following Hervé's example, the accused deferred their comments until they could hear the prosecution's arguments.[130] Once that formality was concluded, twenty policemen testified regarding the circumstances of the

posters' discovery throughout France.[131] Then five defense witnesses testified that first day, including three Deputies, a city councilor, and an antimilitarist author. They generally claimed that the trial was a violation of freedom of speech. Among the witnesses was Paul Lafargue, who displayed solidarity with the defendants by assailing the strikebreaking activities of the military.[132] All in all the day's proceedings were "rather calm" according to *La Petite République*. A writer from *Le Figaro* even admitted his boredom with the banality of the proceedings, fascinated though he was by "the wide range of ages, hair styles, dress, and opinions" among the defendants.[133]

The following day significant defense testimony began in earnest with many political and literary luminaries speaking as character witnesses and advocates of both peace and freedom of expression. Among them were Aristide Briand, Octave Mirbeau, and Caroline Rémy de Guebhard, better known as Séverine,[134] perhaps France's most famous female journalist during the *fin-de-siècle*. Still, the most important defense witness was Jaurès, who called *L'Affiche Rouge* an "honest statement of conscience" which rejected "war, exploitation, and repression." He felt that those who signed the poster should not be tried because opinion ought to be freely voiced. Although Jaurès rejected the poster's ideas as contrary to his own humanitarian principles, he praised the defendants for daring to confront crucial issues such as the use of troops against strikers. He did not approve of French troops attacking their officers but he supported anyone, troops or strikers, who avoided bloodshed. For Jaurès the poster was basically a call for peace by means of a "war against war." He called the trial itself a symptom of problems which could never be resolved by repression, citing the accused as proof, since they disagreed among themselves on the best means to prevent war and attain social justice.[135]

As Jaurès answered questions posed by various attorneys and defendants, he was greeted with an admonition from Almereyda rejecting the socialist leader's earlier characterization of him as a patriot. "I am not a patriot; I am in accord with my friend Hervé. I am an antipatriot … If war is declared … I shall march for the Revolution against the Republican regime which you defend, Citizen Jaurès, against the justice which you represent, gentlemen [of the jury]. In all respects I am absolutely in agreement with M. Gustave Hervé."[136] Jaurès, clearly upset, talked of "complex problems", "misunderstandings", and the need for discussion with the defendants. The seldom subtle Yvetot then took up the attack by asking Jaurès what he would do if ordered to bayonet a child. Yvetot boasted that he would bayonet the person who had given the order. Jaurès tried to give coherent testimony about questions of conscience, social responsibility, and proper responses to oppression, but the defendants' comments became so ludicrous that the presiding judge dismissed him.[137]



Figure 5. Caroline Rémy de Guebhard (1855–1929) was a French anarchist, journalist, and feminist best known under the pen name Séverine. She was especially active during the fin-de-siècle. (© Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

That afternoon eleven syndicalist and anarchist leaders testified for the defense by expressing their agreement with *L'Affiche Rouge*. When asked why he supported non-working-class agitators, Sébastien Faure, editor of *Le Libertaire*, claimed that antimilitarism "transcended party differences" and was a crucial means "for building revolutionary unity." Commenting on the witnesses that second day of the trial, Michael Roger Scher assumed that: "syndicalist leaders left no doubt that their unions were totally committed to antipatriotism and insurrection in the event of war." Certainly many in the press at that time agreed with government officials that antimilitarism represented "a clear and present danger" to France. The right-wing newspaper *Le Gaulois* worried that "… the evil is infinitely more considerable than one believed, and the exact truth is that there exists in our

country a vast and powerful association of workers whose principal goal is to organize the desertion of the army in the face of the enemy." That writer left no doubt about the source of such subversion.[138]



Figure 6. Georges Yvetot (1868–1942), Co-Secretary of the A.I.A. in 1904 and 1905 and Secretary-General of the *Fédération des Bourses de Travail* and Deputy Secretary-General of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* in the period until 1918. (© Henri Martini/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

In his nearly two hour *requisitoire* the third day of the trial, prosecuting attorney Seligman rejected the argument that the signers of *L'Affiche Rouge* were simply guilty of a "crime of opinion." Seligman argued that two passages in the poster were subject to criminal charges because they involved "provocations to murder as well as to disobedience and insurrection." Thus, they fell under the sanctions

of the press law of 1881 and infamous "*lois scélérats*" of 1893–4 against "anarchist activities". The prosecutor declared that "the expression of ideas was free. But a call for murder was an action which was an intolerable violence against public order. The incriminating passages on the poster are not simply excessive lines which escaped from the pen of an author. They are a demonstration of a methodical campaign against the country by the A.I.A." If the antimilitarists were willing to go to prison because they believed that they had achieved strong support among ordinary workers, the prosecution actually agreed and would not underestimate them. Noting that there were no A.I.A. sections in Germany, Seligman stressed that the political culture of France had permitted the organization to become so powerful that it threatened French security in the event of war.[139]

The court had been packed that third day, in part, possibly because some workers had incorrectly assumed that Hervé would testify. Even without his testimony, the day was memorable. Among the defendants who gave personal accounts of their adoption of antimilitarist and antipatriotic views was the writer and activist Urbain Gohier, a former royalist, sometime anti-Semite, yet a Dreyfusard. Gohier's rather eclectic views came to include antimilitarism because he believed that capitalists and militarists failed to defend France. Having a man like Gohier sign *L'Affiche Rouge* lent support for the idea that the antimilitarism cut across class lines. On the same day another defendant named Roger Cibot appeared to confirm that conclusion by ascribing his antipatriotism to having witnessed the exploitation of workers at the factory of his bourgeois father.[140]

Throughout the trial the press singled out Hervé as the major instigator, provocateur, and leader of French antimilitarism.[141] When the trial opened on its fourth day, December 29, Hervé was called to testify. For Hervé's future collaborator, Victor Méric, the antimilitarist firebrand seemed to be a combination of four different men, because his clothes, his voice, his physique, and his ideas seemed mutually exclusive.

> "The clothes clashed with his ideas, the body camouflaged the anger, the voice concealed the intent, and the ideas contradicted the face and the hands. Hervé, France's leading antimilitarist, was dressed in the uniform of a military officer. His pants were cut according to army regulations and his tight fitting dolman jacket buttoned to the neck. The coat was actually a hand-me-down from … his brother, who wore it as a lieutenant in the artillery corps."[142]

Once Hervé rose to speak, he admitted to the packed courtroom that he intended to use the trial to promote antimilitarism. "It is not every day that the government supplies us with so resounding a tribunal as this … Here we speak before the pick

of the reporters of the Parisian press. We would never forgive ourselves for having let slip so auspicious an opportunity explaining our exact beliefs to the entire public."[143] In a peroration lasting more than two hours, full of stories, sarcasm, and constant self-satisfied laughter, all to attenuate his extreme blasphemies according to *Le Figaro*, the quixotic antimilitarist "General" explained that Hervéism was misleadingly equated with antimilitarism as if syndicalists like Yvetot had waited for him before propagating their antimilitarist and antipatriotic ideas. Yet Hervé did not deny that he was the theoretician and standard bearer of the movement. In his view one had to become "a man without a country … and without a history" in order to re-examine accepted beliefs. Employing a customary trope, he stressed the parallel between religious faith and patriotism and "modestly" compared his role to that of John Hus. He assailed the idolatry of arms and the Bastille Day parades as part of France's patriotic religion, where colorful uniforms weighed down with childish medals simply replaced former chasubles. He claimed that many thought the flag was a mere "piece of cloth" placed high on a "stick" which had become a hated object with the "blood of battle dripping from its folds." Any alleged French political superiority could be rejected because French nationalism and patriotism only bound slaves to masters and sought to blur class antagonism. Only revolution could end class conflict, dismantle permanent armies, and create a free Federation of European peoples as a stage for a future Federation of the World.[144]

After calling the trial political, Hervé dismissed the chief prosecutor's rejection of class differences and even assaulted the bourgeois jury. "In vain can you deny the existence of classes, Monsieur Avocat General. They exist. It's staring you in the face; look at them. Here, right in front of you sits a class on these benches. We, the accused, are the proletariat. Over there is another, sitting in front of you, the bourgeoisie, there to judge us." To him it was obvious that the bourgeoisie had good reason to love their country, but the proletariat did not. He then responded to standard charges against the antimilitarists. As far as the charge that antimilitarists merit the scaffold, "we really deserve the funeral pyre for heretics." To the charge that Hervéists contradicted their antimilitarist teachings by defending the French *levée en masse* at Valmy in 1792, Hervé called Valmy a battle against the banded monarchies and aristocracies of Europe. It was thus "the extension throughout the continent of the duel begun in France between the rebellious Third Estate and the Ancien Regime." As for the accusation that Hervéists refused to defend France but would urge socialists to fight Germany if the Kaiser tried to crush Russian revolutionaries, Hervé answered that "a conflict between the Russian Revolution and the German Kaiser would still remain a civil war." Rather than running away due to fear if France were threatened, Hervé said that antimilitarists cared nothing about

bourgeois France and its colonial ventures. "If we have to risk our skins, since we have only one of them, we will risk them, not to defend your nation for you, but to try to found the socialist nation which we already carry in our minds." If war had to come, he promised that it would be a civil war and no other. As he was about to conclude, Hervé asked the other defendants to pardon his verbal excess, which he ascribed to his unconcern with prison. In a great rhetorical finish he menacingly appealed to jurors not to risk the wrath of French mothers who would inevitably lose sons if a war erupted. These mothers would then accuse the jurors of "having sent to prison men who had a method to save us from this grief."[145]

The end of Hervé's testimony led to accusations, insults, and challenges apparently by young, patriotic attorneys there to assail the defendants. So the judge threatened to clear the courtroom. When benches were knocked over and fighting broke out, gendarmes intervened, and the trial had to be delayed for over an hour. Once the trial resumed, the remaining twenty-four defendants gave generally impassioned, boastful, and sometimes threatening statements. Late that Friday afternoon, testimony ended, and the jury heard that they would receive the case on Saturday after final arguments.[146]

Summary statements were so lengthy that the jury could not begin deliberation until after seven that Saturday evening, but only two and a half hours later the decisions arrived. The verdicts yielded twenty-five convictions, two acquittals, and one reduced sentence. The maximum sentences possible were five years. Hervé's four year sentence was the most severe ever given for a press-law violation by a court of the Third Republic up to that time. Each of the guilty was fined one hundred francs. Almereyda stated: "I thank the jury for the very republican Christmas gifts that they have given us. What most touches me, even more than the verdict, is the protests of those who were acquitted."[147] The only female defendant, Félicie Numietska (Teutscher), called her acquittal sexist, while the aged Italian revolutionary Amilcare Cipriani, who fought for France against Germany in 1870, was no more pleased with his acquittal. After the verdicts each defendant rose individually to thank the jury for the convictions and promised to intensify the campaign, yet they promised to appeal the verdicts the following Tuesday. Hervé complained that this was typical bourgeois justice which verified antimilitarist assumptions. After eleven o'clock the trial formally concluded, whereupon the defendants left the courtroom singing "*L'Internationale*" with raised fists. Fighting immediately broke out inside the courtroom causing the arrests of two spectators. Outside the Palais de Justice a small crowd shouted antiwar slogans, while a short distance away on Pont Neuf militants clashed with police and more arrests were made.[148] According to an interview published that New Year's Day in

Le Matin, the verdict left Hervé ecstatic since he considered it a good sign that he was the main target of the government. His only complaint was a lack of sleep.[149] Of course, it is possible that Hervé and his co-defendants were surprised by the severity of the penalties according to Paul B. Miller.[150] There are some indications that the signers expected that they would not have to serve their sentences or that they would soon get pardons.[151] Nevertheless, Hervé's reactions in court and those of most other defendants showed a complete disdain for prison and even an eagerness to be sent there.

Until his incarceration, Hervé kept active delivering speeches in January and early February 1906 at the Manège Saint-Paul, Montceau-les-Mines, and Rouen while he appealed the decision which was ultimately rejected on February 2, 1906. As late as February 5 he was actively going about his routine at the monthly meeting of the S.F.I.O. Federation de la Seine which sought to address the issue of Paul Brousse's candidature under socialist auspices as well as the level of support to give for *L'Affiche Rouge* protests. Hervé does not appear to have contributed much to the discussion, while Guesdist Victor Renard said that the S.F.I.O. could protest the recent verdict but could never support the ideas expressed which were individualist acts while the party was collective. If socialists wanted to sign another version of the incriminated poster, they would have to act outside official party channels.[152] The police kept a close eye on Hervé at that time especially because some officials feared he might escape to Geneva.[153] Police reported that Almereyda received a letter from Nieuwenhuis announcing that funds necessary for antimilitarist propaganda would soon be sent, including a special amount to help soldiers desert. Antimilitarists were also being sent into the provinces to talk to workers, especially workers from Spain, Italy, and Russia.[154] Almereyda was also urged by Spanish antimilitarists to prepare for a future A.I.A. Congress in Oxford, England which had been foreseen in 1904 at Amsterdam.[155]

Responses to *L'Affiche Rouge* trial varied. Syndicalists and various revolutionaries reacted emotionally to the verdicts. "All over France multiple meetings were organized protesting the fates of the signers of *L'Affiche Rouge*." A Paris meeting with 1500 in attendance heard C.G.T. leader Lévy, Jaurès, and the anarchist Libertad speak in favor of the inculpated antimilitarists.[156] One police report discussed calls by the C.G.T. for massive antimilitarist agitation all over France. The syndicalists wanted new posters with so many signatures that prosecution would be impossible.[157] Posters using the formulas of the *L' Affiche Rouge* and protesting the verdicts could be found throughout France from Cette to Cherbourg, from Paris to Toulon, and from Menton to Lorient.[158] At Toulon 4000 workers gathered to protest the verdicts.[159] The *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* called the

campaign against the A.I.A. an attack on free speech and promised solidarity with the signers, energetic protest of the verdicts, and engagement in antimilitarist activities. The C.G.T. promised to send agents to the East to get signatures in a region where the population was most interested in the question of war. Four thousand signatures had already been gathered by the syndicalists protesting the verdict. The police also reported that the "red" unions were concentrating on P.T.T. workers, teachers, and the men in the arsenals; they expected to do well with farmers, too, by using methods that had worked so successfully for Hervé in the Yonne.[160] In the Yonne Jean Lorris, Secretary-General of the *Bourse de Travail* of Auxerre, inspired a poster in February 1906 containing 2317 signatures which repeated and supported *L'Affiche Rouge*.[161] The police also worried about French Masonic lodges counseling desertion and exchanging information with their German counterparts.[162] When a C.G.T. poster was placarded in Lorient, it was torn down immediately. In fact, few of the members of the local *Bourse du Travail* there were willing to support Hervé's controversial ideas on war prevention.[163] Toward the end of February one police agent reported that "only the *Comité de Defense Sociale* ... was stirred up to organize paying meetings with the goal of gathering funds destined to support the families of the antimilitarist prisoners."[164] Yet at the same time, the police reported that a new antimilitarist group called *Liberté d'Opinion* was being formed by René De Marmande, F. Numietska, Jean Latapie, Paul Delesalle, Alexandre Luquet, and Auguste Dormoy.[165] On February 11, 1906 a new antimilitarist poster with 2000 signatures was pasted along the streets of the French capital. That effort had been organized by Almereyda just a few days before he was incarcerated.[166] Certainly many unions and other antimilitarist groups protested the verdicts.[167] This upsurge in syndicalist antimilitarism was not the result of *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair alone since critical events in Russia and Morocco, a perception of the increasing repression of French workers, and growing social polarization were catalysts as well.[168]

The conservative and nationalist press generally thought Hervé and his "gang" were grave dangers for France. Typical were the words of Édouard Drumont in *La Libre Parole*: "Antimilitarism is the basis of all the sophisms directed against the nation: and Hervéism is the key."[169] Many newspapers including *La Petite Loire de Saumur* and *La Dépêche de Lyon* wholeheartedly approved the verdicts, while *La Dépêche de Nantes* bemoaned the resounding forum Hervé had received.[170] Moderate republicans worried "that Hervéism was being unwittingly strengthened by those who most wanted to destroy it."[171] The Radical newspaper, *Le Progrès de Lyon*, thought Hervé's antipatriotism was "abominable", but would have preferred that he receive a "moral chastisement" rather than a decision which threatened

freedom of expression.[172] Initially, even Clemenceau wrote in *L'Aurore* about how foolish it was to prosecute antimilitarism. What had to be done was argue against it.[173] Gradually, Radical papers hardened their views about Hervéism because their concerns turned to the elections of 1906. Hervé's rather flexible and suave former attorney, Aristide Briand, who had already migrated from anarcho-syndicalism and socialism to the Radicals, thought that the government had played into the hands of the antimilitarists who created *L'Affiche Rouge* by bringing them into court. If only officials had simply let the wind, rain, and general indifference do their work, the antimilitarist message would never have attained such a publicity success.[174]

Socialist reactions to the trial were complex and sometimes confused. Instead of dealing with antimilitarism, socialists generally chose to defend civil liberties.[175] Even though socialists were divided on the question of antimilitarism according to Gilles Heuré, they could agree that they had witnessed a "political ambush" and "governmental ineptitude."[176] For Scher, rather than analyzing socialist actions in the event of war, socialists accepted the contradictory tactics of revolution and national defense.[177] Hervé's rhetoric had avoided this dilemma, but his own ideas entailed conflicting practices. The press generally failed to make such distinctions and reacted to Hervé's rhetorical extremism not his contradictory tactics. The trial had put the S.F.I.O. into an unenviable position. "Hervé, as a party member, could not be abandoned, but neither could he be endorsed. Efforts to ameliorate relations with anarchists and syndicalists were essential, but the only socialist who [apparently] received a respectable hearing in both camps was Hervé." Because Jaurès wanted the S.F.I.O. to encompass all of socialism, he was either blamed or credited with supporting Hervé's right to express himself, but Jaurès was very much opposed to the kind of violence mentioned in *L'Affiche Rouge*, and on January 9, 1906 he refused to sign the manifesto against the December verdict.[178] French socialism had to deal with Hervé and his movement as well as cope with charges that it had become infested with antimilitarists. Anarchists were reluctant to get involved,[179] and many syndicalists thought the A.I.A. was disruptive and dangerous.[180]

L'Affiche Rouge Affair did not occur in isolation, though for a time it focused the attention of the police, press, and politically aware. Even before the trial syndicalists had been promoting an eight hour day for workers. Throughout the beginning of 1906, the C.G.T. concentrated its energies on the May Day rallies for the eight-hour day and the *repos hebdomadaire*.[181] That campaign continued amidst the intensified antimilitarist propaganda which drew on the poster. The uproar created by *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair quickly blended into other events. A secret

C.G.T. meeting in early January 1906 decided to disseminate an antimilitarist poster entitled "*Guerre à la Guerre*" which was posted the opening day of the Algeciras Conference. The new poster echoed the message of *L'Affiche Rouge* by rejecting war on both sides of the Rhine, but it concentrated on French colonial ambitions which led to the First Moroccan Crisis.[182] The same syndicalist meeting also promoted a C.G.T. delegation to Berlin to strengthen ties with German antimilitarists. French syndicalists expected the Germans to use their new poster and participate in a series of international antiwar demonstrations.[183] The failure of this delegation contradicted Hervé's assumptions which were based on antimilitarist activism on both sides of the Rhine.[184]

How did Hervé react to imminent incarceration which would see him separated from his normal routines, friends, and mistress? "He was not a man to get tender-hearted or to pour out his feelings on the sadness of his fate. [He was], undoubtedly, certain of support from the outside, [and] of his friends' concern, like that of Émile Masson, who sent him money in December 1905."[185] When Hervé and the other signers of *L'Affiche Rouge* were picked up early in the morning on February 7, 1906, they were taken to La Santé Prison and underwent formal processing by the prison authorities during which Hervé raised a ruckus concerning his treatment. Much later Hervé reminisced about his experience in 1906. Roused out of bed at six a.m. by four Inspectors from the *Sûreté*, he was sent to the depot where he found several of his prison-bound comrades waiting. The trip to La Santé was rather jolly as the prisoners sang "*L'Internationale*." Once at the prison, he was thrown into a cell no bigger than a "narrow telephone cabin" where he protested being frisked like a common criminal when his crime was political.[186] Generally mandatory, such a search involved "the use of fingers that probed into a person's innermost recesses."[187] However, Hervé's protest activated the penal hierarchy "all the way to the office of the Président du Conseil, Sarrien, where the attaché in charge checked the details regarding the treatment of the antimilitarists. Finally, due to his palaver and threats, the political prisoner got his wish."[188]

On February 9, 1906 at 12:25 a.m., Bousquet, Cibot[189], Émile Coulais (who had been caught hanging the posters), Garnery, Grandidier, Vigo (Almereyda), and Hervé were put on a train in a 2nd class carriage at the Gare de l'Est and calmly travelled to prison at Clairvaux accompanied by two Special Commissioners and five Special Inspectors. The forty other agents sent by the Prefecture of Police to the station did not bother to leave their posts because the place was deserted and the prisoners were orderly. Before departure, each prisoner received a sandwich and a glass of wine. On the trip a couple of the prisoners expressed concerns about being sent so far from Paris which meant that their families and friends could not

visit them easily. Hervé was especially troubled about not having the documents necessary for his work.[190] Almost immediately a campaign began involving many members of the press as well as individuals and groups on the Left who sought to gain pardons for the prisoners.[191] In May 1906 French officials discovered that several soldiers at Clairvaux guarding *L'Affiche Rouge* prisoners actually helped them smuggle out brochures, which must have reinforced police fears.[192] While at Clairvaux Hervé, Almereyda, and others discussed the possibility of creating an antimilitarist newspaper, an idea already bandied about prior to *L'Affiche Rouge*.

Michel Winock has described the era from 1900 until 1914 as an era when the liberal state began its slow evolution toward a modern social welfare state. Ironically for French workers at the time, Clemenceau created the Ministry of Labor in 1906. Earlier laws making strikes and unions legal, in 1864 and 1884 respectively, were followed by a law on workplace accidents on April 9, 1898 which can be considered the first social insurance law, the fundamental labor law. In 1904 municipalities were required to provide employment placement services. On July 14, 1905 a law was enacted for public assistance of the elderly, the sick, and the indigent. July 13, 1906 saw the establishment of the *repos hebdomadaire* or weekly day of rest. Retirement pensions, however meager, were granted to workers and peasants by a law of April 5, 1910. Workers' well-being was increasingly accepted as a necessary goal if only to keep the social peace, and that was at least a beginning toward a more modern state. Be that as it may, the period from 1906 until 1909 has been called the peak of revolutionary syndicalism while the years from 1906 until 1910 were characterized by a wave of strikes.[193] Poor wages and conditions undoubtedly underlay the strike wave, but strikes were fundamentally political at this time according to Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter because strikers hoped to get the government to step in, mediate, and achieve a compromise. Strikes often occurred when it seemed "possible to renegotiate the political balance in favor of workers." Whatever the motivations, "1906 saw the first 'strike wave' of the many that were to come during the twentieth century."[194]

In the aftermath of *L'Affiche Rouge* trial, French workers also became involved in massive strikes and protests following Europe's worst mining disaster ever at Courrières.[195] The new Minister of the Interior, Clemenceau, not yet *le premier flic de France* or the detested *briseur de grèves*, "went alone to Lens to the strike committee, showed clearly that he understood the workers and their fight, and asked them only to pursue it without violence or illegality. They would not listen to him; overexcited social protest rejected his optimistic humanism. And, without a doubt, at that moment and in that place, something inside him snapped."[196] *A. Fryar Calhoun's* study of Clemenceau argued that he only gradually moved

toward a policy of repression after syndicalist strike actions and antimilitarist activities.[197] Hervé's friend, Masson, had expected or at least hoped that the coming of Clemenceau could have been the culmination of his dreams for liberty. Like most men on the Left at that time, he could not have been more disappointed and disillusioned.[198] Even though Clemenceau instituted an independent Ministry of Labor, his repression helped create a gulf between labor and the government which he could never bridge.[199]

Other historians are also more indulgent toward Clemenceau than were his contemporaries on the Left. David S. Newhall described Clemenceau as doing all he could in March 1906 to calm the situation among the miners without force. If Clemenceau was accused by the Left of denying his past, he was charged by the Right with provoking trouble due to his dilatory methods. Clemenceau may not have believed that there was much of a leftist plot in 1906; his major worry was that the Right would reap the benefits of labor violence and disorder. Ironically, despite his inveterate patriotism, his experiences during the Second Empire, the war of 1870–1871, the Commune, as well as the Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs had made Clemenceau suspicious of the military. He remained in communion with the patriotism of the Old Left and was thus close to the views of most French citizens.

> "… The large majority of his countrymen … were wary of internationalism, revolted by Gustave Hervé['s] 'Let's put the flag on a dunghill' brand of pacifism, mistrustful of Rightist chauvinism, and bemused by Barrèsist lyricism about 'blood and soil' but … were still resolved to defend *la patrie* without a backward look if the call should come … Hervéism, though distinctly a minority opinion among the Socialists, became a millstone around their necks as a result of its currency among the anarcho-syndicalists and the debates it sparked inside the Second International, a dead weight which not even Jaurès' feats of verbal legerdemain could lighten. No single issue did more to sour relations with the Radicals, hinder reform legislation, tar the union movement …, and stir up the public to no constructive end. Many good Dreyfusards … took alarm, renounced the Bloc, and fell to accusing Clemenceau of taking too soft a line toward a looming threat of leftist anarchy, which they feared would bring back *la Réaction* to strangle the Third Republic as it had the Second. In their eyes, especially after the hitherto 'reliable' winegrowers and *fonctionnaires* were infected, Jaurès had become an arsonist, while Clemenceau was an incompetent, 'incoherent' fireman."[200]

Most of those on the Left, on the other hand, assumed that:

> "Clemenceau was using Hervéism as a red herring to assure himself of easy triumphs in public opinion and the Palais-Bourbon. But his denunciations of it were not merely tactical even if they did help him to recoup in the Center what he lost on the far Left.

> He had paid his dues in the fight against right-wing nationalism, and charges that he was toadying to reactionaries to get their votes were both stupid—he did not want or need them—and personally offensive … His deep feelings on the subject, however, made calm discussion difficult. The spectacle of a school teacher … advocating insurrection as the answer to *la patrie en danger* appalled him. As an issue, in short, Hervéism was a distraction he was emotionally unable to ignore."

Clemenceau worried that Hervéism and anarcho-syndicalism had become allies, and this meant that strikes in key industries, especially state industries, boded ill for future developments as European militarization continued and the potential for war seemed to increase. "The ministry's problem with the long-festering issue of the rights of civil servants, in particular the right to organize, would have been troublesome enough without the distracting intrusions of Hervéism and anarcho-syndicalism."[201]

"Any student interested in the history of the workers' movement cannot fail to be attracted to the decade preceding the First World War." This period included major tensions and contradictions, well-illustrated by the general strike of May 1, 1906 for the eight-hour day. That was one of the few times in twentieth century France when workers seemed close to fulfilling their dreams.[202] "Since 1904, the C.G.T. had been preparing a great general strike for the eight-hour day. It was set for May 1, 1906.[203] But the strike was triggered prematurely when, on March 10, 1906, a gas explosion at Courrières … killed [up to] 1300 miners … Soon … miners were on strike across the country. Other workers went out during April, in sympathy and in anticipation of May Day … By the end of the year, almost half a million people had gone on strike … Clemenceau … covered the striking areas with troops—50,000 for Paris alone—and arrested 700 union leaders. Workers felt deserted by the Radicals, and even by the Socialists, who had been too eager to collaborate with the government."[204] Although antimilitarism was not the only concern on the extreme Left in early 1906, Clemenceau's actions undoubtedly made antimilitarist arguments more relevant.[205]

The attitude of the Ministry of the Interior in *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair is significant. Several reports blamed soft sentences in earlier antimilitarist trials for the audacity of the A.I.A. in 1905. Yet Interior officials called the trial a serious blow to the A.I.A. which led to the organization's disarray.[206] One dossier reported that the trial caused such trouble for the A.I.A. that it "shall never again recover. Composed almost entirely of anarchist elements which share little discipline, it is difficult for [the A.I.A.] to bind together its scattered parts. Each group assumes its own autonomy and acts in its own fashion."[207] Just after *L'Affiche Rouge* signers were incarcerated, the police reported discontent in the A.I.A. with the manner in which

the national committee was constituted. Almereyda's rival Janvion was convinced that he was too much of a self-promoter to not harm other antimilitarists.[208] Most Interior reports, however, felt that the A.I.A. was basically inspired by the C.G.T. The police were genuinely afraid of antimilitarism, so they wanted the judicial system of France to be more tenacious in prosecution. There was praise of *L'Affiche Rouge* trial, and the police believed that antimilitarism had received a serious blow. Yet police fears continued, as their concerns shifted to the C.G.T., concentrating on extreme syndicalist rhetoric, neglecting its reformist practice.[209] Police spies and officials documented division and weakness among antimilitarists yet feared their potential extremism. The confusion begins to disappear only when we accept the divisions and ambiguities within antimilitarism as well as the multiple functions of police surveillance: to gather information, to verify a perceived threat, to promote a forceful response, and to justify the very existence of the police.[210]

Jean-Marc Berlière postulated that the gathering of information by the police was very different from its analysis, interpretation, and synthesis from various sources, which was a far more difficult task. "While the search for information was a matter of routine and organization, its interpretation involved delicate and perilous practice which could be immediately assessed."[211] The police reports on Hervé and his associates used here confirm that the information provided by police agents and informers was often so "full of mistakes [and] … 'badly controlled allegations' … that [it] … 'could not be placed in anybody's hands without danger' …"[212] Despite the uneven quality of the individual reports of the agents and *mouchards* analyzed in this study, many police informants documented antimilitarist weakness and defects, while more general and synthetic works, not surprisingly, invariably concluded that the dangers were so great that increased efforts were needed by the forces of order.

One can certainly exaggerate the impact of *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair. This was a time when France increasingly felt threatened from within and without; it was a time for *défense sociale* when "all deviants or marginal elements were suspect *a priori*." Antimilitarists seemed to threaten France both internally and externally.[213] Jonathan Almosnino credited the police with such *répression implacable* of the A.I.A. that it could never recover. In Almosnino's view, police repression led to the slow decline of the A.I.A. With that Almereyda drew the necessary lessons and progressively adjusted his activism in new directions upon his release from prison.[214] In fact, the A.I.A. began to disintegrate due to internal difficulties as well as external threats which prevented it from accomplishing its goals. Its loose structure and heterogeneous composition precluded success. Hervé tried to use the A.I.A. to increase his influence and advertise his ideas. Although *L'Affiche*

Rouge Affair may have been a publicity success for him, the immediate decline of the A.I.A. must have underscored the need for tighter control and greater direction. The A.I.A. failed because of its weaknesses and because Hervé and his associates allowed it to fail.[215] The creation of *La Guerre Sociale* in December 1906 was, in part, an attempt to remedy deficiencies obvious to most police observers. A weekly antimilitarist newspaper, which appealed to the variegated extreme Left, could have been an antidote to problems that beset the A.I.A. It would be directed by Hervé and his closest associates, and be dependent on no other group. There was no grand design in Hervé's career. Here, at least, a romantic revolutionary acted pragmatically.[216]

If early 1906 were characterized by a wave of posters, meetings, and calls for amnesty, only a fraction of the French took part. The most vocal antimilitarist organization, the A.I.A., despite a sensational trial, lost direction and perhaps members.[217] The repressive actions of the police were only one aspect of the story. The A.I.A. succumbed to repression because it was weak, insignificant, and needed publicity. Even though the A.I.A. began to suspect a police spy among its members when new posters were immediately discovered before they could be placed on Parisian walls,[218] the actions of French authorities were not primary in explaining the decline of the A.I.A. since its troubles preceded *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair. Sensation and notoriety merely masked internal division, doctrinal incoherence, and personal rivalries.

This conclusion is based on the general reports on antimilitarism by the Ministry of the Interior. These documents sought ways to attack the antimilitarist threat by means of articles 26, 66, and 67 of the Code Penal as they were modified in Law of December 18, 1893. The police wanted to act against antimilitarists before any crime was committed. Because the penal code generally dealt with crimes already committed, the authorities thought they needed a new law. Such a law was based on the assumed existence of a vast plot and conspiracy of supposedly integrated, overlapping, and interdependent organizations including: the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, and Hervé's *Parti Révolutionnaire*, which gravitated around *La Guerre Sociale* and supposedly included the infamous *Organisation de Combat* and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaire*. Ironically, a sort of hazy conspiratorial project was part of Hervé's goal, but his conceptualization was a far more theatrical and romantic venture than a serious threat to French security. Hervé's shift, in good part, came because such conspiratorial cooperation was impossible. Anyone who has studied the relations among these groups before and after the dates of the police documents would be amused. The lack of support for the *Parti Révolutionnaire* among his own allies and friends led Hervé to overtly

jettison the quest for such a *parti* by early 1912. His caution and skepticism were there almost from the very beginning.[219]

For Rolande Trempé "Antimilitarism and antipatriotism took on greater and greater importance successively and proportionally as the menace of war became clearer."[220] French police data show increasing numbers of deserters and cases of insubordination by 1906, but they also document antimilitarist weakness, divisions, and rivalries. The decline of the A.I.A. presaged the imminent crisis in syndicalism, both of which should have led to more realistic police assessments.[221] Undoubtedly, increased strike activities in an era of unequal economic gains and growing antimilitarist rhetoric made the police task of understanding the threats rather difficult. The revolutionary tradition had become anachronistic, but both the police and antimilitarists like Hervé were slow to catch on. The rhetoric of revolution easily fed the police love of conspiracy. The excitement and sensation created by Hervé, the A.I.A., and *La Guerre Sociale* fit a conspiracy model quite well, however rhetorical the threat may have been. The police failed to appreciate that conspiracy was born of weakness.

Jean-Jacques Becker tersely summed up the problem of pre-war antimilitarism with the following statement. "Syndicalism had certainly created antimilitarists: it is much more doubtful that it managed to produce true antipatriots."[222] For Gilles Heuré, by 1914 "there was an undeniable decrease in the intensity of the antimilitarist and antipatriotic current in the French socialist movement, but also in the C.G.T."[223] Though Paul B. Miller devoted a fascinating volume documenting the complexities in the growth of pre-war antimilitarism in France, he was led to conclude: "The influence of antimilitarism on the army was greatly exaggerated by leftist and republican enemies who saw the propaganda, heard the rhetoric, knew the stakes, but failed to weigh the facts. The right-wing agenda of journalists and others made the Left easy prey, even if evidence for serious antimilitarist sympathies in the army was limited."[224] For Eugen Weber, "much of the fear of antimilitarism was based on ignorance of antimilitarists." Many inside the army knew that the reality of military life fit neither the hopes of the antimilitarists nor the fears of the police and the nationalist press. Someone like the young writer René Benjamin perspicaciously wrote how soldiers who knew their Hervéist doctrines by heart would "behave very well provided they are marched up to the line of fire in good order" on the day of mobilization.[225]

Some police agents and informers used *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair and the decline of the A.I.A. to label Hervé an isolated and peripheral figure, while others later described him as the center of a vast conspiracy that included the C.G.T., the anarchists, and the Hervéists in the S.F.I.O. What many general police reports

failed to see but what some individual agents saw quite clearly was that Hervé had a revolutionary general staff, but few troops. The two proletarian "armies," the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T., constantly sought to isolate the quixotic Breton "General". The two large organizations which especially catered to French working classes did not make the police task any easier because they were forced by tradition to mask their reformist practices with revolutionary rhetoric. How were they to know that both the police and Hervé would often take them seriously? By 1911 the ingenuous Hervé finally became convinced that revolutionary unity was impossible on the Left. He would soon discover that the French Left could unite temporarily in a patriotic war, but never in an antiwar crusade.[226] If French police erred on the side of caution in their exaggeration of the antimilitarist threats, one can certainly understand their fears. However, such police paranoia could have led to disaster in August 1914 if the *Carnet B* had been implemented.[227]

Around the time of *L'Affiche Rouge*, Hervé's boyhood friend, Émile Masson, while on annual reservist maneuvers in Brittany, wondered whether the easing of discipline for the troops could have been a military response to the rise of Hervéism. When the harsh verdict came in and Hervé was sent to Clairvaux Prison, Masson forwarded his friend half his royalties from his work on Thomas Carlyle even though for two years he had been promising to share the funds with Péguy and the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*. With Péguy moving toward a revanchard nationalism, Hervé's brand of idealism was then much closer to that of Masson, who cancelled his subscription to the *Cahiers* and broke with its editor whom he had come to consider deceitful. The Breton professor at Pontivy was troubled by increased pressure from Péguy for donations, his increasingly nationalistic allure, and his opening volume of the new series of the Cahiers titled "*Hervé-traître*." Péguy's treatment of Hervé was an indication to Masson that his former literary idol had lost his idealistic grace and faith. Just as the Dreyfus Affair ended on July 12, 1906 with a declaration of innocence by the *Cour de Cassation*, Hervé was released from prison. Two weeks later the Massons were in Paris celebrating his freedom at the apartment he shared with Madame Dijonneau. "Now that Péguy no longer incarnated the struggle for truth, it was for Hervé, the stubborn Breton, to brandish the flame of Révolution."[228]

5

The Foundation of *La Guerre Sociale*

Activist Journalism or Revolutionary Theater?

The idea of creating a weekly antimilitarist newspaper to be sponsored by the A.I.A. actually antedated *L'Affiche Rouge* Affair. Just after the Saint-Étienne Congress of the A.I.A. in July 1905, Miguel Almereyda presided over a meeting which discussed the need to have a publication that could provoke articles in the bourgeois press and debates in the French Chamber concerning the topic of antimilitarism. According to Almereyda even the avant-garde press did not report fully on the ideas and activities of the A.I.A.[1] Victor Méric claimed that the idea of a newspaper was a longstanding A.I.A. goal.[2] However, just before *L'Affiche Rouge* was produced, the decision to create a weekly antimilitarist newspaper became an incendiary subject even within the A.I.A. when Almereyda and Émile Janvion violently argued over the priorities of a poster versus a newspaper. Despite Janvion's brandishing of a pistol in support of an antimilitarist newspaper, Almereyda got his poster, which he thought would have more immediate impact.[3] There is little documentation in French archives regarding Hervé's efforts to set up *La Guerre Sociale*. According to most witnesses *La Guerre Sociale* was the product of prison discussions at La Santé and Clairvaux during the incarcerations for *L'Affiche Rouge*. Other sources credit militants of the A.I.A., both in and out of prison, especially Henri Fabre, Merle, Almereyda, and Méric, with the genesis of the newspaper. In 1912 Hervé took most of the credit for the idea of launching *La*

Guerre Sociale and for the choice of its name. He claimed that the idea came to him at La Santé and Clairvaux where he was incarcerated in the spring and summer of 1906. "I am the one who had the idea for this newspaper at La Santé in the spring of 1906 … I am the one who came up with its name at Clairvaux during the summer of that same year."[4]

Without denying Hervé's central role in founding *La Guerre Sociale*, several sources credit Fabre and Merle with putting the idea to Almereyda while he was in prison. Méric claimed that Almereyda was the driving force in creating the newspaper, while Hervé "needed a lot of persuading."[5] At first most of the released antimilitarists forgot about the proposed paper as they returned to their former professions. When Almereyda left prison in July 1906, he resumed his activities as the Secretary of the A.I.A., and both he and Merle worked on the A.I.A.'s bulletin from October through December of that year. However, the A.I.A. and its bulletin were not enough to sustain their enthusiasm for long. Almereyda and his friends had never given up on their longstanding idea of creating a revolutionary newspaper. It was Fabre who had the money for the newspaper. For Jonathan Almosnino, the real artisan of *La Guerre Sociale* was Almereyda who, along with Henri Fabre and Eugene Merle, had to convince Hervé to implement the project that they had pondered in prison earlier in 1906. Hervé was hesitant because he did not want to get involved with a still-born newspaper. In the end three factors tipped the scales and finally convinced *Le Sans Patrie* to join the venture: a credit from the Dangon printers, money collected by Henri Fabre, and Almereyda's tenacity.[6] Apparently, the decision that *La Guerre Sociale* would not be the official organ of the A.I.A. came gradually.

La Guerre Sociale began in the conversations of the political prisoners of La Santé and Clairvaux in 1906 and in the ongoing deficiencies of the A.I.A. A weekly newspaper could be a better vehicle for the revolutionary elite deemed necessary by Hervé as he grew increasingly skeptical of the motives and understanding of the mass of workers. There was no grand design in Hervé's career. He adapted spontaneously to events, trends, and forces. The demise of the A.I.A. and the creation of *La Guerre Sociale* are related, yet neither development was paramount at the time of *L'Affiche Rouge*. If there were ideas for a weekly antimilitarist newspaper as early as 1905, these plans came to have a far different meaning with the decline of the A.I.A. *La Guerre Sociale* sought to remedy many of the flaws of the A.I.A. which were, in fact, a microcosm of the flaws in the French Left as a whole. However, it remained to be seen whether or not a new organization or a new vehicle could end the lack of cohesion, coherence, and cooperation which characterized the extreme Left.[7]

There was no doubt that Hervé was the intellectual leader and main writer at the newspaper but Almosnino described Almereyda as the paper's "true artisan". He was the editorial secretary responsible for orchestrating each page to be visually pleasing, lively, and aggressive. Almereyda occasionally wrote longer articles for the paper, but generally he was responsible for the layout and a weekly series of brief biting articles called "*les echos*." Among the newspaper's veritable directors were several young full time journalists who had become politically active by way of their adolescent anarchism. In fact, Merle, Méric, and Louis Perceau found themselves acting as journalists, administrators, financial planners, and editors of the paper, even as they initially continued to write for other papers. Each week they met with Almereyda at the printers or the Café du Croissant to develop that week's issue.[8] Even though Almereyda continued to write militant antimilitarist articles and remained an active antimilitarist, in becoming editorial secretary of *La Guerre Sociale*, he progressively reduced his activities for the A.I.A. and by April 1907 he was no longer the Secretary of the latter organization.[9]

The run-up to the launching of *La Guerre Sociale* coincided with the beginning of Georges Clemenceau's first ministry from 1906–9. With that Radical ministry and those which followed, "the Republic entered a muddled period, which no longer enjoyed the homogeneity that the Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes years had derived from the precision of their fields of combat and the clarity of inspiration of their majority." Under Clemenceau and his successors nothing would be as clear cut as before. Several factors changed the usual pattern of conflict between the parties in the decade before the war: the parliamentary crisis, the intensity of social struggles, and the problems involving international relations.[10] In 1906 the "new Blanqui", Hervé, found himself on the opposite side of the barricades from Clemenceau, who, ironically, as a young medical student and activist in the 1860s had been a protégé of the imprisoned Blanqui himself. The former mayor of Montmartre during the Commune, Clemenceau, and the young Insurrectional leader, Hervé, had something else in common besides lesser and greater *retournements*: journalism.[11]

The launching of *La Guerre Sociale* in late 1906 was atypical of most French newspapers of that era in at least two senses. It differed from the traditional political newspapers like Clemenceau's *La Justice*, which catered to members of the political elite, and it was certainly no mass information daily like *Le Petit Journal*. *Le fin-de-siècle* Parisian press may have been multiform, complex, and changing, but not even the Hervéist weekly could afford to dispense with some of the "tried and true" patterns of the bourgeois press. Besides *les quatre grands*: *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Petit Parisien*, *Le Journal* and *Le Matin*, there were many other Parisian

papers, most of which had weak circulations. There were the *feuilles de qualité*, such as *Le Temps*, *Le Journal des Débats*, *Le Gaulois*, and *Le Figaro*, which catered to wealthy and sophisticated citizens from various political horizons. There were several evening papers, including *La Liberté*, *La Patrie*, and *La Presse*, which were often tied to business circles and had relatively stable circulation numbers. Several *feuilles d'abonnés* like *La Gazette de France*, *Le Siècle*, and *L'Univers* had many provincial readers but had major problems surviving and often saw their readership decline. *La Justice* can be included among *les feuilles de journalistes* which included *L'Autorité* of Paul de Cassagnac, *L'Intransigeant* of Henri Rochefort, and *L'Éclair* of Ernest Judet. These were newspapers directed by talented, often violent, writers with their own political clienteles. Similar newspapers, such as *La Lanterne*, *La Petite République*, *Le Soleil*, and *Le Rappel* were inspired by less homogenous political groups. However, the great novelty of the period was the appearance of the *feuilles de militants*, such as *L'Action Française*, *La Croix*, and *La Libre Parole*, whose function was not only to convince their readers politically, but to indoctrinate and organize them in *ligues*, parties, or movements.[12]

La Guerre Sociale certainly fit the description of a *feuille de militant*, but the socialist press in general had a difficult beginning, only blossoming in the late 1880s. Most early socialist or working class papers experienced problems such as: a lack of subscribers, too many unsold copies, trouble competing with the mass press, and, thus, major financial difficulties. "These papers had trouble defining their nature. They wanted to be organs of propaganda, but to reach the widest audience possible, they had to provide space to news items, variety features, and serialized novels. Nevertheless, they could neither neglect their doctrinal purity nor the needs of proselytization. The least moderation … would see them rebuked as veritable ideological traitors." Because they also had to focus on informing and creating activists, most of their news was devoted to their own party, group, or movement, which was not particularly interesting for outsiders. Doctrinal and personal rivalries on the extreme Left reduced the potential clientele for most of these newspapers, whose histories could be described in terms of successive scissions. Also pertinent to their fates were "the multiple legal actions and trials which were severely aggravated by the '*lois scélérats*.'"[13] *La Guerre Sociale* fits this characterization, but it was much more successful. Why? Perhaps because it had learned a few tricks from the mass dailies and yet managed to maintain a certain doctrinal intensity which, for a time, appealed to diverse militants on the far French Left.

The mainstream press included many pugnacious political newspapers but *La Guerre Sociale* was created in an atmosphere increasingly dominated by "not very politicized (at least in appearance) information sheets that allocated a great deal of

space to sports and brief news items. And consequently they enjoyed mass success. *[Les quatre grands]* ... together made up 40 per cent of the national circulation of daily newspapers. Yet numerous and prosperous provincial papers also existed."[14] In 1914 the four great Parisian dailies printed around four and a half million copies a day while France had less than forty million people. With mass education came mass literacy, and most people were "exposed to at least one newspaper nearly every day." This meant that the mass circulation press, in an era before radio and cinema became major competitors, had a major impact on the views, assumptions, and concerns of ordinary people. But the penny press disseminated more than information; it represented a new source of power and influence which became a mighty vehicle for those who had the means to own and operate such tribunes. For Edward Berenson, the press during the Belle Epoque "had achieved a relative level of power and influence that no single medium of communication would ever enjoy again." Hoping to not alienate readers, *les quatre grands* tried to appear as politically neutral as possible, so they generally supported whoever was in power and rarely disputed specific parties or programs. "They adopted instead the much more powerful technique of influencing readers by appealing to deeply embedded attitudes about religion, nationality, and sexuality, all of which in conducive circumstances could make certain cultural proclivities profoundly political."[15]

Newspapers had not always been so influential. In the mid-nineteenth century French newspapers were small, two to four pages, cramped, as well as devoid of illustrations, photos, and headlines. They were generally sold by means of quarterly or yearly subscriptions rather than by the issue. And they were so expensive that only the middle and upper classes could afford them. Even though some literate working people pooled their resources to subscribe and many read newspapers in cafes or popular libraries (*cabinets de lecture*), such lower class readers were a politically conscious minority. In the first half of the nineteenth century, newspapers were extremely doctrinal and opinionated without the sensationalistic and informational focus of the modern press. The French press had to overcome technological, political, and economic obstacles before it could take advantage of the increasingly literate population.[16] Newspapers like *Le Petit Journal* "transformed French journalism from a forum for politics and polemics into a medium of instruction and diversion for working men and their families." Newspapers entertained their readers by means of chronicles as well as through the *faits divers* (news items) and the *romans-feuilletons* (serialized novels) which became key elements in the penny press which appealed to ordinary people. Beginning in an era of political repression under the Second Empire, the typical *fait divers* was often

the sensational crime story, a veritable "*roman vrai.*" Dramatic tales of crime, death, love, and mayhem sold papers, but mass circulation could not have been achieved without technological innovation.[17]

The new technology and content oriented to a mass readership meant that the penny press had the potential to reach beyond the capital into the hinterland. All that was needed was a satisfactory means of distribution. Traditionally, newspapers were sold by subscription and sent through the mail. That suited the small-circulation elite press of an earlier era, but the mass based era demanded something more effective. Since workers could not afford long-term subscriptions, street hawkers were used in Paris. Outside Paris, imitating the earlier democratic-socialist press of 1848, depots in provincial train stations were set up to receive packets of papers which *colporteurs* carried deep into the countryside to sell to peasants and rural artisans. Circulation increased enormously from the 1870s. By 1911 eighty percent of the issues went to the provinces. First *Le Petit Journal* and then other great Parisian dailies enjoyed major growth. In contrast to recent newspapers, the mass-circulation press in the *fin-de-siècle* got most of its revenue from single-copy sales rather than advertising. In 1905 *Le Petit Journal* received 75 percent of its income from newsstands or ambulant sales, 3 percent from subscriptions, and 20 percent from advertising. Such dependence on single sales meant increasing efforts to peddle papers which meant not only more sensational stories and exciting *romans-feuilletons* but elaborate advertising campaigns and special contests in which readers could win fabulous prizes from sponsor/advertisers.[18]

To explain the increasing role of the press in France before World War I, it is important to remember that in 1872 43% of adults were illiterate, while on the eve of the war that percentage had fallen to around 10%.[19]

> "The conjuncture of three inventions: the railroad, the telegraph, and the new techniques of printing, had, in effect, given the press a power of diffusion with no comparison to the past. That power was all the greater because the elementary education of all the children from the lower classes had, in the meantime, increased the number of potential readers. All these combined factors explain the staggering … circulation figures. Between the years 1880 and 1910, the number of newspapers sold each day went from 1.5 million to 10 million copies (for 20 million adults)!"[20]

The mass dailies not only employed sensational news items and installments of fiction, they developed contests to cater to an escapist passion in many readers. Other Parisian newspapers followed the example of *Le Petit Parisien* by employing contests and promotions. "Some attracted attention by sponsoring sporting events; others organized the events themselves, as *Le Matin* did with its *Tour de*

France automobile race of 1899 and its air show of 1910. Newspapers sponsored referenda on capital punishment, divorce, marriage, and other pressing cultural and political issues to draw in even more readers."[21] Because such contests were expensive, only *les quatre grands* had the means to attract the bulk of Parisian readers from 1900–1914. They got 40% of the nation's readers and 75% of those in Paris, which threatened the livelihood of other less solvent newspapers. Since most papers depended on single copy sales, the more newspapers the mass press sold, the fewer potential readers for the others, especially at a time when French population growth was stagnant. From the rise of France's first mass daily (*Le Petit Journal*) in 1882 until 1914, the number of Parisian dailies steadily declined. If the provincial press fared better, that was because it generally catered to local needs.[22]

While the penny press depended on *faits divers* involving tales of murder, suspense, love, and adventure to attract and titillate readers, it also employed daily installments of serial novels known as *romans-feuilletons* which catered to the same sensations. "The writing style of these fictional *feuilletons* was virtually identical to that of the factual *faits divers*; the two blended together and nourished each other with references and images." Readers, at some level, must have been prey to blending fiction with reality according to Berenson. The *faits divers* and installment novels "gave readers an exaggerated sense of the prevalence of crime and of its potential dangers to them."[23] Equally troubling, perhaps, is the perspective of Madeleine Varin d'Ainvelle on the popular press. "The serial novel (*roman)*, the news item (*fait divers*), the anecdotal manner of narrating politics, which do not necessarily generalize for all the press, but which creep into the popular press and its reporting style, turn the newspaper into a marvelous instrument of escape. Then it is necessary like opium or morphine; each day demands its dose for escape."[24]

Varin d'Ainvelle contrasted newspapers of political opinion, such as *La Guerre Sociale*, with *la grande presse*, associated with their large circulation, increased publicity, exciting stories, numerous scandals, and general sensationalism.

> "Political opinion newspapers are characterized by their uncovering of the meaning of events, their defense of particular interests, and their expressions favoring political action, which allow them to 'enter' more deeply into the consciences of their readers. Their meaning, interests, and activities affect the personalities of readers, their social integration, functions, status, ideas, and attitudes. Also, the newspaper-reader relationship is deeper and more intimate than in the case of the information press."[25]

Throughout the nineteenth century there was a gradual evolution toward general information newspapers away from the press which stressed strictly political

issues. Concomitantly, the price of newspapers dropped. "The public was proportional to the price of a newspaper." In the late nineteenth century the age of the mass circulation daily had arrived. Such a shift could not have occurred if the contents had not changed to meet more popular tastes and if the literacy rates had not increased with the spread of compulsory education. Newspapers which appealed to particular views as well as the mass information dailies had to write with their readership in mind. Such a situation would always risk simplification and vulgarization. As newspapers sought to give the public what it wanted, especially the immediacy of the event, the possibility opened up that some new technology might better supply that goal.[26] In the evolving mass press the story increasingly seemed to become a shared experience rather than vehicle for understanding. In adapting to the public's attention and language, newspapers were driven to offer readers that which was "most captivating, most impressive, most lively, in a word, the most immediate." Jacques Kayser long ago discussed how the press was transforming political events to anecdotal stories, veritable *faits divers*.[27]

As the mass press developed, reading was replaced by looking, glancing, or "checking out". Varin d'Ainvelle preferred the term "*grande presse*" instead of "information press" because the latter phrase assumes that there are no value judgments in their reporting. In fact, she argued that *la grande presse* has psycho-therapeutic entertainment and diverting purposes. "The more people undergo the force of anonymity and bureaucratization of relations, the more they seek elsewhere the intimacy and affectivity of primary relations from which they are separated. In the same way, the true political character of politics today is abandoned even when the subject is politics."[28] "The veritable distinction that can be supported is not between newspapers of '*information*' and newspapers of 'o*pinion*,' but at the core of the press, between its function as an instrument of social membership and its function as entertainment."[29]

Part of the explanation for the changing nature of the press, according to Varin d'Ainvelle, involved the need to appeal to more and more people to keep the circulation high to make up for the decreasing price per issue during the *fin-de-siècle*. Clearly, outside advertising would only be attractive if the circulation warranted it. The mass press meant a new technology, and that demanded greater capital; press competition led to accelerating mechanization and greater commercialization in the newspaper industry, which meant increasing press concentration and more control by fewer and wealthier owners. Parisian dailies steadily declined in number from the 1880s until the 1960s, while the provincial press declined in numbers from the 1890s.[30]

> "From the reality of numbers, newspapers have been led to renounce their proper political expressions of opinion, if they had them. They stopped being a transmission channel between parties and readers, between ideological tendencies and the public forum. A defined political base was too narrow. To demand it, a newspaper would have to renounce the number of its readers … Readers had to look to the engaged weeklies or to conversations for that which the daily papers no longer provided … [The mass] newspaper ceased being the expression of a group, that which took charge of their interests and political project … [The mass press] … had to be devoid of political, social, economic, and religious references which would shatter it. It needed to be very general in view of the quantity which it was called on to subsume."

It was necessary to appeal to mass audiences, be they French, provincials, citizens, women, youth, sportsmen, or gamblers.[31]

Even though it was a self-proclaimed *journal de combat politique*, *La Guerre Sociale* shared this penchant for *faits divers* and even employed *romans-feuilletons* of its own. In choosing its lead stories *La Guerre Sociale* not only stressed major events involving the aroused and potentially revolutionary working class, it often focused on personal tales of violence against individual workers at the hands of the "vile and dangerous" police and military. By reporting on its own efforts to create a revolutionary consciousness among ordinary workers, its own activities in creating revolutionary organizations, and various intriguing tales of police and military crimes against ordinary workers or working class soldiers, was *La Guerre Sociale* inciting revolution or simply selling newspapers by permitting thousands of disenchanted workers to experience revolutionary allure without the danger? Was Hervé's weekly still acting subversively despite or by means of its obviously self-promotional "revolutionary" journalism? If the *faits divers* and *romans-feuilletons* allowed ordinary citizens to live in danger, adventure, and romance while seated at their cafés or in front of their hearths, why couldn't "revolutionary theater" provide a similar vicarious experience to disenchanted workers? Newspapers seemed to have become the stage for political spectacle with an almost unlimited readership as an audience.[32] Certainly, *La Guerre Sociale* mirrored some aspects of the mass dailies and catered to similar tastes and habits of its readers with different intentions in mind. The *faits divers* and *romans-feuilletons* in *La Guerre Sociale* generally differed from those mass dailies but their function could be quite similar: to grab the readers' attention and provide sensational entertainment as well as instigate *Le Grande Soir* (the Revolution). However, Hervé and his revolutionary players were never simply cynical users of the repression of the working class in order to sell newspapers and win followers. At some level they must have believed in their revolutionary mission and yet suspected that the revolution itself

was largely rhetorical. If they were quite willing to go to prison for their activities, they also had reason to expect to be released, sooner rather than later, to the cheers of their followers.

Gilles Heuré's insightful contrast of the journalistic styles and assumptions of Charles Péguy and Gustave Hervé is pertinent here. For Péguy, "Hervé … was even a 'traitor' to a certain conception of journalism … [While] Péguy cultivated a journalistic intransigence, a style of approach, a rapport with the reader which did not suppose any type of laxity or zeal on the part of the latter for a single elegant or seductive formula. The *Cahiers* were not addressed to people who 'wanted to receive their opinion ready-made.'" Péguy sought to develop the critical sense of his readers. "He did not agree with the notion that a newspaper should simply be able to polish … [its subject matter] in order to exploit it. 'To cause discontent among at least one third of one's clientele with each delivery, as Péguy professed and compelled himself to do, never entered into the objectives of Gustave Hervé who called the '*bons bougres*' to arms with a complicit and familiar 'hey there'. Where the first man already saw demagoguery, the second saw, at first and above all, a professional *savoir-faire*. Journalistic 'truth', 'doctrine', and 'method' decidedly did not have the same meaning for the two men." Although Péguy recognized Hervé's talent, he thought that the Insurrectional leader preferred to communicate through slogans and even sabotage orders. For Péguy, "Hervé was an editorialist who spoke quickly and clearly, who took the reader by the throat, who ordered him, shouted at him, astonished him, and amused him by means of original formulas. Anyway, reading his editorials was not meant for solitary readers: it must be employed in places of sociability—groups, meetings, gatherings—and to arouse commentaries. The articles of Hervé easily coincide with the rhythm of the militant weekly; each week the hawkers spread his striking title like a shock wave." Péguy believed that Hervé sought to command and hence to enslave his revolutionary readers, while Péguy wished to challenge his rather restricted readers in order to make them think. There was always a danger of authoritarianism and reaction in Hervé, yet Heuré seems to imply that the defrocked professor was more in touch with the times or more modern than the former Normalien, Péguy, for better or worse.[33]

Hervé was released from prison on July 14, 1906, after a general amnesty for political prisoners. On December 19, 1906 the first issue of *La Guerre Sociale* appeared.[34] Between these two dates Hervé's activities were as varied and flagrant as they had ever been. On July 25, 1906 the Parisian bar association examined Hervé's request for admission. Along with his attorney Jacques Bonzon, he met with the bar association all afternoon and was admitted once the Parisian bar

realized his amnesty negated earlier charges against him.[35] When Félicie Numietska announced her resignation as secretary of the A.I.A., she hoped that a new National Committee would be more solidly organized. Hervé, along with many of the future staff at *La Guerre Sociale*, seemed to grant her wish by joining the new A.I.A. National Committee.[36] There was a discussion about fusing the new Hervéist weekly with the monthly bulletin of the A.I.A., but it soon became clear that the A.I.A. had become just one of many components in Hervé's latest efforts at revolutionary concentration.[37] There may have been a growing rift in the leadership of the A.I.A. in the weeks before *La Guerre Sociale* came to print.[38] Many members of the A.I.A. soon realized that the militants who launched *La Guerre Sociale* had made the new paper their primary concern. Much as the two groups may have expected to maintain ties, it was not long before rivalries concerning money and control over the antimilitarist forces led to open conflict.[39] Still, Almereyda remained secretary of the A.I.A. until April 1907 even though he had less and less time to devote to that organization.[40]

After his release from prison, Hervé continued his antimilitarist activities within the S.F.I.O. and in support of the C.G.T. On August 29, 1906 he began his legal career in Saint-Étienne as a defense attorney for nine strikers.[41] At the end of September he and fifteen militants from the 42nd section of the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine* were arrested at the Trocadero for disrupting a patriotic rally, "*La Fête Des Conscrits*," presided over by General Dalstein. Hervé interrupted the ceremonies by trying to give a speech surrounded by his antimilitarist followers. When widespread booing and catcalls greeted him, his antimilitarist followers intoned "*L'Internationale*."[42] The next day Hervé, Georges Yvetot, and the leftist attorney Willm spoke at a large meeting at the Salle de l'Alliance in Levallois-Perret also dealing with the departure of the new class.[43] *Le Petit Parisien* of November 16, 1906 reported that Hervé and Ernest Lafont would act as defense attorneys for the staff of the C.G.T.'s *La Voix du Peuple*, accused of attacks on the army and provocations to soldiers to disobedience during the same October departures. The newspaper ironically noted that this was the same court, the Assizes de la Seine, in which Hervé had been tried for *L'Affiche Rouge* and his clients now included a few signers of the poster, some of whom would become contributors to *La Guerre Sociale*.[44]

Hervé's most important function in the weeks before the creation of *La Guerre Sociale* was his participation at the National Congress of the S.F.I.O. held at Limoges November 1–4, 1906. It was at Limoges and then at the Nancy Congress of the S.F.I.O. in 1907 that Hervé most clearly voiced his ideas about preventing war. His antiwar motions at Limoges and Nancy were duplicated at the Stuttgart

Congress of the Second International in 1907 which passed a hybrid motion that Hervé called "a victory for the *Sans-Patrie* of France."[45] Although most French and European socialists had disagreed with Hervé at those conferences, his analysis helped push others to clarify their positions. His extreme positions also helped to show, for those who wished to look, the glaring contradictions within many aspects of socialist thought, including areas not directly tied to the question of war.

The Limoges Congress "was the occasion for Hervé to reaffirm his ideas on antimilitarism/antipatriotism and to differentiate himself from the other advanced currents [in French socialism] such as Guesdism and Vaillantism."[46] If most socialists agreed that working class emancipation was a sort of unity and that political action was indispensable and complementary to economic struggle, other issues proved to be more prickly and complex. At that gathering there were several areas of disagreement including: conflicting ideas about the role of the state, the relationship between socialism and syndicalism, and the socialist attitudes toward antimilitarism and war. Other than the questions of antimilitarism and war, perhaps the most contentious issue involved "the relationship which the S.F.I.O. expected to establish with the C.G.T. after the approval of the Charter of Amiens" a few weeks before. The Guesdists assumed that the party had precedence over the unions and that politics dominated economics. "They also wanted socialists to act like socialists within the unions so that union action occurred 'not only without the hostility, but with cooperation given from outside the party'. In other words, [there should be] respect for the autonomy of organizations but collaboration between them." Vaillant and Jaurès disagreed with Guesdist ideas regarding socialist-syndicalist relations. For them, the two types of struggles and two sets of institutions should not supersede or try to dominate the other. The S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. should respect their mutual independence, although the two men expected reality eventually to impose some sort of unity of action. "Both men were ready to second the efforts of the C.G.T. in its 'syndical and revolutionary' action and recognized the use of the general strike …" Although Jaurès thought the efficacy of the general strike was always relative, he remained optimistic about S.F.I.O./C.G.T. cooperation. "Moved by his desire for conciliation and his spirit of synthesis," according to Rolande Trempé, "Jaurès was certainly optimistic and surely deceived himself about the serious intentions of the syndicalists …" Even though he realized that the Charter of Amiens meant that the C.G.T. had "'burned its bridges with all the other parties'", he assumed it had "'built a bridge with the Socialist Party', the only one, in his eyes, which led, as much for the present as for the future, on all occasions, the same combat as the C.G.T. through whom 'socialist thought is implicitly affirmed'. It is this conviction of a profound

identity between the two organizations which explains the obstinacy with which Jaurès devoted himself up to 1914 to conciliate the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T., which represented two complementary aspects of socialism."[47]

At Limoges, Jaurès's motion became the official position, but barely. Jaurès thought you could combine political and syndical action by means of both a syndicalist general strike and the conquest of all political power in the expectation of a general expropriation of capitalism. Affirming the C.G.T.'s Amiens Charter, he assumed that such a double action would be effective through the free cooperation of the separate and autonomous economic and political organizations. For him, the C.G.T. could be independent of political parties and the S.F.I.O. could pursue a political program with similar goals. He felt there was a fundamental agreement of political and economic action which the two organizations could separately lead "without confusion, subordination, or defiance."[48]

Hervé was eager to talk about antimilitarism at Limoges, but that did not prevent him from entering the debates on syndicalism since he saw the Charter of Amiens as an opening for direct action and a rejection of electoral tactics and goals. For him, the Congress of Amiens "allowed an autonomy for revolutionary forces mobilized outside the party." A critical goal of Hervéism, which would be promoted by *La Guerre Sociale* in the years ahead, was to rally syndicalists to his movement rooted on the extreme Left of the S.F.I.O. "If he wished to remain at the confluence of the unions and the party, it was to work on their common margin, while allowing each its specific priority. Social conditions, which he was scarcely interested in, belonged to syndicalism. Parliamentary matters, which he feigned to scorn, belonged to the party."[49]

Hervé did not enter into debates on all the issues at Limoges. Issues like women's suffrage would never be priorities among the largely masculine staff of *La Guerre Sociale*. However, even when he was not directly engaged, Hervé was listening, and he did not fail to pick up an indirect assault aimed at him by Jules "Renard, who sharply addressed authors of 'the huge books stuffed with metaphysics' and jeered 'the sons of millionaires' who fantasize about syndicalism and 'thumb their nose at longstanding comrades … While strikers starve to death … these little fellows eat their rolls with their cocoa.'" The *Sans Patrie* could not resist responding in kind. "'In vain, I have wracked my brains. I could never have taken the epithet bourgeois millionaire to be me. I feel like a real jerk when someone talks about a bourgeois who writes books; but what reassures me is that my books have been banned.' And he counseled the critic of bourgeois writers to make an exception 'for Marx who wrote a book which still serves us every day.'"[50] In the future the staff at *La Guerre Sociale* would hear similar charges by anarchist and

syndicalist rivals, who were sometimes jealous at the success and notoriety of Hervé and his team. In fact, the social origins of many of the writers at the paper were quite modest, but genuinely proletarian elements were largely confined to the paper's managers, as Gilles Heuré and Jonathan Almosnino note.[51]

As seen above, French socialism generally included three different positions on antimilitarism after socialist unification in 1905.[52] At Limoges, Hervé's motion repudiated "bourgeois patriotism" because the only battle workers had to wage was *la guerre sociale* "to install a collectivist or communist regime." If peace were threatened, the duty of all citizens was to respond to any declaration of war, no matter which side declared it, with a military strike and an insurrection. In the debate that followed the motion of Yonne, Hervé discussed two methods to create an insurrection in case of war. The first method consisted of "going into the army, letting oneself be armed, then, once armed, one could create an insurrection and seize the communes and the means of production." The second method was that of the peasants of Yonne who, in refusing to join the army, created a kind of reservists' strike at home. Once the active army was away at the front, the reservists who stayed at home would rise up in insurrection.[53]

Reactions to Hervé's ideas at Limoges were largely negative. Guesde called Hervé's motion nonsense, and refused to separate any attempt to prevent war and militarism from the necessary revolution against capitalism.[54] Guesde actually called Hervéism counterrevolutionary because it disorganized the defense of "the most socialist country" and guaranteed the advantage to the country least able to initiate an insurrection.[55] Guesde believed that an insurrection was least likely to be successful precisely at the moment when war began. In *Leur Patrie*, echoing or foreshadowing Friedrich Engels, V.I. Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg, Hervé had written that war was the only time when a social revolution had any chance of success.[56] Vaillant was an advocate of a workers, general strike in case of war, but he opposed Hervé's ideas of a military strike because he believed that in war "the invader had to be combated without any need to discover the aggressor in order to prevent the proletariat's submission to another capitalist government."[57] Jaurès, who previously had branded Hervéism as repugnant and reactionary, reiterated his standard rebuttal of Hervé's ideas as "nothing more than the obscure ideas of Yonne's peasants." Other delegates at Limoges criticized Hervé's ideas as nonsocialist, individualist, and *petit bourgeois* because such ideas harmed the S.F.I.O. by aiding nationalists and reactionaries, caused a decline in support for socialism, and gave the French people an incorrect impression of socialism. Former Possibilists felt that the *Sans Patrie* was introducing anarchist methods and ideas into the unified Socialist Party.[58]

The motion of the Seine, introduced by Vaillant and supported by Jaurès, won over the majority of the party at Limoges and later at Nancy. Guesdists immediately pointed out that it was composed of two almost contradictory parts. The first part, while stressing that imperialism and militarism were only the expressions of capitalist exploitation of the proletariat, said that, given the imminence of an attack by a foreign power, "the nation and its working class under threat have the supreme duty to safeguard their independence and autonomy against an attack and the right to count on the cooperation of the working class from all other countries." The motion then had a fanciful clause demanding "the military disarmament of the bourgeoisie and the armament of the working class by way of the general arming of the people." The second part maintained the decisions of previous international congresses, emphasized the international solidarity of workers and socialists of all countries, attacked capitalism and colonialism, and looked to certain practical measures to prevent international conflicts. The motion specifically called for the use of all possible means to prevent war "including parliamentary action, public agitation, popular demonstrations, and even a general strike of workers and insurrection." The first part was seen by Guesdists to be superpatriotic while the second part extolled the most extreme measures to prevent war. In the votes on each part of the majority motion at Limoges and later at Nancy, Guesde would vote for the first part of the motion but reject the second. Hervé would do the opposite. In an exchange with Jaurès at Limoges, Hervé reported that the second part of the motion of the Seine "says what I have said for one and a half years. I believe that you have made an unusual step in my direction."[59] Though Vaillant and Jaurès's resolution did not please the Guesdists, they would be comforted by the decisions taken at the Second International's Stuttgart Congress in 1907.[60]

The Limoges Congress illustrated the divided and contradictory nature of socialist ideas on war. The unity created in 1905 was a hybrid product, combining several traditions of French socialism and forcing them into a Marxian framework itself torn by contradictions and dichotomies.[61] Hervé and Guesde sought consistency and clarity but the S.F.I.O. was neither. So, true to itself, the majority voted for the motion of Jaurès and Vaillant. The majority motion was a typical *nègre-blanc*, in Hervé's phraseology, expressed in terms that could appeal to both the activist Insurrectionists and the deterministic Guesdists. The resolution of Limoges included what J. Delevsky called the antinomies of socialist principles. It was not the existence of reformist and revolutionary ideas that created socialist powerlessness. Socialist weakness arose because its reformism was cloaked in revolutionary phraseology. Revolutionary ideals, which were carried along by

Hervéism, easily "degenerated into a sterile comedy or into blind action susceptible to contribute to the eventual victory of the forces of darkness."[62]

On Wednesday, December 19, 1906, some seven weeks after the Limoges Congress, the first issue of *La Guerre Sociale* reached Parisian and provincial newsstands.[63] Incredibly, the first issue, which was drafted at Almereyda's small room on the Rue Polonceau, near the Boulevard Barbès, was considered an insignificant and catastrophic dud in almost every way by its young staff, especially because they had such high expectations of producing something sensational and irresistible.[64] The layout and tone of the paper were apparently soon corrected. The title quickly became a cry of revolt when it was shouted by hawkers on the streets of Paris. Its subtitle, which read: "On the other side of the barricade", itself blocked off the paper's six columns and announced its program.[65] Certainly, the paper's name announced its methods: to shock, to excite, to call to battle, and to attack. The very existence of such a newspaper demonstrated that "social war" and political polarization were realities in France, at least until Hervé's shift became evidence of something else. Still, as late as 1912, amidst his profound change of tactics, Hervé could explain the title of his paper in the following manner. "All war is detestable, but if it is necessary to fight, the only road that is not a dupery for the people is a civil war, *la guerre sociale*."[66]

The unsigned lead article described the origins and aims of the revolutionary weekly. *La Guerre Sociale* hoped to speak "about everything and everyone, … that which other papers did not dare to say elsewhere."[67] *La Guerre Sociale* wanted to represent the forces of revolutionary concentration by being open to anyone who was willing to go beyond legal action in order to achieve the expropriation of the capitalist bourgeoisie in view of the socialization of the means of production and exchange. The new journal naively or sagaciously proclaimed it "would not compete with *Les Temps Nouveaux*, *Le Libertaire*, and *L'Anarchie*, which were libertarian or anarchist and too theoretical in nature. Also it would not compete with *La Voix du Peuple* or *Le Socialiste*, which were the official organs of the two great organizations, the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O., which had the timidities and reserves of all official organs. Neither was *La Guerre Sociale* meant to compete with *L'Humanité*, a daily paper in the hands of Jaurèsist socialists, that is to say, ultra reformists and parliamentarians, and open only to moderate syndicalist elements or those on the path to moderation."[68] The syndicalist and Guesdist newspapers "were as boring as rain" in the words of Jean-Claude Peyronnet, an early student of *La Guerre Sociale*.[69] Hervé also promised to not follow in the footsteps of the Radicals by continuing their outmoded anticlericalism, which "rubbed some people the wrong way."[70]

La Guerre Sociale claimed to be neither exclusively socialist nor exclusively anarchist (*libertaire*).[71] It aspired to become the organ of those socialists who deplored the party's increasing parliamentary role. It hoped to work inside the S.F.I.O. to attack its reformism, its respect for legality, and its purely verbal revolutionary appeals. *La Guerre Sociale* also wanted to become the voice of syndicalists who hoped to orient unions to direct action and a violent general strike by accentuating their federalist, antipatriotic, and antiparliamentary tendencies. The new weekly also sought to attract and guide various anarchists and communist anarchists (*communistes libertaires*) who had had enough of vain theoretical discussions and purely individual actions. It was hoped that communist anarchists in the A.I.A. or other groups would employ incessant antimilitarist propaganda as well as energetic resistance to police attacks in order to arouse the masses for the next insurrection which could be instigated by a war, a general strike, or any other unforeseen circumstances.[72] Of course, the attempt to remedy leftist division could be perceived as a threat to organs and organizations whose existences reflected and depended on that same division.

La Guerre Sociale was created just six months after the great electoral victory of the Left in the spring of 1906. The beginning of Clemenceau's ministry in October 1906 was expected to usher in an era of great social reform, but it ended in violent social upheaval usually associated with severe repression of working class activism and a wave of strikes from 1906 until 1910.[73] Ironically, Clemenceau, the former acolyte of Auguste Blanqui in the early 1860s[74] would devote considerable time in his first ministry trying to incarcerate "the new Blanqui." Even before the creation of *La Guerre Sociale*, Clemenceau himself at the time of the Courrières mining disaster had set the stage for his future relations with *La Guerre Sociale* and the rest of revolutionary Left when he said that he was "on one side of the barricades" while the strikers were on the other.

Modern scholars as well as Hervé's opponents in the S.F.I.O, the C.G.T., and among anarchists have often labeled Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale* "revolutionary romanticism,"[75] pure rhetoric, play acting, and demagoguery. Syndicalist General Secretray Victor Griffuelhes accused the journalists at *La Guerre Sociale* of being *braillards* (howlers, bawlers, yellers), only to be met by Almereyda's articles signed with that very epithet.[76] For his part, Jean Grave, the main voice of *Les Temps Nouveaux*, branded the Hervéists a "*ramassis de phraseurs*" (pack of eloquent phrase-makers). Grave explained the success of *La Guerre Sociale* in terms of its ability to "thrill all those who thought that half the revolution would be achieved if each issue of their newspaper assailed the bourgeoisie, and if each of its writers constantly used the words bombs, fires, smashed face, and figuratively hung a

half-dozen officials and politicians on a gas lamp in each article."[77] Yet the new paper represented one of the few revolutionary groups in pre-war France which attempted to create organizations which appeared to be trying to implement revolutionary rhetoric. Even if Insurrectionalism or Hervéism could be described as an updated Blanquism, that hardly inoculated it against the charge of "revolutionary romanticism." *La Guerre Sociale* offered more than violent and sensationalistic rhetoric. The paper's staff suffered prison for their ideas, sponsored a paramilitary band of armed revolutionary youths, supported secret cells of saboteurs, attempted to instigate the general strike, and promoted other forms revolutionary action in countless ways. The violence of its title, the extremism of its message, and the willingness to create organizations to implement its ideas could have been, in part, a remarkable self-deception because Hervé's overriding concerns seemed to be peace, expanding the range of unity on the extreme Left, social justice, as well as an underlying quest for some sort of social harmony. Could that mean that Hervéist rhetoric was always something of a bluff and a performance?

Not all Hervé's lieutenants abhorred violence as much as he did. The new paper clearly perceived the growing reformism and co-optation of the chief "revolutionary" organizations in France. It observed how the endless theoretical discussions among anarchists led to perpetual division and paralysis. Insurrectional activism seemed to remedy an impasse on the Left, but Hervéism could never really go beyond a deluded revolutionary display. Its cure for division on the extreme Left, namely sensationalism in variegated forms, proved to be as divisive as the disease. Hervéism grew out of the complex, divided, and contradictory French Left, yet a movement that advocated violence to attain unity and eventual peace was more than a bit contradictory. Even though Hervé's largely rhetorical violence arose from the need to get his ideas heard or heeded, in practice the *Sans Patrie* abhorred physical violence.[78] By his violent rhetoric and sensationalistic antics, Hervé attained notoriety and spread his message, yet the goals of unity, peace, and some underlying need for order remained ever elusive. That may only appear to be a conundrum. *La Guerre Sociale* was a political avant-garde experience that illustrated the dilemma of the French revolutionary Left. The French revolutionary heritage had become a romantic tradition, while political, social, and economic developments had made revolution itself archaic and anachronistic in France. Most of the French Left evolved to fit the changing situation, though their rhetoric often lagged behind. Because Hervé had so fully accepted the myth of revolution, his deception was striking and his ultimate acceptance of evolution was interpreted as treason by those whose rhetoric was yet to catch up. Hervé was not the only leftist who was branded a turncoat, renegade, or traitor, but because

his rhetoric had been so extreme and so believable, that label could not be eradicated. Apparently, it did not pay to be either too far behind or too far ahead of "history."

In the opening issues of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé claimed that a revolutionary newspaper could find a large audience because he recognized the weaknesses of the avant-garde press and believed the defects could be overcome. In fact, competition was keen among socialist newspapers. The daily *L'Humanité*, created in April 1904, only gradually became the official *journal* of the S.F.I.O. after 1907. It was an unwitting, though necessary, foil rather than a threat to the Hervéist weekly. The socialist daily was rather doctrinal and did not appeal to popular tastes which were met by the mass press. It was written in a rather elevated style and was obviously far more moderate in tone and substance than *La Guerre Sociale*.[79] There were certainly other longstanding socialist papers such as the Guesdist *Le Socialiste* which sought to capture readers dissatisfied with the reformism of *L'Humanité*. Emile Pouget's attempt to launch a revolutionary daily in 1908 and 1909, called *Le Cri du Peuple* and then *La Révolution*, led to serious infighting, surprising alliances, strange financial dealings, and complex maneuvering by newspapers inside and outside the extreme Left. Such a record says much about the difficulties and survival chances of the press on the far Left. When the syndicalist daily *La Bataille Syndicaliste* was created in 1911, many leftist newspapers felt threatened, including *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale*.[80] The left-wing newspapers "… could congratulate and salute one another in their columns, but they tried to guard their readers and, eventually, to cut into those of their neighbor."[81]

"To launch a newspaper is a delicate operation, and Hervé quickly understood that he had a limited space at his disposal. Between the large circulation press and the less powerful and less glamorous socialist press, the match was unfair." The creation of his own newspaper gave free reign for a revolutionary socialist to express his ideas at a time when antimilitarism and antipatriotism were resonating among many of the federations of the recently unified party. Ironically, Hervé expected workers to downplay their material preoccupations in the interests of radical activism, yet he proved to be both an excellent businessman and a fiery revolutionary. As Gilles Heuré phrased it: "The impetuosity of the revolutionary Hervé coincided with the ingenious sagacity of Hervé the owner of a newspaper, who handled trenchant language with as much dexterity as he handled the riding crop. Rather quickly he was going to show himself very able at business competition, at the wily tricks and traps of the profession, as well as uncompromising with any misappropriations of funds which could harm the reputation of the paper."[82]

Sometimes a newspaper's financial sources come from unexpected sources, and the police were especially vigilant in watching the left-wing press. The Republic had many enemies and the *fin-de-siècle* was particularly tense in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair and the clerical question. "The left-wing opposition to the Radical republican government in place, could, in effect, inspire the most Machiavellian combinations."[83] The police perspective on the origins of the new weekly had a conspiratorial hue. Various police sources believed that Hervé financed *La Guerre Sociale* with secret funds from clerical or monarchist sources in the wake of the recent conflicts between Church and State. Hervé supposedly had 30,000 francs at his disposal from such sources in late 1906. When questioned about clerical funds for *La Guerre Sociale*, Almereyda was reported to have responded that "money has no odor. It's just a question of having enough of it and we do have enough." The Interior Ministry source admitted that there was no proof of its charges, but anarchists generally were believed to have few misgivings about accepting money.[84] For the police "it was obvious that if these troubles [for the government] were produced [by *La Guerre Sociale*], they would not cause discontent among the clericals."[85] Later police suspicions centered on German sources for *La Guerre Sociale*, but that was a universal charge against the revolutionary press.[86] Some of his enemies later charged Hervé with being a tool of Jewish money.[87] The Ministry of the Interior was certain that Almereyda, who recently had been very poor, had a pocket full of money by December 1906, and the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* was spending freely in preparation for publication.[88] In the aftermath of the Stuttgart Congress in 1907, Jean Longuet got wind of an 80,000 franc gift by way of a young bourgeois anarchist who was assumed to have been a go-between for a mysterious reactionary donor. The police picked up the rumor that Hervé may have been knowingly or unwittingly in the pay of the party of reaction. The idea then spread that he wanted to turn *La Guerre Sociale* into a daily, which would be a serious blow to *L'Humanité*.[89] "The real or purported existence of silent partners was always suspected in Hervé's slightest actions and gestures, and, above all, in his most minor campaigns and reversals." Catholics, monarchists, Jews, Germans, spies, and anarchists were all the more easily, though generally separately, tied to Hervéist plots and funding since the latter were so poorly defined or so little known. "The occult was also an easy explanation for the excessively rapid success of the weekly."[90]

Despite what Méric reported about the first issue being an aesthetic and journalistic flop, most people seemed impressed by the paper's audacity and marketing skills, even if the treasury was quickly depleted. Though *La Guerre Sociale* "effectively reimbursed the advances of the Hachette distribution service and the Dangon printers, [it] was necessary to quickly solicit financial aid from militants ..."[91]

One such militant and regular provider was Anton Bruckère, who was sometimes called an antimilitarist millionaire! Several police reports claimed he was tolerated mainly due to his money. Another financial supporter was a Russian anarchist named Baron Frédéric Stackelberg who was endowed with a large personal fortune. Both men periodically wrote for the paper.[92] After three months of publication, Hervé revealed that the paper was surviving on donations and funds from "a few devoted friends". He also reported having obtained a 200 franc advance for advertising in the first issue. This particular advertiser disappeared by the third issue but for a while other advertising existed.[93] Gradually page four was taken up by the *Service de Librairie*, a book dealership and bookstore at the offices of the paper, created in late February 1907. This service sold books and brochures by the paper's journalists and other revolutionary authors as well. According to Peyronnet this service was essential for the paper's financial maintenance.[94] Hervéism may have been a fading movement by 1912, but *La Guerre Sociale* still showed signs of creativity and expansion. In June 1912 the paper created another service called *La Chanson du Peuple*, headed by the singer Léon Israel, which sold printed songs and plays as well as staged revolutionary concerts in order to make money and to counteract the *revanchard* wave then sweeping the *café-concerts*.[95]

The paper could not always live by its sales, especially during major events when it published many special editions with little advertising and at half the normal cost of 10 centimes. So the paper was forced to rely on donations which were 10–15% of all receipts. Such contributions often saved the paper from financial catastrophes according to Peyronnet. Still, it was increased sales and regular subscriptions which more than anything else made *La Guerre Sociale* successful financially. "Provided with a large circulation compared to other revolutionary papers, and well supported by its readers, *La Guerre Sociale* paid its [initial] debts in a few years and appeared around 1911 as a viable commercial venture."[96] By March 1911 the paper could triumphantly announce that it needed no more donations. Peyronnet called this the "*belle époque*" of *La Guerre Sociale* when victory was believed to have been achieved. Some issues in 1910 and 1911 had circulations of over 100,000, yet without the sales of the *Service de Librairie*, the paper would have been in debt even in 1911. The margin of financial security of *La Guerre Sociale* was not great, so increased competition could seriously threaten it.[97] By the time Hervé got out of prison in the summer of 1912, amidst the negative reactions to his new course, some followers still dreamt of turning the paper into a daily, but the editor-in-chief ended such talk with a dose of reality. The average circulation during the first half of 1912 was 57,942. In mid-November 1912 the paper had a circulation of 60,000 but only

6,000 subscribers. Other costs associated with earlier arrests, trials, the need to hire replacements for incarcerated journalists during the years 1910–1911, and the anarchist sabotage of a *tournée* by Montéhus in 1912 made expansion of the paper impossible.[98]

"To launch a newspaper, you first have to find the money." The origins of funding can tell a lot about a newspaper's political orientation, but complex and self-interested motives often tell us more than ideology. Though funding may not determine an editorial line, it can certainly encourage it. Still, Gilles Heuré also argues that "the types of financing by the extreme Left do not obey the same rules as those of the mass press, which, with its financial reports and advertizing, handles considerable sums of money." Hervé was well aware that money brought influence, but he did not want *La Guerre Sociale* accused of bending its views to meet its financial needs. Someone like Péguy, who was constantly concerned with funding his *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, could not suffer those who hypocritically acted as if money did not concern them. In late 1907, responding to charges by Hervé and others concerning a recent trip to Switzerland, Jaurès explained that he was not running away from a budget battle or selling out to Swiss bankers, but was simply fulfilling his commitment and helping *L'Humanité* meet its expenses. He informed the Insurrectional leader that it was difficult to ask workers to worry about *L'Humanité* if those who worked on it were not giving their best efforts to keep the paper going. Though Hervé remained a perpetual critic of Jaurès at least until 1912, he was far from naïve concerning the problems and dangers of keeping a newspaper out of the red.[99] Anarchist Jean Grave, while admitting that the revolutionary press only survived by means of "perpetual begging", also reported that of all the revolutionary newspapers, *La Guerre Sociale* was the most likely to cover its expenses.[100]

La Guerre Sociale was the voice of the Insurrectionals who had a mission to organize the extreme Left for revolutionary action against war and for revolution, but the newspaper was also a journalistic enterprise with the usual problems of the press as well as the inevitable legal battles associated with its subversive mission. Besides editorial meetings, proofreading, correcting the final galleys, and editing, the paper had delays due to periodic imprisonments and the glitches associated with the replacement teams of managers and editors which were periodically necessary. Like other newspapers, *La Guerre Sociale* had a schedule to keep in order to meet its Wednesday morning deliveries to the kiosks of Paris and provincial train stations. Around five o'clock on most evenings, the artisans and writers were at their posts. Every Tuesday by six o'clock in the evening Hervé was going over the final copy. Trips to the nearby Café du Croissant generally involved continuing

work and exchanging information. "The periodicity of a weekly seemed the most adapted for an organ of combat and granted a certain flexibility to its editors, who could travel to provincial meetings and deliver the message. Even from prison the journalists succeeded in putting together a weekly."[101]

A former Prefect of Police under the July Monarchy named Alexandre François Vivien wrote: "Seditionaries hatch their plots in the shadow, so the government has to follow them in the shadow, to spy on what they were concocting, to discover their plans ... To penetrate within the parties, it is essential that secret agents should intervene."[102] Throughout most of the existence of Hervéism, the Prefect of Police was the charismatic, energetic, and, from an official perspective, largely effective Louis Lépine who felt that public meetings were poor sources of subversive information and generally a waste of time for police agents.[103] However, that belief does not seem to have curtailed his police agents and *mouchards* from tracking Parisian antimilitarists. In 1911 the police described Hervé by as "a revolutionary devoured by activity ... who wished to move quickly" and who was at the center of a vast conspiracy including insurrectional socialists, syndicalists from the C.G.T. and the anarchists.[104] One wonders what Lépine thought as he perused *La Guerre Sociale*'s promotion of conspiratorial organizations and actions while his police agents infiltrated, shadowed, spied on, and occasionally incited Hervé and his associates.

There were two main reasons why the police proved to be so interested in *La Guerre Sociale* according to Gilles Heuré. It was a very successful and openly revolutionary weekly. It was also, like many of the anarchist and syndicalist newspapers of the political avant-garde, a point of passage for all political militants. "A center of revolutionary antimilitarism from 1906–1911, an agency for sabotage during the troubled months of 1910–1911, a recruitment center for the *Jeunes Gardes* in the years 1911–1912, it was the platform around which orbited many people with multiple motivations, interest, and abilities."[105] L.-O. Frossard recognized how "the success of the paper was not hurt by repression, on the contrary. Its clientèle of anarchists, syndicalists, revolutionary socialists, and the just plain curious were attracted by the pandemonium that it provoked, enriching itself with new readers with each condemnation of the editor-in-chief. The bar of the *Cour d'Assises* was Hervé's tribune—a resounding tribune, which assured him a vast audience."[106] Just visiting the offices of the incendiary newspaper could get the attention of the police as an accountant named Maroche Rigobert found out and was sent to an African battalion as a result.[107]

Hervé hoped that *La Guerre Sociale* could take advantage of the dissatisfaction that revolutionaries felt due to their dispersion in separate organizations. "In 1906

Hervé was convinced that he would find militants in the ranks of all revolutionary organizations ready to regroup around his paper. Anarchists, revolutionary syndicalists, and insurrectional socialists were militants separated by many doctrinal disputes but who agreed on common tactics for daily combat."[108] Hervé believed that the Jaurèsist leadership of the S.F.I.O. could not be superseded by efforts solely within the party. So he founded *La Guerre Sociale* on the margin of the party yet not separated from it. In 1906 he did not want to leave the S.F.I.O., he just hoped to end its reformism. To do this he counted on the support of the Socialist Federations of the Yonne and the Seine, especially those sections of the Seine dominated by former Blanquists and Allemanists such as the 13th, 15th, 19th, and 20th *arrondissements*.[109] If Jaurès's newspaper was a gathering place for the *agrégés*, Hervé's weekly was a temporary stop for the denizens of prison. Countless prosecutions, years in prison, and substantial fines were the expected rewards for those who worked at *La Guerre Sociale*. "Two years after its launching, the weekly would be able to boast that it had garnered thirteen prosecutions, nineteen years of prison sentences, and more than 10,000 francs in fines."[110] "If … [*L'Humanité*] was the antechamber of the Palais-Bourbon, … [*La Guerre Sociale*] was more the office parlor of La Santé. It was scarcely possible to sign your name there without being, from one moment to the next, inscribed on the judicial register book. The total calculation of all the years in prison of all the editorial collaborators was thus presented as a mark of revolutionary excellence by the newspaper itself."[111]

Though Hervé's goal was to take advantage of the divisions within the C.G.T., his appeal to syndicalists was fraught with problems. He was able to find allies among revolutionary syndicalists who were troubled by the growth of syndicalist reformism and pure professionalism. If Hervé agreed with revolutionary syndicalists on the means of combat, he rejected syndicalist notions regarding C.G.T. self-sufficiency. From the very beginning of his political career, Hervé believed in the revolutionary potential of peasants, *petit-bourgeois* elements, artisans, intellectuals as well as workers, and this remained an element of potential discord with syndicalist revolutionaries. Another related source of conflict was the syndicalist distrust of socialism, a feeling shared by almost all anarchists.[112] One study of the C.G.T. noted that Hervé founded *La Guerre Sociale* the same year that syndicalism began to lose its revolutionary élan. Too weak organizationally to win massive strikes, the C.G.T. around 1906 began to concentrate on union building and administrative efficiency rather than revolutionary goals.[113] The history of *La Guerre Sociale* offers evidence that the goals and tactics of the C.G.T. were much disputed among syndicalists. The revolutionary rhetoric of the C.G.T., which often matched that of *La Guerre Sociale*, gave Hervéism the illusion more than the reality of growth and influence.

The chief aim of *La Guerre Sociale* was to unite the diverse and divided revolutionary forces of France in organizations based on a common program under a single leadership. Hervé was convinced that the revolutionary Left shared common assumptions which could provide the basis of unity and action. This stress on unity for action minimized theoretical differences. That characteristic already set Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* apart. The basis of Hervéism entailed the suppression of most theoretical questions hitherto deemed critical by most leftist militants. Criticism of the paper for its lack of theoretical analysis, then and now, must be seen as a failure to comprehend the stated *raison d'être* of the paper. Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale* were materializations of the idea that theoretical disputes perpetuated divisions which inevitably yielded inaction. A concentration on theory led to paralysis of action. If no revolution were possible without a basic minimum program of ideas and tactics, theorizing alone was suicidal. Anton Bruckère put the paper's *raison d'être* quite succinctly in the paper's sixth issue. "More than speeches, better than theories, action is educational. Men learn through action."[114] Of course, an emphasis on action over theory is itself a sort of theoretical assumption. Whatever the relationship between theory and practice, Hervéism did not fail because it minimized theoretical analysis. It failed because its stated objective, revolution, was virtually impossible in modern France since the vast majority was either satisfied with the status quo and/or non-revolutionary, and the state's forces of national security precluded a successful revolution under almost any conditions.

The vision of revolution as a catastrophic occurrence, a sudden overthrow of the existing order by an elite of militants guiding a mass of the disgruntled, was archaic and anachronistic in modern France. The myth of revolution was perhaps the greatest hindrance to those groups in France which wanted progressive reform. Hervéism was certainly a logical embodiment of the French tradition of revolution, however archaic it had become. In 1906 much of the French Left claimed to believe in catastrophic revolution. Their actions, however, belied that picture. Hervéism did not fail solely because of the fundamental dichotomy of reform versus revolution. That dichotomy cut all across a Left that was already divided organizationally. Most of the elements in Hervé's proposed coalition were part of organizations or groups which included both reformists and revolutionaries. So it should have been possible for Hervé to attract revolutionaries and activists from separate or competitive organizations, but that did not occur. The greater Hervé's influence seemed to grow, the more the organizations that he looked to for support, the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., and the various anarchist attempts at organization,[115] seemed to coalesce anew in a kind of "organizational defense" to protect their autonomy, separate existences, and self-identities. In 1906 Hervé

won over many in the A.I.A. because *La Guerre Sociale* included many of the chief militants of the A.I.A.[116] When Hervé sought to attract elements from the larger socialist and syndicalist organizations or the more specialized anarchist groups, he met with failure. His anachronistic and archaic ideas of revolution were not the only reasons that he failed to attract support. Most militants on the extreme Left, at least superficially, shared in that tradition of romantic revolution. Hervéism may have been rejected by many, in part, because its activism and revolutionary rhetoric unmasked leftist self-deceptions which could have been more calculated than those of Insurrectionalism. The failure of Hervéism could well be tied to trends toward what was once described as oligarchy and inertia in modern organizations and bureaucracies like the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T.[117]

At the end of 1907 there were still indications that *La Guerre Sociale* had not yet succeeded in gaining much financial security because there was no money then for an extra 2000 issues according to the police. Apparently the paper could not get credit from any publishers.[118] In 1908 the police reported that *La Guerre Sociale* had an office at 121, Rue de Montmartre, so it was located in the heart of the newspaper district of Paris. In 1908 the paper had a circulation of 28,000 and would rapidly attain a circulation of 50,000 copies. Circulation would attain an average of at least 50,000 by 1911. By late 1910 sales averaged 33,000, circulation averaged 55,000, and it once reached 130,000. The paper had a circulation of 75,000 and 67,000 in October and November 1917 as the war proved to be a temporary godsend for the increasingly chauvinistic former *Sans Patrie*.[119] The paper would have six different office locations near the newspaper district before it became *La Victoire* in early 1916.[120] Hervé's initial shift in views coincided with many signs of the paper's material success. In late 1910 and early 1911 expensive expanded editions appeared, which the paper claimed it could not afford, yet it moved into luxurious new offices which the police claimed made their observations more difficult. The police were interested in newspaper offices for purposes of surveillance, potential perquisitions, and assessments of a paper's financial capacity. The police also assumed that newspapers like *La Guerre Sociale* were agencies of desertion. In January 1911 the police discovered a secret stairway at the new offices on the Rue Saint Joseph which only added to their convictions about Hervéist plots and secret machinations.[121] Of course, surveillance and perquisitions added to the revolutionary credentials of Hervé and his band.

La Guerre Sociale had the knack of arousing its readers through sensational stories, astonishing them by means of provocative headlines, and amusing them through its complicit vocabulary. According to police reports of October and November 1910, the Railway Strike of 1910 led to the paper's greatest increase

in circulation up to that time. Despite circulation growth in 1910 and 1911, a decline occurred from mid-1912 into 1913 along with increasingly negative reactions to Hervé's *rectification.*[122] The paper was quite successful until 1912, but it became overextended by the end of 1912, and Hervé soon had to cut all salaries. Rivalry with a new syndicalist daily, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, began in April 1911, and this affected Hervé's shift.[123] Problems between the Hervéists and the C.G.T. were symptomatic of far more general problems associated with the "crisis in syndicalism" that had been brewing at least since late 1908. Even though *La Guerre Sociale* had many syndicalist supporters and writers, a split was probably inevitable for many reasons including ideological differences, personality conflicts, journalistic competition, and organizational rivalries. It is easy to document Hervé's obsession with leftist infighting long before his transformation; he blamed malevolent rivals, including press competitors, for the failure of Hervéism.

The paper's principal methods of distribution were subscriptions, the Hachette press distribution service covering Paris and the provinces, sales at kiosks and train stations, and street hawkers. Provocative headlines were especially crucial in enabling hawkers to entice passersby to purchase *La Guerre Sociale*. Heuré recognized how difficult it was to know the paper's precise geographic distribution, but he thought there were available clues. During his provincial conferences, Hervé brought copies of the paper to sell. The police kept an eye on him and his staff wherever they went, so their records can help establish the paper's influence. The paper itself published reports of local meetings by affiliated groups and included information about its many contacts in Paris and the provinces. There was undoubtedly a multiplier effect at work in the influence of the paper since a single copy could be passed around at cafés, meetings, and the homes of militants. The paper "was not intended for the solitary reader. Reading was done in locations where revolutionaries socialized."[124] Militants were urged to get legal authorization to sell the paper outside shops, businesses, and factories as well as on major thoroughfares. In the absence of seeing a copy of the paper itself, its message could be picked up indirectly in the speeches by its staff and the many reports by the rest of the Parisian press. The paper was sometimes nailed onto telegraph poles as a signal of sympathy with the paper's overt support of sabotage. With varying motivations *La Guerre Sociale* and the rest of the press reported such incidents.

The paper had greater circulation in some departments more than others. Besides the Seine and the Yonne, the paper made major inroads in the departments of Aisne, Ardennes, Allier, Haute-Garonne, Hérault, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, and Alpes-Maritimes. It was also distributed in English, German, Spanish, Swiss, and Italian socialist circles.[125] One could purchase the paper in most large

French cities, in some rural areas, and in the French districts of many major European cities. Readers also sent information about the progress of Insurrectionalism in their own regions. There was a regular rubric that listed meetings by revolutionary groups from all over France. The paper was available in many train stations throughout France at least until the 1910 railway strike. The paper asked militants to pass used issues to as many of their friends as possible, and it solicited the names of potential subscribers.[126]

The form and style of *La Guerre Sociale* established a sort of complicity between the paper and its readers. Each week readers could easily find their favorite articles and familiar formulas. The paper seldom failed to deliver the propaganda expected by its readers, a propaganda based on events and lessons which fit the paper's perspective. *La Guerre Sociale* was not as dependent on the same sensational events, gossip, or coarse stories as were other papers because its articles often described scandalous events created by the Hervéists themselves. As a newspaper of revolutionary activism, which sought to unite the diverse elements of the extreme Left, *La Guerre Sociale* often organized meetings and demonstrations, created groups and organizations, printed brochures and tracts, and formulated policies and programs which became titillating topics for its own stories. The paper's readers frequently became participants in "events" sponsored by the paper. The same "pseudo-events" later were reported back to the reader-participants. The economic worries of ordinary people could always be used by the paper to attack Russian loans, colonial ventures, or French arms deals. Readers' disgust with Parliament was a simple, never-miss propaganda tool.[127]

Hervé and his staff often created or adopted short striking epithets for certain well-known Frenchmen as well as their ideas, publications, or organizations. Such formula phrases were not only easily recognizable, they also fit Hervé's restricted ideological perspective. The perpetual minister and former proponent of the general strike, Aristide Briand, received harsh treatment especially after he drafted the railway workers to end their strike in 1910. In *La Guerre Sociale* Briand became *Briand-la-jaune*, *Briand-la-jaunisse*, *Le Jaune* ((for the yellow unions controlled by the owners through "scab" workers), *Briand-la-Gaffe*, *Briand-le-Rénégat*, and *Le Rénégat* (for his dramatic shift in views), or *La Fripouille* (The Rascal). Joseph Caillaux, the President du Conseil at the time of a bloody repression of the demonstration near La Santé on July 14, 1911, became *Caillaux-de-sang* (a pun on caillot-de-sang, a blood clot).[128] Louis Lépine, the Prefect of Police during nearly the entire epoch of Hervéism was called "*L'Empereur de Paris.*" *La Petite République*, one of the five great Parisian dailies, was often called *La Petite Répugnante*. *L'Humanité* was often called *Mère l'Oie* (Mother Goose). The *Camelots du*

Roi, the royalist newspaper hawkers, who became the paramilitary formation of *L'Action Française*, were called the *camelote* (cheap inferior merchandise). When the Deputies gave themselves a raise in salary to 15,000 francs per year in late November 1906, they were labeled as "*les députés à quinze mille francs*" or "the deputies who make fifteen thousand francs a year." This evolved to become *Les Quinze Mille* and *Les Q.M.* The Radicals became *la radicaille*, a combination of radical and *racaille*—rabble, riffraff, or scum. If Hervé did not originate all of these epithets, he helped to make them standard expressions for other journalists. To keep his articles interesting Hervé introduced dialogue, drama, and bitter irony. The result was a variety of expression that was seldom dull.[129] Yet Hervé's tone often reached incredible levels of pomposity and apparent egomania so that many of his articles in *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Victoire* appear to have been the work of a bitter, rejected, would-be authority. His editorials often seemed to assume that he alone possessed the remedies for French problems. He was easily ridiculed for that trait even before the war.

Peyronnet characterized the uniqueness of *La Guerre Sociale* as the art of seizing an ordinary event, magnifying it, and leading a campaign around it by using violent headlines, provocative articles, and extreme language. In aiming at ordinary workers and in seeking to avoid doctrinal analysis, *La Guerre Sociale* used concrete examples taken from daily events which illustrated its key themes and tactics. For Hervé and his team appropriate *faits divers* could both entertain readers and promote revolutionary consciousness and actions. The paper was characterized by boisterous, violent rhetoric which had commercial as well as political benefits. The paper used rhetorical excess to create sensation, hence, circulation. The desire to be close to daily events and the need to avoid theoretical discussions gave *La Guerre Sociale* a unique style which was the paper's chief attraction according to Peyronnet. *La Guerre Sociale* aimed to be an *organe de combat* and not a paper of news items. One of the main reasons for the success of the paper was the mode of presentation itself: *La Guerre Sociale* was easy to read. For the eight years of its existence as a weekly or *hebdomadaire*, the format, the typesetting, and the quality of paper had few important alterations. That stability enabled readers to identify with the paper more easily. *La Guerre Sociale* succeeded in conserving a personality and style, yet it avoided monotony in presentation. Its articles were generally short. When serious discussion was necessary, the paper created a continuing series of articles in consecutive issues or multiple articles on a single topic in the same issue. Regular rubrics by the same authors usually appeared in the same locations in each issue. As new journalists joined *La Guerre Sociale*, their articles also came to occupy definite locations.[130]

For Peyronnet, "… the great revolutionary themes only took on real life in *La Guerre Sociale* in liaison with daily events."[131] In order to attract ordinary people and to unite militants with diverse ideas, the paper drew lessons from concrete, daily events and tried to eschew doctrinal exposés. Peyronnet believed that the paper was largely incapable of launching press campaigns for abstract ideas. Almost all its major campaigns came alive only when they were incarnated in individuals, many of whom were unknown until *La Guerre Sociale* began to focus attention on them for its own purposes.[132] Since it never found a suitable case or event to illustrate the evils done by the French housing industry and property magnates, it was never able to launch a major campaign over such abuses. A similar problem was the cost of living. According to Peyronnet such issues were extensively covered in the revolutionary press but not in *La Guerre Sociale*.[133]

> "To become the powerful newspaper of revolutionary combat that it wished to be, *La Guerre Sociale* had to surpass itself. It was only able to do this in making use of whatever was extraordinary and unusual. These exceptional events or items were found in the great scandals and in the major chance events of the working class movement which *La Guerre Sociale* was so prompt to utilize. It was only then, having chosen and sometimes amplified these events, that it led the most detailed, complete, and well-made campaigns over them."[134]

La Guerre Sociale also developed campaigns around more predictable and mundane yearly events. These campaigns were of two general kinds. One corresponded to the great annual events in the lives of French workers such as the Anniversary of the Commune, May Day, and Bastille Day. The other covered ordinary, often recurring, events in the working class movement. These events included the departures of the new classes of conscripts and the annual congresses of the S.F.I.O., the *Fédération de la Seine*, the C.G.T., and the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, as well as the periodic gatherings of the the Second International. The paper also covered various congresses of less-well-known groups including anarchists, antimilitarists, *Espérantistes*, or neo-Malthusians. Of course, each issue reported on as many irregular meetings and demonstrations as possible, especially involving groups sponsored by, affiliated with, or recruited by the Hervéists.[135]

The paper rarely gave an objective, critical analysis of the Commune or the French Revolution, even though it hoped to guard against smug admiration for France's revolutionary tradition. The aim of *La Guerre Sociale* was to use these yearly commemorative events to point out past errors in order to avoid future failures. A commemoration of the Commune would stress the absence of organization, the lack of audacity, and the poor preparation in 1871. *La Guerre Sociale* used events didactically. The great revolutionary events were employed to justify

current ideas and tactics, but as the paper evolved, it found different lessons from the French Revolutionary tradition.[136] The lessons of the past all too easily fit the needs of the moment.

Hervé did not want the commemoration of past revolutionary events to become substitutes for revolution in the present. Yet the rhetoric and antics of *La Guerre Sociale* often appeared to be substitutes for revolution rather than a means to bring it about. Rhetorical violence, non-lethal sabotage, mass demonstrations, meetings of *insurrectionels*, street maneuvers of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, sensational disclosures by the *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire*,[137] and perpetual prison martyrdoms became a kind of "revolutionary theater" that made the revolution immediately less important than the militants' antics and postures themselves. These men may have been sincere leftist idealists, but they often appeared to be Bohemians who sometimes turned politics into "dada." At what point did it become obvious that revolutionary rhetoric and sensational antics enhanced newspaper circulation much more than they sought to instigate revolution?

Renato Poggioli, in his classic 1962 study of the avant-garde, was careful to distinguish the artistic from the political avant-gardes, but there are elements in Hervéism that clearly fit Poggioli's description of the cultural avant-garde.[138] Hervé seems to have had little modern aesthetic sensibility, though Almereyda and Méric did frequent the haunts of cultural Bohemia.[139] Unsurprisingly, the cartoonists who contributed to *La Guerre Sociale*, however revolutionary their politics, were aesthetically traditional in their drawings. Were the Hervéists perhaps typical of the indifference or skepticism felt by most political activists when they first confronted modern art? Yet a closer look at the activities, lifestyles, and political style of the journalists at *La Guerre Sociale* betrays attitudes closer to the cultural avant-garde than to socialist or syndicalist bureaucrats. Undoubtedly, with its ties to anarchism, *La Guerre Sociale* attracted people with qualities of spontaneity, nonconformism, and individualism which were less prominent on the leftist newspapers affiliated with large organizations. The Hervéist journalists displayed a playfulness and even a childishness beyond that found in most anarchist publications probably because the Hervéists avoided most "sterile ideological debates." The mixture of humor and childishness on *La Guerre Sociale* at times made Hervéism seem like the politics of farce not force or violence. Bloody riots and violent threats must be juxtaposed with the image of the myopic leader of French antimilitarism in his military tunic jokingly called "the General" by his followers. Perhaps it was only the police who took seriously a "Prefect of Police of the Revolution" who created the pseudonym Almereyda at age 17 from the words "*y a de la merde* (there is shit)". *La Guerre Sociale* could even joke about assassinations!

In 1909 the paper ran the headline "*Attention-Doit-on le tuer?* (Attention! Should we kill him?)" The readers and the police were expected to react as the Hervéist journalists gleefully asked readers to name the person most deserving of assassination. In the wake of Courrières, Draveil, and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, everyone assumed that *La Guerre Sociale* was referring to Clemenceau. Several weeks went by before the paper revealed that it was Moulay Hafid, the Sultan of Morocco from 1908 until 1912, who truly merited assassination, apparently because he had asked for French military support to put down a popular revolt.[140]

La Guerre Sociale was a political newspaper with serious and often dull political concerns, yet the childishness, the humor, and the surreal, characteristics which Roger Shattuck associated with the Parisian avant-garde in *The Banquet Years*, can be found in many of the writings and the activities of the staff at *La Guerre Sociale*. At first glance there was nothing ambiguous about Hervé or his staff of zealots. Yet a career such as Hervé's, which sought revolution and utopia by way of sensationalism and commercialism, which called for an end to war by means of violence—however rhetorical, which began with *La Guerre Sociale* and ended with *La Victoire*, and which eventually exchanged class struggle for class solidarity, was bound to evince ambiguous and equivocal meanings, another of Shattuck's characteristics of the cultural avant-garde.[141] Poggioli's categories of activism, antagonism, agonism, and nihilism helped him to explain the cultural avant-gardes, but such traits may well characterize extremists of all varieties.[142] Hervé's self-accepted role as martyr, his attacks on abuses, his iconoclastic habits, and his need to shock seem a composite of traits exemplifying the avant-garde in general. In the artistic avant-garde, as in a political avant-garde like Hervéism, the medium could become the message, the movement might be all there was to the revolution. Sensational activism to promote revolution could easily become sensationalism for its own sake. Some syndicalist leaders and many anarchists sensed that Hervéism was revolutionary theater as much as anything. If the police were generally not quite so perceptive, perhaps that was because they needed Hervéism more than they feared it, simply to sell themselves.

6

Journalists and Prisoners

Hervé and the Staff at La Guerre Sociale

To account for the success of *La Guerre Sociale*, many observers noted that it was better written than most other *feuilles de militants* or *journaux de combat*. Even the French police thought that *La Guerre Sociale* became a rapid success. Five years after its beginnings police authorities concluded that "the fashion in which its articles were drafted, the resounding trials before the Assizes, and finally just the name Hervé [had brought] numerous readers to the newspaper."[1] One explanation for the paper's success was its staff, who were generally professional journalists as well as revolutionary activists. Skilled journalists could appeal more easily to popular interests, especially since they also tried to avoid sterile doctrinal disputes. Initially, this may have helped attract diverse revolutionary elements, even if it was unsuccessful in the long run.[2]

Hervé's contemporaries did not fail to note the talent and verve found on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale*. For Jean Grave, "the tone that it used and especially the orders that it distributed made many activists consider it 'the paper of their dreams.'"[3] Even his enemies found things to admire about Hervé's journalism. A harsh critic like Péguy recognized that he was a great journalist.[4] L.-O. Frossard profoundly disagreed with him through all his changes, but he acknowledged Hervé's ability to create a ruckus in *La Guerre Sociale* after the turn of the century.

> "This weekly, a bit like cheap wine, which respects nothing and no one, had an enormous success within the milieu of extreme left. Moreover, Hervé was a journalist of the highest

> order, clear, direct, concrete. He wrote in a firm and rapid style using incisive words. Each week the attention of the public was drawn to this 'Outsider' who never got tired of striking major, furious blows against the established order. Legal actions and trials rained down on him. Every three or four months, Hervé went to the *Cour d'Assises*, where he spread his message and gathered everyone's attention."[5]

Hervé's style was "undeniable and effective" in the view of Gilles Heuré. "It was necessary to take the reader by the throat, control him, interpellate him, astonish him with attractive headlines, shock him by an aggressive tone that he would not find elsewhere in the left-wing press, indeed, intimidate him."[6] At times his emotional appeals and vivid images attained the poetic. If his feelings were generally close to the surface, this quality was translated to his journalism, yet his seismic reactions to events often created an impression of inconsistency. An event often elicited a full range of emotions and responses by Hervé as he reported over a course of days, weeks, and months. However, this volatility in reportage had causes other than his personality. Journalism by nature is bound to be somewhat evanescent, and Hervé's mercurial method as an insurrectional socialist was always at the service of his goal to concentrate all the revolutionary forces, with him presumably as the leader. He could thus use the same event in a variety of ways. Hervé might praise, exhort, pacify, or assail various groups or individuals whenever that seemed appropriate to him. The treatment of other militants by *La Guerre Sociale* mutated depending on how closely they mirrored Hervé's tactical requirements.[7]

The era's journalism was characterized by a ranting style and a rude tone in dealing with current events but it generally did not exceed legal limits.[8] Herve's editorials fit that epoch but he was seldom reticent to push its limits. The journalistic style of *Le Sans Patrie* relied on excess and exaggeration to startle and provoke readers. Such intemperance had multiple purposes. His shocking language and largely rhetorical calls for violence certainly promoted both the circulation figures for *La Guerre Sociale* and his program of insurrectionalism. For Gilles Heuré, Hervé's style served his propaganda. His articles transferred his speeches to print, and thus they amounted to polemical harangues. He expected his writing to translate and echo verbal discussions, thus creating an emotional proximity which is a key goal of journalism because it unites readers with their newspapers. "Herve's written style was not only a means of expressing himself, but also [a way] to capture the reader ideologically and commercially." To read the paper was to advocate a form of engagement. The paper "had as a function less to promote thinking than to incite action. 'La GS addressed itself less [to revolutionary militants] than to the great mass of the exploited for whom it aimed to fashion

the mentality, to direct the judgment, to develop, in a word, their insurrectional spirit.'" He "never had an inordinate respect for his readers, and only rarely did he even make an allusion to them." But after crosschecking his articles, one can uncover many references to "the vile and ignorant masses." He certainly did not make many demands on his readers; rather, he took them as they were. Instead of guiding his readers in a subtle and didactic fashion, he jostled and amused them. He might address his *bons bougres* (good chaps) with familiar commands and forms of address such as: "*Je te crois Benoît*" or "*Erreur mon Empereur.*"[9] He often accomplished his goals through simplicity of expression and concrete images, generally rejecting political-economic jargon. By turning an ordinary worker named Émile Dulac into his proofreader, Hervé tried to ascertain whether his articles would be clear to everyone! Such a style was certainly popular, yet Jean-Claude Peyronnet did not believe it was demagogic since Hervé generally avoided argot and coarse language.[10] That criterion alone may not prove an absence of demagoguery. Péguy, with his *Cahiers* perpetually in financial straits, thought Hervé's violence in *La Guerre Sociale* was both commercial and demagogic.[11] However we describe his appeal, one thing ought not to be forgotten: Hervé almost always had a habit of writing what he believed to be the truth no matter what the responses of the "masses" or his militant rivals. If catering to one's audience is mandatory for newspapers, that was seldom the primary concern for Hervé, who was willing to risk the loss of readers in order to promote what he thought to be a necessary policy: his famous shift being the most obvious example.

Hervé was certainly an activist revolutionary, but he also possessed a bourgeois work ethic. He generally operated simultaneously in many arenas, modes, and forms: teaching, organizing, speaking, practicing law, serving prison sentences, taking on the mantle of the martyr, and writing speeches, brochures, histories, political tracts, and newspapers articles. However, Gilles Heuré quite appropriately stressed that it was as a journalist that Hervé "achieved an indisputable notoriety, delivered his warning shots, rose up in revolt, and threatened." He was never reticent about going up against the great Parisian dailies, even though he admired their effectiveness and mass readership. He certainly knew how to use them, especially when he was on trial.

> [The mass dailies] "… saw in him, moreover, an occasionally juicy and useful collaborator. Juicy because Hervé, when he was interviewed, knew that it was necessary to have the correct proportions of insolence and polemics to make reading enticing. And useful, especially for *Le Matin*, since the diatribes of the *enfant terrible* of the Socialist Party, who knew, if need be, to expose Jaurès and *L'Humanité*, on the one hand, indicating the eclecticism of the socialist clan and, on the other, illustrating the revolutionary and

> insurrectional monstrosity likely to cause readers to tremble. Bunau-Varilla's newspaper, always lying in wait for whatever could astonish or scandalize its readers, did not hesitate, in these years of social and political violence, to produce, with disgust and delight, some politically pathogenic case like Hervé."[12]

The polemical journalist and the incendiary speaker were complementary; both roles enhanced Hervé's reputation within the extreme Left. Going back to his days in Yonne when he wrote for *Le Travailleur Socialiste*, the speeches that this "traveling salesman of socialism" delivered at meetings then became subjects of reports in the newspaper. Later, Hervé's position as a fiery polemicist who wrote weekly articles in his own revolutionary newspaper made him that much more effective as a propagandistic speaker at conferences all over France. What he had done largely in the Yonne before 1906, he did throughout the nation after *La Guerre Sociale* was created. Gilles Heuré counted over 200 conferences in Paris and the provinces between 1905 and the war. The paper and his prison terms simply reinforced his presence and notoriety. The journalist, the prisoner, and the conference speaker became one synergetic dynamo of revolutionary propaganda, which combined outrageous theatrics with serious and sincere arguments. At the invitation of antimilitarist, syndicalist, and socialist groups he crossed the country delivering speeches. Heuré described Hervé's appeal with words like "intimacy", "seduction", "envelop", "sincerity", "genuine", "subtlety", and "sensitive". The editor-in-chief of *La Guerre Sociale* was able to "take the pulse" and convince his audience through his ability "to divine the expressions or the arguments to which they were sensitive" using a range of "talents which gave the orator" the capacity to confront large audiences.[13]

He was what Hubert-Rouger once called one of the *missi dominici* of socialism, who spread the socialist message by penetrating every milieu across the country. Others included Paul Lafargue, Édouard Vaillant, Jules Guesde, and certainly Jean Jaurès. Such orators played important roles presenting socialist ideas through their charisma and their imposing presence. Each one had his own oratorical style and unique personality. If Hervé did not possess Guesde's talent for metallic paralyzing phrases, or Briand's indefinable charm and artistry, or Jaurès's incomparable verbal and intellectual skills, Hervé was always the fearless and fiery battler, albeit a warrior given to mocking irony, who provoked hilarity and displayed a perpetual smile.[14]

> "You did not wait for pauses from him which led to reflection, but detonations which pinned you to your seat. The meeting hall was not breathless due to his irrefutable demonstrations but startled, stunned, dumbfounded, or delighted, from the coarseness

> of a man without a country and without pity. No surprise on that score: Hervé spoke like he wrote. Country or church, governing republicans or parliamentary socialists, the language of unified socialists or military rhythms, bigots or doctrinal sextons, you knew he was going to destroy or admonish, demolish or ridicule in a juicy game of massacre. The fierceness he was able to display in ripping a precious idea to shreds was expected. The Hervé who spoke, was same Hervé who fulfilled his role as an insurrectional: you did not expect him to waddle in hesitations but to tear into the subject of the day. As an orator he was no hostage to convention. And when he spoke to his listeners, he could almost utter the aphorism of Jules Renard: 'Tolerate my intolerance.'"[15]

Though he did not lack oratorical skills, *Le Petit Méridional*, after a meeting at Beaucaire on August 10, 1905, stressed his "unpleasant fashion of reducing the debate, of seeking to produce effects through trivial expressions and images." The police commented on something similar in September 1907 when they described his conferences in the following manner. "It's always the habitual speech: the same demonstration made in the same terms, and the same phrases looking for effects." But Hervé was not simply a showman playing to the crowds. He could not have been so much in demand if he did not respond to definite currents of antimilitarism and real desires for revolution. "The violence that he expressed was a form of courage that inspired those who heard it. The moderation which sometimes tempered his speeches could still be interpreted as a necessary concession to rationality. The violence of his speech reinforced the hostile and delighted the faithful. His most violent passages were often applauded the most." Yet he could be grave when the occasion demanded it, and sometimes he was so moderate that his audiences were disappointed with his performance.[16]

Robert Manévy thought that Hervé's clarity of style, his simplicity in reasoning, and his scorn of conventions created worshipping followers.[17] He was an instinctive editorialist who sought to jar his readers to appeal to their emotions. He could alternate empathy with anger, contempt, and ridicule, sympathizing with proletarian victims of injustice and in the next breath assailing and mocking Clemenceau-de-Limoges, de Raon-l'Étape, de Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, de Casablanca (tying him to sites of police and military violence), "Briand-la-jaune", "Caillaux-de-sang", or "la bête rouge de Saint-Petersbourg" (for Nicholas II). His witticisms, his barely metaphorical slaps at socialist luminaries, and his hilarious insolences were directed at the curiosity rather than the critical sense of his readers. His editorials eschewed detailed, complex, and arduous analysis, employing instead language that hit readers in the gut and affected them emotionally. By taking account of the composite character of his readers, their varying opinions, and their diverse levels of involvement, Hervé did not assume their coherence

or docility. "Everyone could encounter their doubts, find confirmation of their ideas, or savor an assessment over the general climate. Thus, Hervé in a headline that would be celebrated a half-century later, observed that: 'France is bored' to indicate a country gripped by a 'general malaise.'"[18]

Historian Jacques Julliard was no great admirer of either Hervé or *La Guerre Sociale*, yet the expert on French revolutionary syndicalism called Hervé a:

> "brilliant journalist, gifted with an innate sense of formulas and words which created shocks. He raised verbal provocation to the loftiness of an astonishingly new publicity procedure during an epoch when the workers' and socialist press sorely lacked brilliance. Hervé even fascinated his adversaries by his devastating anti-conformism … Adding to his originality, he did not seek to justify his past positions at any price nor to affirm the continuity of his actions, despite all the evidence, as is the rule with politicians. Attracting attention himself to his errors, glorifying in his recantations, he was, through them, all the more comfortable in denouncing the moderation and hypocrisy of his adversaries … and of his friends."[19]

Another historian, far from reticent in her critiques of Insurrectionalism, was Madeleine Rebérioux. Yet she described *La Guerre Sociale* as "a new type of paper, an admirable militant newspaper, [that was] lively, interesting, and often well-informed."[20] Rebérioux credited *La Guerre Sociale* with developing the practical imagination of socialism while Hubert Lagardelle's *Le Mouvement Socialiste* developed the theoretical side.

> "Drafted in a biting fashion, soon printing 50,000 copies, Hervé's newspaper became the organ of the 'Insurrectionals', which joined militants who had given their trust at the beginning of the century to the revolutionary flame of Guesdism. To the insolent phrase and the denunciation of compromise, they added the street brawl, [and] intervention in strikes. Desirous of not ceding to any pressure, the C.G.T. kept its distance after Villeneuve-Saint-Georges."[21]

Jean-Jacques Becker stressed that Hervé was, "above all, a journalist … with a brilliant, lush pen, in many ways one of the originators of a modern press, who began to separate himself from traditional dullness. Using a clear style, keen on employing simple arguments, he eliminated all difficult words." His newspaper was characterized by a "strong, combative mood …, inventions of all sorts, verbal in particular, [which] explain why many years later, the reader—even a professional—of *La Guerre Sociale* could be won over by his reading, perhaps even if it meant an increase of its influence."[22] For Pierre Albert, writing in *L'Histoire générale de la presse française*, Hervé's newspaper possessed a rather uncertain doctrine, "but whose style and violence earned it a rather large popular audience since it printed

50,000 copies. Hervé stood at the margins of the S.F.I.O. and he dreamed of creating a more authentically revolutionary party around his newspaper."[23]

However, one of Herve's lifelong friends from his school days in Brest, Émile Masson, writing under the pseudonym Brenn in an early issue of *La Guerre Sociale*, detected a contradictory element at the paper and perhaps in the character of its editor, which few contemporaries or more recent scholars stressed. The Breton anarchist Masson contrasted what he thought were two kinds of political temperaments: (1) an aristocratic or elitist temperament which was typical of anarchists and (2) a democratic temperament which was typical in French and German social democracy. For Masson, Hervé was aristocratic and therefore an elitist. He was a leader who was dominated neither by fear nor by the need for popularity. If someone like Hervé engaged in the prudent and deferential tactics so necessary to gain supporters, Masson implied that such a course could be both futile and potentially disastrous.[24]

The aims and makeup of the staff of the paper seemed to promote a vacillation which characterized Hervé's journalistic career. The Hervéist leader may have wanted to activate the unconvinced "masses", but Insurrectionalism all too easily became elitist. What happened to a staff of professional journalist-militants when the "masses" proved unable or unwilling to act except for "narrow material concerns"? Hervé and most of his team at *La Guerre Sociale* then assailed the "masses" with the same venom which they usually reserved for capitalist exploiters or ideological traitors. When the "masses" failed to act on Hervéist ideas, they were often labeled "sheep," "cowards," "ignorant," "weaklings," "flabby," and even "worthless". The *Sans Patrie* may have reproached other avant-garde papers for appealing to militants rather than to the mass of the exploited, but Hervé was quick to attack the exploited when they failed to follow him. This "elitist-mass appeal" conflict was not unique to Hervé, but it may have been more obvious in his editorials. It would characterize Hervé's other endeavors no matter what his ideological position.

Peyronnet was probably correct when he noted that the team of journalists at *La Guerre Sociale* played a much more essential role than did the staffs of other newspapers, even revolutionary ones. Their willingness to go to prison for their views must have been part of that uniqueness. Yet, trials and prison sentences were aspects of Hervéist dedication as well as self-advertisement and self-promotion. As a matter of fact, all of the original journalists experienced prison for their activities on *La Guerre Sociale*. Almereyda spent more time in prison than did Hervé, while Merle and Méric were almost always subject to government prosecutions. Trials and prison sentences were methods of martyrdom and sensation-seeking

devices which defined Hervéism and framed the journalistic style of *La Guerre Sociale*.[25] Prison was the crown of thorns for Hervé who by early 1912 had earned the epithet "*l'emmuré*" (the one who is walled in) from the staff at *La Guerre Sociale*. Prison proved his courage, heightened his status, promoted his cause, and made him virtually unassailable by his enemies on the Left. Prison was the price that had to be paid to change the world. And how different it was from seeking an office through elections. As a living martyr walled up in the Republic's most famous prisons, Hervé, prior to his shift, entered into the legends and myths of socialism, in the company of men like Blanqui, Bebel, and Liebknecht. Never aspiring for political office, he was "only a candidate for deportation."[26]

Well before he returned to the faith of his ancestors on the eve of the Popular Front, Hervé, the pre-war Insurrectional, not only took on the aura of a martyr, he consciously used religious imagery in speaking of "entering the monastery" whenever he went to prison.[27] He seldom failed to compare his mission to that of the apostles, but when he did many of his readers raised his status a notch or two by comparing him to Christ, the original martyr for His flock.[28] His equanimity about going to prison, coupled with his well-documented asceticism, his perpetual anecdotes about his family's missionary vocations, his frequent use of religious metaphors, and his recurrent allusions to martyrdom led some to describe Hervé's incarceration as a virtually monastic regimen.[29] Hubert-Rouger cogently summarized Hervé's situation following *L'Affiche Rouge* until his prison release in July 1912. "Gustave Hervé scarcely leaves the Maison Centrale of Clairvaux except to enter La Santé and La Concièrgerie prisons."[30]

Describing the poor conditions imposed on political prisoners at La Santé in 1906, Hervé wrote: "We were in our cells. Our meals were served in each cell and we could only exercise in a small courtyard about twice the size of this room. Now, there were 23 of us!" Then he made the following contrast: "During my other [later] visits, I must say, discipline was less severe. We had as company many strikers and the *camelots du roi*. Our meals, at that time, were served in a large common hall and we could see almost whomever we wished in the large prison parlor. On Sundays, this parlor even became the theater of a veritable gastronomical fair. Many baskets full of food and especially bottles passed over the threshold there."[31] Herve's temperament in prison was extraordinary because he was so at ease there. Quickly returning to a daily regimen and getting himself synchronized with the prison routine, Hervé made his individual cell his study. Using a board suspended by a rod as his desk and using the stool attached with a chain as his chair, he seemed almost at home. During one of his stays in prison, he took the opportunity to study German.[32] His solid nerves allowed him to escape

serious depression. Once his workday was done, the doors closed, and the lights off, Hervé fell asleep almost immediately on a plank bed with a mattress after shedding his clothes. Méric's account tells an important tale.

> "I have seen [Hervé] at La Santé, once night came, the moment the clerk put us under lock and key for the night, enter his cell and undress, taking off his clothes in the blink of an eye. He threw his jacket into the middle of the room; then his pants joined it; after which, there they go! the shoes. Ah! That was quickly done. And the 'general' fell into his bed, turned off the light. Two minutes later, he was snoring. He was a marvelous and methodical sleeper. Nothing was able to prevent him from sleeping. He explained it to us, smiling, that he had two drawers in his brain: the drawers full of dark worries and the drawer with rosy thoughts.
>
> —— 'Then, you understand, when I wish to sleep peacefully, I close the bad drawer and open the good.'
>
> The next morning, at the break of day, he rushes to his clothes, which are lying scattered on the floor, and slips inside them. Never a swipe with a brush. The collar of his jacket is covered with dust and dandruff. So much so that Almereyda nicknamed him on the side: Silvio Pelliculo."[33]

When Hervé was at La Santé, Clairvaux, or the Concièrgerie prisons, he almost never failed to send lead articles and secondary features to the paper. It was no secret that political prisoners received certain benefits from the penitentiary system in those days, one of which was to publish one's articles under a pseudonym, however transparent. While he was in prison, he was almost always able to publish his articles using his standard pseudonym, *Un Sans Patrie*.[34] On one occasion the *President du Conseil* tried to intimidate Hervé by way of the secretary of the Department of Prison Administration, who intimated to the prison director at La Santé that Hervé must stop his insolence. The director then told Hervé that he risked losing his status as a political prisoner and his Parisian location if he continued writing in *La Guerre Sociale*. The prisoner's response was still sufficiently disrespectful that the director moved Hervé to prevent all contact with other political prisoners and cancelled his access to newspapers. On several occasions, including the October 1910 Railway Strike, the official in charge also conducted perquisitions in his cell, which on that occasion revealed nothing more compromising than a supply of paper with a letter heading of *La Guerre Sociale*. A few days later, Hervé notified the prison director that *La Guerre Sociale* would continue to appear with a lead article signed *Un Sans Patrie*, whether he were kept in solitary confinement at La Santé or out in Clairvaux.[35]

"La Santé clearly appeared to be an annex of the editorial department of *La Guerre Sociale*, less comfortable but just as productive."[36] Whenever Merle was not in prison, it was his duty to visit Hervé daily at La Santé. Hervé had so many visitors at La Santé that it was relatively easy for him to communicate with the outside world.[37] When he was at Clairvaux prison in the Aube, the problems of communication increased immensely. During the 1910 Railway Strike, Almereyda and Merle were arrested just after Hervé, already in prison, was moved to the section of common criminals at La Santé. Since Louis Perceau was in hiding because he feared imminent arrest, Méric was virtually alone at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale*.[38] There were other times when most of the original journalists were in prison, in exile abroad, or in hiding in the Midi, in Belgium, or elsewhere. Generally, Hervé had prepared new teams ready to take over on such occasions. These new teams, guided by original staff members, either present or in prison, continued to publish *La Guerre Sociale* with little change in quality and almost no change in content. Prison may have limited Hervé's practical direction in some ways, but it seldom seemed to affect his authority.

Could Hervé actually direct *La Guerre Sociale* from prison? Gilles Heuré does not doubt that Hervé's general ideas held sway at the newspaper even while he was incarcerated. If Almereyda, Merle, and Méric happened to be out of prison then, they could take immediate control of the paper. They could not directly oppose the incarcerated Editor-in Chief, though they might "sometimes privilege information and campaigns" that Hervé did not direct. "Such a state of affairs did not fail to trouble certain writers. In February 1911, according to the *Sûreté*, Goldsky deplored that Hervé was no longer the 'real director of *La Guerre Sociale*' and he told everybody that the latter 'is a prisoner of Merle and Almereyda.'" Of course, one must be cautious with police reports, as Heuré warns, because the police might simply have meant to start a rumor about a war among antimilitarists rather than report on any reality.[39] In his study of *La Guerre Sociale*, Peyronnet argued that Almereyda was virtually in charge of *La Guerre Sociale* from March 1910 until July 1912 while Hervé was in prison, and that argument has some merit. Méric witnessed Almereyda's charismatic appeal, and described how Hervé gave Almereyda considerable latitude to create headlines beyond the scope of ideas presented in his lead editorials.[40] Méric himself often went well beyond what Hervé would have written. Heuré described how Almereyda as editorial secretary "watched over the titles and the general packaging of the headline with the precision of a pyrotechnician."[41] Yet the case for Hervé losing control of *La Guerre Sociale* from 1910 to 1912 seems difficult to reconcile with events. When he got out of prison, Hervé had no trouble resuming direction of the paper despite physical and perhaps

emotional exhaustion, which led him to return to Brittany for a nearly three month convalescence.[42] The years 1910 to 1912 were the years when Hervé's *rectification* developed, yet Hervé had little trouble holding most of his original staff together even though it was now attacked by almost all the anarchist and syndicalist militants long cultivated by *La Guerre Sociale*. It was a strange "control" that Almereyda exercised considering that he, Merle, and several other Hervéist anarchists joined the S.F.I.O. at Hervé's behest soon after his release from prison in July 1912.[43] According to Jonathan Almosnino. Almereyda's own *rectification* was almost an exact parallel with that of Hervé at that point.[44]

La Guerre Sociale was itself a microcosm of the Hervéist movement as well as the organization that Hervé hoped to create. It included insurrectional socialists like Hervé and Louis Perceau, anarchists like Miguel Almereyda, Victor Méric, Eugène Merle, and Jean Goldsky, and for a time syndicalists like Georges Yvetot and Émile Pouget, foreign militants exiled in France like Amilcare Cipriani and Charles Malato, and women like Fanny Clar[45] and the pathbreaking feminist Madeleine Pelletier.[46] Hervé believed that almost all classes and groups had revolutionary potential and the *La Guerre Sociale* was staffed by the sons of nobles, Senators, gendarmes, immigrants, metal workers, and even military officers. Despite the presence of members and leaders of the C.G.T. as writers, it was not long before syndicalists attacked *La Guerre Sociale* as a band of intellectuals. Hervé responded, both sarcastically and cogently, that journalists by trade ought to have some of the attributes of intellectuals. *La Guerre Sociale* was more than the mere projection of Hervé's ideas and personality, so it makes sense to talk a bit about the various men and women who sometimes had to take over the paper while he was in prison.

Though Hervé was skilled journalist and an effective editor-in-chief, his notorious reputation was probably the indispensable element in attracting militants and readers to the new weekly. If Hervé was more than a journalist and polemicist, he certainly fit those two categories, but he had also become a notorious symbol, a kind media star of that era. Notorious though he was, Hervé was also wise enough to surround himself with gifted and energetic people. Gilles Heuré thought that the quality of the journalists at *La Guerre Sociale* along with their political experience assured the success of the paper.[47] The experience of the A.I.A. showed that Hervéist ideas and organizations could appeal to some anarchists. The anarchist-individualist Almereyda was strongly affected by Hervé's ideas when the two men were in prison together in 1906 and 1908. Seldom a writer, Almereyda was in charge of editing *La Guerre Sociale* until 1913. Another young anarchist of Italian-French extraction named Eugène Merle, who would go on

to an innovative and prominent journalistic career during the interwar, was in charge of the paper's administration until 1913. Merle was a friend of Almereyda's, and, he, too, became acquainted with Hervé in 1905 by way of the A.I.A. Victor Serge described Merle as a man who would "become Paris's most powerful and Balzacian journalist."[48] Another editor, Victor Méric, the son of a senator, had been an anarchist before becoming a socialist several years after the creation of *La Guerre Sociale*.[49] Other anarchists would be attracted to *La Guerre Sociale* or to its more clandestine organizations. For some anarchists *La Guerre Sociale* offered an alternative to isolation and theoretical bickering. Hervé was mature, stable, and knowledgeable, especially compared to some of the alienated young men who had gravitated to anarchism.

Perhaps the most fascinating, complex, and important character among the antimilitarists in Hervé's entourage was Miguel Almereyda whose name at birth in 1883 was Eugène Bonaventure de Vigo. Variously described in terms of Sardinian, Spanish, Italian, Andorran, and French extraction and the product of an ill-fated marriage of noble to commoner,[50] Almereyda had come to Paris around 1899 when he was fifteen or sixteen years old. In this era of political turmoil accentuated by the Dreyfus Affair, he soon gravitated to anarchist circles where he was befriended by a slightly older anarchist cobbler named Fernand Desprès. Soon he considered himself an individualist anarchist as well as an advocate of individual violence against oppression, and he was mentioned on a list of anarchists collected by the 3rd Brigade des Recherche, the so-called "*brigade des anarchistes*." After a lengthy period of poverty and unemployment, Almereyda became an apprentice photographer, but was falsely accused of theft by his employer. Even though the charges were soon dropped once the circumstances were known, Almereyda lost his job. At the end of May 1900, he was quickly tried and imprisoned for involvement in the receipt of "stolen goods" as well as general police suspicions of his anarchist connections. Eventually he spent two months in deplorable conditions at La Petite Roquette.[51]

The anger and defiance which the seventeen year old felt soon led him to replace the name Vigo with Almereyda, that scatological anagram of the phrase "'*y a (de) la merde*' ('There is shit')." Apparently, in anarchist circles pseudonyms were common for obvious reasons, and obscenities were thought to possess revolutionary qualities. He was also known to have frequented anarchist colonies around Paris and spent some time at a phalanastery frequented by anarchists and Bohemians of all types. Remaining in poverty for some time, he may have become involved in both printing counterfeit money and various thefts to support himself. Working in another photography shop and writing for *Le Libertaire* did not distract him

from an act of revenge for his recent incarceration. Planting a "bomb" to harm the judge who had convicted him proved to be a futile gesture of protest. In fact, the explosive device, a combination of magnesium powder, sugar, nails, sulphur, and a tinder fuse made to fit into a small shoe-polish can, was little more than a malfunctioning *pétard* left unexploded in a *pissoir* (urinal) near the Place Voltaire because Almereyda was "afraid of harming innocent bystanders." The so-called "bomb" led to a sentence of "a year in prison, which he served almost entirely in solitary confinement in semidarkness and silence."[52] After visiting him in La Petite Roquette once he got personal permission from a cynical Lépine, the young artist Francis Jourdain was struck by the indefinable horrors and contrasts of this prison for children. Almereyda's release several weeks early came only after his friend Desprès contacted others in anarchist milieux, such as Jourdain, who helped him get the attention of the famous, bourgeois, and influential Dreyfusard journalist, Séverine, the widow of the journalist and Communard Jules Vallès. With connections in high places, Séverine helped free Almereyda and then took the teenager for a month of recuperation in the countryside in the summer of 1902.[53]

Almereyda was in prison at some point in each of the following years: 1900, 1901, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1917. With ideological views that were "more instinctive than reflective," Almereyda once said that being a revolutionary meant "'having as an object the integral suppression of a system judged evil'. This born propagandist [and] seasoned professional, was subtle, intelligent, cunning, extroverted, courageous, and … also a good organizer."[54] Almereyda was undoubtedly not the only adolescent of the avant-garde to mix excrement, idealism, and rebellion. Later, Almereyda appeared to be "the Saint-Just of the revolutionary Left" to some of his friends,[55] "an egoistic Don Juan of the Revolution" to many of his enemies, and "the Official Prefect of the Revolution"[56] or "the Prefect of Police of the Revolution" to others, including some police.[57] This second-in-command of Hervéism may be a fitting example of the adolescent, anarchist, avant-garde, Bohemian, and nihilist elements of the political fringes. If Hervé was often referred to as the "General", Almereyda came to be called his "First Lieutenant", but their relationship did not begin quite as deferentially. At their initial meeting, under the auspices of the A.I.A. sometime in 1905, the future "Lieutenant" thought the "General" was a "boring bastard." "The peasant *bonhomie* and sarcastic tone of the professor displeased him." However, their next encounter was quite different.[58]

Hervé and Almereyda certainly formed an "odd couple" in most ways, but they undoubtedly complemented each other for the enhancement of the production. In appearance, Hervé was short, squat, ruddy, with a traditional "crew cut,"

and bourgeois in almost all but his standard military tunic. He was so abstemious and almost monkish in his tastes and needs that he was almost never known to appear at cafés, restaurants, or cabarets after work.[59] Except for a good meal and a bit of what he thought was good wine, Hervé disdained money, had no known vices, and could live like a monk if need be.[60] "It could not enter into anyone's head that this cozy passer-by, whose appearance could not be any more inoffensive, was the leader of the dreadful antimilitarist army."[61] Almereyda was tall, dark, and even nicknamed the "*nègre*", with his thick black hair parted in the middle and forelocks shoved to the side. With a subtle gait, often with a switch in one hand, he was ready to make a striking appearance at the Café du Croissant or some other Parisian haunt. That was quite a contrast to Hervé who had simple tastes, impeccable habits, and was known for his complete lack of material interests—except for his newspaper. He never swore or played cards, and knew nothing about games in general. In prison he preferred walking in the courtyard over idle amusements. Almereyda, on the other hand, was a fancy dresser, given to extravagance, and was quite fond of nightlife, women, and cars. Ever ready to employ expletives in conversations, jokes, or headlines, he had the air of scandal constantly trailing him, and was periodically accused of embezzlements, counterfeiting, and sundry financial shenanigans. After work, Hervé generally took the metro from Les Halles back to his apartment on the Rue de Vaugirard[62] which he shared with his dowdy mistress, the widow Madame Dijonneau (and, for a time, her children) for some forty years. Though the police sometimes described her lasciviously as "Hervé's mistress" or as a woman "who cost him plenty", she was years older, had three living children from her marriage, and at least once, when interviewed, seemed embarrassed by her partner's extreme ideas.[63] Of course, the reputed drug addict, Almereyda, frequented nightclubs, where he was surrounded by exotic women and lived with his stunning mistress, Émilie Clero, in an open relationship. The couple came from extreme poverty but eventually wound up residing at a villa in Saint-Cloud during the war funded from shady sources.[64] Méric's many descriptions of Almereyda and Hervé supply most of the contrasts. One thing that both men had in common was a less than optimistic view of the consciousness, courage, and critical acumen of the average worker.[65]

Alfred Rosmer, a socialist who was less than enthusiastic about Hervéism, thought the "Lieutenant" was just as important as the "General" for the success of the paper.[66] Victor Méric argued that:

> "As an anarchist and rebel, Almereyda was more conscious of the needs of the moment. He became a model revolutionary organizer, and was almost military, like his 'general',

> Gustave Hervé. Thanks to him, to his taste, to his love of the journalistic profession, *La Guerre Sociale* was able to achieve an unheard of expansion. You will find it hard to believe, nevertheless, that Almereyda was a sort of visionary, having no goals other than the Revolution and upheaval. He was also sophisticated, an educated man who did not disdain premiers and exhibitions, and [he] dressed with studied elegance. That proves, once again, that being a revolutionary you are not inevitably a savage or a maniac."[67]

Victor Serge (the alias of the Russian anarchist *émigré* Viktor Kibaltchiche), who considered himself a close friend of Almereyda at one point, stressed the intelligence, charisma, and flexibility of Hervé's second-in-command.

> "He incarnated human achievement in a measure so far practically unknown to me. He had the physical beauty of the pure-bred Catalan—tall forehead, blazing eyes—allied with an extreme elegance. A brilliant journalist, a captivating orator, a capable libertarian politician, adroit in business, he was able to handle a crowd or fix a trial, to brave the bludgeons of the police, the revolvers of certain comrades, or the spite of the Government, and to concoct fantastic intrigues. In the Ministries, he had his connections; in the slums, his devoted friends. He was behind the disappearance from Clemenceau's drawer of a receipt for 500 francs signed by an *agent-provocateur* in the syndicalist movement. He then presented himself at the Assize Court and was acquitted with the jury's congratulations. He organized the circulation of *La Guerre Sociale*, whose guiding spirit he was, together with Gustave Hervé ('The General'), and Eugène Merle, who was to become Paris's most powerful and Balzacian journalist. Almereyda had experienced a frightening childhood, partly in a reformatory for a minor theft. It was he who, after the Ferrer demonstration, seized upon the Liabeuf affair. This was the prelude to a number of other dramas."[68]

Almereyda's end was both tragic and controversial. After separating from Hervé in February 1913 possibly due to financial issues, both ordinary and perhaps questionable, he briefly joined *Le Courrier Européen* in March 1913. Jonathan Almosnino stressed that neither personal rancor nor political differences explain Almereyda's leaving *La Guerre Sociale* in 1913. In fact, Almereyda's own *retournement* paralleled that of his boss. Without deep contacts within the working class beyond his relationships with various C.G.T. leaders, yet having ties to anarchist intellectuals and journalists, and increasingly associated with the leaders of reformist socialism, Hervé's lieutenant's abrupt shift in views is not surprising. As a leading journalist of the pre-war era, he was something of a "hot commodity" who could have been expected to bring new life to the shaky international political weekly edited by Gabriel Paix-Séailles.[69] Later that year, Almereyda along with Merle launched *Le Bonnet Rouge* on November 12, 1913. As editor of the latter publication during World War I, he was imprisoned on August 7, 1917 for high treason when it was discovered that *Le Bonnet Rouge* had received German funding. His mysterious

"suicide" a week later at Fresnes Prison led to suspicions that were never fully alleviated. There were many people in high places like Minister of the Interior, Jean-Louis Malvy, and the former Président du Conseil, Joseph Caillaux, who would not have been chagrined by the disappearance of Almereyda. As far as the treason charge, it may have been appropriate for some of the staff at *Le Bonnet Rouge*, but Almereyda's "guilt" seems more connected to the xenophobia of *L'Action Française*, political maneuvers by Clemenceau and others, Almereyda's pre-war role in Hervéism, his presumed morphine addiction (possibly associated with "chronic" peritonitis), and his "playboy" lifestyle.[70] An irony associated with his death involved his purported pre-war conversation with Malvy, which may have helped prevent the implementation of the *Carnet B*. The "traitor" Almereyda thus played a role in generating the *Union Sacrée*, which, arguably, helped France attain victory. Almost as ironic was the fact that "*Père-la-Victoire*", Georges Clemenceau, used the pre-war decision to rescind the *Carnet B* and their support for *Le Bonnet Rouge* during the war to push for judicial proceedings in 1917 against Caillaux for treason and Malvy for both treason and negligence.[71]

At first glance the family background of Victor Méric would seem to preclude his anarchist and extremist associations because his father was Victor-Sylvain Méric, a Radical Senator from the Var who was a fierce enemy of Clemenceau. Méric's grandfather Charles had been imprisoned for five years at Belle Isle with Blanqui after the coup of December 2, 1851, and he briefly became a deputy at the beginning of the Third Republic. If Méric came from solidly republican stock, the police still thought he was an unsavory character. After finishing his studies at the Lycée of Toulon, Méric was known as an anarchist who contributed to Sébastien Faure's *Le Liberatire* and wound up spending two hundred days in a cell during his military service.[72] Maurice Allard thought that Méric was "difficult to classify". In contrast to the charismatic activist Almereyda, Méric was no streetfighter, doctrinaire, party man, or man of action. Though he seemed detached, absent, and almost a revolutionary voyeur to Allard, he was a resolute revolutionary and antimilitarist who went to prison and occasionally even got injured in demonstrations.[73] James Friguglietti described Méric as a pacifist who first encountered Hervé on the French national committee of the A.I.A. in 1905.[74] Méric later admitted to having had a checkered past "life of Bohemia" on the Left Bank among the bars and cafés near the Rue de Buci where he apparently easily fit in among the scrawny poets, students who seldom went to class, artists who critiqued rather than created, and naïve pseudo-philosophers, "all spiced with an assortment of shady adventurers, seedy pimps, and desperate metics."[75]



Figure 7. Victor Méric (1876–1933). Columnist and critic at *La Guerre Sociale* as well as the creator of *Les Hommes du Jour* and *La Barricade*. This photo was taken after World War I at a Communist Congress in Marseilles. Bnf.

Méric may have came to police attention as an anarchist and antimilitarist in Marseilles, an A.I.A. stronghold, with a newspaper titled *L'Action Antimilitariste* founded by Eugène Merle, but which included only five issues from October 1904 until January 1905. In 1905 the A.I.A. created another short-lived paper called *L'Internationale*. Both of these ephemeral publications at some point came under the direction of Méric. But he was also reported to have founded an antimilitarist group in the 6th *arrondissement* of Paris in 1902.[76] Perhaps Méric was able to migrate between the two cities frequently. Police reports in 1904 and 1905 called Méric the author of a violent antimilitarist brochure *Lettre á un soldat* or *Lettre à un Conscrit*.[77] In late 1904 and early 1905 Méric as well as Miguel Almereyda, Henri Fabre, Jules Grandidier, and the antimilitarist artist Francis

Jourdain[78] proselytized for the A.I.A. on a six month tour in Paris and the provinces, but their results were meager.[79] Although Méric did not sign *L'Affiche Rouge* in 1905, probably for fear of embarrassing his father, he and Almereyda played key roles drafting the poster with Yvetot and his syndicalist colleagues placing the finishing touches. Méric was quite troubled by his failure to sign the poster once his identity as an author of *L'Affiche Rouge* became known.[80] However, he soon became a permanent fixture at *La Guerre Sociale*, where he wrote the amusing, original, and provocative weekly *chronique* under the pseudonym Flax. He rapidly gravitated away from pure anarchism to socialism under the influence of Hervé, and joined the party in 1906. Later he became the editor of *Les Hommes du Jour*, a rather successful four-page satirical weekly brochure which specialized in biographical essays on leading leftist militants or their governmental enemies, and he created a short-lived antimilitarist leaflet around 1910 called *La Barricade*.[81]

One 1910 police report said Méric was addicted to ether and associated with pimps. Supposedly, he and Almereyda were so desperate for money that they sold gossip about their fellow revolutionaries to anti-revolutionary papers.[82] Other police reports accused him "of the worst moral turpitudes, from procuring to pederasty, as well as belonging to a band of counterfeiters"[83] The fact that such police charges were quite common may say more about police obsessions than any deviance or inversions by men such as Méric and Almereyda. Around 1910 Méric published a brochure entitled *Comment on fera la révolution* which outlined methods to organize an insurrection against the regime and to preserve a revolutionary victory through terror. At the same time, he joined the Hervéist *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. Needless to say, such activities earned him frequent trips to prison. On the eve of war, he helped organize an antiwar protest which resulted in a bit of lost blood for some of the few antimilitarists remaining. Despite years of fighting against war and even being placed on the *Carnet B*, Méric was "persuaded" by gendarmes to serve during the war, which he did as an engineer sapper second class. After the war he wrote for Henri Fabre's *Le Journal du Peuple*, was editor-in-chief for Eugène Merle's *Merle Blanc* in 1919, and wrote for *L'Humanité* until the early 1923 purge, after which he joined *La Révolution*, *Paris-Soir* after 1923, *L'Egalité*, and *La Patrie Humaine*. After joining and then leaving the P.C.F., he entered the Union Socialiste-Communiste, but eventually ceased to be politically active. Never having written for the bourgeois press (until after the war?), Méric continued to write about his pre-war experiences in two volumes of fascinating reminiscences in 1930 and 1931 and in many issues of *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste* in 1925 and 1926.[84] Despite Méric's consistently progressive views, it must be noted that a less than subtle anti-Semitism can sometimes be found in

passages of Méric's weekly *Les Hommes du Jour* as well as in his lively articles as *chroniqueur* in *La Guerre Sociale*.

Eugène Merle was an anarchist from Marseilles of Italian extraction who organized an ephemeral A.I.A. newspaper there in the fall of 1904. He, too, met Hervé by way of the A.I.A. and signed *L'Affiche Rouge* which led to increased police interest in him. At the time of the trial, the police characterized Merle as an itinerant political agitator.[85] He joined the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* when it was created. A police report on September 23, 1910 described Merle, Méric, and Almereyda as the personalities who drafted the impoverished newspaper and formed the leadership of the Hervéist party. "They were young men without wealth or 'cut off' from their families. They had no social positions. Their collaboration at the "*Guerre*" was selfless, [since] there was no money in it. Up until now they lived by vague literary works, especially from a collaboration limited to themselves alone at the publications of the Fabre bookstore."[86] Like Méric and Almereyda, with whom he was a frequent collaborator and friend, police associated Merle with some of the same "sneaky and crooked" activities of his colleagues. While Hervé was in prison, Merle and Almereyda were thought to be spending far more than their salaries. The police assumed that the two were stealing from *La Guerre Sociale* and may even have engineered a robbery there to get funds. Be that as it may, when Hervé got out of prison, it was not long before the two men were looking for other opportunities. The *rectification* of the "General" was known to have cost the paper readers, so thinning the ranks was probably not prompted by criminal activities by the staff. Both men joined *Le Courrier Européen* in 1913 but soon left to create *Le Bonnet Rouge* late in the year. By the beginning of the war there was not enough funding at *Le Bonnet Rouge* to keep both men at the paper, so Merle and Almereyda supposedly drew lots. When Merle lost, he left the paper. When he was mobilized, he stopped writing.[87] Of all the Hervéists, Merle's later career was probably the most conventionally successful as an innovative promoter of newspapers like the *Merle Blanc*, a satirical weekly, and *Paris-Soir* in 1923 where L.-O. Frossard and perhaps even Méric joined him. He also developed *Frou-Frou* in 1923.[88]

Women were not frequently found in French socialism before the war, but Madeleine Pelletier was no ordinary woman. She defined herself as an "integral feminist", which for her meant that all types of emancipation were connected: political, economic, social, intellectual, and sexual. "Animated by a messianic idea of changing the world, Madeleine Pelletier tried her whole life to reconcile feminism and socialism." From humble beginnings and after a tumultuous childhood, she received her Bac at age twenty, studied anthropology, and was one of the very few female medical students in France at the time. After sustaining her thesis in



Figure 8. Eugène Merle (1884–1938) was one of the original staff of *La Guerre Sociale* as an administrator and writer. For a time he followed Almereyda to *Le Courrier Européen* and *Le Bonnet Rouge*. This photo was taken after World War I when he was the Director of *Paris-Matin*. Agence Meurisse. Paris, 1927. Bnf.

1902, she was refused entry to become a psychiatrist because as a woman she did not possess the political rights required for the *concours*.[89] After a press campaign by other feminists, she was admitted in 1903. Her involvement in the Dreyfus Affair helped lead to her socialism.[90] After joining the Guesdists, she grew disillusioned because Guesde saw feminist campaigns as a diversion from the class struggle. Women's emancipation would have to wait until after the revolution. In 1906 she became secretary of *La Solidarité des Femmes*, helping to establish that organization as one of the most radical feminist groups at the time. She joined the Hervéists from June 1907 until 1911, but she was under no illusions regarding their views on feminism.[91]

"Indeed in the spring of 1907, *La Guerre Sociale* had published two vitriolic articles on feminism, one of them attacking the sexual mores of Marguerite Durand, and in June 1908 had expressed hostility on the subject of English suffragettes. Pelletier protested to the paper and elicited a response from Hervé who defended the right of his contributors to oppose feminism if they so wished but added that he himself saw no reason to refuse women the vote, though it was a meaningless goal."

Pelletier joined the *Hervéistes* because she viewed them as "true socialists, committed to revolutionary action and untainted by the parliamentary opportunism of the Jaurèsians."[92]



Figure 9. Dr. Madeleine Pelletier (1874–1939) in her study when she was a candidate for the Parisian Municipal Council. She was a French physician, psychiatrist, first-wave feminist, and revolutionary socialist activist who was affiliated with the Insurrectionals by 1908. (© Albert Harlingue/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Her skepticism about how feminism fit with Hervéism was well-justified. Méric was one of the many leftist militants who could not resist puerile humor at Pelletier's expense when she first joined the entourage at *La Guerre Sociale*. Although Méric later came to admire her bravery and consistency, at first, probably behind

her back, he mocked her masculine attire and short hair style. Pelletier certainly left an impression that could not easily be forgotten.[93] Nevertheless, she was sympathetic to Hervé's revolutionary ideology, seeing in him "an individual of considerable magnetism. Another factor which would have influenced Pelletier was the fact that many *Hervéistes* supported the neo-Malthusian campaign of Paul Robin for birth control. Most importantly, Pelletier was politically ambitious. The *Hervéistes* were a small faction where she could hope to make her mark. Looking at her political and feminist activity at this period, it seems likely that her chief desire was to achieve a position of power within the party in order to advance feminism, although she was, in addition, committed to revolutionary action." As time passed, she questioned her own commitment to revolution, "but some of her articles in *La Guerre Sociale* endorsed terrorist methods." Overall, Pelletier was loyal to the Hervéist position that socialists should work towards the total transformation of society. "The present Republic, she declaimed in her articles, was no longer worthy of being defended and should be destroyed: 'Far from thinking of helping the Radicals to save Marianne, it would be better to begin to encourage the possibility of cooperating to strangle her.'" There was a tension inherent in Pelletier's position as she began to question what effect even a successful revolution might have on the gradual evolution of feminist gains which she believed were taking place. She was a revolutionary Hervéist who abhorred reformism, yet she acknowledged the need for reforms like women's suffrage.[94] Like Hervé, Pelletier betrayed an elitist mentality characterized by some hope for the education of the "masses" but little faith in their judgment. "A knowledge of Pelletier's life illuminates not only the conflicts between socialism and feminism under the French Third Republic, but the difficulties of an exceptional individual attempting to construct a coherent feminist agenda."[95] She was an integral feminist because she saw gender issues as central, not secondary, to all other social, economic, and political questions. For her the condition of women was not merely another problem among others; it determined the experience of human beings at every level and had to be understood if genuine social change were to occur. For these reasons Pelletier's feminism, like that of many other feminists, was generally dismissed by socialists as diversionary. Some socialists could all too easily call feminists class enemies.[96]

In 1909 Pelletier was nominated to succeed the imprisoned Hervé on the C.A.P., yet she showed doubts "about revolution as the best means of achieving social justice for women and for the proletariat." In 1909 in *Le Féminisme et ses militants* "she constructed a critique of the organizational weakness of French feminism and outlined what a feminist's attitude toward male politics should

be. She pointed out that some women were at present (1909) attracted by the anti-parliamentary politics of the Left and had therefore renounced the aim of women's suffrage. This was a version of her own experience in the Hervéist circle, where such women were 'perfectly aware that the men of the parties of the far Left are no better disposed to them than the moderates.'" She knew that women's allegiance could move in any direction, but as a feminist she felt that women should learn political radicalism from the men, but they should fight for their own rights, with violence if that were necessary. Given her experience in Hervéism, Pelletier was unsure whether the revolution would aid feminism. "Groups on the Left would tolerate feminism as long as it was not a central issue, indeed as long as nothing fundamental changed in the relationship between the sexes." She eventually thought that the far Left was less sympathetic to feminist issues than were the bourgeois parties currently in power.[97]

Hervé's age and experience may have been more important than was prison in preventing his complete control of *La Guerre Sociale*. Hervé's professional training, his bourgeois habits, and his clumsy humor combined with a generational gap to make him the secret butt of humor for his younger, more Bohemian colleagues. Méric tells the tale of Hervé's inveterate bragging at La Santé prison about his expertise on wine. Almereyda, Méric, and their incarcerated entourage doubted the "General's" gourmand status and decided to test him. After putting ordinary wine in a bottle of a classic Grand Cru Musigny, Hervé raved about the excellent wine. Apparently, one glass was much like another on the palate of *Le Sans Patrie*.[98] Yet there was never a doubt about who was in charge at *La Guerre Sociale*. Respect for Hervé was coupled with mirth at his expense. Whatever authoritarianism Hervé displayed, it allowed for differences of opinion. Certainly some serious ideological differences did exist among the Hervéists. From 1908 to 1910 strained debates over the nature of antiparliamentarianism led to conflicts between the socialists and anarchists on the paper. In some ways these internal divisions were potentially far more serious than the ideological debates that occurred after 1910. Generally, the few times when Hervé found it necessary to control the methods, rhetoric, or ideas of his staff arose because divergences in tactics threatened the goal of revolutionary concentration itself. Such reprimands as occurred were usually tactful and achieved the desired results. The original staff of *La Guerre Sociale*, even after financial considerations or Hervé's shift forced them to leave the paper, does not seem to have expressed any personal enmity against him. The "authoritarian" Breton "General" had created an avant-garde political weekly where even a staff of Bohemians felt quite at home.[99]

7

The Midi Crisis, the Socialist Congresses at Nancy and Stuttgart and the First Campaigns

In early 1907 the nationalist *L'Echo de Paris* ran a series of articles documenting the spread of antimilitarism in the army. The paper's correspondent Georges Doutremont complained that it was necessary for newspapers to insert a new, lamentable rubric on antimilitarism due to increasing evidence of antimilitaristic attitudes and activities in recent years. The author attributed the problem to various anarchist and socialist writers as well as humanitarian politicians who incited verbal and physical attacks against officers, NCOs, and even the flag. "Now it has become a gangrene which threatens the entire army. It is now mandatory to quickly apply a red-hot iron if we wish have a France in the future." The author even reported on a supposedly Hervéist officer who insulted the flag without any serious consequences to him.[1] Other newspapers including the nationalist *L'Éclair,* the moderate *Le Journal,* and the mass daily *Le Petit Parisien* appeared to cover any incident of military indiscipline that they could find. Instead of casting any blame on the army, Doutremont called for more arrests, insisting that Jaurès and Hervé "held the government under their yoke."[2] Given such press coverage and growing police obsession, one could argue that by 1907 Gustave Hervé's provocative ideas seemed to be reverberating throughout France and even affected the rest of Europe. Antimilitarism and Hervéism were familiar subjects in the Clemenceau ministry's circulars and instructions. Hervé and his followers were major contributors to important national and international socialist gatherings.

The police reported antimilitarist meetings and conferences all over France in 1907 as the antimilitarist message spread. On January 30 the Ministry of the Interior reported that *La Stampa*'s Francophobic Parisian correspondent wrote that the French army was infested with antimilitarists yet the government had its hands tied.[3]

In the spring of 1907 there was agitation over the beginnings of unionization among French teachers, who were state employees in the eyes of the government, and therefore without the same rights as workers in private companies. At that time Hervé's longtime friend and Breton *lycée* professor, Émile Masson, supplied articles to *La Guerre Sociale* on the situation in the French education system which he described as stifling and unimaginative for all concerned. In February 1905 Masson had published a moderately veiled autobiographical exposé of his teaching experience at the Lycée in the village of Loudun during 1900–1901. That critical study was titled *Yves Medec, professeur de collège* and appeared in Péguy's *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine*. Masson periodically ran into Hervé and probably visited him in Paris or Brest in 1900. The two men were together in Paris about the time Masson met his future wife in late 1901 near Notre Dame des Champs in Montparnasse. Masson and his wife later visited Hervé and Madame Dijonneau at their residence on the Rue de Vaugirard some time around 1905 on their way to England. In April 1907 Masson visited Hervé in Paris. When he:

> "arrived at the Rue Montmartre, he discovered the new empire of his friend Hervé: the office of *La Guerre Sociale*, the lair of the public enemy of the moment, whose life unfolded so tranquilly between his new professional address and the good Madame Dijonneau's apartment. A true small functionary! who left his landlady [!] in the morning, took the metro, returned in the evening by the same route, ignoring the distraction of Paris … when he was not at La Santé certainly. Hervé was always the same, direct and friendly in his eternal tight-fitting jacket with its narrow collar, his short-sighted eyes blinking behind his *lorgnon*, indifferent to everything except action … At Madame Dijonneau's apartment the discussions were heated."[4]

Although Masson as an anarchist was skeptical about Hervé's collectivism, he saw his friend as a hero. The two men shared common Breton friends such as the Breton painter Jean-Julien Lemordant, who became a famous and inspirational blinded veteran of World War I, and René de Marmande who got together with them at Hervé's apartment that spring.[5]

On January 31, 1907 the syndicalist weekly *La Voix du Peuple* printed a special edition dealing with military recruitment policies, while the following month the C.G.T. published a new edition of Georges Yvetot's *Manuel du Soldat* with 200,000 copies to be sold by October.[6] Designed for new recruits, this antimilitarist

brochure had begun to be published almost five years earlier. It raised "the antimilitarist tenets of the C.G.T." to a more "seditious level without alienating the organization from its national identity and values."[7] Throughout the year the Paris Prefecture of Police and Ministry of the Interior reported antimilitarist activities in the French capital as well as regional centers including: Brest, Lyon, Toulon, Toul, and Nancy, and other garrison cities, such as Albert in the Somme. From May 1 until October 10 that year, the police documented 102 antimilitarist incidents within France.[8] After an *entente* between the A.I.A. and the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, the police reported a new antimilitarist pre-May Day poster called *Aux Soldats* which appeared on April 23 and into May. That poster called the army the guard dogs of the bourgeoisie and encouraged soldiers not to shoot at their working class brothers but to follow their own interests and those of the exploited people from whom they came.[9] In the winter and spring that year *La Guerre Sociale* published several anti-colonial articles which described the French army as robbers and murderers.[10]

The dangerous effects of antimilitarism inside the army seemed verified that year due to developments that took place at Narbonne, Perpignan, Avignon, Mâcon, and elsewhere. The antimilitarist threat in the army was perceived as dire, so the subject entered debates in the French Chamber, and the Minister of War General Picquart sent instructions to his commanders regarding military discipline. In June Hervé was among the lawyers who defended twelve antimilitarists.[11] The paper also issued an appeal on June 24 titled "*Aux Soldats de l'Est.*"[12] The C.G.T. also printed a poster that same month called *Gouvernement d'Assassins* alluding to the late spring and early summer incidents in the Midi which led to the inculpation of thirteen well-known syndicalists.[13] In July an A.I.A. group in Lyon put out a poster supporting the Midi mutiny of the 17th Infantry Regiment and inviting soldiers to revolt. Nevertheless, a Rhone jury acquitted the twenty signatories.[14] On July 3 *La Guerre Sociale* printed a Manifesto calling on the entire Left to come to Longchamps on Bastille Day to assail Clemenceau, Briand, and the murderous cavalry at Narbonne as well as to salute the 17th Regiment. In the next issue Hervé's lead editorial reiterated the call for workers to rally at Longchamp while assailing socialist reformism.[15] In mid September 1907 Hervé was among the attorneys defending ten antimilitarists tried for a poster which approved the earlier military revolt in the Midi and was placarded on August 8–9, 1907.[16]

The Right-wing and moderate press were eager to disclose the antimilitarist danger both inside the army and in the larger society. For example, a teacher at Saint-Die, who was accused of insulting the flag in early September, was described by *La Patrie* as a disciple of Hervé.[17] The police certainly maintained their

vigilance of the A.I.A. that October when the organization tried to distribute 50,000 incendiary leaflets during the departure of the new class of conscripts.[18] *Le Petit Parisien* noted that three antimilitarists on trial in Lyon in November were acquitted with Hervé as their defense attorney. His method involved explaining his own ideas while justifying his clients' views and actions. *L'Humanité* noted how the antimilitarist attorney chose to defend his clients' honesty and nobility of character rather than deny the charges. The socialist daily also described Hervé as the object of continuing curiosity wherever he went.[19] On December 15, 1907 *L'Humanité* announced that *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne* was being prosecuted for a flagrant antimilitarist article.[20] The antimilitarist danger must have seemed especially threatening because the government's own statistics showed that insubordination and desertion actually peaked in 1907, which *La Guerre Sociale* itself noted in 1908.[21]

On the other hand, in 1907 some police reported a lack of interest in antimilitarism, difficulties of getting decent antimilitarist speakers, problems in attracting large audiences, and the dependence on posters by antimilitarists because anything else was too difficult.[22] Of course, the police continued to report on the disruption of the A.I.A.[23] Within syndicalist circles, in general, throughout the year, but especially during the trials of Amédée Bousquet and Albert Lévy for strike activities in June as well as René Mahé, André Picardat, and the eight other antimilitarists in September, what struck many police agents was the division, rivalry, and personal acrimony among antimilitarist groups who did not seem to be cooperating or rallying to help those on trial and in prison.[24] Both the police and *La Patrie* reported that socialists were reluctant to get involved in Hervé's efforts to demonstrate at Longchamps on Bastille Day 1907.[25] Even anarchist and antimilitarist groups hesitated to respond to Hervé's appeals to join the July 14 demonstration.[26] During the departure of the new class of conscripts, it was getting difficult for the antimilitarists to find demonstrators, according to some police agents, because incarceration frightened almost everyone, except for the most desperate, destitute, and foolish. The police were well aware that Hervéist antimilitarism was unacceptable to a majority within the S.F.I.O. even if it was tolerated.[27] Even though antimilitarists had promised concerted action at the departure of the new class, *Le Petit Parisien* noted that the conscripts left Paris that October almost without incident.[28] There certainly was much evidence for the spread of antimilitarism in the French military before World War I, but for Douglas Porch that did not verify an overall decline in military discipline since most antimilitarist episodes were isolated, often arising from immediate frustrations and local conditions.[29] In the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair and the *affaire*

des fiches, the French military experienced what Raoul Girardet called a "crisis of conscience" which many blamed on the Left. However, some people believed that the crisis in the military was, in good part, self-generated, so the growth of antimilitarism could be considered more of a symptom or catalyst rather than an overarching source of disorder.[30]

After receiving an amnesty on July 12, 1906 for *L'Affiche Rouge* sentence, Hervé had been officially, though grudgingly, admitted to the bar on July 24, 1906 and his legal career began. As a practicing attorney Hervé vowed to stay within the limits of the law, but he remained a revolutionary according to Gilles Heuré. Most of his cases during his time as a practicing attorney from 1906 until late 1907 involved defending strikers and antimilitarists. A police report from Nantes dated May 19, 1907 claimed that there was discussion at a local antimilitarist meeting concerning local dockers who had Hervé as an attorney but might have done better with someone more moderate.[31] Police authorities were often astonished at Hervé's virulence and they claimed that opposing attorneys "said that it would be illogical to condemn the defendants if they did not at the same time condemn their attorneys."[32] Nevertheless, Jules Uhry, who covered Hervé's judicial career for *L'Humanité*, whether the insurrectional leader was an attorney or a defendant, could not reproach his professional conduct. Whenever Hervé was harassed as an attorney, the motives were almost always political in Uhry's view. He certainly was in great demand but became the object of curiosity wherever he practiced. "Was he a good attorney?" In response to his own question, Gilles Heuré commented on an interview that Hervé gave to *La Petite République* in which he affirmed that being a practicing attorney took "a great deal of his time. And to confirm his words, the journalists who had come to interview him verified that when the interview was barely over, Gustave Hervé, 'who did not recognize boundaries, got back to the study of a case dealing with a question of common ownership.'"[33]

In the late spring of 1907 at a time when the French national security apparatus was increasingly preoccupied with antimilitarism, a crisis began in the Midi which was to become the catalyst for the first major campaign developed by *La Guerre Sociale*. Paul B. Miller described the 1907 winegrowers revolt in the Midi as "the culmination of this [antimilitarist] campaign of distortion." For Miller that meant that antimilitarists often gave themselves credit for events and movements which were largely outside their influence. The crisis among the winegrowers in the Midi had been festering for years because the region had become dependent on cheap red wine production in an era of increasing competition from Algeria and Spain as well as an expanding fraudulent use of sugar and water. Those two

trends led to an overproduction of wine and a concomitant fall in prices.[34] "At first the viticulteurs protested against the use of sugar in the wine, if one can judge by their slogans (in Occitan and French): 'Death to the cheaters!' 'Sugar and water: that will be our tomb!', 'Water in the canal, sugar in the sugar bowl', etc. They defended 'natural' wine. But they also attacked the government and tax bureaucracy which favored the [sugar] beet producers."[35]

On January 4, 1907 *L'Éclair* described the imminent crisis in terms of poverty and disorder. "And the troubles are only worsening since the government, with a criminal obstinacy, refuses to deal with the interests of the wine producing regions." The coming of railroads had ended the Midi polyculture after the 1850s and that meant new inherent dangers of competition not just for growers.[36] French rural areas had gradually been won over to the Republic by a protective tariff and improving economic conditions. But the vine-growing region of Languedoc had invested far too much in its vineyards. Even though the late nineteenth century French phylloxera epidemic was short-lived and the region recovered rapidly, the area depended on a monoculture.

> "Constant overproduction soon brought about a fall in market prices. As with all economic phenomena, this had multiple and complex causes, but local opinion believed one above all others: if there was a surplus of wine, it was because in the big towns and Paris unscrupulous shopkeepers were stretching quantities by producing ersatz wines, by the addition of sugar. That was a dealers', capitalist fraud, and northern (talk of sugar meant sugar beet and its growers), tolerated by the government, by the state, by Paris. Thence arose a discontent which was at one and the same time that of the hard-working farmer-worker against speculation, of the Midi against the north, of the provinces against the state … The state was not unaware of these complaints …, so a commission of inquiry into wine-making fraud was set up at Narbonne."[37]

Soon delegations of winegrowers became mass "demonstrations bearing witness to collective uneasiness" and Clemenceau got involved when the activities seemed to cross the boundary of legality.[38]

Rolande Trempé differentiated two types of social conflicts: (1) strikes which directly opposed owners against their workers, and (2) movements of social protests which were broader and mobilized multiple social categories. The Midi Crisis of 1907 was a movement of social protest which illustrated much about the social tensions that existed during La Belle Époque.[39] The crisis seemed to hit small producers and agricultural workers hardest, and they were often the same people. Assailed by taxes, accumulated debts, and mortgages, their distress was incredible. Insolvent customers were in no position to patronize village artisans and shop owners. The resulting "despair and anxiety about the future gripped

everybody. Such feelings provoked, stimulated, and characterized the revolt." The popular mobilization originated in the Midi in early March 1907. The main figure in the revolt was a café owner and small wine producer from Argeliers (in the Aude) named Marcellin Albert, who was nicknamed the "cicada" because of his habit of haranguing the crowds while perched in a tree. Albert led a group of 87 local winegrowers and others, amidst the sounds of drums and bugles, to attend a meeting of the parliamentary commission studying the wine industry crisis. Soon Albert found himself heading a *comité d'Argeliers* charged with coordinating the demonstrations. Eventually, Albert was called the "apostle" and the "Redeemer" of the wine industry. His Occitan speeches demanding united action by all vintners and workers soon aroused multitudes who sometimes attempted to kiss his hands as if they were sacred. Increasingly massive demonstrations followed: in the month of May at Béziers, Carcassonne, Montpellier, and Perpignan hundreds of thousands gathered. By June 9–10, 1907 up to 700,000 demonstrators responded to Albert's appeal by going to Montpellier. By then the protest movement had spread to four departments in Languedoc: Aude, Hérault, Pyrénées Orientales, and Gard. The entire region was in revolt against the state. Municipal councils resigned, taxes went unpaid, and the railway lines were blocked. Even though the main cause of the crisis was economic, the winegrowers were convinced that those in power were mainly responsible for the injustice of the situation in some way. The resulting tension increased when the government mobilized the army "to preserve order." A state of siege was proclaimed at Narbonne on June 20 but this actually exacerbated the problems since the army killed five people there. About the same time at Perpignan, the prefecture was set ablaze and railroads were sabotaged in an attempt to block troop transports.[40]

"It was in this superheated atmosphere that the 17th Infantry Regiment mutinied at Béziers on June 19–20." The situation became critical, and the government reacted after being defied by the socialist mayor of Narbonne, Joseph Ferroul, who early on had encouraged the demonstrations. As Rolande Trempé explained it, "Clemenceau [then] showed his skill, his tactical intelligence, and his duplicity." After relieving the tension on June 2 by rushing a vote on a law against fraud, which wine industry experts thought was the chief cause of the crisis, he reinforced the repression in the Midi "by incarcerating many demonstrators. Yet in Paris on June 23 he received Marcellin Albert, the soul of the revolt. He compromised him forever and discredited him by loaning him the necessary funds for his return trip and then informing the press about it! In a few days, while the Parliament gave the government a vote of confidence, the demonstrators demobilized. The decline

of the movement was facilitated by a retroactive discount on taxes which were unpaid in 1904–1905 and 1906."[41]

For Trempé, the main organizational force behind the winegrowers' actions in the Midi was the C.G.V., the *Confédération Générale de Defense Viticole*, which grouped all the winegrowers without distinction and claimed to defend the interests of all. "There was a veritable consensus among the small and large producers. Thus, there was a virtual class collaboration to defend wine prices rather than a class struggle." That is not to say that prior and later class interests and social differences did not come into play, but in 1907, "the unions, despite the warnings, participated fully in the movement against the state and against fraud." This was very different than the situation in Champagne in 1910 and 1911, where the large wine producers were blamed and attacked for their general domination of smaller producers and their fixing of grape harvest prices. In Champagne, even though fewer people were involved, there was more violence if we keep the scale of the trouble in mind.[42]

Clemenceau had a taste for intrigue, the underside of police activity, which David S. Newhall thought could have been a legacy from his days associated with Blanqui. "He felt genuine sympathy … for Marcellin Albert, who had gotten in over his head as leader of the Midi winegrowers' revolt. But immediately telling the press about Albert's secret interview with him, that Albert had shed tears and expressed repentance for the trouble he had caused—things which could only tend to discredit him in the eyes of his followers—could not help but feed suspicions of Machiavellianism. When the Métivier affair came to light in 1911, such suspicions seemed more than amply confirmed."[43] In fact, during the Midi Crisis, Clemenceau may have been worried more about a royalist plot than socialist subversion, and a few royalists did try to use the episode to undermine the government. However, the crisis needed neither reactionary nor revolutionary instigation. To wit, the Midi revolt cannot be labeled separatist, socialist, or royalist in inspiration. Albert and the winegrowers were basically loyal and patriotic Frenchmen, who were generally moderate in their political views and not at all prone to Occitan separatism.[44]

Up until the Midi Crisis revolutionary antimilitarist themes in *La Guerre Sociale* were generally dispersed. Unlike many of its later campaigns, the revolutionary weekly did not create these events in the Midi, it was not the exclusive reporter of the crisis, and the actions during the wine growers' revolt did not center around a single individual. Nevertheless, coverage of the Midi Crisis initiated themes and myths which became important elements of Hervéism.[45] At first Hervé was more concerned with alcoholism, the overproduction of wine, and

the Midi vintners' lack of solidarity with workers. He used the crisis to attack the workers' dependence on wine and to illustrate the problems of capitalism that led to overproduction. Despite multiple articles on the Midi situation, *La Guerre Sociale*'s initial coverage seemed to consider these events as just another example of the evils of capitalism.[46] The next issue had no mention of the Midi Crisis.[47] However, that same week Almereyda was involved in a meeting which pitted anti-militarists against patriotic proponents of militarism whose spokesman Leandri led the debate against Almereyda. At that time, Hervé's chief lieutenant employed arguments regarding the fraternization of strikers and soldiers as well as the idea of insurrection in case of war. At a meeting where revolvers were brandished, Almereyda certainly did not hesitate to assail patriotism and militarism in front of a very divided Parisian audience.[48] The following week *La Guerre Sociale* included a provocative headline referring to a rebellion by the 101st regiment in the Midi and an article by Almereyda titled "*Bravo les soldats*", calling for troops to disobey their officers and show solidarity with the rebellious vintners. But the rest of the issue again had no mention of the Midi Crisis. Hervé's lead editorial attacked the cowardice and demoralization of French workers for their failure to react to the condemnation the previous week of two C.G.T. leaders, Bousquet and Lévy, for strike activities.[49] The next issue of *La Guerre Sociale* included little on the Midi Crisis.[50] *La Guerre Sociale* so far had seen nothing extraordinary about the events in the Midi. Perhaps Hervé was too preoccupied by his legal career because in late June he was again back at the site of *L'Affiche Rouge* trial: this time acting as defense attorney along with Jacques Bonzon and Willm for twelve antimilitarists on trial for the poster *Aux Soldats*. The defense managed to place the ministry itself on trial by citing Briand and Clemenceau's own words.[51]

Two days later, however, after it had learned of the Midi violence, the paper printed its first "special edition." *La Guerre Sociale* finally saw the Midi Crisis as a means to implement insurrectionalism. Hervé called for workers' organizations all over France to use diversionary tactics to prevent troops from being sent to the Midi to put down the vintners and to force the government to release any captured rebels. Almereyda sought a strike by all French workers in solidarity with the vintners in order to topple the Clemenceau government. Many other articles in that issue also dealt with events in the Midi. *La Guerre Sociale* hoped to use the crisis to create a revolutionary situation or at least to create a heightened workers' consciousness which it had previously characterized as indifferent, weak, and immobile.[52] At the end of June, Almereyda began a series of provincial meetings in Eastern France where he called on workers to follow the example of the 17th Infantry Regiment.[53] For example, on June 29 Almereyda spoke on "The

Indispensable Revolution and the Wine Industry Crisis" to 300 people in Dijon where he stressed how the overproduction of wine caused the crisis and hoped for the north to follow the Midi's example.[54] His *tournée* eventually led him to Lyon, Lons-le-Saunier, Besançon, Nancy, Épinal, and Épernay where he continued to demand disobedience to military orders, non-violence by soldiers facing strikers, and assaults on military leaders if they ordered attacks against workers.[55] On June 28 Jaurès spoke in the Chamber taking Clemenceau to task for his imprudent use of force in the Midi and for playing the north and south against each other. The socialist tribune wondered whether such a government could be trusted in this crisis while the Chamber went into summer recess. For him the Midi Crisis was "one of the greatest social events that had occurred in thirty-five years."[56] Other papers chose to draw different lessons from the crisis. One monarchist newspaper used an image of Marianne seated under an oak, in the manner of Saint Louis, outfitted with a typical Phrygian bonnet clad in a dress embroidered with stars of David and a Masonic apron. The caricature intended to associate Clemenceau and the Republic with a Jewish Masonic clique who cared nothing for either grapes or beet growers.[57]

This first special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* had "a curious impression of improvisation. The articles were short and without a profound analysis of the questions. But what virulence, what a sense for provocative headlines and formulas!"[58] At this point the young staff of *La Guerre Sociale* may have believed that a general strike could support a military insurrection already in progress. They may well have assumed, or at least hoped, that a revolutionary moment was at hand. What they learned from the Midi Crisis confirmed and intensified the methods of Hervéism even though the crisis ended quickly. Beneath the large headlines "*Organisons La Révolution*," Hervé drew several key lessons from these unexpected developments in the south of France: (1) The Left (including *La Guerre Sociale*) had been surprised by the events in the Midi. (2) No war, not even social war, could be improvised. Revolutionaries needed to organize in order never again to be surprised by events. (3) Here was concrete evidence that antimilitarist ideas were working because the 17th and 101st regiments had revolted. (4) Syndicalists, socialists, and anarchists had not prevented other troops from going to the Midi. They had failed to immobilize the army at the critical moment. (5) Thus revolutionaries were told to follow the lead of *La Guerre Sociale* by exchanging views and organizing for the next revolutionary situation.[59] Other writers elaborated on these lessons. Henri Fabre singled out S.F.I.O. and C.G.T. leadership for censure. He said that their inaction was due to intrigues and ambitions among their leaders. Cabals in the S.F.I.O. had to end in order for it to act. The C.G.T.

needed to show more adroitness in a revolutionary situation. For Fabre, the Midi Crisis illustrated how events had more meaning than theory. The Left needed to be ready when such events occurred again. In short, *La Guerre Sociale* concentrated its message. Unity and organization by the Left were needed in the interest of revolutionary action. Theoretical details led to divisions which had prevented necessary action.[60]



Figure 10. Funeral on June 20, 1907 in Narbonne, Aude for a victim during the Demonstrations in the Midi Crisis of the Winegrowers. (© Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

The Midi Crisis had other results as well. The city of Narbonne, where the French troops intervened brutally against the vintners, became another symbolic site of Republican repression alongside Fourmies and later Raon-l'Étape, Draveil, and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. Georges Clemenceau and the Radicals once again had shown revolutionary militants that parliamentary actions and Republican reforms were not steps toward workers' emancipation. The revolt of the 17th Regiment became a myth for the extreme Left and especially for the Hervéists. Hundreds of troops from that regiment were eventually sent to disciplinary battalions at Gafsa in southern Tunisia for their mutinous acts.[61] After a hesitant realization about the potential implication of the Midi Crisis, *La Guerre Sociale* eventually saw the rebellion of that regiment as proof that its antimilitarist ideas were an effective means

to create insurrection and revolution. The Montmartre singer Gaston Montéhus embellished the Midi sedition by turning the mythic events into a revolutionary song, "*Gloire au 17e.*" The "Revolt in the Midi" became a refrain and even a leitmotif for countless revolutionary speeches. It also became the subject of serial articles which appeared in *La Guerre Sociale* in 1909. In truth, the military revolts had largely local origins because the troops of the regiments in the Midi had been recruited nearby. Syndicalist or antimilitarist agitation does not seem to have played a major role in the actions of the rebellious regiment.[62] Rather than an obvious manifestation of class struggle and class solidarity, "the revolt of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Regiment showed that their solidarity with the Narbonne winegrowers essentially arose from their communal solidarity."[63] However, the myths about the events in the Midi were accepted by the antimilitarists as a reality, so they reinforced their faith in their mission. The police reported that anarchists were happy about the revolt because they assumed that their ideas were taking hold even though they were ashamed that they themselves had not led the way. Both the C.G.T. and the A.I.A. believed that their ideas had affected the soldiers in the Midi, and the police reported that the antimilitarists were going to print posters congratulating the rebels and encouraging other regiments to follow their example. The A.I.A. launched donation campaigns at C.G.T. headquarters with these goals in mind, while René de Marmande began a *tournée* to get funding. Some anarchists, syndicalists, and revolutionary socialists talked about meeting Clemenceau's violence and terrorism with the same thing.[64]

There was another irony involved in the Midi Crisis. When Clemenceau had entered the government and then led a Ministry of his own with General Picquart as Minister of War, he began his term of office promising a complete transformation of judicial institutions. In the wake of the Dreyfus Affair, a government headed by former Dreyfusards seemed to promise future reforms across the board. Of course, Clemenceau's reactions to events in 1906 ought to have limited expectations. Nevertheless, substantial progress in military justice reform seemed inevitable by the spring of 1907 just when simmering problems of the Midi viticulturists erupted into violence. At that point, Clemenceau ordered a cavalry regiment from outside the area to pacify the region and arrest the protest leaders. Order was not immediately restored and deaths resulted from the turmoil. What was most troubling to the Ministry was when the locally recruited 17th Infantry Regiment based at Agde "made common cause with the protesters, looted an arsenal in Béziers, and threatened to march on Narbonne, where five protesters had already been killed." Even though the soldiers were soon induced to return to their posts and their commandant sought to lessen the perceived severity

of the mutiny, the government judged that such acts deserved severe collective punishment rather than leniency. The events also gave Clemenceau and Picquart reason to reconsider the benefits of reforming military justice procedures and institutions. In the words of John Cerullo: "Arguably, this was hardly the time to experiment with further 'civilianization' of military justice; discipline needed to be fortified, not relaxed." Just when military justice seemed destined to be reformed in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair, the Midi Crisis coupled with a general sense of growing crime and disorder as well as the perceived increase in subversive antimilitarism, all helped guarantee a renewal of that civil-military compact. That pact, now greeted enthusiastically even by some former Dreyfusards, would continue to permit and even promote the mechanisms of military justice to repress any groups or individuals that the civil authorities considered threats to civic and national security.[65]

The most profound effect of the Midi Crisis on *La Guerre Sociale* was probably a lesson in journalistic technique. From now on the paper would try to publish daily during critical and potentially revolutionary situations. "To have waited a week to give a revolutionary appreciation of events, while the filthy [daily bourgeois] press worked furiously to deceive opinion, would have been a grave inconsistency."[66] The Midi Crisis reinforced the newspaper's view of itself as *a feuille de combat* which could act in a revolutionary situation to promote workers' consciousness and increase coordination in order to create a revolution. Of course, such events would not harm circulation.

For Hervé, the Midi Crisis reinforced his ideas concerning the complexity of social classes, which he had long assumed to be oversimplified by most socialists. Although *La Guerre Sociale* failed to activate the forces of the Left to expand the Midi Crisis into one involving other groups and regions of France, the paper sought to use the crisis to blame S.F.I.O. and C.G.T. leaders for their meek responses to the southern disorder. Hervé also used the crisis to help generate support for a demonstration sponsored by *La Guerre Sociale* at Longchamps set for Bastille Day in 1907. He hoped to get other groups to join Hervéists in protesting the government's actions in the Midi, saluting the brave soldiers of the 17th regiment, and using the episode as a means of revolutionary mass education.[67] Almereyda also expected to turn the festivities into a major antimilitarist propaganda event by recalling the events in the Midi. Given such an open promotion of the demonstration, the police knew what to expect. Because Clemenceau had advanced the official parade by one hour and had ordered the troops to avoid the Bois de Boulogne, not many people were there. Hervé's lieutenant coordinated the preparations for the event with the expectation that militants would acclaim

the 17th Regiment and disrupt the official cortège with whistles and catcalls.[68] When preliminary support for the 1907 Bastille Day demonstration proved weak in the S.F.I.O., Hervé lashed out. "The Socialist Party is becoming more and more like German Social Democracy, a machine to gain membership, dues, and votes." The Insurrectional leader still hoped that the C.G.T. would join him on July 14, and he praised the C.G.T. and the A.I.A. as the only organizations that still preserved some revolutionary spirit because they were revivified by anarchism.[69] In fact, in many ways the C.G.T. was becoming much more reticent on the subject of antimilitarism, reflecting a gradual shift in its overall aims and tactics. C.G.T. impatience with *La Guerre Sociale* had been evident as early as May 1907 when Griffuelhes and Pouget tried to get Almereyda not to reissue the poster *Aux Soldats* which was about to be printed at the C.G.T. press.[70] On July 11, 1907 the Ministry of the Interior intercepted Almereyda's instructions for the July 14 review at Longchamps. The police described the C.G.T. leadership as well as the French socialist leaders as very hostile to Hervé's ideas for the review at Longchamps. Police officials doubted whether workers would waste a holiday demonstrating against the army or the government, and they hoped that Hervé would be forced to demonstrate alone.[71] Griffuelhes was bothered by the antimilitarist campaign. Later police reports show that he suspected the origins of Hervéist antimilitarism.[72] According to some French police sources, most of the elements in the C.G.T. had become more cautious on the subject of antimilitarism after *L'Affiche Rouge* trial.[73] The nature of *La Guerre Sociale* must have accentuated the misgivings of any hesitant or suspicious elements within the C.G.T.

The lead articles by Hervé written in three consecutive issues following the Midi Crisis and preparing for the demonstration at Longschamps show some apparent contradictions in his revolutionary tactics. The main lesson from the Midi Crisis was reported on June 26 to have been the need for syndicalist, socialist, and anarchist militants to organize for the next revolutionary moment.[74] On July 3, Hervé attacked C.A.P. and S.F.I.O. militants for failing to respond to the Midi Crisis.[75] On July 10, he stressed that action must arise from below. Hervé thought he had to look to the "mass" of workers if the militant elite failed to act. He claimed that some revolutionary groups were too prone to look to leaders before going forward.[76] The apparent contradiction of expecting an elite of revolutionary militants to organize workers and at the same time calling for the "mass" of exploited to act spontaneously without waiting on timid leaders characterized Hervé's Insurrectionalism. The call for both tactics actually reinforced his aim of revolutionary activism. Timid, dispirited, and materialistic workers would be aroused by active and energetic leaders. Spontaneous action by the repressed and

exploited "masses" would prod reluctant, divided, and inactive leaders. Whether Hervé had reasoned this out or merely reacted to the latest events is unknown. The result was still the same. Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* would use any tactics, no matter how contradictory, that worked to create revolutionary activism. The moment, the event, and the results were more important than any theory, or did that amount to a theory?[77]

Despite the best efforts by the Insurrectionals, only 300 to 1000 militants gathered along the Avenue de Boulogne before Clemenceau's arrival. Whatever the number, this was well short of Hervé's expectations. That poor turnout notwithstanding, whistles, jeering, and incessant antimilitarist slogans alluding to the events in the Midi soon were heard. Demonstrators who were present attempted to hiss Clemenceau and Minister of War Picquart and managed to cry "Á Narbonne!" and "*Vive le 17e!*" Soon the superior forces of the police caught and beat the demonstrators trapped in their pincer ambush. Fights and disturbances broke out after the plainclothes officers of the *Sûreté* arrived to "aid" the supposedly "well-intentioned" uniformed police. The demonstrators were no match for the police, and Almereyda and Merle were among those injured. Hervé's chief lieutenant was roughed up by a policeman who accused him of being born in Béziers, where the officer himself had just been manhandled by the winegrowers. Also attracting considerable attention among those arrested was Henri Wallon, whose grandfather was often called the "Father of the Constitution". When a nationalist paper accused Hervé of having been too afraid to go to the rally, Hervé demanded to be arrested because he had shouted "*Vive le 17e*" at least as much as those incarcerated.[78] One of the anarchists at Longchamp, already sympathetic to insurrectionalism and syndicalism, was Jean Goldsky, who was soon criticized by fellow anarchists for selling out his individualistic ideals. Goldsky claimed that anarchists sat around arguing in their "ivory towers" while syndicalists [and Insurrectionals?] acted and put some fear into the bourgeoisie.[79] Forty demonstrators including Almereyda were arrested, quickly sent to Santé Prison, and then placed with common criminals. After three weeks there, Almereyda along with a dozen antimilitarists were tried for rebellion by the Correctional Tribunal of the Seine, charged with threats against the army. Though Almereyda admitted he had supported the 17th Regiment, he claimed that he had simply demanded insubordination. The result was a six week sentence. Even though Hervé's lieutenant had endured half his sentence already, he was sent to the distant Clairvaux prison to complete the sentence.[80]

Hervé's dual tactic of calling to the militant elite and the mass of workers failed to achieve the results he had hoped for on July 14, 1907. Workers did not respond to the trials against C.G.T. leadership, to the Midi Crisis, or to the

demonstration at Longchamps because workers were "under the heels of the police." Since Parisian workers hated Clemenceau and applauded the actions of the 17th Infantry Regiment, Hervé reasoned that their failure to act on Bastille Day must have been due to their fear of the police. Hervé praised the 15th and 42nd sections of the *Fédération de la Seine*, which included many insurrectional socialists who responded to the appeals of *La Guerre Sociale*.[81]

While such events as the Longchamp demonstration could be seen as preparations for revolution, they often resembled a kind of ritualistic mimicry of revolutionary violence or even a latent adolescent thrill-seeking couched in the latest revolutionary discourse. *La Guerre Sociale* was probably no more objective in reporting on events which it helped create than the police were in reporting on their own role in such events. Much evidence can be found showing police brutality and repression, but violent confrontations had beneficial effects for *La Guerre Sociale*. Such events helped polarize society, pushed timid workers to act, created opportunities for materialistic workers to act for non-economic reasons, and fostered a sense of movement as well as camaraderie among militants. Of course, violent confrontations, just like the trials and prison sentences that *La Guerre Sociale* often sought, became fascinating subjects of the paper's own coverage.[82]

The implications of the Midi crisis and the demonstration at Longchamps would be echoed in *La Guerre Sociale* in the ensuing months, but Hervé's attention was soon directed to the impending S.F.I.O. Congress at Nancy which met August 11–15, 1907. Nancy was the former capital of Lorraine and chief city of the Eastern Department of the Meurthe-et-Moselle, so it was a fitting locale for a conference so interested in war. The French police were up-to-date and most interested in the two main issues for the socialist agenda: (1) antimilitarism and war, and (2) socialist relations with syndicalism. Also on the agenda were colonial policy, women's suffrage, and immigration/emigration.[83] In fact, the chief issues at Nancy were largely recapitulations of the ideas and motions of the Limoges Congress the preceding year.[84] Harvey Goldberg's classic study of Jaurès put the matter like this:

> "Once more, as the Socialists tried to set their thoughts in order before the forthcoming Congress of the Second International, the challenge of Hervé, the acrid criticism of Guesde, the persuasive replies of Vaillant and Jaurès rang through their meeting hall. The arguments, grown wearisome through repetition, were the same, and so were the results. At Nancy, as at Limoges, the majority supported the resolution which had originated with the Federation of the Seine. In taking these steps against war, the Socialists felt they were manifesting both courage and will. 'The greatness of socialism,' Vaillant had once written, 'must lie in its ability to act on its premises … In our struggle against war, we

> must not hesitate; we must, from now on, commit ourselves to a program.' Yet the program was full of ambiguities which not even the expository skill of Jaurès could take away. Could the Socialists distinguish, as the majority claimed and Hervé denied, between offensive and defensive war? Suppose, for example, that Germany, desperate for markets to support a bourgeoning industrialism, attacked France in her colonies. Were Socialists then to take up arms in the name of national defense? Or again, could public protests, or parliamentary efforts, or even the general strike forestall wars which Socialists believed to be inherent in capitalism? And if so, was it enough merely to list tactics without charting a detailed course of action? Critics, armed with the facts of later history, have been harsh on the prewar Socialists, accusing them of confusion in thought and failure in nerve. Yet seen from the perspective of those years their resolve was powerful enough to encourage the pacifists and to distract their opponents."[85]

Gilles Heuré called 1907 another "turning point" for Hervé, who took advantage of an "era of political agitation as well as growing antimilitarist and antipatriotic propaganda." Before the S.F.I.O. Congress of Nancy and that of the Second International at Stuttgart Congress, he hardened his tone and spread his extremist views in *La Guerre Sociale*.[86] Even before Nancy, though Jaurès denounced the "surface violence" employed by Hervé which aroused "useless fears", he admitted that "the ardent and revolutionary minorities" were a "necessary ferment." However, for the socialist tribune French socialism had to work to maintain the peace "without putting a parcel of the national independence in peril." Jaurès believed that "the historic personality of France was sacred, as was that of Germany, as was that of Italy, as was that of all other peoples who attained their conscience, autonomy, and unity after a long effort." He believed that "to develop and affirm itself, socialism would need 'unique and free nations'." For Jaurès, patriotism also posed a logical problem. "How would we be able to arouse the nation against a government promoting war and adventure if the nation could suppose for an instant that we were playing, consciously or unconsciously, the game of the invader?"[87]

A minor issue at Nancy for most socialists but one that would have repercussions both for socialism and general French politics in the years ahead was the question of women's suffrage. At the S.F.I.O. Nancy Congress, the singular feminist Dr. Madeleine Pelletier countered the arguments generally "advanced against the practicality (rather than the principle) of giving women the vote, namely that women's votes would be overwhelmingly conservative and lead to a restoration of monarchical rule and church influence …" Pelletier believed that education could prevent such an outcome.

> "She attacked the arguments put forward by the *Hervéistes* …, who were opposed to electoral and parliamentary cooperation with the Republic and in favor of revolutionary

> change. Like the anarchists, the *Hervéistes* opposed extension of the 'useless' suffrage to women. Pelletier argued powerfully that the working class had shed blood in a series of revolutions to gain the vote, which they clearly had seen as important, even if now they found it insufficient. How could working-class men ask women to forego something they had fought for themselves? Her resolution, though opposed by some speakers, again passed, [as it had at Limoges in 1906 with only six votes against] but with no greater effect than its predecessor. Pelletier quoted one delegate as saying: 'I hope you realize that we vote in favor of your motion because voting for women has no chance whatever of succeeding. If it had, you would see some real opposition.'"

So, despite joining the Hervéists later in July 1907, she had disagreed with them at Limoges and again at Nancy on female suffrage. Even Jaurès's interactions with Pelletier were described in terms which suggested that for him feminist issues were among the least important concerns for French socialism.[88]

The Nancy Congress was especially important because its central goal was to prepare the French position to be presented in late August at Stuttgart.[89] Hervé saw his role at Nancy as a defense of revolutionary syndicalist ideas on antimilitarism and antipatriotism. Socialist reformism, which the Insurrectionals even associated with Guesde's faith in voting and rejection of antimilitarism, needed to be redirected to revolutionary means and goals. Guesdists hoped to meet Hervé's attacks with his expulsion from the party or at least its C.A.P.[90] At Nancy, the *Sans Patrie* presented another motion of Yonne which basically duplicated his motion at Limoges and would be repeated at Stuttgart. Guesde's position was contained in a motion that echoed his ideas at Limoges but now the partisans of Insurrectionalism were much more severely judged. After the passage of the motion sponsored by Jaurès and Vaillant, Guesde reiterated his charges that the motion contained contradictory parts. Guesde saw a paradox in the socialists' desire to create an insurrection during the problematic and uncertain era of war, yet the same socialists refused to demand an insurrection to end already existing capitalist exploitation and bourgeois rule. After Jaurès and Pierre Renaudel charged Guesde with sponsoring "a motion of immobility and inaction," Guesde replied that his goal was to organize the proletariat to end the capitalist system which caused wars. Guesde then cried out "… when you have made a socialist, that will be worth more than making twenty antimiltarists like Hervé … who only think of not dying in the defense of a country that they have not had the courage to conquer."[91] Guesde also reported on a recent statement by the German socialist leader Bebel pledging that the S.P.D. would defend Germany. This led him to conclude that "if Germany is attacked, the German socialists will defend her. If France is attacked you would give us to understand that French socialists would disarm and deliver her! To go to Stuttgart under such conditions would be to prevent socialist

recruitment among workers and paralyze our propaganda. We would be accused of high treason everywhere."[92] According to Guesde, Hervéism was not just a deviation, it was an insurmountable obstacle to the extension of socialism which would only serve to delay the occurrence of revolution.[93]

On Tuesday morning August 13, 1907, Jaurès dealt Hervé some of his own medicine by employing a heavy dose of ridicule to demystify Hervé's arguments. Jaurès depicted Hervé as an adroit manipulator of words who actually confused people in the process. As Gilles Heuré phrased it, "If Hervé had demystified *la patrie*, Jaurès demystified the antipatriot." The socialist tribune ironically recalled Herve's countless efforts to explain how his *"drapeau dans le fumier"* image actually involved a Napoleonic flag and never the French tricolor. Jaurès sarcastically pointed out that the ferocious antipatriot Hervé was actually troubled by having the tricolor tainted by militaristic profanation.

> "Let me tell you, I do not know if this is a need for you or a special disposition, but you have the genius for misunderstandings ... (Laughter). One could say that you apply yourself—and you almost always succeed—in appearing to say something different from what you are actually saying. At the risk of offending you and stealing one of the most brilliant jewels in your crown, which the bourgeois press has placed on your head ... (more laughter), I am bound to tell you that you have never said that it was necessary to plant the French flag in a dungpile. You have never said it. I want to present the Parliament and your adversaries, the creation of a jury of grammarians to certify that you have said the contrary ... (various reactions—citizen Hervé gave indications of denial.) But yes, Hervé [...] The way they celebrated the anniversary of Wagram, how appropriate for this anniversary that they glorified the flag, you became indignant, you were scandalized, you have said: 'How can we choose, why choose the anniversary date of an abominable Caesarian killing to celebrate the flag, while within its folds are inscribed the glorious names of battles fought for liberty'? (Very good! Very good!) In this way, it was to protect the majesty of the flag from militaristic profanation that you wrote your article. (Approbations) And you have said: 'If this sort of thing happens, if you convoke men to commemorate abominable killings which have dishonored the flag, it would be the same thing as planting the flag in the dungpile,' and your article reminded me of the sermon of a Spanish priest who chastised men who came to the altar just after an orgy, saying: 'That would be the same as throwing God on a dung pile' ... That was the protest of an outraged religious conscience, and it's the wounded religion of the flag which protested in you. (This was followed by exclamations and laughing.)"

Then Jaurès delivered a *coup de grâce* which *Le Matin* claimed unleashed "general hilarity".

> "You tried to fix the thing, to adjust the parts, a week later, and the 'breaker of dishes' [*casseur d'assiettes*] became the mender of earthenware [*raccommodeur de faïence*] ... (Laughter and applause)".

Eventually, Jaurès rhetorically demanded that Hervé respond to the hypothesis on everyone's mind. What would he do if Germany, after having rejected international arbitration, went to war? Without letting Hervé respond Jaurès reiterated his point with telling effect.

> "In this case, wouldn't it be the duty of socialists to defend the nation's independence? […] What would you do, Hervé? I am convinced that, by a socialist and revolutionary duty, you would defend, along with your friends, the nation's independence. If it were otherwise, to what consequences would that lead you?"[94]

Instead of destroying countries, as Hervé seemed itching to do in the interest of international socialism, Jaurès called for them to be socialized. Yet, the Deputy from the Tarn did not fail to give Hervé and the Federation of the Yonne credit for having sensationally put the questions of war, antimilitarism, and antipatriotism before the nation. But Jaurès also dissected Hervéism and displayed its supposed childishness, and "he defused the personality of Gustave Hervé in making him more of a pig-headed and excitable ham actor, a clumsy juggler of ideas whose importance sometimes escaped him, than an unsettling revolutionary." Jaurès remained the ultimate team player,

> "in preventing the question of Hervéism from becoming a cause of rupture and an occasion for Hervé to attack the party from the outside. In any case, the attack struck home, to the point that Hervé, bewildered by the force of Jaurès's criticism, tried to compensate for the insults with a clumsy response. A brief speech [by Hervé was] frequently interrupted. When, furious, Hervé launched into Jaurès:
>
> > 'Then, listen to me, Jaurès!'
>
> The latter, got up, gestured a military salute, and riposted to Hervé:
>
> > "'Speak, corporal!' The reply triggered laughter."[95]

The Nancy Congress, like the gathering at Stuttgart that followed, may have provided Jaurès with the perfect national and international arenas to put Hervé in his place, but the idealistic and mercurial Breton would not stay put. Despite the shellacking that he had received at the hands of the eminences of socialism, Hervé felt triumphant after Nancy because his ideas seemed to be gaining acceptance by Jaurès and Vaillant.[96]

A few days later the 7th Congress of the Second International opened on August 18, 1907 in the Swabian city of Stuttgart. It was the first such conference ever held on German soil. That Sunday a massive gathering of between fifty

and one hundred thousand people took place at the Volksfestplatz, a twenty to thirty acre tract on the banks of the Necker, a little over a mile from the center of Stuttgart. Ironically, that site was often used for military maneuvers.[97] The Stuttgart Congress was a culminating point regarding the problem of how socialist parties from various nation-states would deal with their professed internationalism and, at the same time, it was an impasse for the International on the question of what to do about war. "The preceding international congress at Amsterdam concluded on a rather vague compromise. But at Stuttgart the question of the struggle against war was clearly posed. And the positions were all the more long-awaited since, for some time, the international environment allowed a latent climate of war to break through." The Russo-Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, and the First Moroccan Crisis had everyone's attention. An S.P.D. electoral defeat that spring had encouraged the advocates of an expansionist colonial policy in Africa, and it reinforced the S.P.D. right-wing. That meant that the German socialists were on the defensive at the time of the congress, especially on the questions of militarism and war.[98]

The Congress was undoubtedly the acme of Hervéism on the international plane. Hervé's initiatives certainly helped make the question of socialist actions to prevent war the most important problem on the agenda at Stuttgart. The motion, which finally was passed despite its infeasibility and contradictions, was considered by Hervé to have been a "victory for the French antipatriots."[99] Yet Hervé's actions at Stuttgart provide evidence that his future national socialism all along had been rooted in his socialism. The Stuttgart Congress showed that the origins of Hervé's socialism as well as his national socialism were inseparable from the dichotomies and antinomies of socialism itself.

After commenting on the many luminaries of European socialism attending the Congress, one British delegate noted the attention and excitement generated by Hervé. "The figure that attracted the most attention was one hitherto largely unfamiliar to the International Socialist movement, but one of which it is safe to predict much will be heard in the future. This was Gustav[e] Hervé, one of those electric dashing figures of which France has produced so many. This man, almost unheard of at the time of the Amsterdam Congress, has added a new word to the Socialist vocabulary—Hervéism, and whatever we may think of his position and tactics, has given a sort of electric shock to the whole European Socialist movement."[100]

Hervé was present at Stuttgart mainly to voice his arguments about war. However, he was also a firm supporter of syndicalist autonomy and an advocate of direct action methods to transcend parliamentary socialism. Such stances put

him at odds with most socialists at Stuttgart.[101] Certainly, Hervé's chief goal in coming to Stuttgart was to personally deliver his antimilitarist message on the international stage. "At the International Bureau meeting in March 1906, the Germans had opposed in vain the French effort to include anti-militarism in the coming congress' agenda." The Germans were especially fearful of any mention of the mass strike, hence their assault on Hervé. However, as Carl E. Schorske has stressed, the Germans could not control the International the same way that they controlled their own labor movement because most other countries did not wish to exclude the use of the mass strike as a possible means to prevent war.[102]

"[Auguste] Bebel and the ex-army officer, Georg von Vollmar, took the most intransigent position with respect to the French majority resolution which they attacked as syndicalism and 'Hervéism.' Arguing now the unreality of any threat of war and the pacific intentions of the German government, now the impossibility of full-fledged anti-military agitation in autocratic Germany, Bebel and Vollmar resisted any 'method of struggle which might harm the party or, under certain circumstances, become fatal to its existence.'"[103] Bebel obviously rejected Hervé's resolution, but he refused to support the Vaillant-Jaurès proposal because he realized that "in its final phase, [it] made important concessions to Hervé." Although Vollmar claimed he did not want to get mixed up in the internal affairs of a fellow socialist party, he stressed "that there was a danger in being too condescending with regard to Citizen Hervé."[104] He also explained something that Bebel had merely implied. "It is not true that international is the same as anti-national. It is not true that we do not have nations."[105] For Vollmar, "the French offered nothing but an old recipe, a warming over of the suggestions of Nieuwenhuis, whose anarchistic proposals on the general strike had been repeatedly rejected at earlier International congresses."[106] It seemed to him that the two resolutions of Hervé and Jaurès-Vaillant "to suppress war by a military strike or by a similar measure … [were] as crazy as the idea of suppressing capitalism by the general strike."[107]

Emil Vandervelde, the leading Belgian socialist at the congress, thought that the methods promoted by Hervé were not admissible, but he gave Hervé credit rendering "a great service to the proletariat" by launching his "internationalist firecrackers" which could alter the direction which French workers were being led toward jingoism. "That would be the only homage, however discreet, made to the fiery delegate from the Department of the Yonne."[108]

In coming to Stuttgart, "Jaurès wanted to convince … the international socialist movement to do everything to prevent war. Hervé wanted, … if not to see his ideas triumph, at least to cause uproar over his resolution. The violence of his attacks against German Social Democracy … and the extremism of his resolution

caused him to be disavowed by everyone." Jaurès directed his speech mainly at the Germans by affirming that the motion that he and Vaillant brought to Stuttgart arose from a genuine fear that an international crisis could easily degenerate into conflict. He was convinced that parliamentary actions were not enough to prevent war. From now on the full political force of the proletariat had to be placed at the service of antimilitarism. Vaillant admitted that Hervé's ideas on preventing war would mean that the working class ran the risk of "useless sacrifices".[109]

Lenin was a member of the committee which dealt with the resolution on war, and his diary entry at that time "probably reflected the views of a substantial segment of radical opinion."

> "'Even though Hervé did show that he was light-minded … [and] superficial, … it would be extreme shortsightedness to reply to him by a mere dogmatic exposition of the general truths of socialism. Vollmar particularly fell into that error, and Bebel and Guesde were not entirely free of it. With the extraordinary conceit of a man infatuated with stereotyped parliamentarianism, Vollmar attacked Hervé without noting that his own narrow-mindedness and hardened opportunism compel one to recognize the living stream in Hervéism in spite of the theoretical absurdity and the foolish manner in which Hervé himself presents the question. It sometimes happens that at a new turning point of a movement, theoretical absurdities cover up some practical truth.'"[110]

"The 'practical truth' which Lenin saw in Hervéism was that the working class could not" afford to "identify … with the interests of any one of the belligerents in a" future war but could "'take advantage of the crisis created by the war for hastening the downfall of the bourgeoisie.'"[111]

There were four competing views regarding socialist actions to prevent war. Significantly, three different motions were supported by various members of the French delegation. Bebel and most of the Germans joined Guesde's deterministic ideas expressed at Limoges and Nancy "which treated militarism and war as functions of capitalism,"[112] but Bebel believed that the Congress would have been best served by simply reaffirming previous views of the International regarding the actions of socialists for the prevention of war. Hervé's motion was to a large degree a recapitulation of his ideas at Limoges and Nancy,[113] "which proposed to commit the International to antipatriotism, the military strike, and insurrection in the face of war."[114] Jaurès and Vaillant recreated the majority resolutions of the previous two National Congresses of the S.F.I.O. The fourth general view on socialist action to prevent war was that of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. Following the events in Russia in 1904 and 1905, these two revolutionaries came to accept Engels' predictions on the connections between war and revolution. A European war would so weaken the machinery of capitalist states that successful revolutions

could occur. Thus, Lenin and Luxemburg urged that agitation, insurrection, and strikes be used not just to end a war but to overthrow class rule. They proposed to make use of the violent economic and political crisis brought on by a war to rouse the people to revolution.[115]

Remarkably, all four general views to end war were amalgamated into what Hervé called the usual *nègre-blanc* which received unanimous approval by the full Congress. All tactics to prevent war were approved but not demanded. There was no specific mention of the general strike or an insurrection to prevent war, in deference to German Social Democrats, but these tactics were not excluded. Socialist parties could act in any manner they saw fit because the motion specifically tied each country's response to its level of class struggle and its particular political situation. Yet, the last sentence of the motion was a nearly perfect rendition of the Lenin-Luxemburg position which would use war to create revolution.[116]

The passage of the motion on war by acclamation saw Hervé, in keeping with his view of the French as mercurial and passionate, jump on a table with both hands held high, trying to demonstrate that "the German attitude was duplicitous and dubious."[117] Before he left Stuttgart, Hervé took the podium in order to tell Bebel and Vollmar that their votes contradicted their speeches. Yet Hervé hoped his presence at Stuttgart and the motion that was passed would act as "revolutionary leaven in the thick and heavy Social-Democratic dough." Hervé may have felt triumphant after Stuttgart, but he was under no illusions about the resolution on war.[118] The Stuttgart resolution was a combination of Guesdist determinism, Jaurèsist romantic and idealistic optimism, Blanquist ideas of elitist activism, Hervéist insurrectionalism, and Leninist revolutionary realism, all coupled to the inertia of the S.P.D. Nevertheless, Hervé was content because his ideas were being voiced in the same arena in which Nieuwenhuis's similar views had been silenced. "After witnessing the *Sans Patrie* at Stuttgart, Lenin criticized him for failing to understand the relationship between revolution, capitalist development, and war," yet Lenin admitted that that "what Hervé lacked as a Marxist theoretician, he more than made up for as a practicing revolutionary."[119]

Yet Hervé's actions at Stuttgart were ominous evidence that his own ideas never could triumph. His ideas were voiced in a language and logic that reflected the central dilemma of the International itself. The delegates at the Congress needed little acuity to see that Hervé's antipatriotism was an internal French phenomenon.[120] Jonathan Almosnino connected Hervé's rejection at Stuttgart to views reminiscent of French Blanquism as well as revolutionary syndicalism rather than the revolutionary conceptions of Social Democracy. Thus it was not surprising that revolutionaries like Lenin, Luxemburg, and Julius Martov rejected

both Hervé's ideas and the Congress.[121] The violence of his language and ideas was justified by an international ideal that was beyond reproach, yet many of the delegates noted how the voice that spoke at Stuttgart had the shrill tones of atavistic nationalism. According to James Joll, Hervé always "overstressed his points, and the tone of his speech made it embarrassing, especially to the other French representatives; the hatred of Germany, which, after 1914 (sic), was to turn him into as hysterical a chauvinist as he had once been pacifist (sic), was already a predominant motive with him."[122] The conservative French press was not as perceptive. *Le Temps* contrasted Hervé's antimilitarism and antipatriotism with the conservatism and patriotism of the S.P.D. Even the moderate press wanted the French government to imitate the severe measures of the German authorities against antimilitarism in order to get the same results for France.[123]

Hervé's critique of German Social-Democracy and the German proletariat had much truth in it. But like the earlier critique by Nieuwenhuis, it was voiced in an emotional anti-Germanism.[124] Hervé stated that he had prepared a calm exposé of his antipatriotic ideas, but once he heard Bebel's attacks on Jaurès and his own ideas for a general strike, he resolved to speak his feelings. In a biting exchange with Bebel, he accused the S.P.D. of fearing prison, of being a machine to collect money and votes, and of behaving like sheep whenever Bebel or any of its "pontiffs" spoke. In concluding his debate with Bebel, Hervé screamed, "Follow the flag of your Emperor, yes, follow it. But if you enter France you will see floating over our insurrectional communes the red flag of the International which you will have betrayed."[125] For all the truth that Hervé's portrayal of the German workers may have had, it is evidence of far more than a lack of tact. "I was excited at meeting personally German Social Democracy which I for years had only known, and dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders, from its quibbling hair-splitting quarrels about the exegesis of Karl Marx. Now I've seen the German proletarians in the streets of Stuttgart. My naive illusions are destroyed; they are all good, contented, and satisfied bourgeois."[126] Later, Bebel reacted to this assault by informing Hervé that in Germany "they do not grant amnesties after two months, like they do in France."[127]

A day after Hervé's confrontation with Bebel, Jaurès employed a bit of the same sarcastic humor which had been so effective in Nancy in order to cut Hervé down a notch or two due to his adversarial insolence and bad manners at Stuttgart, traits which had dumbfounded everyone. "Yesterday, Hervé tried to criticize the S.P.D. in a speech full of pointed barbs. That shows just how much of an internationalist he has become since, generally, he reserves his attacks for his own party. [Laughter] I might add that if I had a wound for every time Hervé

attacked me, I would have a face scarred like a German university student [general hilarity]."[128]

At Stuttgart Hervé's internationalism was couched in a vocabulary of national and ethnic characteristics with the Germans stereotyped by their patriotism, authoritarianism, regimentation, and Marxist dogmatism. The spontaneous outburst by Hervé was in keeping with the self-described emotionalism of his socialism as well as his later national socialism. The technique of violent verbal confrontation was consistent with his usual methods. The key was seldom what Hervé said but how he said it. His justification for his uproarious tactics at Stuttgart was that it was necessary to get his antipatriotic message to workers burdened by daily work.[129] The nature of his attack on those same workers negates that explanation, his later defenses of German workers notwithstanding. True to his simplifying and polarizing methods, Hervé, throughout his entire career, divided Germans into two groups. Anti-Germanism was at the heart of a technique that admitted the existence of some "good Germans." Despite the later shifts in emphasis, the emotional, binary, and atavistic basis of his socialism remained.

What were the results of Hervé's performance at Stuttgart? For Gilles Heuré the answer varied depending on what was assumed about his goals. Yet, Heuré does not leave much doubt that Hervé left Stuttgart with a less than stellar reputation. The congress "stripped Hervéism bare, and Hervé appeared more like an original prototype of a perturbed extremist, who was insolent and disrespectful to the most worthy members of the working class movement …, rather than an innovator with solid reflections and devastating arguments." Rather than constructing coherent ideas and fearlessly entering into the debate in order to add something original and useful to the socialist vision, Hervé, "in caring for his own renown, perched on the most striking position possible, projected a key idea, and, in an aggressive fashion, drained any form of critical contribution." For Heuré, the Nancy and Stuttgart gatherings "sounded the death knell of Hervéism as a doctrine, revealing it incapable of creating an international consensus, and limiting it to the sole influence of its representative, strained over the negation of the nation and an improbable insurrection at some specified time."[130]

French Socialist Henri de la Porte described the Congress of Stuttgart as "the definitive death of Hervéism" which he judged to have been rather inconsequential in the end. "What does the word Hervéism mean?" asked de la Porte. "Interrogate fifty people: you will get fifty different opinions. Therefore, I am obliged to consider Hervéism here only as the collection of jokes, whims, half-theories, and outrageous remarks personally launched by Hervé. This entire pile of incoherent

points of view and tactics, changed daily and always proffered with the same cocky and less than serious tone by Hervé, [it] … constituted such a chaos of contradictions that the only common link that one can see there is the personality of the one who expressed them, Citizen Hervé." Views such as these led Heuré to conclude that "Hervé was unquestionably hauled up on the banner of antipatriotism at Stuttgart."[131]

In terms of his notoriety, Stuttgart does not seem to have diminished it. French newspapers were quick to contrast the differences between French and German socialist treatment of their particular nations by using Hervé as their primary French example. In the August 25 issue of *La Dêpêche*, Camille Pelletan was amazed by the phenomenon. "Who could have been able to expect that the mediocre personality of Hervé and his noisy challenges to the French spirit could weigh so heavily on politics today? And by what aberration has he been given an importance that he would never have been able to have?" Socialists themselves often seemed dumbfounded by the Hervé effect. In the publication *Messidor* socialist moderate Eugène Fournière was aghast that socialists had allowed their party to be connected to antipatriotism. How had "the party which was the great educator of democracy" have found itself "repulsed onto a revolutionary path in the tow of a violent minority." As Heuré saw the situation: "Hervé here, Hervé there. Whether you spoke about him unkindly, did not seem to traumatize the person concerned. Without a doubt the essential thing was that his name, his influence, and his verbal violence would be spread in the newspaper columns. At the time of the congress, moreover, he did everything for [attention]."[132]

Years later L.-O. Frossard would reiterate similar charges.

> "The incendiary campaigns of Hervéism led to the greatest damage to the party. They banished many serious people who did not want anyone to confuse them with the *casseurs d'assiettes* from *La Guerre Sociale*. Worst of all, people made Jaurès responsible for Hervé. They held him accountable for the excesses, the blasphemies, and the incongruities of Hervéism. And Jaurès could not bring himself to repudiate any solidarity with a man who, like Blanqui, only left one prison in order to enter another. Everything in Hervéism offended Jaurès: the ideas, the form in which they were arrayed, this constant concern 'to stick it to the bourgeoisie', this grandstanding, this crude exploitation of the least worthy passions, this continual excitation of the basest aspects of humanity. But could you exclude him when he was in prison or getting ready to return there? Jaurès didn't think so. The Guesdists had less indulgence regarding the *enragé* pamphleteer."[133]

His first articles upon his return to France described the Stuttgart Congress as "our victory" which was forced on the overly regimented Germans and their Kaiser and which will not be easy to dismiss.[134] However, in one of the same

editorials, he was quite skeptical regarding the efficacy of the antiwar resolution at Stuttgart. Though he said he would accept the S.P.D. vote until he had proof to the contrary, he wanted the German militants to back up their votes with actions. Hervé, then, possibly for the first time in writing, described his ideas for an insurrectional *organisation de combat*. Such an *organisation* was being created in France, and he wanted a similar organization in Germany. Since an insurrection could not be improvised but must be planned, German militants should prepare for it both openly and privately. The best time for an insurrection to occur was when the government armed the people. "So it is necessary that revolutionary militants form secret sections made up of comrades from the same neighborhood, city, or village. These secret sections should be few in number, made up of reliable men who do not drink. [Hervé generally wanted *alcohol* prohibited, not beer or wine.] These sections would be connected from one end of Germany to the other, forming the *organisation de combat* of Social Democracy."[135] The *organisation de combat* was to be activated to prevent war or to aid a general strike, and all members were expected to carry handguns. Hervé claimed he would have proposed this plan at Stuttgart if the Congress had not been cut short and censored to avoid political problems for the S.P.D.[136]

Following the Stuttgart gathering of the International, Jean Jaurès delivered a major address on September 7 reporting on the recent congress to an overflowing crowd of more than 6000 people at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall near the Place de la République. He also called on workers to do everything possible to prevent a future war in Europe and to stop the present Franco-Spanish expedition to Morocco. One purpose for the gathering was to respond to all the lies and accusations of the bourgeois press regarding what socialists said at the Stuttgart Congress. He described two truths that had arisen at Stuttgart which were: (1) the right and the duty of autonomous nations to preserve their autonomy, and (2) the need for workers to not be content with powerless anathemas and mere speeches to deal with the threat of war. After demanding that all international crises that could not be settled amicably be turned over to arbitration, and failing that, for the workers in uniform to use their arms to topple any government which refused arbitration, Jaurès went on to complement the former butt of his wit, Hervé. "And I am not embarrassed to recognize that it is in part because of the activity of Hervé, whom we owe, that the question has been posed as clearly and as brutally as it has been." But he went on to insist that Hervé "has not taken sufficient account of the reality of nationalities … and the autonomy of nations."[137]

A few days later Hervé gave a major address in Paris to an overflowing crowd on September 12, 1907 at the Salle des Sociétés Savantes.[138] The topic of his

speech was the "Congress of Stuttgart and Antipatriotism," but his address was as much a celebration of supposedly triumphant Hervéism as a report on Stuttgart. In his peroration the German workers and socialists fared somewhat better than they had in person. But both the followers of Bebel and Guesde still found themselves assailed. Hervé's presentation also responded to Jaurès's remarks at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall.[139] Apparently, Jaurès's brief acknowledgement of Hervé's contribution to the debate on socialist responses to war could not placate the mercurial Breton still smarting from Jaurès's recent barbs. Perhaps as an attempt to pay Jaurès back for his satirical treatment at Nancy and Stuttgart, Hervé responded with his own sarcasm, noting how Jaurès now saw "some good grain among all the bad" in Hervéism after years of calling it "vile, base, repugnant, and reactionary." Hervé termed Jaurès's acceptance of the general strike and insurrection "quite an evolution." It had taken Jaurès three years to see the "healthy and solid part of Hervéism." Perhaps it would take the Germans even longer to see the same thing. Though he distrusted Jaurès's compromises, Hervé credited him with helping to put the question of war before the International during the last three years.[140]

His response to Jaurès's recent criticisms shows how difficult it is to demonstrate Hervé's latent patriotism. The *Sans Patrie* continued to attack nations, armies, and colonies in the most clear and uncompromising manner. His rhetorical response to Jaurès's confirmation of the reality of *patries* was almost brilliant in its simplicity and absurdity. "Are not Churches, religion, cholera, and the plague also facts and realities?" Hervé asked. "The whole question was to know if they were necessary, inevitable, … eternal … and, above all, if they were beneficial or harmful facts for humanity today."[141] He could not help commenting on German discipline and regimentation at Stuttgart. "I saw forty thousand German Social Democrats on the opening Sunday of the congress, and not one *flic*." Nevertheless, he predicted the creation of a United States of Europe based on autonomous regions, which he called more natural than nations. He denied Jaurès's second objection to his ideas regarding offensive and defensive wars. No matter what Jaurès believed, there was no way to differentiate between the two. Unlike Jaurès, at this time Hervé rejected arbitration as a means of finding the aggressor. For him, arbitration was a naïve and utopian gimmick because nations could easily use it to deceive the press as well as the socialists. Hervé also believed it was foolish to think that socialists of an aggressor power would join socialists of a defender power in order to defeat the aggressor. The man who had given a nearly ethnocentric attack on German socialism at Stuttgart now called for all people to learn *Esperanto* in order to end national differences! On almost all points Hervé

was extreme, internationalist, and consistent, at least rhetorically. Back in Paris, Hervé's patriotism was less obvious. Antipatriotism was more consistent and the Germans less vile when Hervé spoke inside France. No wonder Hervéism was not easily exported.[142]

In the same speech Hervé told his audience to "scream loudly so that the mercenary soldiers who are heading down there[to Morocco] know that you have no more pity for them than for armed robbers ..." He also claimed that the weakness of the C.G.T. was a major cause of the failure to prevent French troops from going to Morocco.[143] What if the forces of the Left remained weak, inactive, and ineffective? Hervé's extremist and emotional appeal was impatient and could seldom tolerate inaction or vacillation. However rhetorical his violence, more than any other French socialist he appeared to be creating organizations which could fulfill his vision. Nevertheless, if the rest of the Left remained divided, powerless, and inactive, Hervé's impatience and activism might someday demand another avenue.

During the fall of 1907 Hervé maintained an amazing level of activity and travel until late December 1907 when he was tried and sentenced for an article comparing French troops in Morocco to common criminals in France. His meetings, editorials, and other publications again made him seem be a "perpetual motion machine" that had an impact throughout the country among teachers, workers, socialist youth groups, and soldiers. Whenever teachers expressed antimilitarist views or reservists voiced Hervéist ideas, the police were there and the bourgeois press not far behind, so that the threat to the nation posed by Hervéism seemed to cascade endlessly.

In mid-September a group of young socialists from the 10th *arrondissement* were caught distributing fliers to military conscripts which echoed the Hervéist mantra that "it was preferable to kill a French general than a foreign soldier."[144] According to police sources the *Jeunesses Socialistes de la 42e Section de la Seine* seemed to be "in fully blown Hervéism" that fall.[145] On October 1, 1907 *L'Écho de Paris* reported on incidents and the arrests of Hervé-inspired antimilitarists who distributed flyers in train stations, especially in the Gare de l'Est, even though most of the conscripts were not scheduled to depart until October 7–9. One of those arrested, Georges Docquet, worked at *La Guerre Sociale* and named Hervé as his defense attorney.[146] Brochures containing his speech at Stuttgart were also distributed during this period. At a meeting in Auxerre on October 27, Hervé called on soldiers to not march if war were declared. Instead, "Respond with an insurrection ... find weapons but go to the Prefecture and you can take control of the city." Even though that speech seemed dangerously subversive to the mainstream

press and some police agents, the *Procureur Général* said that it could probably not be prosecuted successfully because there were no soldiers in the audience, so that it did not come under articles 24 and 25 of the Press Law of July 1881.[147] On October 29 *Le Temps* reported on a recent *conseils généraux* election in the Aude where a local Radical Socialist mayor defeated the incumbent by repudiating "with the utmost energy the abominable theories of Hervé."[148]

About the time of the Nancy and Stuttgart Congresses another series of events transpired which led Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* by late September to begin a campaign for two young workers who had been imprisoned for antimilitarism.[149] Hervé was among the attorneys defending ten antimilitarists tried for signing a violent antimilitarist manifesto entitled *Aux Crimes, Répondons Par La Révolte*! That manifesto had been placarded on August 8–9, 1907. Not only did the manifesto approve the earlier military revolt in the Midi, it called for troops to disobey and even to murder officers if events like the Midi Crisis occurred again. The age range of the defendants was 17 to 30. Of the ten people who signed the manifesto only Henriette Roussel was acquitted while the two apparent youngest, René Mahé and André Picardat, were convicted along with their male co-defendants. The age of the boys had not prevented the courts from putting them into protective custody until they were 21 years old![150] At the time of his arrest, Mahé, whose nickname was the "marquis", was the 17 or 18 year old son of poor traders. He had no prior police record and almost no prior history of leftist activities. Picardat was a 17 year old apprentice hairdresser who may have had a police record by age 14 according to one source.[151] The verdicts against the two young anarchist antimilitarists aroused antimilitarist circles, especially *La Guerre Sociale*, due to their ages and because the young men would presumably spend their time among common criminals in a *maison de correction* until they reached their majority.[152] The ensuing Mahé-Picardat campaign illustrates that cooperation on the Left was not yet a pipedream. Not only was Hervé a defense attorney at the trial, his chief lieutenant Almereyda testified on behalf of the defendants, supporting their antimilitarist ideas and citing both the activities of the A.I.A. and the proposals of the recent international congress at Stuttgart. Although he had not been bothered by the authorities in these legal proceedings, Almereyda had actually helped draft and disseminate the manifesto.[153]

La Guerre Sociale helped organize various actions to try to save the two young men from detention. At a gathering at the Salle de la Liberté on the Rue Ordener on December 6, 1907, Almereyda met with members of *La Guerre Sociale*, *Le Libertaire* (for which Almereyda and other Hervéists had once written), *La Groupe de la Liberté d'Opinion* organized by René de Marmande, and a new and probably

ephemeral group organized by Almereyda called the *Groupe pour la défense des condamnés*. De Marmande's group gathered money for political prisoners and their families, while Almereyda, according to one *mouchard*, was more interested in gathering funds to help his friends be acquitted rather than devoting time and money in defense of Mahé and Picardat.[154]

While such a campaign shows some ability by people with contrary views to debate the issues, it could also be considered a typical example of the kinds of conflicting priorities that would eventually prove quite disruptive. Police reports verify that there was no shortage of personality conflicts, suspicions of police spies in their midst, disputes over policies, and a perpetual lack of funds. Police files in 1907 and 1908 include ongoing comments on the rivalries, differences, personality clashes, and press competition among the groups and organs on the extreme French Left including: *La Guerre Sociale*, *Le Mouvement Socialiste*, *Le Libertaire*, *Les Temps Nouveaux*, *L'Anarchie*, *L'Action Directe*, and other syndicalist groups. There were also rivalries going on within various groups because factions and cliques were constantly forming and dissolving. Evidence of division and disorder among the fissiparous French Left was a constant police refrain which has become a cliché among historians of the epoch, yet the police feared and had inklings of an effort generated by the C.G.T. to combine all the disparate forces of the extreme Left, including anarchists, revolutionary socialists, syndicalists, antimilitarists, leftist youth, cooperatives, and Malthusians, into a single revolutionary movement.[155] And the police occasionally reported discussions of the most extreme and violent actions being planned by leftist extremists including Hervéists like Méric.[156]

When Almereyda finally got out of Clairvaux Prison after three weeks there in the fall of 1907 for his actions on Bastille Day, he faced further judicial pursuits for an article called "*Bravo les Soldats*" which praised the mutinous soldiers during the recent riots in the Midi. At the end of February 1908 both he and Merle, who was the paper's editing manager, failed to appear in court earlier in order to keep their trial separate from that of Hervé. Once they decided to "face the music", Almereyda and Merle were accused by the *Assises de la Seine* of provoking the soldiers into commiting acts of disobedience in that article. Like his boss, Almereyda intended to continue to use judicial proceedings to promote antimilitarism. Thus, he called on soldiers not only to refuse to attack workers, but to rise up against a corrupt social order.[157] Almereyda claimed that for him the final verdict mattered little; the revolutionary cause was all that mattered because it was just.[158] After being assailed in the court as "sulfurous anarchist individualists" by the counsel for the prosecution named Fremont, already known for his hatred of the antimilitarists in general and *La Guerre Sociale* in particular, the two

journalists initially received four-year sentences. That sentence was soon reduced to two years and fines of 500 francs each due to mitigating circumstances.[159] As Jonathan Almosnino phrased it, for Almereyda "repression served the revolutionary cause, elevating the militants to the rank of martyr."[160] Despite the bravado displayed by Almereyda when he finally appeared in court, the two journalists later refused to present themselves to the court for incarceration, claiming that journalists charged with similar crimes has been granted amnesties by the new Briand ministry. Sought by the police, Merle and Almereyda escaped to Brussels where they were helped by Belgian anarchists and money coming from sympathizers in France. When their case seemed to be getting a favorable hearing, they returned to France, but their appeals for clemency were rejected. So, at the beginning of June 1908 they were sent to La Santé where they encountered several friends and acquaintances including Hervé. This was Almereyda's fifth prison term already, even though he was only 25 years old.[161]

The campaign for Mahé and Picardat never dominated the concerns of either Hervé or *La Guerre Sociale* in 1908. Nevertheless, even after the two were released in July 1908 and interned in their native cities, the names Mahé and Picardat were mentioned in countless articles, meetings, pamphlets, and posters by almost all antimilitarist groups on the French Left. Whatever results this campaign had on the release of the two youths, real sympathy was probably limited to already convinced antimilitarists.[162] The extreme youth of the signers, the arbitrary nature of the system of justice, and the horrible conditions in which the lads were kept became emotional themes used by *La Guerre Sociale* to spread its antimilitarist message. Hervé and his followers hoped to use the case to create indignation in order to win new adepts to insurrectionalism. The incredible violence of the manifesto signed by the young antimilitarists was not allowed to moderate the indictment of Republican justice by *La Guerre Sociale*.[163] Articles over the fate of the two youthful antimilitarists could create interest, emotion, converts, and circulation for *La Guerre Sociale*. The situation had to be used to full advantage. Of course, Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* hoped to create enough response to force the government to release the youths. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Mahé and Picardat campaign is the symbolic and ritualistic nature that the use of the names came to have. The names of imprisoned militants and the scenes of governmental repression became leftist litanies of revolutionary saints and shrines intoned at meetings and mentioned in posters, brochures, and articles by the Hervéists and other revolutionaries. Mahé, Picardat, Hervé, Yvetot, Bousquet, Lévy—*ora pro nobis*. The victims at Fourmies, Narbonne, Raon-l'Étape, Draveil, Vigneux, Villenueve-Saint-Georges—*miserere nobis*.

Reporting on sensational trials and unfortunate prison sentences of other antimilitarists encouraged action or increased circulation for *La Guerre Sociale.* But that was not the newspaper's only means to attract attention and readers. The paper was itself the subject of so many judicial proceedings that these legal wranglings became self-advertisements by way of martyrdom and striking means to generate sympathy and support. At times the paper was in danger due to legal expenses and imprisonment of its journalists. Such developments were obvious factors in the creation of a weekly rubric titled "*La chasse aux militants*," but this new feature may have had another function as well. There were so many legal actions going on, so many concurrent sentences and trials, so many affiliated groups or newspapers involved, so many jurisdictions, and so many kinds of illegal activities being engaged in that readers needed a simple and rapid means of keeping track. "*La Chasse aux militants*" was a kind of revolutionary scorecard. Perhaps this feature was a kind of substitute for the sports coverage which Hervé would accept reluctantly after the war as a way for the daily *La Victoire* to try to compete with the mass dailies.

Most of the trials of the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* in 1907 and early 1908 concerned articles over the Midi Crisis and, increasingly, articles on French Moroccan policies and actions. Hervé's campaign attacking France's Moroccan "crimes" was glaring proof of the narrowness of his appeal. Articles over Morocco might provoke the government and land Hervé in prison, but the average French citizen was largely indifferent to Morocco and French colonialism. In response, Hervé was not reticent to call the people stupid and idiotic as they wallowed in the lies of the patriotic press. He lamented the weakness of the C.G.T. because it was unable to launch a general strike over Morocco. He became so exasperated over the failure of the Left to join his anticolonial crusade that the antiparliamentary firebrand implied that antimilitarism and anticolonialism would increase voter appeal for socialist deputies![164] In an article in late November, Hervé compared French troops in Morocco to common thieves in France. The armed French robbers of Morocco fared worse in the comparison, and Hervé's article quickly became subject to legal proceedings.[165] In the next issue Hervé praised a frontier tribe, the Beni-Snassen ("*benis soient-ils*!" "May they be blessed!") who had just defeated a small band of French troops. The antipatriot Hervé praised Moroccan patriotism because it served his own needs to attack the hypocrisy of patriotic Radicals, members of the League of the Rights of Man, French Jews who lamented *pogroms* in Russia, French Catholics who professed universal brotherhood, stupid workers, and idiotic peasants, all of whom did nothing to protest conquest and aggression in Morocco which could lead to war with Germany.[166] In view

of Hervé's later sacrifice of Moroccan rights in the interest of preventing war with Germany in 1911 and after, one might wonder at the meaning of Hervé's earlier Moroccan campaign. Fear of war with Germany seems to have been the only consistent element. In 1907 and 1908 Hervé ridiculed and attacked almost everyone in France for actively or passively assisting in the conquest of Morocco because he hoped to use French colonial violence to generate socialist, syndicalist, and anarchist actions in his insurrectional campaigns and organizations to prevent war.[167] The failure of his campaigns and organizations would eventually lead Hervé to turn to another method to prevent war. In both periods the fate of the Moroccans was less important than the fate of the French. The viciousness of the attack on his fellow countrymen for acquiescing over Morocco overwhelmed the rationale for the attack—the organization of the extreme French Left to prevent a war which, evidently, also protected his lethargic and egoistic countrymen. The content of Hervé's rhetoric could easily change if another rhetorical device could prove potentially more successful. Hervé did not lack a goal or a program. Rather, the means to attain his vision often became confused with or subverted the vision itself.

The Director of *La Guerre Sociale* did not totally neglect social, economic, and class analyses to explain France's Moroccan policy. Such themes were included in his December 12, 1907 public conference and debate at the Salle des Sociétés Savantes titled "*Contre le Brigandage Marocain*"[168] This speech was expanded and given increased documentation for Hervé's defense testimony in his trial before the *Cour d'Assises de la Seine* on December 23–24, 1907.[169] After the trial his defense speech was turned into a brochure by *La Guerre Sociale* to be sold by its *Service de Librairie* under the title *Contre le Brigandage Marocain*. Hervé's trial defense again sought to use the occasion to attack the authorities and their policies. According to Hervé the reasons for French Moroccan expeditions were not patriotic, they were economic. His proof was that financiers, bankers, industrialists, and munitions makers made profits over Morocco. The German firm of Krupp and the French firm of Schneider were both involved in the *Union des Mines Marocaines*. How could this be a patriotic venture? Armed robbery on a French train at Étampes was no different than the theft of a foreign nation's resources by the use of cannon at Casablanca. Hervé called upon "true French patriots" to end France's Moroccan plundering. "If you really love France, stop such vile acts and unmask French heroes for what they really are—thieves." Hervé's rather reductionist account considered the French press, government, finance, and industry to be interconnected in their involvement in profitable colonial ventures. He discussed capitalist needs for new markets and

raw materials as well as the workers' needs for more jobs arising from industrial expansion. At this time he did not entertain the idea that some colonial ventures might have had far more atavistic sources than profits, markets, or raw materials.[170] Hervé may have given a very rough and rather one-dimensional explanation of French colonial policy but his ideas here were Marxist at least in form, despite what some critics have said about him. On the one hand, what is striking about Hervé's exposé of French colonialism was that this fundamentally emotional appeal was couched, however superficially, in social and economic explanations. On the other hand, his appeal to French patriotism to stop colonial exploitation and atrocities may have contradicted the logic of antipatriotism, but it underlined the strong emotional nature of Hervéism.[171]

"On October 10 the public prosecutor's office of the Seine accepted a formal complaint by the Minister of War, General Picquart, against some articles which appeared in *La Guerre Sociale* from August to September, which were detrimental to the army and fell under the jurisdiction of articles 30 and 33 of the Law on the Freedom of the Press of July 29, 1881. The correspondence provided between the Minister of Justice and the Minister of War indicates their certainty that a guilty verdict was possible, if the case were well-argued."[172] Four articles and some passages from Hervé's September 12 conference were incriminated. The *Sans Patrie* may have seen the irony in General Picquart pursuing him for articles in *La Guerre Sociale* after General André had done something similar to publicize *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. "But he also saw …, and not without foundation, a maneuver to force the council of the bar association to disbar him. For the moment, that seemed to trouble him the most. Yet he solemnly announced to a journalist from *La Petite République* …, that if he had to leave the bar, he would happily devote himself to his rounds of conferences: 'The antimilitarist cause will not be lost by that.'"[173]

Hervé appeared before the Court of Assizes of the Seine on the afternoon of Monday, December 23, 1907 facing an accusation of *diffamation et injures pour l'armée*. The authorities also charged Almereyda, Merle, and Claude Rousset, generally known as Galhauban, with provocation of the army to disobedience for some articles which appeared between June and August 1907 but, as seen above, they chose to not appear. The prosecution selected four articles and passages from a late summer speech dealing with Morocco in charging Hervé. In one of those articles, Hervé compared an armed robbery of an express train near Toulouse to the "500 French bandits … and robbers in Morocco." In fact, it had been necessary to make a choice on just which articles to prosecute because there was always the danger that charging too many articles would increase the risk of an acquittal.[174]

Among the dozens of witnesses listed to be called by the defense were Clemenceau, Briand, parliamentary leader Paul Deschanel, Vaillant, and Jaurès, as well as the heads of the Schneider firm, the Comptoir d'Escompte, the Société Générale, and the Crédit Lyonnais. Such a list seemed fitting because the center of Herve's indictment of French colonialism was the economic and political connivance in using the military for personal and corporate profit. Needless to say, the financiers and deputies supposedly involved in Moroccan policies refused to testify. Right from the start, Jacques Bonzon, Hervé's attorney and occasional associate at the bench, "read a letter of default from Merle and Almereyda" explaining their non-appearance. It seems that Hervé's associates did not want to accept the government's attempt to combine what they thought were dissimilar cases. They wished "to give priority to the Moroccan Affair and the written and oral declarations made by Hervé on that occasion." The third accomplice, Rousset-Galhauban, sent a medical certificate explaining why he could not attend the trial.[175]

As Bonzon began his argumentation, he compared this trial to the Dreyfus Case not just because General Picquart was the Minister of War, but because the latter's exchanges with the Minister of Justice discussing the charges were unavailable to the defense. Jaurès sent a letter, read by Bonzon, apologizing for not being able to be there and agreeing with many of Hervé's arguments about France's Moroccan venture and lamenting the inability of people in France to express themselves on such important questions as freely as people do in England. Before Bonzon could finish reading the letter, he was cut off by the presiding judge, Planteau-Delegorgue. After a succession of witnesses, Édouard Vaillant reiterated what he had recently told the *Chambre* regarding the similarity of his ideas to those of Hervé on French colonialism. The ageing former Communard described Hervé as a courageous citizen trying to stop actions that could easily lead to war. Heated exchanges and interruptions were not long in coming. After Bonzon read his list of financiers to be questioned in order to learn the truth about their Moroccan dealings, Planteau-Delegorgue made it known that Morocco was not the subject of the trial. "I thought that M. Gustave Hervé was the accused." The defendant was quick to respond: "I am here as the accused and the accuser." The trial ended the following day, which began with questioning the final defense witnesses, Urbain Gohier and Marcel Sembat, who discussed French actions in China. Then, the prosecuting attorney Fremont delivered a closing speech which unsurprisingly described Hervé as "a miserable Frenchman" who was guilty of "sabotage against the army" and "only wished to wear an [attorney's] robe in order defile it." Fremont demanded that the jury send the vile would-be attorney to prison at once for besmirching the nation with his "diseased hatred and rage against the army."

The defendant then took charge of some of his own defense in a lengthy address which dispensed with most of his standard arguments. Rather, Hervé sought to verify his charges against French Moroccan policy.[176] After a fleeting reference to Zola to remind the jury that majority opinions are not always valid, he said he was quite content to disagree with public opinion on Moroccan policy. He also claimed to be unconcerned about the accusations and insults directed toward him. As an attorney, he often had to bow before the decisions of the court, but as an accused, he should only be treated as an equal. After pointing out how prior appearances as a defendant had made him something of an expert, a bit of standard antipatriotic rhetoric crept into his address. He couldn't refrain from calling the nation a "stepmother" and calling for "a great humane European Federation" to replace it, but his tone remained fairly subdued. Then, he returned to the example of Zola, becoming himself the accuser.[177]

> "I accuse the French army in Morocco of having [acted], in an interest which is not a national interest, which is not a public interest, but in the interest of a certain number of financial crooks, of having bombarded an open city without any warning, of having completely massacred an innocent and inoffensive population, of having gunned down prisoners of war, of having finished off the wounded, of being made the conscious or unconscious agent, in any case the accomplice, of a vile armed robbery."[178]

Heuré summarized the crux of Hervé's argument:

> "With the military budget in his hands, he demonstrated how certain orders of military material profited the 'House of Schneider' first and foremost, and how the latter figured in the capital of the companies installed in Morocco. He reckoned that the troubles in Casablanca were provoked by the despoilments and then repressed with a totally disproportionate violence. That's it for the hidden economics of the affair. As far as the horrors committed, the massacres provoked in the city of Casablanca by the bombardments from the ships *Gloire* and Galilée, that [information] is taken from reports published in the press, including those which you would only suspect of being in the same camp as it [the government]: *Le Matin* and *L'Echo de Paris*."

If Hervé was less antipatriotic than usual, that may have been because he wanted to act more like a journalist. At least that is how former journalist and Hervé biographer, Gilles Heuré, interpreted the speech. If he was fairly subdued and less polemical than normal, Hervé ended with his usual bravado.[179] "One more word in finishing: whatever your verdict, I will continue!"[180]

Then came an emotional three-hour defense by Bonzon which failed to sway the jury. "After an hour of deliberation and a final declaration by Hervé asking for 'the maximum, like Zola', the jury declared Hervé guilty without extenuating

circumstances and the court condemned him to a year in prison and 3000 francs in fines for offenses against the army."[181] In default, Almereyda and Merle were given five year sentences and 30,000 franc fines for having "provoked soldiers to disobedience."[182] Generally, the press reacted in expected ways. *Le Petit Parisien* and *L'Echo de Paris* were both rather detached in their brief reports on the verdicts, but their accounts of the prosecutor's portrayal of Hervé left little doubt regarding their sympathies.[183] However, in *L'Humanité* Jules Uhry did not fail to note the irony of the antipatriot Hervé courageously defending the honor of France which French financial speculators and their military henchmen had besmirched.[184] But the verdict had additional ramifications. After shaking hands with Hervé, one of the guards in the court, a lieutenant named Erbelot, told him: "Though I do not share your ideas, I must acknowledge that you defend them with courage and gallantry."[185] The daring lieutenant was later sent to the distant Alpine base at Barcelonnette for his own gallantry toward the antipatriot. The day after the verdict a reservist in the 150th Infantry Regiment was sentenced to two years in prison because he claimed to be a disciple of the insurrectional firebrand.[186]

Throughout France the colonial escapades were generally seen in glorious terms since most French were "intoxicated by national chauvinism." In Pontivy, where his Breton anarchist friend Émile Masson taught, the *Journal de Pontivy* lauded the "holy war in Morocco." Since Masson admired Hervé and sympathized with his perspective, he was immune to any presumed colonial glories. Once Masson discovered that Hervé was again in prison for his views and had just been permanently stripped of his right to practice law by the *Conseil de l'Ordre*, the young lycée professor was ready to help. Hervé's year sentence also included a fine of 3000 francs, but he had little ability to pay the fine and keep the Hervé-Dijonneau household out of poverty. Since Masson had known Madame Dijonneau for years and was certainly aware of their strained budget, he managed to send them twenty-five francs a month, half from his own pocket, the rest gathered from sympathizers. Madame Dijonneau herself needed money to start a small business to keep her family above water, so Masson contacted the rather well-off and well-connected Dreyfusard poet and long-time friend, André Spire, to see whether he could help. Either out of friendship with Masson or sympathy toward Hervé himself, Spire sent aid to Madame Dijonneau by way of *La Guerre Sociale*. As was typical of her reaction to such events, she was "grateful for the financial support but a bit panic-stricken by all the political agitation."[187]

Hervé decided to appeal the December 24, 1907 verdict on his anti-colonial articles not because he hoped to alter it but because he wanted to keep his law practice in operation a while longer.[188] On January 21, 1908 he was called before

the Parisian bar which, in fact, quickly disbarred him, rejecting his demand for a hearing before the general assembly of the bar. Along with their arguments about the jurisdictional competence of the Parisian Bar over the case, Hervé and Jacques Bonzon had attempted to use his 1906 amnesty and arguments about freedom of opinion to buttress the case, but to no avail. The Parisian Bar Association called their argument about jurisdiction an "artifice" and supported the decision by citing Hervé's anti-war motion at the Nancy Congress and an article from *La Guerre Sociale* for which he was just convicted. The bar association's order explained how, "'... it is no more permitted for an attorney in his public or private life, than in the exercise of his legal profession, to provoke acts which fall under the application of the penal code; that by his persistent provocations and calculations to disobedience and rebellion, M. Hervé has become unworthy of a profession which demands a respect for the laws above everything else.'"[189]

Hervé reacted quickly by sending a letter to *L'Humanité* which published it on January 23, 1908 beneath an article by Jules Uhry contrasting the situation in France with that in Germany, where the Berlin Bar Association had just refused to disbar Karl Liebknecht for opinions very similar to those of Hervé. Both Hervé and Liebknecht were practicing attorneys facing prison sentences. "In Berlin, the official representatives of the attorneys refused to become 'the executors of the supreme orders' of the emperor. In Paris, the members of the bar association have agreed to play that role for the government." Ironically, the current Minister of Justice, Aristide Briand, was not only once an apostle of the general strike and Hervé's former attorney, he was about to be admitted to the Parisian bar. In his letter Hervé complained about the secrecy of the proceedings by the bar association, its delay in informing him, and the errors in its statements. Rather than defaulting in the decision of the bar, as reported, Hervé promised to appeal.[190]

On February 11, 1908 Hervé employed new arguments in appealing his disbarment based on the differences between antipatriotic ideas and political opinions, but they were rejected.[191] Then the *Ligue des droits de l'homme* made a protest against the bar association.

> "Though his incarceration began in February, Hervé put on his attorney robe on March 3, 1908 for the last time in appearing before the first chamber of the Court of Appeal charged with ruling on the appeal lodged by him against the decision of the Bar Association. In effect, the court confirmed the decision of the [Parisian] Bar Association reckoning that the amnesty law of July 1906, contrary to what Hervé had advanced, was not able to include events after July 12 and, above all, could not 'legislatively permit an attorney to display the scorn for the law for which he must have the constant respect.'"[192]

During the third week of February 1908 Hervé was finally sent to prison. Unlike his earlier term in prison, this time "he presented himself accompanied by his attorney punctually at 1:30 p.m. on February 18, 1908 at the office of the public prosecutor. The head of the prison record office received him and, after verifying his identity, handed him over for lockup."[193] The *Sans Patrie* soon confirmed that a new team of journalists was ready to replace him as well as Merle and Almereyda if they were imprisoned. If that team met the same fate, a third team and then a fourth could be made available. Hervé argued that such trials proved the validity of his ideas and provided encouragement to continue because such trials and sentences "deepen the gulf between the bourgeois Republic and us." Such confrontations supposedly heightened enthusiasm and prevented both indifference and skepticism.[194]

Besides dealing with colonial affairs, *La Guerre Sociale* reported on other international events as well as the workers' movement outside France, and it tried, however feebly, to organize Hervéism at an international level. In 1907 Hervé contacted Pablo Iglesias of the Spanish Socialist Party in order to set up a coordinated antimilitarist action in France and Spain on the question of Morocco.[195] By early 1908 the paper began to encourage and help subsidize an Italian newspaper in Turin, Italy to be called *La Guerra Sociale*. That paper, which began with a circulation of 10,000 issues, was described by Louis Perceau as an Italian form of Hervéism. Perceau claimed that it would use antimilitarism to create unity out of the dispersed revolutionary forces in Italy. He hoped it would be more than a regional paper so that it could counterbalance *Avanti* and other more reformist papers. The Giolitti government did all that it could to prevent an Italian insurrectionalism, and the venture, in fact, collapsed after several months. While it lasted, Hervé, Merle, Almereyda, Perceau, and other French revolutionaries were quoted in their Italian counterpart headed by Ugo Nanni and Alfredo Polledro. *La Guerra Sociale* included among its contributors the young revolutionary Benito Mussolini as well as Roberto Michels, whose later careers would again affect, parallel, or cross that of Hervé. Perceau had hoped for a German version of *La Guerre Sociale* but nothing concrete seems to have been accomplished on the venture.[196]

The existence of a serious effort by *La Guerre Sociale* to organize Hervéism internationally would seem to indicate that Hervé's periodic anti-Germanism and latent nationalism were not characteristic features of Hervéism. It is certainly true that the vast majority of Hervé's writings and speeches before the war are clearly internationalist. Internationalism never ceased to be an element in Hervé's values. Yet there is a curious anomaly regarding such efforts to organize

internationally and to report on the international workers' movement. During the first year of the paper's existence, there was a brief attempt to cover foreign affairs as well as the international workers' movement. Yet, the paper seldom used special foreign correspondents. When it did send Merle to Berlin or Jean Marestan and René de Marmande to North Africa, the occasions directly affected the French revolutionary organizations. There were occasional studies of the English trade unions, American unions, German Social Democracy, or a hoped-for Franco-German *rapprochement* in 1913–1914, but these international studies were episodic. Generally, international workers' actions were considered under the general rubric "*La Guerre Sociale*." These articles usually tried to draw tactical lessons from foreign or domestic events for use in the French workers' struggle. Generally that rubric dealt with French provincial events rather than foreign problems. The most serious and detailed international coverage was a series of articles written by Luigi Berta and Louis Perceau in 1908 titled "The Great Revolt in Parma" which did, in fact, have clear, direct implications for French workers.[197] That kind of detailed series on non-French workers faded at the same time that the Italian insurrectional paper vanished. The international workers' movement interested *La Guerre Sociale* in large measure in relationship to domestic needs of French Hervéism.[198] The Hervéist tactic of insurrection to end war needed foreign advocates as a proof that Hervéism was truly international and, therefore, a realistic means of action. Though this may not negate genuine international ideals at *La Guerre Sociale*, the limited concern for foreign workers could simply indicate that French workers' affairs were of greater interest to French readers, and *La Guerre Sociale* may have found little evidence of Hervéist analogues abroad.

In the spring and summer of 1908 an array of articles in *La Guerre Sociale* illustrate the uniqueness of Hervéism. The insurrectional "General" called May Day of 1908 a fiasco because the revolutionary minorities of the C.G.T. were becoming as reformist as many of their current leaders. The cause of this slide was the increase of syndicalist membership according to Hervé! The events of May Day were employed to attack C.G.T. timidity and to stress the elitist aspects of Hervéism.[199] The revolution could only be made by a handful of revolutionaries who "move, shake, raise up, impassion, and communicate their élan" to the "masses" of workers who are naturally cowardly, egotistical, and materialistic. A group of organized revolutionary leaders scattered among the masses was the key to revolution. Despite Hervé's hope that the C.G.T. could forge revolutionary unity, he never ceased to attack its *ouvrièrisme* and its failure to join with militant anarchists and socialists. Intellectual debates were no better than votes in bringing

about revolution, which was made by passion, enthusiasm, and audacity.[200] Later that month, Anton Bruckère noted that the spirit of insurrectionalism was gone. His explanation was that workers were only motivated by economic and materialistic issues, not by events like the Midi Crisis or the Moroccan expeditions. Bruckère, like Hervé, justified electoral campaigns because elections allowed militants to reach audiences other than "the same 5000 Bohemians," who always came to leftist meetings. Economic concerns and elections might be important propagandistic devices yet he assumed that the picturesque and romantic idea of insurrection was indispensible to spark a revolt.[201]

Perhaps the clearest differentiation of Hervéism from mainstream of French socialism was written by Doctor Madeleine Pelletier, the violent and eccentric feminist and Bohemian who somehow found a place among the largely male-chauvinist advocates of Hervéism.[202] Pelletier came close to a complete rejection of Marxism because, to her, ideas, passion, and feelings, especially hatred, created revolution, not economic interests and, even less, economics treatises. In her view, elites were guided by complex ideas, while the "masses" were not. However, she was certain that feelings of social injustice and inequality could create hatred in the "masses." Thus, showing bourgeois homes, wealth, and property to the "masses" could and should arouse the hatred that a treatise on political economy could not.[203]

The years 1907 and 1908 saw an anti-intellectualism emerge among some former Dreyfusards and other men of the Left which was cogently summarized in Péguy's phrase regarding *mystique* being turned into *politique*. When Dreyfusards and some of their friends attained power and used it in ways contrary to their former ideals, a major reassessment of the Affair and the Radical republic emerged. Some diverse leftist writers including increasingly marginalized and evolving thinkers such as Georges Sorel, Hubert Lagardelle, and Édouard Berth came to categorize certain intellectuals as parasites as well as hypocrites. For some members of the political elite, the Affair seemed to have functioned, however unconsciously, as a means of elite promotion. One of the commentators who spoke of that Dreyfusard treason was Victor Méric whose comments in *Les Hommes du Jour* and *La Guerre Sociale* betrayed a complex leftist anti-Semitism that has not been sufficiently examined according to Christophe Prochasson. Méric talked about the stuffed, satisfied, fat, and newly rich Jews and Catholics, politicians and writers, soldiers and intellectuals, who triumphed personally from the Affair, with just a few exceptions.[204]

Hervé's June 1908 review of Georges Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* gives further evidence concerning Hervé's unique socialism. While *Le Sans Patrie* agreed with

Sorel's attack on socialist reformism and his assessment that revolutionary syndicalism promoted the value of individual effort, a taste for battle, workers' solidarity, and a heroic combative spirit, he disagreed with Sorel on one key point. Even though myths might be important motivating elements, Hervé felt that utopian plans of a future society had some merit in attracting people to a revolutionary project. This led Hervé to reject Sorel's refusal to describe the details of the general strike. Perhaps he wanted the C.G.T. to consider in detail "what was to be done" to organize a general strike because, if it did not, he would have had no role to play. Hervé's criticism of Sorel's book, as too esoteric to be useful to the "masses", illustrates again Hervé's distrust of revolutionary theorizing and his equivocation over elitist direction and "mass" spontaneity in the creation of revolution.[205]

From June to September 1908 *La Guerre Sociale* ran a series of articles by Almereyda, Anton Bruckère, and Henri Martini entitled "In case of mobilization." These articles, discussing possible tactics to prevent a mobilization in case of war, fit closely to established Hervéist arguments. The series presented two seemingly opposite types of tactics to create an insurrection and a general strike. The methods proposed by Bruckère and Martini stressed the need to enter the army in order to get guns, to be better organized, to sabotage weapons and supplies, and to create propaganda among the troops for the purpose of a military revolt. But they rejected any adventurism if the masses failed to follow militants. One could not create a revolution or prevent a military mobilization against the army.[206] "This mirrored the views of the international left wing of Social Democracy, partisan of revolutionary propaganda among soldiers but opposed to all adventurism if the masses did not follow."[207] The methods extolled by Almereyda called for reservists to stay at home in order to create an insurrection of the military reserves which in turn would promote the revolt of the army. Since the army would not rebel if the people failed to revolt, it was necessary for militants to stay at home and lead a revolt as an example to the army.[208] Hervé's chief lieutenant thought that Bruckère's views were too cautious. Once war was declared, Almereyda wanted revolutionaries to create a general strike and institute military insubordination leading to an insurrection. His adversaries called this pure Blanquist romanticism.[209]

For his biographer, Jonathan Almosnino, Almereyda was strongly influenced by Hervé's ideas at this time. Both men saw the need for revolutionary masses being led by small groups of determined and seasoned militants, ready at any moment to act decisively. At the time of any mobilization, revolutionary militants had to be armed and ready to employ terrorist actions, either in a general strike or entering the barracks and leading troops in a seizure of power. Coming while both

men were in prison, these tactics assumed that the people would follow active militants. Neither Hervé nor Almereyda seemed ready to ponder the possibility that the militants would find themselves alone and isolated at the critical hour. These methods would be put into practice once Hervé and Almereyda were released from prison. For Almereyda that meant another year of incarceration, hence sixteen consecutive months of detention. By the time he left prison, Almereyda was no longer an ordinary militant and journalist with an anarchist bent. Almosnino argues that, by then, he had become an organizing director ready to implement the new revolutionary conceptions that he and Hervé had worked out in prison.[210]

One may be able to read the aforementioned series dealing with militant response to an impending mobilization as a coherent evolution toward a new tactical and theoretical antimilitarism, or one could see the debate as largely rhetorical and, in fact, the function was simply to mobilize everyone with a revolutionary impulse. Almosnino does not seem to have realized that the conclusion of the series called for both methods to be used. Draft evasion, desertion, and infiltration of the army were all valid tactics. After weeks of debates, evidence, appeals, arguments, and solicited responses from various militants, the readers of *La Guerre Sociale* were told that all tactics and methods to destroy a French mobilization were valid. It would not have been surprising if this campaign had backfired. *La Guerre Sociale* often used controversy to excite the "masses", but to create a theoretical controversy in order to show it to be meaningless could have caused skepticism among militants with set ideas. Again, the aim of the articles was to unite socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists who held a variety of ideas concerning the prevention of a French mobilization. The campaign corresponded to the Hervéist stress on action above theory. In late 1910 when Hervé eventually formalized a clear and coherent policy for conquering and infiltrating the army called "*militarisme révolutionnaire*", it entailed nothing new. What was new in 1910 was the clarity of his methods and tactics for revolution and the prevention of a mobilization. Before his shift Hervé downplayed tactical and theoretical differences in order to create unity for revolutionary action. In late 1910 he formulated clear tactics to see if that could force the revolutionary Left to act on its rhetoric. This turned out to be Herve's "last ditch effort" to galvanize the extreme Left. When Hervé's new tactics were rejected by the C.G.T. and the anarchists after 1910, he would again attempt to downplay theoretical differences on the Left, eventually expanding his call for unity to even include the Radicals. This striving for unity and consensus was a consistent value for Hervé which helps to explain his profound transformation.

Despite notable confrontations between capital and labor as well as the police and the people, at places like Courrières in 1906, the Midi in 1907, Draveil and

Villeneuve-Saint-Georges in 1908 or in more widely-based strikes like those of the Postal Workers in 1909 or the *cheminots* in 1910, Michel Winock characterized the epoch from 1900 until 1914 as one of social compromise. Neither moderates nor most men on the Left ever had the idea of threatening property, and the Radicals, despite their largely middle class clientele, led the way on the progressive income tax. "That would tend to demonstrate that until 1914 the action by political forces was not a reflection of social conflicts." Nevertheless, Winock admitted that "the interests of the directing classes scarcely had to suffer from social legislation, whose balance sheet in 1914 was all in all modest."[211]

8

The Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges Strike and Demonstrations

"We were living under the first Pro-Consulate of Clemenceau, and this champion of individual freedom, this paladin of free thinking was filling the prisons with journalists." That was how Victor Méric recalled his first incarceration at La Santé at the end of 1908.[1] Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges have come to be associated with Georges Clemenceau whose good intentions toward social reform gave way to an "end justifies the means" use of *agents provocateurs* in order to destroy what he assumed were lawless enemies of a Republic whose barricades Clemenceau, the former acolyte of Auguste Blanqui, now manned on the side of "law and order", if not justice. On the other side of the barricades were former Dreyfusards like Hervé and Jean Jaurès, along with other socialists, syndicalists of the C.G.T., and a variety of anarchists, not to mention all the possible reactionary and anti-Republican forces including royalists, lingering Bonapartists, and certain anti-Dreyfusard Catholics. Even though Clemenceau created the new Ministry of Labor when he first became the *Président du Conseil* and appointed the Independent Socialist René Viviani to the post, the working class offensive starting around 1906, replete as it was with major strikes, led Clemenceau to become a man of order.[2]

The critical events in the working class movement which occurred in the summer of 1908 began with strikes in May in the construction industry in the areas just southeast of Paris. Because the strikes involved the important question

of recognition for a local union, the control of the strikes passed to the more experienced and often more radical leaders in Paris.[3] The confrontation between workers and the Republican forces of order led to much bloodshed at Vigneux near Draveil and at Villeneuve-Saint-George so that these places became new symbols of Republican brutality and repression. Rolande Trempé viewed these events in light of an increased organizational presence by owners and employers as well as an expanding role in labor disputes for the state, which created the Ministry of Labor in 1906. Such developments were responses to general economic and social trends in the late 19th century including the growth of the labor movement and the expansion of strikes.[4]

"In a general fashion, workers' conditions improved, but just when they could foresee the possibility of climbing up the social ladder, their demands for reform increased," according to Michel Winock. While Tilly and Shorter saw the era in terms of the increasingly political nature of strikes, for Winock this was a classic example of activism arising from "rising expectations." "Thus, *La Belle Époque* was the period of massive strikes, especially from 1906–1910. At the moment when France renewed its economic growth, prices increased markedly without wages following suit. Despite their diversity, the working classes shared a common precariousness regarding employment opportunities, sickness, and the lack of social security, in a very broad sense."[5] At the beginning of the twentieth century workers' conditions were defined especially by their wages, and real wages increased from the time after the Commune until 1905 because wages rose as the cost of living declined. "On the other hand, from 1905 until 1913 there was a decline in real wages. Nominal salaries and the cost of living both increased, but the former did not succeed in outpacing the latter. [Even though other historians have different explanations] … this was, without a doubt, not pure chance, that the strongest eruption of social struggles, measured in strike days, corresponded to the period from 1906–1910."[6] In spite of controls and surveillance by the authorities and the owners as well as the conformism of the majority of workers,

> "the working class movement did not cease to gain in force at the end of the 19th century; its clearest expression was the strike. Since the law of 1864, [the strike] was no longer subject to legal penalties. Under the Third Republic the growth of strikes was much faster than industrial development: for 890 strikes in 1900, there were 1087 in 1904, 1354 in 1906, and 1517 in 1910. The strike had become a means of conquest, normalized as an almost unique means for [workers'] demands. From 1906 until 1910 strikes became increasingly numerous and often violent."[7]

La Guerre Sociale was quick to comment on the strike at Draveil, which led to two deaths, and the demonstrations in Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, which saw the

gendarmes and dragoons intervene with a resulting four dead and 200 wounded. After that, *La Guerre Sociale* urged its own call to action.[8] Its active intervention in the workers' movement in the summer of 1908 when the C.G.T. leadership was under arrest occurred at a time when Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* were in a nearly ascendant position in the C.G.T. according to Jacques Julliard. Around 1907 to 1908 there had been an abrupt upsurge in Insurrectionalism which culminated in events at Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. "Gustave Hervé … for a short time appeared to be the veritable secret orchestra director of the C.G.T. Isn't it striking to see that this return to the catastrophic ideology of the previous decade, that this sudden flare-up, corresponded to the economic crisis of 1907, that is to say, to a sudden fall in the viability of the strike movement?"[9] According to Julliard, Clemenceau's purpose in forcing these confrontations was fulfilled by Hervéist excess which, in the end, helped create an internal crisis in syndicalism around 1908 and 1909.[10] The emphasis in Julliard's account is a bit skewed. Other scholars clearly show that the "crisis in syndicalism" was a general problem within the C.G.T. closely connected to long-term developments in French society and economy. "The crisis that overtook the movement was simply an intensification of problems that had been papered over in more heroic times."[11] Even the Amiens Charter of 1906, the so-called "blueprint of revolutionary syndicalism," had achieved unity only by incoherent resolutions.[12] Whatever Hervéist ascendancy there was within syndicalism at this time was more of a symptom of the "crisis in syndicalism" rather than one of its major causes.

"Neither the government nor the C.G.T. could have foreseen that the relatively insignificant strike of the Seine sandpit workers would develop into a major clash. Yet once the strike became violent, each side took a stand from which it was reluctant to retreat." The strike began in the usual way, dissatisfaction with low wages and working conditions at a time when the company was making profits. Given that situation, the sandpit workers of the Seine in Draveil went on strike on May 2, 1908. "The strike quickly spread to the neighboring towns of Vigneux, Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, and Villeneuve-le-Roi, and its repercussions reached the heart of Paris where construction of the new subway system had to be halted for lack of material." Still, the situation did not give any indication of becoming a real crisis. As in other such situations with the Radicals in charge, the sub-prefect of Corbeil tried to get management and labor to the bargaining table, but the owners raised the stakes by rejecting any negotiations with the new union. C.G.T. leaders considered that to be a direct challenge and dispatched organizers to the scene. That set the stage "for the politicization of the conflict."[13]



Figure 11. Cavalry showing force during the Draveil Strike and Demonstrations in June 1908. Bnf. (© Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

As in many other labor disputes in prewar France, the gendarmerie played a major role in the escalation of the situation toward violent confrontation. Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly in their seminal study of long-term trends in French strikes from 1830 until 1968 pointed out that the employment of troops could be used to pressure employers as well as guarantee public security and protect managements, factories, and strikebreakers. This was possible because French authorities could always threaten owners with the removal of troops if their refusal to compromise threatened state interests.[14] At Draveil, Vigneux, and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, the gendarmerie were assigned to protect strikebreakers from hostile strikers, but this led to a series of shoving matches, scuffles, and brawls. On the afternoon of June 2, 1908 at Vigneux, amidst the mounting physical confrontations, a dozen gendarmes tried to arrest a striker who had been involved in an earlier brawl. When that striker and a few of his comrades fled to the strike headquarters at a local meeting hall and bar called the Salle Ranque, the gendarmes attempted to force their way in. The confrontation quickly escalated to the use of firearms which left two of the strikers dead. As one would expect, the gendarmes claimed that they had been fired on first, and the workers denied it. The Radical deputy

from the region later claimed that the gendarmes had been observed loading their weapons 200 meters from the Salle Ranque. He also claimed that the officer in command of the detachment had gone beyond his orders and that government forces all too often operated under the assumption "that worker is the enemy … and … the striker is the criminal." Revolutionary syndicalists and many socialists argued the same thing. Even though Clemenceau's orders continually stressed the importance of neutrality by the forces of order, A. Fryar Calhoun's study also recognized how such situations inevitably involved governmental forces and strikers "locked in combat" so that "the frequency and increasing violence of labor conflicts embittered both sides."[15]

If an objective assessment of such events is impossible because those involved have their interests and perspectives, that did not prevent Hervé from drawing the "necessary lessons" for insurrectionalism. The initial deaths of two workers and the wounding of ten others were due to the workers' failure to arm themselves. In an era of Republican repression and police savagery, Hervé called *L'Humanité* disgusting because of its appeals for calm. He even applauded the violence of the nationalist journalist Louis Gregori's June 4, 1908 attack on Dreyfus during ceremonies at the Pantheon transferring Zola's remains from the Cimetière de Montparnasse. Such an act may have emboldened the anti-Semites, but Hervé believed it should be imitated by workers. "Without a doubt, the recourse to violence even for defense against the violence of authority is a grave matter. It's much more dangerous than voting. But … 'one doesn't make omelettes without breaking eggs' … The working class has been so horse-whipped by Clemenceau and his band of renegades, the shootings succeed each other at regular intervals, so that now workers are starting to react from the outrage." Hervé applauded the workers' violent responses to the brutalities of the forces of order after a meeting at the Manège Saint-Paul on June 6, 1908 where a general strike had been voted as a response to the Draveil provocation.[16]

In the next issue of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé seemed to draw a parallel between Clemenceau's actions toward the workers and his attempts to encircle Germany. In an era of internal and external French aggression, workers had to be ready to act to create an insurrection and a general strike. Confrontation with workers may have been part of a clear plan by Clemenceau; if so, that plan met Hervé's immediate needs as well. However, in 1908 the *Sans Patrie* consistently rejected socialist charges that worker violence was caused by *agents provocateurs*. Hervéism demanded that workers believe in the possibility and utility of revolutionary action. Hervé believed that the government was afraid of violence. "The government had to know that the use of its troops in strikes created antimilitarism and

antipatriotism which could lead to a military insurrection as happened during the Midi Crisis." To blame the most violent responses by workers on *agents provocateurs* was clearly counterrevolutionary. Curiously, Clemenceau and Hervé unconsciously reinforced each others' views and strategies at this time. Clemenceau promoted confrontation to discredit and destroy the extremists. Hervé supported confrontation to prove the value and possibility of extremist activism.[17] Yet in 1908 the government's conspirators, inadvertently and temporarily, allowed Hervé to increase his influence in the C.G.T., while Hervé's own largely imaginary conspiratorial agents and antics eventually negated the ephemeral Hervéist influence on the C.G.T. because the syndicalists increasingly branded Hervéist activism as romantic and sensationalistic.[18]

Despite Hervé's calls for worker militancy and his refusal to believe that *agents provocateurs* were a major source of working-class violence, the police and some syndicalists had better information at this time. "Actually, from July 1908 a number of militant syndicalists seriously suspected him [Lucien Métivier] so much so that a police report of June 28 that same year, which was drafted the day after his arrest, noted that 'everyone considers [him] as an agent provocateur.'"[19] In 1911 Hervé's newspaper, with the assistance of the current Prime Minister Caillaux, a man already being assailed by Clemenceau for being soft on Germany, would expose Métivier and implicate Clemenceau in the violence and eventual failures of the aforementioned strike activities of 1908. Once Métivier's cover was blown in the summer of 1911 and the *Service de Sûrete Révolutionaire* of *La Guerre Sociale* abducted and tried him in its revolutionary kangaroo court at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale*, the syndicalist *mouchard* drafted an admission which appeared in the newspaper on August 26, 1911 which read:

> "I admit to being in relations for the last three years with M. Perrette, at 11 rue de Saussaies, and that I regularly addressed general reports on the workers' movement and more specifically reports on meetings to which I regularly attended. For all my information, I received a monthly sum of 250 francs. These payments were always given directly to me. However, at the time of my imprisonment, Perrette gave my delivery to my girlfriend."

Actually, in 1911 the S.S.R. learned that Métivier had a personal meeting with Clemenceau in 1908. "In effect, contacted directly by Perrette at the Bourse de Travail around May 1, 1908, he refused to become an ordinary informer for the *Sûreté* and had wanted … to deal directly with the President of the Council and Minister of the Interior [Clemenceau]! After a less than successful first attempt, he succeeded … One of the documents was presented thus" showing what happened.[20] After meeting with Perrette at the Bourse de Travail on May 9, he sent a

note to the Place Beauvau for M. Bonifas, Clemenceau's Chef de Cabinet, saying that he could not meet with Bonifas, but that he wished to wait for a meeting with the Minister himself. Métivier later said that on May 20, 1908 he met once with Clemenceau who gave him three hundred francs. When this information was made public by *La Guerre Sociale* in 1911, it created uproar in the Chamber which Clemenceau did not have to answer directly since he was then a Senator. He chose to respond to the charges in a letter to *Le Temps* dated November 24, 1911. In it he claimed to have received Métivier at the latter's insistence. When Métivier asked to deliver his information personally, Clemenceau said he simply told the syndicalist *mouchard* to send his reports to the *Sûreté Générale*. The director of this service was M. Hennion, who had an office just across the hall, and Clemenceau asked Métivier to follow him there. The former Minister of the Interior explained: "I never saw Métivier again, never gave him instructions, and never had instructions given to him. I never communicated with him, neither directly nor indirectly." After the meeting with Métivier, Clemenceau had Hennion give him 300 francs. The head of the *Sûreté Générale* said that "Métivier has never been a regular employee of the *Sûreté* and never received a monthly payment from its chief official [Hennion]. We were limited to simply giving him money when he provided information." Clemenceau was obviously embarrassed to admit that he had met with such a character.[21]

The Métivier Affair arose several years after the bloody strike-related confrontations which took place from early June to early August 1908 during which six lives were lost and many other injuries were inflicted. One of the violent confrontations happened during a July 30 demonstration protesting an arrest of several militants including Métivier three days earlier. As secretary of the pastrymen's union, Métivier was considered one of the more outspoken and violent syndicalists of the era, and was deeply involved in many other syndicalist and antimilitarist campaigns. The July 30, 1908 bloodshed pushed "the C.G.T. leadership to make good on a longstanding threat to call a general strike, an action it privately had come to fear would fail. The fear was well founded. The general strike on 3 August flopped dismally. Anarcho-syndicalism, long in trouble, declined slowly from this point on, while the CGT was rent by quarrels from which a new, basically reformist and non-revolutionary, leadership emerged in early 1909."[22]

Given what transpired after Métivier's arrest, one must wonder whether Clemenceau had used the syndicalist militant "not merely as an informant but as an *agent provocateur* to call the C.G.T.'s hand." David S. Newhall's biography of Clemenceau stressed that no conclusive proof has turned up, nor is it likely to, but such a conclusion seems tinged with circular logic. To wit, Métivier was a "poor

choice" for an *agent provocateur* "since he had no strong following or influence and was already under some suspicion among the CGT chiefs." For Newhall, Métivier's service was hardly necessary because the strike at Draveil had already enticed a variegated assortment "of idealists and troublemakers pretty clearly bent on provocation. The weight of supposition, however, has usually fallen against Clemenceau. The chain of circumstances is too nicely linked not to have aroused suspicion. That he had wanted bloodshed is more doubtful, but there is no disputing that throughout the strike he showed more readiness to confront than to conciliate and that he ruthlessly exploited his advantages in the conflict, even to the rash—and cynical—extent of invoking Métivier's name in debates as an example of union extremism."[23]

Yet Newhall's assessment of the complex character of Clemenceau is not without nuance.

> "Clemenceau was quite capable of exercising tact, patience, and finesse. But open challenges were something he had the greatest difficulty in brushing off. Once in a fight, he played to win, and he enjoyed it. This combativeness also reflected itself now and again in brutality and bullying in personal relations. Labeling issues with names of persons as he was wont to do—a habit picked up from Blanqui?—can be a useful mental shorthand but is liable to mislead when prejudicial opinions enter in. Admittedly, a natural peremptoriness can often leave an impression of insensitivity where none is intended. Nevertheless, a species of sadism can be detected in him, a counterpart to his very high level of interior sensitiveness … If he were to err in action, he preferred that it be on the side of over-forcefulness … As a fellow journalist once wryly observed, 'M.Clemenceau can be terrible when you prevent him from being kind.' His personality, in short, abounded in defiant complexities."

Few could be around him long enough to ever understand him.[24]

In his post-war reminiscences René de Marmande, who had been on the payroll of *La Guerre Sociale* for a time, ironically connected Hervé himself with Métivier's extremism.

> "Eventually he appeared to succumb, according to the phrase of de Marmande, to a veritable 'delirium of provocation' and 'from a sickness that Gustave Hervé had made stylish: aggravated Browningitis.' In effect, in demonstrations he would offer his revolver to whomever wanted it, and at times he himself would even shoot. In 1910, he suggested to two Directors of the Railway Union that they sabotage a rail line. At the beginning of 1911, he submitted an idea to some anarchists that they kidnap the Minister of Justice to exchange him for some syndicalist prisoners … At any rate, the police reports also underlined, that this twenty-seven year old ex-baker—he was born in Paris in 1884—did not seem to be very intelligent, and was scarcely taken seriously."[25]

The long strike of construction workers in the summer of 1908 gave Clemenceau the chance to demonstrate his *savoir-faire* in counter-subversion. Thanks, in part, to Métivier, a procession of strikers provoked the first confrontations with the troops at Draveil, leaving two dead and ten wounded on June 2 which aggravated the already aroused navvies as well as other workers. Two months later, on July 30 at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, the cavalry charged, leaving four dead and two-hundred wounded. "At the C.G.T., they voted incendiary motions calling for the hanging of the government leader because the guillotine would be sullied in touching his head." Many months earlier syndicalists printed the poster assailing the "*Gouvernement d'Assassins*". The summer crisis led Clemenceau to arrest leadership of the C.G.T., blaming it for the bloody demonstration at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. He managed to break the workers' solidarity on August 3, preventing the general strike which had been decided on after the Villeneuve-Saint-Georges massacre. This provoked a crisis within the C.G.T. which led Griffuelhes to resign and Léon Jouhaux to take his place. "The reformists, already numerous in the *Fédération du livre*, were going to create a *Comité d'union syndicaliste*, calling for trade-unionism à la française while the revolutionaries, grouped around *La Vie Ouvrière* which appeared in October 1909 would maintain a tough line. Pierre Monatte, Alphonse Merrheim, Francis Delaisi, and Alfred Rosmer demanded, above all, in their publication that workers reflect more, that they analyze the state of capitalist development in order to obtain the greatest efficacy in their strike actions."[26]

In Michel Winock's analysis neither the police nor the syndicalist militants come off unscathed.

> "As one can see, social conflicts were characterized by violence on all sides. There was no specialized police: beyond the municipal police, it was the army's mission to keep the peace. On the political and social scene, it was Clemenceau as Minister of the Interior, then President of the Council, who called on the army, as 'the strikebreaker', all the while using provocations before arresting the leaders of the C.G.T. The policy of force was a failure since it renewed the bonds among the ranks of the persecuted syndicalists. Clemenceau's successors, starting with Briand, would attempt, with greater success, to neutralize the revolutionary movement with finesse."

For Winock, most strikes in this era were successful, either completely or partially. He also argued that the social struggles from 1906 until 1910 created the illusion of French syndicalist power and direction. In general, the powerful unions didn't launch the strikes. It was strikes, rather, that helped forge stronger unions. "In 1902 there were only 102,000 unionized salaried French workers of all salaried

workers; in 1910 the numbers were 331,000. In 1906 only 4% were unionized; in 1913 it was 9%. Such numbers ranked among the lowest of all industrialized countries." French strikes may have been numerous but they were poorly supervised by syndicalist organizations. That was a constant theme in French labor history.[27]

Jean-Yves Mollier and Jocelyne George described these events as the turning point for pre-war revolutionary syndicalism, thereby implying that Clemenceau played a major role in the disorganization of syndicalism and the developments which have come to be called "the crisis in syndicalism." "Clemenceau encouraged his police to manipulate workers' organizations. He did not invent the tactic which consists of substituting action for ordinary surveillance, but he made it into a system, which would earn him the lasting hatred of the syndicalists." The disunity among the syndicalist leadership was greatly aggravated by Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, and the government exploited the situation by reinforcing surveillance and increasingly transforming the police into *agents provocateurs*.[28] A. Fryar Calhoun has argued that the Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges episode "was at least the catalyst" of the crisis in revolutionary syndicalism.[29] For Madeleine Rebérioux: "The proper mark of Clemenceau in the lasting destruction of confidence and the mess that his practices introduced there where many socialists hoped for a harmonious effort, resides in his exuberance over police activities. From Marcelin Albert to Lucien Métivier, was but a first step in developing an atmosphere of secret intrigue, of discrediting men, of sowing spy mania in order to maneuver more at ease. He took the field of battle against the workers to be the same thing as a speech at the Palais-Bourbon or sanctions against anarchist groups."[30]

In the weeks that followed Draveil, Hervé continued to characterize workers as demoralized and cowardly. One of the main causes for workers' skepticism was attributed to the treason of such men as Clemenceau, Briand, and Viviani who had sold out the workers' interests for material rewards and personal ambitions.[31] Socialist reformism was blamed for killing the idealism and activism of French workers.[32] This made workers afraid of losing their jobs and of being beaten by the police. Repeating one of his standard metaphors, Hervé compared the Republic to an old prostitute who had sold herself to the powers of finance. Yet the Insurrectional leader still had hopes for a cataclysmic event which could instigate a revolution or, at least, make Hervéism the only conceivable policy.[33]

The role of Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* in the Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges Crisis cannot be explained without an understanding of the internal division within the leadership of the C.G.T. Much of the French Left was, of course, in conflict over revolutionary versus reformist means to bring

about social and economic changes. Within the C.G.T. this conflict or dichotomy involved a dispute among different types of syndicalist revolutionaries. This dual dichotomy within syndicalism helps to explain what the C.G.T. itself called the "*crise du syndicalisme*."[34] Jacques Julliard and Paul Mazgaj, taking issue with some of the idealistic assumptions about a mythical golden age of revolutionary syndicalism propounded by Édouard Dolléans and others, argued that there were two revolutionary factions of the C.G.T., the *politiques* and the *ultras*, which had contrary views on the tactics and even on the goals for syndicalism, yet both factions saw themselves as revolutionary and both used a similar revolutionary rhetoric.[35] Police accounts concerning the C.G.T. leaders and the "crisis in syndicalism" indicate an even more complex situation. It is clear that personal rivalries were an important aspect of this internal syndicalist division.[36] Theoretical considerations were not the sole source of syndicalist factionalism since these factions themselves often showed evidence of division and transformation.

Hervé's relationship with the C.G.T. at this time is very complex. In an article in *L'Action Directe* on April 23, 1908, Victor Griffuelhes, then the syndicalist Secretary-General, attacked the "revolutionary romanticism" of Gustave Hervé, *La Guerre Sociale*, and their friends in the C.G.T. among whom was Georges Yvetot.[37] Griffuelhes, the leader of the *politiques*, was then supported by Émile Pouget. Both were revolutionaries who urged caution. This *politique* faction had a realistic and sometimes prudent approach to revolution in contrast to the "romantic" revolutionaries of the *ultra* faction led by Yvetot and supported by Hervé outside the C.G.T. Émile Janvion, a frequent contributor to *La Guerre Sociale* in 1908, was another leading C.G.T. *ultra*. Janvion constantly pushed the C.G.T. to greater militancy, but he saw his efforts thwarted by Griffuelhes and Pouget, whom he characterized as opportunists.[38] The C.G.T. also included a large faction of reformists led by men like Louis Niel (a typographer and future Secretary-General of the C.G.T.) and Auguste Keufer (Secretary-General of the *Fédération française des travailleurs du Livre* from 1884 until 1920), and there were other syndicalists closely associated with Guesde's Marxism.[39]

In 1908 the factions within the C.G.T. were constantly fluctuating and factional differences were not always related to theoretical questions. In the years ahead some of the rivals would become allies and some allies would become estranged. In hindsight, the direction that syndicalism was taking is clear. Like the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T. was accommodating itself to political realities. It was becoming reformist. Yet the new *dirigiste* reformism led by Alphonse Merrhein and Léon Jouhaux, which became ascendant after 1911, was far different from the traditional reformist approach within the C.G.T. Traditional reformism itself was

complex and evolving. It had long sought cooperation with the state, and it had tried to avoid violence. More and more some reformists looked to cooperation with the socialists.[40] The "new reformism" would not give up its revolutionary rhetoric, but its approach was clearly evolutionary. It began to stress statistical analysis, centralization of organization, class cooperation, and increased production. This new approach grew out of the *politique-ultra* factional dispute because the new *dirigiste* philosophy was a clear rejection of the millenarian, idealistic, violent, decentralized syndicalism which the *ultras* had championed. Griffuelhes, even though he led the *politique* faction, in some ways represented this older romantic revolutionary tradition. In 1908 the factional dispute amounted to a conflict between the advocates of caution and the supporters of violent confrontation. The dispute in 1908 between the *politiques* and the *ultras* thus portended the future course of the C.G.T. Yet the situation was fluid and the positions were clearly equivocal. Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* gained in prominence within syndicalism in 1907 and 1908, but they had clearly supported a fading approach to syndicalism.[41]

The events at Draveil merely precipitated the division developing within revolutionary syndicalist leadership. The *ultras* wanted to meet the government's challenge with a general strike. The *politiques* led by Griffuelhes believed that key industries could not be depended on to follow a strike order. It was the *politiques* who prevailed at both the C.G.T. and at the Federation of Construction Workers (*bâtiment*). The *politiques* needed to talk in revolutionary terms, yet they feared repression. So they hoped to avoid incidents which would force them to carry out their threats. "The *politiques*, although giving lip service to the rhetoric of revolution, were in practice becoming reformist."[42] The hopes of the *politiques* were quickly dashed because some *ultra* sympathizers were police spies and possibly even *agents provocateurs*. Lucien Métivier, after meeting personally with Clemenceau on May 20, later may have sought to become arrested in order to provoke a confrontation.[43] After the arrest of Métivier on July 27 and other syndicalists the next day following confrontations with the police, the Federation of Construction Workers announced that a twenty-four hour protest strike would take place on July 30 for all groups in the Federation. It also called for a demonstration the same day at Draveil-Vigneux. Of course, the government would then be forced to maintain order.[44]

The demonstration at Draveil during the twenty-four hour protest strike on Monday July 30, 1908 culminated in a massacre at Villenueve-Saint-Georges as the protesting workers walked toward the railway station for their trips home. *L'Humanité* called the episode an organized ambush by the forces of order.[45]

However, that bloody confrontation left Hervé almost euphoric. Four dead and hundreds of wounded workers and soldiers not only validated Hervé's analysis of Republican society, it was another catalyst for the polarization that Hervéism demanded. The *Sans Patrie* would use the crisis either to promote the ultimate confrontation or to educate workers in preparation for it. *La Guerre Sociale* was again ready with special editions to fulfill its chosen role. Soon after the massacre at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, the government sent out an arrest order for the leaders of the C.G.T. The syndicalists responded with a twenty-four hour general strike on August 3, 1908 which proved to be an embarrassing failure.[46] Hervé chastised those unions which failed to respond to the strikes, but he praised those industries such as *bâtiment* which supported the syndicalist actions. Still, even failures could be excused if they became lessons on the path to successful future action. The *Sans Patrie* believed that such strikes and confrontations were necessary skirmishes in advance of *le grand soir*. Sometimes such events illustrated the ability of the working class to act without leaders or long preparations.[47] At other times events such as Villeneuve-Saint-Georges proved to Hervé that



Figure 12. Président du Conseil (Prime Minister) Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) and Prefect of Police Louis Jean-Baptiste Lépine (1846–1933) at Choisy-le Roi, February 23, 1908. Bnf.

leadership, cooperation on the Left, and organizations were necessary to win a revolution. In August 1908 he described the "defeat" at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges as a step toward the final triumph since such violence would lead reformist unions to activism. It could also bring unions outside the C.G.T., such as the miners' unions, into it. In another familiar rhetorical device Hervé claimed that Clemenceau must have been working for the social revolution because he had made syndicalist workers more revolutionary than ever.[48] Such an assessment did not prevent *La Guerre Sociale* from attacking Clemenceau for his arrest of C.G.T. militants including Griffuelhes, Pouget, and Yvetot for "causing" the massacre at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges.[49]

The trial of elderly right wing journalist, Louis Gregori, for his attack on Dreyfus and the trial of the C.G.T. leaders for the events at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges were, for Hervé, a parody of the Dreyfus Affair in the first case and proof of the permanent destruction of the Dreyfus coalition in the second. Hervé's bitterness at this time almost carried him down the path of anti-Semitism.[50] The events at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges occurred just after Émile Janvion's exposé in *La Guerre Sociale* of a supposed Jewish-Masonic plot to control syndicalism.[51] The *ultra* Janvion had been a revolutionary contributor to *La Guerre Sociale* from its inception even though he would occasionally employ anti-Semitic arguments, and he was about to receive subsidies from *L'Action Française* in its efforts to destroy the Republic. So it was not surprising that some writers for *La Guerre Sociale* such as Méric and Pelletier responded to the increasing polarization in France with calls for a *politique du pire*, of joining the royalists to attack the Republic.[52] Hervé, who was almost always hostile to *L'Action Française*, in his emotional response to the C.G.T. trial came close to the logic of the royalists. "We don't have the millions of the Jewish bank to found an *Aurore*, to guide a *Petite République*, or to cram all the press of the Left with our message."[53] Despite such rhetoric, Hervé would never join the royalists and his vague anti-Semitic allusions were always ephemeral no matter how angry he felt. Yet, Hervé was soon to tell his readers that they could take lessons from the royalists and borrow some of their combative spirit and audacity.[54]

The feelings of rage and betrayal must have been great for a former Dreyfusard like Hervé, because the former partners of the Dreyfus coalition now in power seemed to be trying to exterminate the C.G.T. The tendency to look for allies in the opposite political extreme remained a constant characteristic with Hervé. Temporary flirtations with *L'Action Française* before World War I would have a parallel in Hervé's repeated calls for Communists to come and join his national socialists after the war. Hervé always referred to the interwar French Communist

Party as the heirs to Hervéism. What united royalists and communists in Hervé's perception was their idealism, audacity, and combative spirit. Most of the time, whichever political group fit that formula became a potential partner for him. Yet, both before and after World War I, Hervé never ceased to reject anti-Semitic extremists. It may have been largely Hervé's veto that quickly ended such appeals in *La Guerre Sociale* in 1908 and 1909. During the interwar era his fleeting flirtations with Communists were simply rhetorical flourishes associated with his deference to idealists wherever he found them.

If Juillard is correct, then the Hervéist ascendancy over the C.G.T. was greatest in this era around 1908 when revolutionary syndicalism was divided into separate factions and when some syndicalist militants were tempted by royalism and anti-Semitism.[55] Syndicalist division was accentuated due to the critical events in the summer of 1908. Despite discrepancies among scholars over the dating of the "crisis in syndicalism" and its overall origins, it seems fair to say that *La Guerre Sociale* was most influential over the C.G.T. only during an era of internal and external crisis. The direction that the C.G.T. was taking was deeply influenced by French social and economic conditions. The events at Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges occurred in the midst of the syndicalist transition away from the myth of general strike and insurrection to a more realistic and modern sense of *action directe*.[56] Thus the peak of Hervéist influence on the C.G.T. was largely a mirage. The internal division and confusion among the C.G.T. leadership, the very factors which allowed *La Guerre Sociale's* influence to grow, were the results of forces that were making Hervéism as well as "heroic syndicalism" obsolete. The peak of Hervéism resulted from factors which made its decline inevitable. In this complex dialectical process the evolution of the C.G.T. forced the pace of and, one can almost say, helped create the gradual shift of Gustave Hervé. By actually seeking to create organizations which would implement the call to revolution, Hervé was labeled a "romantic revolutionary" in part because Hervéism proved how anachronistic the revolutionary syndicalist message itself had become. The C.G.T. then, perhaps largely unconsciously, used Hervé's transformation to mask its own, and the naïve but sincere Hervé became the traitor to the Left. Eventually, the romantic revolutionary became an easy target because he was also something of a bombastic, ham actor who sought attention for its own sake. No simple depiction fits him.

After a temporary truce, the events of the summer of 1908 actually made the various points of view in the C.G.T. more opposed than ever.[57] "This infighting, fanned by the *débâcle* of Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, had, by late 1908, ignited a major crisis within the syndicalist movement."[58] Former socialist leaders like

Briand and René Viviani undoubtedly understood that these internal disputes in the C.G.T. signified an evolution of syndicalism, but this may not have been perceived by Clemenceau.[59] With the C.G.T. leadership in prison at Corbeil after August 3, 1908 for their alleged role in the bloody confrontation at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges and with the C.G.T. Congress at Marseilles set to begin in October 1908, Hervé became worried about a battle between reformists and revolutionaries for control of the C.G.T. He feared that the syndicalists would back down from the revolutionary ideas they set down at Amiens in 1906. Hervéism would then suffer a setback if leaders like Louis Niel were allowed to relegate the role of antimilitarism and antipatriotism among workers. Nevertheless, Hervé did not believe that the reformists could win at Marseilles.[60]

The *ultras* had not been weakened by the fiasco of Villeneuve-Saint-Georges because it had been the *politiques* who had made the decisions, however reluctantly. "Griffuelhes and Pouget, the two with the most direct responsibility, found themselves in jail during the Marseilles Congress. With the *politiques* thus weakened, not only the reformists but also the *ultras* renewed their attack. At the Congress itself, the *politiques*, with the aid of the *ultras*, were able to beat back the reformist bid to take over the movement. The reformists' old war-horse, proportional representation [at C.G.T. congresses], was once again defeated. But the *politiques* were less successful in dealing with pressure from the *ultras* and were forced to compromise on a critical issue—the highly explosive resolution on antimilitarism."[61]

Thus, Hervé's fears were groundless, at least for the moment. At the C.G.T. Congress of Marseilles, Émile Janvion and the cartoonist Jules Grandjouan, two collaborators on *La Guerre Sociale*, were among the *ultra* forces that came to dominate the Congress according to Julliard.[62] Janvion himself characterized the Congress as a victory for revolutionary syndicalism because it gave meaning to the vague, imprecise ideas of Amiens. He described the reformist Louis Niel and the former revolutionary Jean Latapie as *anarchophobes* or *hervéophobes* for their ridiculous and spiteful charges against *La Guerre Sociale*. To syndicalists who charged *La Guerre Sociale* with undue and evil influence, Janvion responded that the Insurrectionals were merely exercising freedom of opinion and freedom of the press. In *L'Humanité* on October 21, Latapie worried about the influence of bourgeois intellectuals from *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Action Directe*, whom he described as *fils à papa* (daddy's boys) whose ideas about revolution were largely verbal and merely a bluff. Latapie called the Congress of Marseilles a victory of Hervéism. He was horrified that Hervéists with their counter-productive version of revolution had gained control of the C.G.T. by falsifying the ideas of those less

politically minded revolutionaries who were responsible for the ideas of Amiens. Latapie stressed that organization rather than sensationalistic rhetoric was the key ingredient for success.[63] Louis Perceau one week earlier had already celebrated the "'victory"' of *La Guerre Sociale* at Marseilles when he characterized the motion in favor of a general strike in case of war as "the downfall of the Guesdist-reformist equilibrium coalition."[64]

In the years to come the enemies of *La Guerre Sociale* would look back at the Congress of Marseilles as the peak of Hervéist influence on syndicalism and as a time when Hervéism almost gained control of the C.G.T. All the skills of Alphonse Merrheim, who had escaped arrest, and Alexandre Luquet, the interim Secretary-General, were supposedly needed to avoid Hervéist extremism. Nevertheless, Julliard has pointed out that the antimilitarist motion which passed at Marseilles actually appeared to say more than it did. The motion simply called for the "education of workers" concerning a revolutionary general strike in the event of war. The C.G.T. was well aware of problems in implementing a revolutionary general strike at an international level. The antimilitarist motion at Marseilles was not an unconditional call for a general strike to prevent war.[65]

In fact, no one faction in the C.G.T controlled syndicalist policies. The *ultras*, pushed by Albert Lévy, the Treasurer of the C.G.T., were now working with the reformists to unseat the leadership of Griffuelhes. Personal and theoretical conflicts were much intertwined. "As a result of this unrestrained factional feud among the revolutionaries, the reformists were unable to gain—for the first time since the founding of the organization—control of the C.G.T. In February 1909, thanks to the combined votes of *ultras* and reformists, Louis Niel became Secretary-General of the Confederation."[66] The division in syndicalist leadership in late 1908 over the *Maison des Fédérations* Affair shows that even the distinctions *ultra*, *politique*, and reformist are too simple to explain the more complex reality. Undoubtedly syndicalist factions changed over time and varied according to the questions under consideration. After Griffuelhes resigned as head of the C.G.T. over the *Maison des Fédérations* Affair, which involved accusations of financial impropriety against Griffuelhes, the *ultras* and a group of flexible or "right wing" revolutionaries with Latapie as their most visible leader joined the reformists to elect Louis Niel Secretary-General of the C.G.T. on February 24, 1909.[67] Hervé's reaction to this election shows how misleading it is to speak of a Hervéist ascendancy over the C.G.T. The response of Hervé was to attack the election of Niel as a victory of reformism and then to blast Griffuelhes's recent election maneuvers as well as his overall lack of audacity during his tenure as Secretary-General.[68] The election of Niel and Hervé's reaction to it are proof that Hervéist influence on the

C.G.T., and even on those *ultras* and other revolutionaries who voted for Niel, was well short of control. Niel did not last long as Secretary-General. By early July 1909 a new man, Léon Jouhaux, supported by Griffuelhes, took over. But this was only a revenge of appearance. The era of revolutionary élan was ending as Jouhaux implemented some of the very positions that had led to Niel's loss of power.[69]



Figure 13. Victor Griffuelhes (1874–1922), anarcho-syndicalist Secretary-General of the C.G.T. from 1901 until 1909. (© Albert Harlingue/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

If Hervé had reason to feel triumphant after the Marseilles Congress of the C.G.T., that feeling faded almost immediately. His deflation occurred due to events arising at the S.F.I.O. National Congress which met during October 15–18, 1908 in Toulouse. The Hervéists at the Congress accepted a motion that Hervé called "the most beautiful reformist and electoral *bouillabaisse* that anyone had ever served in a socialist Congress." Hervé saw reformism triumphant everywhere with the

ascendancy of the South Germans in the S.P.D., in the Italian Socialist Party at the Congress of Florence, and now in the S.F.I.O. in Toulouse. "This is truly demoralizing that after Villeneuve, after Raon l'Étape, Nantes, Narbonne, after Morocco, and after two years of reaction under Clemenceau, a party like ours, which seemed to begin to detach itself from electoral and parliamentary socialism, is now returning to such a disgusting course."[70]

An appraisal of the Congress that appeared in *Le Temps* on October 20, 1908 had a more precise and less emotional analysis. *Le Temps* saw four tendencies within the S.F.I.O. at Toulouse: the Hervéists, the reformists of Breton, who wanted to return to the *délégation des gauches* (the old *Bloc*), the Marxists of Guesde, and the "groups which followed the equivocations of Jaurès." It was the Jaurèsists who prevailed at Toulouse.[71] *Le Temps* failed to note what *La Guerre Sociale* saw as Vaillant's intercession on behalf of the Insurrectionals which was said to have been all that had saved them from expulsion from the S.F.I.O.[72]

The conservative press seemed unaware of the intricate situation that had developed at *La Guerre Sociale* because of the Congress of Toulouse. Initially, the still imprisoned Hervé was angry with the Hervéist delegates because they had given in to majority views. He soon had to curtail his censure of the Insurrectional socialists because anarchist and syndicalist collaborators on *La Guerre Sociale* were too blatant in their attacks against the S.F.I.O. Such attacks could destroy the Hervéist effort of revolutionary concentration. As the architect of Hervéism, the Insurrectional leader was forced to take a middle position by reprimanding his anarcho-syndicalist colleagues as well as upholding an anti-reformist position.[73]

As Hervé was about to leave La Santé in early November 1908, the Bosnian Crisis erupted.[74] However, Hervé's editorial was not a dissection of Eastern European history and geography, one of his favorite themes in future years. His main concern was more parochial. A European war had almost occurred and the divided forces of the French Left had, as yet, done nothing more than create resolutions about preventing war. The International Anarchist Congress at Amsterdam in August 1907, the Nancy Congress of the S.F.I.O. as well as the Stuttgart Congress of the International both in August 1907, and the C.G.T. Congress at Marseilles in early October 1908 had done nothing to implement their rhetoric about an insurrection to prevent war. Hervé paid lip service to the importance of anticapitalism and collectivism, but his major concerns were antipatriotism and antimilitarism. These were the themes which could galvanize opinion for effective action to prevent war and prepare for a revolutionary situation.[75] The fate of Hervéism was inextricably tied to the latter themes.

The complexity of the situation on the Left was making Hervé puzzled and angry, yet he was still determined to act. How could reformism triumph in the S.F.I.O. when workers, socialists, anti-Semites, and royalists were attacking the republic? How could the C.G.T. call for a revolutionary general strike and then do nothing to prepare for it? What could most hurt Hervéism was moderation and conciliation and this is just what the former socialist, now Minister of Labor, René Viviani advocated in a Chamber speech on October 23, 1908. Viviani said that the government wanted the C.G.T. not to be destroyed but to grow, to accept all unions, and to allow equal votes to all members. The government had finally realized that the growth of the C.G.T. could lead it to greater moderation if the larger unions had a proportional share of the votes because the smaller unions were more extremist.[76]

In Hervé's opinion, Viviani, Jaurès, and Griffuelhes were all similarly culpable because all had accused Hervéists of being "revolutionary romantics."[77] Hervé contrasted romantic activism to realistic reformism. The former led to revolution; the latter led to docility. He argued that the new method of softness by Clemenceau's government was far more dangerous than confrontation. When the Radical-Socialist President de Conseil released those C.G.T. leaders from prison who did not protest against the recent massacres, Hervé considered such a move to be more dangerous for syndicalism than the repression itself. The brutal fist of Clemenceau had served the cause of revolution. In fact, Hervé himself generally vacillated on questions of C.G.T. membership growth and organization size. In this instance he called for the C.G.T. to get larger and to organize better, but he feared that this would lead to reformism unless "there were beside it a purely 'revolutionary party' composed of all the most combative elements of the country." This was, perhaps, Hervé's first reference to a *parti révolutionnaire* whose still-birth would belie its ominous sounding conception. The eventual failure of such a *parti* to come into being would be a critical factor in his *rectification*. This late 1908 reference to a "revolutionary party" was rather vague, but the proposed party was clearly meant to be beside, outside, or even against the S.F.I.O. and, if need be, the C.G.T. as well. The purpose of this *parti révolutionnaire* was to guard the revolutionary élan of the working class, to organize the truly revolutionary elements in France, and to prepare in secret for those actions that would be necessary on the day of a general strike or mobilization.[78] The *parti révolutionnaire* was thus meant to offset the evolutions of the S.F.I.O. as well the C.G.T. which Hervé had clearly perceived by late 1908. This new formation was to include a secret *organisation de combat*, which implies that the latter long-standing Hervéist group was, as yet, largely myth and perhaps not yet in existence.

At 7:30 a.m. Thursday, November 18, 1908, a calm and sprightly Hervé left La Santé with a light step and a jesting spirit. This had been his second prison sentence, this time lasting nine months. Upon exiting La Santé, he planned on getting home and immediately returning to work, but he also expressed the wish to get to the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall the following week where Jaurès was expected to speak about the socialist Congress at Toulouse that the prisoner had obviously missed.[79] The news that Hervé was coming to the Tivoli both troubled and excited the leadership of the S.F.I.O. for several reasons. A police report stated: "'They immediately feared that the applause would go exclusively to Hervé and that the personality of Jaurès might be diminished by it.' But, still according to the same source, a contrary argument mollified their worries: 'They said that the presence of the liberated prisoner was a guarantee of the success of the meeting, where many curious will go to attend the oratorical match between Jaurès and Hervé.'" Such worries, banal and typical as they were, speak volumes about the readiness of the Left to practice what some assumed it was preaching.[80]

Less than a week after leaving prison, Hervé was given the chance to debate Jaurès directly, not simply listen to the spell-binding socialist leader. On Wednesday, November 25, 1908 the two met in front of an overflow crowd of 8000 at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall where they were set to consider the questions posed by the Congress of Toulouse. Jaures praised the unanimous motion at the socialist congress which had recently ended in Toulouse, and he credited the benefits of the triple organizational approach to social and political reform by means of the concerted action of the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., and the cooperatives. The socialist tribune rejected any attempt to get rid of parliamentary means for reform and stressed how both electoral and revolutionary means were needed to guarantee success. Revolutionary idealism and practical actions were both necessary ingredients for the improvement of workers' conditions and their total liberation. Such progress does not come from bourgeois ideas and groups but arises from the working class organizations and the workers themselves.

When Vaillant, as moderator of the gathering, gave the podium over to Hervé, the Insurrectional leader charged that political and parliamentary methods were given a dithyrambic elegy at Toulouse while direct action methods of supposedly "unreflective violence" were given a "*coup de patte*" (a leg kick). Although there were excellent ideas in the Toulouse motion according to Hervé, there were some he could not put up with. The Insurrectional leader stressed how the unity of the S.F.I.O. was in jeopardy because there was, apparently, no room for antiparliamentary ideas in socialism. He related how he had entered the S.F.I.O. as an Allemanist but now those ideas were no longer respected by the party. Scission would

be the inevitable result if that situation were allowed to continue. Yet Hervé did not reject the need for elections as a preparation for a collectivist society.[81] Jaurès and Hervé then tried to answer one another's critiques. The famed deputy from the Tarn region pointed out that Hervé's representatives at Toulouse had actually voted for the motion. Commenting on Hervé's idea that violence and force were necessary for new societies to be born, the socialist leader pointed out that a premature use of force often led to an abortion. The meeting lasted over three and a half hours, yet only a few were bored or exhausted by the marathon exchange according to the socialist daily.[82]

Over a month later on January 8, 1909, the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall was also the site of a massive meeting in which an audience of 6000 heard many of the socialist and syndicalist luminaries castigate the government while celebrating the release eight individuals imprisoned for nearly six months for their actions at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. Among the speakers was Hervé who argued for continuing direct action and violence because that's all the government feared. He delivered his message just after the recently liberated Griffuelhes and Lévy entered the hall. Sebastien Faure was more moderate but concurred with most of Hervé's ideas on direct action. Jaurès pointed out that this was not the time for polemics, but he got his own message out by reiterating a longstanding socialist argument that the intervention of socialist deputies was far from harmful to the C.G.T.[83] By the beginning of 1909 trends had been set in motion which would propel Hervé in an opposite direction, but there was certainly no inkling at the time that Hervéism would become a term of ridicule and opprobrium by 1912 for many of its supposed allies. Ironically, the next three years provided some of the most vibrant campaigns and seemingly dangerous organizations in the history of Hervéism. Few could have predicted where Hervé and his movement were heading.

9

The Postal Strikes of 1909, the Francisco Ferrer Affair, and the Liabeuf Affair

In 1909 Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* were searching for a method that could push the "masses" to action. Such a tactic would reverberate if it involved risk and hence demand courage. A tactic involving secret groups of militants in illegal activities would fit Hervé's insurrectional methods and the results could be reported in the press. It could certainly be argued that such activities would be especially efficacious if they had some connection to immediate worker interests. It was no coincidence that the tactic involved almost no threat to life. The tactic chosen was the strike-related sabotage of the telephone and telegraph lines that ran beside the French railway network. The postal strikes in 1909 and the strike of French railway workers in 1910 were the events which allowed Hervé to try to adapt insurrectionalism to workers' reality. Hervé's long talked about secret organizations undoubtedly came into some kind of existence then and played some role in sabotage. But it seems probable that *La Guerre Sociale* adapted to spontaneous and popular actions rather than created the movement of sabotage. The police and the Hervéists both credited *La Guerre Sociale* with control of these illegal acts, but from the very beginning Hervé stressed that he did not sanction, much less control, saboteurs who wanted more frightening results than downed telegraph lines. Jonathan Almosnino admits that it is impossible to assign direct responsibility to the Hervéists and their legendary *Organisation Secrète de Combat*

due to the difficulties of knowing its "composition, numbers, and everyday existence," but Almosnino argues that from 1908 on the Insurrectionals recognized the growth of working class agitation and modified their tactics accordingly, seeking working class support by sustaining their strike activities. That meant promoting sabotage during strikes as a revolutionary action which could radicalize workers through such "glorious feats within the framework of strikes."[1]

The organization of workers had become legal under the Third Republic since Waldeck-Rousseau's famous initiative in 1884. However, organizing was one thing, strike activities were another. If the government was worried about strikes, it must have been aghast at the growing prospects of sabotage whose use began to develop in the heart of the syndicalist movement. As early as the C.G.T. Congress of Toulouse in 1897, syndicalists began to consider tactics like sabotage "which aimed at attacking capital by directly hitting its profits and means of production. Sabotage did not simply duplicate a vision of destroying or damaging machines, in the manner of the Luddites. It epitomized the syndicalist maxim: 'For bad pay, bad work.' Throughout many strikes, the practice of sabotage was common, as shown by the bakery workers who, in 1907, broke the display windows of their bosses. Sabotage had thus become a tool of direct action, an undeniable element in the revolutionary exercises extolled by syndicalist leaders to prepare workers for 'le grand soir.'"[2]

If organizational activities by state employees including teachers as well as postal and railway workers were increasingly accepted by all French governments and most established political groups, strike activities by state workers were considered dangerous for state security and hence prohibited.[3] "The post-office employees were badly paid, though their work rose in volume by one-third between 1900 and 1906."[4] Lack of money for the postal service had worsened the conditions of the ordinary postmen and postal clerks in this era, while the arbitrary and sometimes brutal manner of Julien Simyan, the Under Secretary of the Postal and Telegraph Service, exacerbated the situation. In his efforts to save money, in 1907 Simyan reduced the number of promotions by thirty percent, published damaging service reports on postal workers, and nibbled away at night pay. Thus, Simyan's heavy-handed manner helped instigate the first massive strike by French state workers. A demonstration of postal workers on March 12, 1909 led to violence and arrests which *L'Humanité* blamed on governmental insensitivity, coercion, and arbitrary actions. After a meeting of mail carriers had ended on Friday March 12, they went to the Paris Telegraph Center on the Rue de Grenelle where they demonstrated peaceably until the police arrived. Though *Le Temps* described the demonstration as a riot, *L'Humanité* claimed that peaceful

demonstrators constructed makeshift barricades and fled into the building only when they were ferociously attacked by police. Simyan characterized the resulting damage as sabotage by unruly postal workers. The demonstration led to 37 arrests, 7 prison sentences, and imminent revocations which *L'Humanité* described as "*La guillotine sèche*" throughout these events. Simyan, on the other hand, often called the demonstrators and strikers anarchists, bandits, and revolutionaries. After the March 12 confrontations, Simyan increased police surveillance at the six major Parisian train stations. On Monday morning March 15, 1500 postal carriers met, voiced their grievances, and showed a willingness to act. The strike seemed to get formal endorsement from the mass of postal workers that evening at a meeting at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall with 6000 postal employees in attendance. In his introductory comment Montbrand of the Central Administration said the real anarchist was Simyan. After the vote by acclamation, Eugène Guérard spoke in the name of the Railway Union and called the right to strike a natural right which no government could take away! Writing for *L'Humanité*, Louis Dubrieulh called Simyan capricious, hypocritical, and brutal, but the socialist daily did not spare his immediate superior, the Minister of Public Works, Louis Barthou, the Parisian police authorities, and the entire Clemenceau government for their tendencies to provoke and aggravate situations which called for tact, understanding, and compassion. The socialist daily also blamed the majority in the *Chambre* for special censure for allowing such bureaucratic ineptitude, injustice, and provocation to go on. The birth of unions among government employees had culminated in an authoritarian policy by Undersecretary of State Simyan. Only when negotiations and demonstrations had failed to yield the hoped for results, did a strike result.[5]

"In March 1909 … the strike of postal workers … spread throughout the country. For the first time it was public service employees who launched a strike. On March 19 the Chamber of Deputies condemned the strike by a vote of 341 to 237."[6] As the strike expanded to other sectors, *L'Humanité,* put a positive spin on the events. On March 22 Pierre Renaudel sensed victory in the ambiguous comments of Clemenceau and the fact that Simyan's authority was being bypassed by Louis Barthou, the Minister of Public Works. However, Renaudel mentioned two separate meetings of postal workers which disagreed about the need or wisdom of continuing the strike. It was unclear whether there would be any revocations at this point. That same day there was to be a meeting at the Tivoli to decide which direction to take. By March 25, the strike had virtually disappeared from the pages of the socialist daily.[7]

La Guerre Sociale had supported the postal workers from a distance, but once the strike began Hervé considered it another opportunity to raise the workers'

revolutionary consciousness. He had been quick to give Clemenceau and Prefect of Police Louis Lépine credit for the rebirth of workers' activism. The repression of the postal workers by the authorities was bound to motivate workers from other industries to organize and act in self defense according to the Insurrectional leader. He also assumed that any workers who stayed on the job and failed to support the strike should experience reprisals if the strike were ever to succeed. Hervé was certainly glad about one thing: "One could truly say that the ministry of traitors, of executioners, of policemen, and of hoodlums who preside over the republican scramble for spoils is striving hard to rouse all the workers' groups one by one against the present regime."[8] However, *La Guerre Sociale* and the rest of the extreme left wing press were being overly optimistic. When workers quickly returned to their jobs around March 22–24, in part because none had been revoked, Hervé and *L'Humanité* proclaimed victory because the government had appeared to cave in. While *L'Humanité* attributed the "victory" of the P.T.T. workers to organization, *La Guerre Sociale* assumed that the source of the victory was the government's fear of sabotage. Whatever illusions of victory they may have had were soon dashed by a second Postal Strike a few months later.[9]

With the C.G.T. then headed by the reformist Louis Niel, the police assumed that *La Guerre Sociale* expected to use the strike to enhance its role within revolutionary syndicalism, hoping thereby to prevent Pouget's proposed daily newspaper, *La Révolution*, from becoming the chief voice of syndicalist workers.[10] When the postal workers returned to their jobs without any revocations after the first postal strike, that was a victory in Herve's view, since workers would quickly strike again if their demands were not satisfied. The lessons of the strike for the *Sans Patrie* were two: (1) The government gave in due to its fear of sabotage, and (2) The spirit of revolt was not asleep but could rise up under certain circumstances when you least expected it. So Hervé told revolutionaries that they must be ready to act. That was advice "… for syndicalists who are not just revolutionaries at home, for anarchists who are not only hairsplitters, and for socialists who are something other than good and peaceful voters."[11]

For French authorities the most controversial aspect of the postal strikes may have been Hervé's promotion of sabotage. On March 24 *La Guerre Sociale* reprinted an article from the *Paris-Journal* castigating sabotage but clearly describing how it was done. The implication was clear. Sabotage was an effective means of worker action and here was how it could be done.[12] *La Guerre Sociale*'s headlines on March 31 read "*Par Le Sabotage Et L*'Émeute!" In that issue Hervé attacked *L'Humanité* for its reformist interpretation of the strike. What triumphed were force and might, not legality and right. The postal workers "won" because they



Figure 14. Rue St Paul and the Rue St Antoine, Paris, 4e *arrondissement*, May 20, 1909, during the Second Postal Strike of 1909. [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol]–1909. Bnf.

did not recoil before violence and sabotage. Violence was not the work of *agents provocateurs* and emissaries of the owners as *L'Humanité* charged; it was the true program of revolutionary workers. The ballot box and sit-down strikes were not the means to worker victory no matter what the socialist daily thought. The owners' fear of violence was the main source of revolutionary change.[13] When Pouget's attempted revolutionary daily *La Révolution* failed just after the first postal strike, *La Guerre Sociale* was poised to assume leadership over the working class. Hervé believed (or claimed) that a revolution was imminent. Not only did he urge active minorities to lead the "mass" of workers in a general strike and sabotage, he praised Yvetot's call for greater efforts to propagandize the army. Antimilitarism and antipatriotism were having great effects according to Hervé, but they needed to be combined with an insurrectional organization.[14] It may have been a good journalistic technique to swing from abject despair over worker passivity to frenzied optimism concerning revolutionary confrontations. However, as a psychological strategy for revolutionary motivation, its efficacy seems dubious, but such emotional shifts characterized Hervé's political and journalistic style.

In the May 5 issue of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé predicted another postal strike in two weeks because he was convinced that Clemenceau wanted to humiliate the P.T.T. as he himself had been humiliated a few weeks earlier. The Insurrectional leader hoped that all state workers would join the C.G.T. so that it would show more life than it did on May Day.[15] The previous day *L'Humanité* had assailed the governmental revocations, suspensions, demotions, promotion delays, and other disciplinary measures against postal workers who sought to affiliate with the C.G.T., who engaged in antimilitarism, or were perceived to be involved in certain May Day slowdowns and work stoppages. In the following issue the socialist daily noted that the government was punishing postal workers simply for their political views. Jean Jaurès stressed that the government had broken all its promises and was acting in a provocative manner while the P.T.T. was acting quite responsibly. Once a new strike had been decided on in principle, *L'Humanité*'s Jean Varenne wondered, quite logically, if the government actually had wanted to provoke the strike. Pierre Renaudel thought Clemenceau might be trying to divert everyone's attention from an impending inquiry into the problems of the French Navy. The socialist daily's Alexandre Bracke was certain that Clemenceau and his ministers thought they could push the postal workers to strike because they had enough support in the Chamber and assumed they could easily replace fired workers. That would be their revenge for their loss of face and control during the first postal strike.[16]

"The conflict flaired [sic] again in May, when the Minister of Public Works and the Postal Service, Louis Barthou, fired seven postal agents who had called for affiliation with the C.G.T. In the Chamber the socialists assailed the President of the Council, Clemenceau, and sang the *Internationale*." On May 11, after the interpellation of Barthou in the Chamber, ten thousand postal workers apparently unanimously voted for a general strike at an evening meeting in the Hippodrome, the largest venue in all Paris. But there were questions raised about the less than unanimous support given by letter carriers during the first strike. Once the strike was set, Hervé wanted all other industries to join the P.T.T. in striking, and he called on soldiers to refuse to act as strikebreakers. According to the Insurrectional leader the time was right for a general strike since the organizational progress and the growth of antimilitarism would add to the ongoing grievances against the government.[17] Activism and journalism did not exclude more personal concerns for Hervé at this time.

Later that May, Herve supposedly took an apparent vacation to Brittany where he stayed at the rustic home of his long-time friend, Émile Masson, who taught English at the local Lycée. In fact, this was no vacation because Hervé

had been trying to help his ailing friend for months due to a physical and emotional collapse of peculiar etiology which saw Masson leave his teaching post and seek convalescence, first at his mother's home in Recouvrance, and, then, aided by Andre Spire, at a clinic in Paris on the Rue de la Glacière where Hervé and Madame Dijonneau had visited him. Just released from prison a few months earlier and with a schedule full of activities himself, Hervé walked with Masson twice a week in Paris and opened up his apartment to Masson's wife Elsie and her baby when they came to Paris. However, he and Madame Dijonneau rather maladroitly questioned the doctor's diagnosis of a mental problem rather than a digestive disorder. Hervé agreed to accompany Masson back to Pontivy to ease his concerns. In their biography of Masson, Jean Didier and Marielle Giraud employed the contacts and conjunctures in the lives of Masson and Hervé as one of their leitmotivs. According to a report dated May 17, 1909 by the *Sous Préfet de Morbihan* at Pontivy, only a few of the local notables knew about Herve's visit and they were reticent to discuss it. The report noted that no troubling events transpired during the visit. For all the police efforts to keep tabs on Hervé, they were completely unaware of the nature of Hervé's visit to Pontivy that May. In September Hervé was again back at Belle Vue, Masson's home in Pontivy, trying to support the convalescing professor.[18] Later that August local socialists and syndicalists tried to organize conferences in Brest and the vicinity for Hervé but they could not get a location.[19]

Gilles Heuré noted how Hervé at first seemed encouraged by the postal strikes of 1909 and the railroad strike of 1910. For a man who had grown skeptical about the revolutionary energy of the working class, such activism by ordinary workers seemed to fortify his faith in the methods of direct action.[20] The *Sans Patrie* certainly wrote in favor of direct action including sabotage, but he did not want to cause any loss of life. The distinction between lethal and non-lethal sabotage was carefully noted by the police, but it did not seem to impress them. From now on the Hervéist danger expanded enormously in the eyes of the police.[21] To gain information on the threat, the police had few options other than perquisitions of Hervé and his entourage in their offices or prison cells, sending *mouchards* and regular agents to their meetings, and assiduously reading the pages of the revolutionary press, especially *La Guerre Sociale*. By late 1909 the paper highlighted all the acts of sabotage being produced and took great pride in the fact that the saboteurs had not been caught. For the police "this established with some certainty that the numerous attacks were the work of the Hervéist paper."[22] Heuré seems to accept police claims that it was Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* "who held the detonators at the center of this explosive spider's web." Certainly, some police

officials believed in such a vast conspiracy. "In response to warnings coming from the *Surêté* and the Ministry of the Interior in 1910 and 1911, the prefectures sent a series of replies documenting possible networks connected to a 'vast secret revolutionary society organized by *La Guerre Sociale*.' [This] shows how great the fear was of seeing this new revolutionary wave spread."[23]

It is easy to demonstrate that Hervé encouraged sabotage from 1909 until 1911, that the police generally took it very seriously, and that some officials were terrified by it. It is almost as easy to show that the conspiracy imagined by the police could not possibly have existed in the way they assumed because its component parts were divided, amorphous, jealous, competing, and distrustful, and many police agents knew this. What Heuré failed to report or did not think worth commenting on, was that the police had an incentive to uncover a conspiracy since such a plot would fall under articles 265, 266, and 267 of the Penal Code as they had been modified by the Law of December 18, 1893, part of the so-called *lois scélérats*. In one of its large files documenting a vast conspiracy including the *Parti Révolutionnaire* of *La Guerre Sociale* and its acolytes, the Ministry of the Interior reported that the *organisation de combat* was not yet constituted for the Postal Strikes, but some of its promoters sent out confidential circulars calling for sabotage of telephone and telegraph lines on June 1, 1909 and after, in order to try to get fired postal workers rehired.[24]

During the second postal strike in May 1909, Hervé seemed poised to go to the limit. Like the socialists at *L'Humanité*, he could see the second strike coming because of the government's need for revenge. So he called on workers from all industries affiliated with the C.G.T. to join a general strike in support of the postal workers, and he exhorted antimilitarists, anarchists, and *libertaires* to help workers with more than speeches. He also expressed the hope that all state functionaries would join the C.G.T. and that the latter would act with more than motions and meetings. The expanding list of grievances against the government as well as the growth of insurrectional organizations and French antimilitarism in general led Hervé to believe that the time was right for a general strike. Nevertheless, he was especially concerned about preventing soldiers from acting as strikebreakers. Still, he argued that the new confrontation could create a revolutionary situation. *La Guerre Sociale* again became a daily paper with five special editions.[25]

When the general strike was proclaimed on May 19, Hervé praised the Federation of Construction Workers which saved the honor of the C.G.T., but he lamented the weak leadership of Louis Niel.[26] After the C.G.T. proper called for a general strike, it was followed by the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, the *Inscrits Maritimes*, and various components from *Bâtiment* (construction). Jaurès, too,

lauded their solidarity with the postal workers but he was less than optimistic. Even before the other sectors decided on a general strike, many postal workers started returning to work due to the intimidation and promises of the government. The postal union tried to use the C.G.T. general strike to shame their fellow workers. Despite strong support from the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, the British & German unions as well as publications like the liberal English newspaper, *The Daily News*, the postal workers failed to hold out. The English daily understood why French workers had so little faith in democracy since Clemenceau's government had claimed to support social reforms, while its actual policies created growing antiparliamentarianism in France. Even though the postal workers returned to work on May 21, the repression was severe because more than 800 agents were eventually fired.[27] On May 21 the C.G.T. called off its general strike, as well, grumbling openly about the general torpor of the postal workers. Many postal union officials and revoked workers felt angry, betrayed, and embarrassed by the actions of their fellow postal workers. On May 22 Jaurès acknowledged the collapse of the strike and the sense of triumph by the bourgeoisie, but he was convinced that all was not lost if one honestly looked at what happened and drew the necessary lessons. For Jaurès, the general strike was not the workers' only weapon. If state workers could not enter the C.G.T. or use strikes today, the direction for the future was still clear, and that future did not include sabotage.[28] The Hervéists disagreed because they continued to believe in direct action, sabotage, and insurrection.

Jonathan Almosnino believed that the existence of the so-called *Organisation Secrète de Combat* by 1909 was directly connected to the efforts of *La Guerre Sociale*. French authorities credited Miguel Almereyda with having the leading role in the secret organization, and Almosnino assumes that, at the very least, Hervé's lieutenant held an executive position. If Almereyda's role in the *organisation de combat* was central, it is somewhat ironic that he was in prison throughout much of 1909, including the era of the postal strikes, which Almosnino described as "the first sabotage campaign to strike the country." The eventual result of the two postal strikes would be the firing of hundreds of postal employees. "In order to protest against this repression, the *organisation de combat* called on its local groups to sabotage telegraph lines during the night of June 1–2, 1909." Even though Almosnino admits that examples of actual sabotage were rather limited, he stresses how sabotage would continue throughout 1909 and 1910, damaging thousands of telegraph lines. If "it is difficult to measure the more or less great role of the *organisation de combat* in what can be discovered from conscious sabotage but also due to individual foolishness ...," Almosnino assumes that continuing

acts of sabotage must be tied to the release of many of the directors of *La Guerre Sociale* from prison at that time.[29]

Even though absolute proof on these matters is impossible, police reports on sabotage, along with their conclusions about the instigation of such actions, abound.[30] For Almosnino, "the numerous articles in *La Guerre Sociale* devoted to new perspectives of revolutionary action do permit … an understanding of the internal operation of the *organization de combat*." Each cell in the organization was said to be made up of five to ten individuals, who did not know each other's names, but who were devoted to the cause and each was willing to submit to the authority of a militant who was the only cell member to know the identities of everyone within the cell. The police discovered some of the orders sent to militants by the apparent directors of the *organisation de combat* even though specific names never appeared on these documents which were meant to be destroyed immediately. The messages included specific dates, the means of sabotage, and the types of targets designated, generally telephone and telegraph lines. "For example, one circular showed where one could find subterranean electric lines and how to unearth them to be able to cut them. Also described were the ways of cutting down a telegraph pole or severing an aerial wire."[31]

In his autobiography, Benoît Frachon, a veteran syndicalist activist from near Saint-Étienne and eventual post-war Communist, related that on the occasion "of the important Postal Strike of 1909, the newspaper *La Guerre Sociale* 'invited its readers to organize sabotage of the telephone and telegraph lines. Each week it published the number of lines cut and the locations where that took place under the title 'The Exploits of Mademoiselle Cisaille'."[32] Frachon, in hindsight, doubted the efficacy of such provocative and unsophisticated actions, given his later Marxist "understanding" of the processes of historical development. Despite his restricted perspective, this account offers fascinating testimony about the youthful, working-class, anarcho-syndicalist groups influenced by *La Guerre Sociale*. Frachon admitted that his small group of very young working class buddies was thrilled by the danger and had almost no formal acquaintance with socialist or Marxist theory. His small *anarchisant* group was described as a sort of politicized juvenile delinquency yet was conscious of the incredible class disparities and generalized oppression of the era.[33]

Despite Hervé's support for sabotage as a tactic which could activate workers and perhaps help them attain their more practical objectives, his chief lieutenant Almereyda was in prison during the postal strikes[34] and the Insurrectional "General" was more of a cheerleader than an active director of sabotage. Though he was not yet ready to give up on sabotage as a tactic, he eventually had to admit that

the strikes had failed. For him the "lesson of the defeat" was that the treasonous reformism of the C.G.T. leadership and the lack of audacity by syndicalist revolutionaries had killed the general strike. He lamented the fact that the C.G.T. failed to act in March when sabotage had cut governmental communications for twenty-four hours and Simyan's indecent language had aroused many against the authorities. If the postal workers could be excused because they were novices in strike actions, the C.G.T. could not. This failure left the C.G.T. demoralized. The C.G.T. leaders had destroyed the general strike in the same way that the workers in the Central Telegraph Office failed to adequately support the P.T.T. strikes. True to his shifting rhetoric, Hervé worried that it would take years for the C.G.T. to recover. Only the construction workers had displayed the discipline, the energy, and the idealism that were hidden in the depths of the proletariat. If Hervé continued to praise sabotage, he now called for an end to isolated and sporadic acts. A coherent sabotage campaign ought to be directed against the central telegraph lines along the *routes nationales* and beside the railroad tracks. "More than ever today it appears to be necessary for revolutionaries … to constitute themselves in an *organisation de combat* outside but beside the C.G.T. Only this can awaken the spirit of battle and solidarity which the inert and vile masses clearly need." If the C.G.T. acted as he advised, Hervé believed that it could have its revenge sooner than anyone imagined.[35]

On May 28, 1909 Niel angrily resigned as the Secretary-General of the C.G.T. due to a loss of support after his failure to adequately sustain the postal strikes. In *La Guerre Sociale* René de Marmande praised the votes of the leaders of *bâtiment*, *métallurgie*, and the *allumettiers* (matchstick workers) against Niel. De Marmande was glad the "Niel question" was over, but he admitted that the "crisis of syndicalism" was not. If reformists failed to support a new strike, de Marmande believed that a scission of syndicalist revolutionaries was possible.[36] In his next editorial Hervé responded to syndicalist ideas for a referendum on further strike decisions by stressing how hesitation in critical situations only acted to depress workers' élan. Meetings, voting, and referenda killed action which must be done immediately. The generally revolutionary Federation of Metals was assailed for its support of such blatant reformism.[37]

According to Hervé the government and the bourgeoisie knew that if telephone and telegraph lines could be sabotaged to avenge hundreds of laid-off postal workers, then the railroads could be sabotaged for a general strike against a mobilization for war. Though he was concerned that the saboteurs who acted in fifty departments sometimes cut railway wires that harmed more than simply the government's communications, he expected the saboteurs to get better with

practice. He also assailed *L'Humanité* (*Mère l'Oie*-Mother Goose) for blaming the police for the sabotage. He believed that the government and bourgeoisie were very frightened because they knew the truth. Parliamentary socialists were crippled because electoral concerns forced them to attack sabotage.[38] After "months of attacks by *L'Humanité* against those who extol violence and direct action," Hervé had to discount socialist notions blaming *agents provocateurs* for sabotage because this crippled his calls for revolutionary activism. After Jaurès praised parliamentary actions for lowering the retirement age for railway workers from sixty to fifty and fifty-five years of age, Hervé felt compelled to credit sabotage for such concessions. He believed that the Senate acted because it saw how dangerous it would be if sabotage hit the railroads again as it hit them during the P.T.T. strikes. He assumed that *L'Humanité* was increasing its attacks on the violent methods praised by *La Guerre Sociale* because the socialists were getting ready for new elections and alliances with the Radicals. Of course, Hervé now seemed to be arguing that sabotage was a viable means to get social reforms not revolution.[39] He also used the occasion of the Czar's imminent visit to assail both the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. The Czar had cancelled his previous visit due to an imminent general strike, but his impending arrival was tied to the current lethargy of French socialism and syndicalism. Jaurès would just greet the Czar with a speech. If the C.G.T. could not aid the postal workers, how could it harm the Czar? Hervé believed that only the recent acts of sabotage would force the Russian leader to stay on his ship out of fear of bombs.[40] Secret organizations and sabotage were necessary to end the absolute indifference of the "masses" to the visit of the Czar. In mid-July a recounting by Hervé of "successful" assassinations, insurrections, and terrorism in Russia was an obvious incitement to his readers.[41]

The era of the postal strikes was seen by Peyronnet as the beginning of Hervé's push to increase his influence over the C.G.T. For a time *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to be "the veritable newspaper of the unions ... Perhaps because he was more dreaded and sooner discredited by the S.F.I.O., Hervé's influence on it was not as profound."[42] Of all the socialist federations Hervé only had a majority in Yonne, but even there he did not have unconditional support. Hervéists were minorities in all the departments outside the Yonne. Yet it was in the *Fédération de la Seine* that Hervé had his most active and important adherents. The year 1909 was to see the greatest Hervéist growth within the S.F.I.O. Peyronnet believed that this apparent increase in Hervéist influence in the C.G.T. and S.F.I.O. was the source of Hervé's "great temptation," the desire to make *La Guerre Sociale* the newspaper of a *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[43] This argument has some merit but the conclusion is not mandatory. A *Parti Révolutionnaire* was implied in 1907 and vaguely stated in

1908, so it was not unique to the era after 1909.[44] The creation of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* had always been implicit in the logic of Hervéism. The explicit call for such a *parti* could be related either to the growth of Hervéism or the realization that growth had not brought Hervé any closer to his stated goals.

In January 1909 the *Fédération de la Seine* held a Congress in which the Hervéists tried to reject the reformist text that had been voted at the S.F.I.O. National Congress of Toulouse in 1908. The failure of this attempt was preordained because Hervé's closest ally among the leaders of the S.F.I.O., Vaillant, defended the Toulouse motion. The Hervéists seemed to triumph at the next Congress of the *Fédération de la Seine* in April 1909 because an antiparliamentary motion was passed. That vote did little to calm socialist leaders.[45] Even before the Congress many socialist Deputies had wanted to exclude Hervé, who had further antagonized socialists because he supported or promoted groups at Lyon and Valenciennes which were leaving the S.F.I.O. Yet at this time Hervé did not openly call for a scission.[46] Despite his record of indulgence toward the Hervéists, the police now thought that Jaurès was ready to combat them energetically.[47] The socialist Secretary-General, Louis Dubreuilh, was concerned about the increased militancy of Hervéists. After the Hervéists of the Seine composed an anti-electoral and antiparliamentary manifesto on March 8, 1909, many socialists were troubled, especially those in Paris.[48] Dubreuilh tried not to exaggerate the manifesto's effects. But he and other party leaders feared future damage because Hervéists recruited chiefly among the youth. Nevertheless, party leaders claimed that Hervé generally failed to attract members from former socialist tendencies.[49] Dubreuilh continued to worry about the Hervéist antiparliamentary campaign and inroads in the sections of the Seine in June 1909 as the next Congress of *La Fédération de la Seine* approached.[50] In 1909 and 1910 the police often reported socialist fears of a scission. The authorities even feared that the S.F.I.O. could "become" a revolutionary party.[51]

At the time of the National Congress of the S.F.I.O. at Saint-Étienne April 11–14, 1909, Hervé had readied his antiparliamentary forces to do battle on the national level. Just fresh from "victory" in the *Fédération de la Seine*, Hervé had seen no reason for socialists to accept electoral alliances with Radicals. The goal of the Insurrectionals at the Congress would be to scream about the evils of the electoral swamp, to intensify antimilitarist and antiparliamentary propaganda, and to promote Hervéist ideas in rural areas.[52] By the first day of the Congress, the Hervéists had become the object of attack due to the recent Manifesto by the Insurrectionals and articles by Hervé in *La Guerre Sociale* which seemed to threaten socialist unity by inciting groups outside the S.F.I.O. especially in

the Nord. Many socialist federations demanded the exclusion of Hervé from the party. Hervé's defense was to attack, and he defied the party to exclude him. He was reminded that it was party policy not to attack other groups or persons in the party, and *La Guerre Sociale* was warned about repeatedly singling out the Guesdist *Fédération du Nord* for criticism. Hervé's rebuttal was that he and his paper had long been the ones attacked. He cited the many violent attacks against him in the Guesdist newspaper *Le Socialiste*, and the constant efforts to exclude him, usually when he was in prison and unable to defend himself. Such examples seemed to buttress his claims; *La Guerre Sociale* merely had responded to Guesdists in kind. As far as inciting dissident groups, Hervé said he simply appealed to revolutionaries while other socialists appealed to Radicals. He claimed he never advised groups to leave the party but *La Guerre Sociale* did print all notices sent to the paper by revolutionaries. When Hervé left the podium, he was charged with aiding the anarchists, causing division in the party, breaking the pact of unity, and forming a party within the party. When Hervé returned to the tribune, he demanded the right of *La Guerre Sociale* to its opinions and the right to publish information on anarchism and insurrectionalism. When he related how the Guesdists themselves were a party within a party, he was greeted with applause. There were some voices of approval when he again challenged the Congress to try to exclude the Hervéists. Hervé's case was sent before a Commission on Conflicts which met just before the Congress ended and refused either to exclude or to censure him.[53]

In his reminiscences L.-O. Frossard painted a vivid portrait of Hervé and his entourage at the Saint-Étienne Congress, where he claimed he got to know Hervé a bit better. Frossard claimed that there always seemed to be a Hervé "case" confronting the S.F.I.O. in those years, and the Congress of Saint-Étienne was no different.

> "By chance, that year he was not in prison. He disembarked one evening at the Saint-Etienne train station, flanked by a small band of Parisian delegates who, along with him, formed the 'insurrectional tendency.' For his friends, he was 'the General'. Doctor Madeleine Pelletier, who accompanied him, had the rights to the title of 'Colonel'. Among the officers of the general staff of the 'general'—since these antipatriots consciously employed military expressions,—one noticed Jean Colly, a dismissed railway worker, an ardent municipal councilor from the Bercy district, future Deputy from the 12th, then municipal councilor of the 13th; Doctor Musy, unfortunate eternal candidate against Millerand in the first *circonscription* of the 12th; Jean-Louis Chastanet, dismissed postal worker, with the head of a pianist, who would later become the director of *Le Droit du Peuple* of Grenoble, deputy of the Isère and, [as a] final avatar, by the mysterious path of providence, rediscovered the faith of his ancestors. Unless I am mistaken, the hot-headed Sansimon

Graziani, the most loyal of Corsicans, who always kept Bonapartism and socialism in his heart and who curiously did his utmost to accommodate the one to the other, was on that trip. Gustave Hervé, child of *'l'Année Terrible'*, was approaching the age of forty. Average in height, with thick hair in a crew cut, a goatee, pince-nez on his nose, which was prominent, he had the air of a non-commissioned officer who had recently left the service. Smiling, stout, and myopic, he appeared to be in grand spirits. The 'Colonel' wore a mixed outfit, half-masculine, half-feminine: a short skirt, a vest and jacket, a blouse with a false collar, a long scarf. She had short hair and a straw hat tilted to one side. More than plump, she was plentiful and almost overflowing. Thirty years ago her eccentric attire would attract attention, and I recall that she was worth no small number of taunts toward the 'General's' small procession."

"I already said that the Saint-Etienne Congress was especially dedicated to the agrarian question. Gustave Hervé was unable to not take part in such a debate. He spoke in the name 'of the peasants of the Yonne.' He ascribed an original doctrine to them which reduced everything, that goes without saying, to antipatriotism. A very humorous orator, who pushed language to its utmost, he spoke in a voice given to strange inflexions, sometimes high-pitched and piercing, sometimes muffled. He had a halting delivery, the gift of repartee, and the clarity of exposition typical of a university graduate. The Congress, amused, listened to him with pleasure. He started to deal with the agrarian question and could not dispense with 'needling' the party leaders."

"Jaurès and Vaillant took his epigrams with good grace. When it was Guesde's turn, the debate changed character. Guesde had affirmed that it was the duty of the party to present the peasant masses its doctrine of class struggle and revolution without attenuating it through opportunism. At that point Hervé became ironic:

'At this late hour, we rediscovered the former Guesde, Guesde the insurrectional …'

He would not have time to finish the sentence. The aged Guesde was already getting up, and in his sharp, wheezing, panting voice, as if he were carrying the pain of the world, disdainful, sarcastic, vehement, he administered to the poor flabbergasted Hervé the most magnificent oratorical thrashing that a verbal fencer had ever received. The quiver of deep emotions shook the Congress. Everything about Guesde assured his domination over assemblies: his tall bony and fleshless silhouette, his emaciated visage, his massive forehead, his long pulled-back hair, the gleam in his eyes behind his pince-nez, his hooked nose, his long flowing beard, his long clenched hands, almost transparent, his harsh voice, the visible effort that he imposed on himself, his nervous, concise, rapid, flashing speech, the sovereign beauty of form, the pitiless logic of argumentation. One admired the eloquence of Jaurès, and sometimes you could resist it. That of Guesde seized you physically and left an indelible impression. Those who heard him, even once, would never forget it … I can still hear his response to Hervé.

'There have never been two Guesdes. There has never been more than one, Guesde the revolutionary who has always and everywhere spoken the same language to workers …'

> Paul Souday, who was well-versed in such matters, considered Guesde to be the greatest orator of our epoch. Next to him, Hervé gave the impression of a joker. [And] he understood it, hastened the conclusion of his speech, and returned to his seat amidst the general indifference."[54]

The rough treatment at Saint-Étienne did not cause Hervé to lose hope. The Congress was "proof" that Hervéism had arrived. The Insurrectionals now were the third largest tendency in the S.F.I.O. They had experienced almost progressive growth within the party. In 1906 at Limoges they had had 31 delegates. At Nancy in 1907 they had had 41. With Hervé and much of the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* in prison in 1908, the Toulouse Congress had been a fiasco. But in 1909 at Saint-Étienne the Insurrectionals had 51 delegates out of 326 *mandats*. Hervéists held control in the C.A.P. because the ten Jaurèsians and the nine Guesdists had to vie for the three Hervéist votes on that Committee.[55] Hervé saw his forces as masters of the situation because they could make and unmake a majority. This was one reason why in late April 1909 he hoped revolutionaries, no matter how disgusted they became with socialism, would stay in the S.F.I.O. and be represented there.[56] For Frossard, on the other hand, "The great days of Hervéism were … already numbered. In fact, despite his noisy demonstrations and uproarious formulas, despite his immoderate love and unhealthy taste for publicity, despite his naïve vanity, Hervé was troubled by the approach of war, and he began to say to himself, in order to conjure the deadly peril, that it was a pure aberration to count on the eventual revolt of German social democracy, [which was] 'a heavy machine to attract members and to vote.'"[57] Insightful as Frossard was, 1909 is a bit early to discuss the effects on Hervé of the approach of war.

Despite the vigor and seriousness of the antiparliamentary campaign of *La Guerre Sociale* in 1909, Hervé remained firmly committed to working within the S.F.I.O. Hervé was not above calling on "socialists who still vote" to show their disgust with the Radicals by voting them out of office. As long as socialists were not ready for revolution and expropriation, Hervé was often willing to take what he could get. Despite his continual assault on parliament and electioneering, he accepted the Motion of the Seine in favor of maintaining Socialist candidates in the second electoral round.[58] In a local election at Abbeville in July 1909 that meant calling for the Radicals to be swept away by socialist voters.[59]

The replacement of the Clemenceau Ministry on July 20, 1909 by a more Centrist one led by Briand brought a curious reaction at *La Guerre Sociale*. A special edition on July 22, 1909 issued a notice from the secret committee of the *organisation de combat* to all groups of saboteurs telling them to halt their acts in the hopes that this would persuade Briand to reinstate the revoked postal

workers.[60] Hervé's next regular issue compared Briand to a Russian police spy raised to the office of Prime Minister. Yet Hervé fully expected an era of *détente* to follow the Clemenceau era of repression. This was nine months before the next elections, and Hervé believed the Radicals would moderate their repression and enact reforms in order to win the new elections to preserve their control of the state. Though he expected this "policy of sugar" to thoroughly discredit electoral socialism and parliamentarianism, he was willing to call off sabotage in order to appease the new government.[61]

In July 1909 there were also efforts to get Hervé to go to Brest to deliver a conference on "revolutionary syndicalism" to local antimilitarist and anarchist groups. He had avoided speaking in the region in recent years because he did not want to upset his mother and sister who lived in the Lambezellec area of Brest.[62] In early August police reported that initial efforts to get a large hall for his meeting had been rejected. So the organizers were going to try to get five or six small gatherings instead of two large ones. But nothing definite was decided, and Hervé at that point was not being consulted as far as the police knew.[63]

Hervé's occasional flexibility at election time did not yet signal his transformation nor did it make Hervéism a democratic phenomenon, but it does give evidence of somewhat contradictory values. After critical events and during times of potential political peace, Hervé could moderate his rhetoric and seemingly become a responsible Republican. Yet, the possibility of an extremist reflex response never ceased. Whenever relative moderation failed to achieve his stated goals, he proved eager to return to extremist rhetoric and tactics. At this point Hervé was no less an extremist because he was sometimes capable of acting moderately. Perhaps it is fair to say that even when he promoted social war, he never lost sight of the goal of social peace. If he was capable of working within the S.F.I.O. or with other leftist groups, once those efforts met with failure, he was ready to seek other means to achieve his goal. A *Parti Révolutionnaire* was always a possibility if Hervé could not achieve his aims in direct dealings with the variegated forces of the Left.

Hervéism was a considerable supplementary force which Jaurès and, more so, Vaillant could not afford to disdain. There were many militants who oscillated between Vaillant and Hervé, perhaps simply because the friends of each man were often allies. At all levels of the party, despite their continuous rhetorical assaults on Jaurès, the Hervéists almost always voted on the side of the Jaurèsians. In this sense one can speak of a clear Hervéist influence on the S.F.I.O. according to Peyronnet. It was against this state of affairs that the Guesdists rebelled. Hervé's ideas were directly attacked by the Guesdists, but it was Vaillant and Jaurès who were the real targets because they tolerated Hervé's deviation and they used him for support.[64]

In the summer of 1909 Hervé's attention was diverted from the recent failure of the postal strikes to his recurrent demands for secret revolutionary organizations, the implications of Briand's new Ministry, and the Czar's imminent visit to France. With Briand now head of the government and Nicholas II expected to visit Cherbourg in the late summer, various components of the extreme Left wanted to use the occasion to blast France's ally, which had once been the object of Briand's own incendiary language eight years earlier. According to police reports, Hervé assumed that "… Briand was too cunning to get upset and instigate legal proceedings against the authors of violent appeals [against the czar], since the latter [the prosecuted authors] would be given the perfect occasion to defend themselves by displaying a similar text signed a few years earlier by M. Briand. One cannot move in that direction without troubling oneself!"[65]

All these questions became peripheral following an event that took place outside France. According to many on the French Left, Spanish actions in Morocco were being promoted by major financial interests. The defeat of a Spanish column near Melilla in Morocco in July 1909 led the Spanish War Office to call up Catalonian reserves, especially those from the working class. This move triggered a fierce but short-lived general strike and revolt in Barcelona that same month by reservists called to the colors. Even though violent anticlerical actions certainly occurred,[66] for Sebastien Faure, the events in Barcelona amounted to a spontaneous revolt rather than a separatist or anticlerical one. Even the mothers, wives, and sisters of the reservists took part in efforts to prevent the *Garde Civile* from taking their loved ones. Since many regular army contingents refused to suppress the revolt, the Civil Guard was called in. "The repression which struck the popular movement reflected the fear that the latter inspired among the Spanish ruling classes. Some of the insurgents were thrown into the sea. A number of them were imprisoned in the fortress of Monjuich which overlooked the port of Barcelona …"[67]

During the revolt, while convents and banks were being burned, the police began to search for scapegoats. After perquisitions were made, the authorities created a case, based on the flimsiest evidence, against a prominent bourgeois philanthropist and educator named Francisco Ferrer, long detested by Spanish Catholics for his creation of the secular *Escuela Moderna* in Barcelona. Simply creating such a school was undoubtedly guilt enough for Spanish authorities because the school was apparently comparable to most avant-garde pedagogical experiments of the age.[68] Having returned home from London to visit a sick niece, Ferrer was not in Barcelona when the revolt broke out, but he knew that he would be blamed, so he tried to hide. The trumped up charges that ensued were motivated by clerical revenge, according to Faure, because the clergy could never forgive him for

wanting to educate the people in a progressive manner.[69] There is no evidence that Ferrer was implicated in the uprising, though he had been falsely accused in a 1906 assassination attempt on the Spanish King, so the Spanish authorities may have been trying to "settle some old scores." Apparently, Ferrer's relatives, friends, and employees were arrested in order to force his return to Spain or to Barcelona.[70]

La Guerre Sociale was quick to respond to the situation with Charles Malato running a series of articles on "The Revolution in Spain." Hervé, too, responded in a typical manner by contrasting Catalonian energy, audacity, and direct action with French workers' passivity.[71] In the next issue, which followed the defeat of the insurrection, Hervé drew the lessons for French workers and militants to follow if they hoped to win a revolution. According to the Insurrectional firebrand, the events in Barcelona showed that one needed to be armed with more than clubs. The "masses" could act effectively only if they were led by determined revolutionary cells. A revolution must not be an isolated occurrence but should include as many regions as possible in a broad concerted effort. The lack of solidarity among anarchists, socialists, and syndicalists had to end. Labels, theories, and discussions must not be allowed to prevent revolutionaries from acting together. Above all, a successful revolution demanded that part of the army join it. Revolutionary situations arose suddenly as events in the Midi and Barcelona proved, so militants had to be ready with arms, organizations, and plans.[72]

"The Revolt in Catalonia" seemed to be a typical campaign of *La Guerre Sociale*. From an isolated event consequences and lessons were drawn which illustrated Hervé's latest themes and concerns. But this campaign was far from over. In the weeks that followed, many articles reported on the Spanish repression and attacked King Alphonse XIII. Then on August 25, 1909 a short, seemingly unimportant, article reported on Spanish attempts to blame the insurrection on Francisco Ferrer, considered a dangerous free-thinking anticlerical by Spanish authorities.[73] The problems of Spain seemed on the verge of disappearing from the pages of *La Guerre Sociale* when the news came that Spanish police had captured Ferrer on September 1, 1909 in a village near Barcelona where his parents lay ill. The headlines in the September 8, 1909 edition of *La Guerre Sociale* screamed, "If They Dare Touch Ferrer!" Ferrer's arrest had occurred just a few days after Almereyda was freed from La Santé. "Just having left prison, Almereyda found himself confronted with one of the most formidable protest movements in Paris during *La Belle Époque*."[74]

The name Ferrer and the events in Spain were not simply aspects of a random foreign crisis that Hervé and his staff could use to affect the situation in France. Ferrer was known personally by many people on the French Left. Hervéists and

especially anarchists had been greatly influenced by his pedagogical efforts and innovations. In 1907 *La Guerre Sociale* had joined other leftist forces in protesting Ferrer's innocence in the assassination attempt on the king. In late 1908 and early 1909 Ferrer was mentioned by police reports as a financial source for the proposed Hervé-Pouget daily. In fact, Hervé had met with Ferrer three months before the revolt in Barcelona. Clearly, the name Ferrer was well-known to the staff of *La Guerre Sociale*.[75] He may have been living in Paris and involved in anarchist activities there in 1904 according to one police report.[76] Although he was not a socialist, a syndicalist, or even a Catalan regionalist, in September 1909 Ferrer became a symbol as a bourgeois idealist who gave his wealth to the cause of truth and justice. He was about to become a Spanish Dreyfus, another martyr to clerical and military revenge.[77] Many in Europe were troubled by the events in Spain, but France was the center of the international agitation unleashed by Ferrer's arrest because he had spent much of his exile there. It was not surprising that much of the French Left organized in September to push for the immediate liberation of Ferrer and other victims of the Spanish monarchy's arbitrary justice. Jonathan Almosnino argued: "In the face of the growing discontent, increasingly spilling over the revolutionary milieu, the Insurrectionals of *La Guerre Sociale* including Almereyda felt that they would be able to put their new conceptions of revolutionary action into practice. Their articles became more and more extreme in protest against the arbitrariness of the Spanish monarchy. The paper increasingly tended to look like an *organe de combat*, busy not only in propaganda but also in organizing the discontent."[78]

After the arrest of Ferrer, *La Guerre Sociale* did not limit itself to mere protest. The Hervéist weekly soon threatened the Spanish king and Prime Minister with assassination, and it promised the murder of Spanish clergy and bourgeoisie if Ferrer were harmed. Hervé warned French clergy as well.[79] *La Guerre Sociale* had found a new cause. Sincere concern for the fate of Ferrer and genuine worry for the people of a fellow Latin nation were not absent at *La Guerre Sociale*. Yet, the use of these themes to awaken French workers and militants was undoubtedly Hervé's most important consideration. The Insurrectional newspaper found itself in the rather unique situation where a certain kind of sensational journalism seemed able to promote circulation and mass mobilization, if not yet revolution.[80]

Throughout Europe socialists and democrats demonstrated against Spanish repression.[81] In France, a *Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole* was formed by mid-August or early September (just after the arrest of Ferrer?) with a bureau made up of C. A. Laisant, legendary ex-Communard Alfred Naquet, and Charles-Albert as Secretary. The latter two men had been Ferrer's associates

during his stay in Paris. Their organization's office was based at Albert's residence at 15, Rue du Parc de Montsouris. Charles-Albert had been secretary-general of the *Lutte pour la Education Rationelle de l'Enfance* which Ferrer had founded and was President. Among the earliest adherents to the *comité* were Anatole France, Petr Kropotkine, Séverine, Amilcare Cipriani, Sebastien Faure, Ernst Haeckel, Maurice Maeterlinck, Jacques Bonzon, Charles Malato, Jean Grave, René de Marmande, Jules Grandjouan, Fredric Stackelberg, Aristide Delannoy, along with prominent Hervéists like Méric, Merle, Almereyda, etc. The former *Comité* as well as the *Comité de Défense Sociale* created a Manifesto on September 4 entititled "*Les Exécutions Sommaires en Espagne: A l'Europe consciente*" which was reproduced by the entire progressive press and distributed by Parisian street hawkers. The Manifesto called on the conscience of the world to prevent Spanish monks and their valet Alphonse XIII from perpetrating any more crimes against innocents and creating any more martyrs. It also intoned a prediction: "The Insurrection of Barcelona is merely the first lightning bolt of the great storm which is brewing and which will carry away the dynasty wallowing in the mire which it believes it is ruling, and will soon only be an execrated memory." The C*omité* also drafted posters, sponsored fundraising, organized meetings, and sent speakers throughout France in the days ahead. One poster titled "*Les Curés ont menti!*" answered the many charges against Ferrer posed by Spanish interests and certain French Catholics. On September 9 the President of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* adhered to the protest along with his organization. Even Catholic Sillonists gave their support and were outraged by the actions of the Spanish Catholics.[82]

The police and the press also reported on a demonstration organized by the *Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole* and *Comité de Defense Sociale* (C.D.S.) in Paris on Wednesday September 9 using thirty-five to sixty rented taxis. At this point the two *comités* seemed to act as one and included some of the same people, many with direct ties to *La Guerre Sociale.* As the vehicles journeyed along the quais, they carried placards and distributed manifestoes warning about the impending execution of Ferrer. The procession also encountered fellow militants or sympathetic bystanders en route, some of whom may have accompanied the parade. Starting around two in the afternoon from the Place de la République, the Place de la Bastille, and the Tuileries, the taxis headed toward La Place de la Concorde, La Rue Royale, and Les Grands Boulevards. The caravan eventually stopped in front of the offices of *Le Matin* where the crowd shouted "Long Live Ferrer!" It also came to rest in front of the house on the Boulevard Saint Martin where Ferrer had resided for several months while he was in Paris. The roving rally was finally blocked by police at La Place de la

République where René de Marmande was briefly arrested for insulting the police. Once de Marmande was released, he rejoined Merle and Almereyda in their rented taxi, and they extricated themselves from the roadblock. Then, those taxis that could made for a rendezvous at the Place Clichy from where they proceeded onto the Boulevards des Batignolles and Malesherbes. Almost immediately they were again stopped by police near a militarized Spanish Embassy on the Boulevard de Courcelles. Even though the demonstrators had broken no laws, or so they thought, thirty-nine arrests were made. The demonstrators offered no resistance, but they were brutally frisked and interrogated according to *L'Humanité*. Those who could not provide obvious means of support were incarcerated. The others including Charles-Albert, his wife, Merle, Almereyda, and a writer for *L'Humanité* were released.[83] The police also got wind of rumors that anarchists led by Charles Malato were ready to use an automobile to kidnap the Spanish Ambassador or several other diplomats as hostages in reprisal if Ferrer were executed.[84] The socialist press was rife with reports of Spanish police agents in France tracking Spanish refugees, and there was concern that French officials were involved in that surveillance. The various groups of French Left working for Ferrer's cause vowed to protect Spanish dissidents in France.[85]

The day before the taxi caravan, police reported that there would be a demonstration at some time in favor of Ferrer in front of the Spanish Embassy. A protest meeting was soon set for Saturday September 11 at the Salle des Sociétés Savantes organized by the *Comité* and the C.D.S. *La Guerre Sociale* immediately sent 200 notices urgings its militants to attend and participate in a demonstration to follow at the embassy.[86] The ailing Naquet left his sick bed to preside at his first public meeting in three years. Of the many speakers who aroused the huge crowd, it was Yvetot who received the most thunderous applause after he called for a boycott of Spanish goods and reprisals against Spanish officials if there were one execution in Spain. At that time, talk of a demonstration in front of the Spanish Embassy was not yet put into action.[87] At 5:00 p.m. that same Saturday September 11, Alfred Naquet, Charles Malato, and René de Marmande met at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* to draft a new manifesto on the situation in Spain. The paper also helped the *Comité* raise money for posters, and various Hervéists participated in its meetings. Along with other luminaries on the Left, Hervé volunteered his services as a speaker for a September 18 meeting sponsored by virtually every major group on the extreme French Left in support of Ferrer and the other victims of Spanish repression.[88] The question of Ferrer's fate for a time touched every page of the paper. Hervé and his followers participated at many meetings, demonstrations, and parades for the victims of Spanish injustice. Former Dreyfusard Naquet

compared events in Spain to that earlier French tragedy. He tried to show how the French Left was concerned with far more than the fate of one man. Naquet felt a boycott of Spanish goods was the best way to attack a Spanish King who was a tool of finance.[89] Hervé was the final speaker at the giant meeting at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall on September 18 with thousands in attendance to protest on behalf of the imprisoned Catalans. His sardonic assault on the Spanish monarchy and clergy for their ongoing repression also alluded to the rights of French workers to protest on behalf of their Spanish brothers, the needs of the French to emulate their southern neighbors in revolt, and the growth of Insurrectional and antimilitarist ideas in Germany as well as Spain.[90] From mid to late September police reported meetings in favor of Ferrer in dozens of French cities besides Paris.[91] On September 21 the C.G.T. sent out a notice calling for meetings throughout France on October 16 in support of Spanish revolutionaries including Ferrer. Jouhaux was set to go to Marseilles, Yvetot to Lyon, Marck to Bordeaux, Griffuelhes to Toulouse, Lévy to Nancy, Thuillier to Clermont Ferrand, etc.[92]

As has been noted, *La Guerre Sociale* performed best when it could focus its message in a campaign around the fate of one man. In their efforts to avoid doctrinal controversy and to arouse universal outrage, concentrating on the fate of one person made sense. A passive boycott of Spanish goods proposed by some on the Left was hardly the means to create revolutionary élan, and *La Guerre Sociale* certainly planned on seeking a more activist course. Yet Hervé's attention soon turned to other matters until the imminent execution of Ferrer created sufficient shock to enable *La Guerre Sociale* to arouse audacious action.[93] After Ferrer's attorney was arrested and with no witnesses for his defense, the doomed educator was sentenced by a military court on October 10, but no one knew the verdict until later. On Wednesday, October 13 at nine in the morning Ferrer was shot, apparently, just as he shouted: "I forgive you children! Shoot strait!"[94] The news would not reach Paris until five that afternoon. Even before the facts were fully known, *La Guerre Sociale* called "Everyone to the Spanish Embassy." This was an appeal not only to workers and militants, but also to the leaders of the S.F.I.O., the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine*, the anarchist *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, and the syndicalist *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*. Urgently requesting *L'Humanité* to help organize a demonstration in front of the Spanish Embassy, Hervé's appeal was couched in pathos and anger replete with references to Ferrer's grieving wife, fearful children, lying hypocritical judges, and vile excecutioners. The *Sans Patrie* was so overwrought by Ferrer's probable execution, that he adorned his emotional appeal for clemency in patriotic garb. Ferrer was none other than "the faithful disciple of our revolutionary France." He almost forgot Ferrer for an instant in

his call to action in the name of the French revolutionary tradition of reservist strike, insurrection, anticlericalism, and laicism. According to Hervé the actions of Ferrer and the Spanish rebels had been based on French ideas and values. "If war were ever opposed by insurrection, if frontiers ever fell, it would be because of French ideas." It was for these reasons that French workers and leftist militants were called to the Spanish Embassy to protest Alphonse XIII and Prime Minister Maura, "the Spanish Clemenceau."[95]

The early morning execution of Ferrer and four others by firing squad at the Prison of Montjuich rallied many groups in France, elsewhere in Europe, and even Latin America to protest vociferously, but the news hit the Parisian Left "like a thunderbolt." For Victor Serge, reactions to the judicial murder were spontaneous. "By hundreds of thousands, from every *faubourg*, workers and ordinary folk, impelled by a terrible indignation, flowed towards the city centre. The revolutionary groups followed rather than guided these masses." The editors of the revolutionary press may even have been "taken aback by their sudden influence."[96] Certainly, the left wing papers and groups did not fail to respond. Both *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale* draped their windows in red flags, posted banners in support of Ferrer, and issued special editions later that day calling everyone to demonstrate that evening at the Spanish Embassy.[97] Following the announcement of Ferrer's execution, "*La Guerre Sociale* appeared daily with five special editions."[98] The Hervéist *hebdomadaire* displayed a combination of genuine anger and a demand for revenge: "Ferrer has been executed. Don't moan about it: he received the glorious death that all revolutionaries desire. He died for the noble cause of human emancipation. His death, like those of all martyrs for an idea, is an example and a seed. Don't complain. Let's avenge him! …"[99]

With that special edition in the early evening on Wednesday October 13, "Hervé made a demonstration of his power to rally the forces of the Left. At his appeal some immense lines of demonstrators—socialists, syndicalists, anarchists—descended into the streets, challenging the 'cossacks' of *Briand-la Jaunisse*, who had just replaced Clemenceau."[100] According to Almosnino *La Guerre Sociale* was able to take the lead in the protest movement for Ferrer because Almereyda was ready to act as "the chief organizer of the revolutionary organ." Almereyda may well have played a major role in the day's events, but Hervé's name was much more prominent in newspaper accounts of that night of riot. Montmartre was alive with excitement as people from all corners of the capital headed toward the gathering point at the Place Clichy. On short notice an impressive crowd of thousands including Jaurès, Vaillant, and Hervé met near the approaches to the Spanish Embassy. Such a spontaneous gathering showed the intense emotion

unleashed by the execution of Ferrer. Almosnino argues that Almereyda led the cortège of *La Guerre Sociale* which included anarchists, syndicalists, and insurrectional socialists amounting to roughly a third of the entire demonstration. Reacting to the excited and fairly chaotic gathering, the police charged the demonstrators preventing their access to the embassy. "The militants of *La Guerre Sociale* were prepared for eventual confrontations: certain ones came armed." With the first police assaults, shots rang out and the demonstration was transformed into a full scale riot, for which both the police and the revolutionaries shared responsibility.[101] Trying to piece together and make sense of the ensuing events is difficult because almost every observer experienced things differently, but one can attempt to create a composite picture.

The *Journal des Débats* blamed the rioting on provocations coming from *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale* in their special editions the day of the demonstration as well as violent appeals by the *Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole*. It was certainly true that militant socialists and syndicalists from the *Bourse de Travail* made their way to the Spanish Embassy on the Boulevard de Courcelles that evening. However, the *Journal des Débats* also claimed that "bands of *apaches* also came in from Saint-Ouen and down from Belleville or Ménilmontant, and they caused the protest to degenerate into a veritable riot," despite the formidable preparations by the police which the paper described in systematic detail.[102] The first protesters arrived in small numbers at the Spanish Embassy by 6:00 p.m. but the police soon put up barricades nearby. Victor Serge was convinced that the embassy would have been ransacked that evening if Prefect of Police Lépine had not barricaded all the entries to the Boulevard Malesherbes.[103] In the ensuing hours people kept gathering throughout the district surrounding the embassy. According to *Le Petit Journal* things were fairly calm and not many people could be found at the Place Clichy rendezvous location before 9:00 p.m. Then, very quickly groups came in from many directions engulfing the statue of Marechal Monay in a sea of red banners and flags. Given the intense emotion and the increasing throng, things quickly degenerated.[104] Random shots soon rang out, and the crowd headed down the Boulevard des Batignolles toward the embassy "like a tidal bore." By then the police had formed a triple line at the angle of the Boulevard de Courcelles and the Boulevard des Malesherbes. Those police measures, in effect, prevented circulation near the embassy. That meant that the closest you could get to the embassy was about forty meters according to *L'Humanité*.[105] The situation was primed to get out of hand as a false rumor spread that Hervé had shot at the Municipal Guards after they threatened him. One journalist reported that Hervé arrived on the scene sometime before 9:30 p.m.

in a car with Jaurès and someone named Andrieux. About the time that the car supposedly carrying the socialist leaders was forced to turn back by the police, another column also approached from the Rue de Constantinople possibly led by a major Hervéist contingent, while another column led by Vaillant, Charles-Albert, and C.-A. Laisant was reported as coming out of the Metro station of Villiers all joining up on the Boulevard de Courcelles.[106]

The *Journal des Débats* painted a slightly less chaotic picture, at least at the beginning of the evening. Around 8:30 p.m. Jaurès and Vaillant appeared bearing their Deputy badges; Laisant and Charles-Albert were there as well representing the C.D.S. Hervé came accompanied by Charles Malato and the staff of *La Guerre Sociale*. Soon the entire group headed toward the police barriers, and the crowd followed their leaders. When they tried to break through, the police charged; however, all that resulted were violent screams but little injury. Once the crowd realized that the police had backed off, the demonstrators adjusted to the changing situation and headed toward the Boulevard de Courcelles, overturning tramways, breaking benches, and extinguishing gas lamps. At the Place Villiers and the approaching streets, more workers, anarchists, and "hoodlums" joined the moving throng. Although the Municipal Guards calmly waited, a collision was imminent. When Prefect of Police Lépine moved in front of the barrier to try to calm the situation, he and his forces were met with clubs, fists, and violent screams. Then a shot rang out striking a policeman named Millet standing behind the Prefect of Police, and that instigated even more brawls involving police agents including M. Tounay, the Director of the Municipal Police.[107] Lépine actually had his cheek grazed by the wadding from a bullet while demonstrators chanted "Assassins, Assassins!" The Prefect of Police then shouted back, asking the crowd whether their accusation was also good for the murderers of his police force. The response he got was that it was a "work accident" when a policeman got killed, not a murder.[108] Victor Serge thought that the shot that injured Lépine came "from ten yards by a revolver from somewhere in a group of journalists belonging to *La Guerre Sociale*, *Le Libertaire*, and *L'Anarchie*.[109]

At about the time that the various columns merged at the Place Villiers and the police charged, Vaillant himself was struck in the face. Later, one young store employee named Georges Lambert was taken to the hospital with a hernia after getting kicked in the groin and stomach trying to ward off a police attack aimed at Jaurès. While these events transpired, the crowd started destroying the street lights. In the darkness people were told to head to Les Grand Boulevards. Many went toward the Rue de Constantinople, but some remained in place. Eventually,

protesters got a hold of a garden hose and held off police attacks until they were surprised from the rear. Elsewhere, the situation went "from bad to worse" as consecutive, brutal cavalry charges sowed panic and generated further popular violence. Angry shouts never let up and soon the crowd began to destroy a metro construction site at the Place Malesherbes. Meanwhile, demonstrators set fires to kiosks, burned chairs from cafes, and broke windows at a branch of the Comptoir d'Escompte. After tearing out the gas lamps on the Boulevard de Courcelles near the Villiers metro station some time after 9:00 p.m., everything was in near darkness except for the glow of the various fires. Then someone cut a gas line and set it on fire transforming twenty lamps into torches. Almost immediately, trumpets sounded and the cavalry charged again, this time with sabers drawn, at the heels of the fleeing crowd. Several innocent people were injured, several women were trampled, and dozens of demonstrators as well as police were sent to the hospital. The area around the embassy was not the only point of confrontation since violence and disorder also occurred elsewhere including the Place de l'Opéra and the offices of *La Libre Parole* where several editors were pelted with rocks as they stood on their balcony.[110]

After the initial confrontations, there followed three more hours of even more chaotic and violent street battles replete with more burned tramways, broken benches, flaming gas lines, smashed windows, uprooted trees, and general mayhem which did not end until 1:00 a.m. according to the *Journal des Débats*. Hundreds of demonstrators, police, and bystanders were injured, but the police managed to arrest several armed demonstrators, apparently including those who shot Millet and killed another policeman named Dufresne.[111] *Le Petit Journal* claimed that after a final police charge at the Place de Villiers around 11:00 p.m., the boulevard was vacant and quiet except for the sound of glass breaking under the impact of thrown stones.[112] In Victor Serge's account: "Weariness and the onset of the night calmed the outburst, which left the people of Paris with an exultant sensation of strength."[113] A more detached observer might be less sanguine about the night's activities because once the police had cleared the streets, the area around the Spanish Embassy was unrecognizable, one policeman lay dead, and many were injured.[114] Jaurès lamented the violence and injuries to the participants, onlookers, and police, but he thought that the anger of French workers was understandable. For the socialist tribune there was little doubt that the protesters were "on the right side of history."[115] Eventually, Lépine notified Briand that it had taken more than ten cavalry charges to clear the boulevards, but he claimed that most of the violence involved 200 to 300 hooligans who had little concern for the fate of Ferrer.[116]

Hervé argued that the police attacked revolutionary groups who had only come to demonstrate. In his account, the group from *La Guerre Sociale* was attacked by the cavalry at full charge without any warning or request to stop. Though his staff tried to avoid the drawn sabers, they were trampled by the horses. In response some employed their handguns. Hervé stressed that other groups only shot when they, too, were attacked by the police, who supposedly immediately halted when they realized they were under fire.[117] Almereyda and his compatriots undoubtedly played a major role in the unfolding violence on the night of October 13–14. They certainly came prepared to take advantage of the chaos and general exasperation in order to promote violence. The day after the riot Almereyda admitted that militants "had vowed to defend themselves if Lépine's Cossacks tried to overwhelm them as they usually did." He certainly admitted that the militants had fired shots and set up barricades the previous night.[118] After the acquittal of two Ferrer demonstrators in June 1910, the police reported that the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* bragged that they had shot at the police the night of October 13, 1909.[119]

Unsurprisingly, *Le Petit Journal* was much less sympathetic to the protesters, and reported that a priest was also attacked by some demonstrators. One witness for the newspaper described the people responsible for the depredation as shady looking characters.[120] While *Le Matin* called the protesters who reacted to the police charges "bandits," *L'Humanité* explained how the demonstrators' creation of barricades and their destruction of gas lamps were simply efforts to protect themselves. In general, writers at *L'Humanité* were convinced that police violence was the major source of the bloodshed and popular frenzy. The socialist daily also implied that most of the gunshot wounds occurred only after the police violently entered the crowd on horseback. Later, even Briand made a sharp distinction between the political demonstration led by Vaillant and the band of individuals responsible for the depredations. Gilles Heuré claimed that the crowd eventually numbered 40,000, while *L'Humanité* described a crowd of at least 20 to 30,000.[121] The agitation aroused by the execution of Ferrer did not let up in the days ahead according to Almosnino who described France as "divided in two" by the events. Ties between *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaire* and *Camelots du Roi*, forged in prison, were supposedly broken by the encounters over these event.[122]

While most newspapers were horrified by the "night of terror", at *La Guerre Sociale* Hervé seemed ecstatic. Demonstrations had occurred all over Europe as well as South and North America, but Paris had achieved a spectacular success from the Hervéist perspective because it proved that the Left could still act! He

had been at the embassy, and was convinced that the police attacked peaceful demonstrators who merely defended themselves. Among those assaulted by the police that Wednesday night were socialist deputies Sembat, Jaurès, and Vaillant.[123] One police report claimed that no one had ever seen Jaurès so shaken as on that night. With the support of socialist and even some Radical and Radical-Socialist deputies, the socialist tribune planned to demand the recall of the Spanish ambassador at the next session in the Chamber. Various party organizations including the C.A.P. and the parliamentary groups of the *Fédération de la Seine* organized meetings to decide what to do next, while Vaillant and Guesde called on the International Socialist Bureau to convene in Brussels.[124] After claiming that the violence of October 13 was mainly the work of the same sort of bandits who swarm in all large cities ready to pillage, destroy, and murder on any occasion and then blaming *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* for calling the brigands and revolutionaries there, the *Journal Les Débats* then argued that the Ferrer demonstration was an attempt to reactivate the anticlerical campaign in order to paper over differences on the Left among the collectivists, Radical-Socialists, and Radicals in preparation for the next elections.[125]

Hervé praised the *Syndicats de la Seine*, *L'Humanité*, school youth, and those socialists who still had their old Blanquist spirit. He had special praise for anarchists and workers who had answered cavalry charges and sabers with "*un bulletin de vote de bon calibre*," a hand gun, that is. Such praise for leftist activism could not dispense with an indirect attack on reformist methods. However, his praise of anarchists may have been wishful thinking because at least one police agent witnessed anarchist apathy or disgust over Hervé's cooperation with socialists in a strictly bourgeois concern.[126] The only direct criticism that Hervé gave about the rally was some evidence of panic among the demonstrators. The old *sang-froid*, cohesion, discipline, and courage in the face of the police were not yet fully restored, but they would be soon, Hervé promised. Returning to the death of Ferrer, Hervé called him a martyr and demanded further vengeance. King Alphonse XIII, Prime Minister Antonio Maura, and Spanish reactionaries were again threatened with assassination, and French Jesuits were told they would meet the same fate when the revolution occurred.[127] In a third special edition Hervé stressed that the demonstrators had not sought revolutionary violence on the night of October 13. "We did not have the crazy idea of forcing the barriers, nor did we seek to attack the infantry and cavalry, who were armed with rifles and the Lebel carbine … We only wanted to be allowed to scream our anger there, a hundred meters from the embassy." There was no premeditation to riot according to Hervé, but he

felt compelled to utter a warning: "We have decided to continue, if the police continue."[128]

In a special edition on Friday, October 15, Hervé goaded the French government into prosecuting him for the demonstration, and lamented that Clemenceau was no longer around since he would not have failed to put Hervé on trial. Again, there was praise for the crowd's justifiable self-defense against the police.[129] On Saturday, October 16 the police reported that Hervé was going to call for a riot during Sunday's planned march. The police believed that both *La Guerre Sociale* and the C.G.T. wanted working class victims and many arrests in order to instigate the revolution. Supposedly, the C.G.T. promised 20,000 strikers who would be prepared to riot. The same report claimed that *La Guerre Sociale* expected the electricians to cut power to make the demonstration a success, that is, to create victims and promote arrests. For the forces of order, *La Guerre Sociale* could only engineer another episode of disorder which the Hervéists and their allies were preparing in a feverish urgency.[130] Although Hervé employed all the tricks in his rhetorical arsenal to instigate action and to create the aura of revolutionary élan, his intentions here, if not always his language, were peaceful. In another special edition that Saturday, *La Guerre Sociale*, in conjunction with *La Fédération de la Seine*, *L'Humanité* as well as other leftist organizations and newspapers, called for a new demonstration and parade on Sunday, October 17 at the Spanish Embassy. The organizers managed to get police approval for a demonstration that would approach the Spanish Embassy. Instead of the 20,000 demonstrators which had come out last Wednesday on short notice, Hervé now called for 100,000 for the Sunday afternoon march. Revolution was not the goal because both Hervé and Almereyda demanded that the rally be peaceful! *La Guerre Sociale* even enumerated the various kinds of violence to be avoided, and *L'Humanité* did the same thing. In exchange for official approval of the route, "Almereyda guaranteed peaceful intentions from the revolutionary milieu … [and] he called on his comrades to avoid violence, and to come to the demonstration without either the '*chaussette à clous*' [hob-nailed boots] or the '*machine à bosseler*' [brass knuckles or a cudgel]."[131] Hervé's lieutenant also recommended certain slogans and songs for the march such as *L'Internationale*, *La Carmagnole* of 1869, and *Gloire à Ferrer* just written by Hayard, but he expected that the demonstrators would limit themselves to verbal assaults against the Spanish monarchy. A special notice proclaimed that this was a test to see if a peaceful demonstration could occur in the streets of Paris without being attacked by the police. Thus, there were clear signs of cooperation on the Left throughout the Ferrer Affair, even though some anarchists were troubled by the peaceful approach.[132]



l'Humanité

JOURNAL SOCIALISTE QUOTIDIEN

DIMANCHE 17 OCTOBRE 1909

5 c. Le Numéro

RÉDACTION, ADMINISTRATION & ANNONCES

Directeur Politique : JEAN JAURÈS

POUR L'ESPAGNE LIBRE

Nous Manifesterons Pacifiquement

PLAN DE LA MANIFESTATION D'AUJOURD'HUI

Points de concentration et parcours du cortège

Mesures Prises

PAR LA

Commission d'Organisation

Recommandations générales

Itinéraire

Pour arriver

La Protection de l'Ambassade

La Fin de la Manifestation

Dislocation du Cortège

CONVOCATION

GROUPEMENTS

d'Hommes de confiance avec leurs Points de Concentration.

CONFIANCE

L'HUMANITÉ.

Les Mesures Gouvernementales

AUX ASSASSINS DE FERRER

MAURICE BOUCHOR

UNION DES SYNDICATS DE LA SEINE

GRAND MEETING

Aujourd'hui dimanche, à 9 heures du matin

au TIVOLI-VAUX-HALL, RUE DE LA DOUANE

Prendront la parole :

LUQUET, de la C. G. T. — LEPRINCE — VICTOR — DUPOUY, BOUDET — MIGUEL V. MORÉNO

UN APPEL

de la « Guerre Sociale »

RÉVOLUTIONNAIRES DE PARIS !

TRIBUNE SYNDICALE

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SCRUTIN DU 17 OCTOBRE 1909

Les Candidats du Parti

Citoyen SICARD

Citoyen DUFFAU

Citoyen DUBREUILH

Citoyen DALLE

Élection au Conseil Général

Citoyen GALLON

Figure 15. *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1909. Map of the Parade Route leading toward the Spanish Embassy for the Second Demonstration during the Ferrer Affair. Bnf.

L'Humanité's headlines that Sunday, the day of the march, set the tone for the second demonstration: "*Pour L'Espagne Libre: Nous Manifesterons Pacifiquement.*" However, in the name of order, moderate and even Radical newspapers advised against the demonstration. The reactionary press claimed the march was a preparation for revolution. In fact, leftist organizers of all hues wanted demonstrators to be fully aware of the intention to create a peaceful and orderly march. Below their headlines both *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale* provided a detailed map of the parade route toward the Spanish Embassy, with barriers well marked in advance. Also included were the seven gathering places and lists of two to three dozen men and women who formed the *service d'ordre*. The point of departure and route were similar but not identical to the locations for the largely spontaneous earlier demonstration. The itinerary of the parade and dispersal were thus announced by the Committee of Organization in advance: from La Place d'Anvers all the way to the Étoile and the Tuileries by way of the Boulevards Rochechouart, Clichy, and Batignolles, the Rue Montceau, and the Boulevard Malesherbes. With the parade route and dispersal points set, demonstrators would be able to return to their own neighborhoods peaceably.[133]



Figure 16. Second Demonstration in Paris on October 17, 1909 during the Francisco Ferrer Affair. Bnf.

A few weeks later, in court, Hervé revealed that the night before the second Ferrer protest he rode in a car with the editorial secretary of *L'Humanité* to fix the itinerary and to organize the *service d'ordre.* He also took credit for personally halting the singing of *L'Internationale* during the demonstration when the marchers approached the Madeleine because the cavalry mounts became agitated.[134] During the march Hervéists joined other militants at various locations to provide leadership and to secure an orderly parade. That Sunday, Hervé, Almereyda, and Tissier led a group which formed at the Place Blanche off the Boulevard de Clichy. The fact that Hervé played a prominent part in these events may undercut Almosnino's stress on Almereyda's crucial role. But Victor Serge also called Almereyda both an organizer of the first demonstration and "the moving force behind its successor."[135] Other Hervéists like Perceau and Pelletier were mentioned as having been involved at other locales. There was to be no violence or provocation around the embassy. Revolutionary songs and jeering about the Spanish assassins were to be permitted only during the parade.[136]

One of the main innovations which made demonstrations possible during *La Belle Époque* was the *service d'ordre* by the demonstrators themselves. The second Ferrer protest march marked the first time that demonstrators and police negotiated the itinerary and organized the *service d'ordre*. The march was authorized only after negotiations among the *Fédération de la Seine*, Président du Conseil Briand, and Prefect of Police Lépine. A system was put into place using *hommes de confiance*, who held responsible offices within the party, had a certain visibility, and were willing to put themselves in harm's way. Some ordinary militants were also engaged to keep order and they would be identifiable because of their red armbands and identification cards. The role of the Deputies was to put themselves at the head of the parade where, adorned with their official sashes, they would act as the spokesmen for the movement. Ministers like Clemenceau had assumed that the streets did not belong to special groups or particular classes, but to everyone equally since it was a public way. That was why he had expected that there could be no gatherings of crowds which prevented others from freely moving about. That was also why the police repeated the constant refrain: "Circulate, there is nothing to see there." For French politicians like Clemenceau, national representation occurred through Deputies in the *Chambre* where freedom of debate was granted and where each deputy possessed the right of interpellation, so no governmental action escaped the control by elected officials. Particular ministries rose or fell due to interpellations in the *Chambre,* not due to street demonstrations, strikes, or mob actions. The French press also had the right to freely discuss the issues of the day. For militants like Hervé or Vaillant, workers had to have alternate means of

voicing their grievances. They had to have the possibility of expressing their ideas and feelings directly. Such means created an expanded system of national representation different than the more moderate usage.[137]



Figure 17. Second Ferrer Demonstration, October 17, 1909, the *Service d'Ordre*. Photo by Léon Gimpel. (© Photo 12/French Photographic Society/The Image Works)

A special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* on Sunday again stressed the peaceful approach for the day's demonstration. Hervé pointed out that the organizers had created a force of experienced and proven militants to keep the demonstrators away from the police around the Spanish Embassy. Because Hervé realized that such peaceful tactics were not in the Hervéist tradition, *La Guerre Sociale* apologized in advance. He justified his advice as an attempt to conquer the streets peaceably, yet he hoped that the days of the Combes Ministry, when abused workers demonstrated meekly, would not return. The purpose of the march was to pressure the Spanish government so it would not execute the 1500 comrades of Ferrer who remained in Spanish prisons, not to launch a revolution or start a riot. Yet Hervé could not resist threatening the police by promising that the demonstrators would establish order if the police could not.[138] The following day *L'Humanité* was ecstatic with the results claiming that 100,000 people from mixed classes had demonstrated peaceably. According to the socialist daily that was the largest demonstration in Parisian memory. Virtually the only negative note was that the police and military had massed almost 10,000 agents and gendarmes to control

what they must have perceived as a potential mob. Troubles that did occur, according to *L'Humanité*, happened a half hour after the parade ended and again it was the police who provoked the majority of the disorder.[139] One police report counted 82,000 protesters, so "the demonstration of the 17th exceeded all expectations."[140] Victor Serge, who was in that crowd, may have exaggerated a bit by putting the throng at "one-half million of us, surrounded by mounted *Gardes Républicaines* who sat all-subdued, taking the measure of this newly-arisen power."[141]



Figure 18. The Second Demonstration during the Ferrer Affair, October 17, 1909. Balcony view by Léon Gimpel (1873–1948). (© Photo 12/French Photographic Society/The Image Works)

Though violence and disorder seem to have been slight, Hervé displayed some curious reactions. After blaming Spanish clericals for Ferrer's death and French clericals for solidarity with their Spanish brethren, he said that a renewal of workers' anticlericalism would not cause them to lose sight of social and revolutionary goals. The *Sans Patrie* was genuinely affected by charges that workers had acted as sheep during Sunday's demonstration. He now recalled the violence of Wednesday, October 13 with pride, while the calm of Sunday, October 17 was explained by citing police timidity! Hervé recalled how the police the previous Friday had violently broken up a meeting of demonstration organizers. He demanded that such police actions in the future be answered with bombs! The chief lesson that the Radicals should have learned, from what Hervé described as "the 100,000 demonstrators and 200,000 sympathizers Sunday," was that a mobilization for war would see one million Frenchmen in front of the Foreign Ministry. If a draft of Spanish reservists could lead to a revolt in Barcelona and if an assassination of an antiwar Spanish educator could lead Parisians to such action, European governments needed to heed these warnings. The *Sans Patrie* felt that his movement was making progress, but the French Left was not yet sufficiently organized or audacious. The Republican press was lukewarm or negative regarding the demonstration which they described as involving mostly socialists and syndicalists. Although the S.F.I.O., *L'Humanité*, the *Fédération de la Seine*, the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, and the *terrassiers* joined in organizing the Sunday demonstration, Hervé's jubilation was far from total. His defense of worker non-violence coupled with his own bomb threat against the police, if they attacked workers or their leaders, were signs of confusion and perhaps dejection.[142]

One wonders whether Hervé's curious responses to the Ferrer Affair were a vague realization that an apparently perfect Hervéist vehicle and a well-executed campaign had led nowhere. Gilles Heuré captures the situation quite accurately by juxtaposing Hervé's later claims to have given a warning shot on October 13 demonstrating what an Hervéist insurrection would be like and yet making certain that everything was peaceful on October 17. "That was a rather reliable indication that the revolution, for him, must first unfold in the pages of his newspaper, and only occasionally take one's chances in the streets of Paris."[143] Rather than seeing the Ferrer Affair as an attempt by Hervé and Almereyda to put their new conceptions of revolutionary action into practice, as Jonathan Almosnino does, one could say that it represented confusion, contradictory goals, and inherent caution, at least by Hervé. The *Sans Patrie* did not need inaction and latent patriotism by German socialists as justifications for his later transformation. Divisions on the French Left, a lack of revolutionary élan among workers, and his own instinctive

squeamishness in the face of domestic violence permeated the Ferrer Affair and foreshadowed his future shift in views. Of course, the police did not see the situation that way, especially given the difficulties in bringing Hervéists to justice for their apparent violence during the first Ferrer demonstration.[144]

As news from Spain kept coming in along with false reports that the Barcelona revolt was about to recommence, the *Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole*, led by Charles-Albert and Charles Malato, in concert with Soledad Villafranco, Ferrer's mistress in his final years, continued to work for the release of other Spanish prisoners, an overturning of the verdict against Ferrer, and a reversal of the judgment regarding the confiscation of his property.[145] During the last week of October, Hervé gave a series of conferences in Yonne. When asked about the Spanish philanthropist and educator, Hervé claimed that Ferrer had been killed for saying the same things that he himself was saying now. He told workers in the army not to desert unless they were sent to Biribi. The police reported that his reception in the region was not overwhelming.[146] In the weeks following the Ferrer campaign, Hervé made a half-hearted call for a demonstration at the Russian Embassy to protest the new loan.[147] He also defended the public schools from clerical attack.[148] While agreeing to accept socialist demands for proportional representation in elections, he reiterated his belief that reformism was no way to end capitalist domination. In his view workers still needed to be armed and engaged in small secret groups which could make contacts with militants in the army, because events in Catalonia had shown that revolt could come at any time. The French needed an *organisation de combat* so that they would not suffer the same fate as Barcelona.[149] If his attacks on French socialism were moderated, the arguments against Jaurèssian socialism remained. Hervé defended the new book by Émile Pataud and Émile Pouget, *Comment Nous Ferons La Révolution* from a Jaurès attack, by saying that such simplistic books were necessary to arouse workers to act. Of course, workers would defend a successful revolution from external and internal attack as Pataud and Pouget said. Hervé and the Insurrectionals always stated as much, so Jaurès erred in calling this a contradiction within antipatriotism.[150]

Hervé appeared to have much support within the C.G.T. in 1909 and 1910.[151] However, just how far *La Guerre Sociale* was from control of the C.G.T. became clear at the end of 1909. At a time when the French Parliament was preparing a new loan for workers' pensions, Hervé hesitated in approving the syndicalist policy which rejected any contributions by workers. Georges Yvetot, formerly one of Hervé's closest allies in the C.G.T., wrote in *La Voix du Peuple* scolding "professors" Jaurès and Hervé concerning worker pensions and their defense of

public schools.[152] Hervé charged Yvetot with perennial anti-intellectualism, but he did not stop there. In Hervé's view the C.G.T. was too weak to do anything on its own. It needed *La Guerre Sociale* and even *L'Humanité* in order to act. Hervé had become so enraged at the syndicalist rejection of Hervéist influence that he came close to a reformist view of S.F.I.O.-C.G.T. relations. "The C.G.T. only verbally attacks *La Guerre Sociale* now but if it ever obtains power it would have our entire staff thrown into jail," alleged Hervé. After accusing the entire C.G.T. of anti-intellectualism, he employed what seems to have been a common trope of the times, attacking all dictatorships whether by the King, the bourgeoisie, or the workers. Usually when a new year began, Hervé expressed a wish for an end to parliamentary idiocy by French socialists. The beginning of 1910 was different. "This year ... I wish ... that certain high dignitaries of the C.G.T. would not spew out syndicalist and *ouvrièriste* cretinism which is as dangerous and as foolish as that of ... [parliamentary socialists]."[153]

Several police reports in early November 1909 discussed the violent rivalries among the publications of the extreme French Left, specifically the problems associated with *L'Anarchie* after the death of Albert Libertad a year earlier. One report claimed that *Le Libertaire*, *Les Temps Nouveaux*, and *La Guerre Sociale* sought to completely eliminate *L'Anarchie* because the anarchist individualist publication was too critical of its rivals and competitors.[154] Despite evidence of cooperation on the Left at the time of the Ferrer protests, in the early summer of 1909 there had been much resentment by the *Comité de Defense Sociale* regarding *L'Humanité*'s refusal to print the *ordres du jour* of the *Bourses du Travail* and the socialist daily's purported unwillingness to help militants while they were in prison. Some members of the C.D.S. then used harsh rhetoric against *L'Humanité* and the S.F.I.O. similar to that which Hervé periodically employed regarding syndicalist exclusivist and authoritarian tendencies. If the socialists ever got power, the syndicalists and anarchists on the C.D.S. claimed that they would be threatened by socialist authoritarianism. Some C.D.S. members lamented the disappearance of Pouget's stillborn *La Révolution* as a counter to *L'Humanité*. Yet, at about the same time, the police spoke about a growing conflict within socialism between *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité*.[155]

In January 1910, a few weeks before a vast inundation of Paris would temporarily steal the spotlight, Hervé created a campaign and his own final prison martyrdom out of an obscure event which became a major story in large part because of the intervention of *La Guerre Sociale*. Instead of an international figure like Ferrer, Hervé now chose to champion an alleged pimp who murdered a police agent in a Parisian brothel district. Hervé's first lead editorial in the campaign, entitled

"*Défense de l'Apache*", failed to mention the murderer's name. The name did not matter. The fate of an individual criminal who had targeted the hated vice-squad was of little importance. What was crucial was the meaning that the murder had for the advancement of Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale*. For Hervé the murder of a vice-squad agent named Célestin "*Bouledogue*" Deray by an accused *souteneur*, Jean-Jacques Liabeuf (1886–1910), was a call for revolutionaries to act in the same manner. In an age when militants were assaulted in police stations by the forces of the Republic, "didn't the act of the *apache* who killed agent Deray have a certain beauty and grandeur?" Although Hervé attacked the police, his chief purpose was to ridicule docile French workers and to activate the lethargic militants of the Left. He told honest workers, "Give this *apache* half your virtue but ask him in exchange for a quarter of his energy and courage!"[156] The twenty-three year old Liabeuf was not a hero, not even a symbol, rather, he was an example of energy and courage that should be emulated by ordinary workers when they were repressed by the forces of order. "Liabeuf was a '*bon bougre*' [good guy] who employed '*citoyen Browning*' [a Browning handgun] for personal reasons, certainly, but with panache."[157]

The article was not a major departure from the usual tone of *La Guerre Sociale*. Prefect of Police Lépine and the Parisian police had long been favorite Hervéist targets. For *La Guerre Sociale* the vice squad was a privileged target as a pillar of the hated and corrupt bourgeois order.[158] The "Emperor of Paris and his Cossacks" had long been characterized as fierce, heartless, and violent repressors of workers. Even moderate papers distrusted the Parisian vice squad in particular, so Hervé's stand could have won wide support if that had been his purpose. As on so many other occasions, Hervé wrote to shock the public as well as to arouse militants. Was the Liabeuf campaign a conscious effort to reactivate the political scene after his relative moderation following the evaporation of the Ferrer Affair? Was this excess one aspect of Hervé's inevitable frustration at seeing his best efforts and greatest triumphs produce so few results? Over the course of the Liabeuf Affair, Hervé would argue that this episode was another glaring case of class justice in which poor and unknown "criminals" were given the maximum sentences while well-connected members of the bourgeoisie received reduced or minimum sentences.[159]

It is easier to explain Hervé's article once the facts of the case are known. Hervé was convinced, probably quite correctly, that behind the facts of the murder lay blatant examples of judicial error and police corruption. Despite a century of revolutions and changes in regime, some argued that police matters seldom changed very much. When it came to matters of vice, the French were reticent

to open up a serious inquiry on a matter so shocking to general morality and decency. Such repugnance led to "the refusal to recognize the legal existence of prostitution and to the lack of realism that would arise, furthermore, from deciding its illegality."[160] Before he wrote his article, Hervé commissioned Almereyda to make an investigation in the *quartier* Saint-Merri near Les Halles where Liabeuf had lived. Almereyda talked to friends and employers of the accused, and he interrogated witnesses. It was soon established that the murderer certainly had a police record, but *La Guerre Sociale* argued that he had never been a pimp. *La Lanterne* and *Le Radical* also investigated that milieu and came to the same conclusion.[161] Not all press accounts supported Liabeuf's claims of being innocent of procuring and the violence associated with that trade.[162]

By age 21 Liabeuf was a regular, if often unemployed, shoemaker from Saint-Étienne who was imprisoned at least three times for theft after which he was sent to the North African *bagnes militaires* (the infamous Bat d'Af, the African battalions, or Biribi in the language of that time), according to the memoirs of Police agent Gaston Faralicq. After his military service in Algeria, he was subject to a five-year *interdiction de séjour* in his native city, so he relocated in 1908 to central Paris near Les Halles, where he was "a familiar figure at the sleazy bars on the Rue Quincampoix and the Rue Aubry-le-Boucher, where the 'pimps' waited, playing cards while the women 'worked' along the 'Sebasto.'"[163] At some point he became romantically involved with two women. One was a neighborhood prostitute named Alexandrine Pigeon (also known as Didine Cendrillon and often incorrectly called Marcelle Pigeon by the police and the press), a "dark, lanky," and relatively calm, twenty-eight or twenty-nine year old, who, nevertheless, carried a knife and may have been plying her trade under police protection. She was with Liabeuf the night he was accused of procuring. The other woman was named Louise-Adrienne Delarue, also called the "Grande Marcelle," who was described as a "violent, bloodthirsty" and "extremely dangerous" twenty-three year old "Amazon" and virago from Rouen. "La Grande Marcelle" was apparently at the center of violence and jealous assaults as she both dominated and aroused many of the men in that milieu. In fact, both women were involved in the tragic drama. Rather than acting as a procurer, Liabeuf may have been trying to rescue Alexandrine from a life of vice.[164] According to Hervé and others, many members of the Parisian vice squad actually acted as procurers, and they would stop at nothing to get rid of a rival. When Liabeuf was initially caught with Alexandrine in July 1909, he was falsely accused as a *souteneur*. After his court-appointed attorney failed to show up, the proceedings were hurried, police testimony was accepted as true, and Liabeuf's protests of innocence were ignored.[165] When he was convicted of

vagabondage special on August 14, 1909,[166] he received a three-month prison sentence, but he vowed revenge.[167] After his release from Fresnes Prison, he returned to Paris twice, despite the latest five-year *interdiction de séjour* restrictions, in order to avenge the charges made by plainclothes detectives Vors and Maugras of the 4th *arrondissement.* The first time he was recognized, arrested, and given another one month prison sentence. After serving that sentence, Liabeuf "felt branded with infamy" and returned to Paris again in late December 1909 in violation of the *interdiction de séjour* still bent on revenge.[168]

Once there, he got a job as a shoemaker, working "night and day" to get the necessary funds for his retaliatory mission. In his spare moments he crafted some strange spiked leather arm and wrist bands used by Parisian street criminals, fashioned a sharp, almost surgical, knife, and purchased a revolver at the *marché* in Bicêtre, before searching for Vors and Maugras.[169] On the night of January 8, 1910, several weeks before the great flood of 1910 would drown central Paris, Liabeuf walked "on a dark street in the *quartier* Saint-Merri not far from Les Halles des Paris", hoping to encounter the plainclothes agents.[170] When he became weary, he and "La Grande Marcelle", apparently, went to a sleazy bar amed "Caves Modernes" at 12, Rue Aubry-le-Boucher where they shared a liter of *vin blanc*, and Liabeuf bragged about his mission of vengeance. But he had been seen and followed by two detectives who were ready to jump him at the street corner.[171] Once he realized that he was about to be arrested by police who had nothing to do with his incarceration, Liabeuf tried to escape, but when cornered, he chose to inflict his payback on the spot. The quest for vengeance thus misfired because the "falsely" convicted *souteneur* wound up killing the wrong vice squad member. Thus, the murder happened somewhat by chance when two vice-squad members, "*Bouledogue*" Deray and "*Perroquet*" Fournès, warned in advance, surprised the avenging shoemaker after he left the bar around 8:00 p.m. When the agents grabbed the would-be avenger, they recoiled in pain because they had unknowingly grabbed his steel-spiked arm and shoulder bands. The dark, unhealthy looking, and medium built suspect proved to be far more dangerous than he appeared. Only after being grabbed, beaten, and stabbed himself, did Liabeuf use his pistol and his specially crafted knife, or so he later claimed.[172] In the end Deray was shot and eventually expired in the hospital, Fournès was cut in the throat, while six other *flics* and bystanders were hospitalized in the encounter. Liabeuf was finally captured after he was seriously injured and ran out of ammunition. Although one source claimed he was soon "beaten to a pulp", others argued that the police actually had to protect him from an angry crowd.[173]



Figure 19. Jean-Jacques Liabeuf and the Death of "Bouledogue" Deray. *Le Petit Journal—Supplément du dimanche*, January 23, 1910. Bnf.

In developing a campaign around such a situation, *La Guerre Sociale* "discovered" that the murderer was a serious, hardworking shoemaker. Hervé was certain that Liabeuf's guilt should only be evaluated on the basis of many extenuating circumstances: a sentence in Biribi, a prison record, the resulting unemployment, and a false accusation by the Parisian vice squad.[174] The rest of the Parisian press was reviewed concerning the case, and they were almost universally seen to have lied or kept silent "in order to please the police." Thus a false accusation, a corrupt police, a judicial error, a corrupt bourgeois press, and a simple worker's revenge became the means for Hervé to reactivate his movement by attacking venal authority and shaming timid militants. This was an era when the police and the working class seemed to confront each other incessantly, so it was not hard to create an accelerating avalanche of outrage. In fact, "thanks to the publicity around the case made by Hervé, the mobilization for Liabeuf gained a second wind and attained even more scope outside the extreme Left." Based on the assumption of a prior judicial error having been committed, parliamentary socialists like Jaurès demanded a pardon for Liabeuf. In addition, other famous journalists such as "Séverine, Jacques Dhur, and Urbain Gohier became enagagd in the campaign, and they were joined by a good number of intellectuals including: Anatole France, Octave Mirbeau, Nadar, Marcel Mauss, Salomon Reinach, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Jehan Rictus or even Steinlen to only mention them."[175]

Even the prominent journalists from *L'Action Française* and *La Libre Parole* weighed in for Liabeuf, albeit with a diffent intention: to try again to bring down *la gueuse*. As shall be seen, images and photos dealing with the unfolding events soon adorned the pages of the entire spectrum of the French press, all hoping to generate interest, excitement, and even action among their respective clientele. Certainly the Right wing press and the great bourgeois dailies generally viewed Liabeuf actions from the point of view of an increasing crime wave that threatened middle class interests and values. For such newspapers Hervé was a dangerous and misguided bourgeois journalist who utilized if not encouraged violence in the efforts to bring down the present order in the name of some deranged anarchistic ideal. Some clerical voices wondered how the government could be so soft on ordinary criminals when it had been so severe with devout Catholics at the time of the Separation.[176]

In the weeks ahead *La Guerre Sociale* continued to attack the police, and it singled out the vice squad in many detailed articles. The campaign even led to a titillating article on the history of Parisian prostitution. Almost immediately legal proceedings were opened against Hervé, who sarcastically commented that some kind of a trial was inevitable because he was always tried just before spring

elections. He even professed to wonder whether his support of public schools had led the Catholic press to urge the government to act against him. Returning to a familiar rhetorical ploy, he wondered whether the prosecution could simply be another attempt at payback for the old "*drapeau dans le fumier*" article? [177] In a sense he was correct. Hervé could have been tried at any time simply for being Hervé. To be Hervé was to write articles that shocked and offended in order to maintain Hervéism. This trial may not have been purposely sought by Hervé, but trials had always been a splendid means to generate a sense of movement. Former President du Conseil, Joseph Caillaux, wrote in his memoirs that the press laws were not very successful in meting out justice for press violations.[178] For Gilles Heuré such an assessment does not seem valid for Hervé who would be given sentences totaling six and a half years in prison in three different cases from the beginning of 1910 until January 1912.

> "The same scenario unfolded each time: a sensational trial which was covered by all the press including *La Guerre Sociale*, which published the proceedings; a convict who didn't weaken in the face of imprisonment; and political reactions which widely mobilized socialists and liberal writers. Regarding Hervé, he became the 'Prisoner of the Third Republic', as everyone described him, from Almereyda to Jean-Richard Bloch in *L'Effort*. These trials were important in several respects: they confirmed Hervé's position as a revolutionary leader and conferred on him a sort of immunity which forestalled the anger that his extreme positions in those years aroused among a large number of socialists."[179]

On January 15 Hervé and Raoul Auroy, the paper's new manager, were indicted for the article on Liabeuf with a double infraction: a provocation for murder and the apology for a crime.[180] Even before the trial, Hervé had made it very clear that again he was going to turn the proceedings into "a trial of the police."[181] He soon got his wish. The trial, which began on February 22 and lasted only three days, may have been the most elaborate spectacle of Hervé's career. He and his manager had three attorneys, but Hervé himself led much of the examination using his usual defense strategy. Although his language was often violent, his manner was mild, and his typical expression was often an amused smile of satisfaction.[182] Hervé did not argue that murder was to be tolerated, and he rejected simple minded charges against all the police because he realized that most police were conscientious men, simply doing their jobs. He even admitted that he would have no trouble defending himself if he were ever attacked. As far as violent criminals and deviants, including admitted pimps, he had no sympathy and vowed that the future collectivist society would not tolerate them. His article was meant not so much to praise Liabeuf but to encourage legitimate violence. And that

was what the *métier* of journalism was all about: to call the public's attention to social problems, judicial errors, and police abuse. His target was the vice squad whose recruitment, associations, and habits were often as base as those whom they accused. "'If that is a crime,' he concluded, 'I will be very proud to get five years in prison to atone for it.'" He also admitted to the presiding judge, Planteau, that his goal was to put the police themselves on trial.[183] Four different groups of not less than 69 defense witnesses were called to testifiy on the character of Liabeuf, the corrupt nature of the vice squad, the general pattern of police violence, as well as the role of the police in syndical and political demonstrations. The witnesses included: Liabeuf's employers, leading Parisian militants like Yvetot and Faure who had been attacked and beaten by police, leading socialists like Marcel Sembat, Vaillant, and Jaurès who had suffered the same fate at the Spanish Embassy, and journalists of all shades of opinion like Henri Rochefort who believed that the trial was a question of freedom of speech.[184] When Almereyda was called to testify, he proclaimed Liabeuf's innocence by recalling his own personal experience with "all the savagery of the *mouchards* and the *flics*."[185] The evidence presented was a thorough revelation of police brutality and judicial error. According to *La Guerre Sociale* the jury was so moved that an acquittal would have been inevitable if the jury had been polled then.[186]

Such was not the case, however. Though Auroy was acquitted, Hervé received a four-year prison sentence and a fine of 1000 francs. That verdict was not received calmly: "One witness was physically removed, the court was invaded, and the jury was reviled, while shouts of 'Down with the pigs!' and 'Long live Socialism!' burst through the hall."[187] In his reflections on the verdict, Hervé attacked the jury's "*petit bourgeois* prejudices." He claimed that their shop owner mentality was responsible for seeing him as the symbol of all they feared and hated: the C.G.T., the anarchists, the cooperatives, the Separation, the revolt of 17th Regiment in the Midi, and the *repos hebdomadaire*. Hervé underlined his martyrdom by comparing himself to Ferrer. He thought that he had been condemned, like Ferrer, not for any crime, but because of what they symbolized to the authorities.[188] Attempting to use the conviction to activate the Left, Hervé called for a boycott of the large Parisian dailies which had fostered the climate of opinion that led to the verdict. The C.G.T. and the cooperatives were assigned the task of creating a newspaper that could compete with these capitalist dailies. Perhaps Hervé still had hopes that *La Guerre Sociale* could become that publication.[189]

Reactions to the trial were hardly unexpected. Meetings protesting the verdict were quite common, much to the displeasure of the police, who feared that even famous non-revolutionary writers like Octave Mirbeau "might encourage



Figure 20. Hervé and Raoul Auroy in the Cour de Assises on February 22, 1910 at the Trial over the Liabeuf Article. (© Maurice-Louis Branger/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

insurrectionals to commit violent acts."[190] The right wing press was scandalized that revolutionary chaos supposedly had taken shelter in the court, while the Guesdist newspaper *Le Socialiste* spoke about the need to destroy a regime that was murdering liberty.[191] *L'Humanité*, various socialist leaders and groups, some Radical newspapers as well as several luminaries of the press rallied to support Hervé on the basis of freedom of speech and opinion. Jaurès thought the verdict

was a sign of the silliness and hatred that dominated French society, and he was especially troubled by the ongoing abuse of the modified 1881 press law. But it was critic and novelist Mirbeau who crystallized an important truth about Hervé which was seldom expressed so succinctly: "It is easy to support or insult him: it is more difficult to imitate him."[192]

Although the fate of Liabeuf seemed secondary to Hervé even before he got to prison, Almereyda decided to call a temporary halt to all violence and rhetorical excess in an effort to persuade the French President to pardon the avenging murderer.[193] In the weeks ahead the concerns of *La Guerre Sociale* shifted to the effervescence among the railway workers, the creation of a *Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire*, talk about a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, sensational stories coming out of Biribi, and the spring elections of 1910. In fact, the year 1910 would prove to be the critical year in the political transformation of Gustave Hervé. In early 1910 Hervé may have thought that Hervéism was about to reach its crescendo even though some of his original assumptions were proving to be erroneous. The Liabeuf Affair was peripheral to more fundamental issues, patterns, and campaigns that affected Hervéism 1910–1912, but it was a campaign that would not disappear. The Liabeuf article put Hervé in prison for more than two years, a time in which the place of Hervéism on the Left would shift markedly.



Figure 21. Jean-Jacques Liabeuf in the Cour de Assises, May 1910. (© Maurice-Louis Branger/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Before and after his trial for murder, Liabeuf was used by Hervé to symbolize Republican injustice. On the day that Liabeuf was tried, his fate was contrasted with that of an innocent bourgeois teenager who managed to escape the clutches of the vice squad only because her father had some power.[194] Hervé did not fail to protest the May 4, 1910 guilty verdict against Liabeuf.[195] Several months after the *Sans Patrie* entered prison he continued to justify Liabeuf's actions.[196] On June 14 he sent French President Fallières a letter asking for Liabeuf's pardon. Citing new evidence in the case, the letter was basically an emotional appeal to Fallières centering on the feelings and problems of Liabeuf's mother and family.[197] Hervé's missive, of course, carried no weight, but the appeals of Séverine, Rochefort, Anatole France, Édouard Drumont, Léon Bailby, and Jaurès, as well as newspapers representing the entire political spectrum of the French press fared no better. President Fallières had a reputation for being against the death penalty, but when he failed to commute the sentence, *L'Humanité* ascribed his failure to Lépine's threat to resign if the execution were not carried out. Apparently, Briand, Fallières, and the Minister of Justice Barthou had all favored a reprieve until Lepine's threat. To the socialist daily it was obvious: "The execution of Liabeuf was a political act."[198]

In the weeks before his execution by guillotine, Liabeuf waited at La Santé prison. Meanwhile, newspapers and organizations on the Left continued to denounce the verdict and assail the Parisian vice squad. Almereyda remained active on behalf of Liabeuf from February until the early July execution, getting respected intellectuals engaged instead of merely relying on revolutionary militants. Many activists were unhappy with such apparent opportunism since it seemed to privilege governmental clemency at the expense of revolutionary propaganda. When Almereyda's efforts in using legal persuasion failed, he was more than ready to employ violent methods to gain some satisfaction, if not a favorable outcome for Liabeuf. "Already, in the course of a meeting in Paris on February 26, Almereyda did not exclude the most violent of means in order to save the condemned man, affirming 'that one would not dare guillotine Liabeuf since the day of his execution, revolutionaries will be at the foot of the scaffold where they will mix the blood of Liabeuf with that of the hangmen.'"[199] Although most organizations of the mainstream Left supported Almereyda's efforts to save Liabeuf, it is doubtful that they ever sanctioned violence. But there were always a few individual militants ready to go beyond organizational caution.

Although Almereyda seemed willing to use any conceivable method to save Liabeuf or to activate the French Left, the Liabeuf Affair, in fact, became intermingled with another prominent campaign championed by the extreme Left at the same time. Beginning in fits and starts in the bourgeois press by the summer

of 1909, the Aernoult-Rousset campaign eventually activated the socialists and syndicalists by 1910, becoming a major affair exposing the violence, murder, and injustice associated with the French military penal system largely in Biribi. *La Guerre Sociale* had been in existence long enough for its campaigns to overlap and intermesh so that the sense of movement and activism was virtually constant. The approach of Bastille Day would see the government postpone the return of the body of Albert Louis Aernoult, a purported victim of Biribi, due to fear of workers' demonstrations. Police violence seemed to increase according to *La Guerre Sociale* while the Parisian Left awaited the fates of Liabeuf and Rousset.[200] Émile Rousset was another military prisoner in Biribi who had exposed the events surrounding the death of Aernoult at the hands of prison guards in North Africa. The entire revolutionary French Left was apparently coming together in a campaign using the fates of Aernoult-Rousset to focus on problems of French military justice. An analysis of this new campaign illuminates the infighting among the forces of the extreme French Left and its effects on the political transformation of Gustave Hervé, and it shall be considered in that context. The fate of Liabeuf, however, was soon settled.

Several weeks prior to Liabeuf's execution, the police claimed that Almereyda was creating cells of five sure, closely associated men, who would each be armed at all meetings and demonstrations. The police believed that Almereyda was considering using such groups to surprise and kill lone police agents or two-man patrols.[201] Jonathan Almosnino was probably referring to similar police reports when he explained how Almereyda had prepared combat groups of five or six militants by the end of June 1910, each carrying a Browning handgun and ready to use their weapons to prevent the execution of Liabeuf. For Almosnino this was evidence that Hervéists were far better organized by then than they had been for the Ferrer Affair. Revolutionaries like Almereyda now apparently expected and wanted the demonstration to degenerate into a veritable riot.[202]

In the afternoon prior to the expected execution, 20,000 socialist revolutionaries marched on the Elysée Palace where they threatened President Fallières.[203] "*La Guerre Sociale* multiplied its special editions calling for clemency for Liabeuf and appealing for a demonstration at La Santé prison to prevent the execution." No one knew exactly when the guillotine would fall, but Almereyda appeared at the Boulevard Arago beneath the prison walls on the evening of June 29 with several hundred protesters when rumors abounded regarding the imminence of the execution. After waiting into the early morning of the 30th of June, the militants eventually realized that the execution would not take place then.[204]

In fact, Liabeuf was to be executed on the following night of June 30–July 1. That night thousands of socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists joined citizens from

all over, including many supposedly from the dregs of Parisian society, to demand clemency for Liabeuf and to speak with one voice in protesting against the government's "*Assassins!*" Following a circuitous, heavily-guarded journey, the wagon carrying the guillotine arrived at the Boulevard Arago under the cover of darkness, but a street battle soon ensued into the early morning. In the crowd that dawn was the socialist tribune Jean Jaurès who was manhandled by the police according to Russian anarchist Victor Serge, also jostled by *les flics* along with his mistress, Rirette Maitrejean, and their militant friends among a crowd. Among the crowd, which Serge estimated to have been between twenty and thirty thousand, was Almereyda, Serge's friend, who vainly tried to force his way through the police cordon.[205]

By most accounts the confrontation was extremely violent and bloody. Almosnino assumed that "militants from Almereyda's combat groups responded to the charges by mounted police with pistol shots."[206] But reports about a policeman being killed in the exchange proved to have been false. It seems doubtful that many policemen were wounded; it is much more certain that most of the injured were demonstrators and bystanders. By 3:00 a.m., even before the execution the police were in no mood for restraint. As the crowd surged forward againt the barriers, the forces of order responded. When rocks were thrown at them, the police charged using sabers, rifle butts, fists, and kicks against the crowd, many of of whom then ran in terror in all directions, some toward Denfert-Rochereau and the avenues which radiated around the Lion de Belfort. *L'Humanité* reported that a police inspector named Orestani, who was under the command of Guichard, was shot in the throat and had to be carried away around 3:30 a.m. A few minutes earlier a police charge on the Boulevard Arago struck bystanders including women and workers heading off to their jobs as well as those in the crowd who could not flee. That police assault continued in place for some time.[207] One police report claimed that twenty spectators were injured by the police, who themselves sustained two wounded, including an Inspector named Moulis. Other reports talked about an early morning of insurrection with hundreds of spectators injured following a rather festive late night spectacle of laughing and gossip among a throng that included many fashionable women.[208]

As dawn approached amidst the ongoing carnage, Liabeuf was brought by a police van from a cell at Divison 21, where he had actually been able to sleep before being awakened and told to have courage because it was time, to which the prisoner responded: "I have had it until now, and I will have to the end."[209] A special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* on July 1, 1910 announced the death of Liabeuf before sunrise that morning by guillotine at the hands of chief executioner

of the Republic, Anatole Deibler, who was described by one police agent in attendance as "well groomed, blond, blue-eyed, dapper, and rather sympathetic."[210] Hervé was in La Santé that morning, some fifty meters away from the guillotine on the Boulevard Arago, as the blade of Deibler decapitated Liabeuf. From his cell he may have heard the pathetic and banal final words supposedly uttered by the twenty-year old Liabeuf: "*Je ne suis pas un souteneur.*" He also witnessed the bloody rioting before and after the execution which injured his comrade Victor Méric, among others.[211] Jonathan Almosnino depicted the scene: "At dawn, while fatigue was setting in and many of Liabeuf's supporters gradually heading for home, the guillotine blade struck the condemned man who shouted his innocence a moment before."[212] Police agent Gaston Faralicq described the guillotine's effects as: "sending two purple jets of blood as far as the barriers" behind which the privileged could only gasp and gape. Once the blood was washed away, the guillotine cleaned, and the body and head reunited, the latter were placed in a basket and put on a wagon which was escorted by cavalry to the Cimitière d'Ivry just beyond the Porte d'Italie.[213] For Faralicq, who had been on duty guarding the guillotine that night, the victim was a bit more politically engaged at the very end than *La Guerre Sociale* had indicated, shouting: "'*Vive l'anarchie, mort aux va … !*'" as the blade cut off his final words as well. As an even more famous Anatole once remarked: "Historical facts are easily accepted until we have more than one witness."[214]

A special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* had demanded a protest demonstration to coincide with the operation of the guillotine. The headlines of *La Guerre Sociale* as well as Hervé's editorial called for a new wave of anarchist knives to avenge Liabeuf as Caserio had avenged the anarchist Vaillant. Hervé, thus, made an implicit appeal for someone assassinate President Fallières as Caserio had assassinated President Sadi-Carnot in 1894.[215] Such calls for vengeance and assassination paralleled his continued calls for armed secret revolutionary cells ready to act on a moment's notice. Hervé argued that increased governmental repression occurred because the Parisian police and the French army needed violence to maintain a corrupt regime, so he hoped that the Liabeuf Affair would do to the French police what the Dreyfus Affair had done to the French army.[216] In fact, that afternoon after the execution there was a protest demonstration by some 20,000 "socialist revolutionaries" at the Elysée Palace to show President Fallières their extreme anger at bourgeois justice.[217] Rather than immediately ushering in *le grand soir*, the execution of Liabeuf saw journalists from *La Guerre Sociale* and *Les Hommes du Jour* place two wreaths of white flowers on the tomb later that day. When the cemetery guardian called the Prefecture of Police for instructions, he

was told to have the flowers removed. Instead of complying, the Hervéists simply left the cemetery, informing the guardian that he was responsible for the flowers and should keep them informed.[218]

As the agitation died down in the ensuing days, Hervéists like Almereyeda were singled out by rival militants as somehow being responsible for the death of Liabeuf because of all the ruckus that they had helped create. That did not stop Hervé's chief lieutenant from further agitation. His visit to console Liabeuf's mother supposedly included an effort to bring the victim's body back to central Paris and to organize a burial which would serve as the pretext for another demonstration. Such an effort would be repeated with more success when Hervéists helped get the body of Aernoult returned to Paris in 1912. Almosnino argued that Almereyda's role in the Liabeuf Affair could best be described as finally "passing from words to actions." After years of calling for an insurrection in the face of obvious injustice, his most recent biographer thought that Almereyda had helped "to put a new conception of revolutionary action into practice."[219]

When the Liabeuf Affair ended, Hervé remained in prison, but the issues and emotions raised were not finished. New articles by the Insurrectional "General" were more flagrant and provocative than his original article on Liabeuf. He would seldom be prosecuted hereafter, apparently because further trials could only increase his profile and prestige.[220] A special edition at the end of July 1910 announced "the victory of the police" after President Fallières pardoned a murderer in a train robbery who happened to be the son of a policeman. In the course of a robbery, the murderer Graby was found guilty of throwing a woman off an omnibus, killing her. However, Graby, unlike Liabeuf, would not be guillotined because he was a soldier and the son of a police lieutenant. The police now seemed above the law to Hervé.[221] The police may have maintained their repressive authority, but Hervé still hoped to reverse the situation. *La Guerre Sociale* remained on the attack by continuing to imply that President Fallières ought to be assassinated. The Hervéists asserted that governmental actions during the ongoing Rochette financial scandal, which re-erupted that July, made revolution more likely because they demonstrated that the government's supporters were inveterately corrupt and brutal.[222]

One could argue that the Ferrer and Liabeuf Affairs were signs of an explosive political and social situation in France in these years. Such events coupled to numerous strikes from 1906 until 1910 seemed to be clear evidence of growing radicalism among French workers. The violent rhetoric found on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to place Hervé, Almereyda, and their bands of followers in the center of that agitation. From 1909 to 1911 the circulation of the newspaper

was occasionally three to four times what it had been at its commencement. At times during volatile events, the paper printed more than 100,000 special editions. Militants working on the newspaper or associated with it in the provinces were increasingly numerous. The paper had some two hundred local groups which spread its message and were apparently ready to respond to its appeals. Hervéism seemed to have become a coherent force or possibly even a separate party replete with militants ready and able to activate the masses for whatever struggle seemed most pertinent at the moment. But what was the goal? Justice for an individual? Equality for all? An insurrection and/or general strike to prevent war or instigate socialism? If *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to be the active center of revolutionary agitation amidst the strikes and sensational affairs from 1909 until 1911, one could never be sure just what kind of revolution was in the offing or what the precise intentions of the revolutionaries were.

Almosnino argues that a man like Almereyda was convinced that a revolutionary period was opening up in France. The years 1908 until 1910 were the apogee of what some called revolutionary romanticism, and Hervé and his chief lieutenant played important roles in that increasingly anachronistic and quixotic stance. However, 1910 was not only the commencement of Herve's last incarceration, it marked the beginning of a major shift in his views which was not very apparent at first. For Victor Serge: "After the fight for Ferrer the philosopher, the battle for Liabeuf the desperado proved (although we did not see it) the seriousness of the deadlock in which the revolutionary movement of Paris was situated, no tendency being exempt. Energetic and powerful in 1906–7, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* began to decline, mellowed after a mere few years by the development of highly-paid sections among the working class. The 'insurrectionalism' of Gustave Hervé and Miguel Almereyda revolved in a vacuum, expressing nothing in the end but a craving for verbal and physical violence."[223]

Militants like Hervé and Almereyda shared the rather constrained perspective of their Insurrectional milieu. Workers in general were not organized and did not share the assumptions of the most extreme working class militants who sometimes blended in with the Hervéists. Syndicalists like the *terrassiers*, who had absorbed much of the revolutionary syndicalist ethos of direct action, sometimes sided with the Insurrectionals, but neither group was typical of the working class as a whole. This latest expressions of Insurrectionalism would soon prove to be out of sync with the political situation for the country as a whole. Certainly, Almereyda, as Herve's key lieutenant and an inveterate man of action, who was the very embodiment of revolutionary romanticism, organized many new formations and engaged in all sorts of dramatic actions which fit certain conceptions of revolutionary

action. Were these conceptions really very new? For a long time, Almereyda, like Hervé, had been growing disillusioned by the lack of unity within the revolutionary milieu. Once he was outside prison in the late summer of 1909, Almereyda, with the implicit support of the imprisoned Hervé after March 1910, had increasingly tried to remedy that situation.[224] But it did not take long for Hervé and then Almereyda to begin to move outside the logic of Insurrectionalism.

The recent campaigns by *La Guerre Sociale* may have failed to save victims from injustice but that had never been their primary goal. Their main purpose had been to unite the disparate forces of the Left in revolutionary action. Correcting judicial errors in France or abroad had never been their chief objective. Such press campaigns were meant to activate the lethargic "masses" and to propel the Hervéist movement onward. In that sense the Liabeuf Affair had been another perfect vehicle. The Liabeuf Campaign had maintained traditional Hervéist attacks on a brutal and corrupt police, a judiciary at the service of the rich and powerful, and a press in collusion with governmental and financial power. A helpless yet industrious worker had found the courage and audacity to act. The rest of the workers in France were called on to imitate Liabeuf, but Hervé wanted to channel their activism into secret revolutionary organizations working in conjunction with a projected *Parti Révolutionnaire* which was never completely abandoned until 1912. The "failure" of the campaign for Liabeuf and the incarceration of Hervé were not then perceived as failures of Hervéism. Undoubtedly the police and many militants at the time must have considered them to be among the summits of Hervéist activism. Yet the failure of Hervéism was ever so close and ever so preordained. The principal examples of Hervéist activism, its blatant and sensational press campaigns, were indications that the victory of Hervéism was impossible. Such activities had made *La Guerre Sociale* a clear commercial success, but the movement of Hervéism had an outmoded political goal. Hervéism was a modern movement with an obsolete vision. It sought to create revolution by pseudo-conspiracy as well as advertisement. When *La Guerre Sociale* advertised conspiracy, it increased circulation, but did it enhance the chances for a successful takeover of France? Hervéism could have been abandoned in favor of increased sensationalism in *La Guerre Sociale* only if Hervé had been simply a sensation-seeker or demagogue. Though he may have been a touch of both, there was obviously more to him that that. He eventually rejected much that made the paper a commercial success as he tried to bring Hervéism closer to political reality. If *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to survive longer than Hervéism, that was because Hervé's journalistic style could be accepted as entertainment. His political style had become anachronistic due to fundamental realities which could never be altered by superficial activism,

however sincere. By the time the newspaper changed its name to *La Victoire* in January 1916, Hervéism was long gone.

If Hervé moderated his rhetoric for awhile after the Ferrer Affair, the Liabeuf Campaign was an attempt, and not the only one, to separate him from reformist socialism and to reactivate insurrectionalism. In late January 1910 Hervé's support for French public schools was separated from Jaurès's notions by stressing how the goal of education must be revolution not social peace.[225] Just before his trial for the Liabeuf article, Hervé increased the tenor of his antiparliamentary campaign. His forum was to be the S.F.I.O. Congress at Nîmes in early February 1910. After a motion by the Federation of Vaucluse calling for his exclusion, Hervé threatened to leave the party. When his threat provoked cheers by other socialist elements at the Congress, Hervé retorted that he was the only truly sincere socialist leader left. Only his presence guaranteed the party support from revolutionaries.[226] According to most sources, antimilitarism and antipatriotism were not Hervé's prime concerns at Nîmes. He was most concerned with the antirevolutionary nature of parliamentarianism in the S.F.I.O.[227] However, one police report called Hervé's performance at Nîmes and his stances before and after the Congress a sign of his growing powerlessness and suggestibility. "At Paris, he undergoes now the influence of Merle and Almereyda, (and thus his violent articles in *La Guerre Sociale* are explained), then that of the more conciliatory Renaudel and above all that of Tanger. It is certain that at Nîmes it was Renaudel who influenced him to give a moderate speech which plainly caused disarray in the ranks of his partisans." When he agreed to accept a continuation of his post on the C.A.P., Almereyda was supposedly furious and said that he could not trust Hervé to follow through on the organization of an Antiparliamentary Committee. Jobert, on the other hand, thought the anarchist-leaning Hervéists would soon leave the Insurrectionals, but he, as a socialist party member, would stay and vote with the Blanquists.[228]

As the spring elections approached, many deputies sought to justify themselves before their constituents. "Encouraged by the prospect of success, Jaurès joined with other Socialists and Radical-Socialists in sponsoring the measure [on workers' pensions] and in guiding it through the Chamber. Though far from perfect, the law, he felt, could be further revised and improved."[229] Hervé's support of the syndicalist position on workers' pensions led him closer to the Guesdist position at Nîmes, a move which made the Insurrectional leader nervous. "Within the S.F.I.O., the opposition clustered around Guesde, Lafargue, and Hervé, who, ever suspicious of propping up capitalism, interpreted the pension law as a cruel piece of deception."[230] Revolutionaries were not against worker pensions in principle, but they were hostile to the pension fund being administered by the state, the

provisions demanding a contribution by workers, and the advanced eligibility age of sixty-five. "The prospect of passing the pension law activated a strong latent contempt for reforms." Ironically, socialist and syndicalist revolutionaries were almost as hostile to the legislation as were many employers and most conservative deputies.[231] Paul Lafargue made the Guesdist case against the pension fund, but it was Hervé "who revealed the subsurface of bitterness within the unified Socialist Party when he excoriated reformism and its philosopher Jaurès: 'Jaurès is Millerand, he is Viviani, he is Briand! His probity is greater than theirs but his tactics are the same ... Though we are now fifty strong in Parliament, we are indistinguishable from good Radical-Socialists.'"[232] According to Hervé, this was the first time Guesdists and Hervéists had ever been in agreement. His stance against workers contributing to their own pension fund was probably as much an attempt to increase Hervéist influence in the C.G.T. as it was to decrease the strength of reformism in the S.F.I.O.[233]

The *Sans Patrie* never forgot that Guesdists did not share his views on elections, on the C.G.T., or on militarism, but he sympathized with some aspects of Guesdism. He admired its discipline and sense of organization. He could even call its concentration on economic problems helpful. The Guesdist desire for complete collectivism was proof that they were more anti-bourgeois than were the Jaurèsians. It is possible that in February 1910 Hervé was searching for a new course that included the Guesdists as Peyronnet has suggested.[234] Jaurès was heckled by both Guesdists and Hervéists when he shamed them for betraying the humble workers with their hair-splitting dogmatism while socialists long claimed to champion the downtrodden. In fact, the Jaurèsian pension motion carried 193 votes to 156. On March 30 and April 1, 1910, the law passed the Chamber with overwhelming support.[235] Despite Jaurès's hopes that the pension law would accelerate the march of social justice, it "did not provide adequate payments; nor did it usher in a great era of reforms inspired by socialism. Once again, Jaurès was exaggerating both the importance of certain reforms and the influence of his party. But in the current of 1910, when socialism seemed everywhere on the rise, it is not so surprising that he should have been carried away."[236] In his memoirs, longtime syndicalist and eventual communist Benoît Frachon described May Day 1910 as a great demonstration against "the pension for the dead". He called the workers' pension law "a pseudo pension for which workers would get less than twenty *sous* [one franc] a day at age sixty-five."[237]

Hervé believed that the Congress's acceptance of governmental ideas on workers' pensions was pushing the S.F.I.O. the way of the Radicals.[238] The socialists had gradually given up their maximum program involving the socialization

of the means of production. At Nîmes they gave up their minimum program as well by accepting the Radicals' version of workers' pensions. Hervé called this the triumph of Millerandism which he blamed directly on the leadership of Jaurès.[239] "The Socialist Party believed that it would only put its little finger in the parliamentary machinery but the communist-anarchists had been correct all along in predicting that the entire body would come along." If the S.F.I.O. continued on the road to reformism, Hervé believed that all workers' groups, even the C.G.T., would be contaminated.[240]

Hervé's methods and solutions were never consistent, probably because his multifaceted activism operated at several levels. He had just agreed with the syndicalist position on workers' pensions, but his *Parti Révolutionnaire* was based on the idea that the C.G.T. alone was not enough to instigate revolution. For a time in late 1909, Hervé had agreed with Jaurès on workers' pensions and public schools, but at Nîmes he delivered one of his most severe judgments against Jaurès's leadership. In his rejection of Jaurèsian control of the party, he found himself temporarily in agreement with the Guesdist wing, but his call for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* was as anti-Guesdist as it was anti-Jaurèsian. For all his revolutionary activist zeal, Hervé was always suspect to most anarchists due to his purported authoritarianism, his search for organizational unity, and his goal of revolutionary concentration.[241] By June 1910 anarchists talked about a crisis in anarchism which was associated with the loss of dynamism, a decline in enthusiasm, a pessimism about goals which seemed far from realization, and the lack of new members "to take up the torch". The police believed that anarchists would now be limited to engaging in preliminary education rather than propaganda by the deed. The anarchists apparently hoped that the failures of revolutionary syndicalism and parliamentary socialism would lead disillusioned militants and workers to reinvigorate their ranks.[242]

When the S.F.I.O. Congress met in Paris in mid-July 1910 in preparation for the impending Congress of the Second International at Copenhagen, the defeat of the Insurrectional motion was blamed on poor Hervéist leadership in Seine-et-Oise and Bouches-du-Rhone. Negligence led some Hervéists to vote with the majority; this yielded a vote of 292 to 34 defeating the Hervéist motion which demanded the use of revolutionary means alone to prevent war. The majority motion, sponsored by Sembat and supported by Jaurès, included international arbitration and disarmament among its provisions to prevent war. The Insurrectionals of the Seine labeled the majority motion of the Seine "sanctimonious pacifism." Louis Perceau claimed that this vote did not represent the true strength of Insurrectionalism in the S.F.I.O. Yet Perceau's claim, that Hervéists were one-fifth

of the S.F.I.O. rather than one-tenth as indicated by the vote on the antiwar motion, was overly optimistic. Since Perceau was the sole Hervéist delegate among the twenty representatives from the S.F.I.O. at the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International, Hervéism could be seen as declining by 1910.[243]

Prior to the Copenhagen Congress Hervé called for secret antimilitarist organizations because one could not improvise a counter-mobilization against war any more than a mobilization for war, especially since neither the S.F.I.O. nor the S.P.D. had done anything since the 1907 Stuttgart Congress to organize socialist actions to prevent war. One wonders what that implies about all the Hervéist rhetoric and propaganda about an *organisation du combat* and secret insurrectional cells. Hervé described the French motion on disarmament to be presented at Copenhagen as mere "pacifist bleating". He claimed that the danger of war was greater than ever, yet the S.F.I.O. motion mentioned neither a general strike nor an insurrection. The imprisoned insurrectional leader mocked the French proposal by noting that it presented "no danger of frightening the S.P.D." Hervé's usual discussion of German discipline, organization, and financial strength was coupled to an admission that the Germans were capable of courage. Yet he reiterated that Germans were insufficiently revolutionary because they lacked audacity. He promised that the French would employ a general strike and rise up in insurrection in the event of war no matter who was the aggressor. Despite its extremism, Hervé's outline for a French response to a mobilization was undoubtedly never meant to be unilateral.[244]

Following the Copenhagen Congress Hervé was elated even though the delegates to the International were showing signs of weariness over the question of war.[245] The support which James Keir Hardie gave to Édouard Vaillant concerning the use of a general strike and insurrection as possible means to prevent war was hailed as an unexpected Anglo-French rejection of S.P.D. ideas. Yet Hervé remained unconvinced that this motion would compel the Germans to act to prevent war. Actually, the Vaillant-Keir Hardie amendment was referred to the International Bureau in Brussels and to the next projected Congress of the International set for Vienna in 1913.[246] Nevertheless, Hervé was sufficiently buoyant to conclude an assessment of the Congress with his standard ethnic-national character explanation of S.P.D. behavior which was also a paean to the French revolutionary character. This reaction was in keeping with a trend at Copenhagen noted by James Joll of increasing tension between socialists of various nationalities.[247] According to Hervé, German "blood" lacked the French combative and irreverent attitude toward authority. Thus, the Germans were missing the most basic, if not the only, ingredient of the revolutionary temper. Because Germany had no

revolutionary tradition and no history of insurrections, Hervé demanded that the S.P.D. begin to habituate its members at least to the word "insurrection" so that the reality of insurrection did not panic them. He hoped that German equivocation would end by 1913 because French chauvinists and English jingoists could exploit the S.P.D. lack of revolutionary élan against Anglo-French socialists.[248]

At the time of the S.P.D. Congress of Magdeburg in late September 1910, Hervé was sympathetic to German revisionists only because they admitted their reformism. He assailed the Prussian leaders of the S.P.D. as pseudo-revolutionaries "just like the Guesdists." His only hope was that Karl Liebknecht might yet form an insurrectional group in the S.P.D.[249] Two weeks later Hervé heaped praise on Berlin workers for responding to police attacks. Here he claimed that German workers would never attack France or defend Germany, and he continued to urge the Germans to organize a secret network of small revolutionary cells so that they would be ready to act in the event of a general strike or mobilization.[250] The tradition of revolution may have had an ironic anaesthetizing function for many on the French Left who realized that revolution had become almost impossible. But, how would a "true believer" react once he discovered that revolution had become largely a tradition? Since Hervé was the only major French socialist leader whose actions and rhetoric appeared aimed at making revolution possible, his disillusion was bound to be great.

10

Le Parti Révolutionnaire and *Le Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire* (C.R.A.)

Gilles Heuré argued that Hervé radicalized his views to such an extent from late 1908 after the socialist Congress at Toulouse until just before he entered prison in late March 1910 that he actually contemplated creating a *Parti Révolutionnaire* sitting at the margins of the S.F.I.O. Such a stance represented the culmination of Hervé's radicalization in Heuré's account.[1] Even though such a *parti* was never officially launched, it inspired enough fear, comment, rhetoric, and future formations, that its history can help us understand the nature and impact of Hervéism. After the creation of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé began to employ a complete repertoire of revolutionary nomenclature associated with clandestine subversion. As his "secret" circulars proliferated, he called for the formation of *organisations de combat* or "revolutionary cells" yet his appeals for such secret organizations were generally done openly, thus enveloping an array of theoretically subversive operations in an overt publicity campaign. His description of the necessary requirements for membership in such organizations could only be termed ascetic, moralistic, and mundane rather than heroic. "In January 1909 he listed the qualifications requisite to be a militant in revolutionary organizations. Those who formed them should be 'as impervious to greed and ambition as to fear and depression', and demonstrate proof of 'discretion', 'sobriety', and 'selflessness'. In addition to an airtight separation between the sections, it was also necessary for the revolutionary elite to be morally irreproachable."[2]

Since its foundation *La Guerre Sociale* had hoped to become the point of union for revolutionary socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists. That union of forces had failed to materialize as quickly as the Hervéists had hoped even if there were occasionally hopeful signs that a revolutionary moment might be at hand. Jonathan Almosnino also argued that there was a marked radicalization in the words and methods of the Insurrectionals by 1909 even though lively debates continued among the variegated militants at the newspaper. In Almosnino's account, the paper seemed to lack sufficient outlets to satisfy militants like Almereyda who felt the need to create a more structured and effective organization. "Like the anarchists, to whom they were closer than to Jaurès and Sembat, the Hervéists advocated direct action. They drew inspiration from the Revolution and granted no confidence in bourgeois institutions." By 1910 they seemed to have a real influence within the C.G.T., yet they "were more and more cut off from the majority" of the S.F.I.O. who were "more inclined to call to arms at election times than to organize for extra-parliamentary actions."[3] Both Hervé and Almereyda wanted to unite the extreme Left for both quotidian affairs and those revolutionary situations that seemed to be ubiquitous during this heyday of *La Guerre Sociale*.[4] By late 1909 the newspaper was increasingly replete with the names of threatening devices such as "*la chaussette aux clous*", "*la machine a bosseler*", "*le citoyen Browning*", or "*Mam'zelle Cisailles*", metaphors and metonymy for new subversive tactics and associated devices.[5] With growing frustration or with heightened expectation, by 1910 the Hervéists seemed ready to make some sort of jump outside the S.F.I.O. toward the creation of a truly revolutionary party. But that attempt lingered long, and then faded, proving to be still-born at best.

Hervé seemed to be continually organizing for revolutionary action, and his proposal for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* would soon become associated with the creation of an *organisation de combat* which dovetailed in the minds of both the police and later scholars with the Hervéist paramilitary force, the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, formed in 1910.[6] One rather conspiracy-minded police report of 1911 described the connections in the following manner. "It was at the center of this very diverse and rather amorphous *parti* that the famous '*organisation de combat*' arose, soon completed by the creation of the *Jeunes-Gardes*."[7] In fact, in reading police reports as well as the revolutionary press of this era, one is reminded of the labyrinthine conspiratorial groups described in Umberto Eco's *Foucault's Pendulum* which, one suspects, few readers had the patience or interest to penetrate and untangle. The Hervéist formations seemed designed to both confuse and frighten the police. The police responses certainly fit those intentions. The police sometimes traced the idea for an *organisation de combat* back to the International

Anarchist Congress held in Amsterdam in 1907. Throughout 1908 and 1909 Hervé kept referring to such an *organisation*. Nevertheless, it was only after the failures of the Postal Strikes in 1909 that his incessant calls finally were put into something apparently concrete.[8]

Jean-Jacques Becker wrote that the *organisation de combat* came to life during the course of a celebration at La Ruche,[9] Sebastien Faure's anarchist school and orphanage in Rambouillet, on August 1, 1909. Faure was asked to give a lecture on revolutionary tactics and the future. Although he was an individualist, Sebastien Faure advised the grouping of diverse revolutionary tendencies (socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists). After the celebration several militants such as Almereyda, Tony Gall, Maurice Doublier, Alphonse Merrheim, Georges Yvetot, Louis-Jean Thuillier, J. Bonhomme, Georges Durupt, Gassier, and Norange went to a local café and decided to develop a secret Directing Committee, made up of members coming from all points in the revolutionary landscape. Following repeated advice from Hervé, this committee called itself the *organisation de combat*. Yet the police recognized that the *organisation* was neither powerful nor dangerous, and would only become so when it recruited "men of value" like Charles Malato and Victor Griffuelhes.[10] For Becker, the group, directed by G. Hervé and his usual associates, including his longtime chief lieutenant, Almereyda, was quite heterogeneous and not truly anarchist. The *organisation de combat* was situated "on the vague frontiers of a more or less independent socialism, an intellectual anarchism, a 'committed' journalism, and an adventurism without a well-defined ideology, not excluding the direct or indirect representatives of the security branch of the police [who were] particularly numerous and active in anarchist or pseudo-anarchist circles."[11]

The stated purpose of such revolutionary formations was to go beyond the purely verbal revolutionary rhetoric of mainstream French socialism. After assailing the passivity and duperies of socialists at the S.F.I.O. Toulouse Congress held in October 1908, Hervé claimed to be unconcerned by the efforts of party leaders to exclude him for extolling violence and encouraging his insurrectional and antiparliamentary ideas.[12] In late February 1909 police reported that the Hervéist minority of the Socialist *Fédération de la Seine* held a meeting in which they discussed Jobert's motions at the Toulouse Congress concerning a separate or distinct group, possibly remaining inside the party. According to the police, Hervé at this point claimed he had no intention of creating a group outside the S.F.I.O. In fact, the possibility for a separate *Parti Révolutionnaire* would become an ongoing and controversial issue for the Hervéists. In 1909 his idea may have simply been to form a group that would discuss questions to be posed at national and international congresses. The main Hervéist goal then seems to have been to

come up with a program which would stress antimilitarism and insurrection and employ more formidable means of action than were created at the time Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. In February 1909, a month prior to the first postal strike, Hervé stressed the need to prepare a general strike and not simply wait for one. He had long been arguing for getting the military on the side of the revolution, a stance that would eventually be called reactionary and signal his *rectification.* According to police reports, the young Hervéist acolyte Jean Goldsky wanted more study of the program before adopting anything, and Hervé concurred.[13]

Throughout 1909 *La Guerre Sociale* kept talking about leaving the S.F.I.O., undoubtedly encouraged by information coming from some of the most revolutionary sections of the official party.[14] When Hervé talked vaguely about a "revolutionary formation" at the S.F.I.O. Saint-Étienne Congress in April 1909, his comments appeared threatening. The ensuing anger and commotion at the gathering led some federations to reopen the arguments about his exclusion even though he had not argued for secession. Heuré stresses that without Jaurès continuing to try to keep the fragile S.F.I.O. together, Hervé might have been excluded.[15] Be that as it may, for the next year the proposed *parti* was "placed on the back burner"; in such circumstances even trying to develop such a party would have to wait a year.

A year later, Hervé felt no better about the revolutionary potential of the S.F.I.O. which he labeled "*notre parti urnifié*", and he called the S.F.I.O. Nîmes Congress in February 1910 a "defeat" for his ideas. "What was to be done" to maintain revolutionary activism at a time when revolution seemed so unlikely? Hervé's response to the "defeat" at Nîmes initially seemed to be a greater effort to create a *Parti Révolutionnaire.*[16] He appeared to formally launch the foundations of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* on March 9, 1910 in *La Guerre Sociale.*

> "For us, the *Parti Révolutionnaire* is a party of insurrection; our [insurrectionary] party will prepare it in striving to train its militants by street demonstrations and through skirmishes each time that a propitious occasion presents itself … The Revolution begins with the sounds of whistles, and it will continue with the sounds of revolvers. It will end with the sounds of rifles. There is only one weapon which has never gotten rid of a single regime: that arm is the election ballot."[17]

Gilles Heuré thought that such a text was the logical culmination of positions taken by a man who, as early as June 1907, despaired about the "working class spinelessness and the general sloppiness." More than an actual party of revolution, Hervé's proposal was meant to be a sphere where revolutionary aspirations could converge and improvise. It was a network more than a structure. Such an unstructured party would have made it much more difficult for the authorities to

monitor and verify either its strength or weakness, as Hervé must have known.[18] Both the police and the socialists had something to fear from this new creation. For the police the stated goals of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* confirmed that "Hervé and his friends, although they remained members of the unified socialists party now were absolutely and exclusively genuine anarchists."[19] The police were bound by their mission to protect French security from such apparent threats. The socialists feared that Hervé might take away enough support to threaten the S.F.I.O. By maintaining the revolutionary flame, the Insurrectionals hoped to ignite revolutionary fires within various ideological zones, which socialist deputies and police agencies, with different motivations, were determined to extinguish. During the trial over his Liabeuf article in February 1910 and after he was sentenced and about to be sent to prison, socialists supported Hervé's right to speak his mind, but *L'Humanite* soon admitted that it had lost patience with a militant who constantly assailed a party that he had freely joined.[20] Both the police and the socialists worried that the Hervéists might be able to incorporate the most active syndicalist elements, thus turning the C.G.T. into an even greater revolutionary danger and leading workers away from mainstream socialism. In fact, C.G.T. moderates led by Louis Niel were quite hostile to Hervéist ideas. Nevertheless, when the revolutionaries appeared to regain the upper hand at the Toulouse Congress of the C.G.T. in October 1910, police fears seemed justified. Even though the syndicalists remained divided among themselves and have long been described by scholars as going through a "crisis in syndicalism", the police seemed to function on the basis of a "worst case scenario."[21]

Police and socialist fears and perceptions were one thing. The realities facing the new *parti* were quite another. Wishing for and actually obtaining a new *parti* were hardly synonymous. By March 1910 Hervé must have realized that socialists were not flocking to join. The *Sans Patrie* certainly knew the extent to which syndicalists distrusted "intellectuals," for syndicalists had their own organization to protect. He knew from experience that anarchists often feared any organization, and they were worried that Hervéism would promote a revolutionary dictatorship.[22] Hervéists had long been aware that anarchists viewed political organizations as a "prelude to opportunism and governmental participation."[23] Most of Hervé's Insurrectional troops had not resolved to leave the S.F.I.O. in order to join an organization that was still in an embryonic state. Hervéism was at its strongest in the departments of the Seine and in the Yonne but militants even there were far from ready to leave the S.F.I.O. "Gustave Hervé, whose popularity and influence were unparalleled among revolutionary militants, ended by abandoning the prospects for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, acknowledging that he would not be followed

by his supporters. Without his help, it was inconceivable to federate the various revolutionary nuances in the same party."[24]

Jean Claude Peyronnet theorized that the *Parti Révolutionnaire* arose out of intoxication with success. Peyronnet argued that declining tolerance for Hervé's antics by socialist leaders such as Jaurès, Marcel Sembat, Maurice Allard, and at times even Vaillant could have made the idea of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* that much more enticing.[25] A decline in toleration by formerly friendly socialist leaders can be attributed to two factors: Hervé's increasingly open calls for violence and sabotage dating from the time of the postal strikes and the incessant antiparliamentary campaigns of *La Guerre Sociale*. The fact that antiparliamentarianism would evolve into abstentionism for many Hervéists in the months preceding the 1910 elections and because even non-Guesdist leaders like Jaurès began to be more critical and more fearful of Hervéism before the postal strikes may indicate that Hervé's promotion of sabotage was not the central Jaurèsist concern.[26] Rather than viewing Hervé's increasing efforts at creating a *Parti Révolutionnaire* as something new and demanding an explanation, as Peyronnet, Almosnino, and Heuré do, it might be more accurate to see the periodic calls for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* as the very essence of Hervéism. In a sense *La Guerre Sociale* was created under the assumption that such a *parti* was possible. Frustration with the existing organizations on the Left had at least as much effect as any intoxication with Hervéist successes in the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. in promoting a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. What is more necessary to explain are Hervé's reasons for not pushing his *Parti Révolutionnaire* to the limit.

Both Peyronnet and Almosnino described Almereyda as the chief proponent of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* at *La Guerre Sociale*. "According to Almereyda it was urgent to gather the forces of the extreme Left as much for daily action as to respond to revolutionary situations which could arise, as was just witnessed in the agitation during the Ferrer Affair [in the early fall of 1909]."[27] Certainly, Almereyda often pushed Hervé further than he had intended. There is evidence that Hervé encouraged secessionist groups from the S.F.I.O. in early 1909. According to Peyronnet, Almereyda may have been active at that time in trying to get the anarchists themselves to form a *Fédération Révolutionnaire* (F.R.) so that this organization could be utililized as one component of the proposed *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[28] Other sources described the F.R. as an organization of anarchists formed in 1908 or early 1909 and dedicated to the same revolutionary program extolled by *La Guerre Sociale*.[29] According to Jonathan Almosnino, militants from the A.I.A. tried to organize an F.R. as early as February 1909. After that beginning:

> "a congress which was held at the Rue de la Grange aux Belles in the month of April 1909 launched the new organization which sought to focus on propaganda, direct action, and [the creation of] a counter-police. As soon as he left prison [at the end of the summer of 1909], Almereyda got involved with it, speaking in the course of meetings or various local committee gatherings of the organization. He was a member of the directing committee of the *Fédération* along with anarchists [René] De Marmande, [Georges] Durupt, Goldchild [Jean Goldsky], and also [Lucien] Belin. The *Fédération* engaged in political action beyond antimilitarism, and was open to all the forces of the extreme Left which favored insurrection. As far as one can tell, outside of the typical milieu of militants, it did not attract the general public as did the S.F.I.O. or the C.G.T. Numbering several hundred militants at the very most, the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* was confined to the anarchist and revolutionary syndicalist world which already shared most anarchist conceptions."[30]

If there is some evidence that *La Guerre Sociale* had close ties to the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, that was probably largely at its beginnings. Though there are indications that Almereyda had a role in the origins of the new group, he was certainly in prison for much of 1909 while the F.R. was in the process of formation. The F.R. "did not get beyond the level of a political group, while among militants the need for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, having an influence on large masses of workers, was bitterly felt. It was necessarily with the Left wing of the S.F.I.O. that such a party could see the light of day. In 1910, this unification seemed possible, all the more because the Insurrectionals were increasingly isolated from the majority of their party, which was more apt to beat the drums for elections than to organize extra-parliamentary actions."[31] By most accounts the F.R. evolved directly out of or parallel to the A.I.A., and was usually described by police sources as the final reconstitution of the A.I.A.[32] The declining role played by Hervéists in the A.I.A. mirrored the small and peripheral role which the F.R. had in the pages of *La Guerre Sociale* after April 1909. The F.R. does not seem to be evidence of Hervéist expansion. In some ways it seems to have been a largely spontaneous regrouping of A.I.A. which was trying to bring some life back into anarchism and antimilitarism. *La Guerre Sociale* naturally turned to it for support in the perpetual Hervéist quest for revolutionary concentration. As noted above, in 1908 Hervé distanced himself from the A.I.A. when it sought funds and direction.[33]

After April 1909 there were almost no regular articles in *La Guerre Sociale* on the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*. Hervé himself attacked the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* in August 1909 at the time of the Czar's visit to Cherbourg because it had created no united action against the Russian leader. At that time Hervé claimed that the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* existed largely on paper.[34] Certainly, by November 24, 1909, the police reported that Almereyda no longer had the confidence he formerly had in the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* which numbered

only a few hundred members. If Hervé still expressed hope that the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* could stay afloat, he was unable to do anything to save the group. Since *La Guerre Sociale* itself wanted to amalgamate all the revolutionaries of the Seine and then to extend their influence into the provinces, the Hervéists might have resented the competition or merely grown skeptical about the group's efficacy. Apparently, the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* had little impact and was involved in few notable actions even if Almereyda and other Hervéists tried to relaunch the F.R. in the summer and fall of 1910.[35]

In Peyronnet's view the secessionist groups from the S.F.I.O. and the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* itself were *coups de sonde* for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, but Hervé was not yet ready for a scission with the S.F.I.O. From another perspective these creations seem to fit long-standing Hervéist ideas and practices. They do not have to be seen as the startling departures which Almosnino assumes. If they represented a new urgency in Hervéism, such formations could well have resulted from growing disillusion and frustration rather than optimism or euphoria. By late 1909 and early 1910 these new creations had either failed or sat idle awaiting amalgamation into the much discussed but nonexistent *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[36] A Ministry of the Interior report written during the 1910 railway strike concerning a *Société Secrète Révolutionnaire* equated the *organisation de combat* with the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. The report admitted that the *Parti Révolutionnaire* was "not yet definitively constituted" but that it had revolutionary action groups mainly in the Seine, the Nord, the Somme, and the Pas-de-Calais. French officials believed that these groups "may not have been the direct agents but they were at least the instigators of acts of sabotage." The report also tied *La Guerre Sociale* to sabotage in the provinces during the postal strikes, but the evidence was incredibly vague.[37]

It is possible that the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* was to have been a part of Hervé's longstanding call for an *organisation de combat*. We have seen that Hervé considered the A.I.A. to have been an *organisation de combat* at its Saint-Étienne Congress in July 1905 and he talked about such an *organisation* after Stuttgart in 1907 as he advised the S.P.D. on ways to implement a revolutionary strike. One Ministry of the Interior file dated September 1911, noted above, claimed that the *organisation de combat* originated at the 1907 International Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam.[38] During the Midi Crisis in 1907 Hervé called for an end to "verbal revolution" and hoped "to sow the spirit of revolt." A year later during the strikes and bloodshed at Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges he called on workers to follow the lead of *terrassiers* by building barricades, arming themselves, employing sabotage, and being ready to retaliate against the *gendarmerie* and police. In May

1909 *La Guerre Sociale* claimed that there were more than 2000 sections of Insurrectionals already standing, made up five to six people in each section.[39]

What are we to make of the *organisation de combat*, the *Parti Révolutionnaire*, and the other Hervéist formations about to be created in 1910 and 1911? The confusion of the Ministry of the Interior and the Paris police with all of Hervé's secret organizations and revolutionary formations is quite understandable if these creations existed largely on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale*, in the wishes of the Hervéists, and during the nightmares of the police. It is striking that so much of the evidence which the police had on Hervéist secret organizations came directly from articles written by Hervé. If such groups were meant to intervene in revolutionary demonstrations and assist in sabotage operations, "because only such activities could end the purely verbal revolutionary exercises of the S.F.I.O.", as *La Guerre Sociale* claimed, what was the purpose of so openly advertising them in a weekly newspaper?[40]

The vague and ephemeral nature of the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* in 1909 fits the history of insurrectionalism up until then. Whether the F.R. was the *organisation de combat*, the latest manifestation of it, or one of its components, the nature of the F.R. conformed to the tenets of Hervéism. If Hervé did not create it, he was willing to use it in an era when non life-threatening sabotage was proving to be a valuable tactic to activate the "masses" and to sell newspapers. The experience of the F.R. did not lead Hervé to "an intoxication with success" because this organization, like his others, failed to bring most anarchists (not to mention most socialists and syndicalists) over to Hervéism. This experience was another reason to tone down, at least temporarily, the rhetoric for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* and to seek to increase Hervéist influence over the established "revolutionary" organizations in more standard fashion.

In another sense, the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, the *organisation de combat*, and even the *Parti Révolutionnaire* served both Hervé and the French police quite well. For Hervé they provided the illusion of action and movement with the hope that other militants would rally to Hervéism. For the Ministries of the Interior and Justice, they served as "proof" that their services were needed and ought to be both increased and better funded. The large general reports of 1911 and 1912 by the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Ministry of Justice on the "*Association de Malfaiteurs*"" accepted Hervé's creations as real because they sought proof that "conspiratorial organizations against persons and property" actually existed. The existence of such conspiratorial organizations could have enabled the French administration to employ articles 265, 266, and 267 of the *Code Penal as* augmented by the Law of December 18, 1893 which was intended to give the

police greater powers against subversive plots before crimes actually occur.[41] It is highly possible that both Hervé and police officials realized the flimsy nature of these organizations, yet each had reasons to promote and magnify their existence. Hervé created a smokescreen of secret revolutionary activism in the hope of firing a revolution. The police saw a potential revolutionary explosion behind the nebulous organizations of Hervéism in the expectation that this would increase their own authority and utility. At some level, at least, Hervé and the police depended on each other to sell themselves.

In January 1910, the month before the S.F.I.O. Congress at Nîmes, certain militants at *La Guerre Sociale*, perhaps led by Almereyda, worked more assiduously to develop the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and another organization called the *Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire* (C.R.A.). Specific and urgent appeals for the *Parti Révolutionnaire* were not alien to longstanding Insurrectional goals and the formation of the C.R.A. conformed to the assumptions of a growing number of Hervéists. At that time, the Insurrectionals had thousands of followers and supporters throughout France. Their chief difference from the anarchists, according to Almosnino, was "their participation in the electoral process, not sharing the habitual abstentionism of the anarchists. On the contrary, they wanted to make use of parliamentarianism to popularize revolutionary ideas among the masses through electoral campaigns and even future seats for Deputies at the National Assembly, utilized as a tribune." Hervé's newspaper had always seen itself as the rallying voice for the extreme Left and Almereyda had long had personal ties to the anarchists and other revolutionary currents. Such a confluence of ideas, motives, and militants was central to the potential formation of a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. For Almosnino the still-born or ephemeral *Fédération Révolutionnaire* represented an appeal by certain anarchists to the Insurrectionals for some sort of unity. That was what led the Hervéists to seriously consider joining a *Parti Révolutionnaire* in early 1910.[42]

Yet in early 1910 Hervé was content to let others at *La Guerre Sociale* take the initiative. Whether Hervé consciously remained "above the fray" or manipulated it at a distance is unknown. *La Guerre Sociale* included a variety of opinions about how best to fulfill Hervéism. As a member of the S.F.I.O. with many allies in the Yonne and the Seine, Hervé could not afford to antagonize the socialist bases of his movement. However, since he needed syndicalist and anarchist support, he had to accommodate their opinions, too. If Hervéism were to succeed as a movement of revolutionary concentration, a variety of ideological positions had to be appeased. Views differed regarding how best to create the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and the efficacy of a *Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire*. The divisions over

these new groups eventually conformed to an anarchist-socialist division within Hervéism, but initially the views at *La Guerre Sociale* represented a far more complex and fluid situation. At first, Hervé opposed neither of the two new Hervéist *démarches*, but the *Sans Patrie* had to be concerned with political realities. He had to be certain these new creations would be supported by his followers. Even the leader of an extremist movement could be more patient and realistic than his most volatile lieutenants. When he failed to prevent the growth of socialist reformism at the S.F.I.O. Nîmes Congress of February 1910, Hervé was ready to act.[43]

On January 5, 1910, Almereyda had asked militants what immediate and practical measures were necessary by *La Guerre Sociale* in order to create a revolutionary situation. The responses of Eugène Laval, Gaston Delpech, Émile Pouget, and Amilcare Cipriani branded revolutionaries as buffoons when they talked about sabotage, insurrection, general strike, and reprisals against the police yet had only a phantom *organisation de combat* to carry out their threats. Almereyda defended *La Guerre Sociale* but he also believed that new revolutionary organizations were both necessary and possible. In Almereyda's opinion, the Ferrer Affair, by awakening the workers' revolutionary spirit, gave new revolutionary formations a chance to succeed.[44] Two weeks later, Émile Tissier renewed the call for a *parti d'action révolutionnaire*. This proposed formation was to involve coordinated actions by all revolutionary elements previously recruited by the Hervéists. Tissier's appeal also called for Insurrectionals to leave the S.F.I.O. Almereyda's comments on Tissier's proposals asserted that the idea of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* had been a common anarchist proposal for many years. Hervé's chief lieutenant made it clear that he spoke only for the *libertaires* at *La Guerre Sociale*, but he called on Hervé and Aristide Jobert to respond in the name of the socialist Insurrectionals.[45]

For a time a *Parti Révolutionnaire* may have seemed like a realistic option. The electrical workers of Paris and the construction workers actively supported *La Guerre Sociale* during Hervé's trial in the Liabeuf campaign. Clearly, Hervéism had great support within some C.G.T. federations. Several Hervéist groups were forming outside of or parallel to more established organizations. The S.F.I.O. leaders worried about Insurrectional groups which discussed leaving the party.[46] In early 1910 French police reported that socialist leaders were divided about whether Hervé would leave the S.F.I.O., but most socialists were thought to have welcomed such a scission. The police did not believe that a *Parti Révolutionnaire* could succeed. There may have been enough revolutionaries to create such a party, but they were described as too heterogeneous, lacking a common doctrine, and devoid of attractive personalities. Thus, many police officials did not believe the Hervéists had the ingredients necessary to create a viable revolutionary party.[47]

In meetings from January to March 1910, the Insurrectionals disagreed among themselves about leaving the S.F.I.O. Some Hervéist socialists favored it; some were ambiguous; while others wanted to wait until after the February Nîmes Congress. An Insurrectional like Jobert for a time favored a *Parti Révolutionnaire* tied to the S.F.I.O., thereby killing the entire logic behind the new party. What is important to realize is that the push for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* and scission with the S.F.I.O. were not just anarchist ideas but were favored by many Insurrectionals, though some had roots in anarchism. Some officials at the Ministry of the Interior connected Hervéist secessionism to a loss of influence in the Socialist *Fédération de la Seine*.[48] Hervé also had to be concerned about syndicalist views. To wit, he spoke in favor of creating a *Parti Révolutionnaire* at a mammoth meeting organized by the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* and the *Fédération du Bâtiment* and attended by up to 8000 people on March 4, 1910 at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall. That meeting was meant to protest governmental measures against union leaders and workers, and featured anti-parliamentary and anti-police rhetoric, calling for violent street demonstrations at election time to send a message to the authorities. So, just before entering prison the Insurrectional leader still had a strong following in the C.G.T. as he continued to argue publicly for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[49] Before any such venture could succeed, he had to have the support of both syndicalists and socialists. Police sources generally assumed that Hervé hesitated to depart from the S.F.I.O. following the Nîmes Congress, but he still named Merle and Almereyda the chief promoters of the proposed *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[50] Hesitation and equivocation by the Insurrectional leader was perfectly understandable given the divisions among his socialist and syndicalist followers.

Hervé made few direct comments on the abstentionist campaign until just before the spring elections. Yet his March 9, 1910 article supporting the creation of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* alluded to the idea of abstentionism in a positive manner. Just after his sentence to four years in prison for the Liabeuf article, Hervé came out openly for a new *Parti* knowing that he would be out of the way for some time. He does not seem to have been guided by personal concerns, doctrinal issues, or latent moderation in waiting for so long before approving a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. He simply had to be cautious until he knew that his long sought after revolutionary concentration would not be sabotaged by such a formation. His primary justification for supporting the new *Parti* was the universal disgust with parliamentarianism. For him a *Parti Révolutionnaire* could prevent European reformist socialism from destroying the spirit of revolt in France.[51] After praising Vaillant and Guesde for preventing the S.F.I.O. from becoming a ministerial party, he, nevertheless, encouraged all socialists disgusted with electioneering to

join the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. Despite his own recent participation in a major syndicalist meeting, Hervé's attitude toward the C.G.T. had evolved into an attack on syndicalist paralysis resulting from reformism and exclusivity. The C.G.T. alone could not create a revolution because it neglected peasants, small shopkeepers, craftsmen, and, above all, intellectuals. It was obvious to Hervé that the C.G.T. needed an energetic and combative *Parti Révolutionnaire* on its Left flank.[52]

Hervé's program for the *Parti Révolutionnaire* was rather vague, but it certainly appealed to revolutionaries of all types and backgrounds. He called for the creation of a classless society on a federalist basis in which the instruments of labor and exchange would belong to a *Confédération Générale des Producteurs*. The proposed *Parti* would have a common tactic—a social revolution achieved by means of an insurrectional general strike. Its daily program would include propaganda, agitation, and other actions. It would promote its ideas by conferences, newspapers, and brochures publicizing the goal of a violent expropriation of the bourgeoisie. The new party would seek to undermine the religious, moral, patriotic, legalistic, and parliamentary prejudices which supported the possessing class. "As a party of agitation, it would profit from patronal, governmental, judicial, police, and clerical infamies in order to create campaigns, hold meetings, and descend into the streets for the purpose of awakening the spirit of revolt in the cowering masses ..." Privately and publicly, members of the party were expected to exemplify selflessness, courage, and idealism. The party would "profit by the effervescence of electoral periods, not by going to the polls ... but by demonstrating the powerlessness of Parliament" to act in a revolutionary manner. It would show how parliamentary reforms arose from the external pressure of active minorities using direct action. This program represented a concession to the *libertaire* abstentionists at *La Guerre Sociale*, but Hervé's acceptance of abstentionism was short-lived.[53]

This pleading for support from S.F.I.O. and C.G.T. revolutionaries was probably based more on Hervé's hopes and fears rather than any intoxication with impending victory. He may have had premonitions about imminent rejection since most syndicalist leaders of the Confederal Bureau were against him. He also knew that he could never win over a majority in the S.F.I.O. leadership. Yet it was his remarks to anarchists which most clearly displayed his frustration. If his characterization of anarchist individualists as egoists and *communistes-libertaires* as doctrinaires were true, then where did Hervé hope to find anarchist recruits for the *Parti Révolutionnaire*? Besides Sebastien Faure, his associates, and their friends, from where were anarchist adherents to come? Hervé's analysis of the failure of revolutionary activism was accurate, but did he have a viable solution?[54]

For years Hervé had alluded to something like a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. In his March 9, 1910 article promoting the projected *parti*, he listed "only" two requirements which had to be met before he would leave the S.F.I.O. He demanded that the Insurrectionals of the Federations of the Seine and the Yonne overcome their fears that anarchists and syndicalists would be less disciplined and less numerous than the new party required. Thus, Hervé tied his adhesion to the *Parti Révolutionnaire* to its acceptance by Hervéists in the Seine and the Yonne. He also wanted *libertaires*, syndicalists, and Insurrectionals already outside the S.F.I.O. to form groups and send their names to *La Guerre Sociale*.[55] Two weeks later Hervé admitted that Insurrectionals of the Seine and the Yonne had failed to support the *Parti Révolutionnaire* adequately. He blamed the peasant character of the Yonne Federation for its reluctance to create a new party. The situation of the Seine Federation was not yet clear to him.[56] However, he now seemed to display genuine affection for the S.F.I.O. because some Guesdists and even a few reformists were viewed almost with tenderness. Hervé lamented his own inability to command the kind of authority and discipline over the Insurrectionals which Guesde had over his followers. One of the arguments which he used to proselytize the *Parti Révolutionnaire* was the need to go beyond established socialist authorities and party pontiffs, yet Hervé implicitly craved pontiff status himself. His mixed feelings regarding the proposed *Parti* were especially evident as he told S.F.I.O. leaders not to fear attacks by the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. He had not yet given up on the project since he stressed that the new party would not be antisocialist because common action would be needed on the day of revolution![57]

In a sense, Hervé virtually demanded that a *Parti Révolutionnaire* be created with all its elements before he would join. This may show both caution and a sense of loyalty to the S.F.I.O.; it is certainly evidence that Hervé was unwilling to risk separation from the main centers of his socialist support. In 1904 Hervé could not attend the Amsterdam Congress of the International because he was not affiliated with a major socialist organization. He did not want to renew that isolation in 1910. Despite some misgivings, Hervé for a time had been willing to create a *Parti Révolutionnaire* outside and even against the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. The purpose of the new party was to facilitate action by revolutionaries. Since its existence depended on support from revolutionaries in those organizations, its foundations were shaky if not inevitably doomed. One could not create a revolution with organizational legerdemain any more than one could end capitalism with a combination of revolutionary rhetoric and reformist practice. A police note of March 1910 explained the failure of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* in terms of a syndicalist distrust for the "intellectuals" at *La Guerre Sociale*.[58] Herve and his comrades had been and

would continue to be well aware of this syndicalist phobia regarding "intellectuals."[59] For Christophe Prochasson such developments were part of a larger process involving the changing relations of intellectuals, however defined, with the larger society: in this case the relations between workers and so-called intellectuals. It was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain such ties.[60]

Discord among the staff at *La Guerre Sociale* was soon evident. Although Perceau, Méric, and Jobert favored the status quo and hoped that the Insurrectionals would remain in the S.F.I.O., where they could pressure the socialists in a revolutionary and antiparliamentary direction, others like (Pierre?) Laval of the 13th section and Mayet and Trenard of the 14th wanted a rupture with the S.F.I.O. At a bi-monthly meeting of the Insurrectionals in mid-March, Méric demonstrated how material and moral difficulties prevented the creation of a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. For the present, Méric said that he and his friends would rally with the majority, but he asked the secessionists to wait for the results of consultations with Hervéist allies and provincial supporters. Jobert noted that the Insurrectionals themselves were divided and had difficulties with both syndicalists and anarchists. Thus, a *Parti Révolutionnaire* was unrealizable at the moment. Jobert argued that after the elections the Insurrectionals could find out whether the Federation of the Yonne as well as other socialist groups in the Nord, the Somme, and the Aisne, which included strong Insurrectional contingents, would be favorable to the new formation, so that the new party would have some chance of success.[61] On March 30, 1910, Émile Tissier, the self-proclaimed originator of the new party, surprisingly asserted that the proposed *Parti Révolutionnaire* had such wide support that it would be created with or without Hervé.[62]

The culmination of the drive to create a *Parti Révolutionnaire* occurred amidst the abstentionist campaign for the spring elections in 1910. In late January that year, Jules Grandjouan, the cartoonist on *La Guerre Sociale* who also contributed to the satirical *L'Assiete au Beurre*, had begun steps to create a *Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire* with the support of Almereyda. Almost immediately Hervé's chief lieutenant announced that the Insurrectionals of the S.F.I.O. would be unable to join the new *Comité* due to their fears of exclusion, but he promised the support of all Hervéists not in the S.F.I.O. Essentially that meant those anarchists and syndicalists who had ties to Hervéism. But not all militants had the same views regarding parliamentary action. Most favored abstention and wished to treat elections almost as if they did not exist according to Almosnino. "But certain anarchists, among whom Almereyda, inspired by the revolutionary use of elections by the socialist movement, supported agitation in favor of a *vote nul*[63] in the scope of the electoral campaign. Eventually Almereyda had to bend in

favor of the majority of militants who wanted to wage an exclusively abstentionist campaign. On the other hand, his strategy, which sought to use election periods to advance antiparliamentary and revolutionary propaganda was adopted."[64] So Almereyda's abstentionist repertoire came to include: voter cards, antiparliamentary meetings, abstentionist election posters as well as brochures and, strange as it seems, abstentionist candidates.[65] In order to reach the most voters, the C.R.A. put up abstentionist candidates in various Parisian and provincial *circonscriptions.* That helped them attract attention by getting the use of meeting sites without cost, and it meant reimbursement for some of their other expenses. Their "official" posters did not have to have stamps even though the candidates named asked voters to abstain.[66]

There was a socialist faction at *La Guerre Sociale* that viewed elections as a crucial time for antiparliamentary propaganda. Victor Méric wrote about the incongruity that made antiparliamentary socialists the most avid speakers during electoral campaigns.[67] The antiparliamentary anarchists at *La Guerre Sociale* had been active in the electoral process well before the 1910 elections. But Hervéist antiparliamentary activism entailed divergent opinions. A *libertaire* like Almereyda rejected the anarchist individualist version of abstentionism because it would not affect voters. He also realized that anarchist individualists wanted to avoid any ties to both socialism and syndicalism. Thus, the C.R.A. was organized without the anarchist individualists and without most Hervéist socialists. It even had trouble recruiting syndicalists.[68]

Jonathan Almosnino thought that the abstentionist campaign was an implicit attempt by Almereyda to use anti parliamentarianism as a binding force or a common ground for cooperation.

> "If the forces of the extreme Left were dispersed and divided, it was the same for the anarchist movement itself. Each tendency, whether communist, individualist, or syndicalist worked in different milieux and conceived of daily activism in varying ways. Each [anarchist] newspaper, whether it might be *Le Libertaire*, *Les Temps Nouveaux*, or even *L'Anarchie*, represented a separate school, and worried more about differentiating itself from its rivals than cooperating with them. It was this division that Almereyda sought to end in dedicating himself, as was typical of him, to the antiparliamentary campaign in the spring of 1910. If anarchists had anything in common, it was their resolute opposition to elections and parliamentarianism. So the legislative elections of 1910 were the occasion for the anarchists to strengthen their antiparliamentary abstentionist agitation."[69]

As treasurer of the C.R.A., Almereyda controlled the money gathered from donations among militants and ordinary workers. Funds were then sent to some two hundred and fifty Parisian and provincial groups which had formed throughout

the country in the space of a few weeks.[70] The group issued posters as well as brochures, and throughout the elections campaign it even published an illustrated satirical newspaper called *Le Quinz'Mill'* at one centime an issue.[71] "Tens of thousands of posters were drafted, displaying the principles of revolutionary antiparliamentarianism and criticizing the parliamentary institution. Three brochures were sent out in hundreds of thousands of copies." The first brochure covered the misdeeds of Deputies during the most recent legislative session. The second brochure, and perhaps the most important one, reproduced an earlier work by C.A. Laisant entitled *L'Illusion Parlementaire.* The last was a French translation of a brochure by the Italian insurrectionary anarchist Enrico Malatesta.[72]

On March 9, 1910, *La Guerre Sociale* published a statement of principles which was to guide the C.R.A. Its central thesis was that parliamentary support of the bourgeois-capitalist system was an attack on the working class. Parliamentarianism was labeled illusory because its aims were never defined, and it sapped the energy and initiative of the workers and their organizations. Workers were told to count on themselves alone for total emancipation since elections and parliaments were meaningless. Workers must channel their efforts in the economic struggle toward revolutionary actions by way of unions. They were also advised to enter revolutionary groups or to create them if they did not exist.[73] One week later Grandjouan described the self-deception of socialists who assumed that seeking to control Parliament was a revolutionary endeavor. In order to gain control of Parliament, socialists would have to jettison their revolutionary ideas.[74]

In the end the Hervéists "adopted a strategy which sought to make use of election terms to engage in antiparliamentary and revolutionary propaganda. Therefore, it was a homogeneous (excluding the anarchist individualists) and structured antiparliamentary movement which saw the light of day during the legislative electoral campaign. Behind Jean Grave, Matha, and Almereyda, anarchist militants from *Les Temps Nouveaux, Le Libertaire*, and *La Guerre Sociale* participated in the common action. Syndicalists from the C.G.T. such as Pierre Monatte and M. Marie also joined in."[75] The aforementioned newspapers worked together in publishing a report dealing with the donations received by the C.R.A. After the election, the campaign results and the financial situation of the C.R.A. were to be published.[76]

When traditional candidates went out on the campaign trail, they had to face far more than their official adversaries. They also faced antiparliamentary agitators who were not without important resources. In order to get a larger hearing, abstentionist militants attended the meetings of regular candidates and then engaged in open debate with them. In March 1910 Almereyda and his comrades

presented the antiparliamentary message at many socialist, Radical and even republican meetings. Sometimes they even ventured into nationalist and largely bourgeois strongholds. On March 8 Hervé's lieutenant attended a socialist meeting in the 18th *arrondissement* organized by Charles Bernard, and the next day he went to a meeting organized by the Radical Bouillon at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. On both occasions Almereyda entered the debate and faced audiences of hundreds, which were occasionally hostile, in order to assail parliamentary politics. Almosnino reported that Almereyda himself was a candidate in the Aisne where he had officially filed at the prefecture and obtained the right to organize a meeting at the local courthouse. At that meeting Almereyda may have urged the hundred or so participants not to vote, but for some he left little doubt that it was his name that they should put up for these elections. Nevertheless, he seems to have put most of his effort into activities in Montmartre where large audiences were likely. On April 7 five hundred mostly independent voters attended a meeting organized by the antiparliamentary section of the 18th *arrondissement* where they heard Almereyda and (Pierre?) Martin talk about the strategy of revolutionary antiparliamentarianism.[77]

As election day approached, regular candidates were increasingly leery of handing over the tribune to Almereyda for a *contradiction*. When he was not allowed to speak, his followers generally raised what they assumed was a necessary ruckus. Perhaps the most flagrant example of such a scenario occurred on March 23, 1910. When Almereyda and his comrades sought entry at a meeting in the 18th *arrondissement* organized by the socialist Rouanet on the Rue Saint Isaure in the Clignancourt district, they were confronted by the socialist *service d'ordre*. After exchanging several blows, Almereyda and his associates managed to slip into the hall but he could not get to the podium due to the hostility of the audience. Eventually, Rouanet was allowed to speak for two hours, but his hostile remarks, accusing the antiparliamentarians of teaming up with the royalists and playing the game of reaction, incited a violent response from the Hervéists which involved threats, vile language, spitting on the speaker, throwing him into the crowd, flattening several other socialist militants, and then employing fists, tables, chairs, benches, and finally two warning shots from antiparliamentarians armed with handguns. That put an end to the general free-for-all. Though such antics did nothing to confirm the democratic credentials of the Hervéists, they were quite pleased with their ability to disseminate the antiparliamentary message.[78]

Even before the election results were in, discord at *La Guerre Sociale* over the abstentionist campaign became evident. Just before the spring 1910 elections, as the C.R.A. accelerated its efforts with more antiparliamentary speeches and

increased antics at meetings of candidates of all stripes, even abstentionist ones, Hervé's second lieutenant let the paper's readers in on the grumblings within the campaign.[79] On April 20, 1910, in his report on abstentionist activities, Almereyda stated that Hervé and Sébastien Faure judged the campaign negatively.[80] Hervé's misgivings about abstentionism as well as the *Parti Révolutionnaire* must have been voiced in private because he continued to support the new *Parti* in the pages of *La Guerre Sociale*, and he did not question abstentionism in print until after the first round of elections.

In a special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* the day before the first round of spring elections, the Hervéists appeared to be united on the question of abstentionism. Their rhetoric had lost none of its verve. The headlines demanded "A Strike of Voters" and Hervé's editorial noted the "universal disgust" which workers felt for the elections. The paper seemed to "speak with one voice" as it called on voters to abstain from casting ballots in order to teach Radicals and parliamentary socialists a lesson.[81] In another special edition on the day of the election, Almereyda's lead editorial defended the abstentionist campaign from attacks by parliamentary socialists (and by socialists closer to home?).[82]

When the results of the April 24 elections came in, Almereyda and his comrades were especially content because they had shown "the efficacy of communal actions by revolutionary forces when they were united … In the Montmartre district where their agitation was important, a third of the voters abstained while only a quarter did so in the rest of the capital." That evening a thousand militants gathered to jubilantly assail all the election results as well as praise the success of direct action. It took several police charges later that night to disperse the last of the abstentionists.[83]

Only after the first round of elections did Hervé openly question the value of abstentionism. His April 27 lead article described abstentionism as the real winner of the elections but that was merely an accidental victory. Hervé approved of the decision of the *Comité Révolutionnaire Antiparlementaire* to end the abstentionist campaign for the second round of voting. Revolutionaries of the *Comité* were told to join the *Parti Révolutionnaire* instead of wasting time on a negative organization like the C.R.A. In response to attacks by police and *jaunes* (the owner-sponsored unions), Hervé asked workers to carry "*le bulletin de vote Browning, marque déposée, avec garantie du gouvernement belge*." Voters must "end abstentions and go to the polls to vote for Citizen Browning, the only candidate of *La Guerre Sociale*."[84] Hervé certainly knew that his followers were not strong enough to bring down the bourgeois Republic through an armed revolt. The only use that handguns might have, Hervé admitted, was to repel police attacks. These

sensational references to the use of firearms by revolutionaries worked to conceal Hervé's more moderate approach to antiparliamentarianism. Such incendiary rhetoric cloaking a tactical re-evaluation may reveal far more about Hervé than an inability to admit that his support was limited.[85]

A separate anti-abstentionist article juxtaposed with Almereyda's report on antiparliamentary activities disclosed the extent of the rift among the Hervéists. In it, Hervé related that he, Perceau, Méric, and Pelletier had never favored abstentionism. They had signed the antiparliamentary manifestoes without mentioning their own reservations. After a clear but brief statement in favor of abstentionism on March 9, Hervé had come to reverse himself; he now admitted that voters actually could influence Parliament to create reforms. "Competition between Radical and Socialist candidates during elections pushes them to make reforms which are not imposed by direct action but by the action of electoral politics." Because the "crowd" was not revolutionary, it could only become more demoralized and less likely to employ direct action during an abstentionist campaign. Hervé recognized that militants would never view reforms as revolutionary. Nevertheless, his assumption that abstentionism divided revolutionary and reformist socialists who would have to cooperate on the day of revolution, negated both the rationale for the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and the logic of Hervéism itself.[86]

If Hervé were correct about the futility of abstentionism, he failed to recognize or at least to admit how his own assessment contradicted the *raison d'être* of Hervéism. What was Hervé attempting to do? Evidence of an increase in resentment against him by socialist leaders in 1909 and especially on the eve of the 1910 elections must have concerned him. He worried that abstentionism threatened his base in Yonne where socialist voters were accustomed to vote for antiparliamentary socialist candidates. Perhaps he feared that abstentionism threatened a loss of support in Yonne for the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. Possibly this represented an attempt to gain complete control over *La Guerre Sociale* at the commencement of his four-year prison sentence. The problem evaporates if one considers the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and the abstentionist campaign as two more efforts to create a revolutionary concentration which failed. Hervéism may have been a romantic and utopian movement, but Hervé could not dismiss political reality. An activist movement could not go forward by leaving its original supporters behind unless it attracted new adherents. Hervé seems to have been a perpetual prisoner of the original forces and conditions of Hervéism.

On May 11, 1910 Hervé and Almereyda presented their views on the elections and the abstentionist campaign. Hervé had mixed feelings about the success of the socialists who increased their strength from 54 to 76 parliamentary seats.

He applauded the recent shift to the Left, but he feared the growth of socialist opportunism and the demise of the S.F.I.O. as a revolutionary party. Though he praised socialist organization, discipline, and financial strength, he blamed socialist opportunism for losses in many working-class strongholds. If only the revolutionaries had developed a more dangerous tactic than abstentionism, the S.F.I.O. might have suffered a well-deserved general disaster rather than some partial setbacks in the elections.[87] In response to Hervé's attacks, Almereyda admitted his own misgivings about abstentionism. He agreed that small-town voters could not abstain from voting without grave dangers to themselves. When he recognized that some districts needed to get rid of Deputies hostile to workers, Almereyda had withdrawn his proposal for *votes nul*. Yet Almereyda's response was probably the sharpest exchange that Hervé had ever seen from his staff. Almereyda accurately pointed out Hervé's contradictory arguments. After four years of antiparliamentary rhetoric, Hervé was in no position to worry about the feelings of parliamentary socialists. If Hervé could have overcome his personal antipathy to electoral meetings, he would have seen that abstentionist tactics were effective on both militants and ordinary voters. Of course, abstentionism was effective partly because of the repression by Clemenceau and Briand, as Hervé charged. Nevertheless, Almereyda claimed that the same argument applied to all revolutionary activities. Hervé's lieutenant thought that abstentionism could be as effective as voting in applying pressure for reforms.[88] The debate over abstentionism had obviously led these two Insurrectional leaders into a less than revolutionary argument.

Perhaps to rebut any charges of moderation, Hervé amended what seemed to have become a lukewarm antiparliamentarianism. He ridiculed informal electoral alliances of socialists with clericals and royalists. He renewed his demand for *représentation proportionelle* as a means to end political maneuvering during the second round of elections, and assailed the socialist parliamentary leadership as ultra-reformist and even conservative.[89] In commenting on his recent entrance into prison, Hervé mocked socialist electoral success by claiming that if socialists were ever voted into power they would probably send him to prison in distant Noumea or Cayenne. The S.F.I.O. was indicted as a more socially conscious version of the moribund Radical Party. A brief plea for the *Parti Révolutionnaire* culminated in an admission that his Yonne supporters had rejected the party. The C.G.T. and the anarchists were praised for correcting their deficiencies, but that appraisal may have represented more a slap at the socialists than an accurate appraisal of his beliefs.[90] After all, he had just described the C.G.T. failure to march on May Day as a defeat, and he urged the syndicalists to prepare for revenge.[91]

Hervé's assessment of the three principal leftist elements (the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., and the anarchists) often reflected his own level of influence on them. Appraisals of each element also functioned to approve or reprove the others. Because Hervé's pen was tied to the moment, the event, and the specific needs of the situation, his ideas varied drastically. Yet his general positions eventually became known. His approval of the celebration of the anniversary of the Commune by the increasingly reformist *Fédération de la Seine* in the same issue in which he blasted the parliamentarianism of the S.F.I.O. was not inconsistent. He simply wanted to praise an event that fit the needs of his revolutionary propaganda.[92] When the C.G.T. failed to join the *Fédération de la Seine* at Père Lachaise, Hervé ridiculed syndicalist dogmatism in refusing to associate with a political party.[93] The variable assessments of socialist and syndicalist actions a few months after Hervé entered prison were tied to Hervé's opinions at that time concerning the needs of revolutionary propaganda. The controversy with the abstentionists seemed "to vanish by magic" fairly quickly after he entered prison. Nevertheless, Hervé continued to write about secret revolutionary organizations as well as the creation of the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. The ongoing campaign dealing with Biribi became a mainstay in his editorials by June and July 1910 as the Aernoult-Rousset Affair was promoted on the extreme French Left.[94] The inability to plunge forward in creating a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, which was a major setback in the fortunes of Hervéism, was masked by continuing revolutionary rhetoric and journalistic sensationalism.

Though Hervé did not formally reject the idea of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* until 1912,[95] his article on May 25, 1910 discussing the failure of the Yonne Federation to follow him can be considered the *de facto* end of the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. He made it clear that because Yonne had rejected his call to leave the S.F.I.O., he himself would not leave it either.[96] Heuré argues that Hervé's renunciation of this longstanding goal did not occur due to his realism, rather it arose due to a lack of followers. Eventually, Hervé found the occasion to fully explain his reasons to longtime anarchist ally Charles-Albert in April 1912. Over two years into his final prison sentences, Hervé gave Albert two major reasons for canceling the effort to create a *Parti Révolutionnaire*: (1) The refusal of the *Socialiste Fédération de l'Yonne* to follow him, and (2) The rejection of the project by the *libertaires*, those anarchists sympathetic to syndicalism. Heuré thought that there might have been another reason. He may have been worried that he could not properly guide the new *parti* from prison, especially considering that Almereyda and Grandjouan wanted it to be autonomous.[97]

Both Peyronnet and Heuré concluded that the failure of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* sounded the death knell of Insurrectionalism or something intrinsic to it.[98]

For Victor Serge, an inveterate revolutionary and witness to the events, by 1910 Hervéism "turned in the vacuum, only expressing the need for verbal and physical violence by a small minority."[99] Such insights are important, but they beg the question: why were so many sensational events and formations associated with Hervéism just beginning in 1910? Such a paradox needs a resolution which Heuré presumes to uncover. After their *Parti Révolutionnaire* proved to be stillborn, the Hervéists needed to save face. So they fiercely attacked the S.F.I.O., with Hervé accusing mainstream socialists of doing "'Nothing! Nothing! Nothing! Nothing!'" after Stuttgart. He also assailed the German Social Democrats for their amazing apathy. For that assault, he employed an image he would use again in July 1914 when humor was in even shorter supply. "'When we talk about insurrection, they look at us like cattle gazing at a passing airplane.'" Certainly the Insurrectionals did not tone down the rhetoric at their meetings. In fact, they kept talking "about a vast secret revolutionary organization, terrorism, the means of obtaining 'cheap Browning handguns', [and] acts of sabotage in which '*les bons bougres* would find something to celebrate.'" Since the end of 1909 *les bons bougres*, sabotage, and Mam'zelle Cisailles had become part of a regular rubric at *La Guerre Sociale*.[100]

Though the impetus behind the *Parti Révolutionnaire* project may have been over, as Heuré and others argue, the police continued to pay close attention to the subversive threats, claims, and antics generated by the Hervéists. Thus, in September 1911 they still listed the *Parti Révolutionnaire* as one component of a vast conspiratorial *Association de Malfaiteurs* along with the C.G.T., the anarchists of the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire*, the *Organisation de Combat*, and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires.* Such a document speaks volumes about police assumptions and goals, but tells us much less about Hervéism.[101] For Heuré the failure to implement his project for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* amounted to a double check for the doctrine of Hervéism and for the leader himself. "Herve had not been able to channel, for his own interests, the political exasperation against the republican power of Clemenceau, '*le briseur de grèves*.' In reality, he scarcely had a precise political project. His ideas on the political process for conquering power never equaled those of Jaurès. For Hervé, all that counted was the incandescence of the insurrectional assault. To the famous rejoinder usually attributed to [Charles] Rappaport: 'If the revolution broke out on Sunday, what would you do on Monday?' Hervé would have been clearly embarrassed to respond."[102]

Hervé may have walked away from his *Parti Révolutionnaire* by May 1910, even if he was not yet ready to fully admit it or to explain all the reasons. Nevertheless, he and his men continued to create and publicize organizations and antics which maintained their revolutionary profile and certainly sold greater and greater

numbers of newspapers. The legendary *organisation de combat*, the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnare*, and the *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire* were incredible propagandistic enterprises "which managed to publicize what should have remained secret" unless Hervé's brand of concealment was never meant to dispense with advertising and publicity considerations. "The art of conspiring was always a variant of the art of promoting. During this period when he threatened intervention by secret societies, he did his best to make legible that which could have remained coded." Heuré surmised that advertising conspiracies was "the corollary" of the need "to cause fear."[103] If Hervéism failed politically in 1910, as many seem to feel, it continued to succeed as a kind of activist media experience well into 1912. In a commercial and journalistic sense *La Guerre Sociale* was a complete success which pointed to the future. No one was willing or able to admit, certainly neither the police nor the Hervéists, that promotional activities might be almost all there was to their much feared or vaunted revolution.

At least three problems remain: (1) Many acts of sabotage did occur. Heuré certainly believes that Hervéist threats were not simply hot air. The police counted more than three thousand acts of sabotage between October 19, 1910 and June 11, 1911, and they could only assume that the *organisation de combat* actually existed and was inextricably involved in such ventures along with *La Guerre Sociale*.[104] In mid-October during the railway strike, Hervé or whoever was writing for *Un Sans Patrie* confirmed the police concerns. "'The revolutionary organization is standing; it has been launched.'"[105] Yet, Hervé or his replacement ridiculed Briand for seeing a conspircay headed by *La Guerre Sociale* and an *organisation de combat* coordinating all the acts of sabotage somehow tied to the Germans. The author did promise that strikes, sabotage, attacks on *renards*, revolts, and *organisations de combat* would continue as long as the present society continued.[106] Among the threats at the time of the strike were: "sabotage of the railway and telegraph lines, viaducts, tunnels, [as well as] methodical interference in the radio communications coming from the Eiffel Tower ..."[107] (2) If Hervé had begun to despair about his goal of revolutionary concentration and if the rationale for insurrectionalism were shattered, what did all these organizations and incendiary promotional activities mean? (3) Paradoxically, Hervéism reached its peak and conspiratorial organizations were being created and advertised most, when Hervé and the bulk of his followers may well have sensed, if not fully admitted, that their revolution was a romantic fantasy. Perhaps Hervé and his colleagues both believed their own rhetoric, yet realized that it was largely hype or merely hope. If that is the case, why were they so willing to go to prison for words and deeds which had almost no chance to fulfill their stated goals?

In the weeks before the railroad strike, Hervé urged militants to enter the army and win it over in order to create a revolution. By September 28, 1910 all that separated Hervé from his later ideas of *miltarisme révolutionnaire* was an admonition that it might be better if leftist soldiers refrained from becoming officers.[108] The idea that workers should enter the army to gain influence over their fellow soldiers was not unique to Hervé. In September 1910 the French police noted the same idea among syndicalists at the C.G.T.'s *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* and socialists of the *Jeunesses Socialistes*.[109] In a special edition just days before the railway strike, Hervé drew a lesson from the downfall of King Manuel of Portugal. "No one ever made a successful revolution against the army, and a revolution with the cooperation of the army is all the easier if the *Parti Révolutionnaire* has with it at least part of its officer corps ..."[110] *Militarisme révolutionnaire* and *La conquête de l'armée* were policies which evolved gradually in Hervé's revolutionary lexicon. They were openly stated if not formalized before the railway strike. These policies were compatible with a viable *Parti Révolutionnaire* which Hervé had not yet completely abandoned. The police believed that these were Hervé's most extreme tactics to date. Yet because his new course was soon labeled "authoritarian" by anarchists and syndicalists, these new concepts would be rejected just like Hervé's earlier tactics. Since many of the militants, who would soon attack Hervé, held or had held similar views, it seems likely that Hervé's ideas, in part, were assailed in order to isolate him.[111] His incessant failures to unite the Left led Hervé to increase the extremist nature of his tactics and rhetoric. Constant rejection seemed to push Hervé's Blanquism to the limits, yet it was rejected all the more violently by those on the Left who felt threatened the most. Many C.G.T. officials had done everything in their power to curtail Hervéist influence. Syndicalist efforts to create a daily newspaper can be considered to have been partly anti-Hervéist in motivation. Among his potential revolutionary coalition partners, it was only the S.F.I.O. that did not reject Hervé after 1910 if only because Hervéism never had been a serious threat to reformist socialism.

Peyronnet believed that the origins of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* arose from Hervéist optimism and growth. The leading role that *La Guerre Sociale* had in the Ferrer Affair, the Liabeuf Campaign, and the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign, plus its support and leadership during the postal and railroad strikes of 1909 and 1910 were evidence of the great influence that Hervé and his newspaper had on the Left. In 1909 Hervéists were increasing their support in the S.F.I.O. In 1909 and 1910 Hervéist influence was at its peak in certain unions if not on the entire C.G.T. For a time the paper was accepted as the defender of a certain revolutionary purity. Leading militants who were attacked by Hervé immediately responded

on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale*. Circulation had gone from an average of 15,000 in 1907 to more than 50,000 in early 1911. Hervé was one of the two or three most popular speakers at leftist rallies, and usually received the loudest applause and the greatest jeers. Some militants even kept souvenir statues of him in their residences. Undoubtedly, Hervéism had achieved a certain position of influence and importance on the Left. Yet Peyronnet himself noted that the idea for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* arose largely because Hervé had failed to make the S.F.I.O. a revolutionary party.[112] The same argument could be made about the C.G.T. Hervé had placed the syndicalist organization above the S.F.I.O. but syndicalism, too, had gone the way of reformism. *The Parti Révolutionnaire* may have arisen due to Hervéist growth, but the need for such a party was axiomatically an admission of prior failures.[113]

From the beginning of the summer of 1910, Almereyda worked to reactivate the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* according to Almosnino. He apparently got the support of militants active in the antiparliamentary campaign to found local groups in the southern and northern parts of Paris where the anarchist Douyau offered assistance. The new organization had to focus on revolutionary propaganda but it was also involved in various clandestine actions by putting combat groups in place ready to engage in sabotage and street demonstrations. The F.R. also sought to become a counter-police in order to unmask police agents who infiltrated revolutionary groups. But most Insurrectional activities of this kind did not take place within the confines of the F.R. according to Almosnino. Such actions were performed by diverse militants in separate groups directly led by Almereyda.[114]

As a final footnote to these Hervéist organizations and activities from 1909 until 1912, it should be noted that if Almereyda tried to relaunch the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* in June 1910, he himself would be in prison by October 14 that year. The police reported a final unsuccessful Hervéist attempt to restart the group on October 16, 1910 as part of its continuing efforts to generate a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. However, some of the same sources assert that the F.R. had completely disappeared at the latest by May 1910. By the time it was reconstituted as the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire* (F.C.R.) on November 13, 1910 during a meeting at 70 Rue des Archives,[115] the police reported that it had taken an anti-statist, anti-authoritarian, anti-pontiff, *ergo* anti-Hervéist direction. It certainly became one of the chief voices against the new Hervéism by 1911–1912. At the meeting creating the F.C.R., an anarchist named Combes stated: "We don't want to bring down the present society to make Victor Méric the next Prefect of Police."[116] The F.C.R. rejection of the Hervéist *Parti Révolutionnaire*, for all intents

and purposes, ended any possibility for a revolutionary party, if not the continuing rhetoric about it. On July 6, 1912 the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire* became the *Fédération Communiste Anarchiste* and was soon led by Louis Lecoin, a former admirer of Hervé who would try to assassinate the voluble chauvinist Director of *La Victoire* during World War I.[117]

For years, Almereyda and Hervé had been trying to develop common ground among revolutionary organizations. The failure to put a *Parti Révolutionnaire* in place led them to ponder other strategies and possibilities.[118] By the time the F.R. had evolved into the F.C.R. and then the F.C.A., Almereyda had gone to prison, returned, and, like Hervé, evolved in response to repeated failures at revolutionary unity as well as altered domestic and international conditions. Under the leadership of Almereyda in 1910, the C.R.A. faded into obscurity, while the more sensationalistic J.G.R. and S.S.R. were launched. These two Hervéist formations would capture the imagination of readers, the attention of the police, as well as the jealousy and ire of fellow revolutionaries. They would not usher in *Le Grand Soir*.[119]

11

The Railroad Strike of 1910 and the Origins of *Le Retournement*

In 1910 several interesting developments occurred in Paris. Among them were: the great flood of the Seine, the Railway Strike, and, for some on the Left, certain nuances in the political ideas of Gustave Hervé which soon signaled his gradual political shift. If the flood had no connection to Hervé's "new course", the same cannot be said for the October 1910 strike among French railway workers, *les cheminots*. Still, it is probably misleading to date Hervé's *retournement* in a precise fashion because the change was gradual and arguably unconscious at first. Ironically, the shift away from revolutionary romanticism grew out of what appeared to be the most extreme phase of Hervé's neo-Blanquism. In order to get revolutionaries to act and unite instead of argue and attack one another, Hervé proposed a "conquest of the army" and an end to internecine conflict on the Left. To implement this hybrid political program Hervé and his staff continued to promote Insurrectional organizations and develop new ones that seemed no less incendiary. However, he increasingly appealed to the mass of workers above the heads of their often conflicting leaders. This attempt to redirect and fortify his elitist-mass strategy occurred around the time of the Railway Strike of 1910 whose perceived failure was proof that something even more drastic had to be done. The leftist reactions to his new extreme course were so negative that Hervé gradually reversed his strategy to implement his goals. In some ways, the most extreme expression of Hervéism and the extreme reactions to it were both factors in Hervé's reversal.



Figure 22. The Parisian Flood of late January 1910. Avenue Ledru-Rollin, January 30, 1910. Bnf.

The 1910 Railway Strike did not arise in a vacuum, and it can be approached as the culmination of a long evolution in economic, social, and political trends reaching back at least to the Revolution. The prohibition against associations as embodied in the Le Chapelier Law of 1791 was relaxed only gradually. Although the authorities thought some associations among workers were beneficial, especially if they were tied to religion and enhanced stability, under the Restoration and the July Monarchy most sanctioned associations were bourgeois, but workers' own aspirations for association were growing.[1] Writing in the early nineteenth century, Flora Tristan established a link "between the bourgeois practice of association and the workers' aspiration to association …" Citing Tristan's insights, Maurice Agulhon described the early 19th century in terms of "a flourishing spirit of 'sociability' …" among the bourgeoisie, despite their individualistic ethic, and among the lower orders, however different their versions of sociability were from the increasingly bourgeois elites. For Agulhon the spirit of "sociability" also involved a "'conflict between an associationist civil society and an anti-associationist state'" as the post-Napoleonic state worried about potential threats on both the Left and

Right, thus displaying lingering fears concerning both the Jacobin Club and religious congregations.[2] For H. Stuart Jones that conflict between civil society and the state in France was generally fought in the public services themselves when "public officials sought to conquer the rights of association that in civil society were gradually coming to be recognized as the visible sign of citizenship."[3]

Though strikes were legalized in 1864 under the Second Empire and unions were also permitted in 1884 following a law drafted by René Waldeck-Rousseau, the idea that state workers could legally strike was not accepted by leaders under the Third Republic. In a petition drafted in the fall of 1870, railway engineers alluded to, but rejected, a general strike as perhaps the only way to achieve their aspirations. However, "… in her thesis on striking workers from 1871 until 1890, Michelle Perrot did not find a single work stoppage among railway workers during these years."[4] If ideas about work stoppages and strikes among railway workers were slow to develop for reasons of patriotism or perceptions about the role of transportation in the economic well-being for all classes, such ideas were increasingly discussed among workers and increasingly feared by railway companies. As time went on, the government's fears of a railroad strike would grow due to the growing involvement of railroads in military mobilization plans. Of course, the railroads themselves were becoming critical in disseminating the very idea of railway unions and concomitant political formulas.[5]

H. Stuart Jones emphasized that "unionization of the public sector was no mere offshoot of the growth of wider trade union organization." Unions were illegal in the public services, though the 1901 law conferred a general right to forms associations. At that time the C.G.T. numbered about 350,000 members, while the *Federation des fonctionnaires* numbered some 200,000. So public sector unions were considered essential for the French syndicalist movement even though that movement was weak compared to the British and German labor movements. In France public service workers were among the most highly unionized, much more so than in the UK, even though French state workers were generally moderate. They did, however, play large roles in strike actions during *la belle époque*, especially those involving the postal workers in 1909 and the railway workers in 1910. "All this … was in defiance of the law, which until 1946 retained its prohibition on *syndicats de fonctionnaires*." French state employee behavior can be explained, in part, by their hybrid status between *le peuple* and *le bourgeoisie*, but even more so by their lack of formal guarantees, which state workers in Germany and the United Kingdom received. In France the campaign for a law for state employees did not come to fruition until after World War II, so French state employees, in the meantime, were left with more direct methods of self protection as well as the arbitrary actions of politicians.[6]

Writing in the aftermath of the Railway Strike 1910, British socialist F.C. Watts argued that every movement of French workers for a wage increase or reductions in hours was declared insurrectionary by the government in order to provide an excuse for brutal repression. This was apparently one of the reasons for the French syndicalists of the C.G.T. to take on a revolutionary character which the majority of its members did not really possess. Another reason that France's syndicalists appeared to be so extreme arose from the fact that any strike there for purely economic demands that embraced more than one section or establishment was called a general strike, even though it had little in common with what that term implied in Great Britain. Such reasons, coupled with a lack of organization compared to other Western states, led Watts to describe labor in France as anachronistic and extremist, arising from the country's social and economic backwardness. Even though some people during the *fin-de-siècle* assumed that French syndicalist methods were the wave of the future, for Watts, revolutionary syndicalism and Hervé's Insurrectionalism with their violent rhetoric and calls for sabotage were regressive and counter-productive.[7]

French historian Elie Fruit thought that "the fundamental contradiction between the public service character of the railroads and the driving force of its management, the private interest, was at the source of the successive crises in which each conclusion sanctioned a new extension of the role of the state, a dialectical unfolding which finished in 1938 with the creation of the S.N.C.F."[8] Almost from the start, private and public sectors found ways to cooperate sufficiently so that financial risks were alleviated and the public's expectations were met. "To palliate the disorder inherent in *laissez-faire*, the state … saw itself constrained to expand its role … at the same time it would assure the financial success of the large companies."[9] With important state direction, by 1858 under the Empire some forty private companies were largely absorbed within six major companies: Nord, Paris-Orléans (P-O), Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée (P-L-M), Est, Ouest, and the Midi. However, the failures of the railway companies of Charente and the Vendée led the state to repurchase them in 1878 creating France's first national railway network.[10] "The creation of the state railway network in 1878 was only meant to be a transitory measure in the minds of the governmental authorities at that time, in expectation of a return to private ownership, and did not call for a deep reform of the existing order. When circumstances did not confirm the hopes of company leaders, the government had to decide for itself to establish the basis for a definitive organization of the network."[11] Though tensions occurred between the National Union of Railway Workers (*Syndicat National des Travailleurs des Chemins de Fer*) and the state network, the latter actually became a source of

reform and hence pressure that could be employed against the private companies despite the reluctance and hesitancy of the government to challenge the private railway establishment. "'The State [network]' little by little became the 'telltale network' which the union members at the [private] companies never failed to cite as a precedent."[12]

However, the attitudes among workers and owners were slow to change and the transformative role of the state was not immediately apparent. By 1910 the paternalistic and coercive attitudes of the owners in such a hierarchical and rigid industry led to growing worker resentments and acrimony so that reactions were inevitable and state intervention between capital and labor became necessary.[13] The railroad industry, with its schedules, rules, regulations, constraints, and constant changes, uprooted thousands of workers from the ancestral rhythms of the farm, craft, and shop. Gradually, a part of public opinion became hostile to the railway companies. However, because the companies had such important friends in high places, real reform was impossible. Even though the *cheminots* had support in Parliament from those who favored state control of the railways, for more than twenty years in the late nineteenth century, little was accomplished to alleviate the plight of the *cheminots*. "Fortified by the moral support of that fraction of opinion hostile to the companies and conscious of the power of the syndical arm that they held legally, some militants transcended their role so as to claim to be champions of the national interest."[14]

"Employers in France, who were often themselves from the working class, did not wish to recognize unions. The government itself would not let its servants join them. The railways, which were partly nationalized, were exploited. The government held down fares, and wages dropped in relative terms. By 1900 engine-drivers had a wage equivalent to that of a navvy. They worked harder; and, on the Northern lines, there was an accident every day. The drivers were generally retired at fifty years of age; and the largest element in the railwaymen's union … was precisely the drivers aged over forty, who forfeited their pension if they struck."[15] For workers, in general, real wages doubled from 1856 until 1906; despite sharing in that trend, the *cheminots* remained at the same level among the least paid workers in France.[16] After the failure of the railway strike of 1898, the *Syndicat National des Travailleurs des Chemins de Fer* became more moderate for awhile, but the companies were no less unyielding. In the ensuing years, unrest among the French workers accelerated due to constantly deteriorating living conditions associated with a general increase in the cost of living, which led workers to attempt to increase their wages to compensate for their reduced purchasing power.[17] Before the Railway Strike of 1910, the *cheminots* had been in ferment for

some time, holding many meetings and passing innumerable resolutions. Their demands included pension rights and the establishment of a minimum wage of 5 francs a day, the so called five franc *thune:* hence the term "*grève de la thune*". Many *cheminots* received as little as 3 francs and 75 centimes per day, so their demands were quite modest and distinctly professional in character, despite the statements of French officials, like Aristide Briand, who, once in office, described the strike as a political insurrectional movement.[18]

Although the police managed to disrupt syndicalization among the *cheminots* in 1898 by pushing the union leadership to unleash an unpopular strike, the role of the police in the Railway Strike of 1910 is less clear according to Georges Ribeill. However, "the theory of a plot by the companies promoting provocation, rather than the police, where the Northern Company would have played the leading role in the matter, is very possible. Diverse circumstances would have determined the opportunity, the long-term preparations, and a propitious social climate for such an eventuality."[19] Though scholars have viewed the role of the police in the French labor movement in multiple fashions, Ribeill could not escape the following conclusion. "As far as the police are concerned, through their operations, they were a special actor in the syndical movement."[20] During their ministries from 1906 until 1911 both Clemenceau[21] and Briand had informants inside the unions who sometimes acted as *agents provocateurs*. For Briand such *agents* proved to be unnecessary because "the police knew that the syndical leadership would enact a strike under unfavorable conditions, and it was sufficient for them to allow their adversaries to act, all the better to repress them."[22] Railway union officials were convinced that police infiltration existed and they were correct. For the Russian anarchist émigré Victor Serge, police infiltrators of the working class often acted in an extremist manner simply to gain the confidence of their comrades. In his recent studies of the *cheminots*, Christian Chevandier is cautious about giving the police too much credit or blame for strikes that failed, however much such failures might be perceived as benefitting the authorities. For Chevandier other factors can help explain disastrous strikes, such as: an unrealistic ideology by some union leaders, the disparity in goals between revolutionary leaders and more practical *cheminots*, the overcentralization of syndical organizations, and certain counterproductive operating procedures employed by some strikers.[23]

The long ministry of Georges Clemenceau had helped to break the revolutionary syndicalist movement in France, but Briand's actions during the Railway Strike of October 1910 turned that event into "the last battle of the general strike" according to Pierre Miquel. Clemenceau had resigned in 1909 after an interpellation by former Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé concerning the naval budget,

so President Armand Fallières turned to Briand to finish Clemenceau's work. It was an ironic choice because Briand formerly was an advocate of the general strike, a legal counsel to Hervé, and a close friend of the legendary syndicalist activist, Fernand Pelloutier. By 1910 Briand did not hesitate to reject his earlier views. Despite appointing former socialists René Viviani and Alexandre Millerand to his cabinet, Briand governed on the basis of *raison d'état* during the Railway Strike.[24]

Although most militants at the time interpreted Briand's actions during the strike as opportunistic and Machiavellian, Republican Socialist deputy and inveterate minister, Joseph Paul-Boncour, did not dispute the sincerity of the new *Président du Conseil* and even claimed that Briand was still very close to his origins. Paul-Boncour argued that Briand was conscious of the power of the unions, so he hoped to initiate a cabinet of "relaxation", thereby promoting genuine conciliation with the Left and the Right.

> "But men can only partly make up for the absence of institutions. Because the place of trade unionism in the state had not been regulated, the relations between the unions and the state were going to affect the destinies of the Republic for a long time, and leave no other choice than repression or the abandonment of certain permanent necessities of the state. The flexibility of Briand could no more avoid it than the strong-arm method of Clemenceau. In fact, during the railway strike, Briand came even more directly in conflict with those he had meant to handle gently, and who, at the end of his career and his struggle for peace, formed the most ardent part of his following."[25]

The more recent research by French scholar François Caron points to the ironic situation in which both French workers and owners were eager to reject reform and accommodation due to the perception that their particular interests would be jeopardized. Owners saw Millerand's attempts to create a dialogue with workers "as a threat to their own authority which was considered as a natural consequence of their responsibilities. Syndicalists rejected any form of compulsory arbitration. In 1909 and 1910 Briand proposed a vast program of social reforms based on both the inauguration of a dialogue and the idea of participation. He was supported in that action by some reformist elements in the C.G.T., but he ran up against general incomprehension among most syndicalists and owners. The mobilization of the *cheminots* in October 1910 gave everyone a good excuse to bury the project."[26]

Caron and other scholars have worked diligently over the years to place the Railway Strike of 1910 in a larger context of social, economic, political, and labor history.

> "After the lamentable check of the 1898 strike, the National Railway Union and its president [Eugène] Guérard had rather brutally changed their orientation: they went from a

> position of 'revolutionary syndicalism' to a very reformist position, better adapted to the mentality of the railway workers whose *métier* put them 'under discipline at all times'. Guérard became a quasi official personage of the Radical republic. The preferred mode of action by the union was parliamentary pressure, supported by a powerful group in defense of the *cheminots*. His adversaries described Guérard as spending his life dealing in the antechamber. This type of syndicalism was very effective, at first in terms of its numbers; while at the beginning of the decade, the number of [railway] union members was insignificant, it attained 70,000 in 1910 for the whole of France, with 12,000 in the Northern network. These figures correspond to rates of syndicalization of 23% and 32%. The rate of unionization was particularly high where there was a parallel between socialist and syndical implantation, as was the case at Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing [in the Northern Network]. Becoming powerful by its numbers, the union managed to be heard and even 'recognized.'"[27]

Despite his obvious success in organizing and strengthening the National Railway Workers Union, Guérard's influence, and that of reformism in general, declined by 1909. In fact, the threat of strikes lingered throughout the era and talk of sabotage was in the air, though anarchists rather than *cheminots* were associated with such extreme methods of action. The *cheminots* generally had a reputation for moderation and professionalism even if sabotage might tempt some during a strike.[28] Preceding the Railway Strike of 1910, revolutionary influence on the cheminots was especially strong on the Northern line as the company increasingly resisted the growing demands of the workers. The government appeared to be concerned about the plight of workers by putting strict limits on the length of the workday, promoting the enforcement of the weekly day of rest, and applying the pension law. But the costs of the laws kept rising proportionally, and it seemed that railway prices would have to rise to keep pace. However, no government could risk such a policy or it would soon pay at the next elections. When the cost of living increased, new demands were made, especially after the Congress of the National Railway Union in 1909, but the Northern company opposed the demands by means of the standard tactic of using small scale concessions. "At the same time, the 'intensive' system of exploitation put in place by the company directors, whose goal was to save as much money as possible, led to an insupportable intensification of work for certain categories of employees."[29]

In this atmosphere revolutionary syndicalism grew and some reformists were radicalized. Guérard was assailed, accused of misappropriation of funds, and finally removed from power in an extraordinary Congress in December 1909 in favor of a collective direction. Another Congress in April 1910 voted for a general strike, created a "secret" strike committee involving workers from five major railway companies and two secondary ones, and totally modified the methods

of action. In this way the National Union of Railway Workers was becoming increasingly obstreperous. The latter congress also forged ties with the powerful *Fédération des Syndicats de Mécaniciens et Chauffeurs* [Federation of the Engineers and Drivers' Unions] which had 3000 members on the Northern line. The latter federation had an effective strength at least as great as the National Railway Union, so "the partisans of the strike knew very well that their success depended on train engineers and drivers. The non-retroactivity of the pension law of 1909 hurt the engineers of the Northern line much more than those from other lines. This furnished a perfect occasion to involve them in the strike."[30]

In the end it proved impossible to negotiate with the owners of the Northern line. Workers' demands centered on salaries, especially the lowest; a minimum monthly salary for all workers; cost of living salary increases; equal pay for equal work; the *repos hebdomadaire* for all workers; the non-retroactivity of the pension law; and working conditions.[31] The National Railway Union wanted the Minister of Public Works to intervene with the company, and such a role was hardly uncommon. After the company's refusal to discuss overall demands was made public on July 11, 1910, the administrative council of the union only waited six days before directing the strike committee to choose the best day "'to answer the moral injury which was made by the disdainful rejection by the Companies.'" However, an August 1910 Congress of the *Fédération des Syndicats de Mécaniciens et Chauffeurs* made it abundantly clear that the engineers were not ready to strike, except perhaps on the Northern line. Within the National Railway Union the views of the P-L-M, the P-O, and the Eastern lines were even more reserved. "The only hope for a general strike was to get it started on the Northern line to forge a movement for national solidarity."[32] In August partial strikes almost erupted on the P-L-M and Northern lines but they were successfully prevented by the National Railway Union. However, a one week strike involving 2000 workers did occur at Tergnier on the Northern line that same month.[33]

On September 20, 1910 the State line fired a union official named Renault who had published a brochure on syndicalism among the *cheminots* which alluded to sabotage, a forbidden topic for railway companies. Other dismissals occurred as well. "In order to protest against the dismissals, particularly that of Renault, thousands of *cheminots* gathered on Friday, October 7, 1910 at the Paris Bourse du Travail." In the next twenty-four hours skilled Parisian railway workers from La Chapelle and then Plaine-Saint Denis, decided to strike even though the National Union leaders and those of the Northern Company had not approved of these actions. On Saturday evening or early that Sunday morning, a meeting took place at Amiens which included syndicalists from the Northern line, the

National Union committee, the general strike committee, and militants from the Federation of Union Engineers and Drivers on the Northern line. "They decided to expand the strike and take advantage of that Sunday break to spread the movement. On Monday October 10, while new meetings were held in the capital, delegates from the Northern [line] gave the strike order, managing to send … a note to each group secretary in the Union of the Northern Company [which read]: 'The strike will be declared tomorrow morning, Tuesday October 11 at 8:00 a.m. Organize yourselves, and keep silent until that time.' The Parisians in the Northern [line] met on Monday evening at the *Salle de Grèves* of the Bourse du Travail. Despite a tedious screening process, they managed to have 3000 [union members there] according to the police." One of the most active union leaders on the Northern line, Émile Toffin, was not happy about the workers of La Chapelle launching the strike prematurely, but he realized that it was too late to stop now.[34] On Tuesday October 11, the National Strike Committee held a meeting even though many members were absent, including some of the most reformist. That gathering decided on a general strike, yet delegates of the Eastern network actually voiced their reservations. Nevertheless, the next day, Wednesday October 12, the revolutionaries managed to trigger an expansion of the strike into the Western network starting in Paris.[35]

Rumbling had been going on for some time throughout the Northern line, and now Parisian railway workers seemed to be "on board." The Northern engineers and drivers walked out that Monday night and early Tuesday, October 10–11, and they vowed to maintain the strike until all their demands were met (including payment for the days that they were on strike), regardless of whether other networks joined them, but they requested a general strike of all the railway lines of France. In the next few days the strike would spread to the Eastern line and the P-L-M. On Wednesday afternoon some 10,000 enthusiastic *cheminots* gathered at the Bourse du Travail. A few hours later the union members of the P-O line voted to strike. But not everyone was convinced, and many were worried that the strike was both adventuresome and risky. The syndicalists on the Eastern line, perhaps affected by an inherent patriotism associated with their proximity to the frontier, hesitated even though their Parisian groups had engaged in the strike. After getting "mixed signals" from leading socialists whom they consulted, the Eastern delegates overcame their reticence and began to distribute their strike orders by using autos. Altogether at least 45,000 *cheminots* were involved throughout France.[36]

Obviously, the government was worried about the possible spread of the strike, but it had not been inactive. In fact, the authorities had been ready since

June to deal with a railway strike. Decree after decree had been prepared for almost all eventualities. Syndicalist leaders who carried orders to striking *cheminots* were soon arrested, and their strike orders never arrived. French troops were ordered to occupy the railway switching posts, *dépôts*, and train stations. Already on Monday, October 10 military engineer recruits occupied the *dépôts* at La Chapelle and La Plaine. A notice of the military mobilization of the railway personnel on the Northern line was placed in the *Journal Officiel* on Wednesday, October 12, and mobilization orders for the other lines were enacted over the next two days. One can see the level of preparation and detail in the packets of police reports marked secret.[37] While the strike committee placed posters on the walls of Paris stressing the illegal aspects of the government's actions, Briand called the strike movement "purely insurrectional" and an "illegal enterprise." The government increasingly talked about a conspiracy. The police claimed to have encountered a metal worker and local union official at Nîmes armed with a loaded revolver, and they got one man to admit that he was ready to blow up the *pont de Avignon*. According to one union official, some 45,000 *cheminots* on the Eastern line sent their mobilization cards to Briand.[38]

From the outset the *cheminots* and their leaders knew that the government was contemplating a mobilization order applied to the strikers, but the unions said they would not honor such an order since it was illegal. Syndicalists assumed that a valid mobilization could only occur in order to transport troops and material for war. At least one union official claimed to have been assured that the government would never be so stupid as to mobilize the railway workers.[39] Socialist Deputy of the Seine, Jean Colly, also promised to interpellate Briand in the *Chambre* over the threat of mobilization. Most of the Left immediately assumed that the strike would expand and become a general strike despite the skepticism, hesitancy, and pessimism of many *cheminots*. Jean Jaurès stressed how the strike was spontaneous and professional and not a conspiracy aiming at revolution. Socialists had repeatedly warned the government about the trouble brewing and urged the companies to bargain with workers to satisfy their complaints. The suddenness of the decision by the *cheminots* on the Northern line was testimony to their anger and long simmering discontent over the cost of living, the length of the workday, salary issues, as well as the authoritarian and prickly attitude of the company's management. However, once the strike developed, allusions to the use of a railway strike to prevent war were made even by *L'Humanité*.[40]

Hervé had long had intimations of the event whose outcome would eventually destroy many of the naïve illusions of Hervéism. Rumblings among the railway workers were heard in 1909 at the time of the postal strikes. On September 19,

1909 a tribunal met at the Café Jules in which Hervé's ally, Alexandre Le Guennic, the new Secretary of the National Union of Railway Workers, accused Guérard of treasonous action and called for a campaign to dethrone him. At the end of October 1909, Guérard was banished from his own group in the Paris-Nord System, and he was accused of various treasonous actions including his failure to deliver promised union support for the May 1909 strike by postal workers. In December 1909 an extraordinary Congress of the National Union of Railway Workers pushed Guérard to resign. Ironically, his reasons for resignation would soon be echoed by Hervé in his growing frustration and disgust with the rivalries, discord, and personal antagonism that thwarted all his revolutionary efforts.[41]

In 1909 and 1910 Hervé was either intentionally silent or perhaps unaware that Guérard had once been an Allemanist and advocate of the general strike who had been associated with antipatriotism and internationalism as part of his activities for the railway workers dating back to the early 1890s, well before Hervé's ascendancy on the extreme French left.[42] In late March 1910 Hervé predicted the confrontation that would help to end his ingenuous insurrectional assumptions. With Guérard gone, Hervé hoped that a railway strike would occur soon. But because he still had faith in Briand's realism and moderation, he dismissed the minister's threats to the *cheminots* as a bluff.[43] The influence of *La Guerre Sociale* over the railway unions grew in the era following the 1909 Congress of Railway Workers and achieved its peak in the summer and early fall of 1910 according to Peyronnet, who also believed Hervéists played a major role in undermining Guérard. "From late 1909 until the end of 1910 the rubric dealing with syndicalism did not cease to grow in the paper. *La Guerre Sociale* supported railway workers' demands concerning the retroactivity of the law of July 1909 over retirement, the *repos hebdomadaire*, and the revaluation of wages."[44] Even the moderate *Le Temps* admitted that some demands by workers were worthy of consideration.[45]

After the 21st National Congress of the *Syndicat National* of railway workers voted to create a strike committee in April 1910, *La Guerre Sociale* wholeheartedly supported radicalized actions by railway workers. In June Hervé blamed a cautious and legalistic manner for the failure of a railway strike in southeast France. Unions there had allowed Briand and the government to scuttle the strike because the strikers were too meek to employ sabotage. At this time Hervé thought sabotage was the key to success. He foresaw a strike on the Northern System which he believed could lead to a great strike of all French railway workers. To support his views, Hervé mocked Briand for his altered views on a general strike and sabotage.[46] In July 1910 *La Guerre Sociale* announced that it knew Briand's exact plans to mobilize the railway workers in the event of a strike. The Hervéists bragged that

their information came from their spies at the War Ministry, but they ridiculed such plans.[47] In late August *La Guerre Sociale* advised the *cheminots* that the situation was ripe for a "delivery" if only certain deputies would stay away because they could lead to an "abortion."[48] More than a month before the strike erupted, *La Guerre Sociale* reproduced its own phony and/or stolen mobilization orders every week for a month, claiming to have obtained the orders clandestinely from the Ministry of War. The Hervéists apparently intended to fill out these orders and send them to the *cheminots* in order to sabotage the expected mobilization.[49]

Peyronnet argued that Hervé's influence on the *cheminots* and the growing role of La *Guerre Sociale* in the working class movement were illustrated by a wildcat strike at Tergnier in mid-August 1910. Because a partial strike could have harmed the preparations for a general strike, Hervé demanded that these "wildcat" strikers return to work, effectively cautioning against impulsive actions by railway workers. Such a sense of responsibility was not usually characteristic of Hervéism. Peyronnet described the *Comité Central*, formed to promote a railway strike, as divided between overcautious, fearful leaders and optimistic, audacious ones supported by *La Guerre Sociale*. Hervé's newspaper had become the principal voice of the Central Committee advocating a railway strike in Peyronnet's view. In mid-September after the Hervéist *hebdomadaire* learned that reformists on the Eastern Railway Network wanted to postpone the strike, the paper immediately "blew the whistle" on this potential "treason."[50] Whatever the extent of Hervéist influence on and cooperation with the railway union leadership in 1910, it never amounted to an ascendancy over the entire C.G.T. One of the most striking things about much recent scholarship dealing with the Railroad Strike of 1910 is the lack of stress on the Hervéist role.

Whatever restraint *La Guerre Sociale* had shown during the spontaneous strike at Tergnier in August 1910, the Hervéists were soon impatient. They worried that the railway unions might wait too long and lose their enthusiasm. They also feared that division among the various railway unions as well as parliamentary phrasemaking would prevent a massive strike.[51] With tensions running high in mid-September, Victor Méric satirized Briand as a sybarite who simply replaced the general strike with personal revelry as his favored revolutionary tactic. Inebriation, gluttony, and debauchery were listed as the minister's newest tactics to bring down the Republic.[52] In late September, Hervé mockingly admitted that Briand may not have created social peace but at least his actions had helped to end workers' complacency and cowardice.[53] Through late summer and early fall Hervé's articles alluded to the assassination of government leaders as a just response to the execution of working class soldiers. Yet on the eve of the railway strike, he reiterated his

calls to militants to avoid any sabotage that endangered human life.[54] Were such expressions simply mixed messages, signs of confusion, or perhaps cynically clever means to sell newspapers? Undoubtedly no single explanation or motivation can suffice.

Certainly the police never underestimated the role played by Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale*, and they were under no illusions about Hervéist restraint in dealing with railway workers and strike actions. In a police report dated August 9, 1910, officials commented on the sagacity of the men at *La Guerre Sociale* in skirting the letter of the law on criminal associations by sending insurrectional groups articles cut from the newspaper underlining key passages in red which incited acts of sabotage. "'There you have it, where Hervé showed himself to be very clever', the *Surêté* noted, 'these groups … only follow his advice. And since that advice is not punished for having been given, *La Guerre Sociale*, innocent and unpunished, makes fun of the entire judicial apparatus.'"[55] The police thought they knew most of the dangerous revolutionaries who were supposedly members of the *organisations de combat* living in Paris, and they compiled lists. What seemed more troubling to the police was the progress that such "revolutionary gangrene" was having in the provinces.[56] One young conscript from the Nièvre named Louis Lecoin refused to march against the railway workers. He would soon tell a *Conseil de Guerre* that he was simply following his conscience. His reward for acting on his own ideals was six months in prison. In *La Guerre Sociale* Hervé eventually called Lecoin's action "the heroic gesture of the little *Pioupiou* de France". That young, unknown and isolated soldier thus began a long career of disobedience and struggle against wars and imprisonment which soon led to disillusionment with Hervé and eventually to an attempt to assassinate him during World War I.[57] In October 1910 the police listed those departments in which they had information concerning the existence of revolutionary action groups with assumed close ties to *La Guerre Sociale*. Thirty four departments were cited with the most active being the Yonne, the Nord, the Somme, and the Aisne. Presumably Paris was the dangerous center, with the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* in the middle of the web.[58] Perhaps the police believed that *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* were the instigators of the railway strike because the leadership of the C.G.T. did not support it fully. At least one police report claimed that the strike demands were a mere pretext for revolution.[59]

The Hervéists had impatiently awaited the railway strike because they saw it as the prelude to a general strike which would presumably spread among all the unions of France. Even though talk about a general strike grew after 1897, most *cheminots*, even among the leadership, did not think like that.[60] Jonathan

Almosnino described the railway strike as a new occasion for the *organisation de combat* to intervene in the working class movement through its advocacy of sabotage. *La Guerre Sociale* hoped to take advantage of the situation by appearing daily throughout the strike. In fact, at the beginning of the strike, one article called for "war to the bitter end, war without mercy and without pity, *la véritable guerre sociale*!" The paper not only supported the strike and called for its spread, it enthusiastically advised the employment of sabotage.[61] During the strike and continuing after, many acts of sabotage were reported and received firm support from the *organisation de combat* as depicted in articles in Hervé's newspaper. Police reports verifying destruction of railway material and telegraph lines piled up. From October 1910 until June 25, 1911, the police "enumerated 2908 cases of sabotage of telegraph lines, 2634 lines cut, 32 telegraph poles completely severed. By means of confidential circulars, the *organisation de combat* advised its militants to privilege the sabotage of communications rather than railway lines in order to avoid eventual accidents which could turn public opinion against it." Although Almosnino admits that it is impossible "to know exactly what responsibility the *organisation de combat*" had in the incidents of sabotage, he cites police records for each department which assumed the existence of a close correlation between the locations of revolutionary groups and the places where sabotage occurred. The Hervéists "worried themselves very little over the effects of their actions on the workers' strikes themselves. Thus … on October 15, 1910, the *organisation de combat* announced 'that sabotage would take place even without the knowledge of the *cheminots*.'" For Almosnino such tactics were not meant to lead the struggling workers but to profit from their strike to command a good many acts of sabotage which might, in the end, actually prove to be counter-productive.[62]

Once the strike began police fears about the influence of *La Guerre Sociale* on the *cheminots* did not lessen. In fact, the police were certain that the Hervéist weekly was behind much of the sabotage. François Caron cited an episode in Tergnier where "a running locomotive was abandoned by its engineer, provoking a serious accident affecting railway material. According to the Prefecture of Police, *La Guerre Sociale* had 2000 readers in Tergnier. The entire working class milieu of the city seemed especially receptive to revolutionary syndicalism." However, Caron recognized that all parties, including the police, had their own biases and agendas, so you had to treat all reports and evidence skeptically.[63] In his general history of the era before the war Caron seemed to take the Hervéist calls for sabotage seriously, yet he also alludes to the police use of *provocateurs*.[64] The French government explained the sabotage that occurred as due to a dangerous Hervéist conspiracy that was unfolding. One could say that from the government's perspective, the ultimate

blame for the arrests and resulting prison sentences along with the concomitant revocations rested with Hervé and his acolytes.[65] It is ironic that many of the police reports in the first half of 1910 stressed the absolute disunity and discord within the extreme Left and predicted a new wave of individual terrorism following the failure of reformism. The railway strike both contradicted and confirmed certain observations at various levels of the police information gathering apparatus.[66]

In hindsight, the campaign of *La Guerre Sociale* at the time of the railroad strike looks like "the last hand of a compulsive gambler." Perhaps Hervé saw the strike as a chance to ignite the revolution or perhaps frustration was already building regarding his continuing failure to unite revolutionaries. The paper came out daily starting on the evening of Tuesday October 11. Its seven consecutive issues were "among the best of all those that had ever appeared."[67] When the majority of the railway workers of the Northern System joined those from the *dépôts* at La Chapelle and the Plaine-Saint-Denis, Hervé called on the railwaymen of all the other systems to join them.[68] He believed that if all French railway workers struck, not even the entire army would suffice to guard the railroads, the telegraph lines, and the telephone wires.[69] Although he had been in prison since March, Hervé's articles during the strike initially included up-to-date reports on the events. Far from losing control of the paper by that time, Hervé seemed to be firmly in charge until Briand attacked him directly.

Once the government discovered an "Hervéist plot" behind the strike and uncovered the role of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé was removed from La Santé's section for political prisoners and placed in a cell for common criminals.[70] Until his isolation ended, it is unclear whether Hervé was able to send another article to *La Guerre Sociale*. Certainly, the tenor of the articles signed *Un Sans Patrie* did not change. On October 12 *Un Sans Patrie* (Hervé?) congratulated the *Ouest-État* system for joining the strike, but he impatiently awaited actions by other networks. This was a time for audacity not prudence because he believed that to strike now on all railways would scatter the forces of repression and guarantee success. Though *Un Sans Patrie* justified his attacks on the government with references to social war, his comparison of the strike to the Franco-Prussian War may have seemed like a mixed message even then![71] The letter to Briand from *Un Sans Patrie* which appeared on October 14 may have been written by Hervé before the government's repressive policies were enacted. His second letter sarcastically reminded the *Président du Conseil* that his former ideas on general strike were finally being implemented. Actions by the workers in the construction and electrical industries, as well as the Parisian Metro, gave *La Guerre Sociale* hope that this strike would fulfill Briand's former program. *Un Sans Patrie* also expressed the

hope that some of the police would join the strike. The conclusion of the letter threatened Briand with lynching from a telegraph pole on the day of revolution![72]

After his prison status changed, Xavier Guichard, Lépine's chief assistant, personally searched him and charged him with complicity in the "illegal" strike. After complaining about his altered conditions which he described as virtually solitary confinement, Hervé eventually threatened a hunger strike if he were not returned to the section for political prisoners within forty-eight hours.[73] He then addressed the prison director using his newspaper's letter heading, and somehow managed to get the letter's contents outside the prison. Almost immediately Parisian newspapers were cognizant of the *perquisition* which took place in his cell. Though *L'Humanité* was bothered by the police actions, *Le Matin* was amused. Eventually Hervé's attorney, Jacques Bonzon, addressed his client's complaints to the press. *Le Journal* published Bonzon's letter to Briand informing him about Hervé placement in the section of common criminals, as well as the denial of visits and communications with his attorney. On October 19 *L'Humanité* published the letter cited below which Hervé had finally managed to get to Bonzon. This letter can be taken as an example of the various letters and communications going on between Hervé, his attorney, and Briand. After complaining of returned letters, passages deleted, and placement in the section for common criminals. Hervé continued:[74]

> "Here is my regimen: as living quarters, a common criminal's cell. I am number 1 of the 8th section. For food, soup and a plate of meat at noon, ratatouille for supper. That's just what I had in the sections for political prisoners. So I am happy with it, you know. For exercise, a bear's den in stone, three meters in width, eight to nine in length. Enclosed on three sides by walls four meters high and bars [on the other wall]. I go there in the afternoons for two or three hours. This is the best time of the day. I did not get any sun for the five months when I was at the courtyard for the political prisoners which is on the north. At least, in my bear cage, which has an open roof, you can feel its warmth. That is always something when taking on the enemy. I am ready to do four years of this regimen, and even a few years more, if I can help the *cheminots* conquer their five francs a day wages. My health is perfect. I have never been so happy, so content with myself and those close to me. I am biding my time to send his Excellency the Minister of the Interior a humble and meek request very respectfully asking him to do me the favor of understanding my point of view in his legal proceedings. I have all the rights to it. With affection, G. Hervé"[75]

Briand himself disagreed with Hervé's earlier accounts and had already sent a letter to the press explaining that the Insurrectional leader had all the privileges of a political prisoner except the right to communicate with the exterior, a privilege that Hervé had abused up until then by promoting sabotage and giving detailed advice to the strike organizers. *L'Humanité* accused Briand of lying about Hervé's

status and claimed that all of his letters, including those to his attorney, had been returned. The incarcerated editor-in-chief of *La Guerre Sociale* was in the section for common criminals at La Santé, but this latest letter had somehow managed to get out and enabled everyone to see what a liar Briand was according to the socialist daily.[76]

Throughout the strike *La Guerre Sociale* had a double message for strikers. (1) They should not be fooled by the lies of the bourgeois press, which wanted to break the strike by false reports because it was acting in support of the government and finance interests. (2) The railway workers must imitate the sabotage employed by the P.T.T. workers in 1909, and they should expand the strike. Throughout the strike, beneath headlines dealing with the actions of *Bons Bougres*, the paper included articles signed by *Mam'zelle Cisaille* which gave notices regarding the mysterious *organisation de combat*, supposedly responsible for the sabotage. The paper was unrelenting in its attacks on Briand, often employing insulting caricatures. Imagine a sybaritic Briand at a table full of food and bottles of wine, smoking a cigar with a beautiful woman at his side, asking the Prefect of Police the following question: "And what about this conspiracy … do you have any proof?" To which the Prefect, standing with hat in hand proclaims: "More than is necessary; amidst all the perquisitions they found all your old speeches."[77]

L'Humanité reported that the railway company was protecting itself from sabotage even before the strike began.[78] Perhaps acts of sabotage were initially instigated in part due to the increasingly common knowledge that Briand planned to militarize the strike by calling up reservist railway workers under terms of the military law of June 9, 1837. That law punished draft evasion by a prison term of up to one year.[79] Although this law gave workers 15 days to report, Briand did not follow the law's directive in that regard. As Jaurès stated, "A ministry which did not have to pardon propaganda for the general strike by its own chief would have displayed more calm and restraint." Throughout the strike *L'Humanité* argued that the strike was not illegal because the Clemenceau government had already recognized such a right by state workers. The socialist daily also argued that the people sympathized with the strikers despite government efforts to terrify them and the hysterical responses by most of the Parisian press.[80]

Facing an event of such magnitude, Caron argued that "the personnel directing the Company were completely horrified. The event was without precedent."[81] Company officials had known that a strike was certainly possible and they prepared their reactions carefully while they waited. In fact, the company prepared their reactions far more carefully than the syndicalists had planned the strike itself. Though the company preparations might have handled a partial or limited

movement, they were drastically insufficient to deal with what actually happened. From the very beginning of the strike on Tuesday the 11th, the Ministry, despite the hesitation of certain Radical Socialist ministers, "decided on an immediate mobilization of the railway workers 'for a period of instruction lasting 21 days.'" By the 12th workers were already being fired. From then on strikers faced three major threats: (1) that of a military sanction if they did not respond to the call for mobilization, (2) that of professional sanction, such as being fired or, at least theoretically, demoted, and (3) that of a penal sanction either for violating the right to freedom to work or for all infractions falling under the Law of July 15, 1845 which dealt with the railway police. As noted above, both the strike committee and the socialist daily had assumed that by law workers were allowed fifteen days to respond to peacetime mobilization orders.[82]



Figure 23. The Railway Strike of October 1910. Bnf.

The massive nature of the strike led the company to proceed with caution. Railroad executives instructed their subordinates to carefully select workers to be sanctioned and to avoid mass firings. The company wanted to make certain that any dismissals took account of "the past history of the employee." Employees having displayed recalcitrant attitudes and subversive actions in the past were singled

out. The company also wanted dismissed workers to be given a formal demand to return to work at a certain hour and location in order to corroborate any decisions taken. In the meantime, at some volatile locales the company offered promotions to *cheminots* who chose not join the movement.[83] Hundreds of *cheminots* were going to be arrested, even though the pretexts were not always very convincing. Eventually 163 of those arrested received prison sentences, mostly for violating freedom to work laws. Three-fourths of those arrested and then put on trial came for the Ouest-État and the Northern lines. Government preparations and repression as well as harsh measures by the railway companies proved effective. Certainly, far too many *cheminots* conformed to the law for the strike to succeed. In fact, the strike was a minority movement. It engaged less than one-third of all railway workers, and not one railway line had a majority of *cheminots* on strike.[84] With the large deployment of troops and the growing numbers of *cheminots* sanctioned, the measures to curtail the strike were proving to be effective. From October 12 and 13, the strike made little progress on the Northern network, and workers started returning to their jobs by the evening of October 13. "Paris was even able to send more trains than it had on October 12. The number of violent incidents dropped slightly."[85]

This stagnation of the strike and the beginning of a resumption of normal operations are easy to understand. To respond to the company's intimidation and repression, the strike would have had to expand on all the networks. In fact, that did not happen. When the strike erupted, many leaders of the railway union were in Toulouse at the C.G.T. Congress. The reformists' reactions were generally very unfavorable. One leader, who was still in Toulouse, called the strike "inopportune". Some militants thought it best to localize the movement by maintaining it only on the Northern network. Most leaders in the National Union and the C.G.T. simply wanted to "wash their hands" of the entire situation.[86] Despite *Un Sans Patrie's* bravura and *L'Humanité's* apparent optimism during the strike, the results were meager on most lines. The decision by railway union leaders on the Eastern network to strike was largely based on resignation. Since they waited until nightfall to publish their communiqué and send out orders, the *gendarmerie* intercepted their messages at their leisure. The P.L.M. representatives also voted for the strike but "without great enthusiasm." In many other areas the strike reception "was strictly selective, limited, and tardy." When *L'Humanité* published the title "*Le Déclenchemente du P.-L.-M. et de l'Est*" on the front page of its October 14 issue, such a title was simply "a desperate attempt to restart a failed movement."[87]

In the *Socialist Standard* in November 1910, F.C. Watts complained that the C.G.T. had limited itself to fairly weak gestures of solidarity such as the publication

of a poster on Thursday October 13 entitled "*Bravo les Cheminots*". Strike activities in other industries had long been brewing, and they came to a climax during the railway strike, but to no avail. Solidarity strikes by the navvies [*terrassiers*] and the electricians meant little because many strikers were immediately replaced by military engineers. At one point most of the important generating stations around Paris had to be manned by soldiers, but that had little effect on the course of the strike. In fact, the general strike in the building trades was quickly aborted when those strikers heard about the resumption of work by the *cheminots.*[88] By then the railway strike movement had been taken in hand by the socialists. "On [Thursday] October 13, the members of the first Strike Committee were arrested in the offices of *L'Humanité*. The second Committee was, in fact, entirely in the hands of the socialists."[89]

The first Strike Committee was arrested at the socialist daily's offices, where they had spent the night awaiting the arrival of the police. Also arrested there were the editors of *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale*, the union leaders' attorneys, and various socialist deputies.[90] Prior to the arrests, Louis Perceau, expecting to be arrested at any moment, fled his newspaper office, avoided his residence, and hid, leaving Victor Méric virtually alone at *La Guerre Sociale*. Méric's lively account of the police raid on *L'Humanité* that night is worth repeating. "I was alone at the paper which was then appearing daily, and I managed for better or worse to get through things with the help of Père Peinard (Émile Pouget). One night our comrades from *L'Humanité* informed us that the government intended to arrest the main leaders and that they had decided to put them up in the newspaper's offices. Here, everybody waited for the police." Méric recalls waiting with several other non-insurrectional socialists at the Café du Croissant on the Rue Montmartre when the word came that it was time to head to the offices of *L'Humanité*. After some confusion and effronteries related to the lack of space at the newspaper offices and the lack of fellowship among the various socialist tendencies, Méric was allowed to pass that Thursday night with Jaurès, Vaillant, Pierre Renaudel, Albert Thomas, and other socialists as well as several strike leaders including Bidamant, Le Guennic, and a few others, playing cards, getting bored, and sleeping among the assorted militants. Jules Guesde, who was not exactly a friend of Jaurès and who had little love for *L'Humanité* or its staff, refused to show up at such a comedy. When Prefect of Police Lépine arrived with his agents later that night, he and Vaillant exchanged a few unpleasantries. The conclusion of Méric's account was that the leaders of the *cheminots* were arrested and Vaillant never got to finish his comments to the Prefect of Police.[91]

Earlier that day *La Guerre Sociale* maintained an apparent optimism and confrontational air because the lead editorial was a letter to *Briand-la-Gaffe* (Briand, the first order blunderer) by *Un Sans Patrie* (Hervé?) which ridiculed the mobilization of railway workers as an act more stupid than Clemenceau could have devised. The writer argued that such an action could not end sabotage because most saboteurs were not railway workers.[92] The police assumed that *La Guerre Sociale* controlled the sabotage campaign throughout most of France. As has been seen above, throughout the period from 1908 until 1911, the police assumed that Hervé, his newspaper, and their *organisation de combat* were at the center of a dangerous conspiracy involving other anarchists and syndicalists in a vast and intricate "*Association des Malfaiteurs*." The sabotage campaign could only enhance that evolving assessment. That was why the police sought to arrest as many of Hervé's associates as possible during the strike. The police "particularly suspected Miguel Almereyda of being the head of the *organisation de combat*. Operating clandestinely, it is rather difficult to know his actual involvement in the railway strike. A few years later police reports alleged that he had travelled to Clermont-Fernand, as a carrier of dynamite and wirecutters." In order to short circuit any activities by Hervéists on behalf of the *cheminots*, the machinery of French justice "started legal proceedings against them a few days after the beginning of the strike and the first verified acts of sabotage."[93]

On Friday October 14 a Second Strike Committee replaced those arrested and two searches were made at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* at 2:00 and 6:00 p.m. by Guichard and a dozen agents of the Parisian *Sûreté*.[94] Calls for sabotage and continuing references to the mysterious *organisation de combat* by *La Guerre Sociale* led the government to continue claiming that Hervé's newspaper was directing the strike as well as the acts of sabotage. Issues of *La Guerre Sociale* found at sabotage sites on the Northern line "proved" to the police that the paper was acting as a voice of the Strike Committee. Almereyda and Merle, the administrator at *La Guerre Sociale*, had been arrested a few minutes apart the prior evening for articles provoking sabotage and conspiracy against the government, and they were placed in preventive detention at La Santé under the regime for common criminals.[95] The following day their domiciles were searched. Other leading contributors to *La Guerre Sociale* were sought and their living quarters, too, were searched. Hervé believed that the government was seeking to destroy his newspaper, but true to his promises, another team of journalists was ready to keep the paper going.[96]

Even though the police arrested both Merle and Almereyda, the authorities were unable to ascertain whether either man had anything to do with the damage

being done by the acts of sabotage. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice instituted legal proceedings based on the numerous incitements in favor of sabotage which had appeared in *La Guerre Sociale* since the beginning of the strike.[97] However, those articles calling for sabotage were unsigned, and according to the 1881 French law on freedom of the press, only the author of an illicit article along with the editorial manager could be tried for a press violation. Neither Merle nor Almereyda fit the letter of the law in terms of their capacities at *La Guerre Sociale*. They were arrested simply as paid members of the newspaper's staff. Such procedures did not quite fit the generally accepted standards of legality. For *La Guerre Sociale* it was "… as plain as the nose on your face, that the presiding judge got the order to lock up our friends at the peak of battle as a measure of national security." When Almereyda confronted the judge, he pointed out the defective procedure but admitted that the incriminating articles corresponded to his own ideas. He even seemed to be proud that he was the first editorial secretary who had been accused of an illicit action in such a fashion under the 1881 law. While he waited to be tried, Almereyda remained at La Santé along with Merle in the section for common criminals. Their efforts to get provisional release or at least to be treated as political prisoners "fell on deaf ears." After some forty days, Almereyda wrote the *President du Conseil* a scathing letter reminding him of his treason to the working class and his selling out to the system of power. The jailed journalist then threatened to begin a hunger strike if he were not granted political prisoner status. A general outcry on his and Merle's behalf by members of the press spanning the political spectrum cut short their hunger strike and got them sent to the political section where they rejoined Hervé. Nevertheless, press agitation failed to get them released from prison. Their dossiers were eventually sent to the Court of Assizes for complicity in the sabotage campaign during the strike. Only the coming of the Monis Ministry got the two men released in March 1911, along with several other militants in similar situations. Needless to say, *Le Sans Patrie* remained incarcerated. By the time Hervé's two colleagues were released, "the *organisation de combat* was no longer news", and Almereyda was almost immediately engaged in even more sensational and seemingly conspiratorial organizations.[98]

While Hervé and the staff of *La Guerre Sociale* dealt with the various governmental, police, and prison authorities, the events in the railway strike continued on inexorably, almost as if all the talk of sabotage and conspiracy were purely a sideshow. On Friday, October 14 the resumption of work increased on the Northern network with half the trains available and two-thirds of the railway tracks open. Caron argued that organized acts, such as sabotage, had a tendency to decrease as the strike faded, but that acts of anger, born of exasperation, increased.

The attacks on scabs [*la chasse aux renards*] became increasingly violent. That same day the Strike Committee tried unsuccessfully to open negotiations with the companies, hoping to get Briand to arbitrate. Whatever Hervé, *La Guerre Sociale*, and the revolutionary syndicalists may have had in mind, the leadership of the *cheminots* wanted the public to realize that the strike was not political and, in fact, had corporative and non-revolutionary goals. At about the same time, leaders from the owners' Union of Mining and Metallurgical Industries (*Union des Industries Minières et Métallurgiques*) appealed to Briand, urgently requesting him not to pressure the companies to negotiate.[99]

That Friday evening, in the aftermath of the previous night's arrests,[100] an overflowing crowd of over 8000 *cheminots* and socialists gathered at the Manège Saint Paul in support of the strike. The fact that Hervé was named honorary President of the meeting seems significant. Undoubtedly the police actions against Hervé and the activism of *La Guerre Sociale* during the strike were considered important by many of those involved in the events. But the speeches at the Manège Saint Paul made few references to Hervé or his Insurrectional colleagues. Though the strike may have been fading and most of the *cheminots* may have been overwhelmingly non-revolutionary, the meeting witnessed some contrary trends. There was a bit of a disjunction between socialist arguments by leaders like Vaillant who stressed the economic, professional, and non-revolutionary goals of the strike and the responses of strike leaders like Communay, a member of both the National Union and the Strike Committee, who appeared to go beyond Vaillant and beyond reformism by saying that future strikes could well become important means to prevent a mobilization in time of war.[101]

On Saturday and Sunday, October 15 and 16, while the railway companies and the Minister of the Interior recorded "a perceptible improvement" in the situation, *L'Humanité* continued to report that "the strike was spreading on all the lines", without being able to provide any supporting evidence for its optimism other than a few isolated details. That Saturday *Un Sans Patrie* compared himself to Phoenix and Proteus. No matter how Briand dealt with Hervé, *Un Sans Patrie* would always be there. The author mocked Briand as an everlasting revolutionary because he had turned moderate corporate demands into a general strike. However, the same article implicitly recognized the possibility of the strike's collapse by postulating positive repercussions for the future social revolution following such a display of proletarian strength—in other words, a moral victory.[102] Even though the situation had become increasingly aggravated where the strike had been the most intense, the overall strike prospects were declining irreparably. Meanwhile, Briand rejected all opportunities to respond to the socialist deputies' requests

that he open negotiations over the fading strike. On Sunday Briand declared the strike to be over, yet the Strike Committee denied this and called for a great rally on Monday morning October 17 at Lake Daumesnil in the Bois de Vincennes, which Briand thereupon banned. By then, the Strike Committee had to face the facts, which it did by ordering a return to work.[103]

Meanwhile, *La Guerre Sociale* ridiculed Briand's idea of a plot centering on the Hervéist weekly. The author compared Briand to Clemenceau and accused him of frightening the bourgeoisie in order to make himself seem indispensable. The article also accused the police of planting bombs and "discovering" foreign intervention in the strike. The attacks on Briand and his conspiracy theory were a bit disingenuous because the Hervéists obviously reveled in their growing notoriety. *La Guerre Sociale* called the plot idea farcical, but it did not deny the existence of an *organisation de combat.* Somehow the Insurrectionals advocated sabotage and advertised a conspiracy, yet almost seemed to refuse to accept their responsibility or ridiculed the accusations. The ubiquitous *Sans Patrie* was heartened that governmental assaults on *La Guerre Sociale* had not prevented the strike from continuing. He promised that as long as the present society remained in place, there would be strikes, sabotage, assassinations, revolts, and *organisations de combat.*[104] However, despite the best efforts of *La Guerre Sociale*, the railway strike was over in less than a week.[105]

Almost everyone had been surprised by the speed with which the strike spread, but it stalled fairly quickly, and then slowly faded. Though Caron argued that the vigor and firmness of the government and companies played a major role in the failure, he also admitted that their responses and the eventual collapse of the strike could have been predicted. The strike had been poorly planned from the start, with "panic and disorder" especially on the Northern and Western networks. However, he argued that if it would have been necessary to wait for revolutionary militants to organize effectively before launching the strike, it would never have occurred in the first place. In fact, the "revolutionary" minority had done nothing to create a "formidable organization" before the strike. "The 'revolutionary' minority of the union counted excessively on the creative force of action; the reformist majority had totally underestimated the creative force of words."[106]

Statistics supplied by Caron indicate that the strike involved established workers with actual grievances rather than "outside agitators" or "youthful and less grounded workers." The often middle-age strikers ran great risks by their actions at a time in their lives when they might easily have hesitated to jeopardize their established positions. In fact, the majority of the fired workers did not seem to have experienced serious problems in finding new employment. One year later,

90% of the agents who lost their jobs due to strike activities had "found a situation in commerce or industry". It was certainly easier for qualified workers at the *ateliers* to find jobs than for the less qualified workers in operations, but the lack of available manpower meant that the situation was not as dire as it might have been. The good job market itself may have affected the decision to strike. Of course, risking one's job was more likely once the ties to one's *métier* or to one's employer were weakened. If we recall that the principal demands of the strikers involved salaries which kept up with the cost of living and problems associated with working conditions, often exacerbated by the effects of the "system of intensive exploitation," such factors help us to understand why the Northern line was "more receptive to the call for a strike than the other networks, where the level of traffic was weaker and the methods of exploitation different."[107] The Railway Strike of 1910 saw the disintegration of the principles which defined traditional employer and employee relations. The authoritarian and paternalistic assumptions of the 19th century were undermined. Because those principles formed a coherent and indivisible ensemble, their disappearance was likely to arise from a trial of force. The rupture in traditional labor relations "… was produced on the Northern line in 1910, ten years before the other lines, because the system on the Northern [line] was more authoritarian than paternalistic, more constraining than protective."[108]

Even though most historians argue that revolutionary syndicalism was echoed among the working class masses, Caron documents how the *cheminot* strikers in 1910 did not fit such a pattern. The reformists followed the revolutionaries grudgingly in order to save the union and due to syndical discipline. "The revolutionaries had utilized the institution that they had penetrated to force the hand of the reformists who only followed them to save it. Most union members had been attracted [to syndicalism] by the reformists and the socialists. They had been used by the revolutionary syndicalists. In that can be located the secret of this 'failed' strike which in fact succeeded." The strike illustrates how "the methods of direct action and its verbal violence drove a great number of militants away from the [syndicalist] movement and contributed to the premature return to work by some of them among the engineers, drivers, and the workers in the *ateliers*." Agents of the Prefecture of Police and many company officials themselves used such arguments concerning excess and violence by the strikers to explain the quick return to work by some *cheminots*.[109]

On October 19, 1910 La *Guerre Sociale* along with *Le Soleil* published an apparently captured document which described various means which the companies and the government intended to use to defeat the strike. Among the examples cited by the Hervéists was a police report planted with a press agency concerning

handguns and clubs purchased by the strikers when, in fact, they knew that the purchase had been made by the Bank of France. Caron believed that the false story was meant divide the *cheminots* rather than frighten the bourgeoisie. Like the Hervéists themselves, Caron did not doubt that the government and companies used their own counter-subversive means to stop the strike, including bombs, conspiracy, and acts of sabotage by *provocateurs* instigated by the police.[110] The men in official positions had four means to deal with the strike. (1) The first included the aforementioned counter-subversive means. The other means entailed various arguments: (2) arguments from authority (intimidation both direct and indirect), (3) arguments based on reason (the incoherence of a divided movement—using false reports on the return to work or hiring substitutes at any price), and (4) paternalistic as well as sentimental arguments and arguments of honor, in other words, persuasion.[111] Sabotage simply played into the company and government's hands by making some strikers appear to be dangerous terrorists who frightened even fellow strikers. Caron saw the 1910 strike and its aftermath in terms of an adaptation of syndical ideology to realistic aspirations by ordinary workers which meant that the syndical movement was accommodating to the republican political game, akin to arguments posed by James R. Lehning and Paul B. Miller's about the accommodation to electoral politics by apparently or formerly revolutionary groups.[112]

For antimilitarists one of the most interesting rhetorical devices employed by company and government officials must have been their use of the mobilization of the *cheminots* to create an analogy between obedience to company bosses and fidelity to one's country. The striker was a kind of *insoumis* who became a traitor. Some bulletins drafted by the various bosses and company officials employed rhetoric associated with war, battle, and heroism in which "faithful" agents needed to hold out against "dastardly" forces. The experience of military discipline, personal ties between bosses and their subordinates, and advancements, almost solely based on the opinions of bosses, characterized the work experience on the railways more than in other industries. Other reasons why the railways were different included the exacting nature of the work and the demands for security. "This authoritarian-paternalistic system could only be replaced by an organization of career guarantees … and the creation of institutions permitting permanent negotiations."[113] For Caron, "The strike of 1910 was, in fact, a necessary stage toward a system in which owner and union representatives were able to discuss as equals, and in which the chief competence of management was no longer authority but rationalization."[114]

In the course of the debate on the mobilization order, Briand used words which angered much of the Left, especially the extreme Left. The famous speech

he gave as reported in the *Journal Officiel* does not convey the impression given to the Left at the time. "One right is superior to all the others," Briand stated. "It is the right of a national collectivity to live in independence and in pride. But a country cannot leave its frontiers open; no, that isn't possible. And I'm going to say something, *Messieurs*, that will probably make you rise up in wrath; if, to defend the nation's existence, the government had been unable to find, in the law, a way to remain master of its frontiers, if it had not been able to use its railroads for that purpose, that is to say an essential instrument of national defense, well then, even if it had to resort to illegality, it would have taken that step …" Paul-Boncour wondered whether Briand had added the word "if" to the official record, because at the time, no one seemed to notice. Certainly, France was not under attack in 1910.

> "One only remembered that from the lips of the man who, at one time in his career, had been the propagandist of the General Strike, had come an appeal for 'illegality'. From the Left, shouts of 'Dictator!' 'Resign!' Painlevé, who had entered Parliament with me a year ago, and later became one of Briand's ministers and his President of the Council, now made a maiden speech in which he impassionedly asked Briand 'since when he had discovered there was a Nation!' And a former attorney-general of the High Court of Appeals, M. Cruppi, who had since become a deputy and a minister, cried out, 'It's abominable!'"

When Briand could not make himself heard, he spoke directly to the stenographers and that is what went into the official record! For Paul-Boncour, Briand was still true to his principles in the long run since "he merely waltzed once with Reaction. It [Reaction] has always had a taste for seducing and utilizing those who come from elsewhere, instead of seeking in its own ranks, where they are by no means lacking, men capable of leading it into battle, if not to victory."[115] Two days later Briand's ministry fell, only to be replaced by another Briand ministry. "One could never hold out for long against the attacks of the Left."[116]

Contemporary observers and later scholars had various explanations and interpretations for the "failure" of the October 1910 Railway Strike. Just after the strike collapsed, most men on the Left thought it was a major failure and a tragic mistake, and they did not hesitate to assign blame. Even though Hervé and his associates had been at the forefront in support of the strike and relentlessly encouraged sabotage to support it, they reacted to the end of the strike with initial disbelief, hesitation, and then admissions of failure, constant tergiversations, and blame, all somehow blending into a renewed faith in the power of the working class to create a revolution. Similar equivocal interpretations of the strike were often embodied in the rhetoric of other commentators at that time. Writing in the strike aftermath, F.C.

Watts found mixed lessons. He admitted that the strike was poorly planned and "it cannot be denied that the use of the soldiery to guard and run trains, together with the mobilization order and the lies of the Press, considerably discouraged the strikers." Nevertheless, for Watts: "The strike has been a splendid demonstration and will doubtless not be entirely in vain. Few, in fact, expected the movement to assume the proportions it did; but weak organization and lack of resources told their sad tale in a steady weakening of the strikers' position."[117]

Despite their differing perspectives, two prominent French witnesses, overtly or covertly, hedged their reactions to the strike. On October 16, 1910 Jean Jaurès wrote that "it was not possible to consider as conquered a working class which came to give such a great proof of force." Such a position makes some sense if one takes a long term perspective.[118] One reason Jaurès was so confident about the impact of the strike was because it caused so much fear at the time. Writing just after the strike, conservative economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu argued: "These events were more grave and troubling than anything seen since 1871." In fact, he called for the banning of the C.G.T. and the closing of the *Bourses du Travail.*[119]

The French police had their own ideas about the lukewarm attitudes of railway worker on the eve of the strike. According to the police: (1) French railway workers had a privileged position even though some of them were paid very poorly. They did not have to perform their military service; received sick leave at full or half pay; received free medical care; and got free railway travel. The regularity of their salaries and the certainty of a retirement pension distinguished railway workers from other French workers and made them hesitate to act in any way which could lead to a loss of their advantages. (2) The strict recruitment methods of railway workers as well as the necessary discipline that came with such work meant a less rapid diffusion of revolutionary ideas among them. (3) Railway workers involved so many different categories of jobs, duties, and perspectives that group cohesion was impossible. (4) Also, there were other railway unions and groups outside the *Syndicat National.* If the *Syndicat National* was the most important and most combative of these groups, it held only a small percentage of all railway workers. Its members were among the lowliest workers; they generally lacked specializations and were thus easily replaceable. (5) At the heart of the union, the idea of a general strike was not very popular. Outside of the thousands of hot heads who were carried away by their own words and sought to play prominent roles, the vast majority considered union action as a means to acquire material benefits, not as an opportunity for revolution.[120]

Historian Elie Fruit tied the failure of the 1910 railway strike to the unsettling effects of the military mobilization of the strikers as well as the hesitations

and blunders of the union leadership. He also stressed the geographical dispersion of French railway networks, professional rivalries among the various workers and employees on the railroads, the effects of railroad amalgamation which was deftly maintained by the companies, the general habits of submission which characterized the railway service, the absolute submission to owners' control, and the fear of losing the advantages pertaining to their jobs. Such factors made the majority of railway workers rather numb to revolutionary rhetoric. Also, the unique psychology of the *cheminots* led them toward realism, including some of those who in the exaltation of their own convictions were able to let themselves forget the realities for awhile.[121]

François Caron has understandably concluded that only multiple perspectives can provide the whole story concerning the Railway Strike of 1910. Writing in *La Vie Ouvrière*, the syndicalist activist and theoretician Pierre Monatte called the strike "a magnificent spontaneous movement broken by the unfortunate initiatives of the 'reformists' allied with the socialist Deputies." The socialists, on the other hand, thought that the organizers of the strike "had only ceded to the provocations of the police and the capitalists, since 'the Companies had wanted the strike. They sought, prepared, [and] provoked it. The *cheminots* fell into a trap.'" Caron believes that the strike was much simpler than such arguments would indicate. "It is certain that the revolutionary minority of the union wanted to use the influence it enjoyed on the Northern network to 'force the hand' of the reformists, who, they were justly convinced, spoke of the strike without really wanting to launch it. The government, emphasizing the existence of several acts of sabotage, had no trouble making the case for a conspiracy. It announced that it was 'on the trail of an organization and plan of sabotage … with its center in Paris.'"[122] In the government's perspective Hervé, despite being in prison at La Santé, and *La Guerre Sociale* were at that Parisian center. "All these interpretations had a common defect. They assumed that the decision depended on organizational leadership alone." However, police reports document that the strike movement arose "from below" according to Caron. Company archives can supply only partial answers to the questions concerning the origins of the strike. "But this imperfect knowledge of real actors can permit us to better understand the 'meaning' of the events, which must also be clarified by the reactions and motivations of others, those who did not go out on strike."[123] Caron's insightful study permits one to consider an array of interrelated issues and problems such as: the characteristics and motivations of the strikers, the changing nature of labor relations in France, the effectiveness of sabotage and violence, the role of Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* in the strike, government responses to the strike, etc.

If historians hesitate to omit the word failure when discussing the Railway Strike of 1910 and continue to assign blame, they generally find a silver lining that manages to turn the perceived short-term failure into a long-term success. In his search for multiple perspectives, even Caron's account of the events of October 1910 does not escape ambiguity. The railway strike "was born and died in the space of a week. It ended in an unconditional capitulation of the strikers. Nevertheless, this 'bungled' strike 'was not useless since it became tremendous'; and in the months that followed the railway workers obtained 'most of the benefits that they demanded.' … Now the exploitation system on the network rested on the 'zeal' of the workers. From this point of view, the strike of 1910 marked a definitive rupture: to handle the men, it would no longer suffice to exalt the virtues of work, it would be necessary to recognize the rights that their labor gave them. There was an equal rupture in union history: in the immediate period … negotiations were rejected by the government and the companies."[124] In the same vein, Almosnino did not doubt that government repression, especially the drafting of the *cheminots*, "took the life out of the movement and at the end of a week, a return to work became the order of the day. The government had not wavered, but during the following months *the cheminots* obtained those things for which they went on strike."[125]

Christian Chevandier admits that the strike was initially perceived by the strikers as a failure, and he documents the starkly negative consequences. Union membership did not cease to decline after 1910 until the war; recruitment was strongly affected; and the prestige of the Railway Union suffered a severe blow. Along with repression came increased division, especially between revolutionary and reformist leaders within the Railway Union. That led to an actual organizational scission when Le Guennic, a close ally of Hervé, and Yves-Marie Bidamant left the National Union in September 1911 to form the *Fédération des Transports par Voie Ferrée*. There were initially almost 3000 dismissals on the affected lines, of which 1925 became permanent. That amounted to 4.4% of the strikers having been permanently fired, a rate of one in twenty-three. For the companies the strike actually helped them get rid of some of the most active syndicalists, thereby replacing a number of soon to be pensioned, older workers, with younger and lower-paid workers, who would be years away from pensions. Strikers were punished unequally on the various networks, often hitting those areas hardest that had been less active during the strike.[126] The hardest hit lines, proportionally at least, were the P.L.M. and especially the P.O., where one in five strikers lost their jobs. The two lines most active in the strike, the Northern line and the Ouest-État, actually had the fewest workers let go, at least proportionally. The repression

was especially strong in Paris and the *banlieue*. The Parisian *ateliers* of the P.L.M. line were moved south to Nevers. The repression was so devastating and caused so much fear and discouragement among the *cheminots*, that some strike leaders lost faith in the movement and left France altogether. In the aftermath of the strike some syndicalists who had been among the most loyal to their companies were apparently so crestfallen and perplexed that they wondered if the whole thing wasn't the result of government or company provocation.[127]

If the consequences were so bleak, what could possibly have been gained by the strike and how could it be seen as a long-term victory? Briand had wanted to usher in a period of calm and expanding social improvements, but he had been unable to prevent the strike, and wound up calling in the troops and mobilizing the strikers. By going back to work as quickly as they did, though not all *cheminots* responded immediately, the National Union displayed the power of the union and thus avoided a complete defeat. The companies and the government were not deceived by their apparent victory, and they quickly granted the very reforms that had been rejected before the strike. The National Union had become a very strong union organization by 1910, and it generally was able to resist disastrous strikes. Union leaders had become increasingly practical, pragmatic, and innovative by 1910. In the twenty years prior to the Railway Strike of 1910, the union managed to create the image of a combative social group, always ready for social confrontation, even though that image did not always conform to reality. Revolutionaries like Hervé and Pouget wanted to believe in the image, but for Chevandier, the National Union was strong precisely because it was reformist and professional rather than subject to the "revolutionary sirens" of Hervéism and the syndicalist *ultras*. Even though the strike was joined by only a minority of *cheminots*, and collapsed in less than a week, what mattered most was the later "construction of its representation, the putting in place of a memory of a bitter fight, and certainly it was that, and massive." In fact, the rapid end of the strike, even without gaining any immediate benefits, showed the force of the strike and the potential power of the unionized workers. The victory that eventually came was the product of that "impression of force" which the *cheminots* had created by forging a corporate identity which transcended the particularities of *métiers* and professional distinctiveness. In the words of Chevandier: "This movement of 1910 was the first strike of the railway workers, because at that moment they had become conscious of their collective identity."[128]

From 1910 until World War I, the strike was an omnipresent evocation for the *cheminots*. The reintegration of the *cheminots* "'by all possible means' had become the only unifying demand" for the railway workers. In late December 1911 the

retroactivity of the 1909 pension law, an issue which had led to the strike, was voted into effect. From that point on, it would become another element in the increasing intervention of the state in labor disputes and social progress. "Despite the firings, in spite of the impression that one could have had at the end of October 1910, if one takes into account the demands that were made, this strike was a success."[129] Well before the 1910 strike, the Minister of Public Works at that time, the independent socialist Alexandre Millerand, had hoped that railway workers "'on all lines would eventually have the same advantages as those on the State [line].'" It is significant that Briand, along with his own Minister of Public Works, Louis Lucien Klotz, just after the strike, tried "to get a statute passed which would regulate career stages and the granting of pay scales, but he also foresaw the prevention of the right to strike." That project was rejected by both companies and unions, and the proposal evolved and took other channels. It was the state, nevertheless, which would enact laws in 1911 and 1912 on personnel and financial matters, for its own railway network, that involved mutual consultations by workers and officials. Even before the war the state's policy sought peaceful relations between workers and management; the state's agents wanted no repetition of the confrontation of 1910. When the *Syndicat National* called for the nationalization of all the railway networks in 1912 at its annual congress, the goal was not the expropriation of the owners, but the spreading of the benefits of the state to all *cheminots* on all the railway lines, eventually generalizing to all workers as part of a program for social and political progress. Nationalization and the unification of all French railway lines, which were increasingly discussed before the war, arose out this context, where the state was instrumental in inaugurating peaceful reform in the interests of both social progress and social peace.[130]

Hervé remained in solitary confinement even after the strike had ended, but he was apparently able, despite the return of some letters, to send copies to his attorney and to get some messages out. After being placed in solitary confinement by Thursday October 13, 1910, he tried to get a letter to his attorney on Sunday, October 16, but it was returned. Finally, Hervé succeeded on Tuesday October 18. On October 20 he refused the special meals of political prisoners because he was not being treated like one. On October 21 the Insurrectional leader sent Briand a letter demanding to be tried "for sabotage, conspiracy, or selling the towers of Notre Dame." If he could not be charged, he wanted an immediate return to a *régime politique.* He promised to go on a hunger strike if his requests were not met within 48 hours. The suppression of the traditional right of political prisoners to continue to write in the press had become as important for Hervé as the strike itself. Not to be able to communicate with his own attorney seemed to be a sign of

the decadence of the Republic according to journalist Jean Varenne in the socialist daily. In a short letter which *L'Humanité* printed on October 21, Hervé still complained to his attorney Jacques Bonzon about the returned letters and demanded to be treated like a political prisoner or like a common criminal, but he was pained with having to live under aspects of both at the same time.[131] He may have also communicated with *La Guerre Sociale* because a lead editorial on October 22 included many elements of Hervé's journalistic style. Hervé would later say that the railway strike led to his transformation, but his disillusion was not immediately apparent. In this article *Un Sans Patrie* blamed the failure of the strike on the inability of the strikers to find a leader! He praised the *organisation de combat*, said it was created by *La Guerre Sociale*, and promised that sabotage would continue even if the *cheminots* disarmed. The "joy of the bourgeoisie and their savior, Briand," was the reverse emotion to "the reign of fear" that they had felt during the strike. The strike had come very close to success; all that was needed to topple the existing society was a little more preparation and organization.[132]

By October 26 Hervé was in constant communication with the outside world. Now he claimed that the railroad strike was no defeat! Certainly, it would have been better if the P.L.M., the *Est*, and the Paris-Orléans railroad lines had joined the strike fully. Though the *cheminots* had returned to work too soon and the state was able to save face, there had been a general strike for three days by at least two railway lines with good support from a third line.[133] The general strike was more than a myth, a utopian vision, or a bluff. It had become real. All that was needed for a revolution was for a few regiments to pass over to the side of the workers. Hervé praised the saboteurs, the so-called *bons bougres*, as true representatives of Hervéist activism. They came from all revolutionary schools of thought, yet they rejected revolutionary metaphysics as much as they opposed voting and Parliament. They used any illegal means (as long as no one was injured) to hasten the end of capitalist domination.[134]

In their biography of Émile Masson, J. Didier and Marielle Giraud argued that Hervé's encounters with the leaders of the railway strike led to his loss of faith in any workers' insurrection just as Stuttgart had begun his disillusionment with German socialists.[135] If the railway strike were the "swan song" of Hervéism as Jean-Claude Peyronnet theorized, Hervé did not yet fully admit it. Ironically, much of what came to be seen as his *revirement* was, in fact, the culmination of Hervéist extremism. What most of the Left would soon attack as a *retournement* was at first simply a call for better organization and an infiltration of the army. These had long been accepted revolutionary strategies. This could be viewed as a mere epilogue to the old battles between the anarchists and the Marxists in the

First International. The charge against Hervé as a "romantic revolutionary" by growing numbers of his former supporters occurred just when he argued that his "new course" was exhibiting greater "realism." In hindsight, one could argue that whatever realism there was in Hervéism applied to regions other than republican France and most of Western Europe.

By mid-November 1910 Paris was preoccupied with another flood of the Seine yet *La Guerre Sociale* failed to take much notice.[136] In the aftermath of the railway strike, references to sabotage actually increased in *La Guerre Sociale*. The signature of the notorious *Mam'zelle Cisaille* increasingly appeared in the paper at the end of articles which recounted acts of sabotage.[137] This bizarre creature, who signed all the latest enumerations of sabotage by the *bons bougres*, was often another pseudonym for Hervé. Hervéist sabotage was initially seen as an instrument necessary to radicalize workers and thus promote revolution, but sometimes it had more precise but less than revolutionary objectives. On November 9, 1910, sabotage was justified as a method to get railway union leaders released from prison and fired railway workers rehired.[138] It would soon be justified as a means of ending the exclusion of *La Guerre Sociale* from newsstands owned by the railway companies!

On November 16 Hervé began a series of articles analyzing the railway strike. He first answered charges by syndicalist leaders that the strike had failed largely because of the anarchist politics of *La Guerre Sociale*. Errors by *La Guerre Sociale* were admitted, but Hervé rejected the idea that anything other than economic conditions or the demands of the railway unions had caused the strike. *La Guerre Sociale* had cautioned the Strike Committee against reformism, but that had not been an error according to Hervé. He believed the paper's errors were: A) advising members of the Strike Committee to hide at the offices of *L'Humanité*, thus seeming to put the C.G.T. under the influence of the S.F.I.O., B) not attacking the Rothschilds sooner due to Hervé's fear of a wave of anti-Semitism among workers, and C) not stressing the sabotage of railway materials.[139] The following week Hervé praised the attitude of *L'Humanité* because the socialist daily had not attacked sabotage and violence during the strike. In fact, soon after the strike ended Jaurès did not hesitate to call sabotage infantile.[140] Since the C.G.T. then had no daily paper, union leaders had little choice but to ask *L'Humanité* to distribute their orders. The error of the strikers, according to Hervé, was neither acting prematurely nor being manipulated to strike by the government. Their only error was the reformism existing at the three railway lines which refused to join the strike fully, especially the reformists of the Eastern Network.[141]

In late November 1910 the attention of the French Left was drawn to the fate of coal miner named Jules Durand who was accused of murdering a strikebreaker

one night in August on a street in Le Havre. Durand was not only the secretary of a recently organized union, he was an avowed anarchist. Even though the accusation was not particularly convincing, it was maintained. "For the Court of Assizes, an anarchist worker, who was on strike, fit the profile of a potential murderer."[142] When the guilty verdict and death sentence came in on November 25, Hervé renewed the call to battle. The time of meetings, speeches, and motions was ended; continued sabotage and a railway slowdown could counter bourgeois repression.[143] In fact, many meetings, protest strikes, and demonstrations over the fate of Durand took place, and the League of the Rights of Man and the Citizen intervened. Soon hundreds of postcards in support of Durand flooded the Élysée Palace, and the protest movement eventually became international. Such mobilization may have had some effect because the decision was revised, and on February 15, 1911 Durand was released. However, the damage had been done because five months in prison awaiting execution had unhinged the union secretary. He failed to recognize a daughter born since his imprisonment, and his own father had died in his efforts to save him. It took a straight jacket to restrain the former activist, who remained in an asylum for the rest of his life. Finally, on June 15, 1918 Durand was declared innocent. The fate of the victim may have been simply tragic, but for the extreme Left the affair disclosed the abyss that separated the views and conditions of the working classes from the affluent classes and the power structure.[144]

While the Durand Affair was commencing, Hervé responded to Louis Niel's charges in *Le Matin* against the anarchism of *La Guerre Sociale* as a cause for the strike's failure. He found this charge ironic coming from a former anarchist, and he was quick to remind Niel that it was his own cowardice that led to the failures of the postal strikes. Hervé's defense of the railway unions against charges of indiscipline was an assault on the C.G.T. leadership as well as an exaltation of Hervéism. The spontaneous acts of the *cheminots* of the Northern System were a necessary stimulus to action. Intelligent leaders would have understood that, in Hervé's opinion. Organization and well-filled coffers were not to be scorned, "but other things are necessary in battle. One needs spirit, enthusiasm, anger, and passion. Only active minorities inspired by an ideal could create the faith needed to instill these virtues in the mass of workers who are ordinarily so inert and resigned." Unfortunately, argued Hervé, reformists had drowned out revolutionaries even on the Central Strike Committee itself.[145] Far from showing dejection, Hervé claimed revolution to be imminent. The railway strike proved that general strikes were possible in any industry. All that was needed to mobilize workers in all industries was leadership by active minorities and an unexpected event. Briand's attack on the right to strike by state-employed workers could still be that

catalyst. The call to revolution might arise over something like Jules Durand's execution, a new massacre of workers, or a serious threat of European war. The key elements necessary for a revolution were leadership, organizations prepared to act, the cessation of quarrels among leftist militants, and especially, support from some elements in the army.[146]

Such tactics were logical extensions of Hervéism, yet they were viewed almost immediately as dangerous by most revolutionaries probably because they threatened established organizations, practices, and ideas. The only new element in the Hervéist tactical arsenal was as much a self-indictment as an attack on Leftist sectarianism. In noting how mutual distrust and doctrinal bickering had ruined any chance of unity and discipline on the Left, Hervé admitted his own culpability for this state of affairs. He had long attacked doctrinal divisiveness in order to create unity among revolutionaries. From now on Hervé would attack the trend to disunity in the entire Left. *La Guerre Sociale*, *L'Humanité*, Jaurès, Guesde, Faure, Yvetot, Griffuelhes as well as average workers were all considered part of the same movement. Not only must revolutionaries unite to create a revolutionary organization, but the entire Left needed to end the mutual attacks in order to avoid demoralization among workers which prevented revolutionary action. Such ideas as antimilitarism, proportional representation, the income tax, neo-Malthusianism, *Esperanto*, and the eight-hour day were not necessarily invalid, but they were non-essential issues which had for too long divided the Left. On the eve of revolution, fraternity, camaraderie, and mutual confidence, above all else, were needed for success. Hervé explained that this change in emphasis was not reformism because its rationale was a successful revolution.[147]

As 1910 ended, Hervé first voiced fears that a Bonapartist resurgence might be as imminent as social revolution. While still speaking of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* (now seen simply as a vanguard of the entire Left?), Hervé sought to stress the common ideals and programs of the entire French Left. The idealism necessary to create faith and hope in the "masses," which was demanded before a revolution could occur, now apparently existed in the entire Left![148] Was Hervé losing hope in the elite or did he realize that a new strategy was needed to win the "masses"? A call to unite the entire Left could easily become an end in itself. If revolution proved impossible and if the Left itself were threatened, here was an Hervéist program for Republican defense. If Leftist divisions were not only unsolvable but even the most serious problem to be faced, here was a justification for fraternity and solidarity as a cure for divisions. The antipatriot could then turn to the *patrie* to end the divisions which had led to his own rejection. If the Republic itself were to blame for the materialism and pleasure seeking which led to "mass" political

apathy, then even the Republic one day could be jettisoned in the interests of unity, solidarity, and idealism.[149]

As 1911 began *La Guerre Sociale* found it necessary to expand to six-page editions in order to include a series by Paul Vigné d'Octon exposing French colonial policy in North Africa. Vigné d'Octon's volume *Le Brigandage Officiel dans l'Afrique du Nord* had been written for the French government, but it was suppressed because the author had attacked French colonial policy. On the eve of Vigné d'Octon's lengthy series of articles, Hervé praised the killing of French colonial troops since the army had killed the railway strike. In the future Hervé would come to fear that attacks on the army could jeopardize revolutionary attempts to enter and control it.[150] But for the present French colonial policy was seen by Hervé as the key element in French foreign policy. French colonial interests feared a loss of colonies to Germany. This led France to an *entente* with England which Hervé predicted would lead eventually to a European war arising out of the antagonism between the British and German capitalist classes. The Russian alliance was supported by French capitalists who feared the loss of their investments, yet Russia was too weak to help France in a European war. Hervé had long claimed that French business interests should have been favorable to peace, but their support of a profitable "armed peace" could easily lead to war. In this instance, Hervé considered the English "alliance" as the most dangerous policy for France because it was the chief ingredient in Franco-German rivalry.[151] The anticolonial policy of *La Guerre Sociale* included both internal and external explanations, yet Hervé and his paper were never consistent analysts. By the end of 1911 Hervé's colonial policy would evolve to fit his own domestic political needs. This evolution elucidates the hierarchy of Hervé's values, in which, ultimately, the safety of France trumped all else.[152]

La Guerre Sociale reported that its six-page issues, which included the series by Vigné d'Octon, cost an extra 600 francs a week, and that was much more than the paper could afford. Peyronnet believed that *La Guerre Sociale* had financial problems even before Hervé's *retournement* due to the increased expenses during the railway strike of 1910, the expansion of the paper to six pages in January and February 1911 for the Vigné d'Octon series, and the need to pay several teams of journalists in 1910 and 1911 due to trials and temporary expatriation by some staff members.[153] Ironically, these financial troubles partly arose from the very costly sensational episodes which appealed to more and more people. However, on March 29, 1911 the paper announced that the financial troubles arising from increased costs were over. According to the police, the railway strike led to the greatest increase in circulation by *La Guerre Sociale* up until that time.

By late 1910 the average circulation was 55,000. Some issues reached printings of 100,000 or more copies, and one issue had a circulation of 130,000. Thus *La Guerre Sociale* reached the peak of its popularity just as Hervé was shifting his course. The end of 1910 and the beginning of 1911 not only saw the appearance of expanded editions of *La Guerre Sociale*, the paper also moved into "new luxurious offices" on January 18, 1911, which the police found more difficult to watch over. The new offices were at 8 Rue St. Joseph in the heart of the newspaper district just east of the Rue Montmartre and close to the Café du Croissant. So it seems impossible to deny that Hervé's new ideas coincided with many signs of his newspaper's material success.[154]

If economic considerations did not seem to play a role in Hervé's shift, what about the changing international situation? Foreign affairs by themselves did not cause the transformation of Hervé's political ideas, but they were the backdrop against which those ideas changed, and they often acted to accelerate his shift. In mid-February 1911 the S.P.D. announced that it would defend Germany if she were attacked. Hervé used this announcement to stress the validity of *militarisme révolutionnaire* and the need for secret insurrectional organizations. He again called for an end to denigration, hatred, and suspicion on the Left. In an effort to ally reformists and revolutionaries, Hervé praised Jaurès and *L'Humanité* for their positive actions during the railway strike. More than ever, Hervé looked for allies among all classes and groups of Frenchmen in order to prevent war. The existence of two antithetical bourgeoisies, one progressive and the other conservative, played a greater and greater role in his political rhetoric. The imprisoned insurrectional leader now stated that the progressive bourgeoisie ought to be supported whenever it favored workers.[155] Yet, workers were still advised to carry weapons and to defend themselves from attack.[156]

Events in early 1911 gave Hervé hope that the hour of revolution had not yet faded. An uprising by wine workers and the smaller growers in Champagne in January reminded Hervé that a combination of workers and peasants was indeed possible. Sabotage and antimilitarism were effective tactics in urban as well as rural areas. Briand's use of troops in Champagne was just another example of the government's destruction of patriotic support among the lower classes.[157] The situation in Champagne in 1910 and 1911 differed markedly from the events in the Midi in 1907. The Midi saw a temporary decrease in class conflict and an obvious unity among the large and small winegrowers against fraud. In Champagne the large wine producers were blamed and attacked for their purported winemaking fraud and general domination in fixing the price of harvests. Even though fewer people were involved in Champagne, there was more violence if we keep the scale

of the trouble in mind. There was certainly sabotage against major producers. In one episode on January 11, 1911, 3000 people invaded the caves of a large operator and destroyed 70,000 bottles. "At Epernay during the night of January 12–13, 1911, the Chateau de Montebello, and the stables and presses of Moët and Chandon were burned." Though the growers in the Midi had been unionized in 1907, the unions were temporarily eclipsed by the united efforts. In Champagne the troubles helped create the first agricultural unions there.[158]

For Hervé, waves of popular explosions were succeeding one another at closer and closer intervals in French cities and countryside. All the symptoms of a general crisis were present; only a catalyst was needed for it to erupt.[159] The failure of the Northern System to rehire its railway workers led Hervé to an attack on the Rothschilds that soon had to be toned down for fear of a wave of anti-Semitism among French workers.[160] At a time when Hervé's new tactics began to receive severe criticism from anarchists and syndicalists, there were few signs of moderation in Hervé's editorials.

In early 1911 Griffuelhes, with the support of C.G.T. Secretary-General Léon Jouhaux, was engaged in a project to create a syndicalist daily newspaper under his personal control. The stated aim of the new paper was to educate and proselytize the mass of workers, but its appeal was weak. The police gathered much information on *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, yet most of that data concerned the newspaper's poor financial situation. There were some police agents, however, who believed that *La Bataille Syndicaliste* was intended to rival *La Guerre Sociale* and to curtail Hervéist as well as general socialist influence on the C.G.T.[161] Increased syndicalist irritation with other elements on the Left was connected to an exacerbation of the "crisis in syndicalism" after 1911. That year saw a decline in membership in many C.G.T. federations.[162] According to Émile Pouget there had been a slow but steady growth in the C.G.T., especially in the revolutionary unions, from 1908–1910.[163] Several years later Pouget reported that this situation was reversed after 1910.[164] "On the eve of the war, in a preparatory meeting for a C.G.T. congress which was to be held in September 1914, Pouget wondered whether the decline in union membership might have been due to the antipatriotic positions adopted at Amiens."[165] A recent scholar connected syndicalist decline to internal ideological divisions, which split syndicalism, and to the C.G.T. failure to organize the labor force effectively. "There was a steady and irreversible decline in union membership, in enthusiasm, and in philosophic cohesion in the pre-war period. The unity of the labor movement had been shattered and fragmented between 1911 and 1914; by late 1914 the nadir of the movement had been reached."[166] In 1911 the number of French strikers was decreasing even though the number

of strikes was increasing. This could well have been a sign of less combativeness among workers. It undoubtedly increased tension within the C.G.T. leadership at a time when the S.F.I.O. was gaining voters, members, and deputies.[167]

Syndicalist decline by 1911 was obvious to most observers of the labor movement even then. "There was, in addition, a growing disparity between revolutionary leadership in control of the central apparatus in Paris and the rank-and-file membership in the provinces. This disorientation between leadership and membership was reflected in the declining membership figures in the pre-war period" and the growing calls for a new direction by delegates at congresses of the C.G.T. A crisis within syndicalism was a long-standing situation but "a major shift in the attitudes and philosophy of French labor leaders began to take place in the years 1911 and 1912. As with any intellectual reorientations, the precise moment of this transformation is impossible to determine; the process of disillusionment and reorientation was a gradual one." By 1912 certain key figures among the revolutionary syndicalists became convinced that the policy of confrontation was dangerous.[168] Nevertheless, it would take World War I to complete the syndicalist transformation. Up until 1914 the C.G.T. had no single philosophy or center of authority. This lack of unity was a major factor in the decline of syndicalism.[169]

In her study of *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, Dominique Bertinotti implied that there was an evolution at the syndicalist daily on the question of antimilitarism in the years 1911 and 1912. During this period *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, despite wide divergences within syndicalist antimilitarism, gradually increased its attacks on Hervé's *militarisme révolutionnaire* and Jaurès's *L'Armée Nouvelle*. In her view, until June 1912 antimilitarism was weak at *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and within the C.G.T. due to the organization's evolving crisis which was characterized by personal quarrels, indifference, and skepticism. Then the C.G.T. went on the offensive against the Berry-Millerand Law, against the evils of Biribi in the wake of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign, and against war in general. This flowering of syndicalist antimilitarism, even though it was largely verbal and lacked the organizations necessary for action, temporarily pushed the difficulties of the C.G.T. into the background.[170] Bertinotti's thesis is not without unresolved issues but it permits an assessment of syndicalist antimilitarism in terms of internal syndicalist problems. The attack on Hervé's new ideas had multiple benefits for the C.G.T. It isolated a rival newspaper and ostracized a rival leader. The attack on *La Guerre Sociale* and Hervé united syndicalism artificially and temporarily obscured the C.G.T.'s internal problems.

The years 1906–1910 had been an era of great social conflict in France. "Revolutionary syndicalism reached its high point during these years, glorifying

the virtues of violence and direct action. It was a policy which could only result in failure for the C.G.T., given the conservative nature of French society, the weakness of the labor movement, and the intransigence of political leaders such as Clemenceau."[171] The peak of Hervéist influence in the C.G.T. probably occurred during the railway strike in October 1910. Hervé's new ideas expressed after the strike then became the occasion for the C.G.T., at least in part, to seek internal cohesion by an attack on "the new Hervéism."[172] The appearance of *La Bataille Sydncialiste* on April 27, 1911 was a multiple threat to *La Guerre Sociale* even though the Hervéists had the decency to publicly hail the appearance of the new syndicalist daily. Nevertheless, *La Guerre Sociale* showed no reticence in advising the new publication. The journalists at *La Bataille Syndicaliste* were cautioned about showing an exclusive concern for workers, and they were urged to be honest with French workers and syndicalist leaders.[173] On the surface relations between the two papers were good in the beginning. There were examples of cooperation during the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign and in September 1911 at the time of the Franco-German negotiations over Morocco.[174] When *La Bataille Syndicaliste* began to experience financial difficulties, *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to go out of its way, despite syndicalist attacks, to demand the preservation of *La Bataille Syndicaliste* on the grounds that a "disarmament of hatreds" on the Left required concerted but parallel actions by autonomous forces of the Left.[175]

Superficial niceties by both newspapers could not conceal forever the true nature of the situation. *La Guerre Sociale* for too long had hoped to become the newspaper of the syndicalists and for all other revolutionary elements in France. The Hervéist weekly had rejected becoming a daily in early 1911 not only because most of its writers were in prison but also because *La Bataille Syndicaliste* was in the process of formation.[176] Several editors and writers at *La Bataille Syndicaliste* had once been writers for *La Guerre Sociale*. Former comrades could become the worst of enemies especially under conditions of competition.[177] By the summer of 1911 the two papers were in open conflict. At a fund-raising dinner for *La Bataille Syndicaliste* in mid-June 1911, the syndicalist daily was called the only true representative of French workers. All other newspapers were branded as "bourgeois."[178] The traditional Bastille Day rally by the French Left in 1911 was described as a failure by the police because the C.G.T. refused to join *La Guerre Sociale* whose leaders they distrusted. That misfire exacerbated ruffled feelings among the Hervéists.[179] Disclosures that summer by the S.S.R. concerning police spies within the C.G.T. embarrassed syndicalist leaders even when the accusations proved accurate.[180] When the C.G.T. sent a goodwill delegation to Berlin in late July 1911, Eugène Merle and several *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* accompanied it. One police agent

wondered whether these young Hervéists who assisted Merle were acting as S.S.R. spies watching the C.G.T. leaders.[181] That same agent believed that the concatenation of excessive language, violent episodes, and theatrical disclosures by *La Guerre Sociale* in 1911 was an attempt to renew interest in the Hervéist weekly at a time when it experienced severe competition from *La Bataille Syndicaliste.*[182] The syndicalist daily was not only a journalistic competitor for *La Guerre Sociale* on the Left, but the very existence of the syndicalist daily was, in part, an anti-Hervéist maneuver.

No group or organization on the Left could afford to lose the mantle of revolutionary purity. The divergent interests of *La Guerre Sociale* and the C.G.T. led to conflicting tactics which promoted and then accentuated Hervé's profound political transformation. When the C.G.T., itself in the process of transformation, found disturbing elements in Hervé's new tactics, it attacked the new course in Hervéism and thereby preserved its own revolutionary purity. The attack also temporarily helped to solve syndicalist division. The attack on Hervéism masked the reality that the era of confrontation by revolutionary syndicalism was over. Many of Hervé's most severe syndicalist critics actually shared many of his atavistic positions.[183] Hervéism would have failed on its own but its failure was made more bitter because it occurred amidst a significant measure of syndicalist duplicity. Hervéism may well have been largely theatrics and bombast, but it was the most organized "revolutionary" movement then existing in France, however superficial and theatrical its revolution may have been. So the attempt to thwart Hervéism by the "revolutionary" Left involved some regressive and self-protective motives by threatened Leftist organizations and leaders. Despite their bitter rivalry in 1911 and 1912, both Hervéism and French syndicalism were accommodating themselves to political realities. *Militarisme révolutionnaire* by Hervé and anti-Hervéism by the C.G.T. were policies and stances which masked that accommodation process, however unconsciously. In August 1914 neither Hervé nor the syndicalists had yet discarded revolutionary rhetoric. If the transition of Hervé to an acceptance of the *Union Sacrée* was smoother than that of syndicalism, Hervé's former critics had, nevertheless, undergone their own prior transformation.

12

The Aernoult-Rousset Affair

The French press often covered scandals involving French military justice. The campaign against the military prisons in North Africa did not originate in *La Guerre Sociale* and was not confined to the revolutionary press. Jacques Dhur of *Le Journal* visited North Africa in 1906, and then he wrote a series of articles in 1906 and 1907 on the military prisons.[1] In 1890 anarchist writer Georges Darien had written about his experience in those North African military prisons, which were often collectively referred to as "Biribi" by antimilitarists. For Darien *Biribi* was a place of dehumanization, sadism, depravity, psychosis, torture, injustice, and climatic extremes, in essence a living hell in the desert.[2] Named after *Biribosso*, an Italian game of chance, Biribi was a "military gulag" situated in remote areas of North Africa, but also in other parts of the French Empire, "the real nadir of France's entire system of military justice."[3] Perhaps, the event that most poignantly symbolized the evils of the North African military prisons occurred on July 2, 1909, at Djennan-ed-Dar in Algeria.[4] On that day a young military prisoner named Albert Aernoult died in the extreme heat after physical exertions and various punishments by his guards. His death would have meant just another victim for Biribi had it not been for the revelations to the Parisian press by another young military prisoner, Émile Rousset. Following Rousset's letters to *Le Matin* and to the parents of the deceased soldier, concerning the death of Aernoult, a

great campaign occurred which united the entire French Left, albeit temporarily and in a limited manner. A campaign that started in the bourgeois press, in *Le Matin* and in *Paris-Est* in late July 1909, was reopened or expanded by *L'Humanité*, and seconded by *La Guerre Sociale.*[5] Within a month of the crime the latter two newspapers featured the death of Aernoult as part of an "extended series on mysterious deaths of enlisted men and general conditions in 'Biribi.'"[6] In the wake of the Dreyfus Affair from 1899 until 1909 there were twenty-one proposals for the reform of military justice which were brought before the French *Chambre.* None of them would bear fruit.[7] Would the Aernoult-Rousset Affair provide a better opportunity for reform to blossom?

Albert Aernoult was a navvy and then *couvreur* (tiler/slater/roofer) from Romainville near Paris who worked with the *terrassiers* (as an unskilled construction worker or navvy) on the Metro in 1905 until a strike temporarily halted construction. Late in that year he was involved in an attack on scab workers (*la chasse aux renards*) and was given a two-year prison sentence *in absentia* because he managed to stay out of prison by fleeing to the mining region Courrières for about a year. After the mining disaster there, he made his way back home where he was arrested in 1906. Only 19 years of age, thus still a minor, and with no prior record, Aernoult appealed his sentence which was then reduced to ten months, to be served at La Petite Roquette prison, a forbidding, spoked–hexagon-like structure in the 11th *arrondissement* of Paris. During this confinement a counselor of state named Voisin convinced him to enlist in the colonial army, the *Bats d'Af*,[8] for three years, which he did on March 26, 1907. That decision probably arose due to poor job prospects given his record as a labor militant with a criminal record, coupled with the fact that such information was bound to be included in the passbook (*livret*) that workers were required to present to employers. Given that he was probably going to be conscripted anyway upon completion of his sentence, he might have assumed that this early enlistment would make a favorable impression later when he got back to civilian life and needed a job.[9] Once in North Africa, several disciplinary problems led him to the military prisons. "On July 1, 1909, he was sent by train from Mecheria to the military prison at Djennan-ed-Dar, in the Beni-Ounif district of Algeria: one of the most notorious of the set of military prisons."[10]

The trip and time spent at Djennan-ed-Dar was meant to last three days, thus completing a sentence he was already serving. In fact, Aernoult may have requested the transference to a more severe disciplinary company in order to reduce his sentence. At any rate, it seems that he was already known to at least one of the *sous-offs* (non-commissioned officers) who would be in authority over him,

and their prior meeting at Colomb-Béchar had been less than pleasant. When he got to the camp after supper time, he was placed in a cell rather than fed. He had previously been in a cell for six days on reduced rations, so when he faced the punishment detail the next day, it would be in a weakened condition. After being awakened very early and given prison garb, he began a work detail along with another prisoner around 7:00 a.m. Such punishment details were more strenuous than normal work for prisoners, and often involved the use of wheelbarrows or large oil cans to remove the shifting sand from the courtyard at double time. By 9:00 a.m. Aernoult had had enough of the work detail and refused to continue his assigned task, in defiance of Sergeant David Casanova's direct orders to keep working. When Casanova reported the situation to his superior, the much feared and severe Lieutenant Sabatier, the latter refused to believe that Aernoult was too weak to continue. Verbal abuse by the prisoner failed to move Sabatier, who had no intention of letting such insults and refusal to follow orders lead to a formal disciplinary hearing. At that time military authorities viewed any action which seemed to intentionally provoke a *conseil de guerre* (a military tribunal) as a clever device called flanking (*tourner*) whereby prisoners "gamed the system," thereby gaining a temporary respite from punishment. Such use of military tribunal procedures was seen "as a form of leverage against officers properly administering perfectly legal punishments." The key issue then became whether violence was used illegally against Aernoult to get him to obey orders and fulfill his duties on the punishment detail.[11]

Rousset later testified that Sabatier responded to Aernoult's verbal abuse by beating him with a cane. Both Sabatier and Casanova denied that, and also claimed that they never employed the *Crapaudine*,[12] tying up, immobilizing, and exposing Aernoult to the elements, as several observers stated. The officers admitted to putting Aernoult back in his cell and tying him up, even though restraining devices were never supposed to be employed to compel obedience, only to prevent harm to themselves or others in a critical situation. Once he was alone in his cell, Aernoult struggled against the restraints for twenty minutes, but then he agreed to go back to the courtyard to fulfill the punishment detail as assigned. When the mid-day rest period came, Aernoult was returned to his cell. In the meantime, Sergeant Beignier, Aernoult's nemesis from Colomb-Béchar, had returned from fetching new prisoners, who were placed in cells adjacent to Aernoult and given food and water. When the latter requested water, Beignier and a couple of auxiliaries went into his cell, "retied him, beat him, and filled his mouth with sand." At least that is what some prisoners and auxiliaries charged, accusations which the sergeant and most of the auxiliaries rejected. When he was returned to the

punishment detail around 2:30 p.m., the temperature may have been as high as 122 degree Fahrenheit, and the prisoner soon complained about his shoes, presumably due to the heat and sand. So the shoes were replaced. Though he now obeyed orders, his work appeared careless, and he actually dropped to the ground, apparently exhausted and ill. However, Casanova thought he was feigning illness, and soon summoned Beignier and Sabatier, who were later accused of tying and badly beating the prisoners where he lay. The officers denied this, but they admitted to having several auxiliaries, directed by Beignier, carry Aernoult back into camp because they were unable to get him to work. Fearing the reactions of other prisoners, Sabatier had Aernoult placed in a more out-of-the-way cell. When Sabatier's own orderly approached this smaller courtyard near the kitchen, he was told to leave. Later on several prisoners reported that they then heard cries of distress, but could see nothing.[13]

According to later testimony by the officers, around 6:30 Casanova took some soup to Aernoult who refused to eat it. A half hour later the other two officers visited the prisoner's cell, and found him seated on the floor, nonresponsive to their queries about his well-being. An hour later Beignier returned for evening roll call, and apparently got normal responses from the prisoner. At 8:30 the latter officer came back to check on Aernoult, who was now unconscious and lying prostrate on the floor. Beignier then sent for Sabatier, but the two could not revive the prisoner. Once the commanding officer, Captain Finot, was informed, he tried to reach Doctor Dorange at Beni-Ounif six kilometers away, but the phone was not working properly. So Beignier was sent to fetch the doctor who did not get to the camp until sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. After a rapid appraisal of Aernoult and his cell, the doctor pronounced the prisoner dead. Having been given accounts of the events by the officers involved, Captain Finot assumed that the many hematomas found on the body were due to the prisoner's own struggles against the restraining devices rather than any deliberate violence. Finot then informed the Commandant at Beni-Ounif that the death presumably arose from natural causes, namely reactions to the heat, and he did not order an immediate autopsy, but the body was placed under guard.

When the other prisoners heard about Aernoult's death, they were not quite as complacent as the commanding officer, and for awhile the camp seemed primed for a riot. Many prisoners assumed that the actions of the guards were the cause of death, and some of them attempted to file complaints to the Commandant and public minister at Beni-Ounif named Bonnelet, but they soon suffered reprisals that amounted to torture and other types of punishment. These initial reactions may not have been completely fruitless because an autopsy was ordered. However,

the report on the autopsy by Dorange proved to be "a small masterpiece of ambiguity" which mentioned all the following: (1) a "cerebral congestion" [stroke] seemingly due to extreme heat; (2) violent contusions and hematomas caused by: (a) the restraints on Aernoult, (b) his own struggles against those restraints, (c) measures by the officers to revive him, (d) the prisoner's movements which caused banging against the wall amidst the "*surexcitation*" from the stroke. Seeming to absolve the officers who had led the punishment detail, Dr. Dorange nevertheless had implied that the wounds were a factor in Aernoult's death. That multicausal analysis was sufficiently ambiguous so that the door was now opened for "further investigation and alternative explanations."[14]

Initially it was neither the prisoners' formal and informal complaints nor the vague autopsy that disclosed the events surrounding the death of Aernoult to the outside world. What really got the public's attention were the actions of a rather unlikely hero, a prisoner named Émile Rousset who emerged as the valiant champion of justice, truth, and class solidarity, personally redeemed by the events themselves. This miscast hero came from a family in Lyon with long prison records, and was himself more of an *apache* (a career criminal) than a proletarian. The day Aernoult died, Rousset's mother was serving her seventh prison sentence for theft. Her son Émile already had four theft convictions before he found himself in the *Bats d'Af* after serving a five-year prison sentence for the latest crime.[15] Yet it was this same Émile Rousset who revealed to the French press the circumstances of Aernoult's death at the hands of his guard officers. Apparently, on the evening of July 4 he had sneaked out of the camp and walked to Beni-Ounif where he sent a letter to his own brother talking about the murder of Aernoult, his fears of the same fate, and all the prisoners' hopes for a camp revolt. His letter also included additional missives to be forwarded to Aernoult's parents and *Le Matin* in Paris. Rousset's efforts were not in vain because the latter newspaper reported on the death of Aernoult in its July 13 issue and *Paris-Est* soon followed. Aernoult's parents immediately contacted the *terrassiers* union calling for its help. Since the construction union was associated with both the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, the regional federation of unions around Paris, and the C.G.T. itself, multiple levels of French labor organizations almost immediately knew about the situation. That also meant that other members of the French Left would be notified and engaged, including parliamentary socialists and more extreme militants. Romainville was represented by a socialist deputy named Adrien Veber who agreed to take up the matter himself.[16]

Once the officers at the camp realized that events surrounding Aernoult's death had been leaked to the media, they immediately suspected Rousset as the

source and were furious. Now an obvious target, Rousset claimed that Sergeant Beignier threatened to have him "walk down the same road as Aernoult." Under such duress Rousset reacted, speaking out openly, continuing to make accusations, and verbally protesting other excessive actions by Aernoult's alleged tormenters against other prisoners. Soon the unlikely hero found himself confined to his cell, the object of increasing attention by his superiors. However, no manner of threats or warnings could prevent Rousset from activating the machinery of military justice. Like Aernoult before him, Rousset now sought to instigate a *conseil de guerre* hearing where he could try to use the threat by Beignier and the murder of Aernoult as extenuating and exculpatory circumstance for the charges now weighing against him. Such a procedure was about to create an ongoing judicial drama that would help critics of military justice resuscitate a reform campaign that had stalled in 1907. By the summer of 1909 the critics of the French military justice system were increasingly frustrated at the failure of the parliamentary reform. Another courtroom drama, another example of "judicial theater" could be the perfect vehicle to publicly display the horrors of French military justice by using these latest misdeeds, victims, and heroes to gain media coverage and activate the public. Such an affair just might get the government to finally institute genuine reform.[17]

In August 1909 *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale* "had publicly alleged a pattern of mysterious deaths in the army's Algerian prison camps."[18] Some of the first detailed accounts of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign in *La Guerre Sociale* were written in late February and March 1910, and the newspaper soon supported the *Comité de Defense Sociale* in sending René de Marmande to Algeria to make an inquiry into the case.[19] If a movement was now beginning to form around the Aernoult-Rousset case, Rousset himself would hesitate to play the heroic role that his supporters wanted him to fill. Certainly, Rousset made quite different impressions on his prosecutors in Algeria and his supporters in Paris. To the first group, he was a cunning criminal and master manipulator of events who was eager to avenge hated authorities. To the second group, he was a kind of "noble savage", a man newly redeemed after the awakening of his slumbering conscience to the altruistic sentiments of justice, "human solidarity", and the "moral revolt against oppression."[20]

By mid-summer 1909 Rousset was desperate and focused on his own survival rather than the noble cause of judicial reform or questions of universal human rights. If the judicial machinery that he had set in motion concerned larger, more abstract issues, the charges against him were uppermost in his mind. In the next weeks and months Rousset would vacillate, and even change his mind more than

once about the actions he had taken, but "the die was cast." His public allegations about the death of Aernoult at the hands of Sabatier, Beignier, and Casanova[21] led to a probable cover-up of that purported crime and accelerating charges against Rousset. Some of the charges were possibly concocted to delay the proceedings (which could allow the agitation over Aernoult to subside) as well as to silence if not destroy him. Eventually they resulted in an additional five years in prison for Rousset by the *Conseil de Guerre* at Oran. After being incarcerated in Oran since late July 1909, Rousset's trial before a *conseil de guerre* finally took place on January 19, 1910. However, that trial included no testimony concerning the fate of Aernoult because the court deemed it inadmissible and irrelevant.[22] Rousset was found guilty of both disobedience and "outrage by word", which led to a sentence of five years at forced labor at the Douéra prison camp just south of Algiers. It could easily have been an additional five years. But Rousset's ultimate fate was not yet set because his situation had become the focus of diverse hopes on the Left for some form of judicial reform or complete transformation.[23]

On October 18, 1909, the socialist Francis de Pressensé, who was also the president of the *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, the world's largest civil liberties organization at that time, wrote to the Minister of War, Jean Jules Brun, repeating Rousset's allegations over the death of Aernoult and seeking an official inquiry into the possible crime. The apparent military cover-up eventually reached the French Parliament. On November 12, 1909 General Brun responded to interpellations by Deputies Allemane and Veber. By assuring the *Chambre* that the matter had been thoroughly investigated and by supporting the official version of Aernoult's death, dealing with a stroke, a seizure, self-inflicted head injuries, and intense African heat, Brun was lending his weight to what seemed to critics to be an obvious cover-up.[24] The Minister of War denied the allegations of wrongdoing and argued that further inquiries had already occurred, but he failed to mention that he had truncated the original report. On November 15, Veber "raised the stakes" in Parliament by reading "a letter in which fifteen of Aernoult's fellow prisoners re-affirmed their charges." In March 1910 Pressensé wrote to the Minister of War complaining that the investigation he had so strongly praised the previous November was merely the "unchallenged accounts" of the officers and guards involved in the prisoner's death. Such an examination seemed to be a far cry from the standards expected in civilian cases. The president of the *Ligue* went on to question the rigor of the examinations and the veracity of the testimony in the investigation of Aernoult's fate, and he wanted Brun to intervene directly in the operations of the military *parquet*, something any war minister would have been loath to do.[25]

When news of Rousset's condemnation for military code violations reached Pierre Renaudel at the S.F.I.O. Congress in Nîmes in early February 1910, much of the Left assumed that the conviction was an injustice arising from the prisoner's disclosures concerning the death of Aernoult. The verdict against Rousset led the Congress to protest the verdict, call for a new inquiry, demand justice for both men, and intensify the socialist campaign for the suppression of the *campagnies de discipline*.[26] For John Cerullo, who has thoroughly investigated these events, that meant: "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair had begun." At the urging of the socialist municipal councilor of Romainville, Aernoult's father submitted two petitions to government officials. One was addressed to the Captain-Mayor of Beni-Ounif to get his son's body exhumed, while the second was directed to the Minister of the Interior, appealing for an authorization to transfer the deceased's remains back to France.[27] Despite the motion in favor of Rousset voted at the Nîmes Congress and the leading role of socialists for the return of Aernoult's remains in the winter and spring of 1910, *La Guerre Sociale* soon protested socialist inaction.[28] In an issue of *La Guerre Sociale* in late February 1910, the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign was specifically described "as a springboard for a broader attack on military justice itself." But the Hervéists doubted that this would happen as long as parliamentary socialists were leading the campaign.[29] From the militants' perspective, Rousset's situation demanded as much attention as the return of Aernoult' s body though no one doubted the potential dramatic impact of the unfortunate soldier's funeral procession. Although *L'Humanité* was the first newspaper to call for the return of the body of Aernoult in order to create a public spectacle which could promote judicial reform, *La Guerre Sociale* accused it of inadequately funding and temporarily losing interest in the campaign as the elections of 1910 approached. If such charges by the Hervéists did not tell the whole story, it was true that many socialists were still not convinced that Rousset was worth championing.[30]

Hervé hoped to use the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign to continue the excitement generated by the Liabeuf Affair.[31] The new campaign proved to have an even more fateful role than the one sought by the Insurrectional leader Not only did the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign last longer than any other campaign in *La Guerre Sociale*, it elapsed throughout the transformation of Hervéism. The Aernoult-Rousset Campaign was the subject of voluminous investigations by the Ministry of the Interior and the Parisian police. The archival record shows how the transformation of Hervé was reflected in the development of the campaign. Archival evidence and other sources also demonstrate how the continuing acrimony and in-fighting during the campaign itself was a catalyst in Hervé's rectification.

The Aernoult-Rousset Campaign did not really develop until it was made the priority of the *Le Comité de Defense Sociale*, a collection of militants representing diverse leftist organizations and newspapers. With origins going back to January 9, 1905 and ties to earlier groups like *La Liberté d'Opinion*, which had been replaced by *Le Comité Pivoteu*, the *Comité de Defense Sociale* was sometimes described as an anarchist organization which hoped to work for the liberation of political prisoners, especially following the government's attack on the C.G.T. after the events at Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. By 1909 the police claimed that the C.D.S. "had taken part in all the revolutionary and antimilitarist campaigns of the C.G.T."[32] Its origins have also been tied to the 1905–1906 agitation surrounding the issue of the eight-hour day. The C.D.S. also considered itself to be a proletarian parallel to *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*. But not everyone took it too seriously because it claimed to lie "'outside and above any political party, any revolutionary or non-revolutionary grouping, any sect or philosophical clique.'" Thus it seemed to have had no ties to the larger society even among the proletariat. No wonder it was accused of being "a collection of radical dilettantes: 'lawyers, affiliates of the Socialist Party, [and] a couple of bosses … who happen to be enamored of anarchist propaganda.'" However, few could discount the altruistic intensity of the organization, and fewer still could deny that the depth and range of the Aernoult-Rousset campaign was directly connected to the energy of the C.D.S.[33]

At some point before 1910 René de Marmande[34] became closely associated with the C.D.S., and since he often contributed to *La Guerre Sociale*, it was natural that Hervé's paper got involved deeply in the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign. De Marmande can be described as an *anarchisant* journalist, a Bohemian, a pacifist, and a general gadfly on the extreme French Left, who was often associated with human rights abuses before World War I. He was "the antithesis of the *militant-pénitent*" for Emma Goldman who portrayed de Marmande as a captivating character who had a quick wit, a love of life, and a biting sense of humor.[35] His reputation on the extreme Left would suffer due to charges and counter-charges as the Aernoult-Rousset Affair reached its denouement. Another important Hervéist, Émile Tissier, was the Secretary of the C.D.S. until February 22, 1911.[36] Jean Goldsky, Almereyda, and Merle were the other Hervéists originally on the *Comité*. The anarchist Charles-Albert, often called "the soul of the Committee", was another frequent contributor to *La Guerre Sociale* at least into 1912.[37] The C.D.S. possessed a publication of its own but it did not appear regularly. Thus, the C.D.S. had to make use of socialist, syndicalist, and anarchist publications, including *La Guerre Sociale*, in order to disseminate its communications. With

affiliated groups in most large French cities and with ties to organizations like the C.G.T., the *Comité* was in a favorable position to promote a vast campaign around Rousset's revelations.[38]

The chief problem for the C.D.S. as well as the entire campaign, as explained by John Cerullo, was the "dynamic linking" of "radical and reformist elements" within what was a coalition of forces seeking alternative versions of change which virtually amounted to radical change versus practical reform. The revolutionary or *enragé* elements wanted an end to Biribi and the current military itself, once and for all, while the more moderate, reformist elements sought various improvements in military justice and institutions, but were very cognizant of political realities, especially in an era of a growing nationalist revival. Each element realized that the other was only a provisional or temporary ally, and each sought maximum influence on the Left in a sort of zero-sum-game.[39] In creating such a binary analysis, Cerullo clarifies many of the problems and issues within the campaign as well as the developments unfolding within the larger French context. However, the binary analysis can only go so far in explaining the panorama of forces operating within the campaign because (and Cerullo does not dispute this) the extreme Left itself was hopelessly divided, even the so-called *enragés.* Various organizations, groups, factions, parties, and sometimes even individuals seemed to be seeking maximum power for themselves.

By the spring of 1910 the C.D.S. and the S.F.I.O. seemed to be heading in different directions. For Cerullo, the socialists and their newspaper appeared to be much more restrained in their goals and tactics than the Hervéists and the C.D.S. in general. The socialists concentrated on the return of the Aernoult's body and *L'Humanité* was leading the way seeking contributions to attain that goal, assuming that the costs would be about 1800 francs. By April *L'Humanité*'s *souscription* had amassed half the necessary funds, and, despite jibes by Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* that the socialists were losing interest in the campaign, the socialist daily expected to have the necessary funds by June. They also were readying a delegation to travel to Marseilles to retrieve the body when it arrived. Not only did the socialists seem to still be active, they invited Léon Jouhaux of the C.G.T. to accompany their delegation as a peaceful gesture toward the syndicalists. With the *souscription* successful, *L'Humanité* funded Alfred Kurz as its delegate to Algeria, expecting him to finalize arrangements for the transportation of Aernoult's remains. Socialists hoped to get the body to Paris by June 25 for a huge funerary parade followed by a burial the next day in Romainville. That date would coincide with the Grand Prix when most of the capital would be on holiday. However, the permission to exhume and transport Aernoult's remains was about to be rescinded

since the authorities hesitated about the wisdom of allowing the Left to "display the body." To wit, the Président du Conseil/Ministre de l'Interior Briand authorized the *Sûreté Générale* to recommend "dilatory measures" to prevent the body from arriving in Paris before June 28. Algerian military and political authorities did more than that; they forbade exhumation between June 1 and September 10, ostensibly due to the heat which supposedly created unacceptably elevated health risks. No one was fooled by the arbitrary nature of the new rulings, undoubtedly simply reflecting official hopes or expectations that the Aernoult-Rousset Affair would fade away if the funeral and demonstrations were delayed. Socialists could have chosen to use these delaying tactics to demonstrate the government's "bad faith" and malfeasance, but they saw the risks involved. By "widening the range of political targets and intensifying the attack on them", socialists would be playing into the arguments of *enragés* who might thereby be granted "an unwelcome prominence among the still small band of Aernoult-Rousset partisans." For Cerullo that meant that "the ideological divide between militants and parliamentarians had already manifested itself."[40]

Apparently, the syndicalists on the C.D.S. were not impressed by anything the socialists were doing. Rather than join with socialist efforts, the C.D.S. had already made its own arrangements in the campaign, sending René de Marmande to Algeria in April. Since de Marmande was a long-serving member of the C.D.S. as well as an editor and frequent contributor on the Hervéist weekly, that did not bode well for the prospects of mutual support and cooperation during the campaign. De Marmande's mission was to interview Rousset in Douéra, organize protests for him in both Algeria and France, and help him in his legal defense. After dallying in Marseilles, de Marmande reached Douéra in May and became personally captivated by Rousset. Soon de Marmande proposed that Rousset retain the same attorney once used by Aernoult and often employed by Hervé, the celebrated Jacques Bonzon. Eventually de Marmande set up meetings and protests in Algiers, Oran, Marseilles, Toulon, Toulouse, Lyon, and many other cities where either the C.D.S. or the C.G.T. provided local sponsors. At that point de Marmande sent such "vivid reportage" of his findings, including other military "crimes", the "exploitive homosexual subculture at Douéra", and the miraculous transformation of Rousset, that no one could have suspected the dark cloud that would soon hover over his evolving role in the campaign.[41]

Initially, the campaign seemed to pump new life into the C.D.S.[42] The *Comité*, with the close support of *La Guerre Sociale*, printed cartoons and postcards concerning Aernoult and Rousset. It also promoted a popular song, "*Gloire à Rousset*," by Charles D'Avray, which soon became a standard piece at leftist

gatherings.[43] In 1910 Jules Grandjouan, whose work frequently appeared in *La Guerre Sociale*, created a poster *Bagne de Biribi* in which Marianne, the symbol of the republic, was depicted more as a shrew than a mother, who could not even get the body of the soldier-martyr Aernoult returned to France.[44] The C.D.S. did not limit itself to posters, postcards, cartoons, songs, meetings, rallies, and trials. Just after the railway strike at least one police agent thought that some allies of *La Guerre Sociale* on the C.D.S. may have considered kidnapping Prime Minister Briand, terrorist acts against the French police, blowing up railway bridges, as well as the burning of the *chateaux* and forests of the Rothschilds as valid means to win freedom for the victims of French justice.[45]

On March 20, 1910 the C.D.S. printed a poster entitled *A Bas Biribi!* which was sometimes seen as the true beginning of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign. The poster attacked both the murder of Aernoult and the judgment against Rousset. It called the military conviction of Rousset an attempt to silence him, and described his conviction as a crucifixion by the military judges. It also accused the Minister of War of covering up the criminal actions by military authorities, while the parliamentary system was tainted by complicity with such ministerial despotism. Obviously, both Biribi and the *conseils de guerre* were assailed in the process. The poster also pressed soldiers sent to Biribi to desert, but if that were not possible, they were advised to kill their officers.[46] Obviously, the language of the poster was quite incendiary.

> "SOLDIERS! If you feel yourself threatened, menaced by Biribi, do not hesitate, DESERT! If you have not had time to desert, if you are heading to the military prisons, where torture and death await you, remember that the military crimes already committed legitimize all reprisals against the murderers in authority. These officers and *chaouchs*,[47] are men who martyr and kill, and their execution on a day of rebellion would be greeted enthusiastically by all men who love liberty; they are executioners; you have a bayonet; use it!"[48]

Such an incendiary poster could well have been a deliberate attempt by the C.D.S. to instigate legal proceedings under the 1881 law covering freedom of the press as modified in the early 1890s in *les lois scélérates* as Cerullo argues. The new laws were aimed not just against terrorist acts but public support of such activities even after the fact. The revised laws continued to be applied in the ensuing years as they were during the successful prosecution against A.I.A. during *L'Affiche Rouge* trial of December 1905. However, such cases were not always successful for the government, and even when they were, the propaganda value for the defendants had to be taken into consideration. The *enragé* militants on the C.D.S., which then included members of *La Guerre Sociale*, had "made a fateful decision" which

would put them at the heart of the agitation surrounding Aernoult and now Rousset. By transcending the socialist tactics of supplicating government officials and organizing vast funeral parades, the C.D.S. had decided on a legal strategy which would "invite prosecution by blanketing working class quarters" of France with their "deliberately provocative poster." Then juries could decide for themselves whether violent rhetoric was justified after the cover-up in Oran.[49]

Hervé hoped that a trial of the sixteen signers of the poster might reverberate, as his own trials generally aimed to do, to incite the people to act. If it did not, he hoped that the mother of Aernoult would attack the Minister of War.[50] In the end, both Hervé and the C.D.S. got their wish when the government called for a trial of the poster's signers to be held that July 1910. A prosecution of the poster was risky for the government because it would open up the legal proceedings surrounding the death of Aernoult to public scrutiny. The *Comité* wanted to do more than assail Biribi and the general problems of military justice. For them Aernoult and Rousset symbolized the proletariat itself, so their interest in the two victims of Biribi was subordinate to a larger interest in a legal system which so perniciously served the entire French system of class domination. Aernoult and Rousset were victims of a system of oppression "by uniformed thugs whose entire *raison d'être* rested on manufactured national rivalries and the grand fraud of patriotism." For the C.D.S. the fates of a couple of soldiers in Algeria implied "an ever broadening range of targets." The two working class victims, Aernoult and Rousset, had been enmeshed in Biribi which was connected to a military justice system that was produced by "the social pathology of militarism" on which capitalism itself depended.[51]

Ironically, legislation introduced in the *Chambre* on April 11, 1910 announced the government's goal of moving most of the *bagnes militaires* to metropolitan France, but such a promised goal would never have satisfied the ultimate revolutionary quest of the C.D.S. which demanded an end to the current military and political systems of oppression. To wit, members of the C.D.S. on the evening of April 19 joined with Aernoult's parents, an ex-prisoner who had witnessed the death of Aernoult, and various other militants and spectators in a protest meeting organized by the Revolutionary Socialist Youth of the 4th *arrondissement*. At that gathering an audience of around three hundred heard a series of speakers describe the events at Djennan-ed-Dar as "mere symptoms" of the "broader pathologies within the bourgeois order." One crucial speech came from Louis-Jean Thuillier, a co-founder of the C.D.S. and the secretary of the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*. Although Thuillier would soon become an arch enemy of Hervéism, Cerullo argued that in the spring of 1910 he "most clearly incorporated the Aernoult-Rousset

matter into the Hervéist worldview, reminding his audience of the army's role in crushing labor disturbances and asserting that Aernoult had been killed not because he was a disciplinary problem but because he was a 'revolutionary.'" At that point in the evening, probably the favorite songwriter of the Hervéists, Gaston Montéhus, urged Aernoult's parents to track down their son's killers themselves. Then, while fondling his own gun, the revolutionary singer proceeded to argue that the *conseils de guerre* would never fade away due to parliamentary activities.[52]

With *L'Humanité*'s interest in the affair apparently waning in the opinion of the Hervéists, and de Marmande devoting most of his attention to the C.D.S., the chief propagandists for the campaign at *La Guerre Sociale* became Anton Jobert and then Goldsky. The Hervéist *hebdomadaire* sent money to Rousset in prison, and it joined with the C.D.S. in promoting the return of Aernoult's body for burial in France. In the spring of 1910, the C.D.S. and *La Guerre Sociale* jointly funded de Marmande's trip to Algeria to meet with Rousset in the prison of Douéra, to inquire about the death of Aernoult, and to seek the return of the latter's remains.[53] In the summer of 1910 the imprisoned Hervé called on the C.G.T. to act to get Aernoult's body back to France since the S.F.I.O. was too cowardly to act. In late June 1910, Hervé called on the S.F.I.O. and *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* to get ready to protest at Longchamp on Bastille Day in favor of Rousset and against the disciplinary companies, but Louis Dubreuilh, the Secretary-General of the S.F.I.O., let it be known that the antimilitarists could expect some support in the revolutionary sections of the Seine, such as the 11th, the 13th, the 14th, the 15th, the 19th, and the 20th, but nothing further because the party was getting ready for its National Congress in Paris in mid-July.[54] Hervé continued to press the C.G.T. for once "to end its purely corporative demands in order to try to lead the people into the streets for a vast peaceful protest against Biribi."[55] In the July 13 issue of *La Guerre Sociale*, despite the apparent lack of socialist enthusiasm, Hervé repeated his demands that socialists and the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* get engaged in Rousset's plight and organize for the July 14 protest demonstration at Longchamp.[56] By mid-August 1910, the Minister of War, following the prior official statements, announced that the companies of discipline would be transferred from North Africa to France. Yet the other half of Biribi, the military penitentiaries and public works, remained in North Africa.[57]

It was a bit ironic that Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* complained more about socialist and syndicalist lack of action rather than their lack of cooperation, because in June 1910 the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* brusquely rejected an invitation by the socialists to join them in the planned demonstrations in Paris for Aernoult's funeral. The C.D.S. secretary Thuillier urged militants to have "nothing

to do" with the socialists in that event. He went so far as to call for separate demonstration in both Paris and Romainville. The C.D.S. snub of the socialists proved to be moot in this instance because in June the government was working to delay the exhumation and transfer of Aernoult's remains. Despite the anger of the socialists at such perfidy in the heart of the campaign, they had failed to bring Aernoult's remains home. Rather than engage in counterproductive infighting, the socialist response was to propose a "mixed commission" which would include equal representation from the S.F.I.O., the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, and the C.D.S. The mixed Commission then could orchestrate "the violent campaign of protest against the attitude of the government."[58] If the mixed commission would eventually show how organizational legerdemain could never substitute for unity of purpose and political will, it may have satisfied socialist goals of keeping "their friends close and their enemies closer."

At any rate, the overly optimistic socialist wishes that the body of Aernoult would be returned to France in October proved to be false because the government decided not to lift the exhumation ban. Perhaps those misplaced hopes arose partly due heightened expectations following the trial and acquittals of the signers of the C.D.S. poster *A Bas Biribi*! on July 4–5, 1910. Cerullo called that trial "the high point of the Aernoult-Rousset Affaire to date." Such an assessment resonates because the trial seemed to galvanize the *enragés* and propel the C.D.S. into the vanguard of the Aernoult-Rousset campaign. For militants it was difficult to decipher exactly who the worst villains were in this proletarian affair: the henchmen of the military machine or their enablers among the socialists in the *Chambre*. The syndicalist weekly *La Voix du Peuple* used barely veiled anti-Semitism to charge the Radicals and Dreyfusards in Parliament with favoritism toward Dreyfus and near disinterest in proletarian victims like Aernoult and Rousset. Even more significantly, the trial forced "the government to carefully consider which it valued more: the political insularity of military justice or the political neutralization of the antimilitarist movement. After the trial, it would become increasingly clear that one could be achieved only at the expense of the other."[59]

Political activists in France were long accustomed to actually seek trials in order to promote their case. Zola had done that during the Dreyfus Affair. Hervé, himself, did that throughout his pre-war career, and the men who signed *A Bas Biribi*! included some of his associates on *La Guerre Sociale* and those close to it including Emile Tissier, Charles-Albert, René de Marmande, and Jean Goldsky.[60] In such trials, the defendants not only sought to exonerate themselves, they sought to accuse others who were seen as guilty of offenses, criminal acts, or vile policies which the defendants wanted highlighted. All manner of witnesses were

called who could help establish the actual circumstances surrounding the death of Aernoult as well as the reactions of Rousset, the realities in Biribi, and the nature of military justice in general as well as the governmental cover-up and complicity in the crimes. Deputies, former Communards, various luminaries on the Left, prominent journalists, former prisoners, and even the parents of Aernoult were there to make the defense case. The defense attorneys made the following arguments. (1) The *compagnies de discipline*, unlike the *Bats d'Af*, were fundamentally illegal because they "operated without explicit statutory authorization." Thus it was the military itself that should have been brought into court to be tried. (2) Since the poster aimed at correcting an injustice already committed, it would be grotesque to condemn the signers for a passage taken out of context and without regard to motive. That was exactly what was wrong with military justice. (3) Compared to the horrid physical violence of Biribi and the overt deceptions of the government, could the excessive protest rhetoric in an admittedly flagrant poster really be seen as criminal? In the end, it took the jury but a few minutes to clear the signers of all charges.[61]

On July 23, 1910, just over two weeks after the trial, the C.D.S. generated another propaganda coup by posting placards which reprinted a letter that Aernoult's parents sent to the Minister of Justice asking him to initiate legal proceedings against their son's murderers since the recent acquittals for the signers of *A Bas Biribi*! validated the testimony of witnesses regarding the death of their son and implicitly indicted the three assassins. Obviously, the minister could not satisfy such a request since the matter was restricted to a military jurisdiction. In the end the government would have to choose which jurisdiction to follow: "the court of public opinion" or that of the military, since public agitation was bound to continue if the officers remained immune to prosecution. Either way it was going to be impossible to avoid political interference.[62]

The results of the trial meant that the C.D.S. could claim victory for its methods of activism even though, outside the newspapers and groups on the extreme Left, there was apparently little interest in the trial among the general public. Though the political base for antimilitarism and the Aernoult-Rousset Affair may have been rather narrow, the C.D.S. could now argue that its poster, trial, and recent acquittals "had advanced the Aernoult-Rousset cause further in two days than Socialists had in seven months." After the trial, their fellow *enragés* at *La Guerre Sociale* now called for the *compagnies de discipline* to be transferred to France and placed under popular inspection and control as a minimum demand. In fact, that summer included two other trials and acquittals of antimilitarists charged with "verbal violence against military justice." The government now had strong

evidence that public opinion, at least among certain groups, could be mobilized against it fairly easily, and that meant that the Aernoult-Rousset campaign could instigate major protest demonstrations. Before the trial the government generally seemed content to obstruct activists. After the trial officials sought to placate them by making "strategic concessions … at the expense of the integrity of the military jurisdiction itself." Above all, the government seemed determined to forestall all major public events which antimilitarists were determined to create around the returned remains of Aernoult. What followed, as Cerullo explains it, was a series of governmental actions which surrendered control over certain procedures that had long been in the hands of the military. Eventually it would become apparent that control of those procedures had become expendable political capital which could be sacrificed to prevent the public demonstration of antimilitarist strength. However reluctantly, military justice would have to be compromised in order to maintain an image of a France that could not be sacrificed: the nation could not relinquish the trust and respect for its military.[63]

Following their successful propaganda coups, the C.D.S. militants seemed to have proved the benefits of their confrontational tactics. However, the socialists were far closer to the centers of power. They had elected deputies in Parliament and their daily newspaper was an established voice on the Left. The socialists had been initially thwarted in their efforts to bring home the remains of Aernoult and unite the Left around a moderate, pragmatic program of reform. However, the "legalistic" socialists remained anxious to continue the fight, and they were well placed to push the government to respond to their concerns. If they were successful, socialists would show militants how governmental authorities could be successfully confronted using less abrasive methods. The socialists in *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* and their friends there continued to press the ministry to delve into the events in North Africa. Throughout the summer of 1910 socialists also managed to coordinate the arrangements for the creation of the proposed "mixed commission". They also chose to use their voices in the *Chambre* to initiate interpellations to pressure the ministry to reopen inquiries over the death of Aernoult, the testimony of witnesses cited in earlier legal findings, and the charges against Rousset. When officials attempted to placate and stall, *L'Humanité* threatened "to publicly expose the inner workings of military justice" if the ministry didn't respond to socialist concerns.[64]

But the government did respond. As early as September 1910 the Commission became aware of a military inquest into the death of Aernoult by General Rabier who was "the only general honest enough to present guarantees of objectivity" according to Pierre Renaudel.[65] By January 14, 1911 *L'Humanité* reported

that General Rabier's inquest was an overwhelming indictment of military responsibility in the death of Aernoult, however unintentional the actions of the officers involved.[66] Even though General Rabier's report forced further delays in returning Aernoult's remains, enabling the government to once again temporarily forestall a large Parisian demonstration, the military jurisdiction was at last opened to increasing public scrutiny. That "ministerial decision, taken under political pressure," amounted to a rejection of the inquiry previously conducted by a military court. The fact that the military inquiry had now been superseded assured that future legal decisions would be politically driven. On its own, the system of military justice would never have reached this point. The result could only be seen as a major victory for socialists using traditional legislative procedures. And that socialist pressure would eventually affect what happened to Rousset and his military accusers in North Africa.[67]

During the first year of the campaign, the C.D.S. and *La Guerre Sociale* seemed to act with one voice. These two often overlapping formations painted a portrait of Rousset as a victimized worker from *bâtiment* with a "heart of gold" hampered only by a weak character and a poor environment. Actually, Rousset seems to have come from a family of petty thieves.[68] For the French Left the act of speaking out about the fate of Aernoult had redeemed Rousset. De Marmande soon compared Rousset to Picquart; other writers at *La Guerre Sociale* compared him to Dreyfus. The left-wing press often compared the Aernoult-Rousset Affair to that of Dreyfus, it was "the Dreyfus Affair of the working class." Rousset's letters to his own family and to the parents of Aernoult were published by *La Guerre Sociale* and other newspapers of the Left in an effort to create sympathy among their readers.[69] Obviously the campaign provided pertinent support for Hervéist antimilitarism, antipatriotism, and anticolonialism. As in earlier campaigns the individual, Rousset, was less important than his symbolic value.[70] Rousset, himself, eventually would come to realize that he was being used by the various forces of the Left not only in their struggles with the government but in their attacks on each other.

John Cerullo's comments on the role that Rousset was being assigned by the extreme French Left are certainly worth citing. "Like other *Affaires*, the Aernoult-Rousset Affair was filtered to the public through the media as a grand moral drama. In this instance, what was on public display can be described as a sort of proletarian Dreyfus Affair, with Aernoult cast as the Dreyfusian sacrificial lamb (or, alternately, moral pollutant) and Rousset, the Zola-esque champion of Truth and Justice (or, alternatively, self-serving reprobate)."[71] The Dreyfus Affair had villains like Major Esterhazy and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, while the Aernoult-Rousset

Affair had villains like Lieutenants Sabatier, Beignier, and Casanova. For the Left, Aernoult had taken on the aspect of the martyr who suffered for the cause of justice just like Dreyfus, except that the proletarian Aernoult actually died, while the bourgeois Dreyfus eventually returned home to his family. In the Dreyfus Affair, the heroes were bourgeois men like Zola, Picquart, or even Jaurès, not criminal proletarians like Rousset. Because former Dreyfusards like Jaurès could easily be accused of hypocrisy by the *enragés* of the extreme Left if they seemed to support the Aernoult-Rousset Affair less intensely than they had defended Dreyfus, Cerullo suspects that those militants "were consciously attempting to co-opt the Aernoult-Rousset case for their own special uses." For that reason Cerullo argued "that the formation of an anti-militarist coalition on the left held a low priority" for many of the militants of the extreme Left.[72] If the bifurcation of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair into moderate versus *enragé* elements has obvious heuristic value, it does not explain the rancorous divisions among the *enragés*.

In early September 1910 the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign was kept alive when news reached Paris concerning the death by firing squad of a young military prisoner named Dulèry who had been "found guilty simply of defending himself against his brutal guards." This news prompted Hervé to wonder where the anarchist terrorists were when France desperately needed them to avenge the evils done by Briand.[73] In late September, on the eve of the railway strike, Hervé called for the suppression of the *bagnes militaires*, the *conseils de guerre*, the *travaux publics*, and the *police des moeurs* (military prisons, war councils, public works, and the vice-squad).[74] At the same time *La Guerre Sociale* and the C.D.S. announced their support of a recent poster *Galonnés Assassins!* printed by a newly created group of former military prisoners called *Le Groupe Des Libérées Des Bagnes Militaires*. Formed in May 1910, closely tied to the C.D.S., and led by the ex-military prisoner Émile Aubin, this new group worked for the suppression of the *bagnes militaries*. Even though it was small and relatively unimportant, Aubin's group was deeply involved in the evolution of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign.[75]

For *La Guerre Sociale* this campaign became a chance to get the S.F.I.O., *L'Humanité*, the C.G.T., the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, and *Le Comité de Défense Sociale* into a coalition where Hervéism would have a chance to predominate. When this perfect Hervéist coalition was finally achieved, it proved to be even less solid than any of the other Hervéist efforts at revolutionary concentration. The coalition seemed to come apart while it was in the process of formation. The refusal of the French government to allow the exhumation of Aernoult in the summer of 1910 was merely the occasion, not the cause, of the commencement of the unraveling of such an uneasy coalition.[76] It soon became apparent that each

of the partners in the campaign hoped to use the situation for its own advantage. Certainly none of the other partners wanted to become a satellite of *La Guerre Sociale*.

Despite evidence of internal dissension among the members of the Aernoult-Rousset coalition, the government feared the propaganda and demonstrations that the campaign was capable of creating. So it tried to delay the return of Aernoult's body as long as it could. The government claimed that the North African 1910 summer heat prevented an exhumation, and it accused the Left of just wanting "to display the body." This impasse in the campaign coupled with the propaganda coup which the militants of the C.D.S. received after the trial for the poster *A Bas Biribi*! led to the creation of a mixed Commission in September 1910 made up of the leaders of three groups: the S.F.I.O., the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, and the C.D.S. The purpose of the Commission was to pressure Briand to allow the return of the body and then to create a massive demonstration once the body arrived in Paris. In the early period of the campaign the Hervéists were prominent in the C.D.S. and they tried to control the situation from that position once the Commission was created. However, competition from anarchists and then syndicalists on the C.D.S. always prevented Hervéist control.[77] In fact, the mixed Commission was something of a marriage of convenience; even though it had a fixed goal, the arrangements associated with the return of Aernoult's remains, it was unable to remedy the underlying tension between moderates and militants.[78]

The French police had an interest in preventing a united Commission. So did each of the partners if they could not direct the campaign. The presence of at least one police spy representing the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* may have sabotaged the stated purpose of the Commission and the interests of *La Guerre Sociale*. Lucien Métivier, later proven to have been a spy for the Ministry of the Interior since May 1908, worked to hinder the Commission by keeping representatives of the C.G.T. separated from those of the S.F.I.O. and the Hervéists of the C.D.S. Ironically, Métivier's standard syndicalist practice satisfied the interests of the French government. The continuing efforts of the police to isolate, hinder, and imprison Hervéists indicate that the police had little doubt about their enemy. One can only conclude that the motives of Hervé's *rectification* were less dubious than certain scholars once postulated.

Probably unrelated to police counter-subversion, the Commission as a whole seems to have developed ill feelings toward René de Marmande. By late September 1910 the Commission succeeded in getting the parents of Aernoult to withdraw the powers held personally by de Marmande concerning the return of their

son's remains, thereby granting those powers to the Commission as a whole.[79] In November 1910 Thuillier was given the new mandate by the Commission to go to Algeria.[80] Whatever chance the Hervéists had of controlling the campaign was probably over now that a high-ranking syndicalist had replaced René de Marmande, a man close to, if not always trusted by, *La Guerre Sociale*. But in November 1910, just weeks after the railway strike and well before the formalization of *militarisme révolutionnaire*, Hervéist-syndicalist acrimony was not yet constant. In late 1910 the chief antagonism within the Commission, according to Émile Tissier, was between the legalists of the S.F.I.O. who favored calm and the violent representatives of the C.D.S. including the Hervéists and the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine* who favored uproar. Tissier argued that the militants were in the majority and should be followed, yet the cash-strapped C.D.S. could not afford to disdain the "deep socialist pockets" when they hoped to tap into any leftover money from the *souscription* fund to support their own activities. Certainly financial issues added to the chronic bickering within the mixed Commission.[81]

In his fascinating and detailed account of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, John Cerullo echoes Tissier's characterization by stressing the conflict between the legalists and the *enragés*. However, that binary analysis, helpful as it is, actually simplifies a far more complex reality as Cerullo's own study shows. The obvious conflicts on the campaign Commission involved rivalries among the C.D.S., the *Union des Syndicats*, and the *Fédération de la Seine* of the S.F.I.O. Cerullo stressed how *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* itself was divided between legalists, who advocated a nonpartisan commitment to justice, and leftists, whose commitment to justice "placed the league on the side of the workers."[82] If it is helpful to describe those three groups on the Commission as *enragé* "intellectuals," syndicalists, and parliamentary socialists, one must still admit that each of the groups was divided into various factions and interests, often involving rival leaders. Certainly, there was a potential for internal struggle within the C.D.S. itself. In early 1911 the problems within the C.D.S. were becoming as complex as those among the campaign Commission as a whole. At a C.D.S. meeting on February 22, 1911 in which Thuillier replaced the Hervéist Tissier as Secretary of the *Comité*, many members attacked Hervé's new ideas. The Ministry of the Interior reported that the new Secretary as well as Métivier were especially concerned about eliminating the influence of *La Guerre Sociale* from the C.D.S. and the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign in general. The syndicalists hoped to replace Hervéist support in the campaign with a growing participation of the unions.[83] At a time when preparations were being made for the syndicalist daily newspaper, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, the syndicalists had superseded the Hervéists on the C.D.S.

Talk about a syndicalist newspaper had been going on for some before the April 1911 creation of the *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, which soon took a place on the Commission for the return of Aernoult's remains and was closely tied to the *Union des Syndicats*. When the Commission needed to name another delegate to Algeria to obtain the release of the body, the rivalry between the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O. was exacerbated. So Pierre Renaudel became a joint delegate with Thuillier to satisfy the socialists on the Commission. Such rivalries were not unusual but greater problems existed as well. As early as the summer of 1911, there were indications that *La Guerre Sociale* was being driven out as a leader of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign.[84] Hervé's new ideas of *militarisme révolutionnaire* coupled with rivalries among *La Guerre Sociale*, *La Bataille Syndicaliste* as well as *L'Humanité* reflected or exacerbated divisions within the Commission, the C.D.S., and the entire campaign.[85] Those syndicalists who were also socialists openly deplored the creation of *La Bataille Syndicaliste* which they called an "out of control" and anarchist paper that acted as a divisive agent. To these syndicalists *L'Humanité* was the "only paper of the working class", and the socialist daily had its own financial troubles even without competition from *La Bataille Syndicaliste*.[86]

When the second Briand Ministry gave way to the government of Ernest Monis on March 2, 1911, the French Left hoped the new Ministry would seek to settle the affair that it had inherited.[87] But the C.D.S. soon grew impatient and issued a new poster demanding that Maurice Berteaux, the new Minister of War, free Rousset.[88] Campaign officials were far from pleased with the ongoing delays in the release of Aernoult's remains, and the continuing presence of an apparently biased military investigator in the ongoing inquiries in Algeria. In February 1911 a Dr. Crespin of the Medical Faculty in Algiers was assigned to examine the head of Aernoult for evidence of trauma, and those examinations took over a month to complete. After first being sent to Algiers, the head of Aernoult was shipped on to Paris, so that at least part of the victim's remains did get to Paris, at least temporarily, around a year before the rest of his body.[89] Despite some positive signals from the new Monis-Berteaux Ministry, the corpse of Aernoult remained in Algeria, and the Ministry again cited summer heat to justify their refusal to the latest request by Aernoult's parents on May 31, 1911.[90] In early 1911 the C.D.S. was active in the Jules Durand Affair, the so-called "Dreyfus Affair of the Poor" involving a death sentence for a union leader involved in the a death of a scab worker during strike actions at Le Havre in August 1910, and it supported the railway workers still out of work following the October 1910 strike.[91] Throughout 1911 the C.D.S. was engaged in printing postcards of Aernoult and Durand to sell to workers who could mail them to the French President, French Ministers,

and even to imprisoned victims.[92] In the end, the press campaign, the actions of the C.D.S., the *démarches* of Jacques Bonzon (Rousset's attorney), and the conclusion of General Rabier's inquest finally moved the Minister of War, Maurice Berteaux, to grant Rousset a pardon in April 1911. The Minister of War had been given just enough evidence about an improvement in Rousset's conduct so that he felt able to take the opportunity to pardon him, perhaps hoping to let some of the air out of the campaign. However, that pardon did nothing to expedite the return of Aernoult's remains, nor was it the last to be heard from Rousset.[93]

Rousset's pardon soon appeared to be a Pyrrhic victory because, contrary to military prison policy as it stood then, Rousset was assigned to another *compagnie de discipline* at Médéa, Algeria where his reputation as a troublemaker had preceded him and his particular unit was about to be sent to a combat zone in Morocco. Since the question of pardons remained "contested terrain", with both the military jurisdiction and war ministry claiming authority, Rousset could not be placed out of harm's way so easily. Predictably, more protests regarding Rousset's new posting came from both the C.D.S. and *L'Humanité*, so Berteaux was put on notice regarding the well-being of the former prisoner.[94] Then, for a brief moment, luck appeared to be with Rousset. Just after his arrival at Médéa, Algeria, he became gravely ill, entered a hospital on July 6, 1911, and was operated on five days later. The operation was successful, and he remained at Médéa for his convalescence, thus precluding his assignment to an active military zone in Morocco. On September 8, 1911 he was expected to appear at the *conseil de guerre* in Oran to bear witness against the officers accused of murdering Aernoult. However, in late August, just a week before his scheduled appearance at the *conseil de guerre* in Oran, a prisoner was murdered at Médéa in the presence of Rousset. René de Marmande was not the only leftist activist to believe that the hasty accusation against Rousset was connected to the imminent proceedings of the *conseil de guerre*. But most observers were not so sure.[95] What is absolutely certain is that this "Second Rousset Affair" would seriously affect those involved in the campaign for Aernoult's funeral.

Back in early June 1911, when Merle first received word that Rousset was to be sent with a regular battalion to Morocco, both *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* initially considered this a victory, but the C.D.S. and *La Guerre Sociale* soon suspected that Rousset's reassignment was an attempt to get rid of him.[96] Soon after he arrived in Médéa, a hundred miles south of Algiers around July 4, an inguinal hernia prevented him from deployment to Morocco on combat duty. That painful injury may have saved him from hazardous duty, but it could not stave off disaster. While he was waiting for convalescent leave to France to follow

his impending testimony at the September trial of Sabatier, Beignier, and Casanova, a dual calamity struck. Not only were the murderers of Aernoult acquitted on September 12, 1911, Rousset himself was accused of killing a fellow prisoner, a cook by the name of Augustin Brancoli, in a "dimly lit corridor of his barracks at Médéa," the night of August 27, 1911. This new charge against Rousset obviously made the acquittal of Aernoult's oppressors that much easier, and provided the military with a golden opportunity to protect its increasingly threatened "exceptional jurisdiction" from the encroaching politicization. This murder charge also came enmeshed in rumors of alleged homosexual rivalry, intimidation, and even rape as motivating factors. According to Gaston Dubois-Desaulle, who exposed the conditions in Biribi after undergoing his own sentence in a disciplinary company, open promiscuity in the camps was manipulated by camp authorities in order to better control the prisoners. Prison officials could distinguish the "active" from the "passive" homosexual, the aggressors or rapists from the victims. They could intervene in these sexual arrangements helping, hindering, protecting, or making vulnerable, all to facilitate control. Now Rousset was accused of being not only a chronic malingerer, an irremediable criminal, a troublemaker, and a petty thief, but also a notorious *malabar* (a violent sexual predator) and a murderer.[97]

The C.D.S. immediately sent Eugène Péronnet of *La Bataille Syndicaliste* as a delegate to Algeria in an effort to discover the facts of this new affair. The murder charge, laced with references to prison sexuality and disputes over fencing stolen goods, could only confirm and increase suspicions by the C.D.S. and at *La Guerre Sociale*.[98] They were convinced that fear and hatred had led the military to fabricate this latest accusation against Rousset.[99] This new Affair, coupled with the acquittal of the accused murderers of Aernoult, led the C.D.S. to issue a another poster titled *De Crime en Crime* concerning the governmental "plot" to frame Rousset in order to impugn his testimony on the death of Aernoult.[100] To the campaign leaders it seemed obvious that fear and hatred had led the military to this false accusation.[101] Still, many of his strongest defenders were dismayed because it took Rousset six weeks to come up with a counter-explanation for the death of Brancoli, other than unsupported claims of innocence tied to the argument that he was being railroaded to discount his testimony against the *assassins* of Aernoult.[102] Despite the best efforts of the French Left, Rousset received a twenty-year sentence of forced labor for the "murder."[103] This so-called "Second Rousset Affair" led the S.F.I.O. and even some members of the C.D.S. to become very skeptical about the character of Rousset. The conservative paper *L'Éclair* described Rousset's family as a virtual "pack of thieves," and it was dumbfounded about the apotheosis of Aernoult and the protestations

of innocence for Rousset.[104] *La Guerre Sociale*, however, continued to compare Rousset to Dreyfus and even to Christ!

In general, most *enragés* quickly rallied to Rousset even if they were not overly concerned about his guilt or innocence. There were larger issues involved than justice for either Brancoli or Rousset, namely: the elimination of the *conseils de guerre*, the dismantling of European militarism, and the long sought end of war and oppression in general. For C.G.T. Secretary-General Léon Jouhaux, Rousset had become a symbol of "'popular courage and workers' probity personified!'" and he could not be sacrificed. That being the case, the C.D.S. soon urged the C.G.T., the S.F.I.O., and *Le Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* to act in favor of Rousset and to finalize plans for the return of Aernoult's remains.[105] Just before the obsequies, the S.F.I.O. hesitated to commit itself completely because of Rousset's questionable record and socialist concerns that the C.G.T. wanted absolute control. In the end the S.F.I.O. supported the funeral arrangements, yet there were hints that socialists would drop the cause of Rousset soon after the funeral. The police claimed that the socialists did not want to appear less revolutionary than the syndicalists.[106]

Cerullo argues that moderates were led to rally behind Rousset partly due the efforts of René de Marmande, a defector from the ranks of the militants and the C.D.S. who "had developed a special personal relationship" with Rousset. In order to save his new friend, de Marmande found it necessary to break with the implicit code of the *enragés* and downplay confrontational and provocative rhetoric and actions. De Marmande must have realized that traditional political pressure stood a much better chance of disengaging Rousset from the gears of military justice in which he was now enmeshed. At this point radical antimilitarism was unlikely to save Rousset and might even prove lethal. So, this Hervéist *enragé* and one of the leading voices on the C.D.S. turned toward the moderates, reformists, legalists, and socialists—"'the intellectual and lettered public'" whose methods and continuing influence were much more likely to give Rousset a chance at ultimate redemption. Even if these new partners had agendas of their own, their tactics, which presented legal arguments underlining the weaknesses, lapses, gaps, inconsistencies, and contradictions of the case against Rousset, promised to be the best hope for gaining a favorable hearing from the authorities.[107]

When Rousset was found guilty of involuntary homicide in December 1911 by the Algiers *conseil de guerre*, his sentence was twenty years at forced labor. De Marmande and Rousset's attorney then took the legal, rather than the incendiary, path, and filed a formal appeal to the High Court of Appeals to quash the December verdict, and they urged the socialists to actively support Rousset's continuing

quest for justice by calling their attention to glaring irregularities in the recent trials in the evolving Aernoult-Rousset Affair. Gradually the socialists gave up their opposition to linking Aernoult's funeral arrangements with Rousset's more troubling case. In his effort to aid Rousset, de Marmande also actively courted *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen.* Just before the return of Aernoult's remains to France and the long-awaited accompanying funerary demonstration in Paris, the *Ligue* sent an open letter to the High Court of Appeals on January 7, 1912 imploring the magistrates to guarantee that "'bourgeois justice be equitable toward a worker-soldier.'" A month later prominent *Ligue* members including Louis Havet, Paul Painlevé, Wilfred Mond, Georges Russacq, and others became associated with the creation of *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*, which had as its secretary-treasurer none other than René de Marmande. Even though Havet was the president and Painlevé the vice president, the real voice of *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* was de Marmande. This new *Comité* also included elements from the anarchist newspaper *Les Temps Nouveaux*, whose editor Jean Grave, "bore no love for the C.D.S."[108]

This new *Comité* not only had "direct and effective" influence in the "halls of power", it was seen as a betrayal by many of de Marmande's former colleagues on the C.D.S. Even though Rousset got his freedom, if not lasting heroic status, de Marmande himself soon became a kind of pariah. De Marmande's old C.D.S. associates were furious with his overtures to the Dreyfusards in the *Ligue*, and they were not pleased with not being invited to a meeting at the *Ministère de la Guerre* to discuss complaints by Rousset regarding his incarceration conditions. Because of their unflagging devotion to Rousset and their expenses on his behalf, the C.D.S. thought they deserved to direct the movement, and not have to share control or give it up to a group of less-than-revolutionary "'intellectuals", "celebrity liberals" and "'millionaire' progressives". De Marmande did not see any need for an open breach between the two *comités* which he thought could simply employ different methods toward common goals, but "'war was declared'", nonetheless. For its part, the C.D.S. accelerated its protests and meetings in support of Rousset, replete with volatile language and incendiary threats, and not forgetting to excoriate "the very reformers and parliamentarians" who had become de Marmande's latest allies. On February 8, 1912, three days before Aernoult's remains reached Paris, Grave's newspaper published Rousset's entire Algiers trial dossier on behalf of *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*. Two days later *L'Humanité* published the full stenographic record of Rousset's December trial in Algiers. Such disclosures not only shed much light on the shortcomings of French military justice, they were propaganda coups, coming as they did on the eve of the

return of Aernoult's remains, which could not fail to activate the masses that all activists hoped would be gathering at Père-Lachaise the following day, Sunday, February 11, 1912.[109]

Despite rivalries and mutual recriminations, the actions of the campaign members had finally borne fruit. On November 1, 1911 the Ministry had directed the police and military authorities to approve the exhumation and transfer of Aernoult's remains.[110] In order to reduce the scope of potential demonstrations along the route to Paris, Marseilles was replaced by Port Vendres, in the department of Pyrénées Orientales, as the sight of disembarkation in France. The Commission still planned rallies along the railway passage of the body, especially at Perpignan and Montélimar, the home of Lieutenant Sabatier. In order to get an authorization for a Parisian demonstration, thereby preventing the government from sending the body directly to Romainville, the C.D.S. had to get Aernoult's parents to agree to live in Paris for three months. When Aernoult's parents finally relented to the C.D.S. change of address request, it was over the objections of Aernoult's mother.[111] After a meeting with Minister of the Interior and former Dreyfusard Théodore Steeg, Socialist Deputy Marcel Sembat got government assurances of cooperation. Prefect of Police Lépine was less gracious. Though he promised not to impede the demonstration, he did not want the body to be in Paris for more than one day. For that reason the arrival was delayed until late Saturday afternoon, February 10.

From now on the major concern of the mixed Commission was the organization of the demonstration itself, though some syndicalists worried that the authorities were not above using *agents provocateurs* to disrupt the event. Even the Radical newspaper *Le Rappel* believed that any violence would come from Lépine's nervousness rather than the ardor of the crowd. In the end it was decided that a security force of trusted militants, as in the second Ferrer demonstration, was necessary to prevent excesses by some demonstrators, though the police and the conservative press doubted that such a force would restrain anarchist hotheads.[112] Each of the commission's components remained free to appeal for support and participation from its membership in its own fashion.[113] In early February 1912 the C.D.S. issued a new poster entitled *Au Peuple de Paris* recalling the history of Aernoult's death and asking workers to participate at the funeral demonstration, thereby hastening the release of Rousset and protesting the existence of the North African *bagnes militaries* as well as the *conseils de guerre*. The police reported that demand for the C.D.S brochure on the Rousset Affair exceeded supply.[114] In the end virtually every French leftist organization participated in the funeral demonstration. The mixed campaign Commission seemed to have finally

prevailed in its mission, despite continuing infighting displayed throughout the campaign. *La Guerre Sociale* certainly stressed how an *entente* of the Left had produced success in the campaign. It proved to Hervé that antimilitarism was still a force in France even if he now wanted the army captured not destroyed. In an effort to rally Parisian workers, *La Guerre Sociale* recalled the mass support for Ferrer in 1909.[115]

After an exhumation in Algeria on February 2, 1912[116], the coffin arrived in Paris late Saturday afternoon February 10, 1912 following a voyage by ship and train via Oran and Port-Vendres. Government agreement on the return hinged on avoiding Marseilles and the danger of more antimilitarist demonstrations and propaganda. Throughout the journey provincial militants were summoned while Parisian workers were being mobilized. Generally peaceful rallies were reported at Marseilles, Saint-Étienne, Tours, Lorient, Angers, Orleans, and Niort.[117] Nevertheless, the funeral demonstration in Paris was the focal point of protest. The size of the Parisian crowd was unexpected, even by the promoters, and probably represented a mostly spontaneous outpouring by working classes and militants. Some police officials had predicted that the crowd would be fairly small, with no more than 20,000. The day after the demonstration *L'Humanité*, after noting how police estimates never exaggerate, concluded that the parade included 150,000 marchers. If there were a hundred thousand bystanders as well, then there were up to a quarter of a million people involved in the day's events. In fact, police estimates varied enormously, and the calculations by the Left were hardly unbiased or made with statistical precision. *L'Humanité*, itself, had different estimates in the same February 12 issue. Determinations regarding the size of the demonstration varied according to the perspective of the witnesses, but the rally must have been impressive because even the French police believed that the new Poincaré government would be forced to quickly revise the decision against Rousset. From all the data available, it seems fair to conclude that between 120,000 to 200,000 people marched to Père Lachaise that Sunday.[118] Undoubtedly, the good weather played a role in an especially impressive turnout for a winter Sunday. A moist strong wind swept the skies clear of the clouds which had lingered over Paris in the morning, so that the demonstration took place in mild sunshine.[119] To *La Libre Parole* the crowd may have been immense, but it was made up of foreigners and antipatriots rather than "real" Frenchmen.[120]

The itinerary of the journey was timed for a Saturday afternoon arrival of the casket at the Gare de Lyon with a Sunday march to Père Lachaise where the cremation would occur at the Columbarium. And Paris was ready. All the workers

of the capital had been called on to join in the funeral march for Aernoult which was also designed to show support for Rousset. The itinerary of the Sunday procession was set to begin around 2:15 p.m. starting at the Gare de Lyon. From there the funeral march was to proceed by way of the Boulevard Diderot, La Place de la Nation, the Avenue Philippe-Auguste, and on to Père Lachaise and the Columbarium.[121] Along the way, as the crowd grew, antimilitarist slogans and songs, grieving cries for the dead soldier, anger and calls for vengeance against his military assassins, and emotional support for the heroic Rousset as well as hostility toward Biribi, the *conseils de guerre*, and the Berry-Millerand Law could be heard among the marchers and spectators. Of course, there was a marked police presence. Squadrons of cavalry, armed *Gardes Républicains*, and Parisian *flics* were everywhere according to *La Bataille Syndicaliste*.[122] Yet a reporter for *Le Petit Parisien* saw troops only once all day.[123] *L'Humanité* called the funeral demonstration a protest rather than homage for a martyred working class soldier. Why? All along the route from the Gare de Lyon to Père Lachaise, the bystanders, who ranged from two to six rows deep, were more than curious observers. By their applause and encouragement for the marchers as well as their wearing of the traditional poppies and eglantines, "most bystanders acted as full participants in the demonstration." Such was the logic of the socialist daily when it claimed that the number of protesters was at least double the number of the marchers.[124]

Once the funeral cortège reached Père Lachaise, the demonstration's security men, who wore red brassards on their left arms, easily provided an open space near the platform for the funeral carriage, the Aernoult family, the campaign Commission, and the orators. While awaiting the arrival of the family and campaign officials, one could easily see the leadership of *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* marching behind the workers and socialists. The beautiful weather presaged an era of renewal in the opinion of *L'Humanité*'s reporter. The fair blue sky continued to grow as small white clouds drifted softly away pushed by the warm breeze. With the sun providing a gilded border to the cemetery's black cypresses, the procession seemed to unfold on a veritable springtime afternoon in February. At 3:20, just when the front of the procession appeared at the lane to the left of the speakers stand, all remnants of the clouds disappeared, and a large patch of blue sun-drenched sky spread out above the platform. Within minutes any empty space near the platform was filled by the front of the procession, as the waves of people pushed forward. In the middle of this rapid swirl, out of which came loud cries and indiscernible chants, the funeral carriage emerged, with flowers glistening against its

background. A taxi with the Aernoult family followed, and "one could see that Madame Aernoult's tears were not yet dry." Also visible on the casket was a black wooden cross as well as a wreath which Thuillier brought from the "*officiers, sous-officiers et soldats de Beni-Ounif, Algeria*," a sad and ironic reminder of Aernoult's fate. Militants, at some point, managed to throw the wreath into the gutter.[125]

As the flags were raised honoring the deceased and his family, one could easily hear the traditional revolutionary refrain, "*A bas les assassins!*" echo among the crowd. Then for a brief period the lyrics of *L'Internationale* were sung. After a short interlude of silence, the speakers, who were nominated by the three Commission groups, began the formal ceremonies which lasted 45 minutes. Thuillier, as secretary of the C.D.S., began the speeches. He stressed that the demonstration would be in vain if it only succeeded in avenging Aernoult and obtaining justice for Rousset. More important was the satisfaction of the people of Paris in gaining the suppression of the *conseils de guerre* and the *bagnes militaires* which the working class had nourished with its blood. The military monster had to be slain in Thuillier's view. He then assailed by name the evil military officers who made Aernoult a martyr, and he demanded a revision of the trial of Rousset, a victim of the hatred spawned by the *chiourme militaire* (military slave guards). The capitalist bourgeoisie were told how their own cruelty and injustice were the source of working class antimilitarism. Then a triple cry of vengeance ended the address: "*A bas Biribi! A bas les compagnies de discipline! A bas les assassins professionnels!*" This led to loud reverberations from those for whom his message was meant.

Then followed the *L'Internationale* and the *Hymne au 17e Régiment* sung by the tightly packed demonstrators. The next speaker was the syndicalist Auguste Savoie, who exalted the funeral demonstration, recalled the martyrdom of Aernoult, and praised the heroism of Rousset. He, too, demanded an end to military abominations which only degraded the idea of the nation. Another syndicalist, Bodéchon, was the third speaker, and he gave a detailed history of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, well-known to all, which reviled the assassins and branded the military institutions as the opprobrium of democracy. Sembat, who spoke in the name of the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine*, had only been named as a speaker that same morning. Nevertheless, his resonant voice carried as far as the most distant rows, whose uproar and confused murmurs were soon softened and silenced in order to hear him. The Socialist Deputy said that it was not enough to march only one time to glorify the memory of a martyr. This demonstration was only a beginning because further actions were necessary to demolish all that was

based on the capitalist bourgeois laws of steel and blood. Workers had to make the *Cour de Cassation* believe that the flagrant illegalities which contaminated the hateful verdict against Rousset were obvious. "We ought not forget the other victims of the bourgeois regime who wait in the Republic's jails hoping that workers and socialists can secure an amnesty from Parliament. Don't forget that Gustave Hervé, [Georges] Dumoulin, and other militants are in prison, and it depends on you to deliver them. When they are freed, you must remain standing and united to destroy capitalism and to create the new world of liberty and justice which the social Republic shall be." Léon Jouhaux then made a few brief, yet forceful, remarks, imploring the crowd to remember that there was no power or safety except in the heart of working class organizations which prepared the creation of that ideal world where the exploitation of men would end. "Ten years ago workers marched to free Dreyfus from his hangmen. It would be unjust to think that they would not march with more energy and force to destroy the *bagnes militaires* where their working class brothers suffer. Workers have proven today that they are resolved to act." Then Renaudel announced the end of the speeches on behalf of the organizing commission.

After the applause died down, the crowd moved on to the left and right of the Columbarium for the funeral service itself. As the crowd shifted positions, a light rain turned into a deluge but the crowd remained stoic, if drenched and muddied. Meanwhile, socialists and syndicalists created a linked chain of hands along the route at each side of the procession all the way to the Columbarium and even barring the cemetery entrance all in order to protect the funeral carriage and the Aernoult family's auto from the invasion of the crowd which had gathered along the sidewalks. That human chain was not so rigid as to prevent a worker from breaking through to deposit a cheap bouquet of violets whose color was accentuated by the red covering of the funeral carriage. The carriage and the auto moved forward protected by the chain of militants. However, the auto soon overheated and would not move. So the security team pushed the auto the entire five hundred meters to the Columbarium. Inside the auto the mother of Aernoult was so overwrought by the emotional day that she was overheard repeating, "Oh! My poor child!" Nevertheless, she closely observed all who bared their heads out of respect. After a moment of rest at the Columbarium, she appeared before the throng and said, "I want to see." When she discovered herself before the sea of humanity, she was heard muttering in a trembling voice, "No, no, I will never forget ..." Then her eyes fell on a banner which read: "*Mères, gardez vos fils.*" She was then heard to murmur, "They have taken mine from me!"[126]



Figure 24. Aernoult Family prior to the Funeral Procession to Père Lachaise, February 11, 1912. Bnf.

At the conclusion of the ceremonies many people streamed for the exits due to the darkening skies and the continuing threat of rain. Yet other people were still coming into the cemetery. The result was obvious: pushes, shoves, and long standstills which hastened the intervention of the police amidst a torrential deluge. *Gil Blas* spoke of four cavalry charges at the chief gate to the cemetery to clear the entrance and as a response to anarchist provocations.[127] In fact, trouble had started inside the cemetery itself when the police seized an anarchist banner that had not been folded up as ordered. This led to one fight with many others to follow. Socialist Deputies Sembat and Renaudel had some success getting the attention of police officials who restored some sense of calm. Nevertheless, fights and disorder continued on sporadically.[128] According to *Le Petit Parisien* none of the largely random acts of violence amounted to much. When the Secretary of the Renter's Union Cochon was arrested, he was not detained for long, though an accidental fire later on in Belleville did lead to more violence. The most flagrant police action, the arrest of a young mother while she suckled her baby, ended calmly when the press intervened with an official of the Prefecture of Police to obtain the woman's release. Although there were some disturbances near the gates

to Père Lachaise and in nearby neighborhoods as the demonstration died down, by 6:00 p.m. the troops and police were able to take their normal posts at least at Père Lachaise.[129]

L'Humanité described the exit from the cemetery as peaceful, and claimed that any incidents that did occur were due to the presence of troops. The limited number of arrests was a sign to the socialist daily that the police were not provoked.[130] Socialists also ascribed the relative calm to the decreased visibility of the police perhaps inspired by Prime Minister Poincaré's instructions to Lépine "to avoid any incidents."[131] *La Bataille Syndicaliste* believed that the police themselves had provoked the crowd's violence.[132] The conservative papers *L'Echo de Paris* and *Le Gaulois* assailed Minister of the Interior Steeg precisely because they viewed the demonstration as an anarchist assault on authority, a victory for the antimilitarists, and a desecration of sacred ground.[133] Though it branded the events a revolutionary demonstration, the Bonapartist *L'Autortité* was not particularly sympathetic to police after its correspondent and other innocent bystanders were attacked by them.[134] Even police estimates of the damages done to Père Lachaise were low (i.e. less than 1500 francs), given the size of the crowd. Though there were twenty-six arrests along with twenty-three wounded policemen according to *L'Humanité*, that paper mocked the police list of wounded by noting how one of the injured police had merely sustained a bruised knuckle.[135] For his part, John Cerullo mentioned "scattered violence" as the demonstrators exited the cemetery and "streamed into the city."[136] Most of the troubles seem to have arisen from the negative perception of police efforts to prevent obstruction when the crowd began to leave the cemetery following the speeches by leftist militants near the Columbarium.[137]

Among the thousands of marchers and bystanders on February 11 was Alfred Dreyfus, a member of de Marmande's *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*, who signed their manifesto on the eve of the funeral demonstration. In response to Eugène Merle's open letter in *La Guerre Sociale* calling on Dreyfus to defend a working class victim of military justice, Dreyfus responded by urging that justice be done even for an individual like Rousset with such a questionable prior record. Unwilling to attack the army and unable to see a real parallel between the possible crimes of a few officers against Rousset and the actions of the army in his Affair, Dreyfus, nevertheless, supported justice for all men, and he promised his full support to Rousset if his innocence were verified.[138] Dreyfus's cautious comments seemed to contradict his signature on the manifesto drafted by de Marmande which was much more provocative in terming the sentence for Rousset an execution rather than a judgment.[139]

How would the great demonstration at Aernoult's *obsèques* affect the fate of Rousset, "the new Dreyfus"? The vast crowds honoring a victim of Biribi on Sunday February 11 must have seemed like glaring evidence for the continuing strength of the French antimilitarist movement. However, the great turnout for the obsequies still appeared unlikely to impress the judges of the High Court of Appeals in advance of their reconsideration of Rousset's case, which was set for February 21, 1912.[140]

The funeral for Aernoult did not end the increasing acrimony between *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. Episodic cooperation between the two papers against things like the Berry-Millerand Law, which threatened leftist militants and workers guilty of insubordination with military induction as well as military prison, did nothing to cancel this growing clash within the extreme Left.[141] In late February 1912 Merle wrote to the convalescing Almereyda concerning the evil influence of *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. Merle hoped that *La Guerre Sociale* could soon become a daily and thus be able to compete more directly against the syndicalist daily.[142] At a C.D.S. meeting in favor of Rousset held on March 20, 1912, police claimed that Victor Méric, the main literary and satirical writer on *La Guerre Sociale*, was abusive to Pierre Monatte, the editor of *La Vie Ouvrière* and a member of the Administrative Council of *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, when Monatte wanted to discuss Hervé's new ideas.[143]

Ironically, the virtual culmination of this Affair did not lead to long-term reforms of military justice partly because the public temper was changing. In the wake of the Agadir Crisis, the Caillaux Ministry finally fell, one month prior to Aernoult's obsequies. Increasingly, national priorities would focus on military strength and preparedness rather than the critical appraisal and reform of military justice. On March 25, 1912 the Berry-Millerand Law passed through the *Chambre* with surprising ease after the socialists left the hall to protest a speech on the taxi strike.[144] The law expanded the categories of judicial offenses subject to discipline in the *Bats d'Af* beyond the legislation of 1905. Although it reduced military prison terms for some civil crimes, it also targeted proponents of antimilitarism guilty of "'outrages against the army, provocations to disobedience, desertion, and insubordination' as well as strike-related sabotage."[145] The law arose out of Millerand's goal of bolstering army cohesion and increasing the stature of officers in the wake of the Second Moroccan Crisis, but the Left branded the law a "new *loi scélérate*" and it led to nationwide protests by socialists, syndicalists, anarchists, and even feminists. The new law was undoubtedly a sign of the changing times, and antimilitarists certainly sensed the altered mood.[146]

In the aftermath of the February 11 demonstration, discordant voices misinterpreted its significance in different ways. To some on the extreme Left, the violence that day was provoked by the police due to their fear of *le peuple*. Some even assumed that these events portended the dawning of a revolutionary epoch. To many on the Right, the violence was "the work of foreigners and *apaches*, who actually made up most of the crowd and were far more interested in petty theft and property damage than in solidarity with the victims of Biribi". The demonstration seemed to be exactly what the government had always feared: evidence of antimilitarist strength in France which everyone in the world could see, including the nation's enemy beyond the Rhine. The day after the obsequies, *La Bataille Syndicaliste* boasted about the working class ability to disrupt a mobilization order should their bourgeois enemies foolishly order one. However, several more objective newspapers realized that the demonstration had actually been relatively peaceful given the huge crowds and the ubiquitous forces of order.[147] The writers at *Le Temps* had a different take on the day's events because they were already witnessing popular patriotism on display with the return of the military parades even before Aernoult's remains got to Paris. "The demonstration yesterday would make you believe that antimilitarism has won over the population and that an army of anarchists is occupying Paris … The same people who demonstrated yesterday, tomorrow would gladly follow the regimental bands which marched through the streets Saturday night. These military parades have happily managed to awaken the military spirit in a people who have always delighted in it."[148]

In hindsight it seems clear that patriotism and even militarism were not the main objects of attack. What seemed to be going on was empathy for working class victims of a miscarriage of military justice. If Minister of War Millerand did not yet realize that, he could still attempt to placate the people with leniency, however undeserved, toward Rousset. Such a policy would help "to belie [the] antimilitarists' contention that the Third Republic would never quench its thirst for proletarian blood." Such a policy could also work to split moderate from *enragé* elements by removing a source of public outrage. However, Millerand's first inclination was to strengthen the military, bolster its leadership, reassert its prerogatives, and consolidate its authority, even involving military justice. He probably hoped that the Rousset business would fade away after Aernoult's obsequies, but on February 22, 1912 the High Court of Appeals overturned the December verdict against Rousset due to questions of improper procedure. That put the decision back in the hands of the military regarding the initiation of a new investigation. Thus, the High Court's decision created new opportunities as well as potential pitfalls according to Cerullo. The timing could play into the hands

of the extremists by making it seem that street demonstrations were an effective means of undoing military justice. Reform-minded legalists worried about the court's decision because redoing the case in Algeria seemed to put Rousset in continuing jeopardy. At this point de Marmande's *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* decided to stress procedural concerns which generated interest among former Dreyfusards who spoke out and organized throughout the rest of the winter and into the spring of 1912. That also made the "turncoat" and "sellout" de Marmande a bigger target for the *enragés* who continued their own much broader campaign for Rousset. Even though demonstrations for Rousset "were multiplying and growing more vehement" after Aernoult's obsequies, Cerullo argues that the protest movement was increasingly bifurcated.[149]

The details of the reexamination of Rousset's case are beyond the scope of this study. Suffice to say that the accused and his attorney, with help from supporters in both camps, including Rousset's brother, had become the accusers. Through various types of witness tampering, including intimidation, traditional bribery, or other types of rewards (initially by the army and then by the C.D.S.) as well as evidence of subornment, former witnesses against Rousset changed their minds, sometimes several times, or they fled, disappeared, or died before they could be confronted in the various investigations. Both the C.D.S and *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* along with *Le Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, some syndicalist federations, and various sections of the S.F.I.O. also kept up the pressure through protest meetings and demonstrations. De Marmande sought to maintain interest in the case by publishing two items: (1) a study of Lieutenant Pan-Lacroix's 1911 inquest on the death of Brancoli, and (2) a set of Rousset's prison letters in *Les Temps Nouveaux*. Even though the official army investigation proceeded to what the military hoped was a kind of closure, such was not the case. The protest movement was having a great impact on Millerand, who feared that without closure, the agitation around Rousset would continue to the detriment of national interests. Ironically, to avoid the appearance that political pressure could influence military decisions, Millerand had to pressure the High Court of Appeals and/or the recalcitrant military to finally close the Rousset investigation, for their own sake he obviously felt. Whatever was decided, one way or another, about the investigation, "the government would have shown itself" to be committed to "procedural fairness" rather than the severity of the *conseils de guerre* or the radical vision of the *enragés*. "Moreover, the astute Millerand must have understood that militants would be drawn to ever more provocative measures lest the leadership of the Aernoult-Rousset agitation pass entirely to the despised 'intellectuals' of the Rousset Affair Committee."[150]

On July 12, 1912 the High Court refused to comply with the government's expectations, so Millerand had to rely on the military commander in charge in Algeria, General Leguay, to decide whether the investigation of Rousset had been fair. Only that could begin to resolve the entire affair. Millerand certainly wanted to protect the army, but he had to deal with an increasing protest movement that apparently threatened the nation's security. However, it did not take long for the situation to change dramatically. On July 29 C.D.S. sources disclosed how four of the witnesses against Rousset had retracted their testimony, saying that they had been pressured in various ways and threatened with *conseils de guerre*. Not only did the C.D.S. take credit for the turn of events, it claimed "that the recanting witnesses were officially under its protection." On July 30 the commanding general reopened the Rousset investigation allowing the prisoner and his attorneys to confront witnesses as well as Lieutenant Pan Lacroix himself. The following day the C.D.S. organized a massive demonstration for Rousset, the largest for him until then, at the Salle Wagram. When the court confrontation took place, Pan Lacroix initially held up fairly well, but eventually he described interrogating techniques that could easily be construed as coercion, even if such methods were standard operating procedures for military justice. Coercion or not, this time the technique failed to work because General Leguay ultimately dismissed the case on September 24, 1912. Guilty or innocent, "there would be no second murder trial for Rousset". Rousset was free to return home; the military was done with him. "'Politics' of a sort had saved him."[151]

Hervé and his colleagues were not tangential to the evolution of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign, but their involvement was complicated by other long-term factors. In the era following the failure of the railway strike and amidst its own internal crisis, the C.G.T. decided to get rid of all socialist influences on syndicalism according to the French police. This syndicalist tactic coincided with Hervé's *militarisme révolutionnaire* in early 1911 and his call for a *désarmement des haines* which developed in the summer of 1911.[152] The syndicalists led by Jouhaux, Griffuelhes, and Yvetot then attacked Hervé's extreme Blanquist position, in large part, for internal syndicalist reasons. This attack was a necessary catalyst in Hervé's *retournement*. While maintaining his ideas of *militarisme révolutionnaire*, Hervé was moving toward a virtually reformist position regarding relations within the French Left as the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign progressed, but few observers initially saw things that way because incendiary articles and activities continued almost as usual. Eventually, his call for the "disarmament of hatreds" among all the forces of the Left was perceived as a grave threat by syndicalists and anarchists whose organizations and newspapers generally defined themselves in

terms of exclusiveness. The police believed that the dispute between the Hervéists and the syndicalists was partly commercial. Because it was under the threat of extinction, *La Bataille Syndicaliste* needed to capture readers from the competition. To protect syndicalism and its daily paper, Griffuelhes and Jouhaux wanted to forbid all ties to political parties and to non-syndicalist organizations by anyone in the C.G.T. The police believed that only a viable newspaper could give the C.G.T. a chance to curtail socialist influence.[153] Given its commercial success and its long-standing reputation for revolutionary purity, *La Guerre Sociale* was a dual threat to syndicalism. The syndicalist attack on what Hervé could argue was his most extreme position, *militarisme révolutionnaire*, at a time when syndicalism was in a struggle with the S.F.I.O., helped push Hervé toward a new tactical remedy, *désarmement des haines*. That policy for the "disarmament of hatreds" could not end the divisions on the Left because it was the antithesis of the C.G.T.'s latest tactics and it would have destroyed the very *raison d'être* of almost all organizations on the extreme Left. Hervé's "reformist" tactic was no less naïve or romantic than any other Hervéist method. The conclusion of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign would almost convince Hervé that unity on the Left for revolution or for anything else was impossible.

The catastrophic culmination of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign occurred in the months following Hervé's release from prison on July 14, 1912. What was arguably the greatest campaign of Hervéism ended in such acrimony at a time when Hervé was in the midst of his campaign for a *désarmement des haines*, is both ironic and significant. This sad conclusion occurred just after the apparent triumphal demonstration of leftist fraternity at Aernoult's funeral on February 11, 1912. As has been seen, earlier that month René de Marmande and some of his allies in the S.F.I.O., *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, and *Les Temps Nouveaux* seceded from the C.D.S. and formed the *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*. Now two antagonistic committees existed, both working for the release of Rousset.[154] One could argue that the ultimate explanation of this scission may reside as much in the nature of man as in the fissiparous nature of the French Left. The immediate reasons were an even more familiar story. Most members of the coalition, including *La Guerre Sociale*, were jealous of René de Marmande's influence over Rousset. According to the French police, the C.G.T. and *La Bataille Syndicaliste* actually accused de Marmande and Rousset of being lovers! The C.D.S. also accused de Marmande of swindling and lying. Some police informers apparently believed that even *L'Humanité* hated him for joining with some Radicals on the *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*. There were also accusations that de Marmande was a police spy.[155] Whether de Marmande was a thief, a police spy, or a pederast is

probably immaterial. Mutual rivalries, jealousies, and hatreds are too well documented to demand criminal, counter-subversive, or inverted agents.

John Cerullo argued that de Marmande realized that the excesses of the *enragés* with their methods of radical antimilitarism would not gain the release of his protégé. So, increasingly fascinated by Rousset and worried about him, de Marmande moved toward an alliance with the more moderate and reformist legalists in the S.F.I.O. and *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* who had ties and some influence on the men who made the decisions in the republic. For de Marmande it was "'the intellectual and lettered public' whose support for Dreyfus had proven decisive in the end" who provided the best means of gaining Rousset's release. Such a shift in tactics, coming as it did after constant acrimony and infighting among the various components of the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign for domination, would lead to major problems for de Marmande, but such personal dramas had larger causes and implications.[156]

The Aernoult-Rousset Campaign increasingly mirrored the divisions on the entire French Left after February 1912. The estrangement between de Marmande and the C.D.S. and eventually between de Marmande and Rousset undoubtedly reflected broader fissures within the antimilitarist movement and the entire French Left.[157] Rousset soon found himself caught amid the rivalries of several factions who each wanted to take credit and to assign blame for the deeds and misdeeds during the campaign. *La Guerre Sociale* wanted credit for the successful return of Aernoult's body and it found itself at odds not only with the C.D.S. but often with de Marmande and *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* as well. Yet most of this infighting was not openly visible at first. The Hervéists resigned from the C.D.S. to protest the increasing coteries among the campaign leadership and because the C.D.S. was "passionately antisocialist". The final split occurred at a meeting of the C.D.S. held at a café at 31, Rue de la Grange aux Belles near the C.G.T. headquarters on July 27, 1912 when a delegate of the C.D.S. named Bonnafous rebutted Almereyda for a "pro-socialist" article concerning the Berry-Millerand Law which Almereyda had just written in the *Bulletin du Comité de Defense Sociale*. This insult led to a general brawl as the final Hervéist act on the C.D.S.[158] This exit was not surprising but it was spontaneous. In its July 24 issue *La Guerre Sociale* praised both the C.D.S. and *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*, yet signs of the Hervéist-syndicalist rivalry were much in evidence. Perhaps the release of Hervé from prison on July 14 had been enough to force the rupture into the open.[159] When Hervé left prison, several months of leave and convalescence followed before he re-entered the fray, and that may have reduced the friction however temporarily.

La Guerre Sociale did not cease its activity in the campaign after its representatives resigned from the C.D.S. Merle was sent to Algeria in late August 1912 carrying money to Rousset from *L'Humanité* and perhaps from *La Guerre Sociale*.[160] Rousset was released in late September when the investigation of the murder he was accused of committing was shown to have included enough irregularities that further deliberations, investigations, and agitation would have been inevitable. The political fallout had proven to be too great for the military authorities and the government to endure a continuation of the whole Affair.[161] *La Guerre Sociale* then sent the former prisoner money for his return to France.[162] The release of Rousset did not create a sense of triumph or a feeling of solidarity on the French Left. *La Guerre Sociale* extolled the former cooperation of the C.D.S., the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine*, the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, *L'Humanité*, and the *Fédération Communiste Anarchiste*. René de Marmande and the *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* were praised for their work to gain the release of Rousset. In an effort to show its impartiality and foster a *désarmement des haines*, *La Guerre Sociale* admitted its disagreements with both *Comités* and with de Marmande. But the Hervéists described *La Bataille Syndicaliste* as a discordant upstart which jumped into the campaign very late and exacerbated the problems. The Hervéists complained that *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* had been excluded by the C.D.S. from most meetings and demonstrations concerning Rousset's return to France.[163]

After de Marmande's secession from the C.D.S. in February and that of the Hervéists in July, the syndicalists had control of the C.D.S. From its prominent position on the C.D.S., *La Bataille Syndicaliste* assailed *La Guerre Sociale* as reactionary and nationalist. The syndicalists called the Hervéists renegades, and the campaign for the "disarmament of hatreds" was labeled either a detestable bluff or a perfidious maneuver to gain control of the C.G.T.[164] In early October 1912, Thuillier accused de Marmande of serving the interests of *La Guerre Sociale* by keeping Rousset away from meetings and rallies scheduled by the C.D.S. leadership.[165] John Cerullo commented on the irony of *La Guerre Sociale* responding with so much criticism of the C.D.S. when the Hervéist publication had been the official voice of the *enragés* for so long. Charges by Hervé's newspaper against the C.D.S. for counterproductive doctrinal purism and a lack of cooperation signified a growing transformation by some on the Left, a realization that things were changing.[166] The C.D.S. and *La Bataille Syndicaliste* used Hervé's own slogans to indict *La Guerre Sociale*. The syndicalists accused the Hervéists of sowing discord on the Left by lies and calumny as well as complicity in the near theft of Rousset's judicial dossier from the C.D.S.[167] They believed that *La Guerre Sociale* had

commercialized the whole Aernoult-Rousset Campaign by its excess and antics, and they pointed out that *La Guerre Sociale* talked of ending quarrels yet became hostile whenever anyone disagreed with its ideas. To the C.D.S. the Hervéists were turncoats and sell-outs for lucre and future electoral offices. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* saw itself as "the only newspaper of the working class," and it could not resist attacking *L'Humanité* as "the only leftist newspaper which demanded payment for the insertion of C.D.S. announcements." The C.D.S. and *La Bataille Syndicaliste* explained their attacks as a response to a conspiratorial situation in which de Marmande, *La Guerre Sociale*, and *L'Humanité* tried to steal the direction of the campaign away from them. The "disarmament of hatreds" was thus perceived as a policy of attack on syndicalism and anarchism, and the Hervéists were accused of maneuvering toward the S.F.I.O. to gain political spoils after the failure of revolutionary concentration.[168]

The intrigue between de Marmande and the C.D.S. had certainly begun well before the dismissal of the charges against Rousset. While de Marmande and Louis Havet sought provisional liberty for the prisoner on behalf of *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*, the Secretary of the C.D.S., Thuillier, showed up in Algeria hoping to woo the ailing Rousset by informing him of serious charges impending against de Marmande, seeking to get him to sever ties with his chief mentor and benefactor. The released prisoner had become such a compelling figure by 1912 that he was expected to help draw crowds to the large-scale rallies that the C.D.S. was planning in their efforts to arouse the public about the larger dangers that militarism posed to French workers. For the C.D.S. to fully engage Rousset in the antimilitarist cause, he would have to be separated from his intimate friend and protector, Rene de Marmande. The C.D.S. Secretary also reminded Rousset how much the *Comité* had aided him and deserved his cooperation in the ongoing struggle against the military Moloch. Thuillier told Rousset that de Marmande's *Comité* wanted to weaken *enragé* influence in the campaign in order to shift leadership toward bourgeois interests. The portrait of de Marmande being painted by the C.D.S. leader was that of a class traitor. However, Rousset remained loyal and deeply attached to de Marmande for some time despite charges that the latter was a government agent who had sold out his fellow militants for money. After some effort, de Marmande managed to get Rousset released, advising him "to avoid any large demonstrations until he recovered his strength." Rousset had serious physical problems before he was released, and he would need and demand a period of convalescence afterwards. However, the C.D.S. interpreted de Marmande's apparent "honest solicitude" as an intentional effort to undermine the antimilitarist movement, so the *enragés* of the C.D.S. then assumed that destroying him was

vital for their cause. This was the scenario that was about to become the tragic-comic conclusion of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair.[169]

Initially, the former prisoner resented the C.D.S. efforts which he found nearly incomprehensible, and simply a matter of some sort of organizational jealousy. He vowed to not participate in any demonstrations as long as de Marmande was excluded, and he even compared the treatment of his mentor to the military's treatment of him. However, de Marmande was increasingly accused of adventurism as well as fleecing the C.D.S., getting kickbacks for legal referrals, and even using its money to maintain a Parisian apartment for a former Marseilles militant sailor who had become his lover. De Marmande was also accused of having had multiple proletarian lovers in the past and now had similar intentions toward Rousset. Although de Marmande vehemently denied the charges and desperately claimed his own economic insolvency due to his efforts for Rousset, his protests simply accentuated longstanding accusations by his enemies regarding his purported tendency to histrionics. Still, Rousset continued to stick by him, even sending a letter of ardent support (possibly dictated by de Marmande?) to *La Bataille Syndicaliste* on October 1, 1912.[170]

When Minister of the Interior Steeg, who happened to be a close friend to several members of *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*, enforced a legal ban on Rousset's entry into Paris, members of the C.D.S. assailed the bourgeois "progressives" but blamed de Marmande especially. The latter told the C.D.S. that they had only themselves to blame for subverting the influence of more moderate activists on his *Comité.* Not only did de Marmande describe the C.D.S. as "an organization without true mandate from the proletariat", he accused it of jeopardizing Rousset's freedom, risking his health, and ultimately exploiting him. With Rousset ensconced at his brother's home in Lyon due to the *interdiction de sejour* being applied by the government, the October 7 demonstration which the C.D.S. organized at the *Cirque de Paris* was a disappointment. But a large C.D.S. sponsored rally the same day in Lyon included a large crowd who heard explicit denunciations of de Marmande. The police started to describe Rousset as being torn by the rivalries and charges. Pulled in several directions, the former military prisoner eventually agreed to publish his memoirs in *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and accepted the help of Eugène Péronnet of the C.D.S. for that task.

However, the issue that really split Rousset from de Marmande involved personal financial issues between the two men. Rousset believed that de Marmande had inappropriately used some of the money which the former prisoner had entrusted to him. De Marmande thought he was owed that money and much more besides due to his ongoing efforts and expenses, so he felt personally

betrayed by his protégé. Gradually Rousset came to accept the negative portrait of his benefactor being made by the C.D.S., and he soon showed up in Paris for their planned rally at the Salle Wagram on October 23. The rally was tumultuous but did not include de Marmande, who was upset by being asked to supply Rousset and his future bride with a furnished Parisian apartment. After consecutive and increasingly curt letters in early November, a pained, angry, and disillusioned de Marmande admitted to "some accounting mistakes" and being a bad record keeper. He also acknowledged various other faults, errors, and imprudences, but that did not stop him from lashing out "in a series of articles in *Les Temps Nouveaux*" at Rousset, the C.D.S. and the entire militant world which had turned on him so viciously.[171] He also wondered why the police had so often persecuted him if he were a spy, and he raised the possibility that the C.D.S. was guilty of projection! He also documented how *Le Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* had used its invaluable access to influential officials to save Rousset, access which the C.D.S. never enjoyed. By publishing Rousset's judicial dossier in *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, the C.D.S. not only showed a narrow sectarian spirit, they had impeded Rousset's liberation and selfishly exploited him.[172]

L'Humanité did its best to stay out of the polemics between the de Marmande and the C.D.S. as well as those between the Hervéists and the syndicalists, though the socialists seemed to reinforce some of Hervéist charges against the C.D.S. On October 15 the socialist daily denied that it wanted to control the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign, though it took credit for creating the campaign in 1910, for originating the idea of returning Aernoult's body, and for funding the latter idea. *L'Humanité* and the Hervéists denied that they failed to inform the C.D.S. concerning recent initiatives for Rousset. For *L'Humanité* the lesson to be learned from this campaign was the inadvisability of utilizing external organizations to regulate socialist affairs.[173] Yet the S.F.I.O. was more than willing to use Hervé's unexpected change of ideas to increase socialist influence over the C.G.T.[174] As long as Rousset was under the influence of de Marmande and chose not to come to Paris, *La Guerre Sociale* explained Rousset's actions in terms of his desire to end quarrels, rivalries, and coteries on the Left.[175] The Hervéists rebutted some of the syndicalist charges by pointing out how they had kept their resignation from the C.D.S. a secret in the interests of the campaign for Rousset. They were less successful in denying their desire to control the campaign.[176] Hervéist-syndicalist rivalry and acrimony did not end with the return of Rousset; it simply ceased to matter very much.[177]

To the syndicalists on C.D.S., the *rapprochement* with the socialists and the government by people like de Marmande and Hervé was a betrayal of the antimil-

itarist movement and an unforgivable "shift toward nationalism" which historians later called a French nationalist revival that had roots going back as early as 1905. This was the backdrop to the charges and countercharges between C.D.S. and de Marmande at the fading of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair.[178] To the syndicalists, de Marmande and Hervéists, for all their differences, had altered their views and shifted their allegiances for dubious reasons. Already in early 1911 syndicalist firebrand and Secretary of the *Fédération des Bourses du Travail*, Georges Yvetot, "sensed the winds of change in his comrade [Hervé] … and broke with him then."[179] Yet, at about the same time Yvetot "published an enthusiastic 'Salute to My Country' in, of all places, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*" after returning home from Germany where he was nearly arrested at a peace demonstration there. Yvetot, like Hervé, had come to realize that German socialists and syndicalists were either unwilling or unable to act to prevent a German mobilization in the event of war because "they lacked the freedom of association and expression that their French counterparts enjoyed under the Third Republic." Since few Germans leftists seemed to share the intensity for internationalism and pacifism which French militants displayed, Yvetot was ready to reconsider his earlier advice to French conscripts and workers about draft resistance, violence against officers, desertion, and sabotage which he had ardently propounded during the heyday of Hervéism. That could have meant that "the Third Republic, whatever its faults, was infinitely preferable to the German Empire" and that French workers would be in grave jeopardy if they managed to disrupt a mobilization while the German proletariat did not.[180]

However, there is another dimension to the larger transformations taking place. Recall that Yvetot and his syndicalist associates at *La Bataille Syndicaliste* continued to assail Hervé and his new course even though many of them were moving rapidly in the same direction. If revolutionaries became citizens under the impulse of the national revival and war, if antimilitarism was somehow a vehicle toward democracy and republican virtues, it must still be recognized that former ideas, discords, and rivalries remained even if they became temporarily latent in 1914. Not all former revolutionaries would long bask in the light of republic because there was still something perceived as vile about the compromises, corruption, and underlying materialism of democratic politics. Even before the war ended, many militants of the Left sought a renewal of purity and untainted virtue. Some of them would come to assume that renewal could only be found on the increasingly anti-democratic Right. Both Gustave Hervé and René de Marmande would wind up as questionable supporters of a republic whose citizenship they appreciated in an increasingly jaundiced manner.

This chapter shows how the Aernoult-Rousset Affair was simply another example of diversity, discord, and division of the French Left before World War I which provided Gustave Hervé with increasing evidence that his insurrectionalism was hopelessly unrealistic, based as it was on rather naïve and romantic assumptions about the possibilities of activism on the French Left and beyond the Rhine. For pre-war militants on the extreme Left, the Aernoult-Rousset Affair was an obvious example of the evils of militarism and the blatant injustice of a class society under the conditions of modern capitalism. Militants largely agreed that the army was a strike breaker, a mercenary force for financial interests, a school of vice and crime, a tool for colonialism and imperialism, and thus a promoter of the very wars that needed to be prevented. For the police of that era, the arguments and actions by the extreme Left during the Aernoult-Rousset Affair must have simply underlined the continuing dangers to internal order posed by revolutionary and antimilitarist elements in France. For many historians today this Affair helps to confirm "the political clout of organized antimilitarism in France, even on the eve of World War I."[181]

For Paul B. Miller, antimilitarism "never became the self-standing ideology that its leaders hoped it would and that its enemies imagined it was. But it succeeded brilliantly as a rallying cry against social and political inequities on behalf of ordinary citizens … The irony is that the antimilitarist Left had to accept the war in order to sustain its fight against it. But the reality is that in so doing it had, at last, forsaken its own revolutionary ideals, and conceded its place in *la patrie française*."[182] Antimilitarism may have led many revolutionaries to become citizens in France by 1914, but citizenship for them was no longer what they would have expected and demanded a few years earlier. Some revolutionaries would quickly grow disillusioned with republican citizenship and then turn toward alternate revolutions or toward counter-revolutionary versions of the republic. As we have learned recently, citizenship all too often amounts to the passive acceptance of material rewards, security, and entertainment in exchange for declining activist hopes and expectations, which arguably are the driving force to genuine citizenship.

13

Les Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires (J.G.R.) and *Le Service de Sûreté Revolutionnaire* (S.S.R.)

It is hard to dismiss Hervé's own assessment that the railway strike of 1910 was a critical turning point in his *retournement* and gradual backing away from Insurrectionalism. In 1935 he told Breton journalist Charles Chassé that his political disenchantment could be associated with the "painful feeling" churning in him upon hearing the trains running again while he was in his cell at La Santé in mid-October 1910. In fact, there were other indications that Hervé was increasingly troubled even before the railway strike. Socialist rejection of his ideas was ongoing, and increasingly he experienced the limits of his influence even within the centers of his support. Increasing jealousy and hostility by anarchists and syndicalists also seemed to demonstrate that the Hervéist goal of revolutionary unity was unfeasible. Despite some occasional evidence to the contrary, the German Social Democrats showed no signs of being ready, much less eager, to oppose a mobilization order with a military strike and insurrection. There was little evidence for the existence of an international Hervéism. If all this were true, what could explain the plethora of insurrection formations and activities from 1910 to 1912 which made that era the very peak of Hervéist insurrectional display?

The weak response to Hervé's ideas of *militarisme révolutionnaire* in early 1911 did not initially cause Hervé to curtail his expressions of hope in the possibility of revolution. If he had lost faith in the revolutionary leadership of established

groups and now increasingly counted on the "masses", he continued to promote secret revolutionary organizations.[1] Despite an outward appearance of continuing revolutionary extremism, by 1911 Hervé's ideas were changing. Yet, insurrectional organizations seemed to attain their peak then, and they were often even more blatant and sensationalistic than ever. Nevertheless, these new organizations failed to recruit well-known militants, and were not designed to appeal to the average workers.[2] The new organizations of 1910 and 1911 employed striking antics and created sensational events, but they were no closer to uniting the forces necessary for a revolution. Victor Serge placed Hervéism in a general context of leftist aimlessness and disorder in this era.

> "After the fight for Ferrer, the philosopher, the battle for Liabeuf, the desperado, proved (although we did not see it then) the seriousness of the deadlock in which the revolutionary movement of Paris was situated, no tendency being exempt. Energetic and powerful in 1906–7, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* began to decline, mellowed after a mere few years by the development of highly-paid sections among the working class. The 'insurrectionism' of Gustave Hervé and Miguel Almereyda turned in a vacuum, expressing nothing in the end but a craving for verbal and physical violence."[3]

The main explanation given by the Insurrectionals for these new formations was that their continuing efforts to unite young militants were necessary because existing formations were too passive and isolated from one another. The police as well as recent historians assumed that J.G.R. grew out of and was connected to the obscure and infamous *organisation de combat* and other Insurrectional organizations.[4] Taking his cues from police sources, Gilles Heuré echoed them and their incongruities.

> "*Société Secrète Révolutionnaire*, the *Parti Révolutionnaire*, the *Organisation de Combat*, the *Jeunes Gardes* [*Révolutionnaires*] … whatever their names were, it was still a question of the same core of Insurrectionals, who, behind *La Guerre Sociale*—the paper listed no less than 2000 sections by May 1909—constituted themselves in small groups of five or six persons, charged with intervening in demonstrations and carrying out sabotage to delight 'Mam'zelle Cisailles' … To weave the mesh for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, Hervé imagined the creation of an *organisation de combat*, then, soon after, that of the *Jeunes Gardes [Révolutionnaires]*."

Needless to say, the French police attempted to keep files on all the members of the J.G.R., and they wrote reports on almost all the public activities of the group. However, the information on the organization was often so hazy and ambiguous that its organizational structure and operational forms were, then and now, sometimes described in contradictory fashion.[5]

Though Heuré seemed to equate the J.G.R. with all the other Insurrectional formations in the passage above, he also noted some obvious differences. "But for the panoply to be complete, it was necessary for the *organisation de combat* to be backed up by another, less anonymous structure, on the contrary, destined to rush forward noisily in the conquest of the street, to manhandle the 'Cossacks of the Republic', [and] to become the security force at meetings."[6] Jonathan Almosnino also contrasted the secretive *organisation de combat* with the blatantly visible J.G.R. "If the *organisation de combat* functioned amidst a great deal of secrecy, it was not the same for the new group founded by Almereyda in the days after his release from prison [in late March 1911]. The *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaire* acted out in the open and its actions were soon relayed by the press and jolted public opinion. This new unitary organization no longer operated in the field of sabotage."[7]

If the J.G.R. did not concentrate on sabotage, the new group seemed to mirror traditional Hervéist recruitment patterns and did not reject standard insurrectional ideas. Méric described its members as a phalanx composed of "a few hundred young guys, employees, workers, and even intellectuals."[8] In promoting the J.G.R., *La Guerre Sociale* stated that the new formation expected to guard against nationalism and anti-Semitism. One notice in the paper described the objectives of the J.G.R. as working "against reaction, against police tyranny, for revolution without concern for ideological position, [and] for unity and camaraderie."[9] The aim of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* was to act as a revolutionary security force at leftist rallies, during public conferences, in Hervéist meetings, and for street demonstrations. If the need arose, the J.G.R. was also expected to resist the attacks of the Parisian police. Though these young men were to be the vanguard for a general strike, an insurrection, or a revolution, their secret nighttime street maneuvers generally had less conspiratorial objectives.[10]

With Hervé in prison from March 21, 1910 until July 17, 1912, the J.G.R. was undoubtedly formed largely under the guidance of Almereyda, the accepted leader and Secretary-General of its five-member executive committee. His name was attached to countless newspaper accounts and police reports dedicated to the exploits and activities of the Hervéist paramilitary force. Fame and notoriety came to Hervé's lieutenant in good part because of his J.G.R. leadership according to Almosnino. "On March 29, 1911 young militants were invited by *La Guerre Sociale* to come to the offices of the *hebdomadaire* for an exceptional meeting. Almereyda held a session there to tell the militants about the new organization he wished to create." All revolutionaries were going to be able to join according to Almereyda as long as they were ready to act "against tyranny, reaction and their

forces of coercion." The organization initially sought to attract young socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists, but it eventually came to include republicans.[11] On April 12, 1911 *La Guerre Sociale* reported that the [expanded?] executive committee was made up of members of the staff of the newspaper including socialists Louis Perceau and Victor Méric as well as the anarchist Eugène Merle, militants from the *Comité de Défense Sociale* like Jean Goldsky and Émile Tissier, René Dolié, a young *libertaire* long known in anarchist circles, Lucien Everard, the Secretary of the *Jeunesses Socialistes* of the 19th *arrondissement*, and René Petit, the Secretary of the *Jeunesses Révolutionnaires de la Seine*.[12] Méric described Tissier, Goldsky, Perceau, and Merle as the chief lieutenants of the J.G.R. Most younger members of the staff of L.G.S. would join the J.G.R. once it was formed. The group soon had its own offices with a reading room and place for exercise, which could function as a "preparation for the small street battles and the vast *guerre sociale*.[13]

After *Le Rappel* was apparently given false information by the Prefect of Police regarding the types of men who made up the J.G.R., Almereyda had it print his letter stressing how the *Jeunes Gardes* included young men with defined professions who were mostly union members, and that included everyone on the executive committee.[14] Peyronnet did not believe the new formation was particularly important because it had only three to four hundred members, most of whom were unaffiliated with anarchist and socialist groups.[15] According to the police and what can be gleaned from the press, the greatest concentration of J.G.R. members at one time was probably never more than three hundred mostly young militants.[16] The *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* may not have equaled the *Camelots du Roi* in longevity, membership, or creativity but their antics were sufficient to merit a song entitled "*Le Chant des Jeunes Gardes*" written by the revolutionary singer Gaston Montéhus and based on music by Saint-Gilles. After the war that song "became the hymn of socialist and communist youth groups." During its heyday the J.G.R. sang the song along with "'*L'Internationale*' at their public gatherings, which sounded as a kind of warning for its enemies."[17]

The police traced the origins of the J.G.R. back to an Hervé article written in July 1907 in which he called on militants to defend themselves and not count on the crowd. The police connected the J.G.R. to the *Parti Révolutionnaire*, the *organisation de combat*, and the much feared conspiratorial *Association des Malfaiteurs*.[18] Almosnino described the new organization as essentially Blanquist in conception, since the Hervéists assumed that it could eventually become a tool to seize power. For that reason, the J.G.R. sought a kind of military style of functioning, mirroring the command structure of the police and even that of the *Camelots*

du Roi. The J.G.R. executive committee sought to direct its forces firmly. "Orders would have to be rigorously applied and never be contested."[19] Those forces were expected "to be composed of disciplined teams of ten men each, armed with the latest weapons(that is to say the best Brownings), and with a leader who would be the only one who knew the men in his team and the only one with ties to the central committee. The watchword was: Get after the police! Onward for the revolution of any type!"[20] Because various police sources had varying accounts of the the J.G.R. and other Herveist organisations, later historians were bound to have ambiguous if not contradictory descriptions of the J.G.R. cells or sections.[21]

The *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* attempted to avoid doctrinal divisions by excluding what *La Guerre Sociale* called all "troublesome elements." By that the Hervéists generally meant anarchist individualists as well as certain criminal elements who inhabited the boundaries of political Bohemia. The French police would undoubtedly have defined "troublesome elements" differently. For Almosnino, the hierarchical structure of the J.G.R. helped keep out those anarchists who charged Almereyda with dangerous authoritarian tendencies. One such anarchist, "after having seen how the *Jeune Garde* [*Révolutionnaire*] was going to function, placed a police cap on Almereyda's desk at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* as a sign of protest."[22] As time went on even *libertaires*, those non-individualist anarchists sympathetic to syndicalism, would find Almereyda, Hervé, and the Hervéists, in general, increasingly prone to authoritarianism, sensationalism, commercialism, and other less than revolutionary tendencies.

The new formation certainly fit Hervé's apparently extreme positions of early 1911 and his ongoing stress on the need for organization. Though the J.G.R. conformed to standard Hervéist ideas, it did seem to have been created in some measure as a reaction to the extremism of the Right. In late March and early April of 1911 at a time when a few extremists of the Left and Right were engaged in an anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic campaign, and *La Guerre Sociale* seemed poised to take the royalist bait, militants at *La Guerre Sociale* created the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires.* To the chagrin of the royalists, who were trying to recruit anti-Republican elements on the Left in 1911 in a *politique du pire*, Hervé forcefully stated he was a philo-Semite and a friend of the Masons.[23] By rejecting the royalist overtures and creating their own paramilitary force at roughly the same time, the Hervéists had certainly given Charles Maurras and his minions motives to react. Both Maurras and fellow royalist Maurice Pujo claimed that Hervé had been given money by the Jews to create the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires.*[24] When Pujo in *L'Action Française* charged the Hervéists with creating the J.G.R. in order to attack the *Camelots du Roi*, Almereyda denied the charge. He and Hervé both

asserted that the J.G.R. was the culmination of a project going back five years in response to police brutality. Almost immediately Almereyda told his forces "that the struggle against the republic of Villeneuve-Saint-Georges could not put aside the fight against the clergy and the forces of reaction."[25] At about the same time, he went with Goldsky to the royalist paper to seek a retraction of their supposedly defamatory article. However, Pujo claimed to have proof that the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* had been formed with the complicity of the police, the government, the popular press, and the Jews in order to crush the *Camelots du Roi*. This idea was partly a reference to a court action involving the *camelots* in the ninth chamber in which a prosecutor supposedly told the royalist paramilitary defendants that the J.G.R. would soon deal with them. The threats and accusations reached the point where Pujo challenged Almereyda to a duel with swords. When Almereyda, who was not skilled in the use of a sword, said he preferred handguns but only fought over serious issues, Pujo called him a rabbit.[26]

In fact, the J.G.R. shared too many common features with the royalists for the resemblance to have been purely coincidental. The future leaders of the J.G.R. shock troops had first met the *Camelots du Roi* as early as 1908 and 1909 in the section for political prisoners at La Santé. Victor Méric noted how these opposing political extremists, though never in philosophical agreement, gained mutual respect for each other's bravery and idealism while living together in prison. Though royalists and Hervéists might be able to agree in their mutual hatred of the Republic, democracy, Parliament, Clemenceau, Briand, and Lépine, their assumptions and goals were generally poles apart. However, for a limited time, mutual hatreds and their communal prison experience allowed the staff of *La Guerre Sociale*'s, generally excluding Hervé, to sit amicably with the royalists at the Café du Croissant on the Rue Montmartre almost every Wednesday evening, while *La Guerre Sociale* went to press. Because the Hervéist weekly inhabited offices in the newspaper district north of Les Halles where both *L'Action Française*, and *L'Humanité* also had offices, it was not uncommon for Insurrectionals, reformist socialists, and royalists to be in the same place at the same time.[27]

Méric reported that the era of mutual respect between royalists and Hervéists ended during the Ferrer Affair when Maurice Pujo wrote an article attacking the Left for the death of a policeman during the rioting around the Spanish Embassy. This was considered complete hypocrisy by the Hervéists because the favorite pastime of the *Camelots du Roi* had always been to fight with the police and to ridicule French authorities.[28] By 1911, with renewed Hervéist charges of police brutality in the wake of the railway strike, coupled with the royalists' efforts at winning converts and buying support on the extreme French Left for

their anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic campaign, the Hervéists were compelled to create their own paramilitary formation. In a certain measure the J.G.R. was a successful creation, even though it never attained the scope of the royalist shock troops.[29]

Heuré argued that the Insurrectional leader probably did not value the actions of the J.G.R. since their efforts often resembled adolescent pranks rather than revolutionary actions. He certainly did not control them directly because he was in prison during almost their entire heyday. According to one police source, in June 1911 the imprisoned editor-in-chief of *La Guerre Sociale* expressed more than a little vexation with the some of the actions of the *Jeunes Gardes*.[30] Nevertheless, Hervé "remained convinced of the utility of a disciplined organization, grouping militants [who were] skilled and resolved for direct action."[31] At the end of July, he again praised the Hervéist paramilitary force. "Fortify and develop the organisation of the *Jeunes Gardes* … It is indispensable that we have at our command a troop of dedicated young men, having no fear, disciplined and trained, able to be mobilized secretly in a few hours at any point in Paris."[32] For some time after the railway strike Hervé also continued to call for teams of saboteurs on the condition that they did not endanger the lives of any passengers.[33]

The first noteworthy appearance of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* was on May Day in 1911. Even though this May Day did not duplicate the scope and excitement of May Day 1906, large numbers of workers did manage to demonstrate. Those who did march were not stopped by the first police charge, and that may have been due to the presence of armed members of the J.G.R. Obviously, the police perspective was a bit different than that of the Hervéists. One of the police agents at the Place de la Concorde that day, Gaston Faralicq, found himself singled out by the demonstrators for special treatment, and he might have been bludgeoned to death by a militant named Le Scornec except for the help of another agent who deflected the *matraque* aimed at Faralicq's neck. Le Scornec would get a two year sentence served as a political prisoner while Faralicq received insults, a damaged reputation, a caricature by the cartoonist Auglay, and the nickname "*Tête de Bois*" in Gaston Couté's less than flattering poem alluding to the policeman's ability to withstand the severe blow to the side of his head. Faralicq was not happy with French juries that he thought almost always acquitted violent extremists on the Left.[34] Even though the police attacked some workers near La Place de la Concorde that same day, the J.G.R. managed to maintain the itinerary decided by the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*. Still the day did not come off as planned. Many workers who celebrated the day lost their jobs and the police engaged in "their usual brutalities."[35]

Almereyda claimed that his group was ambushed later that May Day outside the meeting organized by the C.G.T. at Manège Saint-Paul after marching earlier in front of a commissariat on the Rue de Bretagne. When the *flics* failed to attack immediately, the J.G.R. dropped its guard and were later ambushed once they left formation. Apparently small groups and individual members of the J.G.R. along with a wide assortment of pimps, common criminals, and the general public were attacked and driven to the *quais* of the Seine by the police. *La Guerre Sociale* included an article from one witness, probably Goldsky, who reported various courageous responses to the presumed "police brutality." One purported bystander said that he had to defend his father when he was attacked by the police. One of the *Jeunes Gardes* reportedly struck an attacking policeman in the face with a cane. Almereyda reported that Parisian police were so worried about the J.G.R. that they sent out false reports about the new group's activities.[36]

In response to May Day 1911, Hervé accused the latest head of the French government, Ernest Monis, of having capitulated to Lépine just like his predecessors, Clemenceau and Briand, had done. Although he applauded the workers near the Place de la Concorde who violently responded to police brutality, he ascribed complete responsibility for the violence to the Prefect of Police. Even though workers only numbered 10,000 at the demonstration instead of the 100,000 who had gone to meetings or stayed away from work, the low turnout was blamed on worker fears of being attacked, arrested, imprisoned, and fired from their jobs. Still, Hervé applauded the revival of violence among French workers, and was proud of the actions of the new Hervéist shock troops elsewhere on May Day. He described the new formation as the only group to "demonstrate in a truly organized manner, according to a prearranged plan, and without anyone attacking them." Apparently, the imprisoned *Sans Patrie* had not yet heard what happened later to some of the demobilized *Jeunes Gardes*. At this point the Insurrectional leader called the program of the J.G.R. "the beginning of *militarisme révolutionnaire* in action." His advice to both French workers and his own J.G.R. was: "You will have the street when you organize to take it."[37] The following week Hervé wondered if it would take a new wave of terrorism to end police violence.[38]

On the final day of May, a contingent of some 200 *Jeunes Gardes* went to the Saint Lazare Prison for women to greet Madeleine Marc, a young female militant arrested on May Day who was set to be released after her one month incarceration. At that very moment when she was presented with a bouquet of flowers by Emily Clero,[39] Almereyda's alluring mistress, police on bicycles decided to intervene. Just when the police approached Insurrectional forces, Almereyda himself blew a whistle to signal his men to draw their concealed clubs to meet the police charge.

The J.G.R. force of some two hundred militants was well prepared for action and delivered a sound beating to the police, or so claimed *La Guerre Sociale*, leaving eleven policemen wounded from the clubs and kicks of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. "This time, the professional slaughterers have found out who's doing the talking. Instead of running away like rabbits, letting themselves be assaulted without protest like typical Parisian crowds, at the approach of the Cossacks, our *Jeunes Gardes* did not back away an inch. When the Cossacks unsheathed their sabers, our *Jeunes Gardes*, who had received formal orders not to carry weapons, turned on them with fists, kicks, and canes with such anger that [the police] were forced back."[40]Almeryeda and his troops were then able to withdraw in good order but not unscathed. By bravely leading his forces and swinging his cane in the first line, Almereyda could not avoid the bicycle which struck his chest and the saber blow to his head which put him in bed for a week.[41] A few days later Hervé would threaten: "He who strikes with government issued revolvers will perish at the hands of Citizen Browning."[42]

The *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* were not above provoking brawls with the *Camelots du Roi*. "After the flagrant actions against the police, from the beginning of June 1911 the *Jeunes Gardes* moved toward a new guerrilla war opposing themselves this time against the Parisian royalists."[43] For a brief time the J.G.R. successfully battled the royalists for "control" of the streets in the *quartier latin*. As has been seen, it began after Maurice Pujo in the *Action Française* impugned the integrity of the new formation and challenged Almereyda to the duel.[44] "Each evening at designated locations where everyone knew the [*Camelots du Roi*] could be found, groups of *Jeunes Gardes* descended, nonchalantly occupying the tables, appearing not to know one another. Then a band of *Camelots* would come yelling, singing the *La Vendéenne*, and shouting '*Vive le Roi! A bas la Gueuse*!' Then someone would stand up and protest. Stupor, then insults, threats, and finally a fight would result."[45] That conflict for control of the Left Bank took place on "battlefields" from the Place Saint-Michel to the Rue Soufflot and the Rue Danton. "Two or three times a week this sort of confrontation took place and generally Almereyda's troops got the upper hand,"[46] or so they said. Not even the eruption of the Second Moroccan Crisis prompted these royalist and Hervéist tough guys to imagine that their "war" would become an incredibly minor parody of the violence to come. If one can believe Méric and Almereyda, the J.G.R., though generally outnumbered and with less sympathy from both police and students, sometimes held their own against the *Camelots du Roi*.[47]

At the end of June 1911 the royalists organized a nationalist campaign "against the barbarians", meaning the Germans. Not to be outdone, the J.G.R.

organized its own campaign against "the barbarians of the interior", obviously the *Camelots* and *L'Action Française.* After one meeting on the Left Bank organized by the Hervéists at *La Salle des Sociétés Savantes*, the royalists showed up looking for trouble and found it. If you can believe Méric and other accounts, the J.G.R. forces soon found themselves battling both the police and the royalists. On the evening of the meeting, with less than ten associates, Almereyda attacked a force of some hundred royalists and managed to break a cane over the skull of Pujo. Before the royalists had time to react, the police arrived on bicycles and ended the *mêlée.*[48]

At first glance the major battles in the "war" between royalist and Hervéist youths for domination of the Latin Quarter seem to be restricted to the summer of 1911, but Méric claimed they lasted for two years.[49] The leaders of *La Guerre Sociale* had chosen to meet the "dangers" posed by the paramilitary royalists and the police *brigades centrales* by sinking to the level of gratuitous or reactive violence, which generally did not go beyond rather puerile antics, however bloody. Observers might easily find just what they were seeking in the experience of the J.G.R. The Hervéist shock troops had elements characteristic of a juvenile foolishness, an adolescent gang experience, an embryonic revolutionary elite, or a Bohemian proto-fascism.[50] Méric later described the *Camelots du Roi* and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* as infantile in character and largely adventurism. He compared their activities to urban street gang rivalries rather than clear and deliberate initiatives.[51] For Almosnino, "The small war in the Latin Quarter between the *Jeunes Gardes* and the *Camelots du Roi* in the end had no effect on the evolution of nationalism and militarism in French society. On the other hand, the police harassment, understood by the revolutionary public, made no sense to the vast majority of the population. When the struggle against nationalism experienced its greatest needs, in the summer of 1914, the *Jeunes Gardes* already had stopped practicing that type of action for a long time, having followed the political evolution of Almereyda [and of course, Hervé]."[52] Even though a few more skirmishes occurred on the eve of the war, a world war would be needed before adolescent street antics could attract enough support to become a method to win political power in some countries.

By most accounts Almereyda not only played a crucial role leading the J.G.R. paramilitary group, he was also instrumental in founding the *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire* (S.S.R.). He must have been aware that his newspaper, closely connected as it was to anarchist and syndicalist circles, was:

> "an open field for *mouchards* since the more a militant puts himself in the front lines, the more he cries out for insurrection and sabotage, the more well-accepted he is in this milieu. There can be no doubt that numerous [police] agents were able to infiltrate

> Amereyda's circle, that of Hervé, and even the editing office of the revolutionary weekly. The residence of Almereyda had even received visits by one or more *mouchards* who explained in detail the discussions that went on there."[53]

From what is known about the security arrangements in France going back before the French Revolution, the police had long been involved in infiltrating groups and organizations that they perceived as dangerous and revolutionary. Many historians have documented how under the Third Republic informers and *provocateurs* were continually used by the Prefecture of Police and the Ministry of the Interior to uncover potential dangers or to instigate illegal actions purportedly in the interest of state security. Not all scholars agree on the impact of such surveillance and provocation. When *La Guerre Sociale* was inaugurated, the Ministry of the Interior was held by Georges Clemenceau, and he was certainly no stranger to infiltrating revolutionary circles.[54] "Militants were not ignorant about these practices which also had the effect of sowing doubt and suspicion among comrades." In order to counteract ongoing police infiltration by *mouchards*, the revolutionary Left was bound take steps to forestall the problem as much as it could.[55]

On June 14, 1911 Hervé announced the creation of a *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire* which he "presented as an organization of counter-espionage protecting revolutionary enterprises against police infiltrations."[56] Of all the French revolutionaries Hervé seems to have considered police spies as one of the normal hazards of the revolutionary profession. He implied that an organization like the S.S.R. had been in operation in March 1910, and there is some evidence that such a creation may have been in existence for years.[57] The Insurrectionals discussed the creation of such an organization as early as 1909, but Almosnino puts its actual emergence toward the end of 1910, and it would only become truly active in the summer of 1911. When the S.S.R. was first conceived, the Hervéists talked and sometimes acted like they expected the revolution to break out at any moment. Did they fail to imagine how *le grand soir* might demand a bit more secrecy than their open encouragement of sabotage and their blatant promotion of other sensational activities?[58]

The S.S.R. was composed of a small number of Hervéists who themselves represented several different tendencies on the extreme French Left. Even though it was not a large organization, "it did include informants from among the socialist, syndicalist, and anarchist milieus, and even within the state apparatus."[59] The S.S.R. was a combination counter-secret police and revolutionary tribunal created to defend revolutionary groups from two rival sets of police spies at the French Ministry of the Interior and the Paris Prefecture of Police. Célestin Hennion,

the Director of the *Sûreté Générale* of the Ministry of the Interior and Xavier Guichard, the Director of the *Brigade de Recherches* at the Prefecture of Police[60] continued the traditional practice of infiltrating potentially subversive groups. The S.S.R. was not the creation of a paranoid, conspiracy-obsessed mentality; it was simply an organization designed to oppose infiltration of secret revolutionary organizations and to use such insidious threats to the Left in order to create sensational newspaper stories. Most socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists attacked this new Hervéist formation as demagogic, statist, and authoritarian. Hervé sometimes naively assumed that self-proclaimed revolutionaries would or should act on their "stated" beliefs, and the police believed him. The reward for such quixotic Insurrectional actions and assumptions was often censure by rivals.[61]

The S.S.R. was able to expose certain police spies embedded in French revolutionary circles and it used the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* to issue warnings calling on leftist colleagues to act with greater secrecy, prudence, and organizational vigor. More often, what the S.S.R. succeeded in doing was arousing the ire of anarchists and syndicalists, thereby increasing suspicions and mutual recriminations.[62] Whatever its stated aims, the dramatic S.S.R. exposés of police spies were seen by the C.G.T. as typical Hervéist sensationalism and commercialism. Full page coverage of secret S.S.R. "trials" of suspected police spies at the newspaper's offices replete with photos of the spies, confessions printed in the paper, and press conferences following the show trials made the S.S.R. appear to be simply an unscrupulous method of self-advertisement that was bound to sow discord among revolutionaries. Still, not all the S.S.R. exposés were sensational, and it did try to ingratiate itself with the C.G.T. by warning the syndicalist leaders and organizations about impending police perquisitions and potential *mouchards*.[63]

Possibly the first major action of this Hervéist counter-espionage agency occurred on June 9, 1911 when two purported police spies were revealed as they came to the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* to join the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. For months the S.S.R. had been following the activities of Eugène Prosper Bled (alias Bonnet, not to be confused with the *anarchisant* bandit Jules Bonnot),[64] who was employed by a private detective agency run by the Fourny brothers, which was often utilized by the French government. Bled was a member of the *Fédération Communiste Internationale* (F.C.R.) and the revolutionary section of the 18th *arrondissement*. He was "arrested" by the S.S.R. along with a militant named Dudragne. Both men were taken by J.G.R. members in a kind of ambush at the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* when they thought they were being recruited by the J.G.R. Following the "arrest" of Bled by the S.S.R., the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* were transformed into a revolutionary prison, courtroom, and press conference

hall. The two men were sequestered for 52 hours, frisked, and interrogated. During the proceedings the J.G.R. found a notebook filled with the names of various revolutionary and royalist groups which Bled had infiltrated and they conducted an inquest to uncover as much evidence as possible against the alleged informers. Eventually Bled was made to confess his crimes to Almereyda, who began to call himself the *Commissaire aux Délégations Judiciares* amidst the unfolding drama. In his confession Bled admitted to having spied on revolutionary and anarchist circles for two years by means of regular and detailed reports through the offices of the Fourny brothers. He also acknowledged trying to infiltrate the J.G.R. and to having conducted surveillance on the demonstrations in Champagne. Because Dudragne refused to make a confession and because Bled, himself, may have been exonerated later, this may indicate that the S.S.R. was not afraid of implicating militants without definite proof even in its first major counter-police action. After more than two days of detention and with at least one confession in hand, Almereyda invited the press to hear the results of the S.S.R. proceedings. Bled was compelled to write a confession which was immediately available for publication



Figure 25. *Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire.* Miguel Almereyda (seated and writing), his S.S.R. associates, including Eugène Merle (standing), and the two accused police spies (seated facing the camera), Eugène Prosper Bled (alias Bonnet) and Dudragne, on July 20, 1911. Bnf.

in *La Guerre Sociale* and other Parisian newspapers, some of which had representatives on the spot. It was probably not coincidental that some of the revolutionaries implicated in S.S.R. trials were affiliated with newspapers or groups hostile to Hervé's new ideas. With such sensational S.S.R. disclosures, Almereyda sought to intimidate informers by showing them just what they could expect if they continued to work for the police. Through these S.S.R. and J.G.R. antics, *La Guerre Sociale* undoubtedly managed to antagonize and embarrass many governmental and leftist leaders.[65]

The most flagrant event created by the S.S.R. occurred in late July 1911 with the sequestration, "trial", confession, and press conference staged at *La Guerre Sociale* opening the Métivier Affair. American historian David S. Newhall called this affair "the most controversial single episode of [Clemenceau's] ministry."[66] Lucien Métivier had long been affiliated with the *Comité de Defense Sociale*, and he was the Secretary of the *Syndicat des Biscuitiers—Pain d'Épice* (Cookie and Sourdough Bread Makers Union). As head of the baker's union, Métivier was firmly implanted throughout the C.G.T. organizational structure as a member of the Confederal Committee, the Control Commission of the C.G.T., and the Executive Commission of the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*. Initially, few would have believed that a man so subject to arrest and imprisonment himself was actually a *mouchard*. After playing a leading role in 1908 at the time of the strike by the *terrassiers* at Draveil, Métivier was arrested and spent six months in prison for offenses against the army. Later strike activities led to further incarceration. However, as a syndicalist revolutionary he had a reputation of being more impetuous than was necessary, and eventually suspicions started to mount after so many provocative actions. His associates started to wonder when they witnessed Métivier offer bombs and handguns to anyone who wanted them during the course of his activities as a militant.[67] "In effect, during demonstrations he would employ his revolver against whomever he wished and at times would even shoot. In 1910, he suggested to two Directors of the Railway Union that they sabotage a rail line. At the beginning of 1911, he submitted an idea to some anarchists that they kidnap the Minister of Justice in order to exchange him for some syndicalist prisoners. At any rate, police reports underlined that he was a twenty-seven year old ex-baker who was born in Paris, did not seem to be very intelligent, and was scarcely taken seriously."[68]

Sometime during the morning of July 20, 1911, a representative from *La Guerre Sociale* went to Métivier's residence and asked him to come to the newspaper office on an urgent matter. Having numerous acquaintances among the Hervéists, Métivier was not suspicious and followed unquestioningly. Upon arrival the suspected *mouchard* confronted "a veritable revolutionary tribunal"

headed by Almereyda. As was becoming standard operating procedure in S.S.R. inquests, the *Jeunes Gardes* provided the *service d'ordre*, but the audience was composed of key syndicalist leaders including the C.G.T. "Secretary General Léon Jouhaux, his predecessor, Victor Griffuelhes, and the Secretary of the Food Workers Union [Auguste] Savoie." Besides the revolutionary press, several reporters from the bourgeois press were also present, including some from *Le Matin* and *Le Petit Journal* ready to report the evidence in such a sensational episode. Needless to say, the S.S.R. was clearly eager to get the alleged *mouchard* to confess.[69]

Métivier had little time to recover from his initial shock before Almereyda launched his accusations about spying for the police. At first Métivier denied the charges but as the evidence mounted, it became harder and harder to proclaim his innocence. The S.S.R. revelations proved that Métivier, under the pseudonym "Luc", had been working as a spy for the Ministry of the Interior from May 1908 until July 1911. His pseudonym was found on reports coming straight from the offices of *La Sûreté Générale*. Almereyda was also in possession of documents verifying Métivier's contact with a police agent named Perrette. The S.S.R. claimed that Métivier's first meeting with Perrette occurred on May Day 1908. At the time of his S.S.R. "trial", Métivier was actually carrying a notebook with Perrette's name in it as well as a place where contact was made. Despite the mounting evidence, Métivier tried to evade responsibility by arguing that he had assumed that Perrette had been a journalist. At that point several J.G.R. members were sent to search Métivier's apartment where they discovered even more incriminating documents. Then, the sobbing *mouchard* confessed, admitting his contacts with *La Sûreté Générale* over the preceding three years. His confession included the admission that he had received a monthly stipend of 250 francs for regularly sending Perrette reports on the working class movement, especially covering meetings that he regularly attended.[70]

Métivier also testified to having met with Clemenceau once on May 20, 1908, when the latter was *Président du Conseil*. At that encounter, which began his role as a police informant, Métivier was given 300 francs. The evidence gathered by the S.S.R., including Métivier's confession, proved or at least implied that the police informer had been given orders by Clemenceau to increase tensions in 1908 at the Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges strikes and demonstrations which saw several workers killed and many syndicalist leaders imprisoned. Such a disclosure had severe repercussions in 1911 and for years to come. For the present, the French legal system could certainly not afford to tolerate a counter-justice and counter-police system operated by the S.S.R. and J.G.R. Following the exposé, the police instituted perquisitions of the residences of Merle, Almereyda, and

Perceau as well as the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* on July 27, 1911. Needless to say, indictments were expected against any members of the S.S.R. and J.G.R. involved. To avoid their arrest after the perquisitions, Perceau, Almereyda, and Merle, along with three *Jeunes Gardes*, evaded the presumed impending judicial actions by going to Brussels. Having failed to take the necessary precautions, despite having played prominent roles in all the J.G.R. and S.S.R. actions to that point, Goldsky and Tissier were arrested. In Brussels, the fleeing antimilitarists received funds from the Parisian revolutionary community.[71] Almereyda found lodging with his friend, the rather more idealistic Russian anarchist Victor Serge, who later noted Almereyda's increasingly cynical views. The S.S.R. leader told Serge: "You understand nothing about Paris, my old friend. Get rid of all those Russian novels. Here the revolution needs money."[72] However, the fleeing Hervéists soon returned to Paris and awaited their trial. Some formerly sequestered *mouchards* now accused the S.S.R. of having extracted their confessions through torture.[73]

The Hervéists involved in the caper were soon indicted under charges of usurpation of public functions, sequestration, theft, and collusion in a crime of theft all arising from the recent actions involving the S.S.R. "trials" of Bled, Dudragne, and Métivier. The trial of the Hervéists eventually took place on October 6–7, 1911 for their "illegal" action in disclosing government spy activities. In fact, that trial resulted in a virtual self-indictment by the government in which even the prosecution seemed to welcome the accused becoming the accusers. Almereyda rose to the witness box with documents in hand arguing that the S.S.R. actions were a question of national security. The Hervéist lieutenant then demonstrated how Métivier was a dangerous man because he was responsible for the placement of a bomb in the offices of the director of the conservative nationalist newspaper *La Patrie*. The goal of such acts of provocation, Almereyda argued, was to instigate police repression against the working class. By convincingly charging the *mouchards* with criminal activities, Almereyda won over the audience and the jury in court as well as the crowd outside the Palais de Justice. He was "… at the summit of his career as a revolutionary, never having been as influential nor as well-known to the general public … From now on he was referred to as 'The Official Prefect of the Revolution.'"[74]

Even though the S.S.R. had managed to place informants within the French state apparatus, the Hervéist counter-secret police was far from comparable to the police network itself. This sensational episode was neither fortuitous nor was it simply due to Insurrectional diligence in disclosing the machinations of the French national security apparatus. "The documents which fell into the hands of Almereyda were not the result of chance."[75] These revelations by the S.S.R. in

1911 were largely orchestrated by Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux in response to Clemenceau's criticism of the government's recent moderation toward Germany during the unfolding Agadir Crisis,[76] as historians Jacques Julliard and Jean-Paul Brunet as well as Hervé's occasional collaborator René de Marmande, charged. By tying Clemenceau to Métivier's provocations at the time of the bloody events at Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Caillaux was able to discredit his greatest rival and critic. The ramifications of this confrontation would be played out against the backdrop of a world war which led to charges of treason against Caillaux in 1917. In the end, the antics and accusations generated by S.S.R. in the Métivier Affair were not only sensational and commercially advantageous to *La Guerre Sociale*, they proved to be quite accurate.[77]

In his post-war reminiscences, René de Marmande, despite contributing to *La Guerre Sociale* until 1912, ironically connected Hervé himself to Métivier's extremism. "Eventually he [Métivier] appeared to succumb, according to the phrase of de Marmande, to a veritable 'delirium of provocation' and 'from a sickness that Gustave Hervé had made stylish: aggravated Browningitis.'"[78] In his studies on Clemenceau and revolutionary syndicalism, Jacques Julliard echoed de Marmande and the syndicalists by charging that the S.S.R. was simply another blatant example of Hervéist revolutionary romanticism. In the antics of the new organization "one recognized the sense of publicity and the dramatic orchestration by Hervé and his friends; the 'S.S.R.' was a rather ostentatious name to designate the occasional activities of a few journalists eager for excitement who just got their hands on a few pieces of information." Julliard was undoubtedly accurate in seeing the hand of Caillaux behind the S.S.R. disclosures, but he went too far in describing the S.S.R. as virtually a government tool in 1911. Despite Julliard's semi-conspiratorial implications, whatever contact or relationship developed between Caillaux and Almereyda during the Métivier Affair, it was probably unconnected to Hervé's new policies and only indirectly connected to Almereyda's concomitant evolution. At the very most, it might be fair to say that the Métivier Affair only vaguely presaged the Caillaux–Almereyda association with *Le Bonnet Rouge* during the war.[79] Jonathan Almosnino's take on the episode seems to have struck the proper balance. "Perhaps Almereyda did not play a direct role in these political combinations [within the government in 1911] but the solid political connections that he formed with Caillaux a few years later can be foreseen. What is certain is that, already, in maintaining these ties with the highest spheres of the state, the anarchist no longer had his earlier idealism."[80]

The excitement of the Métivier Affair failed to fulfill the stated goals of Hervéism, but it certainly increased the fear of spies and the mutual hostility on

the French Left.[81] Hervé rejected Griffuelhes' claims that secret organizations were unnecessary because syndicalist actions were so open they could not be harmed by police spies. The insurrectional "General" wanted unity and harmony on the French Left, but he also believed that secret organizations were essential for revolution. However, the methods and tactics designed to create unity were capable of becoming sources of greater discord. *La Guerre Sociale* was created to solve the problem of revolutionary division, but the history of the paper inevitably reflected, and Hervé himself, at times, exacerbated that same problem. For Jonathan Almosnino the men in Hervé's entourage, especially Almereyda, "were characterized by remaining in a separate world, cut off from the quotidian realities of the workers' world, from their aspirations, although they attempted to advise them." Although Almosnino described the career of Almereyda, one could say much the same thing about Hervé.

> "Almereyda, who had never truly been active within the C.G.T., had thus [like his boss] spent all his life under a profound misunderstanding of the working class, despite the fact that he [and perhaps Hervé, too] had been seduced by the awakening of its combativeness. This limited social horizon had favored the political reversal of Almereyda and his companions *en route*. Noting a certain ebb in workers' combativeness, they were not able to have the necessary optimism to wait for better days. At the approach of the war, they had, in addition to the impatience of their youth, a profound desire to act for the best against the conflict that they feared. Not believing in the capacities of the working class to change the course of things, they turned toward the world of power. Having abandoned the view of making connections with the popular masses, it was not surprising to see Almereyda very quickly [and Hervé a bit later, however temporarily] find himself in the orbit of the bourgeois republic."[82]

The accelerating end to Hervéism had repercussions among the ranks and formations of Insurrectionalism. In late May and in October 1912 *La Guerre Sociale* reported the growing division among the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. The Hervéist shock troops increasingly stressed the need for unity within their ranks as a precondition for action, but this came at a time when the most active days of the Hervéist paramilitary forces had clearly passed.[83] Despite promises to change the structure of the group, some *Jeunes Gardes*, undoubtedly under syndicalist and anarchist influence, felt compelled to quit. Recruitment by the J.G.R. changed after Hervé's shift and his rejection by anarchists and syndicalists. By 1913 they accepted foreign-born recruits for the first time![84] The decline in police and newspaper reports concerning their confrontations after summer of 1911 might indicate that the insurrectional and royalist battles were prominent only for a short time. Increasingly the J.G.R. was mainly active at meetings where speakers representing

La Guerre Sociale were present and at major events in the revolutionary calendar. Méric spoke of J.G.R. action as late as July 30 and 31 in 1914 when Hervéists and royalists fought one of their last street battles with the mobilization as their backdrop. But this "last battle" was simply an echo of Hervéism and the great campaigns of *La Guerre Sociale*. Hervé by then would have done anything to avoid war except jeopardize France's efforts to defend herself. The *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* would soon discover that their street battles had done little either to prevent war or to prepare for it.[85]

Police files contain information showing that the J.G.R. continued to be led by Almereyda even after he left *La Guerre Sociale* in 1913, but the paramilitary organization apparently soon added the label *républicaines* to its title.[86] By 1913 Hervé occasionally talked about resuscitating the J.G.R., which implies that it was non-existent or moribund by then. However, there is evidence that the *Jeunes Gardes* (now *républicaines*?), led by Almereyda at least until March 1913, were active during the Three Year Law campaign, when they protected antimilitarist meetings from nationalist reactions and defended pacifist professors from their chauvinistic students.[87] On March 16, 1913 the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, the *Jeunesses Socialistes*, and the anarchists combined their efforts against the *Camelots du Roi* at various meetings at the time of an anti-Three Year Law rally at the Pré-Saint-Gervais.[88] That day one contingent of the J.G.R. was apparently marching down the Rue Armand-Carrel carrying its banner and singing antimilitarist songs, when they were waylaid by the police, leading to beatings and arrests. One policeman reportedly got a bloody nose for his ardor which had been induced by Lépine's rewards for the most "energetic" agents according to *L'Humanité*.[89] On July 13, 1913 at another rally at the Pré-Saint-Gervais against the Three Year Law, cooperation and harmony among the F.C.A., the J.G.R., and other generally rival groups occurred. Mentioned in association with descriptions of the unions and socialist groups in attendance, the *Jeunes Gardes* were seen as "one of the diverse groups" along with Espérantistes and two cooperatives.[90] In August 1913 a number of J.G.R. (*républicaines*?) along with syndicalists and anarchists formed a group of 350 demonstrators who clashed with approximately 500 marchers belonging to the group *Les Amis des Retraites Militaires* at La Place de la Concorde.[91] Heuré reported that throughout 1913 in "meeting after meeting the *Jeunes Gardes* used their canes against the *Camelots du Roi*" who were favorable to the Three Year Law, "while the police … engaged in perquisitions of all the *Bourses du Travail* and scrupulously reported the extent of the campaign and the networks from which it benefited."[92] In 1913 during the anti-Three-Year Law campaign and actions against the military parades, former anarchist Almereyda often found himself

marching with "former companions" in the *Comité des Defense des Soldats*, whose aim was to support the troops. However, in one of those confrontations, once syndicalists discovered the presence of Almeryeda and "his sneaky friends", they ceased participation.[93] In April 1914, while commenting on police actions during a Briand speech at the Elysée-Montmartre, Hervé again discussed reconstituting the J.G.R.[94] In fact, following the assassination of Jaurès, elements of the J.G.R. seem to have helped Hervé evade chauvinistic crowds and the expected implementation of the *Carnet B*.[95]

14

La Rectification du Tir and *Le Nouvel Hervéisme*

The sensational exposés and antics in the summer of 1911 by the *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire* were the journalistic and commercial peaks of Hervéist insurrectionalism. Yet leftist reactions to the most extreme activities of Hervéism actually accelerated the Editor in Chief of *La Guerre Sociale* in an opposite direction as he formally stated his new tactics of the "disarmament of hatreds" in October 1911.[1] Peyronnet believed that Hervé's *rectification* occurred because he felt that the danger of war was becoming greater. The Second Moroccan Crisis was supposedly crucial to Hervé's evolution toward a *Bloc* of the entire Left to prevent war.[2] Such an analysis has merit, but it contradicts Hervé's immediate explanations. For sometime after the Second Moroccan Crisis, Hervé claimed that the danger of war had decreased markedly. A more complete explanation of his legendary shift connects it to internal conditions on the French Left. Repeated failures to create a revolutionary concentration coupled with the rejection of Hervé's most extreme ideas and most sensational groups in 1911 pushed Hervé to seek a union of the entire Left to meet a "continuing" threat of war as well as an emerging nationalist and Caesarian challenge from the French Right, which itself had at least as many internal explanations as external ones. Unless Hervé's arguments about *militarism révolutionnaire* and *le désarmement des haines* were cynical propaganda from the very beginning, designed to gradually move his militant friends into a reversal,

the division on the Left which thwarted his revolutionary goals must be seen as critical in his *rectification du tir*. It certainly took him years to finally shelve his revolutionary rhetoric.

Other developments in early 1911 illustrated what Hervé sometimes called his most extreme position. In late April 1911 his analysis of the S.F.I.O. Congress held from April 16 to 19 at Saint Quentin was terse but insightful. He was glad that the Guesdists were beaten on almost all issues: control of *L'Humanité*, support for the brief Ministry of Ernest Monis,[3] municipalization, and nationalization—all favored by Jaurès. Hervé blamed the failure of Guesdism on its contradictions: Guesde assumed one could make a revolution by trying to control Parliament. Jaurès's ideas were consistent with reformism since he looked to political evolution and gradual control of Parliament. According to Hervé this persistent reformism was a positive development since it forced a revolutionary party to exist outside the S.F.I.O. His reaction to Saint Quentin seemed to indicate that Hervé had not yet forgotten about a *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[4]

In the next issue of *La Guerre Sociale* Hervé gave a mixed review to Jaurès's book *L'Armée Nouvelle*. Despite praise for the volume, Hervé called Jaurès's optimism and confidence, both naïve and blind since his ideas for a people's army could never be implemented while France remained a plutocratic Republic rather than a democracy. It was much better for revolutionaries to occupy themselves with military organizations which could sweep away the bourgeois Republic.[5] Though Hervé's tactics were in transformation, at this point he saw himself as the only truly revolutionary socialist leader in France.

Hervé also assailed leftist leaders for the poor turnout on the Anniversary of the Commune. He claimed that the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine* created insufficient publicity and the *Union des Syndicates de la Seine* failed to join the socialists at the rally. Nevertheless, he hoped that this spirit of coteries would end for Aernoult's funeral.[6] French actions in Morocco in the late spring of 1911 led him to attack French workers and even revolutionaries who did nothing to stop the transportation of French arms and men to Morocco. He was especially hostile toward workers who "could strike for five *sous* a day more pay but could do nothing to save the people of Morocco."[7] The direction of Hervé's antiwar ideas is best illustrated in his praise of the air shows sponsored by the great Parisian dailies in 1911. Even though press rivalries and nationalistic excitement spoiled these events, Hervé saw the solidarity of classes and a temporary end to fratricidal conflicts during the shared awe before man's technical achievement. In Hervé's opinion, this type of popular enthusiasm was a welcome contrast to horse races, alcohol, and *café-concerts*.[8] Despite his fascination with technological progress, ideas of decadence

and a skepticism regarding materialism underlay Hervé's socialism well before World War I.

When the Monis Ministry fell on June 23, 1911, one led by Joseph Caillaux replaced it within days, but the new Minister "seemed even less the Radical than Monis." The new Caillaux Ministry left Hervé in a bleak mood. The "masses" were so detached and demoralized they did not see the difference between Victor Napoleon and a Republic which had now lost all moral authority. The French Left was unable to profit by this wretched state of popular opinion because the S.F.I.O. was reformist, the C.G.T. was too absorbed with hatred of the S.F.I.O. as well as too concerned with corporate and economic issues, and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* were still as embryonic as all other revolutionary organizations.[9] Because of his bloody crackdown on the extreme Left, Caillaux would soon be called *Caillaux de sang*[10] on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale*. Hervé also warned the new *Président de conseil* that he ought to beware of the fate of Russian ministers like the Interior Vyacheslav Plehve who was assassinated in 1904. When Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin was assassinated in early September, Caillaux was referred to as Caillaux-Stolypin.[11] Soon, the troubles within the C.G.T. would be seen by Hervé as the main cause of the increased governmental repression.[12]

In July 1911 Hervé threatened to end the rubric *Mam'zelle Cisaille* if dangerous sabotage, such as the recent bombing of the railroad bridge Pont de l'Arche, continued. *La Guerre Sociale* denied all responsibility for life-threatening sabotage, yet most of the French press called *La Guerre Sociale* the official newspaper of the saboteurs. In fact, many saboteurs were in the habit of nailing copies of *La Guerre Sociale* to telegraph poles near downed telegraph lines. Among their demands some saboteurs echoed the Hervéist *hebdomadaire* by including not only the reintegration of the railway workers but also the renewal of permission to sell *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Bataille Syndicaliste* in the train stations of France.[13] Hervé and his followers attempted to solve the contradictions in leftist theory, but they themselves never escaped the dilemmas. How do you organize a revolution when your potential supporters define themselves in exclusionary ways? How do you create a revolution through sensationalism and advertising? How can a revolution occur if you are revolted by revolutionary violence?

The Agadir Crisis in early July 1911 worried Hervé, yet he believed (or wrote) that recent internal disorders, after five years of governmental repression by Clemenceau and Briand, had left workers without patriotism. He noted that Russia was unprepared for war, and England was without an army. If he believed those arguments, then the traditional Hervéist battle cry "*plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre*" must have entailed a major dose of false bravado that summer.[14] Failures,

frustrations, and rejections were placing Hervéism increasingly in contradictory tactical positions. On July 12, 1911 Hervé, at least in this instance, asserted that war between France and Germany was inevitable even if the new Moroccan Crisis could be solved. Yet the chief forces of the Left, instead of joining together to use a future crisis to end the capitalist system, could only bicker over unimportant matters.[15] The voyage of C.G.T. officials to Berlin later during the crisis elicited spontaneous reactions by Hervé with no concern for overall consistency. While his "ethnic-national character" arguments never disappeared, in early August 1911 Hervé expressed faith in German workers. He now said that a declaration of war would cause the German unions to bring down the Kaiser if French workers showed they were not bluffing. So, the French Left needed to unite, be disciplined, and create vital new antiwar organizations.[16] One week later Hervé was out of patience with the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. for their failures to organize either for an insurrection or a general strike to prevent war. Given the mutual suspicions on the French Left, he believed that all revolutionary groups ought to organize secretly but separately. The alerts of 1905 and 1911 were evidence that the Left was without the plans, preparations, or organizations necessary to prevent war. Clearly, Hervé was disgusted by the perpetual division and lack of organization on the French Left.[17]

That exasperation had been extreme several weeks earlier when the Bastille Day rally failed. From his prison cell Hervé supported the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine* in its efforts to organize a demonstration on July 14 at what he called the modern Bastille, La Santé, in favor of political prisoners. In an attempt to incite Parisian workers, Hervé called the present Republic an old whore compared to the virgin she had been in her youth.[18] The failure of the demonstration was blamed on leftist divisions, socialist meekness, and a bloody repressive police. The lack of support by *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, the *Union des Syndicats de la Seine*, and even the federation of *bâtiment* met with special criticism by *La Guerre Sociale*.[19]

Whenever Hervé was subject to legal proceedings, transferred from one prison to another, or deprived of one of the privileges usually granted to political prisoners such as exercise, visitors, or access to the press, *La Guerre Sociale* notified its readers and the rest of the Parisian press which often relayed the stories or reported on the same events themselves. Such reporting allows us to follow those events.[20] "On June 7, 1911 *La Guerre Sociale* [had] told its readers that legal proceedings were being instigated against Hervé, Auroy, and [Gaston] Couté, for apologies for actions deemed criminal. 'It is with joy that *La Guerre Sociale* will openly put the Cossacks of the French Republic on trial, and their leader, the crazy dangerous Lépine,' proclaimed Hervé." Those judicial proceedings stemmed

from accusations of police brutality against Lépine and the Parisian police on May Day as well as Hervé's praise for the less than pacific response of the J.G.R. That trial was set to occur on September 6, 1911, but Hervé would choose not to appear to protest the living conditions at the Concièrgerie. The Beauce poet Couté, who had become a fixture in Paris, was not tried for his poem, "*Tête de Bois*," because he died from tuberculosis and perhaps the long-term effects of absinthe a few weeks after the newspaper published his poem, dedicated to a police agent, "le flic [Gaston] Faralicq," who had guarded Liabeuf's guillotine the night of his execution.[21]

Throughout the summer of 1911 Hervé's editorial attacks on Caillaux led to his transference in late July 1911 to Clairvaux, the Aube prison around 120 kilometers southeast of Paris, where he had been incarcerated in 1906, and quite inconvenient for communicating with colleagues and friends. For several months Hervé had signed his articles with his own name in an effort to be tried along with other editors at *La Guerre Sociale* then subject to legal proceedings. For the most part, French governments had been content to keep imprisoned Hervéists out of judicial proceedings as the best means to silence them. The Caillaux Ministry seemed to be different. Hervé believed his transference to Clairvaux could prevent an adequate defense but not another prosecution.[22] In late August he was transferred to back to La Concièrgerie,[23] where he awaited another trial on September 6 at the *Assises de la Seine*.[24] As mentioned above, the subject of prosecution was his article "*Vers la conquête de la rue*" defending the May Day violence of French workers in response to police brutality and advising both workers and his own J.G.R. to organize to take control of the streets.[25] On September 5 he wrote a letter to the court, which *L'Humanité* and *La Guerre Sociale* published, notifying the authorities that he would not appear as long as he was: (1) forced to stay in a cell "without air or light", (2) periodically was put on display in the "bear cages" during his daily walks, and (3) continued to be subject to wretched conditions unsuitable for mere violators of press laws.[26] *L'Humanité* expressed its indignation at the conditions which Hervé was forced to endure: "How must a government fear the ideas which our comrade propagates, to employ such despicable proceedings. What baseness of spirit his torturers reveal!"[27]

By not appearing in court, Hervé received compound sentences by default, one of two years and another of three months for several articles he had written during the last year.[28] By the end of September, Hervé found himself back at Clairvaux, inconvenient but less wretched than La Concièrgerie.[29] In early November he was returned to the Concièrgerie to await his appeal of the sentences of September 6. Since his grievances against the French Penitentiary Administration had partly

been met, Hervé was now willing to appear in court.[30] The authorities, however, could not have been pleased by the photos that had appeared in *La Guerre Sociale* on November 1 contrasting a caged bear at the *Jardin des Plantes* with Hervé in the *cage d'ours* at the Concièrgerie.[31] When the trial began, *La Guerre Sociale* proudly announced the "General's Return to the Assises." Gilles Heuré described the opening of the trial almost as if it were a theatrical production with all the participants ready and willing to play their parts.[32] Many of the witnesses testified that the police always acted like Cossacks. Almereyda talked about what happened on May Day at the Manège Saint-Paul when the police ambushed the J.G.R. and bystanders who simply wanted to express their allegiances. The *Jeune Garde* Jean Goldsky, on leave from the army yet dressed in his uniform, also described what happened on May Day. After expressing surprise that a *Jeune Garde* was defending France at the frontier, the presiding judge quickly told Goldsky to get back to duty on the Eastern border. Noted journalist Henri Rochefort, who had seen his share of press violations, wondered how anyone could prosecute Hervé and yet allow an *agent provocateur* like Métivier to go free. Any indictment of Hervé, Rochefort argued, "would only serve to increase the circulation of *La Guerre Sociale*." Veteran witness at most of Hervé's trials, Séverine, praised Hervé and defended press freedom as she had done in many previous trials. Prosecutor Matter was calm and controlled as he explained how law and order were threatened by Hervé's articles. The defense attorney Boucheron sought to get the jury to view Hervé as something other than a blood-thirsty beast. But many observers on the Left were troubled because the jury seemed completely devoid of working class members.[33]

On November 10, 1911 Hervé's nearly two-hour plea to the court was fairly balanced, but many observers thought that he showed signs of strain after eighteen months in prison. Gilles Heuré wondered whether that might have softened his usually violent language.[34] After recounting events in the life and case of Liabeuf, Hervé wanted the jury to know that his own cell at La Santé had not been far from the site of the guillotine on the Boulevard Arago when it cut short the life of the unfortunate shoemaker. That indicted article on Liabeuf had been intentionally provocative to gain sufficient attention in order to save Liabeuf's life. He also told the court about receiving a poignant letter from Liabeuf's mother, who thanked him for saving the honor of her son. He told the jury that by forwarding it to his own mother in Brittany, he hoped to help her bear his own prison term. Since his mother already possessed the Cross of the Legion of Honor from her youngest son serving in the Far East, that letter from another distraught mother "was the best thing that her eldest son could offer her; for a polemicist, that was the equivalent … honor."[35] At the conclusion of his presentation, Hervé returned

to one of his standard rhetorical techniques concerning "two French nations": the feudal France of the bourgeoisie and financiers that he despised and the democratic and working class France[36] which he loved. Prior to his standard attack on Lépine for the police violence on May Day, the event which led to the incriminating editorial in question at the trial, Hervé denied that he hated the police. The police were simply the sons of peasants and workers as well as former soldiers trying to support their families. He admitted that his socialist ideals included a strong sense of social authority. The existence of the J.G.R. and the S.S.R. were cited as proof of his love of order! He also praised police efforts to unionize and he recognized that there were good men in all *métiers*. Though he still characterized Lépine as the tool of the High Bank and himself as the new Blanqui, there was clearly a new emphasis in Hervé's testimony.[37] Gilles Heuré summarized that testimony in this way: "… if [Hervé] condemned the violence of the police and those who inspired them, that was to affirm that demonstrations were essential elements in the workings of democracy: in repressing them, you incite workers to turn away from the republic and to prepare the return of the empire."[38]

Despite being granted attenuating circumstances, Hervé's sentence of two years in prison along with a fine of 1000 francs and editorial manager Auroy's six months and 500 franc fine were only partial reductions of the September 6 decisions. The verdict, which came in less than one hour, set off a violent explosion of revolutionary rhetoric in the leftist press and in meetings of sympathizers.[39] *La Guerre Sociale* responded with its usual humor, anger, and sarcasm. "Two new years of prison! Good: 9 and 2 make 11." Almereyda wondered how anyone could be so stupid as to think that such a sentence would prevent continuing hatred and disgust by the government's critics. "Underneath a drawing by [Paul] Poncet showing Hervé in prison, Almereyda expressed indignation. 'Can you imagine that the peace of Europe is in the hands of such senile old men!'" Despite ongoing ideological battles and press competition with Hervé's newspaper, *La Bataille Syndicaliste* recognized and praised "*L'Enfermé*", while Jaurès and Jules Uhry in *L'Humanité* described him as "buried alive in the Third Republic's prisons." Although Jaurès had questioned the republic's inability to act in a republican manner, he stressed that he could not question Hervé's capacity to endure and never falter. Protests against the verdict also occurred in many meetings in Paris and throughout France.[40]

In early January 1912, less than two months after this latest trial, Hervé was back before the *Assises* for an article which appeared in *La Guerre Sociale* on May 17, 1911 entitled "*Attila au Moroc.*" That article had been accompanied by a drawing by Auguste Auglay depicting an Arab school where a young Muslim stu-

dent had to answer the question: "What is a Frenchman?" Of course, the response was provocative. For the native student, a Frenchman was: "A man who steals everything, burns villages, and kills women and small children." For an antimilitarist to condemn the destructive horrors of French colonialism was probably not very surprising. But Hervé also assailed "the Left in general and syndicalists in particular for not intervening against the military actions in Morocco. And if soldiers were not all guilty, some of them having been misled by the idea of a civilizing mission, that was because *militarisme révolutionnaire* demanded that the army no longer be condemned as a whole."[41]

Gilles Heuré wondered whether a recent press campaign to get Hervé released could have affected his treatment at the trial for "*Attila au Moroc*" since on January 12, 1912 presiding judge Couinaud exchanged amusing banter with the defendant about the origins of the name "*Un Sans Patrie*" and the facts of his career. The facts that so amused the judge were necessary crosses to bear from Hervé's perspective. He had been dismissed from teaching, crossed off the list of attorneys, and imprisoned as a journalist, all for saying what he thought about the ongoing evils and injustice under the current regime. When the judge in jest told Hervé that he wished he had stayed in teaching, that seemed to be an invitation to continue the banter between the two men about the relative dangers of being shot at as a soldier versus being imprisoned as an outspoken journalist, but the jibing did not prevent the judge from trying to advise Hervé regarding exactly who the real bandits, thieves, and murderers were. By the time each man admitted wanting to convince the other, the proceedings seemed to have become a rather banal performance in the theater of the absurd. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the situation was never in question. After the witnesses were heard, the prosecutor's closing speech praised French colonial policies in Morocco and called Hervé's ideas a national dishonor. After a half hour of deliberation, the jury found Hervé, the manager Auroy, and the cartoonist Auglay, guilty. That meant the maximum sentence for editor-in-chief Hervé: another three months in prison and a 500 franc fine. Auroy got two months and 500 francs as a fine, while Auglay had to pay the fine, but was not sent to prison. The verdict set off such an outburst of anger and indignation along with the usual slogans for Hervé and against the state apparatus that the courtroom had to be cleared.[42]

While the *Sans Patrie* was being prosecuted for anti-colonial articles and was supported by most of the French Left for his stand on that issue, other issues were more contentious among what had been the presumed components of his revolutionary coalition. That explains his new policy of the *désarmement des haines*, which was another crucial ingredient in Hervé's progressive shift.[43] Gilles Heuré

explained the launching of this new tactic in terms of Hervé's habit of proceeding in a "concentric circles method involving slogans and progressive reflection." By the beginning of 1911, he envisaged a "realistic" manner of being revolutionary by accommodating all leftists of good will while trying to win over those who continued to promote working class exclusiveness. The idea of a "disarmament of hatreds" implied new alliances. For Heuré such a new tactic can be envisaged in terms of several stages: (1) identifying one's true political partners, (2) stopping the internecine combat and consolidating an *entente* between the socialists and the syndicalists, and (3) toning down the revolutionary ideas which frightened everyone. The policy can even be described as an early form of the *L'Union Sacrée.* Initially it could meet the internal threat of French Caesarism which Hervé seemed so obsessed with, but implicitly it would allow the Left to focus on more obvious external threats such as the war brewing between England and Germany.[44]

From the beginning of October 1911, Hervé's formal call for a *désarmement des haines* was consistently stated. He still spoke as a revolutionary but he continued to back away from the *Parti Révolutionnaire* even though his staff did not unanimously follow him. Instead of emphasizing the concentration of the revolutionary Left, he now stressed the need for an end to mutual attacks and discord within the entire French Left as necessary for common action. *Entente* and *entente cordiale* were the new watchwords of Hervéism.[45] Rivalries and disunity on the Left had allowed the rise of Hervéism, but ironically a continuation of such division meant its failure. He assumed that fear and defensiveness had prevented anarchists, syndicalists, and their publications from following him. Now as a novice conciliator, he lamented the fratricidal war going on between those who had a "phobia of revolutionary syndicalism" and those with a "phobia of the Socialist Party." Sometimes he actually admitted to be moving away from revolutionaries and closer to the reformist clan. The followers of Jaurès saw this as a good sign, a virtual pledge of alliance. The police noted a decline in Hervé's support and thought they detected another motive for the new policies. Because of financial problems at *La Guerre Sociale*, the police thought "the General" had his eye on the post of editor-in-chief at *L'Humanité*, while the socialist daily had its eye on Hervéist elements from the extreme Left, especially syndicalist elements.[46]

Gilles Heuré described Hervé's *désarmement des haines* idea "as an appeal for a gathering of fears. Beginning in 1911 and [continuing] up until the war, Gustave Hervé conducted a complete revision of his ideas and fell back on a desire for a political union, above all national, which he saw as the ultimate rampart against the general explosion. The conflict in Morocco, the Italian aggression in

Tripoli, and the Balkan Wars were annunciatory shocks of the European quake of 1914. Hervé saw the threat of war from now on in the conflict brewing between England and Germany and in the Franco-Russian Alliance which risked causing the country to slide into the 'cycle of violence' between Russia and Austria." Certainly, insurrection was still the traditional and preventive threat against war, but Hervé generally stopped using the word antipatriot in 1912 and for a time preferred the term insurrectionalist. He also wanted to be more and more specific regarding a general strike in the event of a mobilization for war. Realizing that the general strike entailed many uncertainties, he admitted that it actually rested on naïve and pious wishes. He now claimed that you could never prevent war once it was declared because "the nationalist wave [and the] governmental terror" would overwhelm any whim to revolt. "To be effective, the general strike had to take place before a mobilization" because that occurrence would automatically place any strikers "under [the strictures of] martial law."[47] If that were true, what was Hervé's idea for the most effective means to prevent war?

At the end of the summer of 1911, worry about the possible failure of the Franco-German talks over Morocco led Hervé to uncover "proof" that the Germans and the French would act to prevent a war if it came.[48] He soon contrasted English and German working class unity, during strikes and against war, with the division he witnessed on the French Left.[49] Contradictory evidence was no problem for Hervé if it could be used to promote his program. Though he had for years questioned the revolutionary and anti-war potential of the S.P.D., by mid-September he claimed to have evidence of Hervéism in the German party, which he now called "the principal rampart of peace in Europe!"[50] On September 24, 1911 when 60,000 people from the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., and the anarchists gathered together at Aero-Park in a demonstration against war, Hervé was ecstatic. Here was his program for the *désarmement des haines* in action. For him, this was the first common action by the entire French Left, and it showed that unity among revolutionary forces was possible in France.[51] He called the Italian-Turkish War of late 1911 a colonial rather than European war, yet it strengthened his beliefs that a major war could occur at any time and led him to reiterate his call for armed secret organizations of revolutionaries to prevent war. Now, however, Hervé cited Bebel's argument that a general strike could only be effective before a mobilization was declared.[52] In the wake of the Second Moroccan Crisis, foreign affairs started to have at least as much impact as the internal divisions of the French Left in forcing the pace of Hervé's *rectification du tir*.

Most self-described revolutionaries, including occasional contributors like Francis Delaisi, were troubled by *Le Nouvel Hervéisme*. Not all prominent

revolutionaries rejected all of Hervé's new ideas, however. Sebastien Faure noted that for fifteen years he had favored a "disarmament of hatreds" and an *entente* on the Left as necessities for the revolutionary cause. Still, Faure could not bring himself to accept *militarisme révolutionnaire*.[53] When Hervé started to call his antipatriotism a "pedagogical error", that was too much for a syndicalist like Pierre Monatte whose assault on the "*arrivistes* of *La Guerre Sociale*" had wide support in syndicalist circles. For his part, Jean Grave became increasingly worried that Hervéism was a new Jacobinism and that Hervé was a bit too authoritarian. When Grave went so far as to accuse Hervéism of being nothing more than lies, bluff, and sensations, Hervé's close anarchist friend Émile Masson pointed out that the insurrectional leader had always been an authoritarian collectivist, but such men were probably needed for any revolution to succeed. Even if he were wrong, Hervé was what he was, a perfectly loyal revolutionary who was too unyielding to ever be a subtle dialectician. "It is not necessary to ask granite to be quartz."[54]

For most anarchists Hervé's new course was impossible to accept, especially because he had turned his back on direct action. Although the *Sans Patrie* had sought their support from the very beginning, many had been suspicious of his authoritarianism, his ties to socialism, and his stress on organization. Now that his ideas were changing so rapidly, they continued to be his most ferocious critics. His relations with anarchists were quite complex and seldom without conflict. "By culture and political formation, he always sought to act in relation to a structure, whether he was favorable or unfavorable. Despite his sense of rebelliousness and his chronic impertinence, he was anything but an anarchist individualist. His political journey only confirmed his propensity to organize things and people around an executive who organizes, distributes, and compartmentalizes. But Hervé was also a tactician." There is evidence for such conclusions in his troubled relationship with the A.I.A. and in his maneuvers during the attempted creation of a *Parti Révolutionnaire*.[55] In general, anarchists of all stripes had become troubled by Hervéism even before his shift. *L'Anarchie* had never been able to accept Hervé's socialism and his alleged authoritarianism. *Le Temps Nouveaux* was now very wary. "In July 1910 *Le Libertaire*, summarizing the opinions of many, predicted that 'you could very well awaken provided with a Committee of Public Safety, presided over by a Hervéist jealous of the sanguinary glory of a Fouquier-Tinville!'"[56] Revolutionary militarism was not a policy that most anarchists could ever accept given their prejudices against organization, structure, and recruitment even if it was under the aegis of *La Guerre Sociale*. The watchword for *Le Libertaire* was: "*Le militarisme, voila l'ennemi*!"[57] Some anarchists thought

Hervé should rename the paper, *La Paix Sociale* and others assumed he would soon become a deputy.[58]

Since unity and, therefore, peace were not possible by means of a revolutionary party, Hervé was led to seek these goals on a much broader, yet still naïve and illusionary, basis. Attacked for sensationalism and commercialism, Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale* were willing to jettison a proven journalistic method and an established political position accepted by many on the extreme Left in order to try to succeed on another plane. Despite some indications of financial troubles during the railway strike and after, the reasons for this transformation included frustration, rejection, and failure at a political level, not major economic problems. The popularity and allure of *La Guerre Sociale* had never been greater than in 1910 and 1911.[59] The political transformation of Hervé undoubtedly entailed a material risk, but even in the process of a profound *rectification* the paper had not exhausted its creative energies. By 1912 Hervéism may have been a fading movement, but *La Guerre Sociale* still showed signs of creativity and expansion. In June 1912 the paper developed *La Chanson du Peuple* headed by the signer Léon Israel. This new affiliated office of *La Guerre Sociale* was an attempt to sell songs and plays as well as to stage concerts in order to gain profits and to counter the *revanchard* wave in the *café-concerts*.[60]

Until 1912 Hervé still saw himself as an insurrectional revolutionary, but he was rapidly jettisoning antimilitarism and antipatriotism. *Le Rappel* described the situation like this: "They say that misfortune embitters the weak and softens the strong. Now, the 'General' is one of the strong. At Clairvaux and La Santé, meditating over the resumption of individual acts of violence, the shooting of officers, and the attacking of scabs, he discovered the vileness and horror of revolutionary verbosity. As it often happens, it is far from men that one feels oneself to be their equal."[61] If Hervé's transformation was developing rapidly by 1911, he was not yet ready for a new *Bloc*, even if the logic of his program for a *désarmement des haines* was leading to a rejection of class conflict.[62] Ending the divisions and mutual attacks on the Left was a prelude to the elimination of divisions among Frenchmen. In late 1911 and increasingly in 1912, *La Guerre Sociale* published more and more articles showing the growth of revolutionary ideas in the army and the development of union building among the police. The *Sans Patrie* now admitted that both the army and the police had both positive and negative elements. Finding divisions within classes was a prelude to the end of class conflict.

However, *La Guerre Sociale* was no closer to ending hatreds on the French Left than it was to ending the threat of European war. Yet that did not prevent further attempts to do both. In its efforts to end hatreds while maintaining support from

revolutionaries, *La Guerre Sociale* got involved in the controversy over the search for an international language then raging between the advocates of *Esperanto* and *Ido*. The search for an international language to create universal brotherhood and peace was no more immune from discord than were the nations of Europe or the political groups on the French Left. *La Guerre Sociale* tried to be honest and impartial, but its early favoring of *Esperanto*, combined with an admission of ignorance on the matter and a call for expert advice on the international language question, were preordained to create enemies in both camps. Vacillation could be as divisive as clarity in an era when compromise seemed to entail organizational, ideological, and even national suicide.[63]

Hervé's transformation mirrored his evolution on colonial questions. For years Hervé called on native peoples to revolt against their colonial oppressors, but on October 18, 1911 he approved giving part of the Congo to Germany as a *quid pro quo* over Morocco on the grounds that France could no more stop German colonial expansion than it had been able to stop German unification. The justification for his change was the prevention of war. Since Hervéism had proven unable to unite revolutionaries to prevent war, peace had to be sought by other means. It could be argued that the ultimate ideal in Hervéism was, all along, peace.[64] Yet he was moving toward a definition of peace in terms of the preservation of *la patrie française*. Hervé's continuous search for peace seemed to have reverted to an atavistic rationale. Peace and the security of France were becoming the same thing for him. In May 1912, on pragmatic grounds, he approved the idea of a German takeover of Belgian and Portuguese colonies as part of an Anglo-German Accord. Colonial exchange "was the law of capitalist nations" and it prevented war. "Africa could be sacrificed in the interests of peace" because "Africans had shown themselves incapable of developing their own lands … As citizens of the next United States of Europe, we cannot assume to prevent 'capitalist civilization' from fertilizing Africa."[65] Hervé would continue to protest the nature of French colonialism, but he now accepted the right of European powers to have colonies.[66] If he now willingly sacrificed Africa in the interest of peace, he was becoming increasingly less willing to even appear to jeopardize France in the interest of peace.

In late November 1911 an inadvertent S.S.R. disclosure was printed in *La Bataille Syndicaliste* causing serious repercussions on the French Left. The full extent of the antagonism between *La Guerre Sociale* and the syndicalist daily then became visible. Their journalistic rivalry had become an ideological dispute which now centered around which newspaper had the most information about police infiltration of the Left. *La Guerre Sociale* devoted almost all of its November 22 issue to a defense of the S.S.R. The Hervéist weekly quoted its own prior articles

supporting *La Bataille Syndicaliste* as proof that Hervéists had not originated the dispute; the Hervéists argued that they "practiced what they preached" about ending hatreds on the Left.[67] In the newspaper's next issue, an unsigned article, probably by Hervé, accepted some of the blame in the latest dispute with the syndicalists rather than prolong the hostilities. Of course, continued rivalry and increasing rancor were now inevitable as this very edition proved, yet Hervé still expressed the hope that the two papers could somehow work together.[68]

In late 1911 Hervé had not yet rejected insurrection, secret organizations, and revolutionary discipline,[69] and he could still become aroused when reformist socialist Deputies such as Adéodat Constant Adolphe Compère-Morel and Henri Ghesquière used the parliamentary forum to attack Insurrectionalism and the C.G.T.[70] Within one week, however, he found some merits in the charges of the reformist Deputies. To save France from a growing nationalist menace, a new Boulangism, and an imminent Franco-German war, reformists and revolutionaries in both the S.F.I.O. and C.G.T. would have to achieve a *détente*.[71]

In the last issue of 1911 Hervé gave a pessimistic assessment of the state of the revolutionary forces in France. The revolutionary feelings and ideas of militants were ten years ahead of their syndicalist and socialist organizations. What was to blame? Clearly, the quarrels on the Left hindered recruitment and generated little material support. Yet, Hervé now claimed that the *Parti Révolutionnaire* had never been more than a utopian project.[72] What he now wanted was a strong, well-organized socialist party, able to win elections yet be open to other tendencies. Despite his intermittent rhetoric about the authoritarianism and materialism of the German S.P.D. as well as recurrent doubts about the latter's ability to act against war, Hervé envied the German socialists for their funds, organization, and membership.[73] In early 1912 the S.P.D. was described as being well in advance of the French Left "despite the lack of revolutionary temper in the German race." Voting, electoral success, and the creation of a *Bloc* with the liberal German bourgeoisie were now considered positive developments for German socialism. As Hervé shifted his ideas, it was almost as if elections had become more revolutionary than Insurrectionalism. "In truth, I am beginning to ask myself if, with our great words insurrection, direct action, sabotage, *chasse aux renards* [fox hunting or attacking the scabs], we are not, from a revolutionary point of view, small children beside the voting socialists of Germany."[74]

Back in February 1911 the Parisian 20th section of the S.F.I.O. had presented a motion to the Federal Committee of the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine* to start a campaign to get an amnesty for Hervé, much like the one that had led to the release of Jules Durand. When Hervé was first sentenced in late February 1910,

there had been great protests and large meetings, but the administrative committee of the Socialist Party came to believe that a campaign for Hervé's release would get nowhere.[75] Late December 1911 found Hervé still at Clairvaux but awaiting transfer to the Concièrgerie prior to another trial. With twenty months of continuous life in prison already behind him, that alone could have created a more negative or even despondent attitude in him. Perhaps the obvious strain on Hervé was one element in Almereyda's efforts to get Hervé released even before his trial on "*Attila au Moroc*". At the end of 1911, two weeks prior to the trial, *La Guerre Sociale* solicited support from the entire range of leftist and liberal luminaries in order to create a major campaign to get Hervé a pardon.[76] Without Hervé's knowledge and against his stated wishes, Almereyda began a campaign to obtain an amnesty. The disputes and divisions on the Left in 1911 had certainly made such a campaign unlikely to arise successfully from the spontaneous good will of the jealous and bickering forces of revolutionary idealism. So, on December 27, 1911, beneath an enormous headline which read: "*Hommage à Gustave Hervé*", *La Guerre Sociale* included dozens of letters of sympathy, drawings, and cartoons dedicated to obtaining Hervé's release. Contributors were mostly famous French writers, journalists, politicians, labor leaders, and artists including: Anatole France, Jean Jaurès, Octave Mirbeau, Émile Fabre, Victor Griffuelhes, Francis Jourdain, Charles Malato, C.-A. Laisant, Marcel Sembat, Amédée Dunois, Jean-Louis Thuillier, Léon Jouhaux, Élie Faure,[77] Francis de Pressensé, et al.[78]

Undoubtedly, the word got out to Brittany where Émile Masson was again recovering from a bout of the recurring illness which would eventually take his life. In the second week of January, Masson reemerged from his latest convalescence with a "vibrant appeal" in *Le Rappel du Morbihan* demanding the liberation of Hervé, "the most Christian atheist, the Sans-Patrie [who was] the most ardently Breton of the Breton patriots." Such a description of the imprisoned journalist reflected the sharp sense of contradiction which Masson saw in Hervé. That juxtaposition of religion, skepticism, antipatriotism, patriotism, and Breton nationalism was:

> "a strange appeal in socialist columns where religion and the nation generally smell of sulfur. Did Masson surmise the balancing [being performed] by Hervé among current options, his return to the Christian faith—still in the distance—and his imminent rejection of antipatriotism? Knowing him as he did, virtually forever, he awaited the worst as well as the best from the friend whom he was ready to defend despite all opposition."[79]

Hervé certainly attracted criticism from an increasingly indignant extreme Left. When one of his former professors of history, François Victor Alphonse Aulard,

called for his release from prison, Hervé responded with a virtual rejection of Hervéism. The *Sans Patrie* now called antipatriotism "a pedagogical error." For the evolving Hervé, "the antipatriotism of the *'Sans-Patrie'* was fundamentally only the patriotism of the *sans-culottes* of the Year II, adapted to the political and economic conditions of the new Europe." That may have been an "honest recognition of the historic limits of a popular, nationalist, and proletarian sentiment" with which Masson sympathized "but to admit that truth by a political activist like Hervé, made the term patriotism relative and rejected more than a decade of activism." When Masson read the challenges to Hervé's new course from militants like Pierre Monatte and Jean Grave, he responded but had little success in altering their views. In fact, Masson had recognized the statist and authoritarian streak in his friend and in much of the extreme Left, as well.[80]

The campaign seeking Hervé's release expanded following the January 12, 1912 guilty verdict for his May 1911 article on Morocco. Out of this campaign a broadly based *Comité d'Action Pour la Liberté d'Opinion* was formed to seek amnesties or pardons for Hervé as well as other prisoners for political or press violations. *L'Humanité* allied itself to the new *Comité* and described it as the re-entry of intellectuals in the search for truth and justice.[81] Hervé's response was a vow that he would never accept a pardon but would only take advantage of a general amnesty for all the victims of injustice.[82] The vice president of the League of the Rights of Man noted that the League sent out two thousand petitions for Hervé's release, and a large meeting was organized on February 21, 1912 at the Salle Wagram with the same object, with Anatole France as honorary president and prominent Dreyfusard Victor Basch in charge.[83]

In March 1912 *Mes Crimes* was published by *La Guerre Sociale* as part of the strategy to get Hervé out of prison. This book was a collection of Hervé's incriminated articles and defense testimony from the previous years, apparently initially conceived without his knowledge. According to an article by Eugène Merle describing the new volumes for readers of *La Guerre Sociale*, "… if one could still see in … [Hervé] a 'violent person, an intransigent, a sectarian, a doctrinaire, a frenzied anarchist …' that was because, by his 'pedagogical' concern, in which he has a flair, he has a taste for 'biting formulas' and because he likes to express his thoughts loudly, forcefully, and 'bluntly, without nuances to his friends as well as his enemies.'"[84] Nevertheless, the volume included an introduction written by Hervé which was an obvious sign of the growing moderation in Hervéism. In that introduction he justified his antimilitarist and antipatriotic campaign around 1906 in terms of the political circumstances of that era, but he now called for the "disarmament of hatreds."[85]

> "What was called Hervéism was only the brutal, violent, and willfully cutting protest against the criminals who, in the name of patriotism, nonchalantly acted to decree this throat cutting; against this social organization; against this capitalist nation which made such a horror possible, such a monstrous imbecility! And so Hervéism, despite its socialist inspiration, its cries of revolt, and its revolutionary conclusions, is basically only an exasperated pacifism … Perhaps it was not indispensible for us to deck ourselves out with the term antipatriots, while we already had the fairly explicit word internationalists within reach."[86]

Hervé explained the excesses in his formulas as a necessary measure to make international socialists heed the dangers of war that Europe had been running since the opening up of the Moroccan question. For anyone who was tempted to attack his new ideas a bit too strongly, Hervé was not above recalling his willingness to go to prison for his views.

> "When you don't mind speaking freely, indeed, with a bit of insolence, to your enemies in the Court of Assizes, under the threat of five years in prison, when you send the very ministers packing who grant pardons, and when you promise to commit the same crime again when the first opportunity comes, you have acquired the right, I think, to speak your conscience openly, without being suspected of wanting pity from your jailers."[87]

The year 1912 opened with a special edition totally devoted to the question of capitalist slumlords. The issue was almost entirely filled with graphics by Paul Poncet, some almost surreal in form, illustrating the evil conditions of French workers' housing. Yet the most significant aspect of the edition may have been Hervé's appeal to French workers to use their votes to win elections as a means to help change slum conditions. Neither abstentionist ideas nor Insurrectionalism had much future left at *La Guerre Sociale*.[88] The first regular edition that year began a long series of articles by two Hervéist anarcho-syndicalists named Charles-Albert and Jean Duchène on the continuing need for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. With Hervé still in prison and purposely silent on this question, it would be months before readers of *La Guerre Sociale* would know for certain that Hervé had come to reject any further appeals for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. The authors echoed Hervé's voluntaristic, non-deterministic, and idealistic but rather vague critique of Marxism. Though they used typical Hervéist moralistic, non-materialistic, and Blanquist arguments, they argued that Insurrectionalism needed a program beyond mere activism. Like Hervé, they wanted unity, organization, and discipline, but they thought this could only come by analyzing ideological questions carefully, not by leaving them aside. A more ardent revolutionary faith would arise only if revolutionaries acted together on the basis of inalterable convictions.[89] Because Hervé claimed to be increasingly fearful of a Bonapartist Empire, his appeals for a social

Republic had less and less to do with the overthrow of the existing Republic by a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. He was now most concerned with defending the Republic that did exist because it protected France from even greater reaction.[90] Underlining Hervé's growing moderation were, most incredibly, openly expressed hopes for the new government of Raymond Poincaré, which took office on January 14, 1912.[91] *Le Sans Patrie* had as little sympathy with a reaffirmation of antiparliamentary Insurrectionalism as he did with continuing S.F.I.O.-C.G.T. rivalry since, in his opinion, such policies and rivalries could hasten a reactionary coup.[92]

In February 1912 Hervé reemphasized his strong ideas against alcoholism, a problem which he had long viewed as a grave danger to the French "race" and nation. His father's death from cirrhosis, induced or aggravated by alcohol consumption, undoubtedly had made a profound impression on him. In early 1912 he was especially angry that most socialist Deputies had not voted to limit the number of *bistros* in France. Guesdist arguments that alcoholism, as a product of capitalism, could only end with the overthrow of the present order, left Hervé more troubled than ever with "the cunning of the dialectic."[93] After the National Congress of the S.F.I.O. held in mid-February 1912 at Lyon, Hervé attacked Marxist dogma which viewed war as well as alcoholism as inevitable products of capitalism. His indictment of dogmatic socialism stressed the stupidity of Marxist doctrine in failing to differentiate among the bourgeoisie.[94] Hervé wondered how any political analysis could fail to differentiate between such antithetical examples of the bourgeoisie as Camille Pelletan and Charles Maurras. He now had high praise for the *Blocard* tactics of undogmatic Marxists then being exhibited within the S.P.D.[95]

After the Congress and with little sense of self irony, Hervé initially vilified socialists, syndicalists, or anarchists for attacking each other when their cooperation was mandatory. He considered Guesdists responsible for socialist disunity and for hostility with the C.G.T., while syndicalists like Yvetot and Monatte were counterproductive in their attacks on the S.F.I.O. [96] The police actually wondered whether an alliance was brewing between the supporters of Jaurès and those of Hervé at the Lyon Congress.[97] Hervé's discussion of the Congress lasted a month, long enough for an evolution in his assessment to occur. Gradually Hervé came to praise the efforts by the socialists for an *entente cordiale* with the C.G.T., which had gradually become, for him, the chief saboteur of cooperation out of fear for its own autonomy. Hervé's relationship with syndicalist leaders was not going to improve, and he became much more sympathetic to the S.F.I.O., which increasingly appeared to be an obviously better vehicle for uniting diverse groups and classes than the C.G.T.[98] The chief dangers to France now included nationalism,

clericalism, Bonapartism, and, most recently, alcoholism. Hervé was gradually evolving away from a fear of war to a fear for the condition of France and the French in the event of war. To prevent war or to meet the threat of war, Hervé now looked to a coalition of classes. Gilles Heuré was skeptical about Hervé's explanations regarding the dangerous wave of clericals, nationalists, and Bonapartists which he used to explain his increasingly electoralist and *Blocard* views. "In reality," argued Heuré, "he was more troubled by fundamental differences between French and German socialists regarding the attitude to adopt in the face of war."[99]

Throughout 1912 Hervé was caught on the two poles of Marxism. Apparently frantic about internal and external threats, he looked for signs of Insurrectionalism and revolution outside France while he increasingly preached unity and solidarity to the Left inside France. Control by the Left of part of the army as well as the "disarmament of hatreds" on the Left were ways to protect France against internal and external menaces while still preserving a potentially revolutionary position. Hervé had not yet abandoned the rhetoric about insurrections and revolutionary violence within France, but these were now fading and desperate means, not ends. Praise for British miners and railway strikers as well as S.P.D. electoral victories in early 1912 was based on a mélange of revolutionary and reformist explanations which more than anything described French needs for the moment. Hervé had always considered foreign affairs in light of the needs of the French revolutionary Left. Now that French militants had shown themselves impervious to Hervéism, external affairs had to be judged from the perspective of keeping France out of war.[100] Any sign of a general strike, a mass protest, or a socialist electoral success abroad helped to disrupt foreign powers and hindered their abilities to wage war. Domestically, *militarisme révolutionnaire* and *désarmement des haines* sought unity and solidarity purportedly for either revolution or an internal defense against Caesarism, but they could easily be modified to serve the national defense. Rivalries on the Left had sabotaged revolutionary unity and now class warfare in France would undoubtedly undermine French national security. Perhaps class solidarity could improve both internal and external problems. The exploration of the causes of the failure of Hervéism still had an international and socialist rationale, but the conclusions now seemed to be essentially national in focus and rejected almost all Marxian assumptions. All these tactical and ideological political permutations were so obviously tied to the fate of France at that moment, and thus revealed the incredible flexibility of Hervé's binary logic.

On March 20, 1912 Hervé gave his initial reaction to the latest campaign for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. His contradictory response was tantamount to a rejection because his two conditions for entering a new party were nearly a negation of its

very existence. He would only enter a party that was anti-abstentionist as well as allied to the parliamentary Socialist Party.[101] Such a *Parti Révolutionnaire* bore little resemblance to the expectations and projections of 1910. In the same issue Merle printed an interview in which the imprisoned Hervé reluctantly admitted the reality of class struggle as the "accursed side of socialism." The "glorious side of socialism" was human solidarity in which there were no class distinctions. According to Hervé such a socialist spirit had existed in France before 1848 prior to the "intellectual but glacial formulas of scientific Marxism."[102] Apparently, before the reign of Marxism and German socialism, all had been well in the French revolutionary tradition. Hervé's socialism already approached views that would sustain him until his death. His socialism now amounted to an end to class conflict by means of a union of classes under the inspiration of the French revolutionary tradition. Such an evolution appears to be less sinister if we recall that Hervé's ideas were aspects of a veiled overall transformation of nearly the entire French Left before 1914.

A few weeks later Hervé further explained his rejection of the long-proposed *Parti Révolutionnaire*. When the *libertaires* had refused to end abstentionism in 1910 and when they rejected his ideas for a *militarisme révolutionnaire* around the beginning of 1911, Hervé decided to remain in the S.F.I.O. The *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire* in 1912 was a kind of party of anarchists that was obstinately abstentionist. Since such a policy perpetuated fratricidal conflict on the Left, he had no hope that the F.C.R. could ever join a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. For that reason, Hervé chose to remain in the S.F.I.O. which was the best forum to create an *entente* on the Left.[103] The series of articles on the *Parti Révolutionnaire* continued for months in *La Guerre Sociale* as Charles-Albert and Jean Duchène called for comments and responses from other leftists. Most militants with any stature who bothered to respond were generally negative.[104] Eventually, Hervé said that he would support an *Entente Révolutionnaire* if that could persuade *libertaires* to ally with the S.F.I.O. and if it would act as a bridge between the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O. If such a course failed, he would ask those Hervéist *libertaires* still sympathetic to a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, namely Almereyda, Tissier, Goldsky, and Dolié, to enter the S.F.I.O.[105] In other words, Hervé would support a *Parti Révolutionnaire* once the circle was squared!

Yet in 1912 Hervé was far from ready to relinquish his credentials as a revolutionary. When *Le Temps* blamed Hervéism for causing the criminal escapades of the Bonnot-Garnier gang,[106] Hervé responded that these criminals were a product of the evils of capitalism: individualism, theft, murder, and prostitution. The anarchist terrorists of the early 1890's, on the other hand, belonged to revolutionary

socialism even if some of their acts were stupid.[107] The death of Bonnot at the hands of Parisian police led Hervé to echo his earlier stand in praise of Liabeuf. Although Bonnot was a criminal, his murder of a policeman to avoid capture did not lack in audacity. Perhaps there was still hope for the "masses" if they included ten men like Bonnot. If only such men could be found not only among bandits but among revolutionary militants, the police could no longer be able to push the people around. Hervé blamed the illegalism of *les bandits tragiques* on bourgeois and anarchist individualism. Collective action was the remedy for the ills of French society, not isolated individual acts.[108] Such conflicting attitudes about Bonnot reflected Hervéism at a crossroads and often at cross purposes. Whatever misgivings Hervé may have always had about his own *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* amidst his own evolution and reassessment of Hervéism, he still expressed profound admiration as late as May 1912 for the courage of the *anarchisant* criminal Jules Bonnot in confronting the armed authorities who would eventually kill him.[109]

As the year advanced, however, more and more articles in *La Guerre Sociale* expressed worry for the fate of the Republic. There soon developed a conciliatory spirit not only toward parliamentary socialists but for certain Radicals as well. In mid-April 1912 Hervé implied that a social Republic could arise simply from the peaceful evolution of the existing Republic.[110] May Day 1912 was labeled a fiasco by *La Guerre Sociale*, but Hervé blamed the existence of worker indifference, cowardice, and skepticism on the spirit of criticism among the revolutionaries and the opportunism of the Radicals, thus implying that Hervéism itself might have contributed to the problems. The organizations of the Left attacked each other and assaulted their own leaders. Revolutionaries needed faith, hope, and charity to cure themselves of their neurasthenia, suspicion, and persecution mania.[111] Such conflicting reactions to events continued to characterize Hervé as his third consecutive year in prison was about to begin.

During the municipal election in early 1912, *La Guerre Sociale* vowed to limit all anti-electoral notices to the section of advertisements on the final page. The evolution in Hervéist tactics was explained by contrasting situations in different periods. "In December 1906 … the great obstacle to a *rapprochement* between the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T … was the electoralism which raged among the socialists. Today, in 1912, the obstacles to such a *rapprochement* are the ravages of abstentionism and anarchist antiparliamentarianism in the heart of the C.G.T." *La Guerre Sociale* included an abstentionist manifesto by a group called the *Comité Antiparlementaire Révolutionnaire* but the entire staff of the newspaper was now fully anti-abstentionist.[112] What *La Guerre Sociale* failed to explain was that in

1906 revolutionary tactics were the means to attain socialism with international peace as a by-product. In 1912 such tactics could be jettisoned in the interests of peace, while socialism seemed to be, at best, a distant, but seldom mentioned, aspiration. In 1906 Hervéism attempted to create a vanguard for revolution. By 1912 the failure of Hervéism meant that peace and the Republic had become goals to be attained or maintained by an appeal to the entire French Left.

In Hervé's opinion the Anglo-German Accord of May 1912 following the Franco-German Accord of October 1911 over Morocco greatly reduced the threat of war. Yet Hervé was far from tranquil. He worried about Bonapartists who had used the municipal elections to proselytize their antiparliamentary message. For him, the political disorder under the Republic was responsible for the growing Bonapartist threat. While Radicals imprisoned revolutionaries, socialists battled Radicals and Radical-Socialists in elections. Meanwhile, socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists assailed one another.[113] Hervé's message was clear. After years of anti-Republican rhetoric, *La Guerre Sociale* was now telling workers that the Empire and the Republic were not equal forms of government. He accepted the responsibility for having allowed revolutionary rhetoric to increase bourgeois fears. Rather than creating a revolution, Hervéism had helped promote the resurgence of a Caesarism that would delay revolution by fifty years. *La Guerre Sociale* would have to curtail its revolutionary rhetoric in order to create an *entente cordiale* of the Left to defeat the nationalist and Caesarian wave.[114]

Though Hervé professed to believe that war was much less a threat in 1912 than in 1911, he often failed to explain that nationalism, Bonapartism, and Caesarism were movements with dangerous implications not only domestically but also internationally. If Hervéism helped create Caesarism by terrifying moderates, could it also have had a role in the march to war? Did any call to revolution risk international war because revolutionary activism could usher in reactionary and militaristic governments? *La Guerre Sociale* and most of revolutionary Left, save people like Engels and Lenin, never seemed to have thought that way. Yet the logic of Marxism was clear. A society based on class struggle demanded *la guerre sociale* to bring harmony and that implicitly justified international revolutions and maybe even wars that bring revolution. Conversely, an international system made up of class societies might generate war, whether consciously or not, expecting to preempt an imminent social revolution. Because Marxism and socialism were such mixtures of reformist and revolutionary appeals and because they could include both pacifism and violence as possible tactics or positions, these stark facts were often hidden. Since the ultimate ideals were peace, justice, and harmony, the revolutionary program of violence and war was either justified or forgotten.

The political transformation of Gustave Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* was then a tacit realization that Hervéism could not unite the revolutionary Left. In fact, Hervéism itself might have been a factor helping to galvanize the Right, and indirectly might inadvertently be helping to lead France to war.[115] Ironically, the new call for unity on the Left through a *désarmament des haines* could be described as a curious aspect of the French nationalist resurgence. Hervé justified his *rectification* as a step to prevent Bonapartism, yet he would soon be accused of Bonapartism himself. Insurrectionalism and Bonapartism each justified violence for contrasting ideals yet both implicitly or explicitly sought to resolve social conflict through violence. If it is a logical as well as a practical absurdity to propose violence as a path to peace and harmony, that has never destroyed its atavistic appeal.

Gilles Heuré describes Hervé's pre-war antimilitarism in terms of an evolution from antimilitarism to an increasingly extreme antipatriotism, with a gradual modification of views from 1907 until 1911 which led to a virtual alignment around 1912 with the ideas of Jaurès himself on war and its prevention. From 1900 until 1905 Hervé openly and noisily proclaimed antimilitarism, yet Heuré admits that it was already "tinted with antipatriotism." From the latter year until 1907 he espoused a form of antipatriotism, at first very extreme but which gradually evolved to become a "new Hervéism", usually associated with the phrase "revolutionary militarism." Following the Stuttgart Congress of mid-August 1907, Hervé began to realize that any insurrection could not be improvised. His tactics then became increasingly violent or at least increasingly threatening, yet his plans for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* were rejected by Yonne socialists, the C.G.T., and the anarchists by early 1910, so he was forced to back away from that goal just as he was entering prison for a period of more than two years. In this study we have stressed how *militarisme révolutionnaire* and *la conquête de l'armée* were policies which evolved gradually in Hervé's revolutionary lexicon. They were openly stated before the railway strike and formalized over the course of 1911. By late 1911 and early 1912 his call for a "disarmament of hatreds" paralleled the *Blocard* views of Jaurès. While Heuré's scenario of stages in Hervé's antimilitarist journey is helpful, most stages are replete with contradictions and paradoxes as well as ideas and rhetoric from earlier stages. Heuré stresses that one cannot get at the bottom of the Hervé-Jaurès arguments and debates without differentiating antimilitarism from antipatriotism yet even Heuré resorts to the locution "antimilitarisme-antipatriotisme" (to describe the era from 1905 to 1907?) and stresses that Hervé "remained … [an antimilitarist] for a short time." Obviously there are important differences in the terms antimilitarism and antipatriotism but stressing sharp changes and exact chronology belies a much less clear and compartmentalized trajectory.[116]

One of the more interesting and critical appraisals of Hervé's *rectification* came from an *anarchisant* artist who himself had been "taken in" by the Insurrectional leader's sincerity. Francis Jourdain's post-war impressions of Hervé arose as he was describing his own errors of judgment. "Indeed I can admit that I also believed in the sincerity of Hervé. In truth, I still believe it, sincerity seems to me—I hasten to add—the easiest virtue to acquire. It comes all by itself; one barely needs to call for it. Rare are the rogues who are unable to quickly convince themselves about what they're saying, or the excellence, in the end, of their lies."[117] After studying Hervé's transformation and his pre-war antimilitarist movement for many years this writer has been led to two inescapable but almost contradictory conclusions: the insurrectional journalist activists in Hervé's entourage were both serious and idealistic militants yet they must have known their revolutionary project had become largely illusory. Such an interpretation seems to put Schrödinger's cat into our historical calculus if contradictory conclusions not only can, but must, be drawn given the evidence.

15

From *"La Bataille de la Salle Wagram"* Until the July Crisis

In late May 1912 *La Guerre Sociale* joined the clamor on the French Left against the new Berry-Millerand Law dealing with the military, which included provisions for sending militants found guilty of crimes against the army to North Africa.[1] The uproar raised by this new law was used by syndicalists and anarchists to attack socialists because some of their Deputies had voted for it. Because some groups on the Left, who feared being dominated by the S.F.I.O., used the Berry-Millerand Law against the socialists, the Left remained as divided as ever.[2] Significantly, Alexandre Millerand, the current Minister of War, had been characterized as a renegade for years; now people like Hervé increasingly feared that he could become a potential new Boulanger or Bonaparte.[3] The *Sans Patrie* blamed the poor turnout for the anniversary of *La Semaine Sanglante* in May 1912 on the lack of preparation by the *Fédération Socialiste de la Seine* and the continuing rivalries among the forces of the Left. The insurrectional "General" expected the anniversary to remind militants that a divided Left, an absence of discipline, and a lack of support among professional military forces had led to revolutionary failures in 1789, 1848, and 1871.[4] Though "revolutionary antimilitarism" was not yet abandoned by *La Guerre Sociale*, it was no longer the central theme of the paper. The appearance of articles by a *Sergent G.* (Sergeant Gustave) as early as June 1912 advocating Republican and socialist infiltration of the army and its

officer corps in preparation for insurrection and revolution illustrated well Hervé's latest paradox. Military forms and values were necessary to fulfill the mutations in his former antimilitarist program.[5] Many police officials and much of the nationalist and reactionary press thought such ideas were just as dangerous as the old ones. His colleagues on the extreme Left were considerably more dubious.[6]

In mid-June 1912 Hervé spoke in favor of proportional representation as an electoral reform that could create renewed élan in socialism. This attack on the *scrutin d'arrondissement* was explained as a means to reform Radicalism, a necessary precondition for a new *Bloc*. Hervé's first direct call for a return to *Blocard* tactics was justified as a necessary maneuver if the Caesarian danger increased any further. The transitional nature of Hervé's argument is illustrated by his continuing attacks on the Radicals while he justified the R.P. as a means of purifying them. When his *Blocard* ideas were more developed, Hervé would abandon his calls for the R.P. out of fear of alienating the poorly organized Radicals. In June 1912 Hervé's reformist message ended with a refrain concerning the need for guns to achieve revolution.[7] Such was Hervéism *in articulo mortis.*

On Bastille Day in 1912 Hervé received an amnesty. Below headlines which read "*Et Je Vous Dis: Merde!*", Hervé's editorial appeared to be as revolutionary as ever. He expressed joy at the signs of antipatriotism and antimilitarism even on the July 14 national holiday. He claimed to be surprised that the forces of militarism and patriotism did not have three times as many supporters. A socialist United States of Europe was just on the horizon because the antimilitarists were ready to assault the capitalist order and end all frontiers.[8] In another article Hervé extolled the general strike both as a means to end a war already declared and as a device to prevent an imminent war. As he left prison, was Hervé ready again to live up to his long-standing revolutionary credentials?[9] Many of his former associates on the extreme Left doubted it. Some of his enemies explained his *retournement* in terms of that imprisonment. Once he received an amnesty, some of those enemies assumed that it was a reward for his *volte-face*. That explanation fails to fit most of the evidence. Hervé's political transformation began very early in his final prison team, and Hervéism from its beginning included atavistic elements. Yet, even in late 1912 and early 1913 many police called *militarisme révolutionnaire* Hervé's most dangerous antimilitarist tactic.

Hervé's sincerity and idealism were almost never questioned even by his enemies. Yet, there had been signs that years in prison had greatly affected him. Even before Almereyda's broadly based December 1911 campaign to get Hervé released, there had been many rumors on the Left that prison had gravely affected Hervé's morale. He had exhibited extreme emotion during his trial in November 1911.



Figure 26. Victor Méric?, Hervé, Auroy, and the team at *La Guerre Sociale* Offices in 1912 after the "General" was released from prison. (© Maurice-Louis Branger/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Prison undoubtedly affected him, but the ill effects were surprising only because of Hervé's reputation for robust physical and emotional health. Immediately after his release, *La Guerre Sociale* reported that "Hervé was as calm, peaceful, and resolved as ever." However, there is some evidence that for some time after his release, he was unable to tolerate noise, crowds, city air, or even lengthy conversations. Certainly, a three-week delay in fully describing his physical and emotional condition leads one to conjecture that the prolonged prison sentence had been a difficult experience. Almost immediately after his release, he left for a lengthy convalescent reunion with his family in Brittany. Yet this "convalescence" was marked by constant communications with Paris and a continuation of his articles in *La Guerre Sociale*.[10]

During that convalescent leave to Brest, he probably had contact with Émile Masson who had been following the events in Hervé's life quite closely. "Masson certainly burned with desire to communicate to him about his new enthusiasm [for the Breton language and autonomy]. Didn't Hervé, at least, believe in the Breton nation? Masson hoped it was so—counting on his roots in Brest, his first revolts as a Breton student, his revolutionary intuition." In his unedited novel from 1906–1907, *Korrig*, "he depicted Hervé preaching the Breton revolution as a kind of new crusade." In *Antée: Les Bretons et le Socialisme*, which came out in September 1912, Masson opened "with a direct appeal to Hervé, the *Sans-Patrie*, dispossessed of his genuine country: Brittany." Masson certainly wanted Hervé at his side in any campaign for a Breton resurgence and the director of *La Guerre Sociale* knew the value of a fight for the Breton language and the survival of Brittany as an entity of some sort. He was also willing to use his newspaper to publicize Masson's efforts.[11]

About the time of his convalescent leave and a month before his Salle Wagram confrontation with his critics from the extreme Left, Hervé wrote about *Antée*. "One can read the manifesto of these revolutionary Bretons in French, which one of my friends, Ivan Gouesnou,[12] one of the most beautiful spirits of our so idealistic Brittany, has written in his beautiful, warm and colorful language ... It's not one of the least important curiosities of this small book that this Breton nationalist passion comes from an international socialist ... Antée, [was] the son of the Land, who rediscovered all his energy in contact with his maternal breast, that's the Breton race which must defend its fine originality in the interest of humanity."[13] Although Hervé was quite sympathetic to this Breton crusade which was not anti-socialist and could help the Bretons, he was not ready to make the Breton resurgence the spearhead of the revolution, however evolving, despite his friendship for Masson.[14] After the publication of a Breton newspaper *Brug* (*Bruyère* or

Heather) with articles, stories, proverbs, poems, and songs written in four Breton dialects as well as French, by Masson and his colleagues, someone initialed G.H. (undoubtedly the director of *La Guerre Sociale*) sent a small donation in early 1913 when the publication ran into financial difficulties. For his part, Masson gained backing from some influential Parisian syndicalists and anarchists who had never been Hervé's friends and would soon become his greatest critics.[15]

One week after leaving prison, Hervé answered charges that he was now a reactionary or a traitor. His answer was a full acceptance of his new course as well as an attempt to prove that the "new Hervéism" was still revolutionary. He downplayed the charges by noting that his ideas had only changed on three tactical matters. (1) He had given up his attack on parliamentary socialism because the S.F.I.O. was necessary to prepare for the social Republic. Yet he still claimed to believe that the gun was better than voting as the path to the socialist utopia. (2) He had come to advocate a "disarmament of hatreds" in order to create a *Bloc* of the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. as a protection against Caesarism and war. (3) His new policy of *militarisme révolutionnaire* was not an attenuation of his earlier antimilitarism but was a fulfillment of it. The new Berry-Millerand Law which sent antimilitarist soldiers into exile was clear proof that the government feared *militarisme révolutionnaire* as a program that could lead to revolution.[16] However, Hervé's changing cures for revolutionary disunity, to disarm leftist hatreds and to infiltrate the army, were out of step with an evolving political reality, not only because they were so paradoxical but also because most of the Left was unwilling or unable to admit their own adaptations which Hervé seemed to anticipate.

Hervé's explanation of his shifting thinking may have been sincere, but it neglected many important aspects of his new course. His new program not only avoided polemical attacks on parliamentary socialism, it was concerned with electoral reforms and voting. He not only advocated a *Bloc* of the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T., he would soon seek a *Bloc* of the entire Left including the Radicals. *Militarisme révolutionnaire* was an extreme and potentially dangerous revolutionary program. Yet it represented an extreme Blanquism that was bound to frighten most of the Left, and it entailed the potential for an accommodation with the values of militarism. Hervé's new position was no longer Hervéism but his new ideas were traceable to his earlier stances. The heyday of antimilitarism was now over, and Hervé would be the most glaring casualty. Yet Hervé's shift represents far more than just another episode of the nationalist revival in France.[17]

If, after leaving prison, the former *Sans Patrie* maintained his call for insurrection, this idea was now tied to the question of international arbitration of disputes between nations. Any country that refused to agree to arbitration in the event of

an international dispute was to be attacked by its own socialists, while countries which had agreed to arbitration would be free to defend themselves and socialists could join in such defenses. This was far different from earlier Hervéist ideas that stressed the near impossibility of distinguishing offensive from defensive wars. Here was a means of justifying either insurrection or war for higher moral reasons. Hervé still called for secret civilian and military organizations, yet this preservation of a revolutionary vocabulary did not demand a revolutionary application. Hervé's idealism was gradually being channeled to respond to threats against the home of the revolutionary tradition.[18]

In the summer of 1912 *La Guerre Sociale* announced that Paul Vigné d'Octon had left its staff in early July in order to avoid a duplication of his articles at both *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. Discounting Hervé's claim that there had been no quarrel between him and Vigné d'Octon, Jean-Claude Peyronnet argued that *La Guerre Sociale* increasingly disagreed with Vigné d'Octon's anticolonial ideas. It is also possible that continuing ideological as well as personal acrimony and press competition with the syndicalists coupled with financial considerations were the chief factors in the decision to release Vigné d'Octon.[19] At this point Hervé was still quite sensitive about the question of colonialism. He took great pains to show his indignation over colonial atrocities even if he now openly accepted colonial bargains in the interest of peace.[20] A year later he would attack colonialism as well as foreign loans, a low French birthrate, and the Three Year Law not for reasons of human rights or socialist ideals but because such policies and practices sapped French energies and resources.[21] Though Hervé did not explicitly justify his policies in terms of the defense of France, that was becoming increasingly implicit.

As Hervé's incarceration was coming to an end and the Aernoult-Rousset Campaign drew toward its pathetic conclusion, *La Guerre Sociale* had resigned from the C.D.S. and had begun running notices from René de Marmande's *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* criticized some aspects of Hervé's release, and they joined with anarchist critics of Hervé's new course to form a *Comité d'Entente des Forces Révolutionnaires*. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* also created *L'Entre'aide*, a fund to aid militants in prison. The Insurrectional *hebdomadaire* assumed that this new fund was an attempt to rival its own *Caisse des Bons-Bougres*.[22] Polemics with *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and the anarchists continued into September as the S.S.R. revealed a police attempt to infiltrate the *Camelots du Roi* by means of selling them guns for an attack on the government which could then be uncovered and prosecuted. Despite revelations which showed how certain police were trying to infiltrate and subvert the royalists by means of *agents*

provocateurs, the enemies of *La Guerre Sociale* used this episode to accuse Hervé of moving toward royalism. The growing Hervéist support for the *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset* on the eve of Rousset's September release only increased the areas of conflict between *La Guerre Sociale* and its enemies on the Left.[23]

Francis Delaisi, the chief financial expert at *La Guerre Sociale* and a frequent contributor to other newspapers including *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, was fired by Hervé because he rejected the new brand of Hervéism. When Hervé responded to Delaisi's charges that first appeared in *Les Temps Nouveaux*, a bitter polemical war opened in *La Guerre Sociale*. One could certainly argue that Delaisi's motivation was suspect, his documentation often specious, and his viewpoint at times conspiratorial, but his analysis of the new Hervéism was quite perspicacious. Delaisi accused Hervé of trying to combine Insurrectionalism and democracy, revolution and a *Bloc*, internationalism and patriotism, as well as direct action and parliamentary action.[24] "For several months you have so 'revised your ideas' 'switched your shooting shoulders' and 'changed tactics' that one cannot read two of your articles without one appearing to contradict the other. And your old friends themselves can no longer make sense of it."[25] Hervé's defense was sincere but it was also paradoxical. According to Hervé, Delaisi was antirevolutionary as were all those who hurt unity on the Left.[26] Hervé did not care to admit, perhaps even to himself, that his desire to unite revolutionaries had now evolved into an effort to unite a larger and larger coalition, including reformists and eventually Radicals. His response to Delaisi seemed to imply that only the most blatant reformism had a chance to create a revolution in France. The full implications of such paradoxes undoubtedly escaped those Hervéists who still believed their own revolutionary rhetoric and perhaps some others on the extreme Left voicing the same revolutionary delusions despite their barely masked yet ever more practical concerns.

The Radical and conservative press was happy about the growing division on the Left. But a paper like *Le Temps*, which Hervé characterized as the voice of the Jewish, Protestant, plutocratic bourgeoisie, did not seem to realize that Hervé's growing concern for the fate of public school teachers was an aspect of a profound transformation. Hervé's promotion of the unionization of teachers was seen by *Le Temps* as an aspect of Hervé's hatred of France and the army. His response to such charges echoed the "moderate" ideas which he had already presented in the preface of *Mes Crimes*. After voicing his regret over the use of the word antipatriot as an excessive term in response to patriotic hysteria, he characterized his ideas as internationalist rather that anti-French. Again, reiterating how he had never planted the tricolor in a dung pile, he argued that such a fate had been reserved for the Imperial flag. *Le Temps* was not the only observer to note the maintenance of

Hervé's Insurrectional rhetoric even though that tactic was becoming increasingly less important for him.[27]

Hervé's comments on the C.G.T. Congress of Havre in September 1912 show how quickly he could forget personal quarrels in the interest of higher goals. He used the occasion to call on the C.G.T. to realize that its program was almost identical to that of the S.F.I.O. His advice was for syndicalists to send one of their leaders to Vienna in 1913 for the next scheduled meeting of the International. The creation of a united French Left in the face of war was more important to the former *Sans Patrie* than the C.G.T.'s recent efforts to ostracize him. Yet he ought to have realized the fantastic nature of his plea for unity. The C.G.T.'s *ouvrièrisme*, its attack on intellectuals and the liberal professions, and its ongoing verbal assaults against delegates of *La Guerre Sociale* in the press section at the Congress did not yet completely disabuse Hervé of his quixotic plans to end discord on the Left. It must have required some effort for him to take solace in the C.G.T. rejection of desertion and the absence of syndicalist attacks on reformists as signs that syndicalists were accepting his ideas if not his leadership.[28]

Hervé's reaction to the release of Rousset in mid-September showed how his call to unity on the Left barely masked his own transitional movement toward the mainstream of the S.F.I.O. The events of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair would have been impossible according to Hervé if France had a militia system instead of standing armies. The evolving Insurrectional leader was now very close to an almost complete, if temporary, acceptance of Jaurèsist socialism.[29] Hervé's move toward the heart of the S.F.I.O. cannot be separated from his own rejection by most of the leaders of the revolutionary Left. The S.F.I.O. had one advantage for him over the C.G.T.; it was a coalition of all classes while the C.G.T was almost completely made up of workers. Just after the "Battle at the Salle Wagram" on September 25, 1912, *La Guerre Sociale* was filled with references to increasing leftist divisions and growing hostility by syndicalists and anarchists to Hervé's new course.[30]

Two years before World War I *militarisme révolutionnaire* as a program for insurrection and revolution was being justified by Hervé in terms anticipating the post-war nostalgia for the "solidarity of the trenches." Civilian revolutionaries were told that revolution could succeed and be maintained only by infiltrating and emulating the military. *Militarisme révolutionnaire* aimed to win over soldiers and officers to revolutionary ideas, yet Hervé's policy extolled such values as unity, harmony, and solidarity which the immediate concerns of military life nurtured. Revolutionary workers in the army were, more than at any other time of their lives, united with the people because all classes were found in the barracks.[31] On September 25 Hervé asked civilian youth to enter military preparation societies

as a means to ease their transition to military life.[32] A military organization of civilian life to end *la guerre sociale* was now a possibility.

The meeting sponsored by Hervé at the Salle Wagram on September 25, 1912, on the occasion of the departure of the new class, ended what remained of Hervé's optimism concerning a "disarmament of hatreds" by the French Left. Presiding were Hervé's old friend and associate from Yonne, Zéphyrin Camélinat, along with socialist Maxence Roldes and former anarchist Émile Tissier, as assistants for the meeting committee. This gathering was Hervé's first major speech in three years and his first public explanation of his policy calling for "the conquest of the army." In an effort to heal old wounds and to correct misunderstandings, Hervé's address was to be followed by a debate with disgruntled militants. But the Salle Wagram became a veritable battleground because anarchists from the *Fédération Communiste Anarchiste* were determined to prevent Hervé from speaking.[33] The magnitude of the occasion was perceived by the police and the Parisian press.[34] *Le Temps* reported that members of France's elegant set, including many refined women, were in attendance expecting a sensational event.[35] The "Battle at the Salle Wagram," epitomized the problem of leftist division that Hervé had long sought to remedy, and it undoubtedly exacerbated that very problem.[36] The audience at the Salle Wagram may have been dominated by the Hervéists and the curious, but the disrupters were well-prepared. When the meeting began, applause was interspersed with catcalls. Then about fifty anarchists from the F.C.A. started to sing and whistle. Only then did the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* actively intervene. This led to a confrontation characterized by broken chairs, shattered windows, a cracked chandelier, some bloody fights, and several gunshots.[37] *Le Figaro* reported than no one was actually shot at the Salle Wagram. The most serious wound was a saber blow to the head. Most of the twenty wounded described by *Le Figaro* got their injuries from fists and chairs.[38] *Le Petit Journal* thought it was extraordinary that only a dozen people were injured because after the first disruptions another series of fights broke out which involved about a dozen shots and eight wounded by fists, chairs, and knives.[39] Some police reports assumed that the pistols had been loaded with blanks. After the initial ten minute brawl, panic followed and roughly half the people left the hall including many of the disrupters who were expelled by the J.G.R. After a long delay and, apparently, another even more violent outbreak, the meeting continued. Hervé's speech was a familiar explanation and justification of his new ideas. For many of the journalists and, one assumes, most listeners, it was nearly impossible to follow all of Hervé's ideas amidst the cheers, shouts, whistles, and jeers. Most accounts say Hervé wondered whether Hervéism of the old style was not itself responsible for the nationalist wave sweeping France.

Admitting his error in using the term antipatriotism because it had frightened the "masses" away from socialism, Hervé reiterated his hatred of bourgeois capitalist France, and demanded a more equitable France. It was not that he believed that universal suffrage was a panacea for everything, but it had its uses. International arbitration was extolled as one means to end international disputes, but the general strike had proven to be ill-suited to instigate revolution, which was only possible once workers joined and conquered the army. Hervé told workers not to desert but to try to become officers. Desertion was justifiable only for those being sent to military prisons or those subject to press or political crimes. Above all, he told the remaining crowd, the Left must end its divisions and unite.[40]



Figure 27. Gustave Hervé upon leaving prison in July 1912. [photographie de presse] / Agence Meurisse (Paris). Bnf.

There were several objections to his ideas from those anarchists of the F.C.A. who had not been expelled. They believed that Hervé's new ideas were reminiscent of long detested ideas concerning a revolution from above. One of the *contradicteurs* was angry about Hervé's praise for the tricolor. This led the former *Sans Patrie* to

his commonplace binary distinctions between the flags of Valmy and Wagram, the Republic versus the Empire, and of the good France against the evil France. Hervé concluded with a threatening vow that the F.C.A. never again would be allowed to disrupt another of his meetings. The meeting ended with a resolution asking young conscripts to enter the army in order to conquer it in preparation for a social revolution. The nature of the resolution led to such general tumult in the hall that a final vote on the matter was prevented. At the conclusion Hervé appeared to be tired according to the correspondent from *Le Petit Journal*. The paper also reported that Alphonse Merrheim made excuses for the non-appearance of Francis Delaisi who was scheduled to give the contradiction to Hervé's new ideas, but Delaisi chose not to come once he heard about the planned disruption.[41] Another just released prisoner and former admirer of Hervé, named Louis Lecoin, was in the audience. Lecoin believed that the anarchists had been Hervé's best followers but that his impudent *volte-face* had so upset them that they "disrupted the meeting which was an uproar from beginning til end." Lecoin later claimed that he had deflected an attempted shot at Hervé during the Wagram fiasco.[42]

The meeting at the Salle Wagram was not only a humiliation for Hervé, it was the final proof that Hervéism could never succeed in its goals. This meeting did not cause a transformation which was already well advanced, but it probably pushed Hervé further and faster towards a new solution to domestic chaos and war. Such antagonisms among revolutionary idealists may have intensified Hervé's rejection of class conflict as the chief agent explaining social phenomena. The Salle Wagram spectacle must have reinforced his new call for a solidarity of classes as a solution to the social question. Hervé had never believed that the proletariat alone was the embryo of a new society. His socialism had long assumed that peasants, professionals, intellectuals, craftsmen as well as workers would be needed to form a revolutionary coalition. His long experience of syndicalist and anarchist bickering reinforced his evolving search for a means to unite all classes. Now he had further proof that workers and revolutionaries alone were too hopelessly divided and egoistic ever to create a better order. To end such divisions and self-centered interests only a coalition of classes could be effective. Hervé generally analyzed problems correctly, but his solutions were usually idealistic reverse images of the problems perceived, not practical answers. When Hervé observed revolutionaries in conflict, he tried to unite them. Once that effort failed, he sought to unite classes and groups long divided. In this quest, too, he would be no more successful. Ironically, it was war, the one thing Hervé had most tried to avoid, that finally united all the conflicting groups and classes of France, however fleetingly.

Le Temps' analysis of the spectacle at the Salle Wagram was both cogent and humorous. "M. Hervé never does things in moderation. He wanted his conversion to be as resounding as his earlier errors. He therefore resolved to make a public confession … M. Hervé renounced violence; there were eight wounded. The anarchists, syndicalist revolutionaries, and all the advocates of direct action had to prove to their faltering leader that, even with him gone, his teachings remained. 'Citizen Browning' was not invited to the party but he participated, nonetheless, and the 'dagger' of the unfortunate Liabeuf was planted in vengeance in the socialist flesh." *Le Temps* was less than thrilled with a transformation which saw Hervé leave his anarchist assumptions, yet remain a revolutionary socialist, lose his antipatriotism, yet continue to express antimilitarist ideas. Hervé was still an enemy of ideas that *Le Temps* considered sacred. The hostility of his former comrades proved to *Le Temps* that, in essence, Hervé was a mad individualist. If Hervé acted in good faith for himself, he could not have acted in good faith for those who followed his advice. *Le Temps* claimed that Hervé failed to realize that he had contracted duties towards the proletariat whom he guided. Though he claimed to have been fooled and deceived, it was he who tricked the workers. The violence at the Salle Wagram was proof that Hervé's message lived on even after he had broken with "*Citoyen Browning*".[43]

Socialist and future communist and then collaborator L.-O. Frossard witnessed many of the events in Hervé's journey and his comments are replete with critical insights.

> "After his last extended stay in the prisons of the republic, he claimed that he 'switched his shooting shoulders'. His conversion was not explained by weariness or by material interests. Hervé was honest, sincere, and selfless. He had no needs. He did not lack courage. If you really think about it, you could easily be assured that his fiery antipatriotism did not express his true nature. This Breton mystic, who had given in to an irresistible desire to inhabit the world of shameless mental libertinage, had remained, at once, a petit bourgeois democrat and a French ultra-patriot. He wished to explain himself to his former friends at the meeting at the Salle Wagram. They met him with pistol shots. They had not followed the evolution of his thought. They had not understood it and they were not able to understand it. They had not disentangled the part that was orchestration from the production in Hervéism. This shorthand version of socialism which flouted all conventions, which rejected all national traditions, which jeered and ridiculed them, this socialism of nihilists and those beyond the law, they did not suspect, they were not able to suspect that Hervé, the new Blanqui, would propose to them to abandon it with such casualness, at the very hour when the 'flood of perils' was going to permit him to finally engage in the struggle to the death 'against war-generating capitalism.' The conversion of Hervé seemed like a treason to them. They did not stop shouting that into his ears. He shrugged his shoulders and accentuated his evolution. He became that which he was

> before Hervéism, a socialist of compromises and maneuvers, a '*blocard*', one of the pillars of 'republican discipline'".[44]

In *La Vie Ouvrière* another critic of Hervé, Alfred Rosmer, explained how:

> "The fundamental error of Hervé was that he considered revolutionaries not as conscious individuals, capable of making up their minds by themselves but as a troop that a general can lead as he pleased."[45]

On September 29, 1912 the Federation of the Yonne held a banquet at Sens to celebrate Hervé's release from prison. At the banquet, which many socialist Deputies and party officials attended, Almereyda announced his own entrance into the S.F.I.O. because the *Entente Révolutionnaire* had failed.[46] According to Jonathan Almosnino's recent biography, Almereyda was sincere in following Herve's evolution at this point.[47] Other anarchists on *La Guerre Sociale* such as Goldsky, Merle, and Tissier also entered the S.F.I.O. now that Hervéism had been rejected by the very forces it had long sought to lead. Initially, perhaps, their livelihood at *La Guerre Sociale* pushed Hervéist anarchists to accept Hervé's new ideas. Possibly



Figure 28. Ludovic-Oscar Frossard (1889–1946) after World War I. Bnf.

there were few other avenues for them except to join him inside the S.F.I.O. In early December 1912 the anarchists on *La Guerre Sociale* explained their adherence to the S.F.I.O. in a common article. Many others who had followed Hervé in his exploits or were associated with him, such as Francis Jourdain, the writer Léon Werth, and Fanny Clar also joined the Socialist Party in this era.[48] That same month *La Guerre Sociale* reported on thirty-six intellectuals, including those with ties to *La Guerre Sociale*, who had decided to join the Socialist Party.

Christophe Prochasson considered this to be part of an ongoing evolution of intellectual relations with the larger world, whether focused on the proletariat, the people, or *la Patrie*, in an era of growing international tension as well as social and cultural turmoil. Intellectuals, who had thought of educating workers and ordinary people at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, and who experienced disillusionment afterward as *mystique* became *politique*, sought to renew their ideals and to transcend hierarchy in order to discover other means of influence. Joining the S.F.I.O. was one way for intellectuals to merge with the larger world in order to change it even though their autonomy was imperiled. However, the era and milieu were highly fluid, and other young intellectuals were poised to make different choices as the survey of Agathon would soon demonstrate.[49] If politics began to distance young intellectuals from each other, the war would unite them temporarily, only to completely separate them eventually. Most socialist intellectuals rallied to the nation at war. If that war redefined the future role of intellectuals, it could also open up those who had rallied to the nation to the charge of intellectual abdication.[50]

For several weeks after the "Battle of the Salle Wagram", confrontations, often violent ones, occurred between the Hervéists, supported by their *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, and the F.C.A. as well as the syndicalists. The anarchists were willing to take up Hervé's challenge about never again being able to disrupt one of his meetings. The syndicalists repeated their accusations that Hervé wanted to harm *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and the C.G.T. by trying to lead syndicalists into the S.F.I.O.[51] It was Almereyda, more than any other Hervéist, who led the counterattack. He took it as a personal challenge when other leftists sought to disrupt Hervéist meetings. The leader of the J.G.R. even entered an F.C.A. meeting accompanied by some *Jeunes Gardes* and tried to deliver a defense of *militarisme révolutionnaire*. Sometimes the fallout from the Battle at the Salle Wagram and the new Hervéism could be felt far from Paris. At a meeting organized in early October by local railway workers in Lille to support an orphanage there, it was necessary to remind the audience several times not to jeer the main speaker, Gustave Hervé.[52] Aftershocks from the Salle Wagram clash continued for some time, but the era of open confrontation actually vanished rather unexpectedly.[53]

Fairly soon after the Salle Wagram fiasco, Hervé began a series of foreign and provincial conferences to try to explain his new ideas "and redesign his revolutionary profile in taking care to remove the overly antimilitaristic and antipatriotic drapery, and to add some laurels earned in the prisons of the Republic. It was necessary to plant the good message of mainstream socialism in the large working class centers. Regaining his legs of the 1900s, he brought back the fashion of the rubric the '*Carnet d'un commis voyageur en socialisme*' regularly written in *Le TSY*."[54] He was welcomed by the Guesdist federations in the Nord, the Isère, and the Rhone. When he spoke in Lille, Condé, Grenoble, Voiron, Lyon, Valenciennes, and the Parisian area, he stressed how socialists and syndicalists cooperated more easily in the provinces than in Paris. Yet a conference in November 1912 as far away as Grenoble saw a group of anarchists in attendance try to disrupt him.[55] Hervé was also invited by Tom Mann and Guy Bowman to speak in London on October 21, 1912 at an antimilitarist meeting at the Shoreditch Townhall organized by the Syndicalist Union League. That fairly unimportant League expected Hervé to bring some publicity and excitement to their group, but the meeting was boycotted by the Labour Party, and he wound up calling it a failure. His brief visit to London was not without incidents involving anarchist émigrés such as Errico Malatesta who attacked his new ideas. Here, too, the dispute was more manageable than in Paris.[56] In early December 1912, Hervé was threatened with arrest by the Belgian government if he accepted recent invitations to speak in the Borinage and in Brussels.[57]

The "Battle at the Salle Wagram" had occurred during the culmination of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair centering on the return of Rousset to France. These events were interrelated but they were dramatically superseded by the far more forbidding battles in the Balkans. Years of striving for revolutionary unity to prevent war had failed; now cataclysmic external events were again on the horizon. The disorders on the French Left did not vanish, but war in the Balkans beginning in October 1912 made them seem far less important. Personal and organizational rivalries suddenly were displaced by the need to cooperate to save the peace. Yet each group's vested interests remained to thwart that cooperation. Years of personal antagonisms, ideological disputes, "turf battles," and "organizational defense" were not easily forgotten or forgiven.[58]

With war erupting in the Balkans, the International Socialist Bureau in November 1912 asked Hervé to go to Rome to speak there as part of a series of socialist meetings to be held in major European capitals in advance of the special session of the International to meet later that month in Basel.[59] Gilles Heuré described that Italian trip as more of a tragicomedy, closer to the jests at the *commedia dell' arte*

than to the serenity experienced on Stendalian journeys. After a thirty hour train trip to Rome where he arrived on the evening of November 16, Hervé's chance to help the international antiwar effort was thwarted because, instead of getting ready for an impending socialist peace rally organized by *L'Avanti!*, the newspaper of the *Partito Socialista Italiano*, he wound up spending his time as a guest of the Italian authorities at the Regina-Coeli Prison, accused of being a foreign agitator by the Giolitti government. In fact, the rally, which had been expected to be immense, never took place. Just after Hervé arrived at his hotel, the police arrested him, having failed to stop him at the French border. After harsh and degrading treatment, including the latest anthropometric analysis, Hervé was soon expelled from Italy and forbidden ever to return. His night in prison had been so hasty and harried that he lost his suspenders and buckles, forcing him to use the cord from his glasses to keep his pants up.[60] The comic upshot was that the Quai d'Orsay sternly protested the treatment of the French Republic's most famous living former prisoner. The French government requested its ambassador in Rome to deliver hourly reports on the Insurrectional leader's status while he was incarcerated. One early report noted that the French government believed "that the treatment inflicted on Hervé was not in accordance with what one had expected from the Royal Government for a political prisoner."[61] The ambassador was advised to express his government's deep discontent to the Italians for their handling of the situation. For Heuré such consideration by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the former *Sans Patrie* meant that he had become an acceptable socialist for the government. The Italian socialists also protested in their own parliament, while French newspapers could eagerly feed off the episode to express their particular political positions: supporting one of their own who had been treated unfairly while traveling abroad or mocking and ridiculing Hervé. *Le Matin* sub-titled its front-page article "Voyages Form the Young", ironically noting that: "M. Hervé discovered in Italy that the Republic has something good about it." Just before he arrived back in Paris, he was mocked by a bourgeois patriot en route who said he hoped that the socialists would all be tossed out wherever they spread their nonsense, and then the chauvinist shouted "Vive l'armée! Vive la guerre!" To which Hervé responded, "Vive le choléra!" Upon detraining at the Gare de Lyon, he claimed that it was like "coming back from Saint Petersburg." What puzzled and troubled him was the Italian government's failure to arrest him at the frontier. That lapse had caused him a lot of trouble.[62]

Even before his Italian odyssey, Hervé displayed his new tendency to "reformism" by calling for an early meeting of the International with participation by revolutionary, reformist, and even Republican forces. He believed that the Czar was responsible for Slavic belligerence; his solution to the Balkans' problems was a

customs union including the Turks. Yet it was Hervé's view that "the Balkans were not worth the bones of one French *pioupiou*."[63] His rejection of an economic explanation for war in the Balkans fits the assumptions of his idealistic socialism. He believed that war was seldom a question of economic interests alone which were often easily arranged. Wars were caused by feelings and psychological factors which Marxism was unable to comprehend. Hervé, who still called himself a Marxist on occasion, did not deny the economic causes of war, but he made them secondary or inessential matters.[64] For him, the war in the Balkans involved a "conflict of races complicated by a conflict of religions." Races, ethnic differences, religion, and nationalism were increasingly considered the principal explanations for war in *La Guerre Sociale*. "In reality, the war which has just broken out is the culmination of those national wars which have filled the nineteenth century and which have led to Italian and German unifications." Hervé recognized the existence of connections between French, Italian, and Austrian assaults on Morocco, Tripoli, and Bosnia, and the emergence and failure of the Young Turks, the growth of Slavic belligerence, and thus the war itself. By arguing that French Moroccan policy led by "finance cosmopolites" was a major catalyst instigating war in the Balkan War, Hervé certainly blended economic factors, nationalism, religion, and great power rivalries in a complex web of causation.[65] He was aware that German and English bankers had rival interests in the Near East, but he also believed that international business interests favored peace due to their interconnected affairs.[66] Generally, Hervé called Russia the key to the Balkan situation, and he demanded to know the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance in the event of an Austro-Russian War over the Balkans.[67] The end of the First Balkan War led him to conclude that Austria-Hungary had become the new "sick man of Europe" with more Slavs than it could digest. He believed that the Dual Monarchy wanted another war before it got too sick.[68] Hervé's socialism had maintained its anti-war militancy, but it was becoming a hybrid political philosophy. During the First Balkan War, Hervé had not yet given up the rhetoric of calling on French soldiers to attack their own officers in the event of war.[69]

In late October Hervé assailed the C.G.T. for its refusal to join in an extraordinary Congress of the International planned for later in November 1912 at Basel concerning the prevention of a European war. While he still thought an insurrection by the military might be the only means to prevent a war that had been declared, a general strike was powerless to stop a war once it was declared in countries with obligatory military service, though it might help to prevent a war from occurring.[70] At least one police source believed that Hervé in the fall of 1912 was still actively organizing secret revolutionary committees in the provinces (in conjunction with Jaurès!) during his *tournées* to lead the "masses" to revolt

in case of mobilization.[71] A little more than two weeks before the extraordinary Congress, Hervé told militants to take precautions to avoid *Le Carnet B*. In early November 1912 Hervé was so frantic about the threat of general war and perhaps over the decline of his own support that his ideas became nothing less than a call for the International to implement the former program of Hervéism. He not only demanded international arbitration, which was part of his new program, he also hoped that an International Commission would examine the civilian and military means to realize its prior antiwar motions. In his speech to the S.F.I.O. Congress in advance of the Basel meeting, Hervé demanded an International Commission to make sure that all countries had trained revolutionary cells in their armies so that control of the armies could be guaranteed in the event of war. When the antiwar resolution to be presented at Basel was decided, Hervéist ideas were never considered, so Hervé supported Jaurès's motion of the *Fédération de la Seine*. At this time Hervé was trying to balance the polarities of Marxism, and occasionally the revolutionary pole was dominant. *La Guerre Sociale* even republished its 1908 conclusion to the series of very extreme articles entitled "In Case of Mobilization."[72] However, the Balkan Wars did not cause Hervé to return to his former ideas. The threat of general war merely highlighted a fairly consistent position that justified almost anything if it could prevent war. The First Balkan War saw Hervé thus caught in what one scholar once called the "antinomies of socialism."[73] Even though he was not included among the thirty-two main speakers at eight separate tribunes at the Pré-Saint-Gervais international anti-war rally held on November 17, 1912, Hervé could take some solace that the gathering had an attendance of over 100,000. *La Guerre Sociale* tried to see this as evidence of unity on the French Left to prevent war even though no C.G.T. officials had been present there.[74]

When the Basel Emergency Congress met November 23–25, 1912, Hervé wondered whether it was already too late. After months of protesting against war without effect, socialists began to question whether they had the power to prevent it. The Basel Congress optimistically considered itself to be a decisive force for peace. "In reality, they were meeting together for the last time before the winds of war blew their hopes into oblivion." Nevertheless, Jaurès dazzled the audience with his speech.

> "I think of the motto which Schiller inscribed at the head of his beautiful 'Song of the Bell.'
>
> *Vivos voco:* I call on the living to resist the monster which would ravage the land.
>
> *Mortuos plango:* I weep for the countless dead, now buried in the east, whose rotting stench fills us with remorse.
>
> *Fulgora frango:* I will harness the thunderbolts of war now breaking across the skies."

Then Jaurès concluded his peroration amidst the strains of Beethoven's "Hymn to Peace" with what Jaurès's biographer, Harvey Goldberg, called a "high note of prophecy." "We will leave this hall committed to the salvation of peace and civilization." That was certainly the most memorable part of his speech but Jaurès also perspicaciously predicted that military technology had assured that any future war would be carnage.[75]

For Russian Socialist Angelica Balabanoff, the speeches by the luminaries of European socialism were given out of "a sense of duty, a passionate desire to cope with danger, rather than a conviction of success." Goldberg's views were not much different because he believed that at the Congress of Basel, like previous ones at Stuttgart and Copenhagen, "the leaders of the Second International hid their doctrinal doubts and their tactical weaknesses behind a cloud of good intentions. Could Socialists and pacifist really rein in the forces of war? Would Socialist parties, almost everywhere reformist, turn revolutionary in their struggle against war?"[76] Though the congress called for an intense agitation against war, such means were to be legal and they were expected to meet the specific situation of each nation involved. Hervé was at the Congress but did not make one of the formal speeches to the gathered delegates. He certainly approved the Basel resolution along with everybody else, but, like Jaurès, he recognized that there was no certainty that the means to prevent war were sufficient.[77] So, like many other party luminaries, throughout November and December 1912, he held meeting after meeting at places such as Lyon, Thizy, Valenciennes, Saint-Ouen, Pau, Tarbes, and Agen in order to mobilize the people against war and to sensitize them to the horrors looming on the horizon.[78]

Hervé's reactions to the Basel Congress were mixed. He praised the resolution demanding that any war be turned into a revolution, and he acclaimed the S.P.D. adherence to such a resolution. After admitting that some of the socialist parties which had signed the Basel declaration might not be willing to implement it in the event of war, he labeled such parties traitorous, a characterization that would have serious implications for the future course of Hervé's transformation.[79] Both before and after the Basel Congress, Hervé increasingly called for international arbitration whenever the diplomatic situation became aggravated. Since that mechanism was far from certain, he wanted to promote an antiwar agenda throughout the population. "But the *Union Sacrée* that he invoked against war, including republicans, Catholics, or Protestants, reduced the recourse to insurrection simply to the proportions of a slogan. Hervé was a smart enough politician to understand that a *Union Sacrée* against war, if it could be ratified in the fear of war, would be rejected once arms were in hand for combat. Violent

language, more than a real menace, became an outlet for the honest fear that the war inspired."[80]

La Guerre Sociale favored united action by the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O., but it still supported the independent syndicalist actions for a twenty-four hour general strike against war to be held on December 16, 1912. The Hervéist weekly justified this C.G.T. action because its failure would harm "the revolutionary cause".[81] In a special edition on the day of the strike, the former *Sans Patrie* told socialists they would be dishonored if they did not support the general strike of the C.G.T. A failure would aid the French nationalists and damn the French Left in the eyes of the S.P.D.[82] Paul B. Miller cited government sources which claimed that only 30,000 strikers could be found in Paris and 50,000 in the rest of the country. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* used figures of 100,000 and 600,000.[83] Without citing figures, *L'Humanité*'s Marcel Sembat took the occasion to blast the accounts in the bourgeois press, which forever interpreted the situation for the workers in either catastrophic or hilarious terms, but never in an intermediate and rational manner. For Sembat, when someone elicited the same reactions to all events that meant that they did not believe it themselves, and he postulated that the general strike was a marvelous sign of things to come in the effort to prevent European war.[84] However, by most accounts, the strike was a failure or disappointment depending on one's perspective. Certainly the police thought the strike failed and credited their own actions for the poor turnout. Other sources indicated that the *département* of the Seine had as few as 100,000 strikers and in all of France there were only 300,000 to 400,000. The Left, of course, maximized the results while the police usually did the opposite. Hervé made the best of this poor showing by characterizing the strike as a serious warning to the French government that it should keep Russia under control. For him the lesson of the strike was the necessity of better organization as well as an *entente* between the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O.[85]

For the police the strike was a dress rehearsal for C.G.T. plans to disrupt a mobilization for war. Several decades ago Susan Milner stressed the disjuncture and "blurred overlap" between international socialism and internationally organized labor.[86] For Milner the antiwar protests were "essentially … an elaborate bluff to disguise the troubles of the CGT, both nationally and internationally, a bluff that was only called in 1914."[87] For Léon Jouhaux, the issue was clear and undoubtedly far less subversive than the police believed. "The important thing is not to decide what to do in the event of war; it is necessary, above all, to prevent war."[88] Although many syndicalist leaders tried to put a good face on the strike and even claimed victory, Georges Yvetot called the strike mere theater rather than a threat. For Yvetot the possibility of imminent war demanded actions by

workers that would shock the power structure enough to prevent such a disaster.[89] One explanation for the failure of the general strike is the overall decline in syndicalist strength, which went from 687,463 unionized workers in 1911 to around 300,000 in 1914. By 1914 the circulation of the C.G.T. daily *La Bataille Syndicaliste* was so low that the paper almost disappeared. Other explanations given by scholars for the strike failure and the concomitant change in the C.G.T. include: lassitude of revolutionary action, fear of betrayals by government agents embedded in the C.G.T., greater resistance from employers, a lack of financial resources, and an increase in trials, convictions, and fines for antimilitarist crimes after 1912.[90]

At the beginning of 1913 Hervé acknowledged that his change in tactics had cost *La Guerre Sociale* financially. The softening of revolutionary polemics in an effort to end division on the Left and to avoid frightening ordinary people resulted in the loss of some of the newspaper's attractive bite and verve. He explained that his "new course" had arisen due to changed conditions. In 1906 the excesses of parliamentary socialism hurt the cause of revolution. By 1913 indiscipline, individualism, and doctrinal divisions, especially within anarchism, had become the greatest dangers. It was apparent to Hervé that discipline was indispensable for socialism. In 1906 the Republic had been solid; in 1913, it was on the verge of being swept away by a new Empire. Though he still talked of an eventual revolution, now a "democratic and proletarian *Bloc*" to avoid Caesarism and war was his main concern. For the present, revolution had to wait in order to save the Republic "which carried our socialist utopia in its womb."[91] On February 15, 1913 he gave a speech at Saint-Etienne on the concept of "*le désarmement des haines*", yet the police characterized the meeting as covering the question of "*Patriotisme Révolutionnaire*", and Hervé later complained that the local press did not even bother to cover his address. One local paper assumed that the former *Sans Patrie* had changed his views due to years in prison, but the former Insurrectional demurred, saying that he just changed his manner of presenting his ideas to workers and stressing that he had never hated France.[92]

The increasing preoccupation of *La Guerre Sociale* with the growth of nationalism is illustrated in a series of articles by Jean Texcier that began in January 1913 concerning the crescendo of militarism, clericalism, and conservatism in French schools.[93] Victor Méric also began a series of articles which exposed the growing popularity of nationalist songs and plays in the French *café-concerts*. Méric mixed anti-Semitism with antipatriotism as he stressed how the Jewish ownership of these halls gained profits through the promotion of patriotic popular culture.[94] Also *La Chanson du Peuple* began weekly antiwar *soirées* to help offset the influence of the

café-concerts. In 1912 and 1913 the French government made an effort to try to end the possibility of antimilitarist cultural activities in theaters and *café-concerts* all over France.[95]

In early 1913 Hervé continued some of his traditional revolutionary campaigns. He pushed for a general amnesty for political prisoners, an end to the *lois scélérats*, the cancellation of the Berry-Millerand Law, and the reintegration of any remaining displaced railway workers. Yet the chief focus of Hervé's antiwar tactics was no longer a general strike and an insurrection; it was international treaties of arbitration. While Hervé was moving closer to the mainstream of the S.F.I.O. and to the ideas of Jaurès, he could still not resist criticism of *L'Humanité*. He no longer attacked its reformism or its parliamentarianism; he attacked its concentration on party affairs. Hervé believed that *L'Humanité* would best serve the cause of socialism and peace if it were written by good journalists, not just good socialists. Because *L'Humanité* appealed largely to convinced socialists, the former *Sans Patrie* claimed that its appeal to ordinary workers was meager. The socialist press needed to compete with the bourgeois press to attract the democratic masses, not just the class-conscious proletariat. He wanted *L'Humanité* to become the socialist equivalent of *Le Petit Parisien* or *Le Matin*.[96]

The political transformation of Hervé was nowhere more startling than on the question of neo-Malthusianism. With Emile Zola's 1899 novel *Fécondité* as an indication, the French were beginning to worry about depopulation well before the Great War. In fact, French sociologists and anthropologists, following the lead of the young science of demography, had been reporting on troubling French demographic trends for more than a decade. Already in 1896 Jacques Bertillon, the head of statistical studies for the Département de la Seine, had founded *L'Alliance Nationale Pour L'Accroissement de la Population Française*. "In 1908 *La Ligue Populaire des Pères et des Mères des Familles Nombreuses* was formed in France, which expanded its sections and organized street demonstrations." Many people were so worried about the stagnant demographic growth that the Parliament enacted a law for the assistance of large families on July 14, 1913, yet it was the losses of World War I that really instigated natalist legislation.[97] Hervé had always been a neo-Malthusian who extolled a sexual morality based on total freedom. When he discussed sexual matters, despite his own apparently severe personal moral regime, he almost echoed Fourier by characterizing men and women as perpetual *papillons*. In late January 1913 he argued, almost in a Social Darwinist vein, that birth control was being practiced disproportionately by the "physical and intellectual elite of the race." The elite had the most forethought and the fewest births while "the poor and drunken" multiply without cease. This dangerous

"selection against nature" worried Hervé, but he was not yet ready "to renounce neo-Malthusianism"[98]

On the eve of the war, he began a series of articles that tied neo-Malthusianism to French weakness in the face of the German threat. The former *Sans Patrie* claimed his new stand on neo-Malthusianism was neither religious nor nationalistic. His said that his change of mind on this issue was based on his fear for *la parti révolutionnaire*! It gradually became clear that Hervé was afraid that "the most evolved people in Europe," the French, were in danger of extinction. Neo-Malthusianism would not help raise wages as its adherents had so long argued; it would just increase the number of foreign workers in France. Such ethnic-patriotic feelings were nothing new to Hervé's increasingly paradoxical internationalism. On the eve of the war, Hervé called large families the repository of the moral values of discipline, solidarity, and fraternity. France as "a nation of single people and only children" risked moral degeneration. Neo-Malthusianism, whose greatest practitioners were peasants and middle classes, was connected to the egoism of anarchist individualism, itself a product of bourgeois individualism. He also tied neo-Malthusianism to the growth of materialism and the decline of idealism in France. The contrast between a decadent France with her declining population and the young robust and powerful Germany with an expanding population was perhaps Hervé's most curious antiwar argument on the eve of the war.[99] He did not fully develop his ideas of demographic doom until after the war, when its hecatombs made them even more frightening. Nevertheless, the rationale for this apparent transvaluation of Hervéist values antedated the war. This new stand on neo-Malthusianism cost Hervé the support of many of his readers.[100] Like most of his contemporaries, whenever he employed the term "race", it was meant to convey a sense of ethnic and cultural difference, rather than any specifically "biological" meaning. Even if he was never "racist" in any modern sense of the term, his fears for the French "race" add another idiosyncratic element to his socialist internationalism. Hervé's socialism was clearly stamped with the mark of cultural and ethnic xenophobia, especially regarding Germany, well before the start of World War I, an event which "confirmed" nearly all his fears and prejudices.

Hervé called Poincaré one of the better choices presented to France for the office of President vacated by Fallières in January 1913. Yet the promise of a Three Year Law on military service following a half-hearted amnesty for political and military prisoners soon led Hervé to view Poincaré's election as an incitement to the growing wave of nationalism. Population statistics alone would prevent a French standing army to match that of Germany. For that reason, Hervé favored a militia system in which the whole population would be armed in case of war.

Hervé, like Jaurès, assumed that such a militia system would protect France not only from external threats but from the internal menace of Caesarism.[101] Whatever initial hopes that he had for Poincaré were soon dashed. As Norman Stone pointed out, not only was Poincaré an outspoken *revanchard*, "he encouraged Frances's Russian ally into a forward policy in the Balkans, and promised that France would go to war whatever the pretext."[102]

In 1913 Hervé reiterated his calls for French acceptance of obligatory arbitration of international disputes before socialists would be willing to defend France. Increasingly he accepted the policy of employing French colonies as bargaining chips to exchange for Alsace-Lorraine. He hoped that such policies could lead to a Franco-German Alliance or *entente* which would prevent the nightmare of European war. From now until the war's outbreak, Hervé became obsessed with a settlement of the Alsace-Loraine question which he characterized as "the only major difference between France and Germany."[103] Although he disagreed with Charles Andler's indictment of the S.P.D. in *Le Temps* as a colonialist and militarist party, the Director of *La Guerre Sociale* now argued that French socialist efforts to prevent war had to be contingent upon reciprocal actions by German socialists. The S.F.I.O. would not become the dupes or the accomplices of the S.P.D. if the Germans repudiated their internationalism.[104] *Militarisme révolutionnaire* gradually evolved as an Hervéist tactic. By March 1913 it had become more a program to revolutionize the army for war than a method to win over the army for a revolution.[105] The "disarmament of hatreds" evolved from an effort to unite the Left against war to an effort to find a Republican coalition which could create a *Bloc* to bar the progress of *revanchard* internal politics. Hervé shared the myopia of the Left in not seeing what the police thought to be true. The extreme Right may have been as divided as the extreme Left.[106]

In mid-March 1913 Hervé's book *La Conquête de l'Armée* appeared, but its original potentially revolutionary meaning had been superseded by an increasing stress on a new *Bloc* to meet the threat of Caesarian reaction.[107] The book drew a negative response from Émile Masson, who passed through Paris with his family on the way to Wales in July 1913. Later Masson explained his reaction: "Since his *Conquête de l'Armée* I told him that we no longer understood one another." Masson was convinced that armies were all hierarchical, given to passive obedience, and blindly disciplined, except for a genuine spontaneous upsurge from a truly free and enlightened people, who were strong through moral discipline.[108] By 1914 Masson was becoming increasingly disillusioned with intellectuals of all stripes, who tended see others largely as means in their own visions. "Such an intellectual who … seemed anarchist or *libertaire* at the time of the Affair, has

revealed himself since then as a simple 'socialist' or even parliamentarian." For Masson, Hervé's ongoing *rectification du tir* was "another form of conversion." The insight that best summarized the personal views of the Director of *Brug* was: "Ni blancs, ni bleus, ni rouges!" And Hervé would consecutively become all three in his own fashion. Jean Grave had similar thoughts after he read Hervé's brochure. "His conquest of the army, if you got rid of all his revolutionary socialist phraseology, is only a little manual of patriotism for use in primary schools."[109]

Hervé's responses to the growing nationalist wave were multiple, varied, and predictable. In response to attacks on leftist speakers by nationalist forces all over France, the former *Sans Patrie* proposed the creation of teams of *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* throughout France. Such groups could assure freedom of speech, fight for control of the streets, and thus permit the French Left to retake the offensive. Such a creation could become a counter-wave to sweep away the nationalist barbarians. Constant disruptions of Jaurès's speeches by nationalists proved to Hervé that anarchists and syndicalists erred in viewing all political parties as equal. He now called Jaurès the new symbolic head of a "Democratic, Social,



Figure 29. Léon Jouhaux (1879–1954), C.G.T. Secretary-General from 1909 until 1947, outside La Santé Prison, March 18, 1913. (© Maurice Branger/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

and Revolutionary *Bloc*" whether Jaurès wanted it or not.[110] Yet, at about the same time that he was moving toward Jaurès politically, however haltingly and critically, Hervé received a backhanded compliment from one of his most severe critics. On February 16, 1913 in a series of the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* devoted to *L'Argent*, Charles Péguy had faint praise for Hervé as part of an ongoing attack on Jaurès. "There is not a person in France who is as much an enemy of M. Hervé as I am. But it is necessary to recognize that he is not a coward like Jaurès, it must be admitted (he makes Jaurès tremble), and he is not a deceiver like Jaurès, that has to be granted, and he is not a vulgar, crooked horse dealer from the Midi like Jaurès."[111]

In March 1913 the Briand Ministry introduced the Three Year Law[112] as an essential measure to protect France from a German attack. "The campaign against the 'three years' was the occasion for socialists to strengthen their ranks and to demonstrate as much against the government as against war."[113] Compared to Germany, France was smaller in size and population, and it had a standing army less than two-thirds the size of its rival. "From its inception, in other words, the three-year law presupposed the growing possibility of war. It is on the basis that the three-year law would increase not only the probability of war but also its destructiveness that socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists fought it tooth and nail."[114] Even before the bill was introduced, leftist groups were organizing against the Three Year Law, if at first largely separately. Posters, petitions, brochures, and rallies were used by the various components of the extreme Left. Here, Miller echoes police sources in his assessment. "In many respects, they achieved a façade of cooperation in their separate endeavors to block the legislation … Although nearly all revolutionary syndicalists and anarchists remained uncomfortable with any overt rapprochement, the flagging C.G.T. increasingly found itself under the wing of the S.F.I.O. during protests … These collaborative efforts were most evident during three large demonstrations at the Pré Saint-Gervais outside Paris."[115]

In the agitation over the Three Year Law, Hervé was on the side of its opponents, but the logic of his arguments was changing for him and for others. Whatever resurgence of antimilitarism there may have been, it was not a simple matter of opposition to the army. People in the traditionally antimilitaristic Yonne were more worried about the economic consequences of another year of military service.

> "If Hervé saw an awakening of nationalism in the project for the law, he attacked it with arguments which were no longer those that he put forward several years earlier. It was no

> longer a question of antipatriotism: 'If the Three Year Law appeared as the only or even the best means to protect France from an invasion, you would not find a single socialist who would not be ready to vote for it,' he wrote in May 1913. If Hervé obstinately challenged the military efficacy of the three years defended by certain 'old duffers' and other incompetent 'old soldiers' from the general staff, that was because he sincerely believed that two years was sufficient to train a soldier."[116]

A special edition of *La Guerre Sociale* on Sunday, March 16, 1913 at the time of the first rally at the Pré-Saint-Gervais, praised the unity and cooperation of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, the *Jeunesses Socialistes*, and the anarchists at various meetings and against the *Camelots du Roi*.[117] Around a hundred thousand people there heard syndicalist luminaries assail the government for the Three Year Law and its dangerous reactions to the international crisis.[118] Several days later, Hervé hailed the demonstration as a complete success even though the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. had not organized together. Among the speakers at the eleven tribunes there were many of Hervé's most vociferous syndicalist critics and none of his new friends among the parliamentary socialists. Needless to say, given the former *Sans Patrie*'s increasingly *Blocard* tactics, he was not invited to speak. Nevertheless, Hervé argued that, "the extreme Left *Bloc* was made" on March 16.[119] When the government prevented C.G.T. plans to demonstrate later in May at Père-Lachaise in honor of the Commune, the *Comité Confédéral* gave in and accepted a socialist initiative to demonstrate again at the Pré-Saint-Gervais where *L'Humanité* claimed 150,000 people heard socialist luminaries, including Hervé, dozens of deputies, general, municipal, and *arrondissement* councilors as well as militants from other organizations assail the government for its dangerous reaction to the international crisis. Even some uninvited anarchists were at a tribune in the highest area of the grounds.[120] On July 13, 1913, a final major rally against the Three Year Law was held at the same spot, where formal cooperation between the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. occurred again. *L'Humanité* talked about a crowd of tens of thousands. The demonstration included various unions, socialists, the F.C.A., and other diverse groups. Within the latter category were the *Jeunes Gardes*, listed along with the Esperantists and two cooperatives. The gathering had fifteen tribunes and seventy-five speakers, including fifteen socialists but Hervé was not mentioned among them.[121] Though divisions on the Left and within each of its components generally continued, the growing cooperation during the campaign against the Three Year Law may have diminished the level of discord.[122] Despite this rallying by the Left, on August 7, 1913 the law of "*salut national*" (the "Three-Year Law") reestablished a three year military service which had been reduced to two years since 1905.[123]



Figure 30. Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) speaking at the Pré-Saint-Gervais in Paris in May 1913 during the Balkan Wars amidst the Anti-Three-Year Law Campaign. Bnf.

For Paul B. Miller the importance of the rallies at the Pré-Saint-Gervais in 1913 was not merely that they overcame some of the longstanding enmities among leftist formations, but that, despite the problems of revolutionary syndicalism, the transformation of Hervéism, and the exuberance of a "nationalist revival", left-wing antimilitarism remained "a force to reckon with given a just and reasonable cause." Only now antimilitarism was not dependent on antipatriotic rhetoric. Even though assaults against the bourgeois republic and threats of an insurrection in case of war by the extreme Left continued, the arguments against the Three-Year Law were often simply attacks on the government for its ineffective and dangerous policies. The language of protest now sought to disprove the government's policies rather than simply assail the regime. "For the republican and socialist Left, one of the law's main offenses was its contravention of the cherished idea of the 'nation in arms.'"[124]

From Miller's perspective, it is unfair to judge antimilitarism by its inability to prevent war in 1914 since it was still a dynamic force to attain social equality, to maintain justice, and to seek, if not attain, peace. Certainly Miller is correct to stress the extreme Left's accommodation to the realities of the Third Republic and the regime's continuing vibrancy in the face of evolving external and internal

threats. However, in judging the extreme Left in this pragmatic fashion are we not using values and assumptions that are a bit different from those of the pre-war actors themselves? The rhetoric of revolution was a tradition which died hard in France, but it was no less important and no less costly. Jaurès and Hervé both sought to embody that tradition, one flexibly and metaphorically, the other dogmatically and romantically. One pointed toward what we assume is our current state, while the other's stark binary vision foreshadowed what was immediately to come.[125] In the end both men adapted and reflected changing conditions. However, one cannot imagine either Jaurès or Hervé being satisfied for having fought the good fight for peace and social justice in the wake of the disasters of 1914 and after. Hervé may have been reconciled to war by the fact that he had done everything imaginable to prevent it,[126] but Jaurès, on the night of his assassination, may have been contemplating a new version of *J'accuse*, ready to "expose everyone responsible for this crisis", charging the French government with near cynicism in letting the war happen by not acting as boldly as was necessary in stepping up last-minute diplomatic attempts to prevent war.[127]

If great changes were taking place on the extreme Left in the years immediately preceding the war, the attitudes of the police and the right-wing press toward the extreme Left hardly altered. A series of military uprisings in several garrisons in Eastern France occurred between May 17 and May 23, 1913 in conjunction with the furor over the Three-Year Law. Serious disciplinary measures did not suffice to assuage the fears of the right-wing press which demanded that the government implement stringent measures to thwart syndicalist influence in the army. On May 26 the Prefecture of Police mobilized its forces by searching "over six hundred syndicalist and socialist offices for evidence of their complicity in the 'mutinies.'" The police especially targeted groups or unions heavily involved in the anti-Three-Year-Law campaign. Even though the police uncovered no evidence of a syndicalist conspiracy orchestrating the military uprisings, they continued to accuse the C.G.T. of illegal, wicked, direct, and criminal relations and actions involving soldiers, thus threatening French national security. On July 23, 1913 the Minister of the Interior requested that local police commissioners provide him with a list of revolutionaries, anarchists, and antimilitarists among the reservists. In the same month many revolutionary syndicalists were arrested and some were imprisoned "for 'inciting soldiers to disobedience.'" In early September 1913 the *Sûreté* renewed its efforts to track down revolutionaries even though few names were reported. Nevertheless, the police continued to believe that syndicalist antimilitarism and antipatriotism had dangerously infected the French military.[128]

The antimilitarist struggle to maintain influence despite renewed governmental militancy, an ongoing "nationalist revival," and a growing sense of the approach of war, continued until "The Guns of August" sounded. Despite the decline of the C.G.T., the increasing governmental repression, and an incredible lack of coordination by the Left, "antimilitarists adapted to their circumstances to remain the most active force in the nation working to elevate military justice and prevent war." Hervé's transformation and the easing of his antipatriotism did not cancel all of his antimilitarist aims, but simply helped redirect some Leftist components toward more obviously accommodating tones and strategies. On the other hand, the police and governmental bodies were much less adaptable as they maintained "excessive pressure on antimilitarists" and continued "to misunderstand their capacity for collective action." The government failed to see that most antimilitarist activism represented an accommodation to the rules of the game. As Miller explains it, the government never understood this ethical element in antimilitarism which "followed in the same tradition as all French Revolutions since 1789." Of course, governmental repression, despite its threat to antimilitarists, at least testified to an appreciation of the antimilitarists' ability to continue to affect events and protest abuses. Gradually Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* despaired over the prospects of leading and uniting the antimilitarist Left. So, after 1911 it was increasingly the S.F.I.O., the C.G.T., *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, the F.C.A., and a new group called the Defense Committee for Prosecuted Soldiers that led the way. Their efforts protesting the Three-Year Law, the imprisonment of militant leaders, and the detainment of mutinous soldiers in North African military prisons were not just superficial demonstrations of protest. In Miller's words, "After the socialist electoral triumph in the spring of 1914, repeal of the Three-Year Law was just a matter of time."[129]

Perhaps pre-war antimilitarism is best seen as a transition "from revolutionaries to citizens" as Miller argues, or just maybe the legendary example of Auguste Blanqui and *la patrie en danger* should never be forgotten. The revolutionary tradition had never ceased to speak about humanity and *fraternité*, yet violence, revolution, and war were not relinquished in 1793, 1871, and above all in 1914. The efforts by the extreme Left to end social and economic injustice may have been crucial in consolidating the democratic values of the Third Republic, and this very success may have, however ironically, assuaged some of the most extreme antimilitarists, thereby permitting their acceptance of war. However, wouldn't the men who marched off in 1914 have done so regardless of whether they were becoming citizens, cannon fodder, or future revolutionaries? The French Left certainly accommodated itself in the years before World War I, but the tragedy of 1914

ought, at the very least, to have taught them the limits of that citizenship they were forging. Hervé may have led the way on the extreme Left in acknowledging the shared values of all groups and classes under the Third Republic, but his anti-democratic and authoritarian views, foreshadowing his own interwar variant of (or approach to) fascism, were evident well before his articles advocating a French version of national socialism in February 1916. Such a trajectory must cast some doubt on an important strand of Miller's argument. If Germany had been less the aggressor and France's leaders even more cynical than they were, would the reactions of French workers and revolutionaries in 1914 have been any different?[130]

Hervé's program for a "disarmament of hatreds" was applied to the C.G.T. as well as to the S.F.I.O. In late 1912 and early 1913 he made special efforts to get reformist and revolutionary miners' unions in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais to end their squabbles and unite. Hervé now saw the merits of both syndicalist positions after years as a violent anti-reformism.[131] By the summer of 1913 Hervé praised the C.G.T. *rectification* as it moved away from revolutionary tactics and back to corporate-economic issues. Here was a program that could lead to greater cooperation on the Left. Hervé's main reason for displeasure was the failure of syndicalist leaders to inform their troops about their change in tactics.[132] And, he could not understand why the C.G.T., in the process of transformation itself, continued to reject and attack him. Whatever change had occurred in the C.G.T., the syndicalists would never be ready to admit any sympathy for Hervé's ideas. The C.G.T. might have disarmed some internal hatreds, but Hervé would remain an enemy possibly, at least in part, because his transformation implicitly unmasked their own. On July 29, 1913 Merrheim responded in *La Bataille Syndicaliste* to Hervé's article the week before by calling the former *Sans Patrie* a clown, a demagogue, and a weathervane who always tried to outbid others to gain support. Two weeks later Léon Jouhaux claimed that Hervé's talk of a syndicalist transformation was an error because the C.G.T. was still committed to anarchist ideals. The former *Sans Patrie*'s appeal for the C.G.T. to join with the S.F.I.O. in emulation of German unions' ties to the S.P.D. was destined to fail.[133] Yet, in late August 1913 Hervé saw signs that anarchists, too, had begun to evolve toward his newer ideas. He found indications of growing efforts to create anarchist organization. At a recent Congress of anarchists, some delegates of *Les Temps Nouveaux* and *Le Libertaire* attacked the illegalism and individual terrorist acts that they had formerly supported. By this time Hervé had already rejected Insurrectionalism and he was promoting a *Bloc* which called for participation by the Radicals, so his appeals to anarchists to "conquer the army" had a curious and increasingly anachronistic sound.[134]

President Poincaré and Minister of War Millerand re-established a program of *retraites militaries* around 1913 after they had been suppressed since the Dreyfus Affair. This practice of weekly military forays, generally on Saturday nights, from the barracks into the streets of Paris in order to stir up patriotic feelings and foster national unity, "were enthusiastically embraced by citizens anxious to exhibit their latent patriotic energy with effusive marches and rallies. Their success was more than Millerand had anticipated, which in itself attests to a certain 'nationalist revival.'" To the Left it represented "'a kind of military demagogy invented by the Minister of War'" which soon became a target for antimilitarists and revolutionaries. Yet few serious incidents emerged. One of the most notable events occurred in August 1913 at La Place de la Concorde where around 500 marchers from the Friends of the Retraite clashed with some 350 syndicalists, anarchists, and *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. There were arrests and reportedly around 2500 francs in property damage, but any loss of prestige to the army must have been negligible.[135] For Paul B. Miller the issue of the *retraites militaires* and the meek responses to them from all but the extreme Left, was significant. A few weeks after the aforementioned episode at La Place de la Concorde, *La Guerre Sociale* wrote: "At this moment it is not only the revolutionaries who should protest, it is everyone who calls themselves republican and rebukes, like us, the chauvinistic incitements."[136] For Miller such language "reveals as much about the national identity of antimilitarists as it does the government's shifting policies of aggressive nationalism." The fact that Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* had long been involved in a marked transition is not Miller's chief point. *La Guerre Sociale* now (and throughout its evolution?) had used republican values, in this case to protest the *retraites militaries*. The tone of the article supported Miller's thesis that antimilitarism was no longer so much an altruistic ideology against war, but rather had become much more a means for the assertion of individual rights and republican values which were increasingly taking hold in France. It was "a means to counter governmental injustice and nationalist jingoism." After the Agadir Crisis, while France was in the midst of its so-called "national revival," the language of revolutionary antimilitarism was increasingly ineffective and gave way to less ideological and more practical arguments about the perilous international situation.[137] One could also account for the decline in antimilitarism and the increasing accommodation on the extreme French Left, as Heuré does, by citing Madeleine Réberioux's ideas about the declining forces of anti-statism after 1911. The Insurrectionalism of Hervé "began to lose momentum after 1911 due to social reform (which improved workplace relations through the creation of the Labor Ministry in 1906), the unionization of civil servants (which made the state

a better ally of the Left), and increased industrial concentration (which lent force to socialist arguments for nationalization)."[138]

On March 19, 1913 Hervé announced that Almereyda and Merle had left *La Guerre Sociale* in order to take charge of *Le Courrier Européen*, a leftist and bourgeois republican newspaper, parallel to the mind-set of French Radical-Socialism or liberal democracy, concentrating on foreign affairs. Gabriel Paix-Séailles, the editor in chief, wanted to attract new blood to his publication, and Almereyda was then recognized as "one of the most talented journalists of the *grands boulevards* and an intrepid person, always at the head of his *Jeunes Gardes*, who [by then?] had taken on the mantle *républicaine*."[139] Later Hervé would describe how his two former assistants had created *Le Bonnet Rouge* in November 1913, a kind of socialist *Rire*, that is, an illustrated and satirical newspaper. The former *Sans Patrie* had great praise for both men, and he said that no doctrinal dispute had caused their departure. *La Guerre Sociale* was called as much theirs as his.[140] Generally, Peyronnet accepted Hervé's explanation, but he believed financial considerations played a major role in the departures.[141] The Ministry of the Interior claimed that Merle and Almereyda had used the funds of *La Guerre Sociale* too freely. The police also speculated that the immoral lifestyles and political ambitions of Almereyda and Merle were other related causes for their departures.[142] Paul B. Miller assumed that the migration of Almereyda and Merle and the creation of *Le Bonnet Rouge*, modeled on the original *La Guerre Sociale*, represented a definitive end to their collaboration.[143] For a time, *Le Bonnet Rouge* was "completely under the political and financial control of the former President du Conseil", Joseph Caillaux, and that made it an anti-Clemenceau newspaper. This Caillaux-Almereyda connection would prove dangerous for the two men four years later and even fatal for one of them.[144] But for the present, Almereyda and Caillaux each gained something from the relationship.[145]

For Almereyda's biographer, the departure of Hervé's chief lieutenant was a natural attempt to cultivate other avenues and influential people from different social strata as well as to improve his standard of living. No political or personal conflict or rivalry was involved according to Almosnino. In fact, Almereyda remained active with the *Jeunes Gardes* now *Républicaines*. He apparently genuinely agreed with Hervé's ideas on a *rapprochement* with Germany and for a new leftist *Bloc* in 1913 and 1914, even if he did not follow any definite political line on other issues. Their definitive break would come during the war as Hervé became increasingly chauvinistic.[146] Almosnino thought that Almereyda and Hervé along with many of their followers had shifted their views not for lucre or status but because they realized that workers were not particularly revolutionary

and that *le grand soir* was not imminent. These militants, who had never been closely attached to the working class, craved action and wanted to have an impact, so they shifted toward more centrist positions and cultivated men close to the government. In the case of Almereyda, but not Hervé, that led to a more lavish lifestyle with greater temptations, making it virtually impossible for him to ever revert to a revolutionary position.[147]

When Louis Perceau left *La Guerre Sociale* in January 1914, Hervé's new course was just one reason for the departure. Perceau claimed that Hervé's solutions to indebtedness, a lowering of wages and an increased workload, had made it impossible for him to continue at *La Guerre Sociale*. Characterizing himself as an unrepentant revolutionary and antimilitarist, Perceau admitted that he had always considered Hervé a reformist and *Blocard*. The two men remained friends, so the resignation was a difficult decision for Perceau. Hervé was cordial but admitted his desire for a united team of journalists.[148]

At the S.F.I.O. Congress in Brest in late March 1913, Hervé's new ideas were not the chief concern of most socialists present.[149] For Paul B. Miller the lack of response to Herve's shift toward geopolitical arguments regarding the prevention of war was a sign of his reduced influence in the party.[150] That congress settled little since many socialist leaders stayed in Paris following the dismissal of Briand's third Ministry and the appeal of the new Barthou Ministry for the passage of the Three Year Law. Yet Hervé took the opportunity presented by a socialist congress held in his native city to pose his ideas concerning a Franco-German *entente* based on a settlement of Alsace-Lorraine. At this time "the cause of all the evils was clearly this question of Alsace-Lorraine" which he described as a "'suppurating abscess' that it was necessary to get rid of most rapidly 'under the penalty of the worst catastrophes.'" Even though fears of a war of *revanche* were not uppermost in his mind when he proposed the idea, he assumed that some form of autonomy status, much like a Swiss canton in a future Federation of the United States of Europe, could solve an ongoing source of rancor and resentment. Alternately, he thought that Germany might be willing to exchange the provinces for a French African or Asian colony.[151] Hervé cited evidence of a desire by inhabitants of the "lost provinces" to avoid becoming the cause of a war. Hoping to appear less chauvinistic than the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, Hervé's scheme allowed Alsace autonomy within the German Empire and postulated the return of Lorraine to France in exchange for a French colony outside North Africa. He wanted the question posed in Parliament because he assumed that without such a Franco-German *entente* the threat of war would continue indefinitely.[152] When Francis de Pressensé objected that Hervé's Alsace-Lorraine program would diminish the campaign against the

Three Year Law, Hervé asked that the matter be referred to the C.A.P. and the Parliamentary Group of the S.F.I.O.[153] Although he became impatient and angry with the refusals by the S.F.I.O. and the S.P.D. to see Alsace-Lorraine as the key to peace, he continued to make his case.[154]

On May 6, 1913 Hervé's *L'Alsace-Lorraine* went on sale. Like almost all Hervé's books in the previous six years, this was largely a collection of articles previously presented in *La Guerre Sociale*.[155] Marcel Sembat in his book *Faites un Roi, Sinon Faites la Paix* called Hervé's ideas on Alsace-Lorraine patriotic. Sembat's more advanced internationalist perspective recognized that a settlement of Alsace-Lorraine could only arise after a *rapprochement* with Germany, not as a condition for reconciliation.[156] Hervé claimed that Sembat's ideas would fail because France was not a socialist country but was caught up in a wave of nationalist frenzy. If the French government made an agreement with Germany before a settlement of Alsace-Lorraine, the nationalist wave would plunge France into war.[157] The fact that both men's views had merit simply underscored the conundrum. Former Hervéists like Frederick Stackelberg accused Hervé of publicity-seeking in his campaign over Alsace-Lorraine.[158] Charles Péguy acknowledged that Hervé's stand took some courage. "Hervé is the only one from that entire band who sometimes has the courage to say some things that you do not expect. He is one of those men in this world who thinks in the silliest way. But he is the only one of the band who thinks for himself, who looks at what happens, … who says what he thinks, … who has this courage, and who says what happens."[159]

That same month Hervé attended a conference in Berne, Switzerland along with 123 Socialist and Radical members of the French Parliament including men such as Jaurès, Franklin-Bouillon, and Joseph Paul-Boncour. The German Reichstag delegation numbered only 45 members, including 29 socialists. In fact, the German delegation was without any real influence on the German government, and most members supported their government when it came to a decision of peace or war. The former *Sans Patrie* asked one of the Germans what he thought was the most striking thing about the Berne gathering. To which the German responded: "having some of your former ministers here." Nevertheless, Hervé was initially ecstatic about the participation of over 120 French Socialist and Radicals at a Franco-German inter-parliamentary meeting. This was considered a resurrection of the old *Bloc des Gauches* as well as a chance for progress on the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Hervé's vision of a new *Bloc* called for a union of Radicals who were against the Three Year Law with Socialists committed to saving the Republic despite its imperfections.[160] Since the Amsterdam Congress of the International in 1904 had outlawed such alliances with bourgeois parties, Hervé's ideas risked

being labeled as reactionary even by the S.F.I.O. Hervé dismissed such concerns because German and Belgian Socialists had long created *Bloc*-like combinations for electoral purposes.[161] Paul-Boncour recalled Hervé at that time as "almost ready for a conversion, but [he was] still the incarnation of the noisiest sort of antimilitarism." Sadly for Hervé, the conference could not agree on any compromise language on the issue of Alsace-Lorraine.[162]

Hervé's call for a new *Bloc* on the Left in early May 1913 was without hesitation or vagueness. For him, ending the *Bloc des Gauches* in 1904 had been a mistake. A new *Bloc* was needed to protect France from the nationalist wave, the Three Year Law, and the danger of war. Hervé believed that the Kautsky Motion of 1900 actually sanctioned such political coalitions "in exceptional circumstances," and he noted that such combinations had been used everywhere in Europe after 1904.[163] He never hesitated to explain his ardor over such a theme to surprised socialists, some of whom accused him of reversing his views. "Weathervanes are as useful as distance markers. Distance markers show the route, weathervanes establish the direction of the wind."[164]

The logic for a *Bloc* grew out of the failure of Hervéism and the growing danger of war for which the country had to prepare. "'The Insurrectional path was closed … I had to fall back towards another road, the *Blocard* road.' His engagement was selfless—he denied any desire for a candidature in the May 1914 elections—but total: a timely 'Mam'zelle Cisailles' thus addressed Jaurès in *La Guerre Sociale* to confirm to him that she had indeed laid down her scissors to become a *Blocarde*." When the S.F.I.O. annual Congress met at Amiens in January 1914, Hervé was still greeted with catcalls and banter about being "General Girouette." Ironically, he returned to Jaurès's image about mending broken 'earthenware' which had been employed at the Nancy Congress in 1907 to ridicule the Insurrectional "corporal." Now he admitted that putting the pieces of the dishes back together was not a bad idea after all. Because not all the participants wanted to replay old arguments, a general uproar and cascading protests resulted. Even though the situation soon calmed down, Hervé became intentionally provocative, tossing out "some astonishing statements: he was still for a return to the two year [service] but recognized that the three year [law] was better than an invasion." When one of the delegates asked him whether he wanted a coalition with the Radicals, he vociferously expressed the affirmative, while other delegates just as ardently responded in the negative. In climbing down from the dais, he directed his solemn charge at Compère-Morel: "'You do not wish to see the danger that threatens you. I hope that you don't perceive it when it's too late.'" He had always been in a minority position at socialist congresses, but the reasons had certainly shifted.[165]

One of Hervé's recurring interwar explanations for his shift in views is best represented in his terse line: "I am persuaded that it is not I who have changed, but the circumstances." Paul B. Miller echoed the arguments of Jean-Jacques Becker and Maurice Rotstein regarding Hervé's *rectification* as a question of character and temperament. Yet Miller added another interesting element to that argument by describing the antimilitarist leader as a political realist who understood three years before the war that Insurrectionalism and a general strike to prevent war could not work either in France or in Germany.

> "Hervé the antimilitarist was, by nature, a realist whose grasp of politics and history led him into closer alliance with the Republic well before August 1914 confirmed this alliance for all antimilitarists. When the situation changed, when the nationalist revival received political backing from the Poincaré government and it became obvious that the antimilitarist Left still had not adapted itself to this development through the formation of a united front and the formulation of a universal strategy, then it was not hard for Hervé to concede that the struggle against war, *in the way he had been fighting it*, was essentially lost. Hervé's *rectification*, in short, was recognition of the reality and moral authority of the Third Republic. Despite the many trials and convictions, antimilitarism and Gustave Hervé flourished in France precisely because their absolute commitment to combating governmental injustice could be exercised in relative freedom. This did not simply end when Hervé began to 'correct his aim,' it only took on a new, less confrontational form. When the revolutionary working-class let him down, Hervé turned to the idea of republican democracy to protect the rights of citizens and forestall international war … From socialist revolutionary to republican ally, the evolution of Gustave Hervé always took place within the context of democratic citizenship."[166]

Miller's argument is fascinating and fits much of the larger picture of the revolutionary Left before World War I, but it does not quite fit Hervé who soon reverted to an inveterate anti-democratic, antiparliamentary, and authoritarian perspective. The era of Hervé's *rectification* and *Blocard* dreams was in many ways atypical of him. If Herve was constantly evolving by 1910, throughout most of his career he remained fairly clearly positioned at either edge of the political spectrum even if he sometimes managed to sound like a fairly moderate republican. His moderate stages never lasted very long.

In mid-May 1913 *La Bataille Syndicaliste* criticized *La Guerre Sociale* for not joining it and *L'Humanité* in demonstrating at the Spanish Embassy against the visit of Alphonse XIII to France. Hervé explained this lapse as part of his effort to create a *Bloc* with the Radicals who were then seeking to get Spain to join the Triple Entente.[167] In his desire to prevent war, Hervé turned to *Blocard* tactics well outside the mainstream views of the S.F.I.O. On the surface it might appear that Hervé was a becoming moderate and reformist socialist on the right wing of the

S.F.I.O. *Militarisme révolutionnaire*, the conquest of the army, the disarmament of hatreds, a Franco-German *entente* on the basis of a settlement of Alsace-Lorraine, and a new *Bloc* with anti-Three Year Law Radicals now represented a complete spectrum of political ideas whose contradictions vanished because now all were promoted to preserve France from war. The relative weight of these Hervéist tactics was changing rapidly, but in May 1913 the tactical array of the former *Sans Patrie* was something altogether unique.[168] When his coalition for peace finally occurred in war, Hervé would make the necessary adjustment and attempt, at least in his own mind, to unite the ideals of the Left and the Right in a new political constellation.

One of the arguments used by Hervé to promote a new *Bloc* was the S.P.D. position taken at the Congress of Basel in November 1912 which stated that German socialists would not be able to create an insurrection on the day of mobilization for war. Since Hervé had probably known this for years, his growing emphasis on the impossibility of the French to create an insurrection by themselves was a justification of his new tactics. He continued to mention any signs of the growth of Insurrectional ideas in the S.P.D. but the general assumption of *La Guerre Sociale* in the months preceding World War I was that the S.P.D. remained unwilling or unable to prevent a war. That helps explain his increasing use of rhetoric describing members of the S.F.I.O. as similar to those Radicals who ascribed to Republican ideas for a militia and a *nation armée*. By late May 1913 Hervé was on the verge of suspending what little Insurrectional propaganda remained if regional military recruitment, banned after the Midi Revolt, could be re-created.[169]

In the late spring of 1913 *La Guerre Sociale* covered military revolts against the Three Year Law but lamented that the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. had nothing to do with creating these mutinies. The paper also published accounts by French generals who considered the Three Year Law as detrimental to the French military capability. Peyronnet believed that Hervé's transformation was completed in his evolution on the rejection of the Three Year Law. At first Hervé rejected the law as militaristic, anti-Republican, and bellicose, but he eventually evolved to reject the law because it was detrimental to French military defense! Peyronnet's insight was not quite accurate because Hervé continued to lament the failure of the Left to organize a revolution to bring down the Republic at a time when he was reducing his revolutionary rhetoric.[170] In 1913 *militarisme révolutionnaire* was becoming little more than a phrase in *La Guerre Sociale*. By the end of May 1913, Hervé portrayed Clemenceau as a man capable of inspiring and leading France. Such a "balanced" account of the villain of Narbonne, Draveil, and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges may have been

an attempt to influence Clemenceau to reject the Three Year Law but much about Hervé's neo-Blanquist socialism had long implied a leader who possessed qualities like those of Clemenceau.[171]

Hervé's hopes for a *Bloc* were attacked by Guesdists as a reversion to ministerialism. The Guesdists believed that the original disgust over *Blocard* politics had led to the creation of counterproductive tactics such as the general strike, insurrection, and antiparliamentarianism. Hervé disagreed with these charges, but his assessment spared neither Guesdism nor Hervéism. For the Director of *La Guerre Sociale*, the premature end of the *Bloc* was actually the cause of revolutionary extremism. After 1904 the Radicals were forced to look to the Right for the support they could not get on the Left. This led to Clemenceau, then to Briand, and eventually to the great wave of nationalism. The revolutionary method had at least one constructive result: it awakened French and German socialists to the danger of war. Because that same method coupled with the end of the *Bloc* had led to a nationalist wave, only a new *Bloc* could remedy that situation.[172] Only a *Bloc* with the Radicals could create the support to cancel the Three Year Law. Socialists had to forget their plans to implement proportional representation in order to attract progressive Radicals to a new *Bloc*.[173] Such tedious arguments to promote a new *Bloc* had not destroyed Hervé's sense of humor. He claimed that most socialists practiced the *Bloc* on the second round of elections but never called it a *Bloc*. If the word *bloc* scared socialists or was illegal, Hervé wondered if it could be called *alliance*, *coalition*, *cartel*, or even *pomme de terre*. So Hervé decided that he was not in favor of a *Bloc*; he was actually asking for a *pomme de terre* against the Three Year Law, European nationalism, French Caesarism, the Russian Alliance, and the danger of war.[174]

Hervé accused Prime Minister Louis Barthou of inventing an antimilitarist and antipatriotic plot by the C.G.T. in connection to the recent mutinies in order to preserve his Ministry as well as the Three Year Law and to prevent a *Bloc* which would include anti-Three Year Law Radicals. According to Hervé the idea of a leftist plot was ridiculous. The *Sou du Soldat* had never been an antipatriotic organization, and the C.G.T., the S.F.I.O., and the anarchists were becoming moderate in 1913 in order to defend the Republic against the threat posed by the nationalist wave.[175] The Left was not yet united but Hervé's modest idea of a Republican *Bloc* was now a kind of universal panacea for leftist division as well as the threat of Caesarism.[176] The purpose of the *Bloc* seemed to be constantly evolving. He saw it as a means to alter French foreign policies, to create an *entente* with Germany, to end the Russian Alliance, and to form a militia system in the army. The money that France saved by reducing its standing army could be spent on

weapons, equipment, and training, not on barracks for inactive troops.[177] By late July 1913, the program of the *Bloc* was viewed as a preparation for the elections of 1914. A *Bloc* was needed to win the elections which could enable a return to the Two Year Law and a reduction in the nationalist wave.[178]

Hervé's demand for a *Bloc* was coupled with a continuing attack on all doctrinaire socialist ideas. Doctrinal Guesdism was blamed for its refusal to accept a new *Bloc*, but the original destruction of the *Bloc* was attributed to S.P.D. doctrinaires before 1904. In the evolution of Hervé's critique of German socialism, German Marxism, as the source of rigid dogmatic socialism and Guesdism, was tied to the failure of the old *Bloc* which itself had helped spawn the growth of nationalism in France.[179] By July 1913 Hervé admitted that he had no great aversion to having Jaurès become the Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to prevent war. Though he still believed that ministerialism was a poor strategy psychologically, he was no longer philosophically opposed to it.[180] Soon he would admit that ministerialism was a logical adjunct to socialist parliamentarianism, and he would blame German socialists, who did not live in a parliamentary system, for the failure of socialism to admit the logic of socialist reformism.[181]

Such blatant parliamentarianism forced Hervé to explain more fully the death of Hervéism. His former ideas were not yet considered completely mistaken. Hervéism was being put to rest because the S.F.I.O. and the S.P.D. had failed to prepare for an insurrection. Revolution was no longer either wise or necessary after the 1911 settlement of Morocco and the lack of revolutionary spirit in France and especially in Germany. Now that the C.G.T. itself had evolved and the Radical-Socialists were detaching themselves from the Radical-Conservatives, a *Bloc* was becoming increasingly possible.[182]

In 1913 *La Guerre Sociale* continued to attack the French police, with the crimes of the Parisian vice squad being repeatedly exposed. Yet the police were now separated into good and evil elements. For a time Hervé hoped that the new Prefect of Police Hennion would be more moderate and more favorable to reforms than Lépine had been. Occasionally, Hervé defended the existence of police agencies against socialist criticism. *La Guerre Sociale* applauded the growth of unions among police officers just as it discovered signs in the army that non-commissioned officers were becoming more favorable to Republican and socialist ideas. Hervé's socialism was now becoming very close to an acceptance of the nation as it existed.

The former *Sans Patrie* continued to pay lip service to the class struggle while he worked for the *Bloc*, which he described as a cooperation of parties and classes. His justification for this increasingly less than revolutionary program included the

need to return to the Two Year Law, create a militia, promote a Franco-German *rapprochement*, develop a better tax system, support public schools, and foster ministerial participation. Such a program would demolish capitalism "little by little" not in one quick revolution. His hope for a government including Radicals and Socialists was justified as a means of creating social peace. In the event of strikes, Socialist ministers could preach calm and non-violence, while Radical ministers could pressure the police and the military to act moderately. Hervé believed there were two choices for socialism: (1) His Insurrectional method of assault, organization, and revolution, already rejected by the Left; and (2) An infiltration of state institutions and the government to change them gradually.[183] Hervé's logic was flawless. Since he realized that revolution in France had become mostly rhetorical, he now plunged fully into socialist reformist methods with only a few revolutionary flourishes remaining. Nevertheless, Hervé still met with failure. His Insurrectional past was certainly a source of concern for moderate Socialists, yet divisions on the Left continued, in part, because many leftists refused to relinquish the revolutionary veil. The consecutive rejections by the Left, first, of his revolutionary, and then, of his reformist methods and programs, characterized Hervé's transformation to national socialism. They certainly do not fully explain it.

In 1913 Hervé was not yet ready to contemplate uniting the French nation as an end in itself. In the many months before the spring elections of 1914, Hervé attacked Socialists who were willing to ally with clericals and royalists in order to win electoral victories against the Radicals. For a *Bloc* with the Radicals to occur, the Radicals had to be able to trust that the S.F.I.O. would not use the extreme Right against Radicalism. The S.F.I.O., on the other hand, had to be assured that a *Bloc* would be advantageous for its program. Thus, Hervé was careful to support only those Radicals of the Left amenable to programs which the S.F.I.O. could support.[184]

Gilles Heuré regarded Hervé's arguments concerning the awakening of the "clerical and nationalist plague", which justified his call for a *Bloc*, as rather specious. "In reality, he was troubled more by the fundamental divergences between the French and German socialists on the attitude to adopt in the face of war." Yet for Heuré, Hervé's *Blocard* convictions were largely tied to domestic political considerations. Continuing to shout anti-war insurrectional slogans might bother potential moderate allies. He also got rid of his antipatriotism in order to better ally with Jaurès, whom he praised for his inexhaustible energy in the cause of peace. Ironically, he now saw Jaurès as too far to the Left and too much of an internationalist, and he had lost faith in his old Insurrectional threats made in the interest of peace. "The paradox of Hervé on the eve of the war, is found entirely

in a disorientated energy which no longer supported an ideal but which, on the contrary, yielded to a vertigo of remorse. From now he seemed to succumb to a desperate lucidity."[185]

In 1913 when the war danger temporarily subsided, as Hervé saw it, he became increasingly preoccupied with the Bonapartist clerical danger.[186] It is ironic that the object of this obsessive fear in the pre-war era would become his chief panacea for French division, demoralization, decay, and depopulation after the war. That transvaluation is not easily explained. Only the decade of discord and disharmony on the Left coupled with the devastation of a war so long feared and predicted can even begin to account for such a transformation. Of course, it can always be argued that Hervé simply changed his mind, but that still begs the question, why? The manner, direction, and results of that change indicate something significant. His new positions were almost reverse images of his former positions with several important continuities, namely: various atavistic traits, assumptions, or beliefs at the core of his largely antimaterialistic, moral socialism coupled to a constant concern for the fate of France.

In late September 1913 Hervé had a great success at the Congress of *Les Jeunesses Laiques* which included Jaurès, Émile Combes, and Anatole France as honorary presidents. Such mixed company fit well with Hervé's new course. His speech to the gathering, stressing the issues of Alsace-Lorraine and a Franco-German *rapprochement*, was well-received and his motion on these questions received a unanimous vote. Several delegates agreed to present Hervé's *Blocard* ideas at the impending Radical Congress at Pau. The former *Sans Patrie* himself was determined to present his ideas at the next Congress of the S.F.I.O.[187] But an editorial by Hervé prior to the Radicals' Congress was not optimistic about the chances for implementing a new *Bloc*. The Radicals were too divided and lacked direction, while the Socialist leaders did not want to risk a loss of popularity. The director of *La Guerre Sociale* was under no illusions about the difficulties in resuscitating a *Bloc*.[188]

At the Congress of Pau the Radicals did not prepare a *Bloc*, but they showed signs of supporting a progressive program. In Hervé's view this put the S.F.I.O. under an obligation to join the Radicals in a *Bloc* for the spring elections because this would begin the evolution toward a social Republic. In his editorial discussing the Pau Congress, Hervé performed what was to become a characteristic act in his own journalistic career. He now praised a man whom he had vilified for years. *Caillaux-de-sang* became a potential new Waldeck-Rousseau as Hervé apologized for his own prior harsh treatment of this new leader of the Radicals.[189] Joseph Caillaux may have acted rather cynically in championing the income tax to gain

credit for promoting a reform that he knew would be rejected, but Hervé assumed that support for the embattled Radical leader, who was much criticized for such a progressive idea, might actually open the eyes of S.F.I.O. leaders so that a *Bloc des Gauches* could finally be created.[190]

Guesde's formal rejection of a *Bloc* in October 1913 in an interview in *Gil Blas*, while he and his followers practiced alliance with almost anyone during elections, greatly irritated Hervé. The continued silence of Vaillant and Jaurès on the matter further troubled him because he knew they were "as *Blocard*" as he was. Hervé attributed Guesde's error to a failure to recognize the social complexity of modern society. Society was not polarized into two classes, the capitalists and the proletariat. The middle classes and peasantry were complex groups, which included many elements who were natural allies of the proletariat. Marx had been aware of this but not doctrinaire Guesdists.[191] Hervé asserted that he had long argued that Marx himself had been a *Blocard*! Evidently, Marx was less doctrinaire when his ideas could be made to support Hervé's.[192] The former *Sans Patrie* actually accused Guesde of aiding reaction by his refusal to support a new *Bloc*. To back up his stand Hervé cited the alarm of the Right-wing press at the possibility of a new *Bloc*. The conservative *Le Temps* feared that a *Bloc* would create a fiscal revolution. *Le Temps* claimed that Hervé's support of Caillaux as the creator of a new *Bloc* was logical development from his class struggle and anti-capitalist ideas. The Bonapartist *L'Autorité* mockingly said that Hervé had planted his flag in the Radical Party. In the moderate Radical *L'Action*, Henri Berenger described Hervé as the great protector of the Radical Party. Berenger argued that now the former *Sans Patrie* seemed to be planting his flag in the Ministry of the Interior so that *La Guerre Sociale* could soon direct France's finances, army, and Prefectures. For Hervé the entire Right must have been delighted by Guesde's attacks on a new *Bloc*.[193]

After Hervé's book *L'Alsace-Lorraine* was translated into German, the S.P.D. daily *Vorwaerts* rejected his program. The voice of German socialism requested that Hervé look for other causes of war besides Alsace-Lorraine. *Vorwaerts* also criticized Hervé's colonial exchange proposals for Alsace-Lorraine just as French socialists had done. The German socialist daily called Hervé utopian, idealistic, and ignorant of German domestic politics. Rather than being ignorant of the causes of war, the former *Sans Patrie* stressed that his concern was simply to end the one cause most directly affecting France. As for his evolution on the colonial issue, Hervé believed that peace was more important than any principle or doctrine. He accused *Vorwaerts* of Pan-Germanism for calling Alsace-Lorraine a purely German question. Despite this negative reception of his ideas, the director

of *La Guerre Sociale* admitted that the review of his volume by *Vorwaerts* was honest and impartial. It should not be forgotten that Hervé was generally guilty of projecting French political reality, which he understood, onto far different foreign situations.[194]

The new Gaston Doumergue-Caillaux Ministry appointed by Poincaré on December 9, 1913 temporarily dashed Hervé's *Blocard* hopes because Caillaux refused to follow the Radical program set out at Pau against the Three Year Law. This action was viewed not only as a victory for Briand and the right-wing Radicals, it also rekindled socialist distrust of Radicals as *arrivistes* and traitors. *La Guerre Sociale* expressed hope that Caillaux's initial statements would be altered, but Hervé called this a betrayal just when the Republic faced its greatest danger from the clerical and nationalist menace.[195] In fact, Hervé displayed a patience with Caillaux far greater than he usually displayed to those who rejected his ideas. Such uncharacteristic forbearance may be attributable to Hervé's assessment of the Caillaux-Briand duel for control of the Radicals. The first lead editorial of 1914 set the tone for *La Guerre Sociale* in the months preceding the spring elections. Hervé foresaw a duel to the death between the Left and Right over the elections. To win such a duel the Left needed to have the support of the left-wing Radicals. The former *Sans Patrie* ridiculed the dogmatic attitude of the S.F.I.O. which prevented its leaders from working to create a *Bloc*. He continued to be especially critical of Jaurès for his silence on this topic. Socialists were incorrect to consider reforms such as the Two Year Law, the income tax, and public schools as negligible matters. If socialists failed to join with left-wing Radicals, Hervé believed they would be defeated.[196]

During this pre-election era Hervé maintained a consistent anticlerical position even if he cautioned against replacing the social question with the clerical menace. He rejected the moderate views of some Socialists who considered religion to be a private matter. Religion had political implications since Socialist alliances with clericals on the second round of voting troubled the Radicals. So Hervé's continuing anticlericalism had at least one purely political motivation. He wanted to prevent some Socialists from joining forces with reactionaries in order to defeat Radicals. A strict anticlerical position thus preserved a chance for a *Bloc* with the left-wing Radicals.[197] If Socialists continued to be aloof to the *Bloc* and if the left-wing Radicals proved to be uncooperative, one of the main reasons for Hervé's anticlericalism would no longer be a factor. If events favorable to a *rapprochement* with clericals intervened, Hervé certainly had the ability to pivot.

In 1913 and 1914 *La Guerre Sociale* included countless articles on anti-Semitism in Russia as part of an effort to get France to cancel its loans to Russia and

to avoid the Russian Alliance. On January 7, 1914 an article probably written by Hervé explained and excused that alliance and the loans to Russia as necessary because the S.F.I.O. refused to promote a *Bloc des Gauches* and because French and German socialists were not trying to settle Alsace-Lorraine to pave the way for a Franco-German *rapprochement*.[198] The pattern was becoming familiar. Formerly detested policies were excused or even promoted because the forces of the Left had failed to act on Hervé's advice. Of course, Hervé reserved the right to reverse himself if need be. He sometimes argued that a German-Slav war was inevitable, and he generally assumed that the French safeguard, its Russian Alliance, was actually a trap for war.[199] But in his efforts to create a *Bloc* and solve Alsace-Lorraine, Hervé frequently seemed to forget the rationale for such policies. Then his ultimate goals could vanish as he tried to preserve his tactical means. Hervé would accept or promote a Russian Alliance if he could not obtain a *Bloc*. Soon he would accept a version of the *Bloc* called the *Union Sacrée* even though the costly means to it was the war he had so ardently tried to avoid. The ambiguity and contradictions in ends and means had always characterized Hervé. He had not been alone in thinking that a revolution could create universal harmony and fraternity, and he would share the company of those on the Left who, like him, came to accept the war, at least in part, instrumentally as the path to peace, order, and unity. "It is … undeniable that his *revirement*, his rejection of antipatriotism, explicit and public, had, if not inspired, at least served to reveal a more profound tendency. On the question of antipatriotism and antimilitarism, Hervé's 'disarmament of hatreds', was not a completely isolated position. The decline in the intensity of the violent antimilitarist and antipatriotic current in the French socialist and syndicalist movement is certain".[200]

At the beginning of 1914 Hervé attributed the financial and circulation crisis of *La Bataille Syndicaliste* to the divisions in the French Left. The only remedy was a *Bloc* of the C.G.T. and the S.F.I.O. to coordinate action and to cooperate on a program. The former *Sans Patrie* tied the problems at *La Bataille Syndicaliste* to the general crisis in syndicalism which he blamed on syndicalist efforts at self-sufficiency and their attacks on bourgeois political actions. The logic of this argument was that Hervé's advice, if followed, would have prevented the crisis. In his critique of syndicalist woes, Hervé charged workers with being the most ignorant group in the French social order even if it was not their fault.[201] Anger at his rejection by the C.G.T. was leading to an even more elitist attitude which came close to rejecting an entire class.

In late January 1914 the National Congress of the S.F.I.O. met at Amiens. After the first day of the Congress, Hervé proclaimed the end of factions in the S.F.I.O.

because the Congress displayed such discipline and unity. Only the Guesdists were subject to his criticism due to their persistent mumbling of the same doctrinal clichés. However, he was disappointed that the S.F.I.O. had not shown the courage or the intelligence to admit that it was already a *Blocard* party.[202] *La Guerre Sociale* was hardly an impartial observer when it called Hervé's speech promoting *Blocard* ideas "the most eloquent of the Congress."[203] As a formerly virulent *anti-Blocard*, Hervé found it wise to proclaim himself a *Blocard* by apologizing for his previous excessive attacks on his fellow Socialists. He stressed the need to differentiate between the lay and clerical bourgeoisies because he feared that Socialist efforts to win over middle class Catholic voters would jeopardize a potential *Bloc* with left-wing Radicals. When Hervé proposed an alternative to a *Bloc*, a voice cried out, "*pomme de terre*." He did not seem embarrassed by such humor at his expense, and calmly went ahead demanding a coalition of all the parties of the Left as permitted by the Kautsky motion. He believed that only a coalition of the S.F.I.O., the Left-wing Radicals, and the Independent Socialists could create the faith and élan necessary to ward off the internal dangers to France. A call for a coalition with the detested Independent Socialists led to a temporary uproar which was hardly calmed by Hervé's claim that they, too, should have been present at Amiens.[204] Hervé's socialism now approached that of the left-wing Radicals so there was bound to be renewed frustration with him in the S.F.I.O. But his charge that the S.F.I.O acted as a *Blocard* party during elections even while they formally rejected a *Bloc* was a fairly accurate appraisal. The former Insurrectional firebrand was unhappy with the vague motion passed by the congress which he believed was directly inspired by Jaurès's efforts to please everyone. Nothing like a *Bloc* was proposed but alliances with reactionaries were not formally prohibited either. Needless to say, neo-Hervéist reformism would be no more successful than his Insurrectionalism.[205]

The original aims of the *Bloc* were to end militarism, clericalism, and Bonapartism, but gradually Hervé's ideas on the reform of the military came close to contradicting such goals. In February 1914 Hervé's antimilitarism already approximated his wartime efforts to improve the military. He no longer concentrated his attack on war or the depravity of military life. Rather, he aimed his assaults on the lack of imagination, the spirit of routine, and the corruption in the High Command. Military bungling allowed poor living conditions for soldiers which hurt their efficiency and morale, threatening the defense of France. The Three Year Law, of course, was wrong now largely because it hurt French military power.[206] Less than two months before the war began, Hervé attacked the inefficiency of the Ministry of War and the General Staff because France lacked officers, high quality artillery, and adequate shells.[207] Just weeks before World War I began, Hervé attacked French colonial

policy in Morocco not as a potential cause of war or as a crime against humanity but because it wasted resources and troops needed to meet a German attack.[208] Hervé's wartime demands that Ministers be appointed from outside Parliament originated from pre-war anti-democratic assessments of parliamentary and ministerial ineptitude. The transformation of an Insurrectional Socialist to reformist socialism masked an antiparliamentary and anti-democratic attitude that recurred especially during crises.

Hervé's desire for a coalition of Leftist parties became so great that he sometimes favored non-Socialist candidates over Socialist ones. For example, he called on workers to vote for the Radical Ferdinand Buisson instead of the Socialist Navarre in the 13th *arrondissement*.[209] This maneuver led to serious attacks on Hervé by Socialists of that section of Paris.[210] In February Hervé denied the existence of universal class struggle because the peasantry, the *petit bourgeoisie*, and some elements of the middle classes displayed a "natural benevolence." Though he continued to speak about revolution, his idea that "reforms don't kill a revolution but promote it" was a far more self-deceptive notion than his Insurrectionalism ever had been. By this point, violence was considered almost always counterproductive.[211] Well before the war Hervé's long-time support for strikes began to fade. In late February 1914 he attacked miners for advocating strikes in their troubled and divided unions. Needless to say, the striking miners and the C.G.T. assailed Hervé for his lack of sympathy.[212] Such stances are partly explained because he now realized the impossibility of revolution. His altered tactics, following such a realization, kept him outside the mainstream in the chief organizations of the French Left.

Upon the death of arch-nationalist Paul Déroulède in early 1914, Hervé wrote that he had always had a weak spot for the founder of the *Ligue des Patriotes*. For Gilles Heuré, that was not meant to be the sudden confession of a secret nationalism, but was Hervé's embarrassment in realizing that the errors of a man who sincerely believed what he said were preferable to a collective failure based on the growth of naïve hopes.

> "When he wrote à propos of Déroulède that 'it was the imperishable glory of that Don Quixote of patriotism to have incarnated the necessary protests for forty-three years …' it was his own political epitaph that he had signed. This was already a way of suggesting to others that which they should think of him, Gustave Hervé: this is the imperishable glory of this Don Quixote of antipatriotism to have incarnated the necessary protest for seven to eight years."[213]

As the spring of 1914 approached, Hervé's feelings of betrayal by the Doumergue-Caillaux government abated. He understood why the new Ministry could not

oppose both Poincaré and much of the Parliament over the Three Year Law. He attributed Caillaux's failure to obtain the income tax law to a Senate controlled by the forces of reaction. As the spring elections came near, "a Caillaux-Jaurès government was being mooted," but his political enemies worked tirelessly against the Radical leader. From early December until the elections over one hundred articles were written againt Caillaux, and that was the backdrop to the personal tragedy which ended his pre-war political rise. In the effort to destroy Caillaux's reputation some undestroyed love-letters became ammunition in the ongoing smear campaign.[214] When Caillaux's wife murdered the editor of *Le Figaro*, Gaston Calmette, the generally chivalrous Hervé joined in her defense. "When the laws are powerless to defend the honor of women in a country that calls itself civilized, do these violated women have the right to take justice into their own hands or not?" Hervé saw this affair as a double lesson. It cautioned newspapers and politicians against using personal matters to create scandals, and it illustrated the evil methods that reactionaries would utilize to prevent social reform. What most concerned Hervé about this unsavory episode was the damage it did to a potential *Bloc des Gauches*. Now an unconditional *Blocard*, Hervé thought that any threat to Caillaux also endangered any new *Bloc* and the Republic itself. Behind the Madame Caillaux Affair, Hervé believed, stood Poincaré and Briand who both wanted Caillaux out of the government.[215] Hervé absolved Caillaux of guilt in the ongoing Rochette financial scandal by seeing such charges as the work of reactionaries who feared Caillaux's attempts at reform. The former chief Insurrectional now said: "to be for Caillaux is to be a true subversive." Hervé maintained his earlier attack on the capitalist financial feudality but his account of the machinations of the powers of French politics and finance betrayed a newly acquired tolerance for governmental intrigue when it could promote his own program.[216] "And for the first time in his career as a political journalist, he fought openly on the occasion of the May 1914 legislative elections. For it was necessary to vote. Even if they were unable to convince, the arguments that he employed were still able to offend: 'The anarchists don't vote … neither do calves.'"[217]

Hervé's activism was not dormant even though he was at a political crossroads. With *L'Humanité* unable to join him and *La Bataille Syndicaliste* unwilling, Hervé organized a demonstration on April 1, 1914 against a Briand speech at the Elysée-Montmartre. Wondering how Briand could show his face among workers after his ignoble career, Hervé appealed to all the forces of the Left including Socialists, syndicalists, and even Radicals to come to jeer Briand but to abstain from all forms of violence.[218] The demonstration may not have occurred according to Hervé's plans. Although he praised Hennion's police in contrast to Lépine's,

the former *Sans Patrie* threatened to use "Citizen Browning" if the police ever acted brutally again. He was so agitated that he thought about reconstituting the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*.[219]

In the weeks before the spring elections of 1914, Hervé concentrated on promoting cooperation on the Left in order to attain a majority in Parliament. A victory by the Left could help return to a Two Year Law, pass the income tax law, end the nationalist and clerical wave sweeping France, and promote a peaceful foreign policy. The *Bloc* may have been rejected by the S.F.I.O. at Amiens, but Hervé praised innumerable instances in France where it was being practiced. He continued his attacks on Socialists who allied with clericals, royalists, and anti-Semites in order to defeat Radical opponents. An article by Émile Pouget in *La Guerre Sociale* interpreted the low level of interest by workers in the impending May Day as a good sign. Workers were not yet strong enough for revolution, but they had political interests which the Left could satisfy. Since the income tax, the desire for a shorter work week, and the labor shortage were all presumably tied to the Three Year Law, workers had an interest in electing a leftist majority to Parliament.[220]

Success on the first round of voting on April 26 led Hervé to praise the "reconstituted *Bloc*." He felt compelled to explain his happiness in terms of a continuation of his revolutionary idealism merely altered "due to reality and present dangers."[221] He now concentrated on attacking socialists who refused to desist in favor of Radicals on the second round after having previously agreed to step aside. Such maneuvers hindered the creation of a *Bloc*, and they led to Radical reprisals in other areas.[222] He did not want to see a victory for Socialists lead to a sterile opposition; his panacea was a new *Bloc*.[223] After the second round Hervé claimed a victory for the Left. Hoping that the Left would work together better in the new Parliament than they did in the elections, he called on the S.F.I.O. to give up its "Marxist-Guesdist doctrinal intransigence" as a step in the proper direction. He demanded a new *Délégation des Gauches* on the grounds that the state could now be won by voting.[224] Hervé hoped the three parties in his *Blocard* visions would agree to support the left-wing Radical program presented at Pau in order to prevent a new government of Republican concentration favored by Poincaré and designed to maintain the Three Year Law.[225] "In May Hervé again declared himself in favor of ministerial participation by Jaurès at Foreign Affairs working for a Franco-German *entente cordiale*."[226]

Was anybody listening to Hervé at this point? As Heuré saw it: "He had unquestionably lost his charisma, the victim of his sudden moderation".[227] The police certainly reported that he had lost influence.[228] Benoît Broutchoux expressed a similar idea in *La Bataille Syndicaliste* when he described a conference organized by

Hervé in early May at Liévin in the Département du Pas-de-Calais where the audience "was nothing but firemen and musicians." Reacting to Hervé's incessant calls for a *Bloc*, Lenin in 1913 described the former "clever agitator" as guilty of "spinelessness" because of his constant harping about a *Bloc*.[229] His friend Émile Masson was increasingly impatient with Hervé's new course. With his influence clearly waning on the far Left, Masson still believed that Hervé sought to have an impact in the upper reaches of parliamentary politics with his incessant demands that Socialists participate in the new ministry in the spring of 1914. "Although he had a premonition of this estrangement, Masson suffered from it. 'Gustave Hervé is no longer a hero,' he admitted soberly to [Andre] Spire" on the eve of war.[230]

In the days following the elections, Hervé responded to certain Guesdists at *L'Humanité* who were indirectly attacking him when they advocated antiministerial, anti-reformist, and class struggle ideas. The response of the former *Sans Patrie* included his revelation that he read Clemenceau in *L'Homme Libre* every morning, and wondered whether a strong leader such as Clemenceau might be a possible solution to French divisions. The Director of *La Guerre Sociale* was not yet ready for such a drastic solution, and Clemenceau himself would soon reject *Blocard* ideas since he had an anti-Three Year Law position.[231] In late May 1914 Hervé still thought of himself as a leftist and Clemenceau was still terrified of a revolution, even though the possibility of such an event was largely imaginary.

M. Edmond du Mesnil of *Le Rappel* characterized Hervé's *Bloc* as an attempt to unite indissolubly the contradictions of revolution and reformism, individualism and collectivism, proportional and majoritarian representation, as well as antimilitarism and national defense.[232] This combination of opposites was not Hervé's first such tactic. By May 1914 his *Blocard* aspirations represented a clear step in favor of the reformist polarity of socialism, but it also represented discordant if not contradictory purposes. Though he had accepted reformist tactics, his ideals of unity and peace were becoming at best unrelated, and were about to become contradictory. The war would help Hervé to preserve the rhetorical flourishes arising from the revolutionary heritage a while longer by pitting democratic and republican France against autocratic and militaristic Prussia, but eventually it accelerated an almost complete rejection of that heritage. On one level the career of Hervé was an attempt at solving the contradictions of socialist theory.[233] Since he failed to convince the S.F.I.O. to become either consistently Insurrectional or consistently *Blocard*, he eventually sought to transcend those contradictions by a new political avenue.

Hervé believed that Doumergue had been appointed by Poincaré on the condition that he accepted the Three Year Law. The victory of an anti-Three Year

Law majority led to Doumergue's resignation in early June because he did not want to fight with the Parliamentary majority.[234] On June 10 Alexandre Ribot was temporarily in charge of the government, but Hervé described the situation as a "Presidential Crisis" because Poincaré wanted a government which would promote right-wing policies against the leftist feelings of the people.[235] When Ribot gave way to a Ministry under the Republican Socialist René Viviani on June 13, Hervé spoke of the treason of the Republican Socialists.[236] Hervé blamed the situation on the S.F.I.O. failure to appease the left-wing Radicals just when they had been most amenable. Jaurès was especially singled out for his failure to push the S.F.I.O. to cooperate with the other leftist parties in a new *Délégation des Gauches*. Hervé now hoped that Socialist support of the Viviani government would lead it to rally to the Radical Party's Pau program. This could offset the "revenge of Poincaré" which had preserved the rightist program after an electoral victory by the Left.[237]

Despite the lack of response to his ideas on Alsace-Lorraine, Hervé still believed that the resolution of that issue was critical for Franco-German relations. In early June, his stance on Alsace-Lorraine was becoming less flexible. Arguing that it was time to leave "theoretical internationalism" in order to create a realistic foreign policy,[238] he had become exasperated over the failure of the S.P.D. to transcend its view of Alsace-Lorraine as "a German question." German socialism was not only blamed for the rupture of the *Bloc* in 1904, its intransigence over Alsace-Lorraine and socialist theory, in general, was by implication responsible for the failure of the French Left to take advantage of its recent electoral victory. In the weeks before Sarajevo, Hervé was convinced that no danger of a European war existed, and he spent his time getting ready for a showdown with the Germans at the Vienna Congress of the International set to meet in August 1914. It was now time to end the S.P.D. imperialism over international socialism. A party from a country "one hundred and twenty years behind France" and without a parliamentary system had no right to dictate either internal or external policy for the S.F.I.O.[239] Obviously, Hervé's private war with the Germans set for Vienna that August was cancelled when Europe became preoccupied with another matter.

On June 24, as he looked ahead to the Congresses of the *Fédération de la Seine*, the S.F.I.O., and the International which were set to meet in succession to clarify the socialist program to prevent war, Hervé said he could agree to an Insurrectional motion if the S.P.D. formally promised its compliance. Assuming that this was more than posturing, this "last gasp" of Insurrectionalism is significant because it showed that Hervé had not completely abandoned revolutionary arguments. After having long, though inconsistently, argued that German

Socialists and workers would never act to disrupt a mobilization, he had come to accept the same thing about the French. However, Hervéist Insurrectionalism in June 1914 was merely the lingering shadow of the French tradition of revolution. He was now much more concerned with raising the issue of Alsace-Lorraine at successive congresses as a means to prevent war and create a Franco-German *rapprochement*.[240]

Hervé considered the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as a "just recompense" for years of Austrian imperialism. He favored the cause of Slav nationalism and believed Sarajevo undercut any economic explanations for recent wars. In the assassination of the heir to the throne of the Habsburgs, "he saw the will of the Slavic countries to free themselves from the Austrian yoke." Nationalistic demands for self-determination trumped stock market fluctuations and economic problems as sources of change.[241] He attacked the French Republican press for its moderation and cautious advice to the Balkan peoples. When subject peoples like the Serbs looked to the French Republican press for guidance in a critical time, what they found was a press acting "like a cow gazing at a train." He preserved enough of the revolutionary heritage to call for a wave of revolutions from Russia to Austria and Italy![242] Such sentiments may have vaguely reflected the French revolutionary tradition, but they could hardly have helped to calm such a volatile international situation. However, since Hervé now believed that the birthplace of revolution no longer needed one, it is very likely that this call for a wave of revolutions to sweep Europe was an honest, though misguided, appeal to save France from war.[243]

As the Congress of the S.F.I.O. to be held in Paris in mid-July approached, Hervé urged shelving the Hardie-Vaillant Motion adopted in Copenhagen in 1910[244] because of the French inability to create an insurrection or a general strike due to a lack of preparation and the continuing division on the Left. In Hervé's opinion the only advantage in posing it now would be to get a categorical rejection by the S.P.D. After that the French could concentrate on the *Bloc* which was a more viable path to peace than an insurrection or general strike. Hervé believed his own plans for a Franco-German *rapprochement* ought to supersede all other measures.[245] As Gilles Heuré explained the situation: "The angry distrust that he had displayed at Stuttgart against the Germans was transformed in the last months before the war, and for the same reasons, into a denunciation of his earlier positions, sadly revelatory of a collective illusion." Making a similar point, Annie Kriegel stressed how Hervé had the clairvoyance to try to warn workers about the fragility of the positions taken by official socialism.[246] Jean-Jacques Becker echoed such views in analyzing Herve's response to the pre-war situation and the

July Crisis. "Even if Hervé had never hesitated to be original and often marginal, in such a circumstance he could only be frank about socialist thinking without believing himself obliged to use evasions."[247]

When the extraordinary Socialist Congress opened in mid-July, Hervé attacked the Vaillant-Jaurès motion because he believed that a "general strike demonstration" in cooperation with the S.P.D. to constrain France and Germany against war would be confused with his former ideas. He now considered Hervéism to have been unrealistic and even treasonous in appearance which would lead to disastrous consequences for everyone. Calling on the S.F.I.O. to stop bluffing and admit that the social revolution had to be postponed, Hervé believed that Socialists used revolutionary language merely to avoid the appearance of being reformist. Here, the Prefecture of Police reported that Hervé "spoke quite sensibly."[248] The former *Sans Patrie* now claimed that Socialist revolutionary rhetoric had already led the Jaurèsist majority to sabotage the *Bloc*, the campaign against the Three Year Law, and a Franco-German *entente* by means of autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine. In his speech to the Congress, Hervé reminded the party that it had always rejected his demands for serious preparations for a general strike and an insurrection. When war almost occurred in 1911, the S.F.I.O. lacked the organizations necessary for an insurrection. The same was true in 1914. Hervé accused the party of refusing to acknowledge that it was no longer a revolutionary party.[249]

The headlines of *La Guerre Sociale* from Monday July 28 until Friday July 31 virtually mirrored the longstanding evolution of Gustave Hervé, and they illustrated the complex and contradictory makeup of his socialism. On July 28 *La Guerre Sociale* printed the old antiwar cry "*A Bas La Guerre*!" as its headline. On July 29 the refrain "*Ni Insurrection! Ni Grève Générale! A Bas La Guerre!*" clearly rejected revolutionary means to prevent war. As the situation grew more critical, so did the fears of *La Guerre Sociale* concerning the fates of both socialism and the nation as shown by the July 30 headline "*Les Socialistes Et La Patrie En Danger*." Then on July 31 the Blanquist call to national defense,"*La Patrie En Danger*", expressed an increasing acceptance of the near inevitability of war. *La Guerre Sociale* was now a patriotic voice ready to lead France into battle. Nevertheless, most of the fundamental contradictions in Hervé's Socialist values remained as the progression of the headlines implied.[250] What had changed in the years preceding the war were the tactical polarities in his evolution toward reformist socialism. For Hervé the war against the evil German Empire was an idealistic crusade in which the revolution and the nation as well as the proletariat and the social order had finally become united. He was hardly alone on the French Left in harmonizing

these apparent contradictions at the commencement of the war. Yet, by then, Hervé may have had the smoothest transition.[251]

In the last days of peace, *La Guerre Sociale* was filled with mixed messages. On July 28 Hervé demanded that France break its alliance with Russia rather than be dragged into a war merely to save Russian honor. He rejected insurrection and general strike, ostensibly because of the lack of preparation by the French Left, the failure by the S.P.D. to join such measures, and his fears for the national defense. Yet, Hervé also urged militants not to sleep at home in order to avoid being arrested as subversives, under the widely known *Carnet B* arrangements, if they felt they could act more positively outside prison during the crisis. In keeping with the rhetoric and ideas of the former *Sans Patrie*, he called on Frenchmen to greet the vaudevillian President Poincaré with rotten apples when he returned to France, and he attacked Prime Minister Viviani for assaults on workers who marched in the streets protesting war. Hervé did not oppose a Sunday August 2, 1914 demonstration against war proposed by *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, but he wanted it to be orderly. July 28 was the day that the Austrian ultimatum fell due, yet Hervé attacked the bellicosity of the French press because he claimed the Germans were sincerely trying to caution Austria. He assumed that the disappearance of Austria was inevitable no matter what happened in the present crisis. Their cynical ultimatum proved that Austria was worse than Russia. If the crisis were solved, Hervé more than ever wanted an *entente cordiale* with Germany. In fact, Hervé felt vindicated by the events now taking place. His various antiwar ideas had all been rejected; now one could see the result.[252]

On July 29 *La Guerre Sociale* became a daily and would remain so throughout the war. On that day Hervé was somewhat ambiguous about Russia even though he did not want France to fight over the fate of Serbia. More than ever he saw Austria as the evil power pushing for war, and hinted that France might have to enter the war to aid Russia even if France were not attacked. At the same time he stressed the defensive nature of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and hoped that no French government would march if Russia were the aggressor. Such a French government deserved to fall. Hervé hoped the conflict could be localized to Russia and Austria, but realized that a German mobilization inevitably meant a French one, thus guaranteeing war.[253]

In the same issue Hervé voiced a Jacobin justification for a French entry into war. France and its workers must defend the foyer of liberty and the French revolutionary tradition against the German Empire. The former *Sans Patrie* was angry at the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. for their reluctance to reject insurrection and general strike which they knew were impossible to implement. Their refusals

only magnified the government's fears and actually reduced the authority of anti-war rallies. Yet Hervé preserved his own revolutionary credentials by castigating the S.F.I.O., the *Fédération de la Seine*, and *L'Humanité* for their inaction in the face of nationalist rallies for war. Only *La Bataille Syndicaliste* had saved the honor of revolutionary Paris. Now Hervé's only admonition to the syndicalist daily was to reject revolutionary rhetoric and to make its proposed anti-war rally an orderly call for peace to help the government calm France's ally.[254] If Hervé's equivocations matched those of other leftists, the direction of his course had long been clear.

On July 30 the Jacobin and Blanquist traditions guided *La Guerre Sociale*. The lead editorial by Hervé proclaimed *le patriotisme révolutionnaire* and called upon workers to defend France. He praised the recently announced rejection of revolutionary strategies to prevent war by both the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. Claiming to not want to give up his Socialist ideals, he admitted that they would have to await the end of the war. From now on the French Left would work with the nation to bring that day closer. Hervé urged the government not to implement the *Carnet B* because there was no danger of revolutionary antiwar action.[255] Prefect of Police Célestin Hennion, Minister of the Interior Louis-Jean Malvy, and Prime Minister René Viviani were assailed for the brutal treatment of workers during rallies for peace. Such actions only damaged workers' support for France. The key to Hervé's position was his vision of France as the home of liberty and social justice now under the threat of the barbarian empire of feudal Germany. He still spoke about the chances for peace, and hoped the Kaiser would act prudently, but the general tone of *La Guerre Sociale* was a preparation and justification for the Left to rally to the defense of France.[256]

On July 31, the day of the German ultimata to France and Russia, in an immense headline above the paper's six columns, Hervé called on Socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists, as the conscience of the French army, to defend "*la patrie en danger*."[257] At last the former "General" of the antimilitarists had achieved his lifelong goal of a united Left, but that unity came on the brink of the war which leftist unity was meant to prevent. His marching orders were now clear: avoid a general strike and file to the border as one unified body without hatred to defend the nation, thereby giving an example of bravery and discipline to the nationalists. Once that unity was achieved, Hervé concentrated his attention on curtailing the government's attacks on workers' peace demonstrations and beseeching the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T. to tell the government that the Left would not sabotage a mobilization. The only hope for peace was for the Left to influence the government by cooperating with it.[258]

When the assassination of Jaurès occurred just before ten o'clock on the evening of July 31 at the Café du Croissant near the offices of *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité*, Hervé was at the printer's close by when a *Jeune Garde* came in screaming: " 'They've assassinated Jaurès at the café across the street! They're going to assassinate all the socialist leaders! Watch out!' After drafting an article which called for calm. The paper 'completed', he quickly headed to a safe location: 'The *Jeunes Gardes* who helped me every night to give the slip to the police charged with following me, and without a doubt to arrest me when I got out of bed if they applied the *Carnet B*, discharged their mission as on previous nights. I was able to jump into a car and hide at a friendly locale, where I knew that they would only arrest me when I was ready, when my patriotic and journalistic work was done and the mobilization was completed without mishap, hesitation, or grumbling.'" Hervé assumed that if the demonstrators then excitedly singing patriotic songs along the main arteries of Paris realized that the man passing by in the open carriage was the notorious former *Sans Patrie*, they would most likely have done him in on the spot.[259]

The assassination of Jaurès occurred in the presence of longtime Hervé associate Émile Tissier, who was sitting with Jaurès at the Café du Croissant that night, and just moments before his death, heard the socialist tribune say: "Tonight I'm going to write a new *J'Accuse!* ... I will expose everyone responsible for this crisis."[260] Also present at the café that night were Miguel Almereyda and his son Jean.[261] Whatever Jaurès might or might not have done once the "Guns of August" had sounded remains unknown. However, what is known is that both Hervé and Almereyda immediately after the assassination chose, in their respective newspapers, to channel the profound emotions on the French Left into the cause of French defense.[262] On August 1, 1914 Hervé had the fallen leader say to his compatriots: "They have assassinated me! In wanting to avenge me, do not assassinate the nation!" For the former *Sans Patrie*, Socialism had done all that it could to save France; it had even sacrificed its greatest leader. Now Socialists and the entire Left must act to save France and thereby save humanity.[263] There was no doubt in Hervé's mind about assigning responsibility for killing the great Socialist leader because *L'Action Française* had long called for such an action. However, the editor of *La Guerre Sociale* chose to master his legitimate anger to help his threatened nation. "Jaurès is dead! At least France itself will not die!" Even though Hervé had been on the end of some of Jaurès's sharpest barbs, he admired the great leader who had always defended Hervé's right to speak his mind, however infantile or intemperate the remarks. Even though he himself had often ridiculed Jaurès, calling him the "premier trombone" intoning speeches termed "Jaurèsmiades," Hervé was profoundly affected by the assassination.[264]



HUITIÈME ANNÉE. — N° 31 B. ÉDITION SPÉCIALE A 5 CENTIMES SAMEDI 1er AOUT 1914.

La Guerre Sociale

PARAISSANT LE MERCREDI

ABONNEMENTS : Paris ... Départements ... Étranger ... On reçoit les abonnements pour six mois

RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF : GUSTAVE HERVÉ

BUREAUX : PARIS — 56, Rue du Faubourg St-Denis — PARIS. TÉLÉPHONE : Nord 64-69

Défense Nationale d'abord !

ILS ONT ASSASSINÉ JAURÈS

Nous n'assassinerons pas la France

Vive Jaurès !

Jaurès, notre grand Jaurès est mort.

Il a été assassiné, au moment où il revenait de tenter une suprême démarche auprès du ministre des Affaires étrangères, en faveur de la paix !

Il a été assassiné au moment où il revenait de demander au gouvernement de supplier la Russie de faire un dernier effort de conciliation pour éviter l'horreur d'un égorgement général.

Il avait su que l'Angleterre avait fait une nouvelle proposition de médiation à la Russie et à l'Autriche. Il avait appris que la Russie l'avait déclinée. Alors, il fut épouvanté pour la France, à l'idée que l'Angleterre, qui n'est liée par aucun traité avec la Russie, ne voudrait pas la soutenir, si la Russie se montrait aussi intransigeante que l'Autriche elle-même.

Il trembla de voir le concours de la flotte anglaise nous manquer brusquement, à la minute tragique où nous avons tant besoin de son aide.

Fou de douleur patriotique, il courut au quai d'Orsay pour représenter au gouvernement que si attachée que fut la France à son alliée, quelque répugnance qu'elle eût à paraître la lâcher à l'heure du péril, il valait mieux rompre l'alliance russe que d'engager la France dans une guerre où la Russie ne mettrait pas jusqu'au bout le bon droit de son côté.

Quels accents il dut trouver pour dire au gouvernement : « Nous nous battrons ! Le peuple socialiste se battra comme un lion s'il a la sensation qu'il vole au secours d'une Russie qui aura tout tenté pour épargner à l'humanité la honte d'une guerre européenne au XXe siècle. Ne lui infligez pas la honte, n'infligez pas la honte à notre France immortelle de l'engager dans une guerre où elle peut disparaître, sans vous assurer que son allié n'a pas commencé par se mettre lui-même au ban de l'humanité. »

Assassiné au retour d'une mission si sainte, que toutes les femmes de France, que toutes les mères de l'Europe entière lui auraient baisé les genoux si elles l'avaient connue ! Quelle plus belle mort pour le chef du Parti socialiste, pour l'homme qui était la gloire du Parlement français et du socialisme international.

Soyez contentes vipères qui, depuis des années sifflez aux oreilles de tous les imbéciles, que cet homme était vendu à l'Allemagne !

Mais vous les patriotes intelligents, pleurez ! La France a perdu le meilleur et le plus grand de ses enfants.

Mais vous les mères de France, pleurez : vos fils ont perdu celui qui, depuis dix ans à la tête de notre Parti, a le plus lutté pour leur éviter l'horreur de la boucherie qui [illegible]

Nous, mes pauvres amis socialistes, ne pleurons pas : l'heure n'est pas aux gémissements.

Ne pleurez pas ! Et surtout étouffez pour le moment vos cris de rage et vos rugissements de colère.

Oui, vous aviez raison, mes amis, quand vous suiviez la voiture funèbre qui portait son cadavre encore chaud, de crier haletants : « Vive Jaurès ! Vive Jaurès ! » Il vit. Mort, il est plus vivant que jamais.

Prêtez l'oreille. Il vous parle. Vous l'entendez ? Vous reconnaissez sa voix, vous qui l'avez entendue tant de fois dans vos meetings ? Vous reconnaissez son enseignement, vous qui savez bien comment il savait concilier dans son cerveau puissant ce que nous devons à la paix et à l'humanité, et ce que nous devons à la patrie !

Écoutez ! Écoutez ! Reconnaissez sa voix : « Mes amis, mes enfants la patrie est en danger.

« Ils m'ont assassiné !

« En voulant me venger, n'assassinez pas la patrie ! »

Gustave HERVÉ.

Haut les Cœurs !

L'assassinat de Jaurès ne change rien à notre ligne politique.

Il travaillait, [illegible] à sauver la paix : c'est le [illegible] devoir, la plus haute mission [illegible] socialisme. [illegible] mort au champ d'honneur.

Pendant qu'il se battait pour sauver la paix, nous aussi, depuis cinq jours, nous nous battions pour rappeler à notre Parti que les socialistes ont un deuxième devoir aussi sacré, c'est, s'ils n'ont pu sauver la paix, de sauver au moins le pays de l'invasion !

L'armée allemande est à nos portes, menaçante !

Cette nuit, la mobilisation sera commencée en France : demain ce sera la guerre !

Jaurès est mort.

Au moins que la France, elle, ne meure pas !

Quand la tourmente sera passée, il faut que la France républicaine toute entière dise : « Les socialistes ont lutté jusqu'à la mort de leur chef pour sauver la paix.

« Ils ont été les premiers à crier au pays : la Patrie est en danger !

« Les socialistes français ont bien mérité à la fois de l'humanité et de la Patrie. »

La Guerre Sociale.

ÉCOUTEZ ! VIVIANI !

Viviani, vous venez d'adresser à la classe ouvrière des paroles pleines d'émotion qui lui sont allées au cœur.

Viviani, vous pouvez compter sur son sang-froid, sur son patriotisme.

Mais il manque quelque chose à votre adresse à la classe ouvrière.

Il y manque l'annonce que dès demain la République rendra la liberté à tous nos prisonniers politiques !

Viviani, dans l'intérêt de la patrie menacée, donnez cette marque de confiance à notre classe ouvrière ! En ce jour maudit où elle va prendre le deuil de son chef et le deuil de son idéal de paix internationale !

LA PATRIE EN DANGER

Oh ! la journée affolante que nous venons de vivre au chevet de la paix agonisante.

[illegible] l'affolement, la panique.

Et en nous couchant ce soir, nous nous demandons si ce ne sera pas pour demain.

La guerre ! La guerre au vingtième siècle ! L'horreur ! la honte !

J'ai dans l'oreille les sanglots de ma vieille mère, dont l'un des fils sera à la frontière au premier jour, et à cette heure horrible, toutes les mères de France, toutes les mères d'Allemagne, toutes les mères d'Europe sont ma mère. Et leurs fils sont mes frères. Et les enfants de leurs fils sont mes enfants.

Voilà huit ans que nous, les socialistes de toute l'Europe, nous nous faisons traiter de sans-patrie et de traîtres pour avoir voulu empêcher cette abomination. Nous nous sommes jetés, comme des fous, à la tête des chevaux emportés qui traînaient l'Europe vers le gouffre ; nous avons été renversés, nous avons été piétinés et le char de la guerre poursuit sa course folle aux abîmes.

Il ne se lèvera donc point quelqu'un parmi ceux qui sont plus forts que nous pour tenter ce que nous avons tenté, pour se jeter à la tête de l'attelage à son tour !

Le Kaiser !

On le croyait pour la paix.

Si la guerre éclate, c'est Clemenceau qui avait raison : il faisait le guet pendant que l'Autriche assassinait la Serbie.

Si ce n'est pas lui personnellement [illegible] ditisme, c'est l'aristocratie militaire qui gouverne sous son nom.

Si nous nous battons, que le peuple allemand sache que ce n'est pas à lui que nous en voulons, mais à la caste militaire prussienne qui aura déchaîné l'ouragan.

Faut-il redire une fois de plus pour qu'on le redise aux soldats et aux officiers qui, là-bas, l'arme au pied, forment nos troupes de couverture, qu'ils veillent sur la frontière sans arrière-pensée : personne ne leur tirera dans le dos pendant qu'ils font face à la caste militaire prussienne et autrichienne, personne.

Ici, tous nous avons rayé de notre *Internationale* le couplet des généraux.

Et notre *Internationale*, ainsi expurgée, qu'est-ce qu'elle dit au fond, sinon ce que disait la *Marseillaise* que nos pères chantaient il y a 120 ans !

Amis socialistes, amis syndicalistes, amis anarchistes qui n'êtes pas seulement l'avant-garde idéaliste de l'humanité mais qui êtes encore le nerf et la conscience de l'armée française, la patrie est en danger !

La patrie de la Révolution est en danger !

G. H.

Le devoir Socialiste

Conserver son cœur pur de toute haine contre les autres peuples qui ne sont pas plus responsables que nous, hélas ! de la catastrophe, si elle éclate.

Réserver notre haine au parti militaire autrichien et au parti militaire allemand, qui en seront les principaux responsables.

Marcher comme un seul homme à la frontière, en donnant aux nationalistes l'exemple de la bravoure et de la discipline, en confiant à la République la charge des femmes et des enfants.

Bien se dire, et bien répéter autour de soi que si la France républicaine est vaincue dans l'horrible duel qui va ensanglanter l'Europe et déshonorer l'humanité, elle est sur le flanc pour 50 ans, et la République par terre !

Et se dire au contraire, pour se donner du cœur au ventre, que si la France Républicaine est victorieuse, si c'est un Sedan allemand, c'est dans 6 mois la République allemande, du Rhin à la Vistule.

Figure 31. *La Guerre Sociale*, August 1, 1914. Front Page the day after Jaurès was assassinated. (© Jean-Pierre Verney/akg-images.com/The Image Works)

On August 2, the day Germany invaded Luxembourg and Belgium, the former *Sans-Patrie* remained true to his avowed Blanquism as he wrote an open letter to Minister of War Adolphe Messimy demanding to be incorporated into the first infantry regiment leaving for the front. "Despite my myopia and forty-three years, I am perfectly capable of fighting. Since, in the war that is going to break out, France seems to me to have done the impossible to avoid this catastrophe, I beg you, as a special favor, to allow me to join the first infantry regiment that is leaving for the frontier … Long live France. That is all."[265] Reckoning that he had sacrificed everything to try to prevent war—his university position, his legal career, and his freedom itself due to his many incarcerations—Hervé assumed that he was entitled to fight for the country he had all along sought to defend. Such a just recompense or poetic justice was not forthcoming.[266] Of course, Hervé was dissuaded from such a venture because the government figured his rhetorical ammunition might be more helpful in defense of France.

While still expressing fading hopes that French unity could frighten away the spectre of war, it is problematical whether Hervé would have risked that unity to try to avoid war.[267] In these opening days of the war, his rhetoric about *la patrie en danger* was echoed by Almereyda writing in *Le Bonnet Rouge*. He, too, volunteered to go off and fight, and like the former antimilitarist "General", the pen of his "Lieutenant" was deemed far too important to risk in any combat bravado.[268] The prediction that Péguy had formulated in *Notre Jeunesse* revealed itself to be inexact: Hervé, on the first day of the mobilization did not wish to shoot all the soldiers: he wished to join the army. By then Péguy knew that the notorious antimilitarist was ready to join the ranks, and the editor of the *Cahiers* was quite thrilled by that stance, a thrill that he would carry until he fell at the Marne, while Hervé continued to write.[269]

Anyone who had closely followed the evolution of Hervé's ideas in the last years before the war should not have been too shocked to see him histrionically demand to be sent to the front. Prominent *fin-de-siècle* chronicler Jean-Bernard Passerieu was far from surprised by what happened at the onset of the war, even predicting in 1913 that "Hervé, 'like his fellow-travelers and everyone else, would do his duty and rally to the colors once he heard the bugle sound.'"[270] Under-Secretary of State Abel Ferry was not worried about Hervé's attitude if war occurred. "I have said a hundred times that, in case of war, Hervé would be an admirable soldier and the *cégétistes* (syndicalists) [would prove to be] the bravest of our soldiers."[271]

La Guerre Sociale did not appear on August 3, the day of Germany's declaration of war on France. After reflection on these momentous events, on August

4 Hervé reached another rhetorical peak as he tied the war to the death of Jaurès and the Socialist vision of the future. In an open farewell to Jaurès, Hervé told the fallen leader to "be happy at not having to witness the momentary collapse of our dream of universal peace." The Socialist tribune was assured that he would have been proud to see the simplicity with which French workers answered the call to mobilization. Workers were serene in their new mission because France had done all that it could to avoid war. France was clearly the victim of the most brutal German aggression. Hervé continued to tie the revolution to the nation when he told workers to chant the "*Marseillaise*" freely because it was, after all, a revolutionary song. The former leader of Insurrectionalism now considered the war a necessary sequel to the wars of liberation after 1789 because it would be fought for the rebirth of nations like Poland, the freedom for oppressed peoples, and the foundation of a German Republic as part of a United States of Europe.[272]

This rhetoric was undoubtedly sincere despite Hervé's previous assessments of official and popular French complicity in the origins of the July Crisis. This war should have been the ultimate disaster for a leading European antimilitarist. Yet, because all his efforts to avoid war had been rejected and because the unity he had always sought had finally arrived, the war seemed to vindicate his prior failures.



Figure 32. The Funeral of Jean Jaurès, August 4, 1914. Bnf.

Throughout his life Hervé consistently abhorred violence, yet it held a strange fascination for him. The coming of war made him frantic, troubled, fearful, and excited. It never led him to despair. Actually the war galvanized Hervé to action and created a kind of euphoria in him perhaps because it brought a heightened sense of meaning and purpose. It is impossible to know what Jaurès would have done had he lived, and even his closest supporters disagreed. One need not engage in standard Jaurès apotheosis to suspect that he might have reacted somewhat differently than Hervé.[273]

The night Jaurès was assassinated, Almereyda, apparently never having met with Minister of the Interior Malvy before, went straight to La Place Beauvau with Francis Jourdain to try to stop the implementation of the *Carnet B*. Hervé did the same thing at some point and began multiple contacts with the Director of *La Sûreté Nationale* and Malvy in order to avoid the implementation of the *Carnet B*.[274] Although Hervé and many other old-style Hervéists, like Almereyda, Méric, Merle, and Goldsky, had long since shifted their views or at least moved on, their names were still on the list of dangerous subversives.[275] Syndicalist chief Léon Jouhaux was reported to have said that he was "ready to leave Paris and to go and buy twenty cents worth of tobacco in Brussels." Other syndicalist officials also feared massive arrests and imminent internment of the Isle of Ré.[276] Hervé certainly did what he could to convince government officials as well as syndicalists that no general strike, insurrection, or sabotage should occur to disrupt a mobilization. As the July Crisis led to war, Hervé repeated his pleas for calm and continued to assail reactionary forces who feared that Socialists would somehow get the *Carnet B* rescinded. Those right wing forces would probably have been dumbfounded and Hervé would have been relieved sooner had they known that such a policy was already being bruited by some high government officials.[277]

Minister of the Interior Louis Malvy got word of Jaurès's death during a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the Elysée. When he briefly adjourned with Prefect of Police Hennion, he got advice that the government needed to act quickly to avoid a revolution. "But good policemen are not always wise politicians, and the only duty that Malvy had was, for the time being, to not use force against the angry socialists but 'to join in the grief of the people.'" The government did delay the departure of two cavalry regiments as a precaution, but Viviani reassured Minister of War Messimy that public opinion in France was not a problem and that the government should not act hastily.[278] Léon Daudet later reported that Almereyda went to visit Malvy "his radical-socialist comrade" in order "to save the genuine republic" by promising Malvy that the "reds" would be "calm and peaceful" if they were not arrested under the *Carnet B*, general surveillance list.[279] On

October 31, 1915 Almereyda claimed that he had met with Malvy twice before the mobilization. In those meetings he told the minister that the arrest of leftist militants would push the Socialist press to assail the government, which would split the nation in two. According to Malvy's Cabinet Director, Jean Leymarie, speaking at a Senate interrogation on March 5 and 7, 1918, Hervé might have met Malvy several weeks after the war began while the two were supposedly in Bordeaux.[280]

The memoirs of Francis Jourdain confirm Almereyda's account. After a chance meeting during the pacifist rally sponsored by *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, Almereyda led Jourdain to the Place Beauvau where Hervé's former chief lieutenant met with Malvy to discuss the possible implementation of the *Carnet B* since the minister was then being pressured by government leaders to act in the crisis. Malvy was hesitating because he feared that implementing the *Carnet B* would prove to be counterproductive by exacerbating tensions and possibly creating civil war rather than producing national unity. The Minister sought to sound out working class leaders and various militants who were familiar with the revolutionary milieu. Even though Almereyda had shifted his ideas and was *persona non grata* among many of his former associates, he knew that milieu well and did everything he could to dissuade Malvy from repressing the antimilitarist movement. In fact, Hervé's former lieutenant virtually guaranteed working class passivity, especially because their leaders were despondent by the events unfolding.

> "When … Jourdain, shaken by the war which was coming, saw Almereyda leave the minister's office, he found him with 'a smile of triumph on his face'. He explained what had transpired like this: 'I did not waste my time, they are not going to utilize the Carnet B.' … That same evening, *Le Bonnet Rouge* was the first newspaper to deliver the news, which helped even more to calm the ardor of the militant workers who, even the night before, were ready to resist the declaration of war. Several years later Almereyda would claim that he himself had helped to dissuade revolutionary militants from acting on what, side by side, they had preached throughout the era: war against war through sabotage and general strike."[281]

In the end, just 59 people among the 2500 on the *Carnet B* lists were arrested and they were mostly "foreigners who had publicly called for insurrection."[282] However, more than twelve years after the war was over, Victor Méric still thought that Hervé could have seriously damaged French plans in August 1914 if he called on his followers to sabotage the mobilization. "And I think that if Hervé had stuck to his former promises and given the orders to his forces when the war started, that would have created real havoc."[283]

The political transformation of Gustave Hervé, once it began, was almost predictable, yet there is something inexplicable or some missing element. At each moment in his political life, especially at the outbreak of World War I, Hervé remained an enigma. Almost all the attacks directed against him and the praise he received seem accurate and appropriate, if we don't forget to include them all. Hervé's life remains a telling artifact which helps to expose many of the tensions and anomalies in French society and its value system. Hervé is certainly an often cited example of a political reversal on the eve of World War I. Still, he was not alone and his shift was gradual because it dates back to 1910 and 1911. He was certainly not the only political actor to alter his views before World War I.

L.-O. Frossard summarized Hervé's last two years before the war with the following lines.

> "Remaining a pacifist [sic],[284] he led a campaign to regulate the question of Alsace-Lorraine by plebiscite. His campaign fell flat on both sides of the frontier. We were in 1912. Hervé's influence was dropping. Abandoned by the anarchists and the syndicalists, he no longer represented much. People still read *La Guerre Sociale*, since it was skillfully composed. But one no longer attached much importance to what he wrote. War came. Hervé, I already said it, wanted to join up. People did not have any trouble persuading him that his place was in Paris, to 'sustain the morale' of the rear, to encourage and comfort the combatants—and that he would render more service in handling a pen rather than a gun."[285]

Despite Hervé's gradual shift in views as early as 1910 and certainly by 1912, many revolutionary socialists were dumbfounded by the ramifications of such a clear ideological reversal. Gilles Heuré commented on the interval between Hervé's shifting views and their repercussions for ordinary militant socialists by noting that the latter continued to consider Hervé "as the living symbol of antimilitarism up until August 1914."[286] The Sens socialist Lucien Juventy was mobilized in September 1914, and he never forgot the renunciations of his former heroes. "… All these 'big mouths', syndicalists, socialists flew to the frontier or, more precisely, sent their followers. There was no difference between Barrès and Hervé or Jouhaux. How can one not be flabbergasted by these human somersaults who were my idols. I do not understand."[287] Leon Trotsky, who was in Paris when the war began, could not resist blasting Hervé as a "pseudo-revolutionary buffoon" and a "weathervane" who "switched his shooting shoulders—in an instant but never loaded his weapon."[288] In a letter to Pierre Monatte dated January 9, 1915, syndicalist Georges Dumoulin claimed that he could not read Hervé, Gaston Montéhus, and

others without sweating.[289] One police report toward the end of 1915 noted how Socialists could not easily explain "the major recantations of a man who seemed to have made a wager at the expense of his party and readers. In this way, the limits of the acceptable have been surpassed."[290]

Two ex-anarchists who briefly joined the Communists in the post-war era, Victor Méric and Victor Serge, had slightly different reactions to the situation in August 1914. Méric, after working closely with Hervé for a decade, evaluated his final years before the war in terms of gradual changes which became complete. By 1912 his new tactics had led to a complete rupture with the anarchists and syndicalists. Then he became obsessed with Alsace-Lorraine, coming to believe that war was inevitable if that issue could not be resolved. "And like a thread into the eye of a needle, he came to fight for the Republican nation, rejecting his earlier intransigence. He had broken with his associates. A bit everywhere people murmured the word, 'renegade.' The Gustave Hervé of 1912 and 1913 was not at all the same as in the beginning. He was ripe for the war."[291] In the late summer of 1914 from his prison cell at Melun on an island in the Seine twenty-five miles from the Marne battle, a revolutionary like Victor Serge, who had been caught in the undertow of the Bonnot-Garnier Affair, thought that he and his fellow political prisoners "would have followed the nationalist current and understood immediately that, despite all theoretical considerations, a country under attack, unless it is at the height of a social crisis, must defend itself; primitive reflexes, infinitely stronger than principles, are at play; the sentiment of the nation in danger prevails."[292] Despite a very different trajectory than Hervé, an imprisoned revolutionary like Serge understood and accepted the call to war at least initially.

In his efforts to resolve the dichotomies on the French Left between revolution and reform, Hervé alternately chose each pole. Though he sought to remedy ideological contradictions which had practical implications, his own programs never escaped those contradictions. As a revolutionary he never totally rejected reform and evolution. As a reformist, however briefly, his quests generally remained uncompromising. Hervé's political transformation was long and convoluted yet at almost every stage the dichotomies remained. He could not create and certainly never achieved consistent Socialist tactics yet some values—peace, unity, harmony, order, and some version of social justice—were fairly consistently held, however differently they were interpreted, over his entire political career. One reason for his perpetual failures must lie in his goals which were often romantic, utopian, and visionary no matter where he stood on the political spectrum. Another source of failure could reside in the values themselves which remained ambiguous and potentially contradictory. Hervé's political career verges on a sincere yet naïve

lifelong attempt to solve the riddles and paradoxes of opposing value systems. The fact that he ended up embracing the nation and its traditional religion as twin sources of unity, harmony, and meaning for himself and others is telling. The war certainly had a major impact on his future course, but his political journey had changed well before that cataclysm. The war and the international crises preceding it are crucial but not alone in explaining his new direction, no matter what Hervé later said about his evolving shift.

16

La Grande Guerre

Gustave Hervé and the Origins of a French National Socialism

After returning to Paris from the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels on the evening of July 30, Jaurès led a delegation, which did not include Hervé, to the Quai d'Orsay to state the socialist point of view and to warn the government about provocative actions. He soon heard from Prime Minister René Viviani that France intended to avoid provocations by manning the frontier at a distance of ten kilometers. As he left the meeting, Jaurès murmured to A. Bedouce, the Deputy from the Haute-Garonne, that he would do exactly what the government was doing were he in its place.[1] One wonders what Jean Jaurès and Gustave Hervé might have thought if they could have read Foreign Affairs official Abel Ferry's diary at the start of the war, comparing former Foreign Minister Théophilé Delcassé to a spider whose vast web had finally drawn in the insatiable and fearsome German fly, as he always knew it would. Even though Jaurès had just guaranteed the purity of French intentions at Brussels, on the afternoon of July 31 he met with Minister of the Interior Jean-Louis Malvy and then came to Ferry's office at the Quai d'Orsay with a socialist delegation (while Viviani was meeting with the German ambassador) several hours before his assassination, threatening to write a new *J'accuse* article for August 1 denouncing the government for letting itself be dragged into war by the Russians. Ferry believed that such an article by Jaurès in *L'Humanité* might have affected the British decision to support the French and could well have prevented national unity.[2]

There is certainly contradictory testimony about Jaurès's thoughts and comments in the hours before he was assassinated. Jean-Jacques Becker admitted that people often hear what they want to hear, and any individual is capable of apparently contradictory expressions. Jaurès was certainly agitated and undoubtedly had conflicting thoughts in his last twenty-four hours. When he learned about the Russian mobilization on the morning of July 31, he acted desperately thereafter to save the peace. His final article for *L'Humanité* on July 31, written earlier, was replete with a call for workers to stay calm and rally for a diplomatic solution to the crisis which he assumed would play out over the coming weeks not days or hours. Once he saw the situation becoming catastrophic "one senses his growing exasperation with the government whose policies he found to be sluggish; he wanted to convince them not to permit themselves to be dragged into war by their Russian alliance." As Becker saw it, Jaurès was hoping against hope while those in power realized that the situation was slipping away. If he questioned the lack of firmness with which the government was defending the peace, he was not about to change the policy of the Socialist Party.[3]

Jean-Yves Le Naour, in his analysis of *L'Affaire Malvy*, recounts an August 1 Council of Ministers meeting the day after the assassination in which Poincaré mocked Viviani's naiveté over the German threat and talked about instigating a war if that is what it would take to fight.[4] On the other hand, historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle agreed with Becker in thinking that the French had behaved correctly throughout the July Crisis.[5] Even though most scholars emphasize how Germany recklessly risked a general war in their urge to support Austro-Hungarian actions against Serbia, historians Jean-Yves Mollier and Jocelyne George refer to French President Poincaré's righteous satisfaction at a situation that would make war almost impossible to avoid.[6] Hervé concurred with the idea that France was doing all that it could to avoid war during the July Crisis, and once the war began he would certainly suffer no talk about any French responsibility. In fact, he reassured both his readers and his own mother that France had done everything imaginable to prevent this war.[7]

"When war did come, it was almost accidental, and with no popular clamor," as Geoffrey Wheatcroft put it in a fairly recent book review. In his fascinating attempt to rethink the origins of the war Michael S. Neiberg described "The Great War" as "a creation of man", "a classic example of cabinet war" and not yet a popular war created by democratic states experiencing the impact of mass press, patriotic education, and chauvinism. In 1890, the contrary idea had been tersely expressed by none other than Helmuth von Moltke, the Younger (1848–1916), "the uncle and namesake of the general who led Germany's invasion of Belgium

and France in 1914," who said that "'the age of cabinet war is behind us—all we have now is people's war,'" words that Churchill borrowed even before 1914, adding presciently that democracy was more vindictive than autocracy and "'the wars of peoples will be more terrible than the wars of kings.'" On the other hand, "Neiberg argues that the Great War began as a 'classic cabinet war,' brought about by the decisions—or sometimes indecision—of a handful of men. Like a row of falling dominoes, Russia backed Serbia, then Germany seized the opportunity to humble Russia but hoped to knock out its French ally first, with a long-prepared invasion that went through neutral Belgium and thus provoked reluctant British intervention."[8] One wonders whether Nieberg went far enough in his provocative arguments. If World War I was a "classic cabinet war," if a handful a people decided or failed to decide things that made war virtually certain, and if the Germans were the main culprits in their decision-making, there is some evidence that French leaders like Poincaré and Delcassé were far from displeased by the events of August 1914, even if "France had no choice but to go to war."[9]

It was probably inevitable that the creator of Insurrectionalism offered to enlist in August 1914 and became a *jusqu'au boutiste*[10] in World War I once he saw the war as a crusade for liberty, justice, national self-determination, a German Republic, and a United States of Europe. Apparently Hervé first utilized the term "*jusqu'au bout*" on November 11, 1914, but he repeated it throughout the conflict.[11] "If one does not go 'to the bitter end' in this surgical operation which we are now starting to perform on Europe to get rid of the Austro-German militarist chancre, it will be necessary to begin all over again in ten years!"[12] Though his own enlistment was rejected, another more aesthetically-inclined, middle-aged writer, Charles Péguy, managed to enlist and then die a "blessed" death on September 5 during the Battle of the Marne.[13] While he prepared for war, Péguy was delighted to see Hervé and virtually the entire French Left ready to defend *la patrie*. "Hervé, leader of this socialist party which stood up to the last man, caused me to experience one of the greatest hours of my life."[14] Hervé's biographer, Gilles Heuré, noted the irony: "That was the ultimate homage by the author of *Notre Patrie* to that of *Leur Patrie* who had finally rejoined him."[15]

Not everyone was quite as enthusiastic as Péguy in welcoming Hervé into the national embrace. Writing in *L'Echo de Paris*, nationalist writer Maurice Barrès was only cautiously encouraged by such a transformation. "Whatever sort of patriot you are, Hervé, let your mind and all your being unite with the instinct of the nation, and do not miss the splendid occasion to improve yourself even more." In his wartime reminiscences, monarchist and integral nationalist Léon Daudet generally blamed bourgeois democracy along with socialism for disarming France in

1914, so he lumped Hervé with Jaurès for their subversive roles in sapping French morale. Nevertheless, Daudet was relieved that Hervé's "grand dawning" finally convinced him to admit antimilitarism's role in magnifying the dangers to France.[16]

Other royalists were less willing to forgive Hervé for his pre-war antimilitarist antics. Writing in *L'Action Française* in August 1914, Maurice Pujo was aghast that a neo-patriot like Hervé could speak well about German soldiers and offer his newspaper's services to foreigners, cosmopolites, and suspected spies. Pujo was disinclined to forgive a man whose fame had been earned by plotting to sabotage the defense of France. "It is painful for me to recall the sound of the same voice which so easily became ecstatic in telling tales about refusing to fight ..."[17] In early October 1915 the ultra-royalist Charles Maurras wrote an article entitled "Hervé or the Kraut fly" which not only assailed the lingering effects of Hervéism on troop morale but also castigated Hervé's exploitation of the war to sell newspapers and to make himself look like Saint Francis of Assisi. Maurras lamented the past destruction of the Bastille because such a place would have been an ideal convalescent center for "half-crazed" "malcontents" with a tendency to "melancholia" like Hervé.[18] On the eve of the Battle of Verdun, the conspiracy-minded Maurras still called Hervé "*Père la Défaite*" for his pre-war antimilitarism and his earlier polemics protecting the advertisements on French store windows which supposedly acted as secret enemy signals concocted through the machinations of spies. Maurras was convinced that the office of *La Guerre Sociale* was an agency for German-Austrian spies.[19] Throughout the war, well after Hervé's patriotism should have been beyond reproach even among nationalists, he met with lingering suspicions and even open hostility in some quarters. The anti-Semitic and nationalist *La Libre Parole*'s Jean Drault did not mince his words of rebuke directed toward Hervé. "[You displayed] the outright malice of joining the crowd in order to extinguish a fire which you have helped light! ... No one should forget that you were, along with Jaurès, one of those who worked for defeat."[20] The French police were more forgiving and certainly more perceptive. Fairly quickly, they took Hervé's patriotism seriously even if they thought that his humanitarian intentions sometimes made him a bit too critical in tone.[21] "In August 1915 the *Sûreté* did not fail to note that he indeed recognized that he had lost 'nearly half of his revolutionary readers'."[22]

Hostile critics could also be found on the Left. The Radical newspaper *La Lanterne* ridiculed Hervé's constantly changing views. How could anyone trust or take seriously someone like that![23] On the extreme Left even more hostile critics abounded. The exiled communist Leon Trotsky referred to "the self-satisfied, pseudo-revolutionary buffoon Hervé, [as an] ex-[anti] militarist fanatic, [who] changed his stripes and followed the same route" as Léon Jouhaux the president

of the C.G.T.[24] Yet Trotsky also attributed Hervé's wartime journalistic appeal and commercial success to his "robust optimism".[25] Exiled Russian anarchist Victor Serge called socialists like Hervé "clowns, nothing but clowns and [they say] 'they are not weathervanes which turn, rather it is the wind.'"[26] Among the most cutting insults thrown at Hervé were those of the gifted yet politically idiosyncratic writer, Urbain Gohier, who had once shared billing with him on *L'Affiche Rouge*. "'Kamarade Gustave Hervé … [was] … a former attorney, thrown off the bar. In a small school in the provinces, he made a mess of a half-dozen brats in telling them, just like a red parrot, about the reign of Dagobert and the infamies of Brunehaut.' Hatefully anti-Semitic, Gohier could see in Hervé only the 'agent of Israel.'"[27] In Roger Martin du Gard's Tolstoyan fresco of bourgeois life, *Les Thibault*, published between 1922 and 1940, one of the main characters is disgusted by such an apparent *volte-face* because "if people [like Hervé] … give out, how can the others hold out, the ordinary people, the masses …" Several of du Gard's characters used the defection of Hervé as symbolic of the complete collapse of antiwar feeling in France and all of Europe.[28]

Even though his views had been evolving for years, some people assumed that the main target of the 1905 *Affiche Rouge* trial had suddenly changed when he "applauded the *Affiche Blanche* of the mobilization."[29] That is certainly what President Raymond Poincaré wrote in his *Memoirs*.[30] In the *Histoire Générale de la Presse Française* Pierre Albert stated: "In the history of the War of 1914, the name Gustave Hervé generally evokes *le bourrage de crâne*[31] (cramming someone's head with pro-war propaganda) and patriotic fanfare," but such a simplification, while not totally inaccurate, demands a great deal of elaboration. Albert argued that the war led Hervé to evolve to nationalism. *La Guerre Sociale* became *La Victoire* on January 1, 1916 and "offered a curious mélange of socialist idealism and appeals to resistance against defeatism."[32] Such an assessment is clearly misleading since his chauvinism had been emerging for years. The war accelerated and altered Hervé's political transformation which had begun years before, but he found it impossible to fully relinquish the rhetoric of socialist idealism. In France almost no political position could afford to dismiss the French revolutionary tradition.

Syndicalist teachers Marie and François Mayoux did not consider *Le Sans Patrie*'s reversal to be that surprising because they understood that his shift was gradual and, in fact, preceded the war. For the Mayoux, Hervé's "… *revirement*, his denial, his bellicosity, his neo-patriotism …" were comparable to the shifts by other socialists, even if they thought his shift was more spectacular. "The Director of *La Guerre Sociale* discovered and made famous the expression *Changer son fusil d'épaule*. People used to say *Retourner sa veste*. Two images, the same meaning. … [Such action

amounted to] 'burning what one has adored and adoring what one has burned'. Even before the war, Hervé was already primed to praise repopulation and other warlike nonsense."[33] In his *Histoire de l'Arrière* Charles Fraval noted how on the eve of the war the former *Sans Patrie* recommended that France never fight for reactionary Russia, but when war seemed inevitable, he rejected his Insurrectional methods to prevent war and supported the national defense. Instead of trying to arouse the Left to sabotage the mobilization, the director of *La Guerre Sociale* told the Left: "'Let's do nothing and hope for the best.' The complete Hervé resides in that jest ... Hervé changed his red jacket so that it now showed its tricolor lining." The same volume also included an artist's sketch of the former *Sans Patrie* as a chameleon.[34]

In rejecting Hervé's offer to enlist, the Minister of War Adolphe Messimy told him to man the barricades at 56, Rue du Faubourg Saint Denis, the site of the newspaper's offices in the press district of central Paris at the start of the war, as the best means to serve the national defense. With his orders in place, Hervé had no intention of retreating in the face of danger as several other newspapers decided to do when the Germans approached Paris in September 1914 before the Battle of the Marne.[35] "Do I need to say that *La Guerre Sociale* will stay at its combat post? Let the other newspapers move out, that's their business. We will stay in place ... The Minister of War did not want me to go to the frontier five weeks ago. So the frontier came to me. The frontier is close to us; it is only fifty kilometers from Paris. Would I leave? As long as the tricolor floats over Paris—Pardon me this infidelity, Oh red flag of the International!—, *La Guerre Sociale* will remain at its combat post to sound the alarm: 'there is business to finish up here.'"[36]

If some of Hervé's rhetoric seemed to spring directly from the notebooks of Lieutenant Colonel Louis Loyzeaux de Grandmaison, the Chief of Operations for the General Staff before the war who was an "eloquent spokesman of an updated philosophy of the offensive at all costs," Hervé never believed that the war would be over by Christmas.[37] The French certainly had evidence that something like the Schlieffen Plan was to be expected, but "this contradicted their own views, and was therefore impossible." General Grandmaison assumed that "'psychological factors are paramount in combat ... for all others—weaponry, manoeuvrability—influence only indirectly by provoking moral reactions.' The French soldier, combining inbred national superiority with resolute leadership, could smash the German army, irrespective of its numbers, fortresses and firepower. 'The character of our soldiers adapts itself marvelously to present requirements. Numbers no longer decide victory.'"[38]

If Hervé idealized French soldiers at the Marne with an unctuous rhetoric that would continue throughout the war, he also saw himself as a civilian military

expert and a member of the "watchdog press" whose goal was to help correct governmental and military abuses and errors. Still much of his wartime writing fits Paul Fussell's insights concerning the heroic myths and assumptions about war that undoubtedly made such a conflagration more likely and allowed it to continue.[39] Apparently, even a former antimilitarist could neither transcend his schoolboy obsessions with military history, nor avoid drawing upon romantic rhetoric in discussing war. A September 1914 editorial typifies such rhetoric even while utilizing a bit of his old antimilitarism for inspiration, now employed ironically to bolster the war effort. "The soldiers of Brittany, non-believers without any rosaries, happy to die for the Republic … They left for war saying: 'This is the last of wars! This is the war for universal peace! This is the holy war which will annihilate Prussian militarism! This is the war, after which, in all of Europe, men will be able to consecrate for works of life, solidarity, and education, the billions which have been wasted for forty-three years on works of death, since the hegemony of Prussian militarism."[40] Such a description of French soldiers' mentality even at the beginning of the war was undoubtedly pure literature,[41] but soldiers themselves sometimes interpreted the war in meliorist, religious, and even millenarian terms. From the perspective of *les poilus*, only those who experienced the Front first-hand were privileged to employ such heroic rhetoric in a genuine way; journalists like Hervé could only exploit the courage of others for propaganda purposes.[42]

Touching on themes and insights developed by Fussell, Catharine Savage Brosman saw World War I as a great break, but far from the first one, in ideas about romantic war and the heroism of exceptional individuals. The scale and nature of modern war made traditional heroism harder to depict and war itself increasingly meaningless due to the chaos and disorder inherent in mechanized and increasingly anonymous battle. Eventually this would be reflected in war literature, though an iconoclastic scholar like Niall Ferguson might beg to differ.[43] Brosman described how "[Henri] Barbusse finds the war's meaning only by depriving it of meaning: nothing about the experience in the trenches makes any sense: the war seems justified only by the hope that the war's very horror will make future conflicts unthinkable …"[44] Hervé's editorials employed a binary vision which explained the war in terms of a moral and teleological narrative that simply transformed and reversed some of his socialist tropes and rhetoric into a chauvinistic account. Questioning, decoding, or deconstructing the idea of battle, the concept of the hero, or the intelligibility of war itself was simply alien to Hervé's reversible, yet inevitably dualistic, universe.

"General" Hervé could not have been completely ignorant of the reality of the Front, but he was unable or unwilling to describe that reality, much less invent

a new vocabulary with which to explain it.[45] His writing may have kept up civilian morale for a while but eventually it helped to create "a veritable rupture in the nation between the combatants and the civilians" because such accounts of war were increasingly ridiculed at the front.[46] Though Hervé's glorification of battle led the military to encourage soldiers to read him after 1915, his criticism of abuses and concern for *les poilus* never ended. Ironically, in the account of Jean-Jacques Becker, *La Guerre Sociale*, in comparison to the excesses of its rivals, "was, contrary to appearances, one of the few French journals to show some temperance."[47] Such an assessment should underscore the vast gap between Parisian press offices and the Front, even though *les poilus* remained avid readers of the Parisian press despite the inveterate *bourrage de crâne*.[48]

Though the war did not cause Herve's shift in views, it had a major impact on his increasing chauvinism and evolution toward a version of national socialism which eventually echoed features of fascism. However, there is more to be gained from studying Hervé than simply documenting his evolving views. As a journalist he played an important role commenting on wartime events and criticizing abuses associated with government inefficiency, French xenophobia, and military ineptitude. His editorials had an impact on key officials during the conflict, yet in many ways he echoed popular reactions to the seismic events. From the July Crisis and the First Battle of the Marne, through the "race to the sea", the initial offensives, and the titanic battles of Verdun, the Somme, the Chemin des Dames as well as the resultant troubles in the French armies until the final collapse of Ludendorff's offensives of 1918, Hervé's editorials usually reflected the general mood, but sometimes they expressed unique perspectives. As a skilled writer with pre-war notoriety, his editorials, coming at such critical junctures, reverberated throughout newspapers across the political spectrum. His comments "rang out" even if they did not always "ring true," on subjects ranging from the Western Front to the Home Front, from the socialist response to the war to the gradual splintering of the Left under the pressure of events. Former friends often became rivals if not enemies; and former enemies sometimes found it impossible to embrace a recent revolutionary antimilitarist. Hervé's wartime writing drew reactions from prominent Frenchmen like Péguy (however briefly), Poincaré, and Pétain as well as from average French *poilus*, and he had direct contacts with influential men such as Briand, Caillaux, Gallieni, and Malvy during the war. By examining Hervé's wartime editorials and the reactions to them, one sees his evolving perspectives as well as the state of wartime France, even if the trenches generally remained enveloped in hazy rhetoric.

With his team of journalists scattered by the war after having been decimated by his earlier shifts in views and the concomitant loss of circulation, it was not

surprising that *La Guerre Sociale* took on a slightly different hue during the conflagration. The newspaper often seemed so conciliatory toward the authorities that it was increasingly suspected of receiving secret government funding. Always on the prowl for secret machinations from his perch at *L'Action Française*, in late 1915 Léon Daudet accused *La Guerre Sociale* of having ties to the *Sûreté Générale* even though the royalist admitted that he had uncovered no secret plots.[49] In truth, *La Guerre Sociale* was rather well-connected to men in high places. In mid-August 1914 Hervé went to see Minister of the Interior Malvy in order to complain about his revolutionary friends who as foreigners were being held prisoner due to the supposed danger that they would sabotage the mobilization. In mid-September he went to see the Minister of Justice Briand about the same matter and was promised that his friends would be released the next day.[50]

The *Union Sacrée* had an overwhelming impact on Hervé. One early editorial reassured his mother and the mothers of France about unity and confidence. In contrasting the events of 1870 with those of 1914, Hervé was deeply moved and amazed by the national concord. "This time, everybody is on the move: the royalists, the Bonapartists, and the nationalists are all almost as enraged as we, '*Les Sans-Patries*', who are, as I have explained to you a thousand times, among the best patriots. You cannot imagine to what degree the national union has been made, to what extent it is complete." Once the war began Hervé sought to reduce his anticlericalism. He was especially deferential to French Catholics, seeing a common idealism among socialists, republicans, and Catholics. In the same editorial he described a recent dinner with Abbé Colin, the leader of the Catholic party of Lorraine. The former Insurrectional firebrand was quite amazed by the mutual affection displayed by such former antagonists.[51] In Holy Week during the first year of the war, while reporting on efforts by a well-known *cheminot* leader to support all French war orphans, Herve used the occasion to recall the mission of Saint Vincent de Paul.[52] Among his most cutting pre-war critics was the Catholic nationalist and idealistic socialist, Charles Péguy, whose death in combat in September 1914 prompted an editorial by Hervé, whose terms may have been "less laudatory than those of Barrès, but were obviously sincere: 'Charles Péguy was a very great soul. He deserved this beautiful death.'"[53]

For Gilles Heuré, Hervé was generally not guilty of overusing words like "France", "God", "victory", "soul", "confidence", or "patrie", unlike Albert de Mun who wrote in *L'Echo de Paris*. Nevertheless, the editor of *La Guerre Sociale* believed that "history was on the march" in this war which was "the hour of greatness", "the last of all wars", and he assumed that France possessed superior moral force over the Prussian Junker invaders. His intensifying patriotic rhetoric could

be employed on the most unexpected occasions. In August 1914 he virtually dedicated the fleeting victory at Mulhouse to Paul Déroulède in terms that would have caused the founder of the *Ligue des Patriotes* either to cringe or gasp in amazement at such language from the former *Sans Patrie*.[54]

In the excitement of impending battles, Hervé had no trouble reconciling with almost everyone. Early in the war Hervé and Maurice Barrès exchanged courteous comments on religious issues which the former Insurrectional hoped could be dealt with after the war as long as "the secular education laws were not touched." He made amends, however obliquely, with many former adversaries including Poincaré who as Prime Minister had pardoned Hervé in 1912 delivering him from "the furnished hotels of the Republic." Upon leaving prison in July 1912, Hervé had greeted Poincaré with a headline including *le mot de Cambronne*,[55] and as late as July 1914 he referred to him as "our hilarious President." Now he rejoiced that France had such a President. On August 18, 1914 he admitted to having already reconciled with the perennial *ministrable* and "renegade" Briand, the man who had mobilized the *cheminots* in 1910. With France fighting for her life, Hervé acknowledged Briand's virtues despite having called him a "villainous character" and a "human rag" not that long before.[56] His truce with Clemenceau began developing even before the war as was evident in his mid-July 1914 editorial: "One may perhaps find me naïve but when I read each morning the articles of Clemenceau [in *L'Homme Libre*], I ask myself—despite Narbonne, despite Villeneuve-Saint Georges, despite Métivier—is this a bastard?"[57]

Though Hervé had quickly shown signs of seeking to reduce his longstanding anticlericalism, events could temporarily make him regress in rage against religious excess.[58] Even the *Union Sacrée* did not prevent him from engaging in anticlerical polemics after Maurice Barrès in *L'Echo de Paris* defended the excessive zeal of religious medical staff members who prosyletized non-believing soldiers. Hervé attacked the fervor of Christian doctors and nurses who were not content to save the bodies of wounded soldiers. Such noble ardor went too far according to Hervé when religious zealots tried to hang religious medals all over the clothing of the wounded Jews, Protestants, and unbelievers *jusqu'à la braguette*, the zippers of men trousers. The one time advocate of the *culte de moi* and later champion of rootedness and *revanche* defended religion by accurately accusing Hervé of once again trying to scandalize the public. The former *Sans Patrie* defended his scandalous image by claiming that he was merely trying to create more discretion and toleration by Catholics for wounded soldiers and free-thinking members of the medical profession. He told Barrès that the age of religious superstition was over and that the post-war era would be marked by a formidable democratic and



Figure 33. Président de la République Raymond Poincaré (1860–1934) decorates some *poilus* sometime during World War I. Bnf.

secular push to the Left. National concord after the war was Hervé's goal, but he warned Catholics not to attack the French heritage of Enlightenment and the Revolution. At this point Hervé still seemed to believe that Republican idealism, patriotism, and social justice created a more profound faith than traditional religious faith.[59] Hervé's lingering anticlericalism was pragmatic in another sense as well because he accused the papacy of a pro-Austrian policy and of trying to keep Italy out of the war. To the editor-in-chief of *La Guerre Sociale*, the pope wanted to use a German-Austrian victory to try to regain his temporal powers.[60] Even after Italy's entrance into the war, Hervé attacked any efforts by the papacy to create a peace based on a *status quo ante bellum*. Of course, Hervé's attitudes toward the papacy were not antithetical to the views of most Frenchmen, including many French clergy, who were also troubled by the neutrality of the Holy See in what most Frenchmen saw as a struggle between good and evil.[61]

After years of using his own ethnic stereotyping to warn about the threat of the German menace, Hervé still found it impossible to accept the racial anti-Germanism employed by some prominent writers including his former lieutenant Almereyda.[62] In the opening phase of the war, Hervé tried to inoculate himself against the nationalistic contagion and rampant xenophobia of writers like Maurice Barrès and Paul Bourget, yet his rhetoric was often excessive. In describing the Battle of the Marne as a new Valmy, Hervé called on the author of *Faust* to bear witness and sanction the new age being born. "Goethe is not dead; if you are worthy of listening, he will tell you: 'Rejoice, Prussian militarism is about to be struck dead. A new era is about to begin on the earth for men of good will. In these days, in these places, welcome the dawn of the United States of Europe!'"[63]

His articles continued to draw on historical precedents to inspire the nation in war. Even before the Marne he recalled the humiliation of Sedan by employing a chauvinistic bravura and romantic images of battle to extol the virtues of current *poilus*.[64] "Our good lads of twenty, twenty-one, and twenty two years of age have been superb. For 43 years we have had that [humiliation] weighing on us. That has been a hurricane. At five-hundred meters from the enemy, it was impossible to hold them back. They ran like crazed devils, bayonets on their rifles, not hearing any order … And what a beautiful death for the young lads, who, on the threshold of their lives, have joyously offered themselves as a holocaust, for the safety of all!"[65] Hervé could not grieve too much for mothers of French soldiers because their sons were about to win immortality.[66] "'Happily we have mothers who have not raised wet chickens' being guarded by the 75 millimeter *cannon*." His articles also drew on the historical authority of the French Revolution by referring to glorious battles and illustrious marshals whose legendary and immortal patriotism

foreshadowed the current exploits of French soldiers. Even the Paris Commune, minus the socialist allusions, became a reference point in Hervé's efforts to instill patriotic Insurrectional ardor into *les poilus*.[67]

La Guerre Sociale issued daily special editions during the July Crisis, but it officially became a daily paper only on August 6, 1914. Due to a restricted paper supply, Hervé's newspaper, like almost all dailies during the war, was often reduced to two pages. Staff reductions, limited information, and fear of the censor meant that the quality of the French press declined during the war.[68] The profound renewal of the French press may have been interrupted by the war, but Hervé seemed to get new life during the conflagration because the paper had lost much of its uniqueness, creativity, and identity during his transformation.[69] The sensational and polarized nature of war fit Hervé's journalistic style. Excitement and conflict now came from an external threat rather than sensational prewar domestic events often generated by the Hervéists themselves. War promoted national solidarity and newspaper circulation.

Hervé's acceptance of the *Union Sacrée* would never mean that he would remain silent before incompetence, mismanagement, or injustices. Assuming that the press must disclose problems in order to correct them, especially in wartime, Hervé echoed the platitudes about the "watchdog" press keeping France vigilant. In his parlance the press was both a "safety valve" and a means to correct abuses. He accepted the need for censorship in wartime, but, like most journalists, he believed it ought to apply strictly to military information.[70] For him, hiding the truth from the public prior to the Battle of the Marne damaged morale by sowing nearly disastrous panic once citizens realized that the Germans were "at the gates" of Paris.[71] Hervé sarcastically stated that he had been censored because he had revealed the military secret that the Marne was a tributary of the Seine. "There was a great battle eight days ago on the Marne. The Marne—do I dare say it without incurring the wrath of the censor?—is a tributary of the Seine, which—dare I say it?—passes through Paris. Without giving up any national defense secret, I believe that I can say that a part of the Marne battlefield is not far from Paris."[72]

Though patriotism initially may have made him docile, "the censor rapidly furnished him with reasons for indiscipline. Obviously, in wartime most people agree that certain information had to be protected." Even a man like Clemenceau, who often ran afoul of the censor as much as Hervé, in his initial wartime articles in *L'Homme Libre* expressed the wish to avoid the "*folie obsidionale*" of 1870 when the press recklessly published all sorts of wild stories and rumors as news. In fact, a law enacted on August 5, 1914 did much to limit wartime journalistic indiscretions by banning the publication of military information unless there was

prior approval. "From the beginning of August, Hervé reprimanded readers who complained of the lack of news, and he agreed to don his '*képi d'ordonnance*' to immediately request that he and his fellow journalists not be pushed into saying that 'the moon is made of green cheese.'" Though Hervé took his civic duties and professional code of ethics to heart, he along with many other journalists soon found it necessary to push back against the censor.[73]

At one point he was involved in a collective response against the censor instigated by the *Syndicat de la Presse Parisien*. Though he came to sympathize with the censors as "poor fellows who have to check 10 to 15 papers a night", that may have been because he had actually met with the chief censor at the latter's invitation in January 1916. One of Hervé's recurring ethnic stereotypes actually lent some support for the need of a censor. His repeated characterization of the French as courageous but impatient and nervous made him accept the necessity of soothing the French temperament in critical situations.[74] For Becker: "To the question: how could so excitable and so volatile a nation show so much constancy during so protracted a war, our analysis of the censors' procedure bring [sic] the first glimmer of an answer: there is no doubt that by leaving it in ignorance of the gravity of certain military defeats, of diplomatic failures, and of the horrors of war, censorship went a long way towards helping the French civilian front to stand firm."[75]

For multiple reasons in the first weeks of the war, the censors seldom intervened. They were not yet fully organized, the press acted with self-discipline, and there was a dearth of news. Initially, there were few problems because the war was expected to be brief and journalists accepted the presumed, temporary restrictions. By the last ten days of September, the censors began to intervene with increasing frequency. Censorship varied with the character of a newspaper. Thus, an important daily like the moderate *Le Temps*, with its large staff of international correspondents, was censored primarily in articles dealing with diplomacy. "*La Guerre Sociale*, for its part, suffered for the polemical ardor of its editor, and the censors' intervention here was more of a political nature. A paper like *Le Petit Parisien*, which confined itself to major news, was less vulnerable."[76] Throughout the war, *La Guerre Sociale* "... would publish a small rubric, adorned with a drawing showing Hervé facing Madame Anastasie [she was the symbol of the censor because of her legendary scissors], entitled 'Can you read it?'"[77] At times Hervé played a virtual "cat and mouse" game with the censor. Whenever he failed to take notice of the warnings which came his way, rounds of reproaches and summons could ensue. If he felt that an article was censored or an issue seized unjustifiably, he might republish the offending articles within days, a practice that often irritated rival papers.

On June 11, 1915 *La Lanterne* angrily described such illicit republication as arrogant. These actions by *La Guerre Sociale* were risky because, if the censor's instructions were not acted on, a paper could be seized. In early June 1915 there were four seizures of the paper due to articles criticizing the General Staff and health conditions in the army. That action led to futile efforts by Hervé to use his "100,000" readers as leverage against the censor's suspensions.[78] Yet Charles Maurras in *L'Action Française* bemoaned that Hervé had become a virtual "state within a state" because he was treated differently than papers like *L'Homme Libre*, *Le Libre Parole*, the Parisian *L'Éclair*, *L'Indépendant des Pyrénées-Orientales*, and *L'Éclair* of Montpellier. "I repeat that Hervé has become a privileged person. That will have been one of the bitterest gaieties of this sad war. M. Gustave Hervé is dominating it. M. Gustave Hervé is causing fear."[79]

Hervé's hostility toward the censor gradually changed during the war.[80] In 1915, following serious censorship problems in June, Hervé's accounts gradually became more acceptable to the censor. After the mutinies of May and June 1917, the growth of defeatism, the disclosures of treason, and the Bolshevik Revolution, Hervé exhibited greater forbearance of the censor.[81] Censorship certainly entailed negative and counterproductive features, some of which the former *Sans Patrie* alluded to even as he came to fit into the evolving journalistic requirements of wartime.

One seminal study on the French press concluded:

> "A reading of newspapers of that epoch leaves a curious impression of misunderstandings: their conformism, their optimism barely affected by actuality, their naiveté, their manner of writing about life at the front is such a contrast to the realities of war that it seems impossible that opinion could accept their testimony without reacting. In fact, studies of public opinion of the period show that from 1915 on civilians were less and less credulous. To continue to make the propaganda heard, it had to become more subtle and more insistent … Compromised in the service of propaganda either out of duty or unconsciously, the French press during the war lost the quasi-instinctive confidence which readers had previously accorded to it."

Given that record, Pierre Albert argued that patriotism, censorship, and journalistic talent combined to push the French press to discover the rules of modern propaganda which the post-war totalitarian regimes merely had to systematize.[82] For Paul Fussell, "A lifelong suspicion of the press was one lasting result of the ordinary man's experience of the war."[83]

Hervé's editorials generally met French propaganda needs, but he also attempted to ameliorate soldiers' grievances. His efforts included zealous support of programs and charities aiding war French ophans. After interviewing front-line

soldiers on leave, he called for periodic reunions with their families. His newspaper offices helped French and Belgian soldiers on furlough get money and find housing with Parisian families. Whether troops appreciated Hervé's efforts to save them from the evils of alcohol and prostitution is questionable, but homeless *permissionnaires* on the streets of Paris must have welcomed the material aid.[84] From the very beginning of hostilities, the former insurrectional "General" admitted that his office was inundated with visitors ready to help *les poilus* in various ways. As the first winter of the war approached, when Hervé heard that there were foreign volunteers being sent to the front despite a shortage of underwear, he called on his readers to make donations to the troops even if that meant giving some of their used underwear.[85] His campaign for needy soldiers continued into 1915 as he collected money for *poilus* on leave "who had been reduced to the level of stray dogs." Such solicitude undoubtedly was inspired and sustained by countless reports and personal testimony which constantly came to the newspaper.[86]

From the first days of the war, Hervé expected a long and difficult war, but he still managed to preserve his ideals of international brotherhood during the initial carnage. In fact, he never abandoned those ideals completely, but they were soon overwhelmed by more pressing concerns for national preservation. Heuré claimed that although Hervé became "completely patriotic," he "was never subject to an excess of nationalism."[87] Early in the war several articles displayed his continuing internationalism by defending the Swiss Maggi dairies, Alsacian brasseries, and foreign visitors in general from xenophobic assaults by would-be patriots like Léon Daudet of *L'Action Française*. The owners of the Swiss-French Maggi firm were accused of being spies because the numbers on their advertising posters were supposed to have been "secret codes" for "other" German spies. Hervé called such hysterical behavior by patriotic pillagers a threat to France itself. Such imbecilic actions made him ashamed of being French because it was necessary for shops to paste their military identifications papers on their storefronts to avoid popular frenzy. Eventually, Hervé published a list of the dairy owners, both Swiss and French, and he explained the banal function of the incriminating numerical codes, following an interview with a company representative, all in an effort to exonerate the company.[88]

With such regressive Gallic behavior rampant, Hervé worried about the fates of various minority groups: Poles in Northern France, as well as Jews, Belgians, and Turkish residents of France. He also singled out Austrian students at the Sorbonne, German prisoners, and other German visitors who happened to be in France at the outbreak of the war. He believed "... that the children of German women are also our children."[89] *La Guerre Sociale* called on French families to help such victims of the war if they could vouch for their conduct and if they could give them a place

to live so that refugees would not have to be sent to detention camps in the West of France. Hervé argued that young Austrian students at the Sorbonne ought to have been sent home by way of Switzerland so that they could be returned "to their mothers."[90] In several post-war articles including one following the French defeat in 1940, Hervé reported how in August 1914 he opened up his apartment to a young German woman and her eight-year old daughter who could not get into a hotel at the start of the war. After the mobilization, he saw that mother and child got a safe passage to Bavaria via Switzerland. He also described how thousands of Germans had queued up at his paper's offices where they received help from the remnants of the J.G.R. to get to their local police *commissaires* or the prefecture itself to assist in their registration and protection.[91] Such "French hospitality" was not well-received by the integral nationalists at *L'Action Française* who were ever vigilant regarding such foreign *métèques*.[92] On August 19, 1914 Hervé was barely joking when he pondered the actions he might have to take, in the unlikely event of his becoming military governor, in order to deal with such dangerous xenophobia.[93]

Gilles Heuré demonstrates how such lingering internationalism eventually gave way to an assessment of foreigners based on their support for France.[94] During the war Leon Trotsky pointed out the intransigence inherent in Hervé's "ideology of national defense … [which] reduced the right of republican asylum to evidence of political loyalty."[95] In late November 1915 the former *Sans Patrie* wrote an article titled "The Russian Jews in Paris" which expressed agitation at exiled revolutionaries who employ "a propaganda which appears to us, to everyone, like pro-German propaganda."[96] Hervé was troubled by the "Russian Jews'" excessively open advocacy of peace. Though he did not want them expelled, he still hoped that they would soon be led by people who could keep them in line with actions as well as words. If Hervé's humanism was becoming stretched thin, he was ever mindful of French diplomatic needs in assessing the treatment of foreigners. He worried that the persecution of non-French Jewish revolutionaries in Paris might upset "American Jews" who could pressure their government to the detriment of French interests.[97]

The war played a major role in placing Hervé definitively "among the cohort of French journalists whose opinions counted, and who were representative of a large part of opinion. He was, indeed, part of that *'Republique des camarades'* about whom Robert [de] Jouvenel spoke to designate political and polemical journalists."[98] An astute observer like the writer Roger Martin du Gard was initially quite positive about Hervé's reactions during the war. While the future author of *Jean Barois* was in uniform and a bit bored at Vitry-le-François at the commencement of the eighth month of war, he advised his wife to buy and read *La Guerre Sociale* daily because she "would understand quite a few things." Hervé's articles were

"very clear, very wise, and very just. Every day he answers the article of Barrès, with much rationality and calm. That is excellent current journalism, and I have not found the equivalent anywhere else. I would be pleased to know that you are up to date on all that one must understand right now. And this will be a useful counterweight to this atmosphere."[99] A year and a half later the glimmer had worn off Hervé's editorials for the future Nobel Prize winner who then argued that the editor of *La Victoire* had lost much "of his originality and wisdom".[100] Hervé by then seemed like most of the other famous journalists of the era, including Barrès, Bourget, Clemenceau, Joseph Reinach, and Ernest Lavisse. "They are all steeped in the same universal folly. They say the same words, brandish the same amulets, the same dull stuff ... And Gide, Claudel, Suarèz, Sagaret, it's all the same."[101] As noted above, after the war Hervé gained a bit of negative literary immortality in several less than flattering references in Martin du Gard's *Les Thibault*.[102]

For literary critic and novelist André Maurel, Hervé could also be registered among "war writers" including Clemenceau, Barrès, Reinach, Maurras, and de Mun, whose daily commentaries on events mattered.[103] Hervé's secret, according to Maurel, was that he wrote what he thought in his daily lead editorials with no particular system at all. "He lives day to day, saying what he thinks today at the risk of contradicting himself tomorrow."[104] His originality was his sincerity. His readers never failed to know his feelings. "One smiles about it, still, every day. M. Gustave Hervé has become the preferred journalist of the French bourgeoisie who find in him their oracle and interpreter. Each morning the man of the 'flag in the dungpile' responded to the ideas of those he wanted to disembowel ..."[105] For all his ranting, Hervé generally made a lot of sense, thought Maurel. "Above all, Gustave Hervé is an excellent journalist; ..., he does not check the pulse of opinion to register its throbbing, like Maurice Barrès, he beats with it, and he tells it: 'this is what you think, want, suffer, and sing.'"[106]

Not everyone was positively impressed with Hervé's wartime journalism. Speaking about the tendency of almost all European socialists to act like social-patriots and "bastards" in wartime, Leon Trotsky, unsurprisingly, found it appropriate to assail Hervé as the "oracle of the *concièrges*."[107] Among his harshest critics was former friend and associate, Aristide Jobert, who described Hervé's newspaper as being read with blessings by "the reactionaries, the nobles, the old dowagers, the practicing Catholics, and the ultra-patriots."[108] His boyhood mate, the anarchist, pacifist, and Breton nationalist, Émile Masson, kept his subscription to *La Guerre Sociale* during the war but for him *la patrie* was becoming an ever more vile blood sucker. Though Masson still loved his Breton schoolmate, his respect had withered. In fact, Hervé never answered Masson's letters at the beginning of the war, perhaps

recognizing the vast gap separating their positions. Since Masson had become disgusted with the pure materialism and utter casualness with which so many in the rear accustomed themselves to the slaughter at the front, Hervé's editorials had become increasingly difficult to digest. Though he continued to feel close to the former *Sans Patrie*, the latter's *revirement* was so upsetting that reading *La Guerre Sociale* troubled him greatly.[109] Actually, despite his own assiduous newspaper reading, Masson had long claimed that newspapers were "the conscious and calculated symbols of popular cretinism."[110] "I read the newspapers—and particularly *la Garce sociale* [the social bitch or slut] … one minute before wiping my ass with it."[111]

Masson was amazed and delighted that his breach with his fellow Brestois had been almost miraculously replaced during the war with contact with the famous pacifist writer Romain Rolland who assailed the war "*Au dessus de la mêlée*" in exile for *Le Journal de Genève*.[112] During the war Masson claimed: "I love Gustave as much as ever. For the last twenty-five years I had always foreseen two things for him. Either he would die from a rifle shot because he would forcefully shove that military hogwash in the face of his superiors or he would swallow it with piety and gratitude after being tonsured, at the end of a chain." In the end Masson saw Hervé as a good and decent fellow but only that. "There was not the least intellectual originality." As the biographers of Masson, J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, explained it, truth mattered to Masson more than friendships.[113] He and Hervé had stopped understanding one another by early 1913 and the war separated their ideas even more.

While dining weekly early in the war with the prominent, retired Sorbonne professor and former editor in chief of *Le Courier Européen*, the free thinker, pacifist, and socialist, Gabriel Paix-Séailles,[114] Masson witnessed the latter's admiration for the "unshakeable confidence and comforting good humor" of the editor of *La Guerre Sociale*. Masson, increasingly an admirer of Tolstoy and Thoreau, was amazed and aghast to hear that his close friend Gustave was now on such good terms with General Gallieni, the military governor of Paris. Masson described Hervé as profoundly naïve and easily prey to silly blunders.[115] After he learned that Séailles would soon be writing alongside Hervé, Masson noted the ironies of his personal ties with such friends who were evolving so drastically. "Since April [1915] I have not even seen the color of *La Guerre Sociale* and I cannot bear the sight of it. I wrote to Séailles and to Hervé that if they wished to give me some pleasure, they had only to dispense me from the friendly obligation of reading their writing. I know the two of them intimately, and it was I who formerly put them into contact with one another. At that time I conciliated them; Séailles treated Hervé as a 'Beotian.' Today, they breakfast together every Thursday calling me a 'mystic' and a 'poet' behind my back, which I am to them!"[116]

During the war the French press became the vehicle for propaganda and generally unreflective national support, and it usually deferred to the views and challenges of its star editorialists. "Nevertheless, paying the homage that 'virtue bestows on vice,' a writer at *L'Action Française* admitted … that those who wished to be informed by someone other than the General Staff read the newspapers of Hervé and Clemenceau 'due to the indiscretions.' In the socialist trenches, one read the CQFD[117] of Sébastien Faure or *Le Canard Énchaîné*, like Lucien Juventy, who also received LTS [*Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne*]." Hervé's editorials were also available abroad. In the United States *The New York Times* often prominently displayed his articles in its daily summary of the French press. The use of such editorials seemed justified since *La Guerre Sociale* had reached a circulation of 80,000 at the commencement of hostilities.[118] When the noted former Progressive, Republican Senator from Indiana Albert J. Beveridge was on a European tour, he found it fitting to meet with Hervé, a clear indication of the enhanced wartime stature of the former *Sans Patrie*.[119]

Though Hervé was never afraid to disagree with official policies or to criticize bureaucratic evils, gradually his articles became almost pure chauvinism, crowding out most of the remnants of universal brotherhood.[120] In 1915 a former Hervéist named Maurice Maréchal founded *Le Canard Enchainé* which later conducted a satirical referendum seeking to discover the greatest leader of the tribe of *Bourreurs de Crâne*, the "big chief of the tribe of eyewashers" or "those who cram the brains of the gullible with hogwash". That referendum asked: "Who, in your understanding, among all the journalists putting themselves daily in the starring role, merits, in all respects, the title of Big Chief?" Hervé was proclaimed the victor on June 20, 1917 by 5653 votes over his nearest competitor, Maurice Barrès.[121] If Hervé's editorials became more subtle in their propaganda and chauvinism as the war dragged on, as was evident in much of the Parisian press, the aforementioned survey did not reflect it.[122]

Michel Baumont, after analyzing Hervé's writings in the first three months of the war, called him "less and less a socialist and more and more a Jacobin; he was always suspect of anarchic individualism … and more than one socialist reacted in an analogous fashion."[123] In writing in 1917 about the great French writers of *la grande guerre*, André Maurel incorrectly predicted that Hervé would never be anti-Republican or against secularization. He characterized Hervé, even at that late date, as on the front line of anticlericalism and antiroyalism.[124] How was such a false prognostication possible? Clearly, Hervé's attempt to preserve socialist idealism by using the rhetoric of a sacred and altruistic war was partly a means of rationalizing the carnage. His experiences in education and politics as a socialist

could not be cancelled completely even by a Great War. Hervé preserved at least the rhetoric of social justice and internationalism even while his ideological position reversed itself. Maurel believed that Hervé was simply another Frenchman who had begun in anarchism only to pass to moderation by way of socialism.[125] Of course, such was not to be the case. Hervé may have become "the voice" of some bourgeois patriots, as Maurel stated. He may have reacted to events the way the average person did, spontaneously, naively, and without a system. He certainly gave the public the simplicity and clarity which it demanded as he expressed his successive reactions and emotions. Ostensibly seeking to channel French opinion, Hervé was a barometer of that opinion. He could quickly reverse himself because his thoughts and feelings spontaneously reacted to new events.[126]

Hervé sincerely and instinctively reflected events as they happened, but he was perpetually in search of "the truth" and an explanatory system which he did not possess. He was not just another example of a revolutionary idealist becoming a moderate; he remained an idealist and a potential extremist in need of a system to order a chaotic reality. Perhaps he sought a system, in part, to channel, justify, and organize his volatile reactions. *Pace* Maurel, the founder of Insurrectionalism was capable of acting moderately and supporting moderate positions; he could never become a moderate.[127] His former lieutenant Victor Méric argued that Hervé needed a faith to survive and to make sense of events.[128] He was Hoffer's "true believer" personified, a political animal who sought systems to create order and meaning.[129] His political stances often seemed tied to the moment, and the belief systems he discovered or developed could seem quite pragmatic and opportunistic, but his views were based on ardently held beliefs, however changeable they appear in hindsight. If Hervé did not possess the personality or originality necessary to create a new political formula, his contrary ideological positions were united by certain common attitudes, themes, and values.

In his youth Hervé had been fascinated by military history; the war gave "General" Hervé a chance to try his hand at military strategy at least for his readers. "With his chinstrap on, Hervé improvised quickly to become a strategist. Contrary to his fellow journalists, who generally called on an officer to intervene on military matters, he did not allow anyone else the responsibility. Throughout the war, he delivered his analyses under a rubric entitled 'Reflections of a Simple Soldier.'"[130] In 1916 Parisian journalist Jean Ajalbert argued that Hervé had "become the most assured writer on national defense. In troubled days, he projected fire."[131] Hervé was certainly loyal to all French leaders and generals in command, but once he detected evidence of flagrant error or incompetence, he used his forum to pressure French military chiefs to correct their "mistakes." As early as August 6–7, 1914, he

predicted a German attack through Belgium.[132] Almost immediately, he assumed that the war would not be just a sudden lightning affair. "We are approaching the fearsome hour of the greatest slaughters in modern times." He quickly looked to the East where he expected a Russian offensive to bring relief from the German onslaught in the West.[133] Hervé's early optimism about the Czar's promises of social and political reforms was connected to beliefs shared by other French patriots that the fate of France lay on the Eastern Front.[134] By August 26 he explained how the Germans wanted to destroy the French before the intervention of the Russian army, which was the logic of the Schlieffen Plan.[135] By September 1 Hervé criticized the French General Staff for not seeing the obvious because the French army was slow to change its plans to meet the German offensive through Belgium.[136] Hervé explained Joffre's retreat in early September as necessary to give the Russians a chance to engage Germany which would draw off the best German troops.[137]

A constant theme in late August and early September 1914 had been the need to defend Paris. Hervé expressed complete confidence in General Gallieni, the city's military governor, as the Germans approached, advising women and children to evacuate the city so "the men could settle this", expecting Gallieni to have "100,000 chests" ready in trenches and redoubts in the Parisian *banlieue*. Above all, he worried that the loss of Paris in six weeks would make France "the laughing stock of the universe for the next century."[138] The Marne victory, in Hervé's view, washed away the shame of 1870 and restored French military vanity.[139] Such editorials led Gallieni to describe Hervé as a confident and stoic voice who helped calm Parisians and reassure the city's governing authorities that civil order would be maintained throughout the encounter. Hervé himself appeared to be convinced that former revolutionaries had become "the disciplined, fanatic, and patriotic republican guard" of the moment.[140] As Minister of War later on, Gallieni was grateful for the *sang-froid* displayed by *La Guerre Sociale*. "Dismayed by the lack of courage of a large number of writers and politicians at the time of the military reverses at Verdun in February 1916, he would confide to his secretaries that 'the articles of Hervé are doing a lot of good.'"[141]

Not all the military authorities agreed with Gallieni's assessment because Hervé's editorials continually oscillated between the need to be critical about the errors of the general staff and the duty to support the military in wartime. "Pulled between the concern to denounce certain needlessly deadly offensives and the will to show himself as a model soldier on the home front, he remained suspicious of the 'caste' which constituted the general staff."[142] He continued to believe that true patriotism obliged him to try to reflect public opinion for the good of the government itself. Why the French government refused to publish German press reports and why it

never reported battle losses was a mystery to him because it only led to a general distrust of government reports. Hervé was an enemy of wild boasting, and he ridiculed the official French communiqués which only spoke of Allied victories. Lost battles were less troubling than defeats that were totally unexpected because citizens had not been told anything negative about the situation beforehand.[143] Hervé wanted the French to be ready for anything, even military setbacks, because he recognized that military defeats could be especially demoralizing. He realized and repeated that France would not enter Germany "like a knife through butter." Victory was, nevertheless, certain due to French and allied moral and material superiority, élan, and enthusiasm "which makes us invincible, even if here and there we experience setbacks."[144] If he assumed that France would win the war, he never agreed with those journalists who tried to generate optimism and courage by dismissing the power of the German army. However, he was not above claiming "that our guns had an overwhelming superiority over those of the Germans."[145] The editorials of *La Guerre Sociale* and then *La Victoire* never ceased to mention the patience which was necessary for victory even if Hervé himself sometimes became exasperated.[146]

Hervé had never been reticent about criticizing the army, and he did not change after August 1914. Well before the war, Hervé sought to prepare France for battle by criticism directed at military mismanagement, ineptitude, and lack of originality. Throughout the war he blamed the Three Year Law for French unpreparedness to wage war. Without the Three Year Law France would have had Jaurès's "armed nation", which meant double the number of active soldiers and much more military equipment instead of useless barracks to house a peacetime army. At various times, Hervé would report how the war could have been avoided if Jaurès had been Foreign Minister during the July Crisis and how the invasion could have been defeated if the ideas in his *L'Armée Nouvelle* had been implemented before 1914.[147]

The *Union Sacrée* did not prevent Hervé from pointing out problems which hurt the French war effort. His first war-time campaign to correct official abuses and negligence began in September 1914 when he attacked the disorganization of the *Service de Santé*. Despite the censorship, his critique of the ineffective use of medical volunteers and hospital facilities to care for the wounded was incisive and hit home. He claimed that his criticism was not directed at health care personnel, only the bureaucracy that refused to correct its own deficiencies.[148] On September 28 Hervé claimed that the bureaucracy of the *Service de Santé* was a worthy partner to the wretched French Penitentiary System about which he had personal experience.[149] He continued to brave the censor's cutting shears in the spring of 1915 by critiquing the disorganization of the Health Service and demanding more effective granting of military leaves.[150]

On October 28, 1914, Hervé published an open letter to his brother Gaston, already serving on the Western Front. That missive touched on themes to be reiterated throughout the war. He worried about German preponderance in machine guns, airplanes, heavy artillery, and trench warfare. His commonsense yet probing questions for the military authorities often seemed quite cogent. Why couldn't French artillery support the infantry better? Why were bayonet charges made at such great distances? Why weren't enemy machine guns destroyed before an attack? Why were trenches so shallow? Why were officers not dressed to avoid being easy targets for snipers?[151] Hervé's military concerns were pertinent, especially because he was often accurate. Because he wanted a quick end to the war, he attacked small offensives, but he continued to hope for a great assault, following an enemy defeat or coinciding with a German diversion of troops elsewhere, to drive the enemy from France. He believed that the Allied blockade was a main factor forcing the Germans to make unsuccessful offensives.[152] Hervé gave variable estimates for loss ratios of offensive versus defensive warfare. His usual estimates, that an offensive lost three to four times as many men as did a defensive, were actually fairly accurate.[153] Because he believed the success of an offensive demanded numerical superiority, he was preoccupied with increasing the number of French soldiers. After his own rejection for service in 1914 due to myopia, he stressed the need to use and to call up older soldiers from the territorial reserve more quickly. He also advocated the automatic promotion of experienced soldiers into officers as a means of democratizing and expanding the officer corps.[154] As the war endured, Hervé continued to worry about the material conditions, health, and morale of the soldiers in the trenches and on leave.

His military advice was often lucid and perspicacious. For example, in February 1915 he realized that the latest offensives were both deadly and worthless. "A partial, local attack by a company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, or even an army corps only leads to one result: men have to die for nothing except gaining 200 or 300 meters of ground which you generally cannot hold. Even more grave, it's that in these assaults against enemy trenches, it's the bravest who are most likely to get themselves killed … We nibble at the enemy: he sucks from us … the best of our blood."[155] He continued the same theme in October that year in assailing "the monstrous aberration which amounts to sending our best, [yet now] unfortunate infantry into the thickets of barbed wire which one knows to [still] be intact." Occasionally, he singled out particular officers who ill-advisedly launched attacks which led to French bloodbaths. In October 1915 he described an earlier attack as an ill-considered assault which led to a "bloody

hecatomb." Such criticism did not please military authorities and soon brought on complaints that reached high places.[156]

Sometimes his military advice and understanding was defective, and occasionally his ideas were preposterous. To wit, he lent credence to some reports that German bullets "when they do not reach a vital organ, it seems, only cause insignificant damage. Their extreme speed closes the tissue all by itself after the bullets pass through and their heat sterilizes the wound."[157] By assuming the pose of an old experienced soldier who knew what he was talking about, Hervé sometimes seemed to founder in cynicism in the opinion of Gilles Heuré.[158] Perhaps cynicism was a short step from callousness and intentional obtuseness, as in May 1915 when he lectured *les poilus* to moderate their "jeremiads"[159] or when he advised them not to fret about poison gas because the harm was no worse than standard ordinance. Of course, he had no idea how terrifying gas attacks were to the troops since he had no actual experience of battle. The major lesson he drew from the use of poison gas was that "the Germans has a formidable sense of initiative."[160] After that assessment he naively, stupidly, or cynically concluded: "After all, the more this war will be atrocious, the more it will be done in a bloody fashion, the more chances there will be that this may be the last one, and for that humanity may be seized by disgust after this to elicit a: 'Yuk!'" Whether he actually believed that wartime brutality could make this the last war is unknown. He did say that he was not against gas warfare per se, but he was not happy that Germany had developed another new weapon before France did.[161] Hervé could seldom live with the logic of his own pronouncements. For example, though he seemed to accept the use of gas, he always assailed German submarine warfare as barbaric. In June 1915 he was troubled by a French air attack on Karlsruhe that killed civilians because such acts caused France to lose its position of moral superiority. However, he was not against air attacks on the Ruhr factories.[162] His opinions and ideas when viewed over the course of time were seldom consistent or without fundamental contradictions, but that was the nature of his seismic personality which fit his spontaneous journalism.

The former antimilitarist was almost always indulgent for *les poilus* who came from all kinds of social, religious, and political backgrounds but all "fought and died on the same field of honor." He became angry when writers like Paul Bourget continued to assail socialists and revolutionaries of the pre-war International.[163] Yet Gilles Heuré noted the vast chasm separating Parisian press patriots like Hervé from front-line *poilus*. "If he wanted to reassure *les poilus*, he was barely cognizant of the abyss which separated the enthusiasms which blossomed on the marble counter tops in newspaper offices from the hell of the trenches … Could Hervé ever have understood the desperate mocking implied by the title *La Guerre Joviale*

for a trench newspaper?"[164] Even though Hervé titled one highly censored article in late 1916 "the rain, [some] mud, [and some] fleas", most of his articles seemed to lack a sincere concern for the soldiers in the trenches because his advice generally amounted to platitudes about "toughing it out" or "putting one's back into it." If he prayed for the coming of the Americans to relieve *les poilus*, he could not accept a Wilsonian "peace without victory".[165] The hecatombs of war did not cause Hervé to soften his stance on the need for victory in battle. He did not want the blood of Flanders or Picardy to make the French too eager for peace before the victory was completed. Hervé's voice invariably echoed the hackneyed sentiments of the fallen soldier in John McCrae's "In Flanders Fields" about not breaking faith with the dead, but rather by taking up their torch.[166] As Lucien Juventy summed it up, "While everyone was hunting for defeatists, that is to say, for those who have had enough [of the war], the Hervés, the Barrèses, and others are able to continue their infamies where the heavy shells are rare."[167]

For Gilles Heuré it often seemed that "Hervé spoke about the war without knowing it." In the spring of 1916, a soldier named François Pochard called the editor of *La Victoire*, the "national puppet" who would, along with others like him, greatly benefit from "a short stay at the place [that Pochard had just] left. Alas, they have all types of courage, except that one. How easy it is to play with the lives of others anyway. Hypocrites!"[168] For soldiers like Lucien Juventy, the war destroyed their hope, faith, and trust and left them with profound despair. "But did the flowing blood, did the suffering endured, count for the great men hypnotized by the mirage of victory? … One postpones the old embarrassing formulas of Marx indefinitely, like the foul Hervé says … To think that one has had confidence [that] … all these puppets [would] … react against the vile passions awakened by the war and, on the contrary, to see them increase the ranks of the howlers of death … what a deception!"[169] Such criticisms seem a bit harsh given the fact that Hervé, like almost everyone else in France and most of Europe, was deeply affected by the deaths of friends, former colleagues, and even members of his own family.

As a journalist Hervé felt he had a duty to critique the civilian administration as well as the military. He was constantly on the lookout to correct the deleterious effects of bureaucratic red-tape with its forms, delays, and routines that were, in his opinion, the essence of inefficiency.[170] Gallieni's circulars which sought to flush out loafers, idlers, and various "lead asses" received Hervé's *Imprimatur*.[171] If Hervé was quick to critique abuses by the military and civil administration, he did not spare the Home Front either. The former *Sans Patrie* was alert to the dangers caused by civilians who created panic away from the battlefield by their

rumor-mongering and exaggeration, and he avoided the popular passion for *embuscomanie* (the mania to seek out shirkers and draft dodgers) because he knew the value of skilled workers in the arms industry in wartime.[172] Nevertheless, he was always on the lookout for any sign of moral laxity, and he did not hesitate to congratulate the wives and sisters of soldiers who met the advances of young dandies and well-off middle-aged men with prudence and seriousness.[173]

Hervé certainly wanted to avoid trouble with the military authorities, but he was terrified by the paranoia aroused over spies. On August 15, 1914 he worried about the summary execution of spies at the forts of Sartory and Vincennes because he did not want a war against German barbarism to lead to French barbarism. To try to prevent such xenophobic excesses, he cited *Le Figaro*'s articles reminding its readers about all the foreign volunteers serving in the French military.[174] On August 20, 1914 alleged German atrocities were blamed on isolated German mercenaries. Hervé, who had for years made generalizations about the differences between French and German national characteristics, believed that it was necessary to remind his countrymen that the Germans were not a race of brutal assassins. He told the French to think of the four million German socialists as well as the one and a half million German liberals who admired French culture and who hated the Kaiser.[175] Even though the accelerating carnage affected his editorial treatment of German socialists, he still tried to maintain some sense of fair play in the first stage of the war.[176] Still, it is important to recall that even in the war's early months Hervé believed the Germans were intoxicated with economic and military power.[177] Though he explained that S.P.D. approval of German war credits was based on a love of Germany, not a love of the Kaiser or the *Junkers*, he nevertheless concluded that "the Germans could never create the moral union of the French."[178] Generally, Hervé's most sincere humanism betrayed a growing chauvinism.

At times Hervé's internationalism and magnanimity remained alive in the opening days of the war and occasionally his expressions seemed to surpass even his pre-war feelings. When a young S.P.D. Deputy from Mannheim named Franck died at Luneville in September 1914, Hervé evoked their meetings at pre-war Congresses of the International where both men attempted to preserve the peace. "If Franck consented to join the German army, it was not out of love for the Kaiser but for a love of the German people." Hervé stressed that the French did not hate the German people, "who had so many solid virtues", but he still concluded that the Germans lacked revolutionary spirit. He assumed that France fought Germany in the interests of the German people! This war would rid Germany of its oppressors. He saw the war as a crusade for liberty in the tradition of 1792, which would usher in the rebirth of socialist fraternity. Hervé told Franck

to "sleep in peace on our French soil. We will not forget the German people in our war of deliverance which is the last of all wars." He then promised the fallen Franck that once the war was over he would come and place a red flag of the International on his tomb in Lorraine because that flag remained, despite the war, the symbol of human hopes and the emblem of future universal fraternity.[179] Such a balance of internationalism and chauvinism would not endure the war unscathed. Yet Hervé consistently supported national self-determination which accepted a Republican Germany made up of all the Germans lands of Europe including Austria.[180]

The war was a "resurrection" for France in Hervé's opinion. *La Guerre Sociale* became a daily and achieved a circulation of 80,000 at the beginning of the war, and that achievement continued even after the title changed.[181] The war had solved most of France's domestic divisions and Hervé's political dilemma as well. The war gave him the necessary stimulus to reconcile fully with the nation. Perhaps for that reason, he spoke consistently as if the *Union Sacrée* were a realistic description rather than a hope, dream, or myth. For him the *Union Sacrée* was necessary to preserve the birthplace of revolution. On August 8, 1914 Hervé described the *Union Sacrée* in moralistic and virtually metapolitical terms. "I have seen a people, which everyone believed to be rotten due to individualism, submerged to the neck in material pleasures, and torn by religious, political, and social hatreds, abandon interests, pleasures, and rancor without the least recrimination. In a moving unanimity they have run to arms at the call of '*la patrie en danger*' ... I have seen monks ask for guns from the Republic that expelled them. I have seen zealous revolutionaries who yesterday were antipatriots, ask to go to the frontier to man the most perilous posts."[182] Hervé hoped that the war would act to purify public and private morality. He observed that Paris, "the modern Babylon", was now witnessing "grave and serious women." Somewhat ironically, he also hoped that the war would lead to a higher birth rate which would eliminate a major cause of war and a symptom of French decadence.[183] Although he could not help but support the increasing role of women in the munitions industry, factories, unions, and commerce, in general, as wartime necessities, one wonders what Hervé, the patriotic moralist, would have said if he had learned that illegitimacy rates in France were increasing by two-thirds from 1913 until 1917.[184] Though Hervé remained an avowed secularist and unbeliever amidst his shift in views, his evolving critique of the Republic could have made a clerical proud. The growing image of an expiatory war from the pen of the free-thinking former *Sans Patrie* was hardly fortuitous.

Partly because of the changes on the Left, Hervé considered the war to be a revolution. He certainly applauded growing socialist and syndicalist unity even

if war was the unifying agent. Certainly, his perspectives had been evolving even before the war on a whole host of topics such as alcoholism and depopulation, which would become part of his interwar critique of French decadence. "Habits have changed; in these months spirits are more elevated above the petty problems and egoisms of yesterday. This is the time to take revolutionary measures against alcohol." After the war it would be too late; vested interests then would operate to influence the Deputies. Hervé's editorials threatened the French *Chambre* and foreshadowed his future solution to French problems by using its failure to take action to curb alcoholism to predict the emergence of a strong man willing to make the necessary decisions. If Parliament were incapable of leadership, that would create conditions which would lead to a military dictatorship.[185] Several days later Hervé returned to another aspect of French decadence, depopulation. He claimed that depopulation had helped to cause war because it fostered German arrogance and boldness, and it pushed France to form an alliance with Russia. Blaming depopulation on inheritance laws and materialism, Hervé called for laws which would combat the decline in the French birth rate. Large families should be rewarded with lower taxes, bachelors ought to be taxed more, widows with large families were entitled to higher pensions, and fathers with large families should get multiple votes in elections. Hervé believed that if France did not end alcoholism and depopulation, it would die within a century even without war.[186] Such themes antedated the war and they became part of an interwar social critique that formed the basis of his national socialism.

Hervé had conflicting feelings and ideas about Parliament. On the one hand, he wanted parliamentary commissions to work with the government to direct the military if not military operations. For him Parliament was the chief "watchdog" over French bureaucracy and an institution which could help to remove "red tape."[187] On the other hand, he attacked the pettiness, job-seeking, bickering, opportunism, and demagoguery that was associated with Parliament. Parliamentary government could be tolerated or even praised when conditions were good, but in a crisis and certainly amidst a total war, there was little patience for an institution which seemed to increase chaos, confusion, and disorder. During the war whenever problems seemed insurmountable or whenever parliamentary antics appeared to be damaging French security, Hervé spoke of the need for a stronger presidential system, a strong leader, a military dictatorship, or a new "Committee of Public Safety" to create order, efficiency, and direction. Throughout the war Hervé talked of international brotherhood, a United States of Europe, and solidarity among all Frenchmen, yet he maintained an antiparliamentary theme that fit well into the thinking of both the extreme Right and the revolutionary Left.[188]

During the war Hervé almost always detested governmental changes not because he was such an advocate of Republican forms but because he did not want the government disrupted during a crisis. Hervé never ceased to extol the virtues of former or present French ministers, not because he liked the parliamentary system, but because he trusted men with experience.[189] Praise of ministerial experience was soon coupled with a call for a recruitment of ministers from fields outside government. He assumed that political service would increase in efficiency if ministers were recruited among experts in business and commerce. For many political analysts World War I brought with it an increasing role and a virtual domination by state bureaucracies which implemented nationalized economies so necessary for the war effort.[190] However, from the beginning of the war, Hervé increasingly criticized bureaucratic ineptitude with terms like "*culs-de-plombe*" (lead asses) and "*ronds-de-cuir*" (penpushers).[191] For many commentators the war created the experience of socialism. From Hervé's perspective, the war "proved" the impossibility of socialism. Wartime ineptitude may have made socialism seem like the "road to serfdom" even for a former revolutionary socialist like Hervé.

Preoccupied with the political functioning of French government during wartime, Hervé lamented the ongoing ministerial changes epitomized by seven different Ministers of War in the three years preceding the war. Thus, he employed the term *pétaudière* (a bedlam or anarchy) when talking about the government and Parliament as early as July 1914, a characterization which continued and expanded in the interwar era as Herve's favorite description of Parliament and the French bureaucracy. Although he expected the Parliament to oversee the bureaucracy, he wanted domestic harmony and as little discord as possible.[192] Since his goal was national concord, he cautioned socialists about any attempt to overturn a governmental ministry. As part of his own efforts to attain domestic unity, he visited President Poincaré at the Elysée Palace in February 1916.[193]

At a superficial level the war led Hervé to right-wing political views. Yet Hervé's characterization of Deputies as "devoted to pleasure and intrigue between the *thé-tangos* and the Palais-Bourbon"[194] betrayed a critique of social-political reality, which was essentially antimaterialistic or metapolitical.[195] In a sense Hervé's moralistic critique was beyond politics because for him politics itself was a sign of corruption. He could consecutively join the antiparliamentary critiques of both political extremes due to his tendency to view politics from an idealistic perspective. In critical situations he was incapable of accepting politics as the arena of necessary compromise. It has long been noted that extremist political movements of all types, like the religious movements that, in some sense, they seem to parallel,

share ascetic and millenarian elements even when they arise from the most materialistic of ideologies.[196] In late 1917 at a time when he needed donations to finance an expansion of *La Victoire*, Hervé compared newspapers of political combat to religious preachers, except that newspapers like his spoke to hundreds of thousands of believers and non-believers instead of just hundreds. For Hervé, their poverty and scorn of material well-being were part of their appeal and their vocation.[197]

Though Hervé tried to preserve a semblance of international idealism in his initial responses to the Germans at the onset of the war, increasingly chauvinistic rhetoric soon outweighed most remnants of universal brotherhood. On September 27, 1914 Hervé stopped just short of calling for annexations of German territory.[198] Michel Baumont believed that by October 1914 many of Hervé's editorials were hard to differentiate from those of nationalists like Paul Bourget and Maurice Barrès. His tone even reminded Baumont of Paul Déroulède.[199] In mid-October 1914 he would contrast the noble attitudes of French intellectuals during the Dreyfus Affair with the inaction of German intellectuals at the time of the violation of Belgium and the destruction of Louvain.[200] Later that month, Hervé accused the S.P.D. of solidarity with German crimes, and he told the Germans that they would soon find themselves in a situation in which they would be unable to trouble the peace of Europe for a long time.[201] On October 19, 1914 Hervé explained to his brother serving on the Western front how he was "for the moment closer to the most passionate French clericals, nationalists, and royalists, as long as they favored *la guerre à outrance*, than to the most internationalist German Social Democrat."[202] By late October, once the reality of German atrocities was confirmed, Hervé spoke not only of conquest and reparations, but also the punishment of Germans by mass executions using either the guillotine of Anatole Deibler or the rope of the hangman of London.[203] On the last day of October, Hervé told the German anti-war socialist Karl Liebknecht that if he wanted to talk to the French socialists about the war, he should first create a German Republic. Until then, French guns would speak for the S.F.I.O.[204]

The same rhetorical violence that had once been used to try to prevent war was now directed against any French citizen or ally who refused to support or who sabotaged "the war of liberation." Throughout the war Hervé believed it was the duty of each of the Allies to create offensives if any of their partners were being attacked or had suffered reversals. Russian losses in 1915 led him to demand a French offensive to release German pressure on the czar's forces.[205] That same year he was worried that a potential lack of Allied support, which he believed caused the failure of Gallipoli, would be duplicated at Salonika where General Sarrail's army was trying to aid Serbia.[206]

Even though Hervé's foreign policy pronouncements seemed to be impulsive and erratic, they were guided by his assessments of the immediate needs of France in the war. Almost any action or demand was justified if it helped to create a new ally or prevented a country from joining the Central Powers. Until the Bulgarians entered the war on the side of the Germans, Hervé called on all other Balkan powers to make territorial concessions to them. For Hervé, Bulgaria was crucial because it was supposedly the key to supplying Turkey which itself blocked supplies to Russia. The Director of *La Guerre Sociale* also worried that King Constantine of Greece, who was married to the Kaiser's sister, could prevent Greece from joining the Allies. So he supported the pro-Allied Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos to force the hand of the King. Hervé had favored the Dardanelles campaign, and he pragmatically accepted Czarist demands for Russian control of Constantinople. Victory over Turkey was essential because that was the only way an economically backward Russia could be supplied. Russia had to be permitted its expansionist aims if France were to survive. The ideal of national self-determination and a desire to influence the Jews of Russia and the United States may have been the chief reasons for Hervé's early and consistent support for Jewish control of Palestine. He certainly assumed that the Allies would take over the Turkish Empire once the war was over. In fact, ideals like self-determination were valid only to the extent that they fit French national interests. His support for another front from the Adriatic to Salonika was promoted as an effort to join the Serbian army and to attack Austria-Hungary, the weakest point of the enemy, but the need to take pressure off the Western Front was undoubtedly Hervé's paramount concern.[207]

Hervé's articles may have had some effect outside France because they were republished with varying intents in many neutral, Allied, and even enemy newspapers. He became increasingly adept at giving this "war to the bitter end" an international scope. Besides "crushing Prussian militarism," his war aims included "the liberation of oppressed people of Europe." One of his early editorials was titled "*Guerre de délivrance*" with the expectation that Muslims from India to Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia would be given self-government for their loyalty and refusal to respond to the appeal of the Ottoman sultan. He also expected Russia to live up to its promises to the Poles and Finns. The war would not only liberate France and Belgium, it would lead to the autonomy of their African colonies as well as concessions, autonomy, or independence to subjugated Romanians, Serbians, and Armenians, as well as a refuge for "persecuted Jews" in Palestine. If such policies were seen as just, Hervé also assumed they would win favor in the United States.[208] "Such zeal for liberation left many socialists, from Alphonse Merrheim to Leon Trotsky, dumbfounded. In November 1916, a circular drafted

by the socialist party's minority called the list of peoples that Hervé wanted to liberate exorbitant."[209] However, promising everything to potential allies in the interest of French war needs was bound to lead to contradictory policies.

Much of Hervé's polemical verve was directed against neutral countries, and especially their socialists, who refused to enter the crusade against German oppression. The Italian socialist leadership was compared to Pontius-Pilate and characterized as blind, deaf, mentally ill, and imbecilic for their refusal to join the Entente.[210] Swiss and Swedish socialists who wanted to meet in the interest of peace were told on October 4, 1914 just what they could do with their peace initiatives.[211] He had high praise for Italian leftists who favored Italy's entry into the war as an ally of France. Because they agreed with Hervé, Benito Mussolini, Léonidas Bissolati, Enrico Corradini, and Alceste de Ambris were called the "true leaders" of Italian socialism and syndicalism.[212] Before leaving *Avanti!*, Mussolini had opened the official newspaper of Italian socialism to Hervé's editorials.[213] When Italy entered the war, Hervé praised Italians of all classes but he singled out Italian socialists beginning with Mussolini. "Glory to Mussolini, the great journalist who gave up direction of the official socialist newspaper of socialist *eunuques* in order to tell Italian workers that socialism was only a retreat from civilization if it was not, above all, a perpetual effort toward a higher and higher moral life."[214]

Despite having a German King, fearing Russian power, and worrying about the implications of Russian anti-Semitism due to its prominent Jewish minority, Romania was certain to join the Allies according to Hervé. He believed Romanians had natural sympathy for France due to their Latin cultural heritage and their supposed acceptance of Latin ideals of law and justice.[215] Only when Russia's military situation deteriorated did Hervé begin to lose his naïve idealism or his pragmatically motivated wishful thinking about Russian liberalism. Backwardness and a failure to implement promised reforms were then emphasized. The former *Sans Patrie* wanted a liberalized treatment of Russian minorities and more democracy under Czarism, but he did not favor a revolution since that could have hurt the Allied war effort.[216] When Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915, Hervé attacked King Ferdinand's treachery as well as Allied diplomacy and military tactics. At that time he was against those who wanted to concentrate the war effort on the Western Front, so he now began to stress actions by the army at Salonika to push Roumania and Greece to join the Allies and to aid Serbia by defeating Bulgaria. A new and fairly ridiculous game was then added to Hervé's journalistic repertoire; it consisted of adding or subtracting months or years to the duration of the war due to military and diplomatic successes or reversals. The loss of Bulgaria was said to add one year to the war.

Hervé's first overt wartime call for national socialism came in an appeal to Italian socialists in April 1915 to end their country's neutrality. That editorial stressed how class harmony should replace the class struggle assumptions of international socialism. For the editor of *La Guerre Sociale* the war "proved" that the German-led Second International was dead, and something stronger than class struggle existed: national passion with a concomitant solidarity of all classes in wartime. After the war, socialism would not deny class struggle, "but instead of appealing to the proletariat alone to establish the city of justice on earth, it would appeal to all men of good will who love liberty, equality, and fraternity without distinctions based on class … There will no longer be an international socialism. There will be democratic and national socialist parties which work, each in their own country, to create more liberty, equality, and fraternity." Such national parties would freely federate and prepare a Federation of a United States of Europe ending the existence of oppressed nations.[217]

Throughout the war, Hervé's past continued to be an evolving trope used by his enemies to lament the contemporary scene and somehow ascribe a large measure of blame to the former *Sans Patrie.* "In 1916, the anarchist newspaper *Le Semeur* would simply reproduce [his] antipatriotic articles … from 1907 under the title 'Words from Earlier Days.'" A brochure titled "*On nous trompe*" called Hervé a dirty pig *(saligaud)* for his flagrant reversal.[218] During the war one of his earlier acolytes, Jean Goldsky, a former dedicated defender of *militarisme révolutionnaire* for the imprisoned Hervé, blasted his former boss as a renegade and a "*marchand d'héroisme*" who had sold out to arms merchants and war suppliers. "Hervé was for us, all our youth, an ardent youth, rich in confidence, in selflessness, in valor, in illusions. It is dolorous … to say to oneself: '… Him whom we loved as a leader and as a friend has the soul more vile, still, than others.' This austere man hid the appetites of an ogre. We believed him to be an apostle; he was only a megalomaniac of the worst type. His socialism? Histrionics! His friendship? Unworthy pretense to capture new forces that offered themselves, and turn them to his benefit …"[219]

After he changed the name of his newspaper to *La Victoire* on January 1, 1916, Hervé argued that a French victory over themselves was more important than a victory over the Germans. He singled out social discord, depopulation, neo-Malthusianism, alcoholism, political bickering, and the lack of initiative by French businesses as the chief French problems.[220] If his transformation toward national socialism began by 1912, as he sometimes claimed, such an evolution was described simply as a necessary shift toward a traditional French socialism. By early 1916 he repeatedly stressed that socialism had not prevented war; in fact, it had actually helped to create it. A German national socialism allied to the German bourgeois Left before 1914 could have created a parliamentary Republic

in Germany which would have annulled feudal military rule by Prussia. Such a democratic Germany could have created a *rapprochement* with a France governed by an S.F.I.O. led by Jaurès and allied to the Radicals. But German Marxism not only outlawed such combinations, it destroyed French idealism, social justice, pacifism, and international peace. It was impossible ever to return to such a doubly bankrupt socialism in Hervé's opinion.[221]

On April 3, 1916 Hervé wrote his most elaborate wartime explanation of his incipient national socialism. He described the scission that was developing inside the S.P.D. as an aspect of a crisis in all international socialism. "In all countries … socialists are being led by events to choose between the old German socialism based on the failed idea of class struggle and a new conception of socialism, which I shall willingly call national socialism in order to show clearly that such a socialism must arise from the soil, the history, and the temperament of each people. It must carry the special genius of each race, and it must work within the national setting. Saint Karl Marx preached the class struggle to us. Today it appears that reason, progress, and health reside in class collaboration within each nation …" Such class collaboration would be especially necessary after the war when all classes and parties would have to cooperate in order to develop France's stagnant industry, to remake the French communications systems, to create administrative autonomy by means of decentralization, and to end French decadence by attacking French depopulation, neo-Malthusianism, and alcoholism. "We will never forget that capitalist development is the *sine qua non* of the amelioration of our workers and peasants." Capitalism was considered the means to create greater French well-being, instruction, and justice for the weak and disinherited. This was not nationalism, Hervé cautioned, but a true national socialism whose sources went back to Blanqui, Saint-Simon, and the French Revolution. Rather than an International of workers, Hervé preached the higher goal of a United States of Europe formed by the national socialist, progressive, and democratic parties of all nations. He hoped that the S.F.I.O. would see the errors caused by its impatience for social justice and its excess of idealism. Unlike churches, socialism must never become immutable and infallible. Again, Hervé explained how the war itself was a kind of revolution that forced the ideas, prejudices, fortunes, and situations of the past to change.[222]

Despite his lingering allusions to democracy and justice, Hervé left behind his apparent "moderation" of 1912–1915 and increasingly adopted the language of extremism, opposition, and polarization. He assailed any sympathy for the dissidents of the S.P.D., attacked any talk of a peace before victory, and castigated conciliatory Socialists who sought to unite opposite theories of socialism. It was now necessary to choose between national socialism and Marxism

because a failure to choose would lead to powerlessness, lethargy, and a perilous lack of direction. Hervé claimed that revolutionary language was a ruse which frightened most people. It was little more than sterile opposition, dangerous to its advocates, and incapable of succeeding anyway. The split in French socialism, seemingly created by the war, was not overly troubling because two antithetical socialisms antedated the war. Of course, Hervé hoped the inevitable split in the party could be delayed until peace came.[223] Throughout the war Herve rejected any international meetings called by socialists to try to create peace before the Germans had been defeated. He rejected sending Zimmerwaldians to prison, as Italy did when it entered the war, because he believed that the advocates of peace were sincere, if misguided, idealists who chose to put their faith in the Marxist God. All types of idealism had religious connotations in his view because all were aspects of a secular God.[224] May Day in 1916 was impugned as a creation of German socialism; Hervé hoped that future May Days would become *fêtes* of all classes in all countries for international peace.[225]

On All Souls Day in 1916, Hervé again described the war as a chance for a French resurrection. The war dead had expiated the evils of individualism which had reigned in France since the French Revolution. A paucity of ideas, an absence of faith, internal divisions, depopulation, high tariffs, a lack of personal ambition were all symptoms of selfishness and a lack of altruism by the French before the war. Destiny in the form of the plague of war had given France a chance to resurrect its ideals. Either the French would change and sacrifice or they would be annihilated. Hervé's images of the war united the dead and the living as part of the great collective soul of eternal France. Fallen heroes could not be allowed to have died in vain since this would be the final war. The dead would live forever in legends of a France ready to fight for liberty and justice.[226] Such rhetoric might have been moving and poetic to many civilians on the Home Front, but coming after Verdun and the Somme, such verbiage must have been pure bathos to *les poilus* in the trenches.

The return of ostentation, luxuries, and diversions in Paris in late 1916 troubled Hervé. If civilians could focus on the needs of war, then their actions would not hurt French morale.[227] The former antimilitarist firebrand wanted all businesses that catered to luxury and pleasure closed. As the war dragged on, his willingness to propose extreme actions and policies accelerated. The government must act like the "Committee of Public Safety", energetically and even in a revolutionary manner, if necessary. The uneven division of sacrifices between soldiers at the front and civilians safely in the rear caused a decline in French *élan*.

So Hervé called for a new French *levée en masse*, a mobilization of the civilian population to meet this discrepancy in sacrifice, to counter such a program already existing in Germany. All non-essential jobs ought to be eliminated, and all war profits ought to be taxed. France needed strong leaders, and if French security were jeopardized any further, a military dictatorship was a possibility that Hervé did not rule out. Perhaps only a dictatorship could solve French wartime problems because ordinary parliamentary government did not seem able to cure French ills or to create the necessary spirit.[228]

As the war moved into its third year, Hervé hoped for a military means to end the impasse. With the Western Front in deadlock, he continued to look elsewhere to create a war of maneuver to defeat the Central Powers. In early 1916 Hervé characterized Germany as the audacious initiator of original tactics and battle plans, and he advised the Allies to imitate the German use of railroads to move troops to Allied weak points.[229] The Brusilov Offensive by the Russians in late spring 1916 "proved" to Hervé that offensives were still possible. It was clear that France had become too defensive and needed to return to its early strategy of audacious offensives. When the Germans singled out Verdun in February 1916, they knew its symbolic value, and they must have been aware of French impatience.[230] Hervé's reactions in *La Victoire* were exactly what the Germans



Figure 34. Verdun, 1916—*Le Ravin de Mort*: A Trench. Look & Learn.

had counted on because he, along with French leaders, believed that the nation's honor and strategic interests demanded that Verdun be held.

When no decision was reached at Verdun after months of battle, Hervé implied that it was a victory because it made other Allied offenses and defenses successful. His worry about Verdun led him to demand a French-British offensive on the Somme to help relieve the pressure around the beleaguered French fortress. It was during that Somme Offensive that he received the news that his brother Gaston was killed in action. However distressed he may have been, his editorial line never faltered.[231] The offensives of 1916 had proven to be ineffective in creating the breakthrough that Hervé sought, but for most of the year he seemed convinced that a decision was about to be reached. By the end of 1916, experiencing personal grief and citing evidence of low French morale, Hervé tried to prove that victory was inevitable due to superior Allied manpower and material.[232] He gradually came to stress the need to coordinate Allied strategy on all fronts and the benefits of creating a united effort.[233] The underlying premise in *La Victoire* was that Hervé's advice, if heeded, would lead to a successful war effort. At times that advice saw a new form of government, not just a replacement for Briand, as the key to victory.[234]

As an advocate of "war to the bitter end" and an opponent of the Socialist minority which wanted to resume international meetings with France's enemies, Hervé throughout the war was on the party's right wing but he was still a qualified member. When his case came before the party in December 1915 and April 1916, it was always postponed. Whenever he was attacked, Hervé defended himself and never hesitated to remind his attackers about the sacrifices that he had made: his years in prison, the loss of his teaching position, and his abridged legal career.[235] By 1916, Hervé was constantly attacked for his criticism of Zimmerwaldian socialists, his rejection of Marxism, and his calls for class solidarity.[236] What could the party do with him? The problem revolved around finding grounds to get rid of him without also impugning the majority, whose views he largely accepted. Many socialists had already made up their minds about the former "General" of the antimilitarists. Some thought of Hervé only as a "vulgur clown," but others, like his old comrade from Yonne, Luc Froment (Lucien Leclerc), maintained a lingering affection. In July 1917 Froment admitted: "'When I recall what this man did … my face gets red [in thinking] that it's we who would commit this indecency, this moral impropriety, to ask the Party for an exclusion …'" Yet Hervé glibly turned all talk about his eventual day of reckoning into derision. "'Whatever the urgency driving me out of the party', he wrote in October 1917, 'I proclaim that there is a greater urgency in driving the Boches from France and Belgium.'"[237]

Despite Hervé's hopes for a battlefield decision in 1917, the fate of France in that year rested with powers rather distant from the Western Front. His reactions to events in the United States and Russia show the limits of Hervé's idealism as well as a realization that the fate of *la patrie* was coming to depend on others. Quite early in the war, Hervé had predicted that German submarine warfare would bring the United States into the war even if he was never happy with the "meek" responses of the American President. In the presidential elections of 1916, Hervé favored the Republicans. Wilsonian idealism did not impress him when it seemed to hurt French interests. In *La Victoire* Wilson and the Democratic Party had come to symbolize American *pacifisme bêlant*.[238] In early 1917 Hervé chided Wilson to fight for his ideals now that he had heard the war aims of both sides.[239] French Socialists were advised against any adulation of Wilsonian idealism. Rather, they ought to hail men who were willing to die for those ideals![240] The American declaration of war following a Russian Revolution and a retreat by Germany in one area of the Western Front left Hervé elated. The American leader was now the voice of Calvinistic intransigence, a symbol of the hatred of injustice as well as the promoter of peace, liberty, and human fraternity.[241] However, the troops at the Front, finding it impossible to project into the future, were not much concerned with issues and events outside their own immediate interests, even if external affairs like the Russian Revolution and the American entry into the war would prove to be quite significant.[242]

Hervé's assessment of events in Russia was directly and predictably connected to his opinion about their effects on the fate of France. Initially, Hervé appeared to be deliriously joyful over the March Revolution, arguing that the events in Russia had been influenced by the French Revolution of 1789. So he claimed that Russia was about to end the oppression of its subject peoples which would truly turn the war into a crusade for liberty. Yet Hervé cautioned the Russians not to try to jump from 1789 to 1793 because Russia was not yet ready for that.[243] Leon Trotsky quickly saw that Hervé's assessment of events in Russia had nothing to do with revolutionary ideas but had everything to do with their implications for the war effort, hence for the fate of France. The Russian exile saw in Hervé a type of social patriot, present in France and Russia as well as throughout the rest of Europe. Such men easily "switched shooting shoulders" when it was convenient but "never bothered to load their weapons" in either case.[244]

Hervé assessed the extremism in Russia and tried to defuse its potential effects in France by equating Germany's lack of revolutionary idealism with German materialism and brutality, and then contrasting them with the idealism of Russia and France, which supposedly inoculated the latter nations from the vile effects

of Germanic Marxism.[245] The logic of this polarized vocabulary soon broke down and probably escaped Hervé's own understanding. Previously he had given conflicting advice to several minorities. He told the subjugated peoples of Europe to revolt against their German and Austrian oppressors, yet he had told the Irish rebels of 1916 not to stab England and the Allies in the back. The only logic decipherable in Hervé's calculus was that violence and revolution were acceptable and even glorious when they served the cause of France. Of course, Hervé readily admitted that he had to safeguard the French Republic first.[246]

As French domestic troubles grew and the battlefield saw no breakthrough, Hervé began to favor emulating the American Constitution (which he assumed made the President "a virtual dictator"), guided by ministers who were independent of legislative power and recruited from outside Parliament.[247] Such ideas presaged Hervé's post-war authoritarian solutions to French problems which called for the creation of a *République Autoritaire* led by a strong leader like Pétain. When he was accused of reaction in late 1916, Hervé reminded his critics that the French "Revolutionary Committee of Public Safety" had not been called reactionary. As the war endured and as the Allies suffered reverses, Hervé's political ideas became increasingly more extreme. Parliament had to reform itself or a new Napoleon would arise. He did not care to admit that his own logic was demanding a new Napoleon.[248] Using French history to explain current situations was a habit that Hervé never relinquished, no matter how strained the allusions became. To wit, in late 1916 he compared the current Parliament to the Directory, not the Convention. "Now all can see just how an 18 Brumaire occurred."[249] In early 1917 *La Victoire* reiterated demands for electoral reforms and a new Constitution, and Hervé's lead editorials continued to stress how parliamentary inefficiency was leading France toward Caesarism.[250]

Before the Nivelle Offensive in the spring of 1917, Hervé had displayed his usual cautious optimism before battle.[251] Only gradually did *La Victoire* mention troubles in the French army. The budding national socialist simply stated that he was worried about French soldiers' morale due to their low pay, their infrequent and often unequally distributed leaves, and their subjection to propaganda by revolutionary soldiers influenced by events in Russia.[252] If he wondered about the continuing efficacy of offensives, he did not question them.[253] During the interwar period Hervé proudly recalled how "Pétain had sent 150,000 copies of one of his articles to the divisions most infected at the time of the mutinies of 1917."[254] Though he never used the word mutiny to talk about the events in May and June, on July 11, 1917 he mentioned a "refusal to follow orders" which arose after "bleating pacifists" had "sown doubt and demoralization throughout the

country." Four days later he alluded to some "fits of ill humor" and "collective outbursts" that took place near the front. He realized that such actions could not be tolerated but he recommended leniency.[255] In late January 1918 Hervé explained these events as caused by inflation, low pay, the failure of the Nivelle Offensive, and the Russian Revolution.[256]

Strictly antimilitarist elements may not have been predominant in the mutinies, according to Becker.[257] However, as late as August 1917 Maurice Barrès reported on an episode described by General Castelnau concerning a Corporal named Didier, apparently a free-thinker and former Hervéist, who was condemned to death following the mutinies. Before his execution the Corporal told his chaplain that his death was due to having picked up ideas from Albert Thomas, René Viviani, and Gustave Hervé. Barrès claimed that the author of the report, in deference to sitting Ministers, mentioned only the name Hervé. Castelnau wished that the officer had reported the soldier's story exactly as it had been given. Barrès appeared to agree.[258]

The editorials of Hervé during 1917 were replete with charges of treason against government officials and several newspapers, as well as accounts of failed offensives, increasing socialist antimilitarism, and serious accusations against former colleagues. Throughout the summer of 1917 Hervé advocated repression against the defeatist press and strikers as well as the amelioration of conditions at the front and for soldiers on leave, especially in Paris, where vice, alcohol, filth, and evil awaited *permissionnaires*. For Hervé, French problems in the summer of 1917 virtually demanded a new "Committee of Public Safety."[259]

When the French Minister of the Interior Jean-Louis Malvy, a former protégé of Joseph Caillaux, was attacked by the French Right and by Clemenceau for being "soft on pacifism" in the aftermath of the spring disorders of 1917, Hervé at first supported Malvy. He admired Malvy's refusal to implement the *Carnet B* in 1914, and he approved his moderate response to the mutinies of May and June 1917. Violent repression of pacifism in wartime would only have created martyrdom for defeatists. Hervé advised Clemenceau to keep his mouth shut because such use of the problem of defeatism, presumably for political advancement, disrupted French morale even more.[260] Once Malvy was implicated in *Le Bonnet Rouge* Affair,[261] former associates of Hervé were now involved. At that point reactions by the editor of *La Victoire* went full circle several times. However, the most telling aspect of Hervé's writing that year involved his complicated shifts in attitude toward Malvy, Caillaux, Clemenceau, and his former colleague Almereyda. The tumultuous situation in 1917 disclosed some less than flattering personal attributes and a calculating quality heretofore unsuspected in the former

Sans Patrie. The Bolshevik Revolution coupled with an Italian defeat at Caporetto amidst *Le Bonnet Rouge* Affair led Hervé to demand a strong leader because such an action could finally end the French ministerial crisis.[262]

Historian Jean-Yves Le Naour thought that Malvy was sacrificed in the interests of national defense and public opinion as an expiatory victim for the crimes of French defeatism. His was a political trial by the High Court whose purpose was not so much justice as the condemnation of any adversary of the government. For Le Naour, the Malvy Affair was the "Dreyfus Affair of the Great War" which "revealed the true nature of the *Union Sacrée*, an expression forged by a man of the Right [President Poincaré] who symbolized a policy in the service of nationalism and which would inevitably disarm the Left." Malvy was a victim of the mythical *Union Sacrée* itself, that truce which he helped forge and for which he was pilloried amidst the crises of 1917.[263]

Well before he was named Prime Minister, Clemenceau attacked Malvy for his supposed softness on defeatism. As Minister of the Interior throughout the war until his dismissal, Malvy had not only rejected the implementation of the *Carnet B*, he had subsidized the Radical-Socialist *Le Bonnet Rouge* in order to maintain its support in the war effort, but the newspaper eventually turned against the war. When the police searched the paper's new administrator Émile-Joseph Duval at the Swiss border, they found a German check in his pocket and arrested him. When the police later searched the newspaper's office, they found French military documents, which proved to be a problem for anyone who worked for or supported *Le Bonnet Rouge*.[264] Almereyda's recent biographer, Jonathan Almosnino, argued that even though Duval broke the law regarding dealings with the enemy, he was probably not a German agent. Certainly no concrete evidence turned up to verify the latter assertion. Upon the arrest of Duval, suspicions shifted directly to the obscure machinations of *Le Bonnet Rouge* and its staff, and the Right used the affair to assail the government due Malvy's ties to the newspaper. In the Chamber, Maurice Barrès interpellated Malvy and called upon the minister "to arrest the rabble at *Le Bonnet Rouge*." It did not take Clemenceau long to re-launch his own attacks on Malvy in the Senate due to his ties to Almereyda and *Le Bonnet Rouge*. Of course, the attack on Malvy by *Le Tigre* was also a blatant attempt to forge a path to power. Assailed by the Right, ministers Malvy and Viviani ended their longstanding support for Almereyda and *Le Bonnet Rouge*, which was increasingly censored and finally suspended on July 17, 1917. Almereyda had become "too hot to handle" and a veritable "ball and chain" for the current ministry. The police surveillance and dragnet were closing in on Hervé's former lieutenant by the end of July.[265]

It is difficult to evaluate all the evidence and opinions concerning Almereyda's actions during the war because he had so many enemies, friends, and accomplices, each of whom had different motives and memories. Sometimes portrayed as a reincarnation of Balzac's character Rastignac, his tragic end would better fit the mold of the ill-fated Lucien de Rubempre.[266] Almeryeda was variously described as an agent of Germany, an accomplice of drug dealers, and even a commercial promoter of abortions. His increasingly lavish lifestyle was only possible with money whose sources were sometimes questionable. Certainly, material considerations became ever more important to Almereyda and that meant that he was increasingly surrounded by questionable characters. His addiction to morphine, possibly arising from the lingering aftereffects of nephritis or an incomplete treatment of an appendicitis, meant that Almereyda was "no longer truly master of himself." Under the effects of the drug, he experienced a physical and moral decay which meant that he was a very different person than he had been during the halcyon days of Hervéism or even during his patriotic republican phase at the commencement of the war. His condition also meant that he was not able to keep track of all the shady but lucrative shenanigans of Duval. There is little doubt that Almereyda benefited financially from his ties to *Le Bonnet Rouge*.[267]

In the troubled year 1917 Almereyda became a convenient target for someone like Clemenceau in order to undermine Malvy and Caillaux. The ammunition provided by the years of charges and countercharges between *L'Action Française* and *Le Bonnet Rouge* gave Clemenceau all that he needed to gain power while knocking off his enemies and rivals in the process. When Malvy and Caillaux found themselves under assault, they did not hesitate to let Almereyda and the men at *Le Bonnet Rouge* fend for themselves. "Abandoned by his former protectors to the vindictiveness by a part of the Chambre and the press, Almereyda decided to go to the limit to defend himself in what proved to be the last battle of his life. To defend himself, he prepared a detailed list of all his financial contributors, which included the names of numerous personalities, those from finance, industry, and politics."[268] That list, along with Almereyda's inveterate taste for scandal, must have caused great anxiety for many men in high places. It does not seem far-fetched to conjecture that such a scenario may have led to his so-called "suicide" in Fresnes Prison south of Paris late Monday night August 13, but possibly culminating the next afternoon. Some believed that *L'Action Française* was directly involved in the death of Almereyda. Others theorized that the police finally took care of an old nemesis. Probably the most plausible motive behind the murder of Almereyda, if that is what it was, was fear by men like Malvy and Caillaux, whose support for the victim and his paper

could have been easily documented and would have been quite incriminating at a time of war and mutiny.[269]

On July 22 Clemenceau delivered his famous accusations against Malvy in the Senate; on August 5 Malvy resigned. The following evening Almereyda was arrested after perquisitions at his Saint-Cloud villa and the offices of *Le Bonnet Rouge*, where military documents dealing with General Sarrail's operations in the Balkans were found which had been furnished by Paix-Séailles. The possession of such documents, however illegal technically, did not prove treason because Almereyda and the newspaper undoubtedly gained access to them as part of their support for the Balkans offensive. However, the possession of such documents at a time when one is suspected of treasonous activities did not bode well for the newspaper's director, who reportedly fainted when he heard what the perquisition had turned up. A judicial inquiry was ordered that same day and Almereyda was sent to La Santé after his arrest. Not having recovered from his illness and not having access to morphine, Almereyda's physical condition steadily worsened. Though he was not allowed provisional liberty which was sought for medical reasons, he was finally transferred to Fresnes to better deal with his illness, but the journey itself in a prison van undoubtedly made his tenuous condition worse. Almereyda continued to beg for his medicine in his final hours, yet the press could not get beyond the censor to report his status. When his death was announced on August 14, 1917, the cause given was pulmonary bleeding, yet a week later the death was described as a suicide by hanging through the use of shoelaces tied to the cell's bars. For Almosnino the truth is still unknown, however "few people accept the suicide hypothesis."[270]

Even before he came to power, Clemenceau had been active in "destroying the peace party from within." If ex-Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux was the semi-official leader of the so-called peace party, then Almereyda was the virtual "factotum of this party" according to Victor Serge. "The peace party was counting on the weariness of the masses, on the fear of a European revolution, on the vacillation of the Habsburgs, and on the social crisis maturing in Germany, and it was encouraged in various ways by German agents." However, with the mutinies following the disastrous Nivelle Offensive gradually dying down and the American entry into the war, the worst of the spring crisis of 1917 was over by that summer. Serge had stopped seeing Almereyda the closer his "former friend" moved in high politics and finance.

> "Intoxicated with money and danger, he was dissipating his life, a morphine addict now, surrounded by theatricals, blackmailers, beautiful women, and political touts of



Figure 35. Miguel Almereyda taken into custody on August 6, 1917. He was found dead a week later in Fresnes Prison of an apparent "suicide." (© Albert Harlingue/Roger Viollet/The Image Works)

> every description. The graph of his destiny had started from the Paris underworld, had mounted to a climax of revolutionary pugnacity, and was now tailing off in corruption, among the money-bags. When … [the Ribot Ministry] had him and his staff arrested, I knew at once that it would be impossible to try him; he would have been too likely to put the war in the dock and thoroughly compromise the men behind him. He would probably have been shot: but not alone. A few days afterwards, he was found in his prison bunk, strangled with a shoe-lace. The business was never cleared up."[271]

When the *Le Bonnet Rouge* Affair opened, Hervé wondered whether the new scandal was connected to the defeatism of the newspaper *Le Pays*. He did not know whether Miguel Almereyda's newspaper had accepted German money as *L'Action Française* had long charged, but he believed that Germany would have been foolish not to try to influence French opinion. After Almereyda's arrest, Hervé refused to appear in court to defend his former lieutenant. At the trial of Malvy before the Senate (acting as a High Court) on July 30, 1918, Hervé gave two reasons for refusing to come to the aid of his friend Almereyda. (1) Caillaux had been a financial and political influence on *Le Bonnet Rouge*. (2) Almereyda led an immoral personal life that included the use of drugs.[272] More likely, the interests of



Figure 36. Joseph Caillaux (1863–1944) and Pascal Ceccaldi (1876–1918), Caillaux's friend and attorney, during the Trial of Caillaux following the *Bonnet Rouge* Affair. Bnf.

France and Hervé's fears of being tainted by defeatism combined to persuade him to recant his friendship. *La Victoire* described the "suicide" of Almereyda on the night of August 13–14, 1917, just days after his arrest on August 6, as suspicious and assumed that it was part of a governmental cover-up of a scandal implicating certain prominent Frenchmen including Caillaux.[273]

Heuré does not mention Hervé's refusal to support Almereyda when it might have mattered in the summer of 1917 before the latter's death. In Heuré's account, the former leader of the Insurrectionals remained faithful to Almereyda throughout the war, defending his former lieutenant on several occasions. In December 1915 Hervé described Almereyda as having "the proudest soul, the most valiant heart." Three months after Almereyda's death, the former *Sans Patrie* explained how his former chief lieutenant's noble qualities were "unfortunately damaged by an enormous need to enjoy life." For the editor of *La Victoire*, Caillaux had been a kind of evil genius for both Malvy and Almereyda, turning the former Hervéist, who possessed a "mad bravery", into a kind of "defeatist wreck". In his deposition during the Malvy trial in July 1918, Hervé testified that Almereyda "was intellectually one of the most brilliantly endowed men that I have ever known." That defense testimony earned him the gratitude of Almereyda's son, the future film director Jean Vigo, who himself died quite young, and was said to have never recovered from his father's death.[274]

For *La Victoire*, by 1917 Caillaux had come to symbolize all the evils of parliamentarian job-seeking and leftist desires to gain political advantage from a "peace without victory." In November 1917 Hervé accused Caillaux of being the soul of the defeatists and even called for his prosecution. If such charges and accusations against Caillaux appear extreme today, they can be explained due to Hervé's assumption that the preservation of France was at stake. However, some of his fellow journalists thought that the anti-Caillaux campaign was inspired by publicity-seeking motives.[275] When Malvy was forced to resign as Minister of the Interior, Hervé admitted that Malvy had been too soft on pacifism. Nevertheless, Hervé did not appreciate Clemenceau's attacks on a sitting French minister.[276] Soon *La Victoire* would hail Clemenceau as the savior of France. One recent historian of the period described that complicated series of events like this. "Malvy was tried for treason, convicted of malfeasance, and exiled for five years. In office, Clemenceau went after Caillaux, who had maintained informal contact with Germans in the hope of achieving a compromise peace. Within a month of coming to power, Clemenceau obtained a vote from the Chamber suspending Caillaux's immunity so he could be tried for 'intelligence with the enemy'". Though not actually tried until 1920, Caillaux was sent to prison and eventually given a sentence of three

years. "Clemenceau had made his point. No politician would utter another word in favor of peace. Nor would others."[277]

When Poincaré called upon Clemenceau to form a Ministry in mid-November 1917, Hervé supported him despite *Le Tigre*'s impulsiveness and penchant for holding personal grudges. Given France's serious internal and external dangers, a strong leader was mandatory. No matter how much he may have personally disliked Clemenceau, Hervé said you had to admit that Clemenceau "ruled with a firm hand." The former *Sans Patrie* argued that democracy was not a sensible government in wartime because it allowed invasion, permitted the creation of *soviets*, and could easily lead to defeat. War required discipline and obedience which could only be achieved by a temporary dictatorship. Because of the needs and problems of war, France needed Clemenceau, the strongest personality in Parliament.[278] Once the former *briseur de grèves* was at the helm, Hervé described him as "the most authentic son of the French Revolution" and the greatest enemy of Imperial Germany. The coming of Clemenceau was thus a necessary internal *redressement* as important for France as the Battle of the Marne. This new government had come to answer Hervé's prayers for a "Committee of Public Safety."[279] One recent source described the coming of Clemenceau as "a quasi-dictatorship",



Figure 37. *Le Tigre*, Georges Clemenceau, reviews the troops during World War I. Look & Learn.

part of a "second mobilization" to deal with the trauma and disorder of 1917, a "politics of exclusion" which "set the stage for the self-inflicted crippling of the Third Republic in the 1930s." The *Union Sacrée* had been inclusionary and united the nation.[280]

One month before Clemenceau's return to power, one of Hervé's critics, the anarchist Louis Lecoin, who had been praised by the *Sans Patrie* for his heroism in facing a *conseil de guerre* in 1910 at the time of the Railway Strike and who later claimed to have saved Hervé's life at the Salle Wagram in September 1912, attempted to assassinate "the renegade". After first contemplating the assassination of Poincaré, but quickly realizing that this would be impossible, Lecoin thought of Hervé. After failing to find the former Insurrectional leader at his apartment on the Rue de Vaugirard, Lecoin tried to shoot his former hero near his office, but agents of the *Sûreté*, already alerted about the threat, stopped him just before Hervé entered the office or even knew of that particular attempt.[281] The latter had been generally forewarned and was himself armed with a Browning, ready to defend himself, he said later. The event had little impact on the former Insurrectional leader, who admitted that being in the "public eye" always created "obstacles". "I run a bit less danger than our *poilus* who are fighting right now in Flanders, Verdun, and at the Chemin-des-Dames."[282] In his memoirs the would-be assassin explained his reasoning: "These former pacifists, they show themselves to be the most eager for the destruction of the living. How I hated them! Neither did I pardon them for having taken from me my fine confidence in others."[283]

Mutinies, treason, and an assassination attempt against him did not prevent Hervé from continuing his efforts to bolster the war effort which always meant trying to keep French Socialists in line. He believed that Socialists who wished to go to Stockholm in 1917 for a conference to end the war "without victors or vanquished" were a shame to France and had absolutely separated themselves from the reality of the French war experience. These defeatists were told to ask the Kaiser for a train to Stockholm.[284] The mercurial editor of *La Victoire* was glad that a split in French socialism was about to occur because it would make the chasm separating French idealism and fraternity from German materialism and class struggle more obvious. He was disheartened because so many French Socialists still spoke of class struggle concerning France's domestic relations even while they advocated revolutionary patriotism in the war against Germany.[285]

Though he did not believe that Lenin and the Bolsheviks would survive, Hervé worried that the November Revolution would lead to a separate peace. *La Victoire* sought to use the Russian experience to show Western socialists the need to end Bolshevism in the West. If the socialists in Allied countries followed

the path of Bolshevism, they would demoralize Allied armies and undermine their governments.[286] Hervé persisted in tying Lenin and Bolshevism to German Socialism since both used "hatred and class struggle" as opposed to the "love and justice" of French Socialism. Though Lenin was accused of lengthening the war by a year due to his desire for a separate peace, Hervé predicted that Bolshevism would soon be swept aside by a dictatorship of Russian patriots. Bolshevism could only create famine, unemployment, and anarchy.[287] At this point, Hervé claimed that Bolshevism was a greater danger to the Allies than either Caillautist defeatism or even the German army. He told Lenin's admirers in France that Russian workers and peasants were too ignorant to manage the Russian state. Lenin himself was considered naïve to trust in a German revolution, since such a revolution could only arise from German defeat and dislocation.[288] Although the mind-numbing binary thinking and simplistic historical analogies continued unabated in the editorials of *La Victoire*, sometimes crucial insights popped up.

When the German offensive began in late March 1918, Hervé compared it to another Battle of the Marne. He characterized the Germans as desperate despite their victory over the Russians.[289] Amidst the offensive, Hervé's long-demanded United Command was created under the leadership of General Ferdinand Foch. Despite the pounding that Paris was receiving from long-distance German artillery, Hervé was hopeful because Foch had the audacity to recapture the offensive and re-create a "war of movement" which had been abandoned after half-successes and failures in the first years of the war.[290] The Germans had taken advantage of naïve Bolshevik idealism to win the war in the East, and they were trying to do the same in the West. *La Victoire* was grateful to Clemenceau for his rejection of defeatism and his refusal to accept a "peace without victory."[291] Bolsheviks, international socialists, defeatists, and traitors were all united in Hervé's mind because all aided the cause of the German Empire.[292] After weeks of a duel to the death in the West, by late April a balance sheet of enemy and Allied forces made Hervé certain of victory. Though the Bolshevik Revolution had been a disaster, the disorders it had created had supposedly immunized France, Italy, and England against the deadly revolutionary virus. This realization made Allied defeat impossible. The Germans would have to rely on themselves now that Allied socialists had the Bolshevik fiasco before them. Hervé's optimism was accentuated not only by the temporary halt to the German offensive in late April but also by the growth of Allied forces.[293]

On September 23, 1918, less than three weeks before the Armistice, Hervé was "excommunicated" from the Federation of the Yonne at its departmental congress without being permitted to know the charges or speak in his own defense.



Figure 38. Clemenceau reviews American troops during *La Grande Guerre*. Bnf.

He blamed Bolsheviks and *minoritaires* at Auxerre and their allies in the S.F.I.O. who rejected his ideas on national socialism which had been presented in *La Victoire* on May 9, 1917. The denial of class struggle, the praise of capitalism as well as audacious, future-minded leaders of industry, and the rejection of the socialization of the means of production had been too much for the arbitration commission and for most Socialists to accept. Hervé told his readers he would not appeal the decision. Rather, he would await a National Congress of "French" Socialists, or he would defend a *Bloc National* of honest men and parties working to remake and restore France to its place as the leader of democratic nations. Claiming that his battle for social justice would continue, Hervé assumed that a truly national socialist party would soon constitute itself "purged of all the dangerous foolishness of our pre-war gospel."[294] Almost all Socialists now rejected Hervé, but he had been rejecting socialism, as it had come to be conceived, for a long time.[295]

At the end of the war, *La Victoire* was joyful, generous, gloating, sorrowful as well as optimistic. Hervé praised everyone and forgot about defeatists because he did not want the victory spoiled. He had always advocated national self-determination even for Germany, though one of his editors had more vindictive terms in mind. Economic progress, not class struggle, was Hervé's program for national concord and social peace. Still, much as he tried to look to the future, he could not forget the victims of war. "Our joy does not hamper or mock the sorrow of the grieving. Together the dead and the living can become part of our national resurrection."[296]

Even though the former *Sans Patrie* seemed to write lucidly throughout the war and was troubled by both bloody offensives and the treatment of foreigners, for Gilles Heuré the reality of the carnage overwhelms any attenuating circumstances one is tempted to grant him.[297] Before the war Hervé had called for a war on war, but his antimilitarist forces had never actually been bloodied on any fields of battle more vast or dangerous than the sites of various urban riots or political demonstrations. When he finally had to confront the hecatombs of war, it was by means of a political calculus which depersonalized the warriors or turned them into means for higher ends. "From this perspective, *La Grande Guerre* played a major role in formulating Hervé's political ideas of the interwar era. In the years ahead, it would remain for him the historical moment which caused all the problems of the pre-war era to swing toward other solutions." Heuré closed his account of Hervé during the war with a fascinating query. What might have been the impact on France and Europe if *La Victoire* had somehow included an editorial in 1916 or 1917 dealing with "the days of shame and mourning" at Verdun, the Somme, or the Chemin-des-Dames which echoed the rhetoric of "L'Anniversaire de Wagram?"[298]

17

The Postwar Crisis in France

At the end of World War I, Hervé considered himself to be a patriotic Republican in favor of a coalition of all the parties which had upheld the *Sacrée Union*. Former anticlericals were told to accept a religious peace in order to preserve wartime fraternity.[1] *La Victoire* wanted a *Bloc National* made up of all parties except those at the political extremes. For Hervé, victory in World War I proved the strength of the Republic. Yet he called both the monarchists at *L'Action Française* and the Bolsheviks "brothers" despite their mutual hatred. Even though he described the Royalists and Communists as sincere idealists, they were in error. France needed neither a king nor a revolution to improve it. Despite his bow to the Republic, he hoped for a modification of republican institutions so that it would take on aspects of the American Republic which he characterized as a "near dictatorship" under the American President. His hopes for a great national reconstitution of France included a continuation of the *Union Sacrée* and the Republic, but his expectations would soon evolve toward a revision of the French government in a consciously neo-Bonapartist direction.[2] It was not so much a fear of the Left that led to this call for a revision; rather, it was his fear of disorder, disunity, and division which Hervé believed characterized the parliamentary system that led him to demand a system that could prevent chaos. His evolution "toward" fascism during the interwar era would entail a call for class solidarity under the leadership

of a strong executive. This tactical position is parallel to the old Hervéist theme of unity of all the revolutionary forces of France behind an elite of militants or a single *chef*. An end to division, disorder, and chaos not only motivated many members of the political extremes, it also implied a nearly transcendental search for order and unity that virtually implied a rejection of politics as such.

Hervé wanted Radicals, Independent Socialists, and dissidents of the S.F.I.O. to join the *Bloc National* so that it could attract all levels of the population and would not appear to be a nationalistic or right-wing government. Only a broad coalition of Frenchmen would enable the new government to consecrate itself to the task of rebuilding France. He accused reformist Socialists of a lack of character and naïveté because they had been "taken in" by the foolish mysticism of the Bolsheviks. He hoped that patriotic reformist Socialists such as Albert Thomas would leave the S.F.I.O. and help form some sort of truly national socialism. Any talk of Socialist unity for Hervé was nothing but a lie. Most French Socialists who supported the Bolsheviks in Russia and sought Socialist unity in France did so because they were afraid of being labeled renegades, reactionaries, and nationalists. Hervé ridiculed Jean Longuet's idea of an international strike to protest Allied intervention in Russia, and he applauded all signs of a split in French socialism. In June 1919 the former *Sans Patrie* attacked Parisian transport workers and French miners for their prior strikes. *La Victoire* predicted that syndicalist and socialist insolence would not be tolerated by a nation that had just defeated Germany. At the time of a congress of all European syndicalists held in London in June 1919, *La Victoire* praised the worthy corporate demands of English workers which were contrasted to the noxious political demands of the French C.G.T.[3] At the end of the war, Hervé made discreet but insistent advances to the C.G.T., yet by October of 1920 he was moved to such desperation that he made the following threat: "The C.G.T. will be reformist or it will not be."[4] Though Hervé's national socialism did not forget the rhetoric of social justice, the means to attain it had clearly become circumscribed.

Although he claimed to favor social justice, Hervé thought that post-war May Days were too demanding. Of course, there were countless workers and militants around who reminded the former *Sans Patrie* of the halcyon days of Hervéism. His response to their accusatory reminiscences was anger. "The political and moral education of the working class must be redone almost completely." From now on strikes could not be tolerated. If he assumed that mutual good will could settle the strike of Parisian transport workers in 1919,[5] he called the strike of the metal workers a "*vent de folie*" (a moment of madness). For Hervé, strikes that demanded constant wage increases were scandalous. "We the winners, if we are

only egoistic pleasure seekers, incapable of the spirit of sacrifice for the community, we are lost, despite our victory." By early summer in 1919, he analyzed social relations far differently than he had before the war. "The working class, without the bourgeoisie to guide it, is currently as incapable of running the factories and the entire production process as the ordinary soldiers of French army would have been to drive out the Germans, if there had not been a Foch, his general staff, and the tens of thousands of officers from all the armies, to lead them, who increased the valor of their heroic soldiers a hundred fold by their intellectual and moral power."[6] It is fairly easy to enumerate Hervé's negative reactions to almost every strike during the interwar era, including striking *cheminots*, dockers from Lorient, Parisian glass cutters, bakers, miners, as well as the textile, postal, transportation, and auto workers.[7] When even the police went on strike in December 1923, the former *Sans Patrie* called that a terrifying indication of the depth of the tragedy. Hervé was capable of cautioning owners to compromise and negotiate as he did in September 1921 when the textile factory owners at Roubaix had broken off negotiations. He seems to have vacillated on higher wages and the eight-hour day in 1919 while his P.S.N. was attempting to gain traction, but generally he advised owners to remain strong and break the strikes, especially when they had become political. He often advised workers to accept reduced wages, and he even rejected the eight-hour day when Clemenceau promoted it in April 1919 in order to calm the post-war crisis.[8] Despite vacillation, such as his temporary support for the forty-hour work week at the time of the Popular Front, he remained fairly consistently regressive concerning labor issues throughout the interwar era.

Beyond the specific ostracism of Hervé by the French Left in 1918, *La Victoire* had other practical reasons for its hostility to socialism and syndicalism. In early July 1919 the newspaper found it necessary to return to its standard wartime two-page format. After eighteen months of nearly continuous four-page editions since February 20, 1917, the paper had to reduce its number of pages when the Maison Hachette distributor raised its charges to pay for increased salaries when its workers threatened to strike. Hervé not only reduced the size of *La Victoire*, he laid off half of his typographers and some of his editors. After telling workers and union leaders to think about the consequences of their actions, he assailed recent C.G.T. strikes, especially the strike planned for July 21, 1919. "*La Victoire* will not have completely merited its title", Hervé informed his readers, "until the day that it succeeds in grouping all the socialists who are disgusted with the class struggle and Bolshevism and succeeds in bringing back our working class into the path it should never have had to leave, that of a French and truly national socialism."[9]

By the end of the war, many workers had adopted revolutionary ideas which the strike waves in May and June of 1919 and then in 1920 underscored. Revolutionary events in Russia and elsewhere also had a major impact on working-class expectations and middle class fears. After the war the C.G.T. swelled in numbers; by some accounts C.G.T. membership before the war had dropped to 300,000, by 1919 there were two million. Even though syndicalist strength in some departments was no more than 5% of all workers, the general public feared growing proletarian forces. With the delays in demobilization and the rise in the cost of living, workers had become exasperated.[10] "Real wages in 1919 were, in fact, 15% below what they had been in 1914."[11] In March and April of 1919, at the time of Allied intervention in the East, Clemenceau tried to head off the increasingly desperate workers' demands with timely concessions including rapid demobilization, partial amnesties, collective bargaining, cost of living remedies, an eight-hour day, and a six-day week. That did not prevent May Day actions by workers any more than banning such action did. "There was irony in this, since Clemenceau had in 1906 so brutally repressed the first major May Day strike for the eight-hour day! The CGT nonetheless called a strike for May Day 1919, mainly to placate their followers, who sensed that, in Shorter and Tilly's words, the time was right 'to influence the political struggle' with mass action."[12] Instead of reaping the thanks of their followers, the C.G.T. leaders hesitated and soon felt workers' bitterness all the more because the rank and file assumed "that they had been on the verge of victory." In Paris alone nearly half a million demonstrators were involved in actions that led to many injuries and one death at the hands of the police. Despite calls for a general strike by a revolutionary minority in the C.G.T., the leadership would not act. Even though workers remained active through May 1919 on hundreds of strikes involving more than 200,000 strikers, syndicalist leaders would not order a general strike because they assumed it would simply instigate a bloody repression. That caution did not prevent metal workers, miners, and transport workers from striking in June 1919. For its temporization, moderate C.G.T. leadership was resented, heckled, and generally disparaged by many syndicalists.[13]

The syndicalist failure to channel worker's grievances constructively and the Socialist inability to account for the changing electoral landscape boded ill for the French Left in the November 1919 national elections. Socialist illusions about an imminent revolutionary wave in France hardly helped them to effectively plan electoral strategy. In the wake of the recent agitation among workers, the French majority must have feared the revolutionary peril all the more, especially given the ongoing events in Russia. That is what led to the November 1919 election victory by the conservative *Bloc National*.[14] Although from 1914 to 1919 Socialists

increased their votes by some 300,000, their failure to form alliances with bourgeois parties and their accelerating divisions spelled electoral disaster that fall. The new *scrutin de liste départmentale* may have created proportional representation, but it offered an advantage to lists which received the highest number of votes. The Center and Right took advantage of the new system by working together and appealing to voters' patriotism by putting up veterans as candidates, thereby deftly manipulating voters' fears of Bolshevism. The resulting victory led to what was often "Blue Horizon" Chamber, for the many sky-blue dress uniforms of those Deputies who were veterans.[15]

Despite the strike failures and political defeat in 1919, many militants and their working class allies continued to entertain the illusion that a revolutionary transformation was still possible. In 1920 spectacular strikes, especially among railway workers, broke out again. The Miners' Federation experienced much amalgamation in 1917 which produced a powerful wave of unionization. Hard hit by low wages and high prices, railway workers reacted forcefully after a railway union official employed on the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean line was locked out for fulfilling normal union obligations. Harsh responses by owners led to a walk-out followed by a general strike affecting many railway networks at the end of February 1920. Immediately the new French Prime Minister and former socialist Alexandre Millerand[16] seemed to solve the crisis by brokering a general deal involving a host of issues affecting the future of the railways. However, once the railway companies backed out of the bargaining and wound up firing many workers, Millerand decided not to pressure the companies. When talk of another strike was heard, he promised that the government would act to put down any "revolutionary" strike even if it meant a return to Briand's 1910 tactic of drafting any strikers. Given the failure of the French Left to either prevent the war or end it quickly as well as the revolutionary success in Russia, workers were in no mood for caution. They certainly had many immediate, practical concerns which did not reduce their impatience. Because syndicalists were unable to obtain either sufficient reforms or significant wage increases in the post-war era, many workers were ready for a showdown, and the new Chamber with its right-wing majority was ready to oblige.[17]

Initially, Jouhaux and the majority of the C.G.T. leadership became more prudent, but the minority of revolutionaries utilized the impatience of recently unionized workers in order to promote a forced confrontation.[18] Revolutionary *cheminots* managed to unseat the moderate leadership of the railway union by the end of April 1920, and then called for a general strike on May Day if the companies did not rehire workers fired in February. When the *cheminots* asked

for the support of the C.G.T., the skeptical Jouhaux was forced to accede due to accusations of treason and collusion with the owners. Even though C.G.T. leaders felt compelled to support the strike, they feared its potential revolutionary consequences, so they instituted successive strikes in several sectors rather than a vast general strike. At first the strike action by miners, seamen, and dockers seemed to succeed. However, the owners responded effectively, in part by hiring middle class and Christian union replacements. Even the miners' strike actions were not as effective as was expected. The Northern Railway System did not even have majority support. Almost nowhere did strikers number more than half the workers. In the end, the action of 400,000 metal workers was stillborn, and strike activities involving the building trades, automobile workers, as well as those in aviation and transportation fared no better. By the second week of May 1920 the strikers' energy was fading rapidly. By the end of May, the companies were triumphant, yielding thousands of penalties and dismissals of workers for their efforts. In fact, some 18,000 railway workers lost their jobs which represented 5% of all railway personnel.[19] "For the right, this was 'a civic Battle of the Marne'."[20]

Successive waves of strikes failed due to the organizations of the owners, the aid of the government, and the lack of support among other French workers. Workers were humiliated to the point of apologizing for their rashness and begging forgiveness from employers. One million disillusioned workers, roughly 50%, left the C.G.T. That led to serious internal conflicts and the dissolution of the organization was even contemplated. "The electoral victory by the Right in November 1919 and the workers' defeat in May 1920 created the conditions for the splits in the Socialist Party and the C.G.T."[21] Against this backdrop socialism split at the Tours Congress on Christmas 1920 between a *Parti Communiste Français* and a new version of the S.F.I.O. By February 14, 1922 a moderate majority in the C.G.T. saw the expelled minority create the Communist *Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire* (C.G.T.U.). Now two rival leftist unions existed alongside those of the Catholics. The C.G.T. was so weakened that the government soon lost interest in dissolving it.[22] "The Communist union … abandoned the syndicalist tradition of remaining independent of politics, and created a new unionism subordinate to the Party."[23]

After the war the C.G.T. certainly wanted reforms in France's political economy which included not only nationalizations but a national economic council that was expected to include unions, management, consumers, and the French state. Such reformist ideas "had little chance of being accepted after the failure of massive strikes of 1919 and 1920. Though the C.G.T. leadership had not wanted the strikes, it had been forced to back them. After the strikes collapsed,

the C.G.T.'s political influence was negligible for the rest of the decade, killing Jouhaux's hopes of being recognized as a partner by the government."[24] Hervé hoped that this experience would lead workers to push syndicalist and socialist leaders toward moderation. Again, Hervé was overly optimistic. The reaffirmation of the Charter of Amiens at the C.G.T. Congress of Orleans in October 1920 and the division of the S.F.I.O. at Tours in December 1920 dashed Hervé's hopes.[25]

The failure of Hervé's *Parti Socialiste National* (P.S.N.) even before the November elections of 1919 coupled with the actions by revolutionary socialists and syndicalists in 1919 and 1920 led Hervé to much more extreme positions in domestic politics. Though the leadership of the C.G.T. was deeply divided in 1919 and 1920, Hervé assailed Jouhaux's role in the reaffirmation of revolutionary syndicalism. The former *Sans Patrie* believed that workers and unions had "never had it so good" because of the advantages they had gained during World War I as part of the government and owners' efforts to maintain social peace.[26] Apparently, Hervé was unaware of the decline of real wages from 1914 until 1919.[27] But low wages were not the only source of workers' activism and dissatisfaction. As has been seen, a belief in an imminent revolutionary transformation of France in 1919 and 1920 gave greater force to the minority of revolutionaries in the S.F.I.O. and C.G.T.[28] Would such illusions persist in the wake of the splits in the Left in 1920 and 1922?

In the summer of 1920 with the revolutionary situations in Russia and Eastern Europe continuing, some French revolutionaries still hoped that contagion from the East would reach France. The division of French socialism at Tours did not occur through an exacerbation of traditional cleavages in the S.F.I.O. Neither did it occur due to divisions provoked by the war, nor through the split of revolutionaries versus reformists. The division at Tours arose from an assessment of two temporary events of 1920. One was the relative defeat of the working class movement in political and syndical operations. The other was the belief that world revolution was imminent despite the recent defeat of the Red Army before Warsaw. Annie Kriegel characterized these occurrences as "double accidents" which created two different assessments by the French Left. Many thought the division would be temporary, but it increased in the 1920's.[29]

By the end of the war, Hervé hoped for the expulsion of revolutionaries from the S.F.I.O., so what especially bothered him about the Tours Congress was the maintenance of Marxism by the heirs of Jaurès. He believed that socialists should have rejected class struggle, concentrated on the national instead of the international arena, respected Republican legality, and looked to social justice not by means of expropriations but by equal access of all classes to entry into France's

elites.[30] At first glance, for Hervé, the Tours Congress "weakened the socialist movement overall, but it also reinforced it by arranging several admission tickets to it."[31] Ironically, when Trotskyites and other communist opponents of P.C.F. authoritarianism assailed the party, they accused it of "resuscitating Hervéism, crude demagoguery, verbal excess, and bluff."[32] Heuré assumed that Hervé would have been amused.[33] Perhaps because French Socialists invariably rejected his entreaties and expectations, Hervé periodically lashed out against them more harshly than he did against French Communists.

Hervé became so exasperated by the persistence of the revolutionary mentality among workers affiliated with the C.G.T. that he collected a series of his most extreme anti-syndicalist articles in a brochure in late 1920 under the title *La C.G.T. Contre La Nation*.[34] During the railroad strike in early May, which he called a fiasco, Hervé delivered a general assault on all workers. "The workers are … as egoistic as the bourgeoisie. They are not any better morally, and intellectually they are worth much less. The great obstacle to the coming of the communist paradise … is the intellectual and moral mediocrity of the mass of workers, who still need to be educated, and the disgusting lack of character of their leaders, who do not dare to tell the truth." Hervé believed that most workers only struck due to their fear of the revolutionary minority who had been poisoned by internationalist dogmas of hatred and death.[35] Apparently, the former *Sans Patrie* had not yet discovered religion as the universal social panacea because he called Bolshevism, anarchism, socialism, and syndicalism mystical religions which replaced Medieval Christianity. He claimed that such secular creeds were like traditional religion because they, too, were not subject to reasoned discussions.[36] Despite the sincerity of syndicalist leaders, their actions simply completed the work of destruction begun by Germany in 1914. For that reason Hervé wanted the government to destroy the C.G.T. hierarchy. He assailed Jouhaux for going beyond the legal professional aims of syndicalism, for making the C.G.T. "a state within a state," and for trying to impose syndicalist ideas on the legal majority in France.[37] When "a Bolshevik paper" noted that Hervé no longer spoke as he did during the 1910 railway strike, the former *Sans Patrie* delivered his favorite post-war comment. "It's true, but perhaps you have forgotten, there occurred a minor event that has changed many things. There was a war."[38] A version of that response became the masthead of *La Victoire* throughout the interwar era.

The war and its aftermath illustrated just how "stupid and naïve" workers had been and how intellectuals had "read too much" instead of learning to understand life![39] Hervé's negative assessment of syndicalists and their leaders was coupled with praise of the leaders of industry who were "extraordinary in intelligence and

work strength." He told workers to be patient because changes were evolutionary. Once workers were better educated they would be "worthy" of a greater role in the government and in the administration of national wealth.[40] The severity of the disorder of May 1920 pushed Hervé to remind his republican readers that democracies might require the intervention of Bonapartes to save them.[41] In his efforts to halt the disorders, workers' purely economic concerns were contrasted with the illuminism and revolutionary enthusiasm of syndicalist extremists. Yet purely material concerns had always had a negative connotation for Hervé, who still considered workers, in general, to be both impulsive and violent.[42] Much as Hervé had always searched for clarity, he seldom escaped conflicting arguments. His views in 1920 were so convoluted that it seems fair to consider the disorder of that year as a major factor pushing his national socialism away from reformism and toward a new kind of extremism. After the hecatombs of war and the release of the furies of Bolshevism, Hervé had no doubt regarding the sources of disorder and disharmony. Though he tried to explain the post-war strikes as a struggle between socialist reformism and revolutionary Bolshevism, his arguments were increasingly traditional reactionary ones.[43] It would take an alternative form of idealism for Hervé's new political views to again more plausibly attempt to channel workers' grievances toward supposedly "more acceptable" social and economic compromise.

Hervé's extreme rhetoric in 1920 was intermittent. At the beginning of the year he had written several articles on productivism, which was an attempt to solve the social question gradually by an evolution in capitalism arising out of greater co-ordination among workers, owners, and the state by means of mutual control of industry, technical education, and increased production. His occasional references to productivism, Taylorism, and Fordism may indicate that Hervé, like Georges Valois and *Le Faisceau*, exhibited what Samuel Kalman has described as contrasting (and almost contradictory) trends toward modernism as well as traditionalism.[44] After the disorders of May, Hervé proposed his own semi-corporatist ideas to the C.G.T. involving regional councils composed of all professional groups. Such councils would be directed by the Senate acting as the chief Economic Assembly, while the C.G.T. would play a purely professional role.[45] Starting on June 1, 1920, Hervé wrote six consecutive appeals to French Socialists, still hoping that a moderate national socialism could be created which could forge an understanding with capitalism, reconcile with Germany, and create a United States of Europe. These editorials were collected in a brochure late in 1920 under the title *Lettre aux Socialistes*. Though the editorials sought to reconcile French workers to the nation on the basis of an evolutionary approach to social justice, Hervé blamed French errors on the acceptance of the ideas of an

uprooted, denationalized, Jewish refugee who turned his personal experiences in Germany and England into the atavistic theology of Marxism.[46] In an era of social conflict, Hervé's best efforts to preserve a rhetoric of fraternity, harmony, and internationalism could not prevent the emergence of a language of fear, hatred, and xenophobia.

Though Hervé never totally relinquished his humanism and internationalism, his view of human nature had always been ambivalent. Hervéism had stressed the need for individual militants to show audacity to lead the timid, materialistic, and ignorant "mass" of workers. The self-interested behavior of the masses had always been contrasted with the idealism and selflessness of an elite of militants. By 1920 the elite had changed in character, yet Hervé still sought to attract the "masses" who remained selfish, materialistic, and ignorant. Hervé's optimistic and sometimes utopian ideas about the future had never been separate from pessimistic assessments about the nature of man. Hervéism had feared anarchy and looked to discipline as well as unity among revolutionaries. Hervé's national socialism applied the same approach to the entire nation. The decline of internationalism and socialism as agents for order, harmony, and discipline led Hervé to look first to the nation and then to its religions to attain these ideals.[47]

Hervé's views on human nature seem contradictory. For example, if he stressed liberty, audacity, and spontaneity in the heyday Hervéism, the Insurrectional "General" also knew the value of discipline, order, and leadership. The post-war national socialist continued that curious blend, even if the stress was different. But the views of the former *Sans Patrie* were not the only ones displayed in *La Victoire*. The moderate Republican André Lichtenberger, who had been recruited by Hervé in 1914 and would remain at *La Victoire* until his death in March 1940, had a much more coherent view than the mixtures of optimism and pessimism, hope and fear, as well as progress and regress which generally characterized Hervé. However, in late July 1920 Lichtenberger himself wrote an analysis of French social problems that would easily fit into the standard reactionary arguments about decadence and the need for renewal which are often associated with the origins and definitions of fascism. To cure the ills of urban industrial society which included alcoholism, cabarets, and various sensual pleasures, Lichtenberger called on the state to keep peasants in the countryside. The decline of virtue, the spread of dangerous diseases such as syphilis, and the ravages of depopulation were caused or exacerbated by urban life which bred immorality.[48] Lichtenberger, like Hervé, an *agrégé* in history, was an excellent writer and not devoid of clever perceptions and urbanity, but in this instance his political and moral views were a narrow, naïve, and nostalgic assault on the modern era itself.

The government's response to the disorders of 1919 and 1920 gave Hervé a temporary faith that the Republic did not have to be synonymous with anarchy. He believed that conditions were now favorable for reforms which would create greater authority by means of a stronger executive.[49] After the eclipse of Clemenceau's political star and the short-lived Presidency of Paul Deschanel, Hervé hoped that Millerand as the new President would become the providential leader of Republican authority. In late 1920 Hervé collected many of his articles on Millerand to form a brochure entitled *Millerand-De Strasbourg à l'Elysée*. What is most noteworthy about those articles was the clear emergence of Hervé's evolving twin solutions to French political chaos and social disorder: (1) a "providential man" as the powerful executive under a reformed Constitution creating discipline and harmony in France, and (2) religion to replace the now bankrupt socialist faith. Critical thinking and secular education, once crucial ingredients in Hervé's intellectual repertoire, were now blamed for workers' anarchy and the threat to civilization. Hervé still vacillated on the need for a new version of Bonapartism, but his solutions to various crises had periodically implied a Bonapartist approach from the beginning of the war.[50]

With the *Bloc National* in power in 1920, Hervé remained pro-Republican, but *La Victoire* was beginning to include a growing consideration of religious issues. The resignations of the anti-clerical Deschanel as President of France and his replacement by the increasingly more conservative Millerand in September 1920 seemed to symbolize to Hervé the religious reconciliation needed by France.[51] Eventually Hervé would salute Millerand's steps toward the religious pacification of France, such as sending a French Ambassador to the Vatican and marching in the funeral of Cardinal Amette of Paris. Hervé wanted Catholics to know that the Republic was not their enemy. He still expected the Church to accept the 1905 Separation, and at this point he hoped that Catholic leaders and organizations would stay out of politics. When he described the moderation of the Republic to French Catholics, he sought to contrast it with the mystical dreams of Eastern communism. For Hervé, France did not need a revolution because nine out of ten French political, administrative, and business leaders were the sons or grandsons of workers or peasants.[52] On the fiftieth anniversary of the Third Republic, Hervé praised Marianne as a noble model!

However, amidst the hopes, chaos, and confusion of the post-war era, Hervé increasingly looked to Bonapartism to solve the problems created by the revolutionary spirit. During the war Hervé's repeated calls for a government of authority, a Committee of Public Safety, and a leader with audacity show that Hervé's neo-Bonapartism antedated re-Christianization as a solution to French problems.

In 1921 on the centenary of Napoleon's death, Hervé sought to rehabilitate the image of the former leader. Napoleon was wise, not only for his creation of the Civil Code but also for instituting the Concordat. Echoing Clemenceau's legendary quip, Hervé agreed that:

> "the Revolution and the Empire formed a whole. Napoleon was simply the crowned soldier of the Revolution who created order out of the confusion of the French Directory. He restored authority and discipline in a country where the revolutionary factions were incapable of a stable government. Bonaparte maintained the essential conquests of the revolution: civil equality, freedom of conscience, accession of Frenchmen to individual property, and the consolidation of national property taken from the former privileged nobility. He had been fought so intently by all of reactionary Europe of that age only because he was the symbol of the living and triumphant revolution."[53]

Convinced that the ideas of *L'Action Française* were anachronistic, sure that the hereditary principle was dangerous, and certain that Republican principles were too rooted ever to be rejected in France, Hervé viewed "Bonapartism as a continuation of the French Revolution which conciliated the principles of authority and the Republican tradition."[54]

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Le Parti Socialiste National of 1919

Even though he had lost friends and at least one close family member during the war, Hervé's preoccupations quickly turned to politics. Important political topics were not hard to find in the post-war era, especially questions dealing with domestic issues such as French elections, labor agitation, socialism, Church-state relations, depopulation, etc. There were also important foreign affairs issues to consider, including the Russian Revolution, German political instability, Rhenish separatism, reparations, etc. At first his focus was the resurrection of a *Bloc* to try to incorporate socialists before they shifted into Bolshevism. Gilles Heuré implied that Hervé was incapable or simply unwilling to recognize and ponder the impact of four years of war on either the dazed and disillusioned veterans who returned from the front or the victims on the Home Front who had endured the shocks and personal losses affecting almost everyone. Rather than being insensitive or exceptionally unimaginative, Hervé may have simply calculated that pondering the horrors of war and its impact was simply counter-productive. If true, that in itself says volumes about the man. Whatever his inner logic or motivations, his remedy for the nation's ills was going to center on a proposed party which sought to combine nationalism and socialism. This new party was expected to be integrated with the new *Bloc National* and would exclude enthralled French Bolsheviks as well as anachronistic monarchists. "His political horizon entailed the triptych of a healthy class collaboration: Capital, Talent, and Work."[1]

During the war Hervé sought French unity and the maintenance of the *Union Sacrée* as the means to win the war. Yet these means to victory also provided apparent solutions to problems that he had long sought to remedy. The war temporarily achieved the unity, harmony, order, and discipline that he had for so long sought, even though such cohesion proved to be temporary when old divisive influences re-emerged amidst the carnage. Once victory had been achieved, the central problem for Hervé was to maintain, perfect, or resurrect the French renewal which the war had begun. Internal divisions could be transcended, peace perpetuated, and French decay reversed if Frenchmen would continue to put France above individual and particular interests. One way to achieve such goals was to combine the noble ideals of socialism with the great "spiritual" force of the French nation.[2]

Gilles Heuré explained Hervé's interwar political goals as two-fold: (1) To check Bolshevism and the dangerous influences of the Russian Revolution on France; (2) To foster a political and moral rupture with pre-war Radicalism. Though Bolshevism/Communism was invariably a target in *La Victoire*, sometimes Hervé's rhetoric was more generous to the Communist *illuminés* than to the anticlerical Radicals or mainstream, rhetorically revolutionary, Socialists. The slogan, "*Le radicalisme: voilà l'ennemi*", certainly fit Hervé's interwar political position, especially during elections. For Hervé, Radicalism was an obstacle to French national renewal because it fostered "disastrous and harmful political habits" which could lead to two extreme reactions: Bolshevism and fascism. If Bolshevism was the worst menace for Hervé, his negative assessment of the fascist threat was initially ambiguous. As time went on fascism became a threat to be wielded against the forces of the Left if they did not behave, but occasionally it became a possible remedy, however drastic, to disorder.[3] Throughout the interwar era Hervé remained legalistic, and he generally argued that fascism should be avoided. Yet a definite ambivalence remained on the subject because his authoritarian and Bonapartist solutions as well as his praise of similar solutions to national decadence in Italy and Germany, came close to the very fascism he supposedly wanted to spare the French. At times Hervé extolled "*la machine à voter*" over "*la machine à bosseler*" (the Hervéist *matraque*), but over the course of the interwar era the general direction of Herve's political rhetoric was anti-democratic and authoritarian, though he continued to call for reform and renewal in a legalistic manner. That is a nuance of some significance.

In the increasingly polarized interwar era, Hervé never completely relinquished his utopian vision even though some of his efforts to implement it verged on its antithesis. To modify the image of Maurice Agulhon, the Chambre *Bleu Horizon*, which emerged from the November 1919 elections, was not just blue for

the uniforms of the many veterans in the Chambre or the symbolic blue line of the Vosges, its folds may have included a very faded red as well as an obvious white for many Deputies and a good portion of the population. It marked a strong fear of revolution and an implicit hope that anticlericalism had become outmoded after four years of common sacrifice.[4] Even that image does not quite fit Hervé, who rhetorically, at least, wanted to preserve a few spots of crimson within the tricolor.

What Hervé and many others had bought into was the myth of the *Union Sacrée*. The scholarship of Jean-Jacques Becker long ago established that "political mistrust and conflicts continued throughout the war, although discreetly" and the public accepted the war with determined resignation far more than enthusiasm despite superficial memories of flowers in rifle barrels, massive patriotic crowds, jubilant communal embrace, and shouts of "Á Berlin!" which were largely an urban, middle-class phenomena. The farmers and villagers knew better.[5] Despite his selective memories, the myth of the "sacred union" served Hervé's interwar political purpose by reinforcing his long-held views that habitual parliamentary disunity and unseemly electoral maneuvering dissipated national energies. It would not be long before that logic would reinforce a tendency to expect and demand an authoritarian unity to remedy democratic disorder and chaos.

Given the financial problems at *La Victoire*, the "Appeal to French Socialists", launching the *Parti Socialiste National* on July 6, 1919, was less than auspicious. If Hervé's national socialism was starkly anti-Bolshevik, it must also be recognized that it evolved out of conceptions inherent in his idealistic socialism before his *retournement*. His growing anti-Marxism was evident even before the war, and the foundation of his national socialism had been formally developed in *La Victoire* by April 1916. The P.S.N., with the tricolor fringed in red as an emblem, was a pragmatic and symbolic attempt to unite all classes of Frenchmen. The party even described itself as republican as well as socialist "in the economic and social domain" and promoted universal ideals, not necessarily alien to the Left, including some rather vague and nebulous aspirations implied by the terms harmony, discipline, unity, fraternity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, and morality.[6] Yet, for Hervé, the "vulgar and simplistic" formulas of class struggle, anti-capitalism, international workers against all capitalists, and socialist parties against all Republican parties had to end. To remedy such "ideas of hate", he looked to "the French sources of socialism" somehow epitomized by the ideas of François-Noël Gracchus Babeuf, Claude Henri de Rouvroy–Comte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Auguste Blanqui, and Jaurès. He expected that his new party would become the "extreme Left of the next *Bloc National*." Such

a *Bloc National* would seek to resurrect France by means of religious as well as social peace, a constitutional revision, the creation of economic regions having autonomous powers, a public works program—especially to alleviate the areas of war devastation, and the creation of new international military institutions which would make a League of Nations possible as well as guarantee an end to Prussian militarism. In order to create such a *Bloc National*, a *Parti Socialiste National* was needed to lead workers away from German socialism. Hervé believed that Germanic Marxist socialism was too utopian, too much the creation of "bookish intellectuals", and too alien to the realities of individual men. Though he claimed not to reject all Marxist ideals, Hervé believed that such an ideology was subversive to the present social order given the current state of human development.[7]

Hervé wanted former members of the S.F.I.O., various "renegades", Independent Socialists, and Republican Socialists of all varieties to join his new party. He hoped to recruit socialists then being expelled from the S.F.I.O. such as the forty socialist Deputies led by Compère-Morel. He openly appealed to Alexandre Millerand, Aristide Briand, René Viviani, Victor Augagneur, Maurice Allard, J.-L. Breton, Alexandre Zévaès, Albert Willm, and Jean Allemane to join the *Parti Socialiste National* and thereby avenge the Amsterdam Congress of 1904, where Guesde poisoned French reformist socialism by placing it under the domination of German Marxism.[8] Many of these sought-after recruits could themselves be described as "renegades" and Independent Socialists who had often been former enemies of Hervéism.

Expecting that national socialism could create a more just and "maternal" society for all men not just workers, Hervé assumed that such a system would care for children as well as encourage and protect large families. Nurseries, health services, and education would be priorities. Everyone would have the right to own property, but farmers and workers would be entitled to the "surplus value" for their labor. Cooperatives of production and consumption were to be encouraged. To end strikes by workers and lockouts by owners, compulsory arbitration would be instituted. Workers would also be granted a social security retirement program. The state was to become a better administrator, but it would neither control private lives nor socialize industries. The state's role was to defend the general interest against exaggerated private and corporate appetites. To end individual and group egoism as well as to create a more stable government, free of petty parliamentary intrigues, a stronger executive authority was necessary. Since universal suffrage, progress in education, as well as freedoms of the press, assembly, and union formation would all be guaranteed, any recourse to violence and revolution would be considered criminal. Such "noble" aspirations led Hervé to assume that the *Parti*

Socialiste National would be the best avenue to progress, reform, social justice, social peace, and Republican order in France.[9] In July 1919 Hervé's first attempt to create a National Socialist Party was not meant to be a reactionary program in any overt sense. It did entail revisionist currents, especially regarding the need for order and a stronger executive, which would later evolve, under conditions of frustration and crisis, into authoritarian appeals that some today could label fascist. If his program in 1919 had not been so naïve, one could almost call it progressive.

Hervé's P.S.N. did not reject internationalism, but it demanded a solidarity of all classes within France. Before French workers could join German workers, they had to learn to love their fellow Frenchmen. Hervé accepted international fraternity as it had been "created by the French Revolution." Such a fraternity of men and nations could only be achieved by French strength and the solidarity of all classes within the nation. The old international ideals had been betrayed by the S.P.D. in 1914 and the Bolsheviks in 1917. France needed a strong military force in order to repel all possible invasions, but other countries did not need to fear France because the French Republic always held within it "the hope of a Universal Republic."[10] Despite the propagandistic character of Hervé's evolving discourse, its creator was far from immune to his own rhetoric.

In order to heighten the contrast to German Marxist materialism, Hervé's national socialism stressed French idealism. In place of a spirit of revolt, he advocated class cooperation and solidarity. Instead of hatred and traditional leftist indiscipline, the P.S.N. looked to toleration and courtesy. Hervé said that his new party would respect legality because France had freedom under a Republic. He defined the P.S.N. as a party of reason, justice, honor, and humanity. These were the ideals that the French Revolution supposedly incarnated in the image of *la patrie républicaine*. Hervé characterized the new party as optimistic because it opposed the pessimistic and pathological values incarnated in class struggle, social war, and neo-Malthusianism. Returning to a theme he had begun prior to the war, the former advocate of family planning and even abortion now assailed his former neo-Malthusian ideas. That assault became a crucial feature in his national socialism.

Hervé wanted the *Bloc National* to create French renewal by going beyond traditional politics. In fact, he felt that it was the petty and dirty business of politics that had prevented French renewal in the first place. The former *Sans Patrie* hoped that the elections of 1919 would be conducted in order to carry France beyond politics! French decadence was largely a question of depopulation and economic stagnation. Such problems arose out of poor French governmental

machinery, ministerial crises, and an irresponsible bureaucracy incapable of innovation.[11] Hervé believed that all French patriots and Republicans, in order to preserve France, had to seek the following reforms: an end to depopulation, a revision of the Constitution in order to create a stronger executive as well as to form more stable and competent ministries independent of parliamentary intrigues, ministers chosen from outside Parliament, and administrative/bureaucratic reforms including the replacement of outmoded *départements* with large autonomous economic regions.[12]

Since Hervé assumed that the *Bloc National* would work for such reforms, why was a *Parti Socialiste National* necessary? Despite the idealistic definitions and phraseology, the P.S.N. also had a very pragmatic purpose. The new party was expected to attract large numbers of workers to the *Bloc National* who normally would have voted for the S.F.I.O. It was assumed that after the elections the P.S.N. would work to uproot German Marxist materialism and replace it with the patriotic, idealistic, and reformist values that Hervé associated with French socialism. To maintain the *Union Sacrée* with all Frenchmen including workers, France had to have the P.S.N. To preserve the victory of 1918 from sabotage by the organizations of the S.F.I.O. and the C.G.T., these organizations had to be combated. What better means to wage this battle against the forces of disorder than a P.S.N. reinforced by contingents of the *anciens combattants*, those symbols of the solidarity of all classes created by "the mud and the blood" of the trenches in the service of France.[13] In many ways Hervé's national socialism appeared to be a creative effort to reform the French political system. It was also an adaptive and anxious call to calm and order after years of war. Optimistic and positive expressions of cooperation, harmony, and solidarity seemed much healthier than social war, class conflict, as well as political hatreds and competition. But once Hervé realized that workers and their organizations would not follow him, he soon reverted to the language of confrontation, exclusion, and animosity. If the suppression of divisions by moderation, gradual reform, and the rhetoric of fraternity did not succeed, Hervé was ready to resurrect his aggressive rhetoric if not violence itself.

On August 2, 1919, after ridiculing Briand and Millerand for not responding to the "hazardous" task of leading the P.S.N., Hervé announced that aged socialist Jean Allemane had joined the new party. After having left the S.F.I.O. in disgust in 1913 and temporarily retiring from politics, Allemane had rallied to the *Union Sacrée* in 1914.[14] He, too, favored a patriotic socialism due to the tumultuous conditions created by the war. But Hervé's chief hope to make the P.S.N. a viable force was the adhesion of the *Parti Républicain Socialiste*.[15] Actually, in December 1917

some of the Republican Socialists had already begun to call themselves the *Parti Socialiste National* in order to better affirm their opposition to the S.F.I.O. and its increasingly Zimmerwaldian character.[16] This prior National Socialist Party was led by Alexandre Zévaès as Secretary-General. Though Zévaès had once been a *bête noire* for *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé had never met him. Their prior animosity did not prevent Hervé's enthusiastic amalgamation of the two national socialist parties. Zévaès brought with him a directing Committee made up of Albert Orry, Albert Letrillard, Henri Chartrand, and Jacques Prolo. This earlier P.S.N. had its own cadres, a weekly newspaper, *L'Effort*, directed by Jacques Prolo, and a constitution. Hervé believed Zévaès's party had exhibited sufficient vitality to be of great assistance in the expansion of national socialism. Zévaès and his party addressed a letter to *La Victoire* agreeing to join Hervé's P.S.N. on the basis of patriotism, anti-Bolshevism, public order, and social progress. They agreed that it was impossible to separate the ideal of the Social Republic from the French nation.[17]

Hervé and Zévaès seemed to have had much in common since both men were former Socialists who had been banished by the S.F.I.O. and both were assailed by the Bolsheviks. *L'Humanité* attacked Zévaès as the legal defender of Raoul Villain, the assassin of Jaurès. Hervé gave an apology for Zévaès's action which entailed a curious and self-disclosing attack on Jaurès.[18] In fact, Zévaès had been looking to the French origins of socialism long before Hervé's shift. His watchwords had long been, "Be socialist but be French!" For Zévaès, the war proved the validity of his pre-war evolutionary socialism. Like Hervé, Zévaès stressed the disappearance of class antagonisms by means of the ascendancy of the nation. Both men exhibited an anti-Germanism which antedated the war, but Zévaès's anti-Germanism seemed even more xenophobic and eccentric because he blamed the Germans not only for Marx, cloudy Idealist philosophy, and S.P.D. duplicity but for homosexuality as well.[19]

In 1919 Hervé described the P.S.N. as a reformist socialist party. He had not yet disowned the French Revolutionary heritage, and he continued to look to a United States of Europe as a stage in the evolution toward some sort of world government. As he had in 1916, Hervé spoke of the creation of national socialist parties all over the world, even in Germany. He assumed that such parties ultimately would join within the framework of the League of Nations to form a Fourth International. Despite its growing hostility to Bolshevik internationalism, Hervé's P.S.N. carried on the dream of a Union of Social Republics.[20] Though an idealistic and utopian legacy had not yet vanished, Hervé would soon call the Enlightenment and the French Revolution the sources of modern evil. Such regression and a complete reversal in explanation masked certain continuities in

Hervé's social critique, tactics, and program. Increasingly during the interwar era, whenever his panaceas were rejected and the social and political climate became more polarized, Hervé's program became more extreme.

Though the P.S.N. wanted to prepare a list of candidates which could appeal to workers, its syndical policies foreshadowed certain corporatist solutions to the social question. The new party initially accepted the legitimacy of worker demands for higher wages and an eight-hour day. So the failure to attract workers in 1919 may have been one reason for Hervé gradually to reverse himself as he came to see the eight-hour day as a cause of inflation.[21] The P.S.N. did not reject syndical organizations or activities, but it was averse to the political role that unions then had in the S.F.I.O.-C.G.T. conceptions. Zévaès wanted the role of unions to be limited to corporate or professional goals such as the concerns for better working conditions and higher wages. The P.S.N. expected each union to include all the workers in its particular *métier*, no matter what their political views, in order to be strong enough to deal with owners' coalitions and in the interests of unity. Workers in such a system were to be given job security as well as guarantees against wage reductions. Thus, owners would receive the necessary stability to run vast industries. Both owners and workers had social needs as well as obligations. The dangers of strikes and class conflict would be avoided by compulsory arbitration and the exclusion of Bolshevik unions. Such a program was considered mandatory for economic reorganization and industrial development.[22]

In the late summer and early fall of 1919, the P.S.N. held meetings and rallies in Paris, especially in the 13th *arrondissement*, and in the Isère, where Zévaès had a power base. The P.S.N. had been created to prepare for the election of November 1919, but it did not present a list of candidates probably because it lacked support. On the eve of the elections, Hervé advised S.F.I.O. reformists not to support Radicals and Independent Socialists in a *Bloc des Gauches*. A *Bloc des Gauches* not only would be crushed between the *Bloc National* and the Bolsheviks, it would also make the *Bloc National* seem nationalist and rightist. To preserve the aura of the *Union Sacrée*, Hervé appealed to all non-Marxists of the Left to at least join the *Bloc National* even if they chose not to join the P.S.N. The great success of the *Bloc National* and the election of the *Bleu Horizon* Parliament failed to sustain the identity of the P.S.N. as the Left wing of the *Bloc National*. Soon after the elections the names Allemane and Zévaès disappeared from the pages of *La Victoire*, and all talk of the P.S.N. temporarily ceased.[23] Neither Catherine Grünblatt nor Gilles Heuré found any explanation for those departures. The *Parti Republicaine Socialiste* continued to exist precariously into the 1930s. Presumably, such adhesions had been temporary unions of convenience easily cancelled once the results

proved so disappointing. Hervé had other more immediate priorities: a newspaper to publish and a payroll to meet. Nevertheless, events in 1919 and 1920 only reconfirmed for him that necessity of national socialism.

The direction that Hervé's political formations would take was tied to his developing assessment of the traditional Right as too moderate and unimaginative. That perspective, like his earlier evaluation of the fissiparous French prewar Left, was colored by his almost continuous and inevitable rejection. Hervé's interwar formations found little available political space and they were stymied by his notorious record. The former *Sans Patrie* was destined to be dismissed or despised by most of the Left and the Right. To explain Hervé's long-term political fortunes, one must look at the traditional French Right during the interwar era. In France, "parties as such hardly existed. On the right the URD (*Union républicaine et démocratique*), the Republican Federation, the Democratic Alliance, etc., were parliamentary groups extended by uneven networks of electoral committees far more than bodies organized in real associations." Generally, elected officials from the Right were entrenched and influential local notables who were not easily controlled by party structures. In Paris they usually worked through "coteries, friendships, [and] various networks of private interests." They were often at odds over specific legislation which affected various regions and groups differently.[24] Hervé's aim to unite the Right in some sort of umbrella party or coalition for constitutional revision seemed destined for a quixotic history.

Julian Jackson explained the problems of the interwar French Right in terms of a dual fault-line. In addition to religious conflicts among Catholics, Protestants, some Jews, and many secularists, the Right was torn by an underlying tension between large and small producers, which increased with the wartime expansion of major enterprises involved in engineering, electricity, and chemicals. The Radicals were generally seen as the party of small producers. If the *Alliance Démocratique* was associated with more modernizing business interests, the *Fédération Républicaine* was linked to industries with higher labor costs such as textiles, mining, and metallurgy. "In defending their social interests, conservatives were hampered by divisions in the French Right dating back to the Dreyfus Affair." The Center-Right *Alliance Démocratique* had generally stressed the need for an alliance with the anticlerical Left as a means of protecting the Republic. The more right-wing *Fédération Républicaine* wanted to prevent the Dreyfus Affair from disrupting conservative social interests and opposed discriminatory laws against Catholics. During the interwar era, it became increasingly Catholic as it replaced defunct confessional groups, which made it harder to forge a lasting alliance with the *Alliance Démocratique*. The *Alliance Démocratique* could have allied with the Radicals,

but the latter party preferred to join the Socialists despite the lower-middle class nature of the Radical voters who constantly pushed the party to the Right. "Thus the Radicals tended to ally with the Socialists at elections, only to fall into the arms of the Right at the first whiff of a financial crisis. This political schizophrenia contributed to political instability—although it also defused conflict by allowing the Right to recover power relatively painlessly … Conservative politics was so fragmented after the Left won the elections of 1924 many conservatives believed that their traditional parties were inadequate to defend their interests. The year 1924 saw the emergence of a number of extra-parliamentary movements calling themselves leagues."[25] One could argue that the fragmentation on the Right might offer an opening for more militant groups and parties, but among the plethora of possibilities the former *Sans Patrie* seemed like a "has been" with too much negative baggage. Hervé's disappointment and disgust with both the traditional Right and the revolutionary Left and their reactions to his efforts help to explain the origins, evolution, and fates of his various national socialist formations during the interwar.

19 De-population and De-Christianization

Although Hervé's transformation is often considered to have been rather striking, it was, in fact, far more gradual than is generally assumed. In 1936, he admitted that his shifts on the issues of population and religion were far from sudden. After losing his faith at age ten, he became a self-confessed atheist (or free-thinker) for the next thirty years. Throughout most of the era before World War I, he accepted the Republic, the mystique of socialism, and its anticlericalism, yet he later claimed that he continued to admire Christ, the apostles, and various saints. That situation lasted until January 1914 when a magistrate among his friends gave him several books on French depopulation which tied demographic decline to poor social legislation. Such an explanation seemed fairly weak to Hervé: there had to be more to it than that. From May 1914 he began a series of articles in *La Guerre Sociale* on the topic, reserving his pro-Christian views until the end for fear of offending his socialist readers. The war intervened to delay his conclusion which would have stressed religious and anticlerical factors involved in depopulation.[1] It was surely the war that provided the greatest impetus for Hervé's growing stress on religion which played an increasingly instrumental role for the former *Sans Patrie* as a support for the *Union Sacrée*, a consolation for those facing death, and eventually a link to his own roots. Hervé's failure to unite the Left against war, his pre-war recognition that depopulation was a serious danger, and then the war

itself with its concomitant problems and crises, all came together to crystallize a national socialist project galvanized by the need for a re-Christianization of France to solve decadence in all its forms as a means of national renewal. Pronatalism may have been universal in France by the end of the war or even earlier and need not be tied to any particular political position,[2] but Hervé's fears of depopulation, tied as they were to the decline of religion, were bound to have reactionary overtones.

As Gilles Heuré has pointed out, Hervé had always been interested in religious issues and was well-versed in them, often taking a scholarly attitude. Even though he was capable of using anticlerical rhetoric during the Dreyfus Affair and after, he had never been a "*mangeur des curés acharné* (an unremitting anticlerical)." We have already seen how he got along with the clerics at Lesneven from 1893 until the fall of 1894. Throughout the heyday of Hervéism, he seldom spared the Catholic Church from his barbs, repeatedly connecting patriotic and religious faiths with social and foreign war, but even as an atheist he was unusually respectful of the religious sensibilities of his audiences. He may have given vent to anticlerical themes in *Le Collectivisme* of 1905, when he employed standard charges against the deficiencies of Christian socialism and sneered at the foolishness of the gospels, but he spared Joan of Arc from criticism, realizing that she could be employed as a lower class heroine, rather than monopolized by the royalists for their reactionary agenda. During the war the Maid of Orleans became a symbolic leader of men, eminently serviceable in the inspirational rhetoric of *La Victoire's* editorials meant to rally French troops.[3]

Even though the details about the crystallization of his awareness of the problem of depopulation are a bit inconsistent, this issue clearly preceded the war and became crucial in his evolving analysis of French decadence. During the war the editor in chief at *La Victoire* attacked neo-Malthusianism because he believed it led to French debauchery, corruption, indiscipline, and depopulation. In his view it had helped cause a war because a depopulated France had been such an inviting target. In his 1924 brochure *La France qui meurt* the symbols used to show the relative sizes of national populations were soldiers! French soldiers got progressively smaller in size over projected time compared to Germans, Italians, and British soldiers.[4] Neo-Malthusianism, for him, had almost led to the extinction of France and the French "race" and thus it was a crucial element in France's decline from world leadership. Such themes would be developed and expanded by Hervé and many others into a critique of French decay. This critique had reactionary and anti-modern elements, but it also entailed a moralistic dimension which cannot be confined to any political perspective. Hervé's explanations and panaceas were begun before the war but the role of religion probably was not fully "understood"

until the war. In 1923 he claimed to have burned all his own rationalist, anti-patriotic, and anticlerical histories at the onset of the war.[5]

In 1935 he told the Brestois journalist Charles Chassé that in 1914:

> "one of my friends had brought me two books whose reading he recommended to me. One was the work of [Jacques] Bertillon on the collapse of the birthrate in France. The other [was], the book by [Georges] Rossignol, *Un pays de célibataires et de fils unique*. The problem of French depopulation appeared to me in all its horror. What remedies are there for such a disaster? Those that economists proposed seemed to me to be rather pitiful. There was no doubt about it. It was the disappearance of religious beliefs which caused this decline in births. And I looked around me. You yourself are a free-thinker; you are not married; you have no children. Your friends have one child at the very most. The regions of a low birthrate are the regions of unbelievers. If there are in France a certain number of births, it is in the provinces that have remained Christian. Oh well! I told myself, now that I have clearly understood; I was not able to keep that to myself. But here I was in a fine fix! What a beautiful discovery I had made there! I had declared my *mea culpa* on the question of antipatriotism. Was it going to be necessary now to admit that the moral truth was to be found within Christianity? And what are my readers going to think?"

He planned on telling his readers about his conclusions by September 1914, though he wondered whether that would sink the newspaper forever. But then the war came and with it Hervé's new patriotic duties for *la patrie en danger*. Although he claimed that he had thought about leaving journalism, getting a pardon, and returning to teaching after the war, he felt obligated to lend his voice to explain the dangers France was running due to de-Christianization and Bolshevism.[6]

In fact, the problem of depopulation had far more basic causes, such as alcoholism, inheritance laws, and the Civil Code, which Hervé did not neglect, but for him the key was the decline of religion.[7] By 1881 France had approximately 14.3 million pieces of land, and large landholdings were constantly being whittled away. In 1910 the country still had 56 percent of its people living in villages, towns, and communities with fewer than two thousand inhabitants. Even though France's place among European industrialized countries was declining from second to fourth place, being displaced by Germany and Russia, the country was still rich, having wage levels that exceeded those of Germany. However, France was unique among advanced countries in that "most people lived directly or indirectly from agriculture … France was a classic peasant country, where farmers worked small plots with their families." If peasants and small farmers had many children, their properties would have been subdivided, and would have become unworkable; besides, there would have been too many mouths to feed. "The unique French property structure depended on a limitation in numbers of children, which eventually produced a population decline

between the wars. By 1891, there were alarms. A Dr. [Adolphe-Louis or his son Jacques?] Bertillon wondered what the government could do. There was a periodical on contraception called *La Génération Consciente*, the French equivalent of 'family planning'."[8] Since there were only 39 million French on the eve of World War I, the slow growth in population seems to have had longstanding legal, cultural, social, and economic causes, many of which failed to fit Hervé's increasingly counter-revolutionary explanations. Since Hervé had no children of his own, perhaps that only heightened his growing obsession with depopulation as he got older.

Given his assumptions, the postwar P.S.N. was expected to lead a crusade against the socialism of civil war, class hatred, depopulation, and death in order to reconstitute the moral cadres of French democracy which were about to collapse.[9] Significantly, unlike many clerical conservatives, he was also against female suffrage, which he viewed as both a cause and a symptom of anarchy and social revolution. Apparently, after the war the increasingly clerical Hervé failed to get the message from the "second Ralliement" and Pope Benedict XV that the women's vote was not to be condemned but could be employed in the service of Catholic principles and interests.[10] For Hervé, supplementary familial votes for fathers of large families would serve both as a means to reduce depopulation and to encourage votes by more religious, hence more conservative, family heads who he believed produced more children.[11] A July 1920 law which created "severe penalties for any propaganda or diffusion of birth control methods" must have been an encouraging sign. "That was a law," according to Maurice Agulhon, "which was truly typical of the moment since it combined two motivations: patriotic in its aim to increase the birth rate, and ideological by its convergence with the Catholic theory of conception."[12]

Hervé's concern about depopulation during the interwar was shared by many, even among some feminists on the Left. The *Bloc National* certainly wanted women to produce more children. "The war had aggravated fear of a 'depopulated' France, already widespread before the war." No wonder that the post-war government created laws and institutions to offset neo-Malthusian attitudes and ideas. If those laws helped to destroy neo-Malthusianism as a movement, they "were ineffective in their stated aim of increasing births: the birth rate went up immediately after the war and then declined after the laws were passed. The hysteria suggests that more was going on than an attempt to increase the birth rate. What was at issue was women's role in society."[13]

In the wake of the strikes of 1920, once Hervé's rekindled hopes for workers' moderation proved vain, he inaugurated a new campaign for the re-Christianization of France. Despite his belief that the decline of religion in France had led to French decadence and decline, "religion continued to be a major element" in how various

social groups defined themselves.[14] His initial calls for a religious renewal in France were apparently largely pragmatic. Much as he may have wanted to return to his earliest faith, Hervé continued to describe himself as an unbeliever or a free thinker.[15] What he did believe was that "the Catholic Church … by its strong discipline, by its sense of authority, by its solid material and moral armature …" was capable "… of contributing intelligently to the defense of civilization menaced by materialist socialism … the greatest threat directed against the very foundation of civilization since the fourth century."[16] Gilles Heuré noted how this religious campaign corresponded to a political opportunity. After the victory of the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1924, there was a perceived growing need to mobilize Catholic voters, especially after the *L'Action Française* was placed on the *Index of Forbidden Books* on December 29, 1926 under Pope Pius XI. Such supplementary factors may well have influenced Hervé's re-Christianization campaign.[17] In the words of Catherine Grünblatt: "Conceived first as a dike against socialist civil war, the re-Christianization of France soon became the remedy for the ills from which the country suffered."[18]

Hervé must have been aware of just how marginalized prominent Catholics had become from French political leadership during the interwar era. "Catholics, whether of professional, academic or business backgrounds, were still … barred from certain areas of state employment." That meant: the Prefectoral Corps, the Council of State, the Education Ministry, or government ministers. Of course, Catholicism was not monolithic. With the demise of that explicitly Catholic political party, the *Action Libérale Populaire*, during the interwar era, "Catholic conservatives who accepted the Republic had little choice but to back the liberal-conservative *Féderation Républicaine*, which became the unofficial voice of the Church in parliament." Despite claims that the struggles between clericals and anticlericals had become anachronistic since economic and social issues had superseded them, and arguments that the religious and secular political Rights should merge, the religious division remained. Hervé had little trouble in blasting the Right for its division, moderation, and perpetual failure to support him. It may be debatable whether a successful political system requires a united conservative party, but conservatives and mavericks like Hervé believed that it did. Though he did not blame atavistic religious sensibilities on that impasse, secular conservatives often did. Initially the Catholic Right was more authoritarian than the Center Right, which traditionally had "placed enormous faith in the value of parliamentary debate." While many critics of the Third Republic including Hervé demanded a constitutional revision, there was no consensus about just what sort of reform was needed. Despite some convergence between the two main currents of the Right regarding constitutional reform, partisans of reform at certain critical

moments were unable to agree, especially due to lingering attachment to parliamentary sovereignty. Kevin Passmore has demonstrated how such divisions within the elite help us to understand the perception that the regime was in crisis during the 1930s. To wit, one can "detect a cycle of expectation and disappointment" which led to "a shift towards the extreme Right on the part of some of the most interested in structural reform." Many of these disillusioned partisans of reform were attracted to antiparliamentary *ligues* and general right-wing extremism.[19] Hervé was a notorious political non-insider whose interwar political formations certainly attracted a few of the disillusioned, but it proved to be all too few.

In the early interwar period there was a tension between Hervé's domestic and foreign programs as well as a tension within each of those programs. The Right and the Left, nationalism and socialism, as well as French interests and internationalism were difficult to reconcile, especially when so few people in France seemed to support Hervé's aim of reconciliation with Germany. Depending on the area of greatest crisis, Hervé adjusted his foreign and domestic policies accordingly. On the eve of the Presidential election in January 1920, he praised the Presidency of Poincaré and supported the candidacy of Clemenceau. With Clemenceau as President, Hervé hoped that France would not need a President "with dictatorial powers like those of the American President." The Constitution of 1875 was "not so bad" as long as France was governed by men like Clemenceau, who could show Germany that France would enforce the Versailles Treaty![20] Hervé was against the election of Paul Deschanel, whom he characterized as an anticlerical supported by the *Bloc des Gauches*.[21] The defeat of Clemenceau made Hervé so angry that he reverted to virulent antidemocratic rhetoric. Democracies were vile because they obviously hated strong leaders, favored mediocrities, and entailed only weak policies.[22] The Director of *La Victoire* failed to stress that the French Right feared a Clemenceau dictatorship as well as the aging leader's talk of progressive income taxes and taxes on war profits.[23] When Millerand was called to form a new Ministry and eventually came to replace the ill-fated Deschanel as President, Hervé transferred his hopes for a reinforcement of executive power, leadership, social and religious peace, as well as national renewal onto the former socialist.[24]

In two short books published in 1924, *Propos D'Après-Guerre* and *La France Qui Meurt*, which again were collections of his articles from *La Victoire*, Hervé continued to tie French political disorder and the decay centering around depopulation to the loss of France's traditional religious faith. His writing renewed his pre-war arguments about the dangers of depopulation, but there was a marked shift in emphasis. In June 1914 he had called for families to have three or four children, especially for the benefit of the "*patrie révolutionnaire*." At the end of

1914, upon the simultaneous mobilization of two classes of conscripts, the former *Sans Patrie* "made his *mea culpa* as a hardened bachelor, racking his brains for only having his own 'skin to offer the nation', without being able to add to it those of three or four sons."[25] After the war he tied depopulation overtly to the decline of religion culminating in a series of articles in August 1923 which were then collected for his short book on depopulation.

Hervé's argument ran something like this: In 1789 France had been the greatest and the most populous nation in civilized Europe. In the nineteenth century French population suddenly slowed down, and the era since the French Revolution had been characterized by political and social disorder as well as economic stagnation. The cause of French ills and all modern evils suddenly became clear to the former neo-Malthusian and revolutionary. The heritage of the Enlightenment, which proclaimed the sovereignty of reason, not only acted to correct the abuses of the *ancien regime*, it worked to destroy the traditional ideas of respect, discipline, morality, duty, and sacrifice instilled in children by "all" religions.[26] For Hervé, religion was the powerful arm of the nation, the family, morality, and property. Intellectual inquiry was a blessing in the hands of an enlightened elite of scholars, but in the hands of the average person, the critical spirit became dangerous. The free dissemination of knowledge and ideas by secular schools, cheap newspapers, popular novels, and the mass cinema enabled the dissolving spirit of the rationalist *philosophes* to penetrate into the deepest layers of the "ignorant masses." It had led to individualism, feminism, cafés, cabarets, cosmetics, alcoholism, pornography, and urbanization which killed family life and created depopulation. The cause of French ills was thus the decline of religion and the destruction of the values which traditional faiths fostered. The cure for French problems was equally clear: a religious renewal to resurrect those virtues.[27]

Even though fears of depopulation as well as traditional attitudes toward femininity and masculinity were widely held across the political spectrum in interwar France, Hervé's arguments, so closely connected to religious and authoritarian explanations and panaceas, appear fundamentally reactionary.[28] Pre-war Hervéism, like socialism in general at that time, was not particularly interested in women's issues even though *La Guerre Sociale* included several prominent women including Madeleine Pelletier, Fanny Clar, and during the war, Séverine.[29] After the war, other than espousing traditional natalist and familialist views, *La Victoire* did not take any obvious interest in mobilizing women in the various mutations of the P.S.N., although Hervé did evolve on the issue of female suffrage as time passed, apparently assuming that women would vote for more clerical and right-wing candidates. By the late 1930s Hervé's paper was on life support and his

formations were largely moribund. Because Hervé's arguments about depopulation stressed irreligion as a cause, they ought to be considered moralistic rather than eugenicist. Thus, one could legitimately argue that they were more conservative or reactionary rather than fascist arguments even though worries about depopulation and a rather engrained, French "hegemonic femininity" spanned the political spectrum.[30]

Kevin Passmore tersely and ironically described the post-war efforts to deal with depopulation in France. Classical liberal advocates opposed both social legislation and interventionist natalist measures during the interwar era, which helps to explain the continuing reluctance to support social legislation and "the apparent paradox that in spite of near unanimous belief in the dangers of depopulation, little legislation was introduced before the implementation of the *Code de la famille* by decree in 1939." The *Fédération Republicaine* assailed social insurance laws and excessive government funding because both were seen as detrimental to the free operation of the market. In the last decade before World War II, liberal financial orthodoxy also virtually guaranteed that devaluation would not be employed to deal with the Depression, which probably exacerbated the problem of depopulation.[31]

Hervé was a fierce partisan of the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Holy See, which had ended in 1905. He never hesitated to assail Socialists and Radicals for delays in diplomatic recognition with Rome. His re-Christianization program and eventual conversion also had a philosophical dimension according to Gilles Heuré. In his 1924 *Propos D'Après-Guerre*, Hervé described Ernst Renan as "one of the great demolishers of the French soul and spirit" even though he had extolled *La Vie de Jesus* in 1903 as essential reading. Hervé's latest volume was thus a blatant critique of almost everything he had once held dear. His assault on the "critical, desiccated, and sterilizing rationalism of Voltaire" thus castigated an earlier hero. After an attack against all the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment for spreading their "pernicious materialistic rationalism" which undermined the "moral armature of the society," he stressed the connection between depopulation and the evils of the Enlightenment rationalism. "Today, we are witnessing the rapid destruction of the French race due to the voluntary restriction of births, the fruit of our utilitarian rationalism pushed to the extreme." French victories in World War I merely masked the nation's decadence, even though they also verified that France's moral traditions were still alive.[32]

The former *Sans Patrie* sought to reassure his Jewish and Protestant readers that they had nothing to fear from his new program for re-Christianization because all religions could play important roles in national renewal.[33] He also

expected religious restoration eventually to be achieved even in the schools. Had Hervé changed his mind completely on this, too? For Gilles Heuré, there was less change than one imagines.

> "Certainly, at the beginning of the century he favored the [state] monopoly of education. But at the Congress of Free Thinking at the end of December 1903, in front of a dumbfounded hall, he championed [the idea] that secular education must not be closed to the Congregationists, and that the latter ought to even be authorized, indeed encouraged, to perform a year-long internship at an École Normale, 'where they could hear the secular arguments.' In his own words, that declaration unleashed a 'storm among the non-believers.'"[34]

Throughout the 1920s Hervé fiercely promoted the reintroduction of religious schools in France. In fact, he wanted both secular and religious schools to function side by side. Secular schools were even referred to as "neutral schools." In *L'Avenir* Emile Buré wrote that Hervé used the term "école neutre" simply because he could no longer stand to hear word *laique*. Because the former *Sans Patrie* was so upset about having been de-Christianized in the free thinking secular schools, Edmond du Mesnil of *Le Rappel* coined the nickname "Gustave l'Hermite" for him. In his interview for the latter Radical newspaper, apparently Hervé credited his Catholic critics with "political clairvoyance" during his Yonne *tournées* for being the most ferocious adversaries of his "*illuminisme révolutionnaire*."[35]

The First World War undoubtedly had a major impact on Hervé's attitudes toward the Christian faith. If his actual reconversion took "a bit" longer, that did not stop the former Insurrectional firebrand from purging his pre-war writing of anticlericalism. In his two interwar histories, one on Europe in general, the other on France specifically, "he returned the Church to a place that he had denied it until then."[36] Not only had Hervé's plans to end French decay and depopulation looked to the re-Christianization of France as the key, his two post-war histories had almost perfectly reversed his naively rationalistic, anti-clerical, and socialist histories written before the war. In late October 1929 *La Victoire* began to serialize *La Nouvelle Histoire de France*. In October of 1931 the paper announced that Hervé's *Nouvelle Histoire De L'Europe* was about to be released after having been serialized in *La Victoire*.[37] That rationalism, anticlericalism, and socialism reversed positions in the course of almost three decades of Hervé's historical explanations is more than a curiosity or an example of another simplistic explanation. When the chief sources of man's progress, perfection, and transcendence became the chief sources of decay, disorder, and disharmony, more is signified than a political shift from the Left to the Right.

Before World War I, Hervé's histories ridiculed the myths of patriotism by comparing them to the already vanquished myths of religion. Patriotism, religion, and capitalism were assailed in the name of peace, international brotherhood, and social justice. Instead of attacking patriotic faith, the post-war Hervé used religious faith to buttress patriotism in order to create an antidote to the ideas of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution which had been so naively extolled before the war. Hervé did not lose his idealism because of disillusionment over his pre-war failures to unite the Left and the brutalizing experience of World War I. The post-war Hervé was still idealistic since he called for peace, a United States of Europe, and the brotherhood of man. The post-war Hervé was still naïve because he actually believed that religion could solve the problems of the post-war era and of modernity in general. Rather, the post-war Hervé had become bitter perhaps due to his disillusionment with his earlier misplaced faith. Hervé had actually believed that science, democracy, and socialism were capable of saving man and the world. Now patriotism, religion, and capitalism were called upon to create the very unity, harmony, and social justice which had earlier been seen as the inevitable by-products of revolution, socialism, and science. Now patriotism and religion had become essential forces for social solidarity without which the French could attain neither social justice nor meaning in life. There was an obvious shift or regression in Hervé's outlook after the war, yet there was continuity as well. Hervé was generally suspicious of and even hostile to both individualism and materialism no matter where he stood politically. It seems fair to conclude that the failures of his antimilitarist crusade as well as his socialist faith led Hervé back to his Christian and French faiths which one feels may never have been far below the surface of even the most strident sounds of Hervéism.

The most striking feature about such simplistic explanations and panaceas for modern conditions is that they were almost exact reversals of his earlier often one-dimensional ideas about socialism. The naïve rationalism of Hervéism had given way to the utilitarian faith of Christian national socialism. Yet the two systems of thought shared a spirit of reform, however propagandistic, as well as zealotry in which idealism was contrasted with materialism. Many of the values that Hervé stressed in his socialism were resurrected in his Christian national socialism, but the details, the symbols, the heroes, the villains, and the feast days had been reversed and transvalued. In a semiotic sense such a transformation may be tied to a general polarized and oppositional system of signs or terms. In reversing his positions so perfectly, despite idealistic, anti-materialistic, internationalist, and social justice themes of continuity, Hervé had accepted the bipolar nature of the political vocabulary, dialogue, or discourse of his epoch. The very parameters of political language

seemed to circumscribe Hervé's political thinking and guide him toward a very limited number of political possibilities. There were clearly other ways of looking at the epoch beyond his binary method, but Hervé's reversal seems to have fit into a general pattern with which those events were viewed. The former Insurrectional socialist turned Christianizing national socialist was not alone in generating a dualistic vision.

K. Steven Vincent's account of Benoît Malon shows the diverse and contradictory nature of the French political heritage which could include *étatiste* and *dirigiste* traditions on both the Right (monarchical, Bonapartist, and Gaullist) and the Left (Jacobin, Saint-Simonian, and communist). There was also an *anti-dirigiste* tradition on the Right (aristocratic and liberal) and one on the Left as well (federalist, syndicalist, anarchist, and more recently, *autogestionnaire*). In the same way, there was a moralism which animated French socialism throughout the 19th century which was vehemently opposed to commercialism, consumer society, and bourgeois decadence. French thinkers since Montesquieu had argued that virtue was necessary for the survival of republics. This was contrasted with corruption for much of French history and was only replaced by alienation with the advent of Hegelian philosophy and the rediscovery of Marx's early writings.

> "What concerned republican socialists like Malon was corruption—specifically, the corruption of virtue, which, according to the republican tradition in France, was brought on by a decline of public-spiritedness. Corruption meant a loss of public life, a turning inward, and a transition from public concerns to selfish private considerations. Rousseau, Robespierre, and Tocqueville—to name several from across the political spectrum—were all concerned with corruption and the loss of republican virtue."[38]

Hervé's critique of French decay and disorder, even though it involved standard political arguments which characterized the *Bloc des Gauches* as anticlerical and secular, also entailed a critique with moralistic and even metapolitical dimensions. Even moderate members of the Left were indictable for irreligion, hence the depopulation, decay, and disorder destroying France.[39] "Our Republican Opportunists of 1881 prepared the way for the Radical Combists. The Radical Combists were the precursors of international and revolutionary socialism. The international and revolutionary Socialists, *meā culpā*, were the recruiters of Communism and Bolshevism."[40] Hervé did not believe that secular education and the divorce law could be abolished, but he favored the cancellation of the anticlerical programs enacted between 1901 and 1905. He thought that two state supported school systems had to exist to preserve traditional values and to save France from depopulation, "racial destruction," decay, and political disorder.[41] Rationalism,

skepticism, individualism, materialism, hedonism, and revolution were destroying France and her idealism.[42] Some of the same values in positive guise had once inspired Hervéist idealism. Hervéism, which had sought to create material well-being for all and viewed sexual matters in terms of individual decision, had also considered individualism, materialism, and hedonism as negative elements associated with bourgeois acquisitiveness, greed, and selfishness. Thus, the complete transformation of Hervé's ideas actually maintained several critical elements. Before 1912 business and even certain religious leaders of France had been considered sources of French corruption, selfishness, and narrow-mindedness; throughout most of the war and continuing in the interwar, they had become the hope for reform and national resurrection. France's revolutionaries and its intellectual elite before 1912 had been the precursors of a harmonious and perfect society. By the interwar era they had become major sources of dogmatism, individualism, materialism, anarchy, and decay.

20

La Victoire and Its Director During the Interwar

Plus Ça Change Plus Ça La Même Chose

Jean-Claude Peyronnet believed that after his presumed *revirement* in 1911 Hervé had lost the art of seizing minor incidents for the creation of important pre-war journalistic campaigns around them.[1] In her study of Hervé's interwar national socialism, Catherine Grünblatt believed that this stale and repetitive trend continued during and after the war. The former *Sans Patrie* characterized his wartime method as a constant repetition to his readers of his own faith in eventual French victory. One can legitimately argue, as Grünblatt does, that "Hervé only justified pre-established options" in his articles in *La Victoire* during the interwar. Though he never quite lost the art of reacting spontaneously and emotionally to events, after the war his journalistic style was increasingly tied to a more and more narrow view of French problems and their solutions. In contrast to the era before 1912 and the war years, *La Victoire* was becoming increasingly predictable and repetitious in the interwar.[2] Such a contrast is a helpful insight, but Hervé's journalistic techniques and political ideas were always connected to events. His editorials were reactive and emotional responses to changing situations. Hervé lost established readers throughout his career precisely because he was willing to alter previous policies. If his political philosophy underwent a memorable reversal, his personality and journalistic style remained consistent. He was unable to settle into an established position or mold for long because situations changed. Even after his authoritarian views hardened into a monotonous orthodoxy during the interwar, his foreign policy stances clearly cut "against the grain" and were rejected by most

of the Right. In looking at Hervé during the interwar, one can say that he was still attempting to make his voice heard, however faint it had become to most listeners, and he was never afraid to follow his own ideas even when they jeopardized his chances to hold on to his declining readership. Though his ideas seemed to have quickly coalesced into apparent dogmatism after 1919, something of the iconoclast still remained.

In January 1923 Hervé wrote an editorial arguing that the ideological position of *La Victoire* was situated between the extremist positions of *L'Action Française* and *L'Humanité*. Thus their ideological views actually paralleled their locations on three floors at 142, Rue Montmartre until *La Victoire* moved to new offices at 24 Boulevard Poissonnière on May 11, 1923 for the rest of its existence.[3] Despite the obvious rhetorical and propagandistic aspects of his argument about that ironic superposition, something more was involved. *La Victoire* at the beginning of the interwar wanted to become a vehicle to bring the workers and the extreme Left into the heart of the French nation. In 1919 Hervé attacked the political extremes in an effort to forge unity, solidarity, and fraternity among all Frenchmen. Yet in another way Hervé believed that extremist political positions all shared a common audacity and idealism which *La Victoire* hoped to maintain and channel into a crusade for the moral regeneration of France. If *La Victoire* claimed to inhabit an ideological position between the dangerous and divisive positions of the royalists and the Communists, it also sought to redirect their noble idealism into a union for the reformation and resurrection of France. In a sense Hervé's goal in the interwar period was to form a political entity which would embody his perception of the central ideological position of *La Victoire* situated between the extremist *L'Action Française* and *L'Humanité*. Though Hervé's domestic political ideals soon came close to those of the *L'Action Française*, much as he detested royalism as anachronistic, he never forgot his origins on the extreme Left, and he never ceased to at least express his hope that the Communist *illuminés* of *L'Humanité* would see the error of *la guerre sociale* and join his *socialisme national*. For a scholar like Zeev Sternhell the political transformation of Gustave Hervé was connected to the origins of fascism, and his extreme anti-Marxism was a striking indication. Though Hervé's brand of national socialism was related to the origins of fascism, the former *Sans Patrie* assumed his new political vision shared common characteristics with other adherents of the political extremes including the Communists. However rhetorical and propagandistic his arguments may have been, at some level Hervé seemed to believe them.

Not surprisingly, relations between the three newspapers were less than cordial. For Hervé, *L'Humanité* was often described as being written in the manner of

Mother Goose fairy tales, and the Communist daily reciprocated in kind, sometimes calling him a *fantoche profasciste* (profascist clown). The royalists were no more conciliatory despite Hervé's initial attempts to recruit them to his national socialist campaign. *L'Action Française* quickly rebuffed Hervé's post-war entreaties, combining scorn with rancor by assigning him the nickname Gugusse (Coco the Clown). "They feigned to have pity for 'good Gustave' rather weakly escorted 'to the nursery or the old folks home by his *Jeunes Gardes*.'"[4] In his insightful biography of the *provocateur*, Gilles Heuré noted how Hervé briefly "praised the 'patriotic passion' … [of *L'Action Française*] and … did not wish to prematurely 'excommunicate' it from the Bloc national …", but when he "was quickly rebuffed by Maurras's newspaper, he withdrew the hand that he had extended to the royalists." He then accused the king's men of lying about their support for national unity since they were, in fact, "irreconcilable enemies" [of the Republic] who favored a civil war against it, just like the Bolsheviks.[5]

Although Hervé usually claimed that the "slings and arrows" that he received were "badges of honor" and signs that his message was finding its target, by the late interwar period, age was obviously affecting him and he seemed to be increasingly troubled by the hostility he aroused from almost all sides. "Although he had always wanted to appear insensitive to attacks, and had actually demanded them as the just recompense for a writer who courageously expressed views which struck home," his skin was thinning. A few years after the war Hervé was forced to admit that he had been subject to almost daily attack during the previous two decades. However, he continued to put on a brave front, repeating that opposition to his ideas "just reinforced him in the conviction that his mission was justified."[6] In December 1923 Hervé expressed his ongoing exasperation at being unable to satisfactorily explain his shift in views to the average Frenchman. "To explain the change in views of a man by the lessons which emerged for him from events, even as enormous and as unexpected as the world war and the international Bolshevik crisis, that is an effort which is above the intelligence of crowds. It is more in the range of their minds and hearts to attribute it to dissolute reasons of personal interest."[7] At one meeting during his 1928 speaking tour to promote the P.S.N. in advance of the spring elections, Hervé displayed a certain sadness.

> "I think that this crowd, which used to love me so much when I was a rebel, is ready to launch the classic cup of vitriol at my head because they believe that I have betrayed and walked out on them. From such crowds reproaches sometimes spurt out which tear at the heart, and which make it impossible for me to be heard. I feel then that my brutal rejection of doctrines in which they passionately believed, has demolished something in them respectable and sacred like all sincere faiths."[8]



Figure 39. Hervé at the Offices of *La Victoire* in 1930, with an unknown? associate. (© Maurice-Louis Branger/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Hervé may have been in desperate straits financially throughout most of the interwar, and he seemed to be losing readers continually not just because of his unpopular foreign policy positions but because his readership was shrinking as it was aging. However, that dismal perspective was not how Hervé imagined his situation at the beginning and through much of the interwar era. In his mind, *La Victoire* was about to recommence its pre-war crusade having learned much in the preceding years. Before 1912, Hervé was the center of much attention, became deeply engaged in various political storms, and wrote incessantly with verve about the contemporary events which affected his ideas. By the 1930s he seemed to have retreated into the recesses of an isolated lair far from the most active journalistic fronts.[9] His survival depended on constant and rather pathetic begging for funds from his few subscribers since he was determined not to surrender his journalistic redoubt. By 1935 his political hopes and journalistic future rested on a crusade to draft Pétain as the leader of a proposed authoritarian Republic which would both save the nation and preserve *La Victoire* from extinction. Hervé's newspaper no longer fit "the classic image of a daily steamer with gangways bursting with

activity." The interwar Hervé was increasingly living "withdrawn into himself, more and more alone, preceded by an army of phantoms, rather than followed by organized groups." Those who had once been friends and foes, associates or competitors, were generally long since gone or disappeared. Although he invariably recalled the death of his fallen rival Jaurès as a milestone for France, if not as a personal tragedy for himself, the death of his nemesis Jules Guesde in 1922 was certainly not a source of great sadness for Hervé, who perhaps recalled how the severe orthodox Marxist had cut him down to size more than once. But the former *Sans Patrie* was genuinely saddened by the deaths of Marcel Sembat and his wife in the early 1920s as well as the loss of René Viviani in 1925. Some former colleagues and associates at *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Victoire*, such as former administrators Raquillet (at one point the mayor of Mercurey) and Vaughan, were also sorely missed.[10] If the tragic wartime death of Almereyda, which has been mentioned, did not seem to have affected Hervé too deeply, that was because such an association was so antithetical to the ones that the budding national socialist was trying to forge during the war and after. The former *Sans Patrie* was undoubtedly frightened during the war by being tainted by his association with Almereyda. Later he may have felt guilty due to his lack of empathy and apparently craven attitude in 1917.

Many former colleagues do not seem to have stayed in touch with the director of *La Victoire* and did not appear to have been particularly missed despite their earlier intimate association. One former colleague who had remained an engaged journalist but had lost contact with the former *Sans Patrie* was Victor Méric. The reason for that lapsed relationship was undoubtedly Méric's continuing socialist idealism and pacifism. For Méric, despite such blatant changes on so many issues, "few men changed less than Gustave Hervé. Fundamentally, he remained the same."[11] Though Méric may have been mystified, troubled, and even hurt by Hervé's shifts, he knew that the former *Sans Patrie* never left the fold for money or glory.

> "When I returned after the war, I was going to see him one last time. He naturally wanted me to return to *La Victoire*. But I told him, a little embarrassed, that … I wanted to tell him … I had not changed much … I believe that I was even more of an *enragé* than before. [When he heard this] He lifted his arms to the sky:
>
> 'That's it … I suspected as much … Now you are a Bolshevik … I bet you are a Bolshevik?'
>
> He added: 'You understand nothing about it … You are just a dreamer … A species of poet …' We then went our separate ways. When I got home, pondering the chasm that

> the war had created between this former companion and me, in the face of so many illusions which collapsed, I almost had to cry like a child whose toy had just been taken away."[12]

At another moment in what may have been that same interwar encounter, Hervé seemed almost as amused as he was chagrined by his former colleague's continuing revolutionary bent. In the words of Méric:

> "It had been years after the war since I had last seen him. Nevertheless, one day I encountered him on the boulevard. He was walking peacefully, his head tucked into his shoulders, his myopic eyes blinking behind his pince-nez. I stopped him. After a few words he confided to me:
>
> 'You see, I have changed … What do you expect, I must have a "'faith.'" I am not able to live without "'faith.'"
>
> 'Do you think such a thing is truly indispensable?'
>
> 'Oh! You were always a "'subversive'". When we all walked along the path of the revolutionary religion, you remained a skeptic. You watched us with a smile on your face. But for me that was very different.'
>
> He observed me for an instant. Then, with a kind of solemnity, he said:
>
> 'I believed in the Revolution … I no longer believe in it. The war opened my eyes. Then no longer having that religion, I rallied to the faith of my ancestors.'
>
> 'Which?'
>
> 'The faith of the Bretons, my ancestors … The Catholic faith.'
>
> I was a little dumbfounded.
>
> He added: 'You will come over, you too, some day or another.'
>
> He walked on across the boulevard with his heavy steps. Glued to the sidewalk, I followed him with my eyes, pondering the man who had disappeared, the man that was nicknamed the "'new Blanqui'", who collected prison sentences. Was that really the same man? What rival personalities battle within us, such confused struggles, and are we so sure we know ourselves?"[13]

In his interview with Hervé during the summer of 1935 for *La Dépêche de Brest*, Charles Chassé found the former *Sans Patrie* to have changed dramatically physically. In 1912 Chassé had communicated with Hervé for *Le Mercure de France*

concerning his memories of his year and a half teaching at Lesneven. During that pre–World War I exchange, Hervé's written responses had been full of such carefree gaiety "that you could have believed it was written by a student on vacation" even though he was then a resident of the Concièrgerie Prison, a rather unpleasant structure with a dark history and an equally dark interior on the banks of the Seine and attached to the Ministry of Justice. The last time Chassé had seen Hervé was in 1913 in Brest at the annual Socialist congress. When he met him again, Chassé initially thought that he must have the wrong man. How much he had changed in the meantime! By 1935 the former *Sans Patrie* had shaved his goatee, discarded his pince-nez, and no longer wore his emblematic military dolman, which the pre-war Insurrectional firebrand employed as some sort of ironic attire, a hand-me-down from his brother Gaston, the colonial Captain. "Now he wore a black jacket, moreover very simple, the jacket of a man who could just as easily outfit himself in a sack if that were the norm. His hair, still rather full, was reddish-brown. The man was short and rather fat. The face was that of a monk, a monk with a very happy smile. Something like Léon Daudet, but a less exuberant Daudet and not in the least authoritarian. (Although the word authoritarian then figured in the program of Neo-Hervéism). He displayed not authoritarianism but, on the contrary, a completely open simplicity, a very hearty camaraderie."[14] Despite his mischievous eyes, the former *Sans Patrie* was not eaten up with hatred as was the royalist. "'Here,' he said, in speaking of *La Victoire*, 'one does not insult: one argues.'"[15] When Chassé noted the darkness of the room and a kind of veil covering Hervé's eyes, he mentioned his current lack of eyewear. Then Hervé recounted the tale about his eyesight and why glasses or a pince-nez really didn't matter much. Segueing from his poor eyesight to his poor penmanship, Hervé went on to speak of writing in general, noting how his articles were all reprinted in the press chronicles read by many even though his own newspaper had few readers. In fact, "the personality of Hervé had remained attractive to the public, not only because he knew how to find striking formulas, but because his sincerity was appreciated, even by those who did not agree with his views."[16]

When Chassé visited the offices of *La Victoire* on the Boulevard Poissonnière, he was struck by the isolation and the decrepit conditions which led him to surmise that Hervé could well have published the paper virtually alone.

> "For a moment I waited in a bare room with flaking walls. In the vestibule there were large stacks of recent brochures in which Hervé recommended Pétain as a dictator. Then, I walked down a long hallway on which opened several other dilapidated rooms. What did this resemble? A monastery? No, the doors of a monastery are shiny and the walls

> there are at least conscientiously whitewashed. Without being incarcerated, hadn't Hervé managed here to recapture the atmosphere of the Santé Prison?"

Immediately, Chassé found himself "in a room as naked as the others. This was Hervé's office, which was only adorned with a large dedicated portrait of Mussolini behind his chair. Here and there were old posters, with quite faded colors."[17] That description of the offices of *La Victoire* parallels the impression given by the paper itself, always begging for funds, for readers, for supporters, and for attention which, save for a bit of intermittent notoriety, never seemed to come. Two of Herve's most loyal followers, Lucien Leclerc and Georges Émile Dulac, admitted that he paid paltry wages.[18]

"The pathetic Hervé who bailed out the fragile small craft that his newspaper had become only corresponds remotely to the image of the fascist journalist, cavalier by dint of being cynical." That was why Gilles Heuré argued that Hervé had nothing in common with the swaggering journalists of the 1930s who were depicted in the novels of Drieu La Rochelle, Jean Prevost, or Ilhy Ehrenbourg. For Heuré, to capture the personality of Hervé in the era after the Great War, one had to search the novels of Joris-Karl Huysmans. The former *Sans Patrie* was no Des Essientes, the self-absorbed, isolated and decaying aesthete of *À Rebours*, and no Durtal, the despairing delver into darkness of *Là-Bas*; such characters were too indulgent in sensual pleasures. For Heuré, the director of *La Victoire* most resembled Bougran, the retired bureaucrat of *La Retraite de Monsieur Bougran*, unable to adjust to the end of his normal work and routine so he tried to recreate that world within his own domicile.[19]

If Hervé had been hated before the war, the postwar did not alter that. In a 1925 inquest on "Fascism in France", the writer Charles Fraval apprised readers of *L'Ère Nouvelle* that Hervé had been assigned a place among "the clan of fascists". One of Herve's favorite targets during the interwar was Édouard Herriot, the former mayor of Lyon and leader of the Radical Party during most of the early interwar era. When he got the chance to fire back at the former *Sans Patrie*, Herriot "missed neither the chance nor the mark." Writing in *Le Quotidien* in early December 1923, the Radical leader called Hervé a "mediocrity gone astray." For Herriot: "It was not sufficient, in order to claim to be a proletarian, to be a messed up member of the bourgeoisie. We know the type; Gustave represents it marvelously. Hervé caused many unfortunates to be sent to prison, exalted by his theories on *'la chaussette à clous'* and *'la machine à bosseler'*, and who, now, provided with all the comforts possible, Aulic counselor to our most powerful majesties, carrying the chamberlain's key around his neck (almost), he dumps

the muddy torrent of his abuse on the democrats that we are."[20] Hervé was quick to respond because he thought the attack was not only harsh but unjust. In the December 9, 1923 issue of *La Victoire*, he took umbrage with the accusation of being a bourgeois failure: "I am not from the bourgeoisie. I am from the people." He then responded to the charge that he had been responsible for sending others to prison but would not have joined them. That charge seemed preposterous to a man who had been given multiple prison terms and spent almost five years in at least three different prisons. In fact, he assumed that he had, rather justly, been the greatest victim of his own theories.[21]

As noted above, Hervé was, not surprisingly, something of a lightning rod for men of the extreme Left during the interwar era. But he often had the same effect on leaders of the extreme Right. Despite his rhetoric of *kinship* with the zealots of *L'Humanité*, he generally viewed the Communists as the most dangerous inciters of anarchy and chaos during the era. Quite often, however, the Socialists were described in even more negative terms. Even though Herve was increasingly marginalized during the era, his voice was heard, if only at second and third hand, so he counted for something. We have seen how *L'Action Française* was especially hostile to the former *Sans Patrie*, cruelly and contemptuously rejecting his efforts to win them over. In 1925, when the anarchists of *Le Libertaire* assailed fascism, "they did not forget to mention the 'ex-brawler Gustave Hervé who [calls for] a whip against the people.'"[22] In 1934 a brief brochure on French fascist groups by Pascal Maurel included Hervé's M.S.N. along with groups such as *Solidarité Française* founded by perfume manufacturer François Coty in 1933 and commanded by Major Jean Renaud, the *Croix-de-Feu* of Colonel de la Rocque, the *Camelots du Roi* of *L'Action Française*, and the *Francistes* of Marcel Bucard. In speaking about Hervé's *Milice Socialiste National*, Maurel called it a "skeletal organization [made up] of the former anticlerical and old fogeys."[23]

Jean Quéval began his post-war volume on the French collaborationist press with several pages on Hervé and *La Victoire* if only to dismiss the newspaper as a rather uninfluential publication, almost a curiosity. It was one of a half dozen newspapers that barely hung on to existence, the kind of paper that could be gleaned for a bit of color by other newspapers. It was virtually a private venture even though *La Victoire* still had some influence as a paper of reference for other journalists. That might not be much, but for Herve it was quite a bit. It was important to him that passersby had a chance to glance at his newspaper. "It was his, it was his reason for being, his emblem, his past, his story, this was—he could imagine—his glory, his life." Even though Quéval's story on the press of the

collaboration began with the Director of *La Victoire*, "the veritable history of the fifth column" began when Hervé and *La Victoire* had disappeared.[24]

> "In the press of the 1930s, the Director of *La Victoire* was a moldy old fellow. People remembered that after Versailles he led a campaign with rather good reason for an authoritarian republic. People still read him since he did not lack straightforward talent, [and was] quick and good-natured. But his fellow journalists did not treat him any less casually for it, seeing in his newspaper the last witness of a bygone age. The old time journalists, nevertheless, remembered the young man Gustave Hervé, and those [old timers], if they had known that *La Victoire* had attempted to switch to collaboration, they recalled with humor and bitterness the press episode ... [dealing with Hervé's remaining in Paris and publishing as the Germans entered the city in 1940]."[25]

21

Financial and Circulation Problems at *La Victoire*

Part of Hervé's effort to win over the French Left made it mandatory that *La Victoire* become a newspaper for a mass readership in order to be a viable alternative to *L'Humanité*. For that reason *La Victoire* included regular serial articles as well as weekly features on medicine, music, and literature. It created special sections for students as well as younger children, and it began a sports section, which often became a full page, in order to rival features found in *L'Humanité*. Hervé claimed to not care for sensational and scandalous stories, but he realized it would be journalistic suicide not to print them.[1] During the era from 1932 to 1933 when Marcel Bucard was the Editor-in-Chief, *La Victoire* included a regular feature by Bucard for *anciens combattants*. Such features illustrate Hervé's desire to create "a paper as complete as the great *journaux d'information* yet remaining an *organe de propagande et de bataille*."[2] Partly for financial reasons, Hervé's efforts to make *La Victoire* a great daily mass newspaper failed. *La Victoire* had no correspondents and most of its news was Parisian. Investigative journalism was not the forte of writers at *La Victoire*.[3]

Yet the main reason for the poor circulation and incessant financial predicaments of *La Victoire* was the nature of its message. *La Victoire* was a political newspaper that believed politics to be a sign of corruption. It called for an elite to save France from decay, division, and disorder, yet it looked to the mass of workers,

peasants, and shopkeepers to buy *La Victoire* and support its crusade. *La Victoire* sought a political change in France to be attained by a revision of the French Constitution. It also expected to become a mass newspaper by appealing to the average reader. After World War I fewer and fewer dailies took pride in calling themselves political or underlining a particular political position. So the journalistic course of *La Victoire* was going into a stiff headwind.[4] Hervé's goal was some sort of transcendent unity and harmony; his means were a daily newspaper centered on mundane political reality and a potential rather than tangible national socialist movement. Such a blend of the real and the visionary was not new or startling. The fact that *La Victoire* failed to attract readers and followers was tied to the particular economic, social, and intellectual environment of modern France which provided little political space for Hervé's panaceas. The former *Sans Patrie* himself had gotten out of touch, had changed too much, and had become too predictable. Other journalists read him for copy but his occasional insights were either too episodic or sometimes too dated to satisfy general opinion and prejudices. Hervé's national socialism never succeeded in revising the French political system and *La Victoire* was perpetually on the verge of extinction, yet his political program shared many assumptions and themes with other far more important and often more ominous political groups. His desire to revise the constitution, to create a stronger regime, and to find a strong leader mirrored much interwar opinion. Though he had quickly become so notorious that he was an outcast in later life, he would gradually work his way back to the established faith of his childhood. His whole life was spent searching for some form of certainty and truth, yet his life and his creations are proof that meaning can be created in the absence of such absolutes. Hervé's life and career seemed to confound the narrowness and illusions of his own dualistic and polarized perspective.

Hervé had failed to form a coalition of the extreme Left before 1912, and he had failed to unite the Left in a *Bloc* just before the war. After the war *La Victoire* was a marginal voice on the French Right while *La Guerre Sociale* had been a relatively important element of the French Left.[5] In the mid-1920's Hervé preserved the hope that he could unite leftist workers with the nation; that illusion may have been a key element in his marginalization. *La Victoire* had come out of the war in fairly good shape, with a decent circulation of 40,000, but its readership gradually faded. If Hervé expected his paper to become the counterweight to *L'Humanité*, he lacked both the funds and the party base of the P.C.F. Nor could he come close to matching the funds which the far Right newspapers of François Coty possessed.[6] Circulation figures and donation statistics indicate that *La Victoire* did not have much success in its appeals to workers, but the interwar

creations of Hervé may have had some success in attracting former Communist, Socialist, and syndicalist leaders and officials.[7]

In late May 1920 Hervé announced that a Byelorussian named Vladimir Bourtzev had joined the staff of *La Victoire* and brought with him funds and workers affiliated to *La Cause Commune*, a publication tied to many Russian émigrés. Bourtzev would share the editorial column with Hervé until early in 1921. The anti-Bolshevism of *La Victoire*, no doubt, enhanced the paper's appeal to Russian exiles living in Paris. His support for their views on events in Eastern Europe led to the dismissal of Georges Bienaimé, a pro-Polish writer on foreign policy subjects who had worked at *La Victoire* since the war. Hervé admitted that a conflict in views had existed for some time, and it needed to be settled. The new funds and subscribers which Bourtzev brought with him allowed *La Victoire* to return temporarily to a four-page format and undoubtedly played a role in the dismissal of Bienaimé.[8]

Even before the war ended, Hervé had admitted that *La Victoire* could not survive on advertising and subscriptions alone, yet he stressed that the paper would not accept ads dealing with liquor. However, by June 1923 ads for Saint Raphael could be found in the paper. To attain financial solvency, the only other possibility was charity, and soon the newspaper was devoting much space to its financial problems and its perpetual search for funding which was described in terms of "*le nerf de la guerre*" and "*des canons, des munitions*." In general, throughout the interwar era, the necessary funding came in sporadically, and that meant that the attempts to go to four pages and even six pages were seldom sustainable for long. After the P.S.N. was launched and the elections loomed on the horizon, the paper suddenly announced that it was returning to four pages. How had he done it?

Eventually Hervé responded to charges by *L'Humanité* regarding the sources of his funding, and he defended himself against the accusation that he had received money from the *Union des Intérêts Economiques* (U.I.E.), but he admitted to being tired of begging and ready "to accept the financial support of political friends be they groups or individuals."[9] The U.I.E. was also known as the Caisse Billiet because it was directed by Senator Ernest Billiet as a kind of pressure group representing business interests seeking to influence public opinion by means of the press and other avenues in order to offset the perceived growing dangers from socialism and communism. Such interest groups were becoming ever more important and systematic after World War I, and their nefarious influence on French democracy was becoming an increasingly important theme on the Left: hence the charges by *L'Humanité* against *La Victoire*, a newspaper with limited resources.[10]

According to Catherine Grünblatt, Hervé's open appeals for funding eventually disappeared until January 22, 1924 when he announced that the general economic and financial crisis made it mandatory to return to two pages. By October 1924 his explanation became more plausible. The source of the most recent financial troubles for *La Victoire* was Hervé's criticism of Poincaré which led to funds for the paper being curtailed. On November 27, 1924 he admitted to having received money from the U.I.E. which explained the relative health of the newspaper between 1919 and 1924.[11] Herve never stated how much had been given, but it must have been substantial because without it the paper reverted to two pages. On February 17, 1927 the former *Sans Patrie* wrote a long editorial admitting that he had received funds from the Caisse Billiet from the 1919 elections until December 1922, when Poincaré informed Senator Billiet that *La Victoire* was becoming too clerical. However, that funding was renewed fairly quickly, and the Senator even guaranteed the rent for the new headquarters on the Boulevard Poissonnière which the paper had been forced to take in May 1923. Still, by February 1924 another conflict arose between the U.I.E. and *La Victoire* when Hervé found it to be impossible to accept Poincaré's political path which seemed to be moving too far to the Left, so the Caisse Billiet again withdrew its support. Relations continued by means of contact between the newspaper's administrator, E. Vaughan, and the Caissse, but they proved to be much less fruitful. Because major political differences remained, Hervé decided to find another way to stabilize the paper's precarious financial situation.[12]

Until that point *La Victoire* was a personal enterprise, but on October 1, 1924 Hervé decided to turn the paper into a limited partnership in which the shareholders would not have the rights of control. The initial capital outlay sought was 500,000 francs based on 500 franc shares. The paper's funding goals were met according to Grünblatt, but they must have proven to be inadequate because the capital levies kept expanding. By July 1925 the paper had attained a capital of 1, 700,000 francs, but when that proved to be insufficient, the paper sought another million francs worth of stock sales. As of January 2, 1926 only 200,000 francs in additional capital had been raised. The following two weeks would bring another 50,000 francs, which Hervé found quite troubling because he was convinced that the fiscal situation of the Republic was so precarious that new elections could come at any time, and he wanted *La Victoire* to be ready.[13] Nevertheless, Grünblatt claimed that *La Victoire* had raised 2,450,000 francs in capital by September 1926, when Hervé decided to transform the limited partnership into a joint stock company because "an important group of our friends are ready to make great efforts on our behalf to raise the necessary millions." The name of that group

was never divulged, and the necessary funds fell well short of the newspaper's goals and needs. In July 1927 Hervé claimed he was not getting anything from the Caisse Billiet or any other secret source, yet he never ruled out such possibilities. It is clear that he could not understand and resented the failure of Caisse Billiet to continue funding *La Victoire* "in our campaign for national renewal." Once when he was accused of accepting funds from François Coty, he declared that he would welcome such support if it were ever offered because his goals included getting workers and owners to work together in the national interest. On the eve of the 1928 elections, the base of Hervé's readers and shareholders was incredibly limited according to Gilles Heuré, yet with only 1600 shareholders the paper somehow was able to expand to six pages for a time from November 1927 until August 1928.[14] Eventually, the newspaper's core "of the financial backers, like his subscribers, undeniably melted away like snow in the sun. The editorial line of Hervé obviously did not correspond to a part of his readership. The French-German *rapprochement* that he advocated at the onset of the 1930s [sic], his indulgence regarding the Communists at the approach of war, and his opposition to anti-Semitism separated his newspaper from a part of his subscribers and financial backers 'who were, to our great astonishment, violent anti-Semites.'"[15] Throughout his career and among scholars more recently, Hervé has been associated with claims or accusations of both philo-Semitism and anti-Semitism. More will be said about that below.

In an effort to compete with the mass dailies, to spread its message among the lower classes, and to enhance the promotional activities for Hervé's national socialist organizations and parties, *La Victoire* initiated two separate Sunday editions in late 1925 and early 1926. Probably created in late 1925, *La Victoire du Dimanche* came in two editions: one for workers in the Parisian basin including the "red belt" as well as the entire Seine, the Seine-et-Oise, and the Somme; and another edition which was meant for farmers. These Sunday editions were a resumé of that week's articles largely taken from *La Victoire*, sprinkled with drawings by prominent cartoonists like Aspic, Pem, and Tap. To avoid unsold issues, these Sunday editions were almost exclusively confined to subscribers. The circulation of these weekly editions was much greater than that of the daily paper because the editions reached the provinces. The edition for workers not only sought to increase sales and spread the program of *La Victoire*, it sought to convince workers that the *Cartel des Gauches* could not promote their "true" interests. It preached class collaboration as well as anti-Bolshevism, and it clearly tried to be an antidote to the "poison" of *L'Humanité*.[16] According to the French police *La Victoire du Dimanche* "did not seem to have augmented '[Hervé's] limited readership in any

significant manner'"… even though he hoped to appeal "'to them for successive augmentations in the capital of the company.'"[17]

In an article from early June 1926, Hervé claimed a circulation of 20,000 for the daily *La Victoire*, while *La Victoire du Dimanche* had a circulation of 50,000.[18] In December of 1927, as he was preparing for the coming spring elections, Hervé mentioned circulation figures of 200,000 provincials for the Sunday editions which Heuré assumed was highly exaggerated, in part, because of the Director's own complaints about the softness of the organizational support among provincial elements.[19] In the late 1930s Hervé wrote that his 1928 proposal for a Franco-German reconciliation cost him one-half of his readers.[20] In his second to the last issue of *La Victoire*, he claimed to have lost three quarters of his readers, but he cited General Lyautey as one reader who both stuck with him and agreed with his ideas on giving back Germany's colonies.[21] "From 1928 on [the paper's] financial problems were going to become more and more pressing."[22] Given his growing financial problems, *La Victoire* ended its ties to the Havas news agency at the end of March 1929.[23] In June 1930 Hervé reported that the daily and weekly newspapers were 600,000 francs in debt, which was increasing by 50,000 francs a month. He complained about the competition from the mass information dailies which "don't get involved in political controversies in order to not upset their clientele. The political press, on the other hand, is just read by its partisans and, thus, has a mediocre circulation. We get little publicity and advertising money. We cannot live without our faithful devoted partisans who finance us constantly." Since 1924 these devoted partisans seem to have made up all the deficits with donations, but such donations had failed to meet the needs of the paper by the end of the decade, falling almost 1,300,000 francs short of their request in June 1929.[24] For most of the 1930s *La Victoire* suspended publication during the summer to save its resources, though the Sunday newspaper continued to be published. Presumably, from 1932 until 1940, most of the Sunday articles written in the summers, which were not simple copies or resumés of articles from the rest of the French press, came from the pen of Hervé.[25]

Because he refused to convert the little influence that he still possessed into hard cash, that would cost him dearly according to his colleague, Robert Fleurier, who testified during the trial of Marshal Pétain in May 1945. "The paper did not have a very large budget, and often by the end of the month there were difficulties. Hervé always refused to accept subsidies which would have had the aim of binding him to sundry and private interests." There were some financial bright spots like the period in 1920 when the Bourtzev joined the paper and brought in sufficient funds in time to stave off bankruptcy. "But the following year, the *'frère*

quêteur', as Hervé baptized himself, held out the beggar's cup to cover the deficits and got upset that the independent tone displayed by his newspaper was not considered in a more favorable light."[26] He always believed that political newspapers were necessary because they alone "in grave hours, stated, translated, and shouted from the rooftops, what had to be said in a few lapidary formulas, the still confused but deep feelings of the national soul … Despite the development of the great information press … there still exists in this country a few free political tribunes which do not sell out, even when they live on public charity and a few meager alms from their partisans, and which, in troubled times, cry out loudly what the whole nation starts to say to itself quietly."[27]

As noted above, beginning in the summer of 1932, Hervé suspended daily publication for much of each summer. On May 8, 1934 he claimed that *La Victoire* and *La Victoire du Dimanche* had only 15,000 subscribers between them coupled with 20–30,000 propaganda subscriptions a year to the Sunday paper intended to win back workers. Sometimes the paper sent 100–200,000 issues to workers' districts hoping to draw them away from Marxist and free-thinking influence. The 700,000 franc annual deficit was reduced to 600,000 as a result of increasing capital outlays from subscribers between 1924 and 1931. However, after 1932 the economic crisis meant that capital augmentation was becoming increasingly difficult and simply begging had not been sufficient. To augment capital Hervé wanted to return to selling 1800 shares at 500 francs each. Such shares actually seem to have been forms of charity. At the same time, he reiterated his case about being the only doctrinal and battling newspaper left, except for *L'Humanité* and *L'Action Française*. Such newspapers posed questions and created ideas which the mass dailies could not do. Nevertheless, in early May 1934 the former *Sans Patrie* continued to claim that *La Victoire* influenced provincial newspapers and was beginning to have an impact in the ongoing campaign for national awakening.[28]

The year 1933 proved to be crucial for Europe as a whole and for Hervé in particular. In January 1933 Hitler came to power. The same year Hervé's *Milice Socialiste Nationale*, a rather stillborn attempt to generate some kind of dynamism, faded away along with Marcel Bucard's presence at *La Victoire*. At the same time Hervé admitted that the paper was again running a chronic annual deficit of 700,000 francs and that the expected support from war veterans failed to materialize. Despite several groups of youthful recruits, the M.S.N. failed to take off and *La Victoire* had tried to fund it. His *brigade de fer* of ten bourgeois funders was no longer able to sustain their support for the newspaper due to several deaths among them including: M. Bernard, "a French-Jewish benefactor" who died in

June 1933; M. Bruno de Boisgelin, a "great Christian" who defended *La Victoire* when it was most assailed, also passed away; and M. Pierre Moulin, another man from an "old noble family" who had found solace in *La Victoire* after the deaths of his two sons in World War I, died during the year.[29]

In May 1936 Hervé reported that the newspaper would have trouble getting through the summer since re-subscriptions were few, and "barely 1000 of our friends give us regular contributions and it's always the same ones." He now claimed that the newspaper had been spending 600,000 *francs* per year since 1924 yet its latest request for donations at the beginning of 1936 only achieved 200,000 of which 42,000 came from apparently what was left of the *brigade de fer*.[30] Sometime before June 1936 Hervé sent out a *Lettre aux elites françaises* in order to gain new subscribers and to help launch a *Front Pétain*.[31] Eventually he admitted having received only 350,000 francs by June 30, 1936 after his request for 600,000 on January 1, 1936.[32] On December 30, 1936 he called for an additional 10,000 francs a month to meet the increased printing costs which were exacerbated by his campaign for Pétain.[33] During the Popular Front era *La Victoire* stopped appearing in kiosks and was only available to subscribers. From August 1 until September 30, 1936 the paper ceased publication due to the increasing costs of publication passed on to newspapers by the Maison Hachette and the paper providers which Hervé ascribed to the recent factory occupations and wage agreements.[34] Nevertheless, even without funds Hervé expected to reconstitute by the P.S.N. in October 1936 because he thought that the disorder generated by the Popular Front would be an opportune time to attract wealthy backers.[35]

On January 27, 1937 Hervé announced that *La Victoire*, like the Catholic newspapers *La Croix* and *L'Aube*, would soon be appearing only six times a week because the lack of funding forced cancellation of the newspaper's Monday morning edition. Apparently, only regular readers would still be able to get *La Victoire* at their designated sellers (*vente ferme*), but from now on the newspaper would be unavailable for purchase by single copies (*bouillons*).[36] On the first of October 1938, the former history professor made a reference to the closing of an office in Lyon, but that seems surprising given the ongoing dire financial straits of the newspaper.[37] In late November that year, in response to the rise in prices due to the Popular Front and the loss of anti-Semitic subscribers, the Director of *La Victoire* announced that the paper would return to a one page format on December 1 as had been done from September 25 until October 3.[38] "In March of 1939 *La Victoire*, having fallen to 500 copies, was moribund and only lingered on thanks to the notoriety of its director."[39] Once World War II had begun, Hervé announced that *La Victoire* would recommence what it did during *La Grande*

Guerre. Without any hint of intentional irony, the director promised that his paper would be available at newsstands in order to help sustain French morale without any *bourrage du crâne*.[40]

In his book on the collaborationist press, Jean Quéval described Hervé as the head of a rather pitiful "confidential" newspaper. Yet Quéval strangely used Hervé and *La Victoire* to introduce the topic of collaboration by the French press in World War II even though *La Victoire* lasted very briefly after initial German permission to publish.[41] Jacques Isorni, Marshal Pétain's attorney in May 1945 and a film critic on *La Victoire* for a month and a half some time during the late 1930s, thought that Hervé had become stale and outdated by the time of his employment, and the paper "did not have two hundred readers."[42]

> "Jealous of his independence and undoubtedly clumsy in secret negotiations, Hervé was unable to promote his political positions by means of silent partners or potential financiers. If he profited from the generous payments distributed by fascist Italy to the French press, as the *Sûreté* suspected in 1930, it does not appear that he drew sums of any importance from the secret funds of the Italian Embassy. In the eyes of Italian fascists, the Director of *La Victoire* simply appeared to be a losing investment, who did not need to be bought because he was ideologically acquired and no longer represented an influence which could sway public opinion."

As for Nazi funds from the German Foreign Ministry which often aided newspapers useful to Germany, the *Sûreté* found no evidence that *La Victoire* was a recipient, however well-intentioned it had seemed to be toward interests beyond the Rhine.[43] Certainly, any remnants of international idealism, however misperceived, which remained part of Hervé's vision were bound to conflict with the actual bases of his support.

22

Le Parti de la République Autoritaire

In 1923 Hervé was as upset with the violence of the extreme Right as he was with that of the extreme Left. The antics exhibited by the *Camelots du Roi* not only helped the cause of the extreme Left, they were the antithesis of the discipline which he assumed was mandatory for a *redressement nationale*.[1] Despite the counter-revolutionary cast of his own ideas, Hervé was almost always against violence. His regressive domestic policies were reactive responses to increasingly rapid changes in an era of disorder and violence. Because his extreme solutions to French problems sought safety, security, and order, he was out of step with almost every shade of militant opinion in France in the interwar period. Positions similar to Hervé's were often more forcefully stated and more readily accepted when they were expressed by others. After placing great hopes in the *Bloc National*, Hervé became disillusioned by its failure to attack the problems which he considered most urgent: depopulation, the heritage of republican anticlericalism, and constitutional reform. In 1923 Hervé had, for a time, supported Poincaré's aggressive foreign policy in the hope that such support might foster governmental policies favoring re-Christianization.[2] His desire to avoid international disorder, his disillusion with Poincaré's anticlerical domestic policy, and his criticism of the Ministry's excessive formalism along with its penchant for overly legalistic approaches to solve problems led to a cancellation of financial support to *La Victoire* by the *Président du Conseil's* political allies.[3]

Despite tensions in Hervé's relationship with Poincaré and the *Bloc National*, as the election of 1924 approached the former *Sans Patrie* characterized the political campaign as a battle between the forces of death and life. He associated the *Cartel des Gauches* with decay, de-Christianization, and anarchy. The *Bloc National*, on the other hand, symbolized rebirth, religion, and discipline. Hervé continued to reject monarchism as well as Bolshevism, but he now told his Catholic readers "to boldly join the paths which Jacques Piou and Albert de Mun had engaged them concerning the advice of Leo XIII."[4] Hervé initially argued that the talk of international peace by the *Cartel* was a mirage because its policy of de-Christianization could only lead to Bolshevism and another German invasion.[5] After the election of the *Cartel des Gauches*, Hervé accused Édouard Herriot, the new *Président du Conseil*, of worrying too much about the threat from clericals of the Right when the true danger was from Socialists and Communists. In fact, Herriot was forced to back down from plans for introducing secular legislation in Alsace-Lorraine.[6]

Before the elections Hervé had actually called Poincaré "a national danger."[7] The electoral victory of the *Cartel des Gauches* on May 11, 1924 was attributed to Poincaré's failure to lead the *Bloc National* adequately. The election was "a day of infamy" for *La Victoire* because it had wrecked all hope of renewal and re-Christianization. Disorder, depopulation, and Bolshevism were now inevitable. The domestic policies of the *Cartel* would so weaken France that Hervé claimed that another war was inevitable.[8] Maurice Agulhon's assessment of the new *Président du Conseil* was a bit more nuanced. For all his charm, culture, and accomplishments, Herriot could not adjust to meet the needs of a rapidly changing nation, and he never mastered the economy.[9] To gain Socialist support, Herriot spoke in favor of the Socialist proposal for a tax on capital. However, to reassure the markets, he named a business representative as Minister of Finance, who opposed taxing the rich. Thus Herriot seemed to be sending mixed messages. While his promise to enact the tax upset the markets as well as his traditional small town supporters, his failure to implement his promise coupled to his appointment undermined the confidence of his Socialist allies. "Holders of short-term bonds ceased renewing them, forcing the government to obtain advances from the Bank of France. By the end of 1924, the bank had to put more money into circulation without backing than was legally permitted." The government ordered bureaucrats at the Treasury Ministry to conceal this even though the bank remained a private institution. One of the bank's regents was François de Wendel. Not only was de Wendel a deputy and a leading member of the *Fédération Républicaine*, he was a manager of the leading French iron and

steel conglomerate as well as President of the *Comité des Forges*, the very powerful, conservative, and hardline employers' organization. De Wendel threatened to resign as regent in March 1925 if the actual accounts were not made public.[10]

Domestically, the situation inherited by the *Cartel* was none too promising with financial scandal, religious turmoil, a resurgent anti-parliamentary Right, and policy tensions within the *Cartel* between Radicals and Socialists arising from contradictory economic policies. In such a dire situation the *Cartel* "had very little room to maneuver,"[11] yet extreme remedies were necessary. Besides evacuating the Ruhr, Herriot had to back away from his plans to secularize the schools in Alsace-Lorraine because the backlash was too great for him to reintroduce the lay laws there. The new *Ministre du Conseil* did manage to promote a Concordat in Alsace and maintain relations with the Vatican.[12] The eventual resignation of Herriot in the spring of 1925 due to the fiscal crisis led to five new governments in the next 16 months, but not one of them managed to calm the financial markets.[13] As many scholars have noted, the Third Republic had a penchant for empowering governments which promoted policies contrary to the election results delivered by French voters. While Herriot was in power and even when he was merely the leader of the Radicals, Hervé and *La Victoire* generally dealt with him mercilessly.

Conservative politics had become so fragmented within a few years after the war, that after the victory of the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1924, many conservatives assumed that traditional parties were unable to defend their interests, so they turned to extra-parliamentary movements which called themselves *ligues*.[14] Robert J. Soucy convincingly argues that fear and anger over the victory of the *Cartel* in the spring of 1924 inspired a resurgence of antiparliamentary and antidemocratic forces in France which amounted to a "first wave" of post-war French fascism. Many groups on the far Right, inspired by the plebiscitary tradition of Bonapartism and Boulanger, not only sympathized with and admired Mussolini for his destruction of Italian democracy and creation of an increasingly dictatorial Fascist regime in Italy after 1922, they dreamt of emulating the Italian *Duce*. Hervé's *Parti de la République Autoritaire* can certainly be seen as part of this larger "first wave of French fascism" even if one may hesitate to label Hervé a fascist.[15] "The first wave of fascism," much like Hervé's latest *parti*, "failed to attract much of a following. France, which had won the war and which was enjoying economic prosperity [despite bouts of fiscal troubles, inflation, and capital flight?] in the mid-1920s, did not suffer from the conditions that had enabled Italian Fascists to recruit a mass following. The plethora of would-be leaders [including Hervé] also weakened the extreme right."[16]

If Soucy's first wave of French fascism arose in 1924 following the election of the *Cartel des Gauches*, peaked in 1925, but receded in 1926 when Raymond Poincaré's moderate government defeated a new version of the *Cartel* and stabilized the French economy by stopping an inflationary spiral, a second fascist wave emerged after the onset of the Depression in France in 1931 and the election of another *Cartel* majority in the Chamber in 1932. The peak of French fascism did not occur during the Stavisky Affair and the events of February 6, 1934; rather, it came in 1937 after the victory of the Popular Front. Hervé's fairly moderate P.S.N. of 1919 antedated Soucy's "first wave" of French fascism by five years. If Hervé's increasingly authoritarian formations, including his most extreme formation in 1932–1933, appear to fit Soucy's chronology in part, it remains questionable whether any of Hervé's interwar parties fit the fascist label.[17] Soucy employs the phrase "republican fascism" to show how various interwar French leagues and parties which claimed to be republican employed violence and advocated antidemocratic programs whenever legality failed to meet their needs. Because Hervé emphasized his opposition to violent and illegal means to attain a plebiscitarian dictatorship throughout the interwar era, his interwar formations may not fit the term. Unlike the *ligues*, Hervé's formations generally lacked dynamism and seldom emphasized military values, youth, or the veterans' mystique. His relatively moderate message fit his audience and that is significant.[18]

Despite the nearly complete transformation of Hervé's political program in moving from socialism to national socialism, there were several constant elements. In both systems Parliament was corrupt because it was associated with the very disorder that Hervé wanted to end. In connecting Parliament to self interest, divisiveness, conflict, and partisan politics, it was a constant symbol of narrow, selfish, local, and individual material interests. Before World War I the positive polarity in Hervé's thought was the ideal socialist utopia where the individual was fulfilled in collective endeavor. From 1912 to 1919 the socialist utopia had gradually been replaced by the French Republic, itself an evolving term of reference. By 1925 the *République Autoritaire*, though it entailed a political program created by normal political means, was a perfect structural replacement and virtual antipode to the socialist utopia. Both visions had been described by Hervé in common sense and practical terms but the goal of each vision entailed an end to the conflict, divisiveness, disorder, and disharmony of human society itself. Each vision entailed dissatisfaction with the imperfections of contemporary society and sought to transcend them. Hervé's socialist vision assumed that education and increasing knowledge were twin paths to universal harmony. Hervé's *République Autoritaire* assumed that man's intellectual capacity on its own was too limited to find harmony.

One wonders how Hervé could have expected any one man, however enlightened, to be able to achieve harmony and stability without the coercive violence that his political system and panaceas seemed designed to avoid. He certainly appeared to have gone from optimism to pessimism but that was not completely true. Each of his visions sought material well-being for all men even though each seemed to be rooted in a fundamental distrust of material values. Hervé compared Communists to his old style Hervéists, and he described them as pure, zealous, impulsive, generous, doctrinaire, and without guile; they were idealists who were thus capable of attaining the ideal realm of his vision. Hervé's claims of having more sympathy with French Communists than for the S.F.I.O. was probably more than blatant propaganda. He called the members of the *Parti Communiste Français* "my old insurrectional friends." He knew that one day they would return to their senses and rejoin the national tradition by entering his new party. Because Socialists were politicians and maneuverers, they were fundamentally opportunistic, untrustworthy, impure, and hypocritical. So he had much less hope for them. Since Socialists were closely associated with the Parliament and material corruption, they were generally considered beyond salvation. Communists rejected Parliament, so, despite their underlying materialism, they were capable of the idealism which was necessary to transcend base materialism and create a system seeking unity, order, and harmony.[19] At this visionary level, Hervé's Christian national socialism corresponded to his earlier idealist socialism. After the war Hervé spent two decades trying to recreate his original Christian beliefs, but his entire political career had demanded a faith in order to transform the mundane into some semblance of the sublime. Most of Hervé's editorials dealt with the quotidian, but the way he structured his arguments cannot be fully grasped unless we understand his overarching framework and largely unstated assumptions. As a journalist involved in standard political questions, his mundane panaceas occasionally betrayed his increasingly ethereal organizing assumptions. Although his life was bound to daily journalistic and political concerns, his editorials over the long term revolve around efforts to solve the riddles of the real and the ideal or the material and the spiritual.

Hervé's disillusionment with the *Bloc National* and Poincaré coupled with a financial crisis had intensified the Bonapartist tones in *La Victoire* by early 1924. In February Hervé called on Clemenceau to lead a new Authoritarian Republic.[20] This intensification of Hervé's ideas for a revision of the Consititution in order to create a stronger state culminated in the creation of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* in 1925. By 1924 Hervé's program demanded a new Constitution as a dike against the growth of indiscipline, increasing

anarchy, and parliamentary excesses. However, his attack on the self-centeredness of business interests, perhaps because they failed to finance *La Victoire*, made his proposed *République Autoritaire* a true political mélange. The demand for a limitation of the powers of the Senate and its evolution into a permanent legal court as well as an advisory body on foreign affairs represented long-standing hopes at *La Victoire*. Such a revised governmental system would utilize presidential decree laws subject only to advice from Parliament. The anti-democratic tone of *La Victoire* was now more consistently voiced. The "masses" were "vulgar and stupid" but they were told to reform and educate themselves so that they could enter the bourgeois elites, "the only groups fit to rule." Hervé did not want to end universal manhood suffrage, but he wanted the powers of the legislature circumscribed by means of an evolution of Parliament into a mere advisory body. True power would come from the elites, especially the technical elites, who would advise the executive. These changes were needed because the growth of democracy had made parliamentary manners more and more divisive, brutal, and demagogic.[21]

Such anti-parliamentary arguments were increasingly widespread even among mainstream politicians.[22] Kevin Passmore has shown how many people from the Center to the extreme Right and even from the Left, in groups like the *Fédération Républicaine*, the *Alliance Démocratique*, and the *Redressment Français* as well as the Radicals and even some members of the S.F.I.O. during the interwar era subscribed to an ongoing critique of the Third Republic which was more or less a protest against what would eventually be called the immobility of the "stalemate society." That critique, though it varied from group to group, generally revolved around the following notions: a faith in French grandeur and uniqueness; a special notion of "competence" arising from generalism, experience, and scientism if not necessarily technical expertise; financial caution; a rationalization of economic production to reconquer foreign markets, better coordinate business interest with the state, as well as undermine trade unionism; constitutional reform; antisocialism; national fitness based on neo-Lamarckian notions separating the masses from the elites; a potential for anti-immigration policies and xenophobia; a faith "in a unitary French nation" which "underpinned the belief that party competition undermined national unity"; the need for a sound and growing population; a skepticism regarding the capacity of the masses to act wisely; and, concomitantly, their need for elite guidance. Yet such patterns of thought did not exclude admiration for things foreign, especially American and English practices, and even aspects of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, especially anti-Communism, though most commentators argued against dictatorship as

unsuitable for France.[23] Such ideas were far from alien to the program and arguments of Gustave Hervé throughout the interwar era.

The formal creation of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* on October 27, 1925 began with an appeal by Hervé which read: "Whoever likes me should follow me."[24] Certainly the party was both a new initiative by one proponent of national socialism in a time of "danger" as well as a sign of his growing disillusionment with other political formations. He hoped that this political initiative could galvanize support for a new regime to be created legally "because the country aspired to calm, tranquility, and internal peace after the terrible shock of the war, and it would not, light-heartedly and without revolting, allow itself to be led on adventures such as a fascist coup. In addition, a fascist coup was only conceivable if the anarchy had become such that it appeared to everyone to be the last chance for security."[25] Hervé's new party reinforced the assumptions of the P.S.N. Such a regime assumed "a pacified and moralized social body" and implied a right-wing plebiscitary approach as well as a functional system of class collaboration. Hervé believed that French renewal demanded an era of national penitence against the pleasure-seeking habits which he assumed had caused the moral crisis which was visible everywhere.[26] He never forgot workers' needs for social insurance, but their rights and demands could not be allowed to jeopardize the proper management of firms. He recognized workers' hopes for social and economic amelioration, but the latter goal was not to be attained by strikes, threats, and violence but by cooperation, social solidarity, and a greater sharing of benefits. Sometimes Hervé implied that workers would share in the management of firms, but since that idea was never developed, except perhaps in his later arguments about corporatism, what he seemed to mean was simply an equality of opportunity to achieve what one was able.[27]

Such a system assumed the existence of "owners who merited high praise [and] had a vocation to direct a working class which had to work: [men] like Cognacq, the founder of Samaritaine, Boucicaut, the founder of Bon Marché, and Bader, the one from the Galeries Lafayette."[28] Arguing that social justice was the fruit of a natural social harmony, in July 1927 he described business owners as similar to fathers. For him, even less than benevolent owners possessed merit. At the end of the war, Hervé had come to realize that greater efficiency in production arose from the audacity, discipline, hard work, and innovation of individual business leaders and skilled technicians, not collectivist schemes concocted by "bookish doctrinaires" inhabiting a "cloudy metaphysical realm." Individuals were all different and economic efficiency as well as production demanded that this be recognized, which could best be done by rewarding merit. In early 1928

he praised the American production methods of Taylorism then being used at the Michelin Company, regarding even its rather rigid management style as admirable. Freedom of action for the entrepreneur would be the pivot of Hervé's economic ideas during the interwar era.[29] "Throughout twentieth-century French history (and before) reflection on American experience has acted as a means of reflecting about the possible future of France."[30] Hervé certainly fit that pattern during the interwar, periodically comparing France to the United States, often looking to America to supply remedies for French problems. The American Republic with its strong president was for Hervé an example of a *République Autoritaire*. On the eve of the Popular Front, Hervé was so jealous of America's "veritable dictatorship" under Roosevelt, that he was willing to overlook its "nearly communist" tendencies in the interest of solving inherent capitalist disorder.[31] However regressive his political panaceas proved to be, Hervé was clearly not opposed to either *taylorisme* or *fordisme*.

The new *Parti* was created to end parliamentary chaos, attack secularization, and counter the threat of Bolshevism. Though he considered fascism to be creative compared to destructive Bolshevism, for Hervé fascism concentrated too much on youth, was too bloody, and could only make things worse in France. His new party was to be an alternative to fascism which preserved the socialist ideal of social justice. The French Right needed a new party to transcend its perpetual moderation and offset the strong organizations and journalistic support which characterized the French Left. *L'Action Française* and its royalism had no appeal to ordinary people. Both the *Parti de la Democratie Nouvelle* of Lysis and the *Parti des Républicains Rénovateurs* had failed to excite the people. Millerand's *Ligue Républicaine Nationale* was too parliamentary, and, therefore, too timid. *La Fédération Nationale Catholique* led by General de Castelnau refused to become involved in politics. Hervé still admired the *Jeunesses Patriotes* of Pierre Taittinger, but so far they had refused to become a political party. The *anciens combattants* were hopelessly divided into several organizations, and they, too, refused to act politically. Hervé advised them to join his *Parti de la République Autoritaire*.[32]

Gilles Heuré's account of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* stressed the numerous obstacles facing it as well as the utter lack of personal engagement and enthusiasm by Hervé who already had his hands full with *La Victoire*. "It was only with a knife to his throat that he launched forth into institutional politics, desperate that another 'more informed' might be able to spare him the trouble ... Nevertheless, because it was necessary to comply, he listed the requisite qualifications" and forged ahead. If he "regretted" that no one with more authority or expertise seemed willing to undertake this task, he thought his knowledge of history

and politics as well as his skill as an agitator and propagandist might be helpful.[33] Claiming to be a republican who was independent of the financial plutocracy as well as free of personal and financial ambitions, Hervé described his new party as "the *avant-garde* of the great Republican army seeking order." He also answered charges that his new formation would simply divide the Right even further by saying that he wanted all the groups seeking order and harmony to work together. "If someone wants to undertake this crusade in our place and if he has the means superior to ours to lead it successfully, let him show himself [and] I will pass the command to him." Other groups were told that *La Victoire* would join any *parti* stronger than its own.[34] Heuré argued that Hervé only pretended to be unconcerned by all the competition on the extreme Right and sought to dismiss any notion of personal ambition. The director of *La Victoire* claimed that, unlike other people, he did not want to divide the forces of order for any personal motives. In stressing the goal of unity on the Right, Hervé sought to verify that his chief aim was political not personal.[35]

On New Year's Day in 1926 Hervé forcefully restated his case for a *République Autoritaire.*

> "We will not be able to rebuild the country without a veritable crusade bringing a healthy patriotism, fraternity, and a new conception of Republican government among the population. Such a regime would be a far cry from the envious and leveling equality of the Third Republic because it would respect hierarchy, discipline, and authority. We Frenchmen are so constructed that we cannot remake our political system unless we know where we are going. We need to have confidence in a new system before we can sweep out the old. To a France disgusted and disillusioned by politicians, party rivalries and bickering, ministerial crises every six months, and the incompetence and irresponsibility of the parliamentary assemblies, we propose as a rallying cry, 'The Authoritarian Republic! A Republic with a leader!' Under this formula we propose a republican doctrine which is not a dictatorship, it is not fascism, and it is not the Empire. It involves the restoration of authority to all levels of the social hierarchy, beginning with the head."[36]

Concomitantly with the creation of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire*, Hervé sought to create a paramilitary formation similar to the Hervéist *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires* and, in fact, his new paramilitary force included several former Hervéist shock troops. The political philosophy of the *Jeunes Gardes*, if not its role, was the antithesis of the J.G.R. It appealed to youth to protect the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* from Communist assaults. The *Jeunes Gardes* wore tricolor or blue armbands and hoped to become a support to the police, the *gendarmerie*, and the army, but Hervé considered his formation to be an alternative to fascism. Emile Tissier was Secretary-General of the new party as well as the chief figure in

the creation of the *Jeunes Gardes*.[37] Besides rallying a new group of young militants to join the *Jeunes Gardes*, the *parti* was expected to be a propaganda vehicle to attract a network of adherents and a new source of subscribers. The police followed these efforts and reported on the dearth of funds which obviously limited the chances for a successful paramilitary formation.[38] It is unclear exactly when the *Jeunes Gardes* first saw the light of day, but they do not seem to have been an important formation until the eve of the 1928 elections.

Hervé sought to preserve the Republic as well as universal manhood suffrage, yet he distrusted direct democracy. The *République Autoritaire* solved his contradictory feelings about democracy by seeking a government headed by a single leader advised by the elites of all classes and groups in a system sanctioned by plebiscitary democracy.[39] The *Parti de la République Autoritaire* preserved the chief goal of the P.S.N., which was to bring back the workers to a French social program. The new party sought to address the workers whom the leagues had presumably forgotten.[40] Hervé considered the position of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* to be the same as the old P.S.N., the Left wing of a new *Bloc National* to be elected in 1928. He himself was the Director General of the new party, above Secretary-General Tissier. The political program of the party had six major goals: (1) A non-dictatorial restoration of authority with power concentrated in the hands of a plebiscitary President of the Republic who would end the moral and political anarchy of France; (2) An increase in the French birth rate promoted by the state with incentives and re-Christianization; (3) International grandeur as well as peace; (4) All the social justice possible in an orderly and harmonious society; (5) Constitutional revision to end parliamentary demagoguery, ministerial crises, job seeking, favoritism, and opportunism, yet with a guarantee of traditional Republican liberties; (6) The promotion of the moral ideals of work, discipline, sacrifice, and justice seeking to promote internal order.[41]

The Constitution of the *République Autoritaire* can be taken as a summation of all Hervé's interwar efforts to renew and reform a Republic that had become an eternal "*pétaudière*". It was not even necessary for him to invent all the critiques and solutions himself, because a writer and administrator on *La Victoire* named André Chéradame had written a book in 1912 called *La Crise Française* which analyzed "the diverse symptoms of the 'general disorganization'". Ironically, among the symptoms of "the French crisis" enumerated by the author was Hervéism itself! Chéradame's volume recommended various constitutional reforms including the "strengthening of the powers of the President of the Republic."[42]

Drawing heavily of Chéradame's critique, Hervé's reformed Constitution was meant, "in the first place, to restrain the role of the deputies." He called them

plotters who sought to become ministers, conservatives who wished to change nothing, manipulators because they had that capacity, and calculators because that was their vocation. Because the regime was so unstable, the deputies were only provisional. Above all, the parliamentary deputies were deplorable because they "maintained the regime of 'bedlam' that he execrated." Though it seems so ironic today, Hervé borrowed freely from the American Constitution because it closely confined the role of Parliament to legislation and regulation, and gave preeminent powers to the head of state.[43] The American Republic was a model for a *République Autoritaire* not only due to its strong executive but also because it provided for a Supreme Court to act as the arbiter between the executive and legislative branches of government. Its nine lifelong members were to be composed of former French Presidents and nominees from the upper legal bodies of France. It would be the first body of the state, with precedence over the Parliament. "It would be the supreme safeguard of liberties and the chief barrier against despotism from above and demagoguery from below." Free access to property, jobs, or business enterprises now seemed more important to Hervé than freedoms of opinion and expression. The new Constitution guaranteed liberties but his system did not rule out censorship, and liberties were only granted "as long as they did not damage public order and morality as well as internal and external security."[44]

Because Hervé believed that universal suffrage crushed the French elites, he wanted "the candidate" to the Presidency of the Republic to be chosen by a non-political assembly of French elites, a *Conseil d'État* made up of administrative (including mayors and municipal officials) and private elites (from business and academia) of France. The candidate chosen by this system, reminiscent of the papal conclave method, would then be subject to the ratification of all French voters in a national plebiscite. Hervé wanted a seven-year term of office or preferably a ten-year term with re-eligibility without opposition for the life of a President. If a majority of voters did not approve a Presidential candidate, the Senate and Chamber would each choose a candidate to be submitted to the voters in another election. The powers of the President would be great. He would initiate legislation and choose ministers from outside Parliament and not subject to it. The executive branch of government would initiate all laws so that the pernicious divisiveness of parliamentary and democratic politics could be transcended. Proposed laws (virtual decree laws) would have to be submitted for consultation to Superior Councils of technicians and professionals tied to each ministry of government. Only then would legislation be submitted to a joint Parliamentary body of the Senate and Chamber. In case of a conflict between the executive and legislative branches, the Supreme Court would settle the dispute or it would be submitted

to a referendum of all the voters "as in Switzerland." Parliament would be limited to voting the budget, inspecting acts of government, and exercising war powers. Hervé claimed he did not want the Parliament to become a corporatist economic body because he believed that such an assembly would become too political and divisive! The economic interests of France were to be represented in the Superior Councils of each ministry. Political and personal passions as well as interests were not to be allowed to disrupt the stability of France.[45]

One could argue that such a defense of the Republic implied its negation. One might also say that such a system was a mystification, a delusion, or a contradiction, yet it was explained by Hervé as a sincere attempt to avoid the twin dangers of Bolshevism and fascism. Although he refused to call Hervé's program fascist, Gilles Heuré argued that the entire edifice of the *République Autoritaire* was a virtual dictatorship. To put an end to the "'*Folies Bourbons*' of the parliamentary regime and the '*Chambre ingouvernable*' which left, in 1926, a 'regime de putrefaction', Hervé designed the plans of a new Constitution" which resembled a dictatorship. In January 1924, he said as much. "What was the dictatorship of public safety if not a large '*chaussette à clous*' [hob-nailed police boots], complete to tame the enemies of the nation … and on occasion those of the Republic."[46] Although Hervé always argued that he hoped a fascist coup would not be necessary, he wanted to be ready for something like it as a last resort. The *Parti de la République Autoritaire* was meant to prepare for the electoral battles of 1928, "still in holding ourselves ready, in case events precipitate and take a tragic turn, to have recourse to the revolutionary method of the patriotic Italian fascists, if it is necessary to break a Bolshevik movement."[47] Using Samuel Kalman's study *The Extreme Right in Interwar France* as a guide, perhaps it is fair to say that conservative, reactionary, and fascist strains were concurrently exhibited by *Le Faisceau*, the *Croix-de-Feu*/P.S.F., as well as more marginal formations such as those developed by Hervé.[48]

The creation of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* occurred in an epoch when Hervé searched for a "providential man" to lead France out of the morass of parliamentary democracy. "Since the war Hervé had been on the lookout for such a leader. He successively showered Gallieni, Joffre, Foch, and Clemenceau with praise. He rose up forcefully against the machinations hatched to thwart the election of '*Père-la-Victoire*' to the Presidency of the Republic."[49] One could argue that Clemenceau was Hervé's primary post-war choice to fulfill the role of national savior. By March 1925 Millerand and Briand had become his principal hopes. During the financial troubles of 1926, the temporary return of Joseph Caillaux to power beside Briand in July led Hervé to see his former nemesis and arch-villain Caillaux as a possible savior of France. In the 1920s at various times

he also expected Poincaré and André Tardieu to fulfill the role of national leader, but in the end he was generally disappointed with his choices and with the French people.[50] After 1935 he hoped that Pétain would fulfill this role.[51] Hervé realized that a leader had to have charisma and be dynamic. Such a man had to be able to excite the crowd; he had "to adorn himself in 'striking colors' … Since the war, Gustave Hervé tracked a dictator, saw him in every official who was a bit authoritarian, and hoped for him in each figure with a little popularity." However, during the interwar era the hope for a leader or dictator to resolve problems was not original with Hervé and such a quest was common among all shades of rightist opinion.[52] Despite Hervé's detailed programs for revision and reform, the crucial element in Hervé's political program was a magic figure, a leader, or a "providential man" akin to the "Magic King" of the *L'Action Française* who would resolve differences, divisions, and disorder by his very being. The magical leader was comparable to Hervé's earlier mythical revolution where many of the same problems and conflicts were to have miraculously disappeared through another set of magical formulas.

In a sense Hervé's political solutions to French problems were all metapolitical or simply forms of Bonapartist nostalgia. For someone like Maurice Barrès, a national man and leader or a new Napoleon could not solve the problem of national decadence. "[T]he temptation of having the dictator serve as a solution to all the problems of national disunity is rejected" in Barrès's most famous novel, Les Déracinés." Less aesthetic and mystical than the famous author who promoted rootedness, Hervé chose a simpler, more direct, more mundane, but inevitably magical approach to solve French disorder, disunity, and decadence.[53] The *République Autoritaire* self-consciously echoed Bonapartism, which for Hervé was a positive force as well as a continuation of the Republican and authoritarian traditions of France. In May 1921 he had hailed the 100th anniversary of the death of Napoleon as "the man whose name symbolizes the highest point of military genius and the warrior virtues of the race." The great conqueror was "the crowned soldier of the Revolution who created order out of the confusion of the French Directory. He restored authority and discipline in a country where revolutionary factions were incapable of agreement to constitute stable government."[54] All that had to be checked was the Bonapartist tendency to wage war. But could Bonapartism be so easily separated from fascism as Hervé (and many later French scholars) seemed to assume?

If Hervé generally envisaged only a legal takeover of power, if he wanted a peaceful revision of the Consititution, and if he abhorred all violence regardless of the political views of the perpetrators, he still entertained the possibility of

a violent coup or uprising of the people to prevent a takeover of France by the extreme Left. Hervé's inveterate abhorrence of violence cannot be easily separated from Robert J. Soucy's somewhat paradoxical notion of "republican fascism." However, before we brand Hervé a fascist several bits of evidence have to be considered. On April 1, 1926, in the midst of his campaign for the *République Autoritaire*, Hervé reprimanded the *Jeunesses Patriotes* for their tendency to provoke violent confrontations.[55] To give the *Parti de la République Autoritaire* a chance to succeed in the elections of 1928, Hervé sought to recruit workers by appealing to their xenophobia. He also asked Catholics, *anciens combattants*, *Jeunesses Patriotes*, the *Ligue des Patriotes*, and the *Ligue Républicaine Nationale* to join his party. His solution to the social question was a paternalistic one which looked to the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII as a guide. *La Victoire* told French owners that if they had followed papal counsel, workers would never have followed revolutionary leaders. Hervé's "socialism" increasingly cultivated Christian roots, and its French roots were modified. The French Revolution was now a lesson in individual effort and respect for private property. Fourier was now characterized as an advocate of the association of capital and labor. Blanqui, of course, continued to be his chief example of revolutionary patriotism. On October 31, 1926 Hervé prominently advertised his party's first Communist recruits.[56] Though Hervé's system was designed to avert crises, it would undoubtedly have demanded a crisis for its attainment because only *la patrie en danger* would suffice to extricate Frenchmen out of their deleterious habits. Ironically, when crises did arise, Hervé invariably acted like a moderate and favored the least drastic solution. Such a tendency seems to mark him as a traditional conservative patriot or nationalist, rather than a fascist.[57]

23

The Reawakened *Parti Socialiste National* and the Elections of 1928

When France's financial situation became critical in late 1925 and early 1926, Hervé appeared to transcend much of his own binary vision in the interests of France. He returned to the days of World War I by demanding a Dictatorship of Public Safety made up of all the non-Marxist Republicans who had ever headed a French government. Decree laws were needed and all doctrines as well as parties had to be forgotten because France was in danger. In fact, the financial crisis actually reinforced his belief that the parliamentary system did not work in a crisis, and he hoped to use the situation to recreate a new *Union Sacrée* so that France would not have to wait until 1928 for a resolution to its problems.[1] Hervé the visionary was always capable of a certain realism whenever a crisis threatened the nation. Though he never gave up his goal for a *République Autoritaire*, in a crisis a modicum of unity, order, and harmony would have to suffice if a temporary end to political squabbling and self interested behavior were all that could be achieved. In early 1926 that meant telling the Right to support a Briand Ministry. No ministerial crisis could be tolerated at such a critical moment. France was much more important than any party, program, or organization. Hervé described the Briand Ministry as a time of peace and *détente*. It was a stage on the path to a Ministry of National Concentration and *Union Sacrée*. Though initially he had reservations about Briand's Locarno Treaties as illusory victories and a false

pacification, such matters did not prevent him from calling for a Briand Dictatorship.

Hervé's lack of knowledge on economic affairs led him to shift to any economic policy that might work. In a financial crisis he proved to be a perpetual *girouette* (weather vane).[2] A temporary fall by Briand in June 1926 even led the former *Sans Patrie* to hope that his former foe, Joseph Caillaux, the resurrected "financial wizard", could save France. He even compared Caillaux to Clemenceau in an effort to rally all Frenchmen to him![3] Of course, Hervé soon reversed himself on Caillaux but the logic of Hervé's latest attack is even more significant. Caillaux lacked the zeal, audacity, and spirit necessary to lead France out of its financial crisis.[4] Years in prison had apparently sapped Caillaux of his former audacity and flair according to Edward Berenson.[5] This assault on Caillaux was soon moderated, but *La Victoire* welcomed the coming of the new Poincaré Ministry in July 1926. The financial crisis had been "so acute that the Radicals panicked" and supported a return to power by the Right.[6] After Poincaré took the Finance portfolio, this reassured the markets and brought back a renewed flow of capital to France. Thus, the financial storm vanished as rapidly as it had formed, and even the *ligues*, including Hervé's latest political formation, seemed to fade by 1927.[7]

Charles Sowerwine cogently described how Poincaré reduced the "income tax, which affected the rich, and increased taxes on food and drink, which hit the poor. He created a special trust fund to redeem public debt" by certain real estate taxes and revenues "from the state tobacco monopoly." With support from the Center Right and right-wing parties, he gained electoral success in 1928. By returning the franc to the gold standard, the currency attained a value of one-fifth its pre-war level. That "cheap but solid franc" managed to attract capital back to France, temporarily cushioning the effects of the world-wide Depression. The revaluation also facilitated ending the state debt to the Bank of France. By consolidating their losses, the stabilized franc assured French investors that they would not be completely wiped out. To wit, such measures promoted a healthier economy. His second ministry from 1926 through 1929 was so successful that "the late 1920s became known as the Poincaré years."[8] However, economic success alone would never satisfy Hervé, who sought a new "providential man" by early 1927 because he was once again disillusioned with Poincaré for reasons similar to his disillusionment of 1924. Poincaré had not rescinded anticlerical laws, transcended party politics, eliminated French decadence, nor displayed the necessary élan to create a new *Union Sacrée*.[9]

The *Parti de la République Autoritaire* disappeared around the end of 1926 probably due to a lack of interest, an absence of funds, and Hervé's efforts to

promote a National Ministry in the face of a financial crisis. Certainly an improved economy, the relaxation of tension between the Church and State, and a growing national consensus temporarily closed the political space open for budding extremist groups including Hervé's.[10] On September 10, 1927 Hervé announced that the dormant *Parti Socialiste National* would be reawakened for the elections of 1928 with a program similar to that of his recently dissolved party. On November 1, 1927 *La Victoire* announced that it was going to a six page format.[11] He wanted to accelerate his activities and continue to recruit workers, though his results proved to be quite limited. "In January of 1928 he saluted the arrival of Lucien Bourniche, a worker with Renault [and] a former Communist municipal councilor from Boulogne-Billancourt" who admitted to joining the P.S.N. "as much out of a political conversion as for disgust in the face of certain electoral practices." Other recruits included former leftists Cecillon as well as Paul Jany, who had been an editor at *L'Humanité* before coming over to join Hervé's reincarnated party. Rather than accepting the need to vote for other parties as in 1919 and 1924, the new P.S.N. provided its own list of candidates for the spring elections of 1928. Hervé, who had not appeared in public meetings since the beginning of the war, now wanted to promote the P.S.N. by personally speaking at the party's campaign meetings.[12] Such meetings generally were held in working class areas in an effort to win workers away from Marxism. Neither the ideas nor the rhetoric of *La Victoire* were softened during these pre-election meetings but the results were not exactly what the former Insurrectional rabble-rouser had wanted or expected.

In the first public meeting of the resurrected P.S.N. on November 8, 1927, Hervé made a less than triumphant return to the Salle Wagram. The police certainly predicted troubles for Hervé's re-entry into active politics.[13] The party may have sought a pre-selected audience, but torrential rain that day restricted attendance to "several thousand" so that the doors were probably open to anyone who wished to hear the former *Sans Patrie* speak, along with former socialist Deputy Albert Willm.[14] The *Jeunes Gardes* led by Tissier acted as a small security service, which only intervened intermittently despite the open hostility of some communists as well as jibes from some remnants of *Le Faisceau*. *La Victoire* described the audience as made up of all classes. The hostile responses from the political extremists present, many of whom were undoubtedly workers, boded ill for the P.S.N. strategy to win over French workers. Yet the very presence of rival extremists at Hervé's first public meeting in over a decade must attest to the symbolic importance that the name Gustave Hervé, if not his P.S.N., still held for French militants. Valois's followers were upset by Hervé's critical treatment of *Le Faisceau*,

but they soon ceased to be a problem because the group was approaching dissolution. Soon, some *Le Faisceau* members did, in fact, join the P.S.N.[15] *L'Humanité* claimed that Hervé was heckled from the start with shouts of "renegade" coming from all corners of the hall. "The clown Hervé returned to the stage. The founder of the *République Autoritaire*, of which he is the dictator and only member, last night decided to explain the program of the new national socialist party that he created, he says, to fight communism." Somehow the meeting lasted two and a half hours despite several disruptions. There were fights between the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, who apparently had decided to help out the outmanned *Jeunes Gardes*, and the followers of *Le Faisceau*, and many people got roughly thrown out of the hall. Apparently, members of the P.C.F. and *Jeunesses Communistes* fought against members of the audience in one corner until the end. When one young communist, despite much disorder and mayhem, managed to get to the podium to question the former Insurrectional leader, the latter decided not to respond. The P.C.F. daily then claimed that all the workers present left the hall singing *L'Internationale* when the meeting ended.[16]

The communist attacks continued intermittently throughout the electoral campaign preceding the spring elections, but their interest was intermittent at best. *L'Humanité*'s reports on Hervé's gatherings, even when communist workers were present to jeer and disrupt him, were generally relegated to the back pages. In this campaign Hervé and *La Victoire* characterized the communists and their *Gardes Rouges* as provoking violence and confrontations. Initially, the communists seemed so troubled by Hervé's message that they made some effort to wage a counter-campaign to disrupt him whenever he tried to speak, especially when he ventured into working class areas. Here, at least, violence and intimidation by the extreme Left seemed to have pushed Hervé and the P.S.N. toward greater extremism in a kind of reflex response. As the violence of the confrontations increased so did Hervé's urgency to expand the *Jeunes Gardes* to meet violence with violence.

Hervé claimed that he could not be intimidated into cancelling a campaign that was "necessary for the salvation of France." He believed it would be cowardice, given the latent idealism within the French Left, not to try to win socialist and communist workers to the P.S.N. So on December 15, 1927, the former *Sans Patrie* journeyed into the revolutionary citadel of Paris at Belleville to speak at Le Théâtre de Belleville. To avoid trouble the P.S.N. demanded that all entrants present party electoral cards from the 20th *arrondissement* as "tickets" for admittance. This was meant to keep out any *Gardes Rouges* from other sections of Paris. Systematic disruption by the communists may not have been official P.C.F. policy because on the eve of the meeting *L'Humanité* told its readers not to

attend Hervé's meeting. To wit, the communist daily announced a P.C.F. meeting in Belleville concurrent with the P.S.N. meeting. However, these tactics failed to prevent a confrontation since anti-Hervé posters printed by the communists appeared all over Paris the day of the meeting. As a result, the former *Sans Patrie* was unable to speak in Belleville because his appearance on stage led to general pandemonium, as foot-stomping and revolutionary songs gave way to projectiles of acid and stink balls aimed at the "renegade". The two dozen *Jeunes Gardes* proved to be insufficient to clear the hall, so Hervé vowed to expand his *service d'ordre* for the next confrontation. He also accused the P.C.F. and the S.F.I.O. of fearing his ideas, and he claimed that this episode was the worst experience in his life.[17]

The next day the communist daily reported on Hervé's meeting as well as its own, but almost nothing in *L'Humanité* contradicted the reports in *La Victoire*. Not surprisingly, the communist paper said its meeting at La Bellevilloise near Père Lachaise was full of spectators while Le Theâtre de Belleville was almost empty. The national socialists in attendance were supposedly outnumbered by both communist workers and the police, who were there to keep order and "to protect Hervé." When the president of the meeting tried to begin, he mentioned the name Jaurès, and that set off a cascade of heckling and jeering which never stopped. *L'Humanité* claimed that the clear message which workers delivered was that "when a person directed [a newspaper named] *La Victoire* after having been the man of *La Guerre Sociale*, that individual no longer had the right to open his mouth." After trying to speak for twenty minutes and getting nowhere, Hervé ignominiously left through a back door protected by the police. Hervé's name also came up at the beginning of the P.C.F. meeting that evening when a communist speaker named Bonnefonds joked about the diverse phases of "Hervéist *cameleonisme* from the *drapeau dans le fumier* to the *conquête de l'armée*, to the *pitriotisme de guerre* [clownishness or tomfoolery of war], and finally to the last hackneyed idea without substance, *le socialisme national*."[18]

Hervé remained undaunted and pressed on with his campaign to win over French workers. Despite reports in the French press that he had no hope of attracting workers due to his earlier ideas, he believed that the proletariat would eventually reject civil war and class struggle in order to join the P.S.N. "as workers in Italy had joined Mussolini." On the heels of the Belleville fiasco, Hervé quickly issued a poster calling for 1000 men from all parties to join the *Jeunes Gardes* in order to guarantee freedom of speech and to counter communist efforts to end discussion.[19] On December 22, 1927, Hervé spoke at the *Sociétés Savantes* "to say what he could not say at Belleville." His attacks on socialism, collectivism, and the Russian Revolution led to an uproar, but Hervé was able to deliver his message

asking for working class support.[20] On this occasion *L'Humanité* had nothing to say about the meeting because, apparently, it did not even report on it. In an effort to attract workers, *La Victoire* not only continued its six-page presentation during the election campaign, it included a section for unemployed workers written by a former syndicalist who had joined both the *L'Action Française* and *Le Faisceau* before coming to the P.S.N.[21] Some workers and former leftist leaders did rally to the P.S.N., but such changes in allegiance by a few militants and workers failed to end the marginalization of the P.S.N.

Hervé's confrontations with the communists continued during a series of meetings in early 1928. On January 26, 1928, he spoke at Bois-Colombes where the meeting was organized by a former communist. However, the former *Sans Patrie* was able to speak only after a column of communists marched out of the hall.[22] Although *L'Humanité* initially failed to report on this latest near-disaster in Hervé's national socialist campaign, three days later the communist daily used Hervé's own arguments against the communists' socialist competitors. After an article in *La Victoire* ironically praised the new anti-Marxism of socialists Pierre Renaudel and the Belgian Hendrik de Man, *L'Humanité* turned Hervé's rhetoric against the S.F.I.O.'s apparent rejection of Marxism and avowed move toward democracy and patriotism. Hervé had used the socialist tactical shifts to support his own ideas and to ridicule the S.F.I.O. for ousting him at the end of the war. Now one could see that his own ideas were becoming mainstream socialist ideas. The communist daily sarcastically assailed the socialists for espousing stale ideas that even a clown like Hervé repeated.[23]

On February 2, 1928, Hervé took the P.S.N. campaign to Bordeaux where leftist disruptors and the absence of a *service d'ordre* forced police to send the 2500 member audience home. Before the meeting disintegrated, money was thrown at Hervé in an obvious mocking gesture for his having "sold out." Such actions, along with flying chairs and a takeover of the podium by the disruptors, failed to destroy Hervé's belief in his mission. At least that is what he argued soon after.[24] The next day *L'Humanité* reported that the event at the Alhambra in Bordeaux had met with disaster for the "renegade" Hervé because of the spontaneous actions of a united front of workers. Apparently, the catcalls, whistles, and tumult reported by the communist daily were proof of working class strength and solidarity. Again, the man *L'Humanité* dubbed "the lackey of the bourgeoisie" was described as needing police protection to make his exit.[25]

On March 7, 1928, a meeting in Billancount near the Renault factory at Issy Les Moulineaux again led to disruption, but this time the *Jeunes Gardes* were charged with brutality by leftist newspapers including *L'Humanité*. Hervé's

response to the most recent events and accusations was a defense of the *Jeunes Gardes* and praise for French police including Prefect of Police Jean Chiappe. Apparently several hundred workers were prevented from entering the hall since they lacked election cards from the district, but that did not forestall serious incidents. Since two hundred communists tried to keep him from speaking, Hervé argued that his *Jeunes Gardes* had acted appropriately in using fists and *matraques* to expel the hooligans. The communist daily claimed that the thugs of the P.S.N. had also carried revolvers and *nerfs de boeufs* (blackjacks) in a well-prepared ambush. *L'Humanité* also accused the *Jeunes Gardes* of assaulting "the wives and children of the comrades." Charges and countercharges were becoming part of this ritual, but the events were generally relegated to the back pages of the communist daily, which did report that after two hours of excitement and tumult a "tired and out-of-breath Hervé" lashed out against the communist unions and the party. Apparently, before the former *Sans Patrie* left the stage, a communist named Lenard managed to respond sharply by challenging him as well as his "band of assassins" and "mercenary troops" to enter "a working class stronghold" where they would be met with a "reinforced group of anti-fascist Young Guards."[26] This seemed to be an admission that the communists this time had underestimated Hervé's protection forces.

At a 9:00 p.m. meeting in Courbevoie at the Salle du Petite-Casino on March 28, 1928, the communists were out in force in order to prevent Hervé from spreading his "Mussolinian socialism" in a working-class stronghold. Throughout the ruckus in what *La Victoire* called a full house, the "typically stubborn Breton" kept trying to get his message concerning the de-Christianization of France, depopulation, the need for moral disciplines, and the benefits of Church-state reconciliation out to the audience, but his words were generally drowned out. *L'Humanité* claimed that the editor of *La Victoire* in his dotage increasingly resembled a Joseph Prudhomme-like character (a symbol of middle-class pettiness and mediocrity) prey to the incessant jibes of Gavroche (the revolutionary street-urchin from Hugo's *Les Misérables*). As Hervé droned on with his pompous prophecies, a modern-day Gavroche asked him why he brought so many police with him. To that query, the former *Sans Patrie* seemed to deny the evidence of two-hundred *flics* packed in trucks parked near the hall. He could only reply: "I have my young guards just like the old days at *La Guerre Sociale*." Someone in the audience then shot back: "In the old days the young guards fought for the revolution. Those today fight against the revolution." When Hervé talked about the miserable wages in France compared to those in America, someone said: "The miserable one is you!" The P.S.N. chief then cited Mussolini who had the ability to name his own ministers without

parliamentary approval, and that brought down the house in laughter. Eventually a man who called himself a former Hervéist asked the speaker if he had ever been sincere or had he always played the kind of double game he was playing today. The former *Sans Patrie* claimed he had always been sincere, and, in fact, he saw himself as the "father of the Red Army." That comment met with general merriment and then challenges from the audience according to *L'Humanité*. A communist Deputy named Laporte assailed Hervé for daring to spout such dubious arguments to the workers of Courbevoie under the protection of Poincaré's police. Despite "the continuing presence of renegades and Gallifets", the Deputy promised that "the P.C.F. would continue the class struggle". Soon a Russian émigré noted that his country, which was thirty-five times bigger than France, knew how to liberate itself by force of arms. The meeting ended following some chauvinistic comments from a soldier who was present and a concluding musical clash between rival singers of *L'Internationale* and *La Marseillaise*.[27]

After all that, somehow Hervé felt "half-satisfied for the first time after a meeting in the working-class suburbs." He claimed that the only troublemakers were a few barking and cat-calling youths. *La Victoire* explained how its director soon got control of the crowd and won them over with his courage and tenacity. It also seemed that the audience wanted to hear what Hervé had to say. Writing in *La Victoire* the day after the meeting, the former Insurrectional fire brand thought he had brilliantly refuted the allegations of his communist opponents and had clearly explained the ideas of the P.S.N. He believed that he would now be "able to break the ice between the working class and himself that had endured since the end of the war." The P.S.N. founder assumed that his latest explanation of his pre-war *rectification* had finally ended the gulf separating him from French workers. *La Victoire* described the close attention given to Hervé's explanation of his *rectification* as an "almost religious silence" among the audience. Once that "great history lesson" had been given, humor was out of place and no one wanted to hear any opposition. "For one-half hour," Hervé wrote, "I felt that I had profoundly moved them, and that for a few minutes I had ceased to be the renegade … in their eyes, that people had told them." Such silent respect led Hervé to believe that workers would now realize that he was not the traitor, the sell-out, the self-interested politician, the *poseur* (show off), or the *cabotin* (ham actor) that his enemies had claimed. In closing he noted the presence of the police and mentioned the recent murder of a younger follower of the *Jeunesses Patriotes* by communists on the Rue Damrémont. But when Hervé said that he saw no need to continue, the crowd understood. Before the meeting ended in battling anthems, Hervé credited his *Jeunes Gardes* and other volunteers with his ability finally to get his message out.[28]

Two days after the meeting Hervé concluded his assessment of the P.S.N. electoral campaign with an admission of national socialist weakness. Only after the realization that success in the spring elections was out of the question did Hervé claim that the campaign had only been waged to create propaganda for national socialist ideas and to help the national parties by taking away voters form leftist parties. The electoral strategy of the P.S.N. was fairly simple. The party would place a list for the first round of elections, but Hervé promised that they would desist for the second round in favor of the National Union candidate best placed to win. By the end of March 1928, the party had groups only in the Gironde, the Isère, Lot-et-Garonne, the Nord, the Pas-de-Calais, the Somme, Seine-et-Oise, and in the Seine (Paris). That was not much to show for four months of efforts, but Hervé generally attempted to stress the most positive side of a failure.[29]

It was in this context that he first openly alluded to the possibility of becoming a candidate in 1932 if the P.S.N. were strong enough to have a majority in Parliament! Only the imminent creation of a *République Autoritaire* by a Constitutional revision would allow Hervé to enter the impure electoral arena as a candidate and overcome his long-term disgust for deputies.[30] Gilles Heuré reported that Hervé had thought about running for office in 1928 and felt some obligation to run, "but, faithful to his principles, he feared that people would reproach him for having hastily built a party to gain electoral office." A note from the *Sûreté* dated February 10, 1928 claimed that he had every intention of running against the Socialist leader, Léon Blum, in the 20th *arrondissement*. The police invariably assumed that leftist politicians would eventually compromise and seek political office. The problem with police reports on Hervé's electoral aspirations is that all such prior reports, and there had been many throughout his career, had been wrong. If the police were often accurate in their assessment of the political ambitions of former leftists, their predictions about Hervé's desire for political office had apparently never been accurate before. In the end it was Georges Émile Dulac, the former Hervéist and proofreader for Hervé, who ran for office in the 20th *arrondissement*.[31]

In the weeks before the spring elections of 1928, *La Victoire* presented short biographies and photos of most of the P.S.N. candidates. In her unpublished study of Hervé during the interwar, Catherine Grünblatt admitted that her own analysis of the twenty-six candidates described in *La Victoire* was risky and preliminary. Her account of the list stressed its *petit-bourgeois* composition, but such a generalization is a bit misleading. The most common occupation listed among the candidates' biographies was journalism. The second most common profession involved small business owners or employees in small shops. Among these twenty-six candidates,

three called themselves former members of the S.F.I.O., three described themselves as former communists, and one was labeled an "*ex-révolutionnaire*." There were also several candidates of working class origins on the P.S.N. list. In certain ways this occupational composition was similar to the leadership of pre-war Hervéism though it is doubtful that the age patterns could match the youthful followers of Hervéism. Obviously the P.S.N. had an interest in portraying itself as a party of former leftists.[32] Given what is known about the increasing Catholic and rural makeup of *La Victoire*'s readers as well as the prominent role that Hervé's program had assigned to leftist idealists, it is quite likely that the P.S.N. was a formation that attracted certain disillusioned leftist activists, if only temporarily, in search of a program or an organization seeking order yet preserving a semblance of social activism.

On the eve of the 1928 elections, Hervé blamed the *Cartel des Gauches* and Herriot for the financial panic of July 1926. Readers of *La Victoire* were told to support the P.S.N. list or any other party whose ideas were similar, especially on the questions related to secularization and de-Christianization.[33] The results of the first round were not favorable for the P.S.N. Of the forty or forty-one candidates named by *La Victoire*, we know the results of only thirty-one because the others gained such an infinitesimal number of votes. Of those whose votes can be gleaned, fifteen ran in Paris, ten in the *banlieue*, three in the Gironde, one in the Pas-de-Calais, one in the Nord, and one in the Jura. "The party was, therefore, essentially Parisian. The 13,451 ballots cast for the P.S.N. included 7354 voters in Paris and 3331 in the *banlieue*." According to Grünblatt these figures corresponded to the circulation of *La Victoire*. The range of voter percentages in the various electoral districts that we know about went from .89 percent in the 10th *arrondissement* to 14.43 percent in the 20th *arrondissement*, including the communist stronghold of Belleville.[34] One reason for the poor showing of the P.S.N. in the 1928 elections may have been the party's increasingly overt religious message, which could well have reduced working class support. Some of his associates sensed that problem and advised Hervé to not present a list of candidates which risked being rebuffed. "His obstinacy in adorning his program with fairly visible candles [*cierges bien visible*] led certain people to say that 'Maurras was deaf but Hervé was blind.'"[35]

Hervé had little comment on the showing of the P.S.N. In mid-March 1929 he met with a poor reception from workers in Montrouge and soon began lamenting how both workers and the French elites had failed to support the P.S.N.[36] *La Victoire* periodically announced it could not continue to appear due to a lack of funds. In late 1929 and early 1930 Hervé reported that cinema and dance hall

owners would not rent their establishments to the P.S.N. due to a fear of fights, communist violence, and Hervé's reputation for boisterous meetings.[37] In 1930 when the deputy from Belleville died, the P.S.N. could not afford to present a candidate.[38] In March 1931 Hervé reported that the P.S.N. meetings in Paris and the *banlieue* had been suspended for the prior six months due to a lack of funds.[39] The P.S.N. survived until 1932 but it had been losing supporters for some time. *La Victoire* began losing readers after 1928 when Hervé commenced a campaign for a Franco-German *rapprochement*.[40] Some readers were certainly alienated by Hervé's softening toward Germany. Nevertheless, P.S.N. difficulties in domestic politics may have prompted Hervé to delve into foreign affairs more directly.

24

The *Syndicats Unionistes* and the *Milice Socialiste National*

The P.S.N. itself had only an ephemeral existence after 1929. However, before the effects of the world economic crisis hit France and probably related to the failure of the P.S.N. to attract workers for the 1928 electoral campaign, *La Victoire* initiated a xenophobic union group called the *Syndicats Unionistes*. In late 1929 and early 1930 after the migration to *La Victoire* of several prominent former Communists, Hervé supported a new union movement in the hope of recruiting workers to his ideas. Using the xenophobic slogan "*Les travailleurs français, d'abord*," the unions demanded the closing of France's borders to new immigrants, employment restrictions on foreign workers, and preferential treatment for French workers. This was a bit ironic because after the war foreign laborers had been welcomed to help make up the wartime demographic losses and eventually to help offset *les classes creuses*.[1] "After the war, immigration did not provoke widespread concern in French society … By the 1930s, however, the entire political spectrum became permeated with varying degrees of xenophobia."[2] Still, it is important to note that by 1931 France had 3.1 million foreigners living within its borders.[3] The *Syndicats Unionistes* duplicated the social program of the P.S.N. in several ways. These unions recruited workers who favored social peace and could be mobilized for Hervé's crusade for constitutional revision. The unions hoped to attract owners who sought access to "stable, moral, and patriotic workers." The *Syndicats Unionistes* assumed that social justice was

compatible with private property, profits, industrial growth, and class cooperation. Social justice had to be compatible with the continuing authority of owners, anti-collectivization, and an *entente* between unionized workers and owners. The *Syndicats Unionistes* were, thus, as anti-revolutionary and anti-Marxist as was the P.S.N.[4] Hervé soon expressed displeasure that owners were not giving greater material and moral support to the new unions.[5] He asked the owners to use the office of the *Syndicats Unionistes* as a placement bureau, not as a security system to control or spy upon workers since such a role was incompatible with working class honor.[6] Hervé's acceptance of the unions' ideas calling for the strict regulation of immigration into France might seem to contradict his idealistic internationalism, but his foreign and domestic policies had always been pragmatically related to what he perceived to be the immediate interests for French harmony and security. Obviously, he also had to worry about his own movement's survival. It should probably not be forgotten that the extreme Left itself was not above using xenophobia to appeal to threatened workers.

The *Syndicats Unionistes* were probably formed in 1928, and in 1929 they placed 3850 workers in 300 industries while holding some fifty-eight meetings that year. According to former communist Georges Carré, the so-called "soul of the *Syndicats Unionistes*" and the writer at *La Victoire* then in charge of working class topics, most of the members of the new unions came from the metal workers of the Seine. Carré coordinated union activities for *La Victoire* and directed the unions' propaganda sheet, *Le Mécano Français*. One police source claimed that the formation only had a few hundred members among construction, metal, and tanning workers recruited in the Southwest around Grenoble and Lyon. When adequate material and moral support was not forthcoming, Hervé assailed French businessmen for their lack of foresight. He was dismayed that owners rejected unions which sought to avert social war by drawing workers away from the "revolutionary" unions. When a Communist C.G.T.U.[7] publication described the *Syndicats Unionistes* as a fascist organization funded by the owners, Hervé seemed almost flattered. Assaults on his formations bothered him much less than the usual indifference.[8]

From 1931 to 1936, 768,000 people in France lost their jobs in manufacturing. It was always possible, in theory, for immigrants to return to their countries of origin, and French workers could sometimes go back to the countryside given the continuing large agricultural sector in France. Yet agriculture suffered, too, because by 1935 grain prices were a quarter of their 1926 level despite price supports. The wine industry suffered, as well, but French farmers still fared better compared to those in other nations. Even though the Republic had lost much of its aura, the French state maintained its authority.[9] Although expulsions and

unemployment during the 1930s "reduced the number of immigrants in France, hostility to immigrants remained high, ..." often because of increasing numbers of political refugees.[10]

> "For governments, the Depression meant massive budget deficits caused by falling tax revenues and rising social expenditure. The two left-wing parties which won the 1932 elections had different responses to this problem. The Radicals wanted to cut government expenditure and eliminate the budget deficit; the Socialists believed this would deepen the Depression. Logically, the Radicals should have governed with the right whose economic views they shared, but this was impossible immediately after winning elections on a left-wing slate. So Radical governments tried to obtain Socialist support for conservative policies. The result was deadlock: seven ministries in eighteen months."[11]

The spring elections of 1932 did not go well for Poincaré's conservative successors as Radicals and Socialists were now in the majority, while the P.C.F. was reduced to 12 seats in the Chamber. Following the assassination of French President Paul Doumer by a disgruntled and possibly deranged Russian émigré, Herriot was again Prime Minister in his Third Ministry but now he was committed to strictly orthodox financial policies. Even though the *Journal des Finances* was happy with his choice of Louis Germain-Martin as Finance Minister, Herriot, in fact, seemed to zig when he should have zagged. The lesson that he learned from 1924 to 1925 about financial orthodoxy was the wrong lesson in 1932 because standard deflationary policies were already failing. Even though the United States was ready to cancel German reparations, the Hoover Moratorium instituted in June 1931[12] was set to expire at the end of 1932 and France was expected to pay America and meet its nineteen million dollar scheduled payment. In general, the French wanted to link reparations and war debts, hoping that both would be cancelled, but the United States demurred. So Herriot decided to repay French debts because that was what was traditionally done when a country had acquired debts. On December 14, 1932 that position cost his government a vote of confidence. The French default was temporary but it led to strained relations. Over the next fourteen months five ineffectual French ministries came and went. After the United States left the gold standard in April 1933, only France maintained a gold-based currency. That meant increased taxes, growing dissatisfaction, and an intensified Depression. The nadir probably came in 1935 with deepening economic problems in the aftermath of the Stavisky Affair which was accompanied with corruption scandals and accelerating resentments. All this led some citizens toward a variety of fascist groups often supported by wealthy businessmen.[13] Unfortunately for Hervé, his parties and formations were not the beneficiaries.



Figure 40. The Third? Ministry of Édouard Herriot (1872–1957) in 1932 (center front); with Paul Painlevé (1863–1933) at the far left front and Édouard Daladier (1884–1970), Camille Chautemps (1885–1963), and Joseph-Paul Boncour (1873–1972) immediately to the right in front. [photographie de presse]/Agence Mondial. Bnf.

Hervé generally admitted his ignorance in economic issues and only gradually became aware of the economic crisis of the 1930's. He explained the Depression in terms of dislocations arising out of World War I, budgetary deficits, and excessive taxes on businesses which created rising unemployment. Such an analysis was compatible with his domestic and foreign policies. His solutions were largely deflationary: a reduction of spending by decreasing state services, a reduction of salaries and pensions for state employees, and an end to state monopolies.[14] However, Hervé and *La Victoire* soon were forced to admit that capitalism was subject to periodic crises.[15] Though he continued to stress the economic miracles created by capitalism, Hervé now realized that the state had to play a greater role in the economy. To limit capitalist excesses and to give workers their just rewards, he hoped that corporatist institutions could be created under the control of both labor and management as well as subject to arbitration by a strengthened state.[16] Until the world economic crisis, Hervé had tried, however circuitously, to separate himself from ideas of corporatism. His "critique of 'individualistic' capitalism and [his support for] a corporative option would be affirmed

successively and proportionally as the crisis persisted."[17] Bolshevism and war were no longer the sole sources of disorder and chaos; now Hervé realized that capitalism itself entailed a certain anarchism. Capitalist *laissez-faire* policies led to powerlessness and a lack of control over the economy which caused chronic unemployment, a general paralysis of production and consumption, and an increase of dangerous protectionism. Capitalism had to be reformed or it would explode. The Depression represented no mere passing crisis but was a chronic problem that demanded a creative solution. By 1934 the choice seemed to Hervé to be between corporatism and Bolshevism.[18] "Corporatism is the most elementary solution of social conservation," noted Hervé in June 1934.[19] The failure of the *Syndicats Unionistes* coupled with the growing economic crisis led him toward a corporative solution to economic problems. If unions by workers or owners were organizations of class struggle, corporative organizations, on the other hand, would establish rules in various professions and defend the interests of all members of the same corporation. The role of the state would be to control "the relations between workers' capital and finance capital from above." Hervé now realized that he had altered his social and economic ideas by increasing the economic role of the state to match his long-standing plans for state dominance in politics. The state's growing economic role had to be accepted because without it the anarchism of capitalist individualism would lead to social revolution and collectivism.[20]

Grünblatt called corporatism "a temporary deviation in Hervé's ideas."[21] In the post-war era, he certainly wanted to keep the state out of the economy as much as possible, and he saw private enterprise and individual initiative as crucial elements for economic well-being which fit his simple notions about leadership and hierarchy. However, Hervé's political ideas since 1919 had proposed repeated forms of social, economic, and political tinkering to preserve not only France but capitalism as well. As an historian, Hervé realized that change was inevitable. His programs after 1914 sought to make those changes as gradual and harmonious as possible. The coming of the Depression was the necessary catalyst for his accelerating change in the economic sphere during the 1930s. An open call for corporatism was no mere deviation; one can argue that it fit perfectly as another confirmation of Hervé's lifelong effort to protect France from division, disorder, and disharmony. Hervé had accepted socialism, then capitalism, and now corporatism in order to protect France. Christianity, too, was a means, however anachronistic, to reform and preserve France. He would finally accept Christianity for his own salvation as well as that of France, but Hervé's France had always entailed something transcendental.

As the domestic and international scene became more volatile in 1932, *La Victoire* and the P.S.N. were clearly affected. Hervé as well as his party, his newspaper, and his ancillary political formations became more extreme in this epoch. By early 1932 Hervé's latest hope for a French "providential man" to offset Hitler and Mussolini was the conservative yet innovative technocrat André Tardieu, who would form three Ministries from 1929 until 1932 and whose political ideas had supposedly come close to those of Hervé.[22] At the time of the 1932 spring election victory of the Left, in which the P.S.N. had no candidates, Hervé accused French nationalists of an obsession with a non-existent communist menace yet Hervé's own anti-communism had hardly abated.[23] In October 1932 he applauded the action of the *Jeunes Gardes* in disrupting an anti-war and antipatriotic play that seemed to glorify Soviet Russia, yet Hervé generally deplored physical if not rhetorical violence, and his foreign policy certainly was and would remain a desperate effort to secure international peace.[24] In early November 1932, he attacked moderates and Catholics for their refusal to win the friendship of fascist Italy when they had the chance during four years of moderate rule. He also assailed moderates for supporting Radicals out of a fear of the Left. *La Victoire* ridiculed the Radicals as naïve pacifists and unrepentant anticlericals, but it was the French moderates who were even more viciously assailed as fearful, heartless, egotistic, and lacking élan. *La Victoire* had always been antiparliamentary, but before 1932 it had contradictorily sought to transcend politics through political channels or through various "providential men" who were generally ageing politicians. By late 1932, with Tardieu's political star, ambition, and health fading fast, Hervé seemed to have run out of parties and politicians on the French Right who could save France from the economic crisis finally reaching the nation and from the external threat to French security posed by the rise of Nazism.[25]

Having run out of allies and options on the conservative and moderate Right, the increasingly critical conditions in France led Hervé to venture ever closer toward fascism. On November 11, 1932, Marcel Bucard joined *La Victoire* as a member of the Directing Committee and new Editor-in-Chief while Hervé remained the Director. A Legion of Honor winner, Bucard was not only a World War I veteran but had also been one of the youngest captains in the army. He had come to *La Victoire* after a post-war apprenticeship with Tardieu as well as affiliations to *Le Faisceau* until 1927, to the newspaper *L'Ami du Peuple* in 1928, to the Bonapartist *L'Autorité* after 1928, and to the *Croix-de-Feu* in 1929.[26] In his 1930 book entitled *Paroles d'un Combattant*, Bucard had called for a Franco-German reconciliation, but refused to relinquish any safeguards for France. According to his biographer, Alain Deniel, Bucard probably left Coty's patronage due to ambition.

Given Hervé's assessment of the weak role of the *anciens combattants* in politics before 1932 and his belief that all war-time efforts were parallel, Deniel was surprised that Bucard would join *La Victoire* especially in light of Hervé's tarnished reputation and record of failures. What Hervé hoped to get from Bucard was not political ideas but Bucard's prestige as a decorated veteran of *la grande guerre*, his commanding appearance, and the large number of *anciens combattants* who potentially could rally to *La Victoire* even if they had failed to rally to *L'Ami du Peuple*.[27] Since "forty-five out of every one hundred adult males in the population were veterans in 1930," the coming of Bucard seemed to be a promising opportunity.[28] Besides his dynamism and ambition, Bucard also brought some two million francs that he had received from Coty: welcome resources indeed for Hervé's generally cash-starved treasury.[29] The arrival of Bucard signaled the transformation of the P.S.N. into *La Milice Socialiste Nationale*. Though Deniel called this the same tired Bonapartist program of Hervé and *La Victoire*, it is impossible to deny that Hervé thought of *La Milice* as a French equivalent to fascism and Nazism.[30] Hervé was still unclear about what fascism was, and he certainly feared the rise of Nazism, but in this era of Hitler's rise to power, *La Milice* was an attempt to imitate as well as counter Nazi force if not Nazi ideology. Hervé concurrently identified with and separated himself from fascism and Nazism.

On November 11, 1932 Hervé's description of Bucard's attributes of youth, activism, leadership, and élan was meant to contrast with the dullness and lifelessness of conservatives and moderates. The director of *La Victoire* stated that he wanted to do for France what Mussolini and Hitler had done for Italy and Germany. This effort to create something new was still tied to legality, but in the mind of Hervé, *La Victoire* was about to transcend politics.[31] *La Milice* would later be described as an organization of propaganda and combat seeking to attack and go beyond political parties, politicians, and politics itself in order to sweep aside the parliamentary and Masonic Republic which was killing France. "*La Milice* was not a political party …" according to *La Victoire*. "It was a civilian militia in the exclusive service of *la patrie*, the nation, … and the Republic." It sought to create a great wave of popular pressure to install a temporary dictatorship legally in order to save France. *La Milice* maintained the chief aim of the P.S.N., to provide an agency to lead workers away from the socialism of class struggle and toward the new French socialism of class solidarity.[32] Its program was standard Hervé interwar fare: social justice, corporatism, an *entente* between workers and owners, a defense of the middle classes and farmers, a religious and educational truce, international peace, the revision of the Treaty of Versailles as long as it was reasonable and honorable, the need for a leader, and other national socialist ideas.[33]

The world economic crisis was not the only source of Hervé's open acceptance of corporatism and capitalist revision. The *haute bourgeoisie* had failed to support his parties and formations. When it refused to fund *La Milice*, Hervé threatened big business and heavy industry.[34]

Echoing the arguments of René Rémond, Deniel characterized Bucard's year at *La Victoire* as a mere stage on his road to fascism since *La Milice* was described simply as Hervé's perpetual Bonapartism.[35] However, any contrast between Bonapartism and fascism may, in fact, be largely semantic as Robert J. Soucy has implied. The *Jeunesses Patriotes* in their efforts to prevent their own members from migrating to *La Milice*, called it French Nazism.[36] What most separates *La Milice* from fascism was the maintenance of Hervé's repugnance for violence as well as his legalistic strategy for the attainment of power. He assumed that an election of 400 national socialist deputies in 1936 could revise the Constitution and install a single leader with temporary dictatorial powers.[37] The search for a Franco-German reconciliation in order to achieve international peace might seem antithetical to fascism, but French fascism was characterized by a search for peace above almost everything else. According to Philippe Burrin, French fascists, unlike those in Italy and Germany, often fell into *le champ magnétique des fascismes* out of a fear of war and a hope for peace.[38] Although Deniel downplayed the racism increasingly found among some friends and allies of *La Victoire* in the era of *La Milice*, there is little doubt that Hervé had approached fascism then. Hervé's desire to imitate Nazism and fascism is clear. After Hitler came to power, the rhetorical violence of Hervé and Bucard temporarily increased in *La Victoire*.[39] Though Bucard had mocked Valois for trying to import fascism to France, and he had not yet begun to stress anti-Semitism to gain supporters as he would with the creation of *Francisme*, his message to the readers of *La Victoire* calling for a moral revolution of France is reminiscent of many of the themes of fascism. Hervé could not equal Bucard's inflammatory rhetoric of moral renewal, but his continued propagandistic appeals to the French Left as the historical source for all French renewal and his desire to create a movement above politics made up of elements from all political positions were themes reminiscent of many fascist movements.[40]

Bucard believed that the war had created a barrier between the past and the generation that had experienced life in the trenches. Life and values had been altered due to the experience at the front. At the front liberty, equality, and individuality had been replaced by order, a hierarchy of values, and a discipline of feelings, family, and one's native land. The chief problems for France were not economic, social, or political. They were moral, spiritual, and religious. A moral revolution was necessary to bridge the gap in generations and to negate the disorder, materialism,

immorality, and egoistic pleasure seeking now on the verge of destroying France. Bucard's critique of society and his remedies were then the same as Hervé's even if his level of sincerity is questionable. Certainly ambition seemed to dominate everything Bucard did. Undoubtedly, the experience of *La Milice* in 1932 and 1933 included many themes commonly associated with fascism, however much Hervé remained ignorant of and frightened by fascism.

The creation of *La Milice Socialiste Nationale* and the coming of Marcel Bucard did not alter Hervé's history of stillborn political formations. Despite the adhesion of several prominent members of the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, that organization rejected any ties to *La Milice*.[41] Two student groups, the *Union des Jeunes Générations Françaises* with 1000 members and the *Jeunesses Françaises Républicaines* of Serge Chatenet with 600 members, did ally with *La Milice*. But the level of their support as well as the nature of these two groups hardly achieved the dynamic activist intent that *La Milice* sought. These two groups seem to have been made up of moderate student activists, yet some displayed certain pacifist tendencies. Still, the groups could almost be described as nearly apolitical.[42] In December 1932 *La Victoire* published an M.S.N Manifesto along with the photos of its four leaders. Hervé was the newspaper Director and the head of the M.S.N., which was described as having succeeded the 1925 *République Autoritaire*. Bucard was the Editor-in-Chief and Deputy Leader of the M.S.N., while Tissier was Secretary-General, and J.-B. Lhérault was also included. The newspaper now included the subtitle "*Organe de la Milice Nationale.*" *La Milice* may have included contingents of the interwar *Jeunes Gardes*, but it had few members and little in the way of financial resources. Its network included groups in Aix-en-Provence, Marseille, Lyon, Mâcon, Villefranche, Perpignan, Montpellier, Nantes, and Bordeaux, as well as in the Oise, the Haut-Rhin, and the Parisian *banlieue*.[43]

In the end, Bucard was able to attract little material support and few new adherents. Despite a series of meetings in 1933 organized in Belleville on March 31, at Roubaix on April 10, at Lille on May 18, at Paris on May 30, and in Montpellier in late June, the numerical and financial strength of *La Milice* barely advanced. In the spring of 1933, Bucard began to separate himself from Hervé, and he sought to create favorable conditions for launching his own movement. He succeeded in obtaining tentative support from certain industrialists who feared that French Radicals could no longer check the "dangerous" program of the S.F.I.O. "collectivists," so they contemplated a possible fascist solution to French internal chaos. On August 20, 1933, Bucard employed the word *Francisme* for the first time in an article in *La Victoire*. Obviously, such a name entailed clear comparisons to Italian fascism.[44] Bucard officially separated from *La Victoire* in the late

summer of 1933 while the newspaper was in hiatus. On September 29, 1933, in the company of twenty-five friends, he formally created his version of French fascism called *Francisme* in a ceremony at 11:00 p.m. under the vault of the *Arc de Triomphe*. When the newspaper returned to the newsstands in early October, Hervé discussed the departure of Bucard and the failure of the M.S.N. to take off.[45] Later he described how Bucard had grown discouraged as well as disgusted. For Deniel, the former Legion of Honor winner apparently had come to wonder if Hervé were not too controversial, too tired after years of battle, and too out of touch with the current generation.[46] Heuré described Bucard as "more activist than Hervé, and tired of the latter's legalism" as well as disappointed by the lack of interest in and adherents to the M.S.N.[47] After the departure of Bucard and his friends, *La Milice* gradually was phased out as Hervé became more concerned with the growth of domestic turmoil and the pressing need for a Franco-German reconciliation. He later admitted that he dissolved the P.S.N (and *La Milice*?) in 1933 because of a lack of funds for meetings, tracts, and posters.[48]

25

Interwar Foreign Policy

The Increasingly Turbulent Eye Between Two Storms

Hervé's foreign policy positions, which were continually being developed and promoted in *La Victoire* during the interwar period, not only illustrate the limits of Hervé's idealism, they also underlined his anti-Marxism. His domestic policy was connected to his foreign policy because his ideals of order and harmony entailed European peace. To create order and harmony, domestic and foreign affairs were both judged on the basis of the needs of France. Because France had been victorious in World War I, peace would guarantee not only international order, it would promote the position of France. In the course of the interwar period, Hervé, often simultaneously, supported what Arnold Wolfers described many years ago as three virtually mutually exclusive foreign policy positions. (1) He favored "the unquestioned preponderance of power on the side of the defenders of the established order." (2) He also called for "a removal of the causes of revolt in order to eliminate the chances of an explosion." (3) He sometimes even admitted the benefits of Wilsonian international panaceas and collective security in his quest for order and peace though his early illusions soon faded.[1]

Gilles Heuré argued that the foreign policy of the P.S.N. was generally quite sound. An "approval of the League of Nations, an *entente cordiale* with England, and pacifism were its main lines." His version of "national socialism, similar to the ideas of rootedness and cultural heritage dear to the nationalism of Barrès,

had no imperialist dimension and meant to respect the equality of races."[2] Such stances did not prevent Hervé from changeability and occasionally contradictory views. For example, he was quite upset in November 1920 when the League would not intervene to prevent the continuing massacre of the Armenians, yet was later generally upset for the attempts to reprimand Italy over the Ethiopian invasion. Throughout the interwar era, he was very moderate in his assessment of Franco-German relations, but occasionally that did not preclude extreme rhetoric and ideas. In fact, at the end of the Great War, Hervé vacillated for a while on the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the possible creation of a Rhenish Republic. He expected the Germans to accept their justly deserved defeat and get rid of the Hohenzollerns. Then, equipped with a new democratic republic at Weimar, they should "humbly and contritely return to a Europe looking to the future, ready for all the kindness toward the newly elected member."[3]

Before World War I he was an ardent adversary of the Russian regime and highly suspicious of the Franco-Russian Alliance which he realized could easily drag France into war. The Czarist regime represented antithetical values to those of socialism or even republicanism. Russia's treatment of its Jewish minority was a flagrant violation of the Declaration of the Right of Man, so Czarism had to be strongly condemned. Once the war began, he supported France's Russian ally, realizing that any Russian success would alleviate the French situation in the west. Throughout the war he applauded any signs of Russian liberalism and fleeting indications of improved conditions for Russian Jews. Certainly, he hoped that the Russian parliamentary system would blossom and the Duma would be more effective. The slowness of Russian liberalization and the failure to reform the autocracy led Hervé in September 1915 to assail the Czarist system with the phrase "Petrograd Rétrograde."[4]

It was not surprising to see the former *Sans Patrie* elated with the fall of the czar because now the war could more justly be described as a "war of liberation." If his exuberance over the fall of Nicholas II was predictable, his concern and caution over the arrest of the czar were based on his historical sensibility. Hervé knew what could happen amidst revolutionary euphoria, and he feared that Russian disorder could lead to a Prussian victory and a restoration of the Romanovs. As an historian he also realized that revolutionary excess just might be "the manifestation of the difficult apprenticeship of democracy." On May 18, 1917 he wrote: "We French republicans who have been so indulgent for the crimes of Czarism during the past 25 years, we truly ought, after all, to grant a bit of indulgence for a few months for the youthful errors of the glorious Russian democracy."[5] Hervé thus accepted a revolutionary dictatorship as a transitional arrangement between

the Czarist autocracy and a democratic republic, but he was adamant that any transitional regime avoid excesses like collectivism which, he believed, were often resorted to by "enlightened minorities". Certainly, Kerensky gave Russia a better chance to avoid the anarchic delirium that would ensue if Russia followed the fantasies of bookish doctrinaires. For Hervé the choice was either "the skill of Kerensky" or "the sword of Kornilov"; yet, each was preferable to a return of the Romanovs or the catastrophes generated by Bolshevism.[6]

At the end of World War I, Hervé considered the Russian Revolution as "a central theme where European and internal politics converged." His urgency to implement a national socialist program arose due to his fears of a Bolshevik penetration of French politics after the November Revolution in Russia. The Second International could not be allowed to revive and become a vehicle for international communism. His dreams for the *Parti Socialiste National* initially emphasized the goal of mitigating the Bolshevik contagion within the S.F.I.O. and among French workers. He used the same language to castigate both French and Russian advocates of a peace before victory. Such men were naïve and exalted visionaries and maximalists. He assailed Lenin as a "Russian maximalist" who possessed the "pride of a visionary and a fanatic" which made him a "man to bring down." After the "shameful" and "dishonorable" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, only arms could alter the course of the "Russian cyclone."[7]

Hervé's desire to thwart French "Bolsheviks" paralleled his demands that the Allies intervene in Russia to bring down the new Soviet government which was "a menace to all civilization." He called the events in Russia not a revolution but "a *jacquerie* of peasants and workers." Socialist idealism had given way to perpetual brigandage by Red Guards whose program for the future was pillage and murder. Because French, British, and Italian forces had been fighting for years, Hervé hoped the American army, aided by volunteers from other Allied countries, could be requisitioned to end Russian Bolshevism. In World War I Hervé had said victory was the only means to create a lasting peace, a League of Nations, and an International *Gendarmerie*. After the war he claimed that an intervention in Russia was the only means to create a necessary international police force. Such an intervention to assist the Russian Whites was termed "a simple police action" which could rally almost the entire Russian population under the formula "Neither Bolshevism nor Czarism."[8] By the end of March 1919, Hervé feared that without an Allied intervention Russia could become a tool of Germany, and together they could force a new world war in twenty years.[9] To make an interventionist policy more tempting, he sought to entice French business interests with visions of the profits to be derived from regions like the Donetz Basin, supposedly

a smaller version of the "Ruhr with agricultural wealth and more."[10] However, it was hard to attract investors when his editorials could not dispense with images of Russia as a land of terror and famine.[11]

Far from attacking all socialists abroad, Hervé praised the German socialist Chancellor and then President Friedrich Ebert's attempt to create a "*Union Sacrée*" on the other side of the Rhine. The Spartacist uprising culminating in January 1919 could have delighted the pre-war leader of Insurrectionalism, but "the war had changed everything," or so said *La Victoire* daily on its masthead. For the post-war Hervé, Lenin as well as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were proselytizers of the Marxist program. These *illuminés* may have considered Marxist dogma as a veritable magic wand to attain social justice and universal goodness, but the former *San Patrie* knew they led only to anarchy, chaos, and famine. German militarism was always a danger, but Hervé believed that it would be far more likely to harm France if Germany suffered the same fate as Russia.[12] Thus, the deaths of Liebknecht and Luxemburg left Hervé with mixed feelings. Though he was saddened by their death and appreciated their efforts before 1914 to prevent war, he accused the two Spartacist leaders of failing to realize that socialist dogma had simply been a means to get French and German workers to reject international war. "Any other dogma would have been good which served well to prevent war." Because Liebknecht and Luxemburg considered Marxist theory as the most important thing, they believed that capitalism had to be destroyed to end militarism. That was why the German socialists had failed to prevent war in 1914. To blame capitalism and not Germany for the war satisfied Marxist assumptions but had little to do with reality. Thus Hervé praised Ebert for saving Germany from ruin when the German Chancellor suppressed the Spartacists who were characterized as honest and idealistic but neither intelligent nor clairvoyant.[13] At the end of 1921, amidst an anticommunist diatribe in *La Victoire* aimed at the P.C.F., Hervé reminded the French heirs of Liebknecht and Luxemburg about how their vaunted "masses" had not "lifted a finger" to avenge the Spartacist leaders.[14] For some time Hervé had been dismissing the revolutionary situations in Germany, Russia, Hungary, and Poland as *jacqueries* or anarchist outbursts, not socialist revolutions, because they led to chaos, not democracy.[15]

For Hervé the Treaty of Versailles was a pivot around which his foreign policy ideas revolved. At first he believed the treaty was just and moderate. What worried him was a clash between Wilsonian idealism and the realism of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. France could not afford to wait for American help if it were attacked. America was too far away from European battle sites to appreciate the security needs of Europeans.[16] The former *Sans Patrie* considered the League of

Nations to be an old French ideal, but the experience of war forced France to seek more tangible guarantees not ideals. A neutral buffer state on the Rhine, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, and Allied intervention to end Bolshevism in Russia were necessary safeguards against instability, invasion, and war.[17] In May 1919 Hervé asked the Germans to accept the "moderate peace," but he also promised the Germans that once Allied hatreds had subsided and the French were satisfied that Prussian militarism had been destroyed "some harsh clauses of the treaty would be spontaneously revised in favor of a repentant Germany which will have … become a free country and a true Republic."[18] Hervé felt that the Saar occupation and the prevention of the *Anschluss* were both harsh and counterproductive terms of the treaty, but reparations and the new states created out of former Austro-German lands were not to be questioned.[19]

When the stillborn Rhenish Republic was proclaimed in early June 1919, Hervé clarified his views on Germany and gave proof that historical analysis was easily colored by one's geographical location. In saluting the new autonomous German state, Hervé also accepted the validity of German claims to Austria! Such an apparently contradictory view was guided by Hervé's assessment of Prussian responsibility for German militarism. Anything that could reduce Prussian power reduced German militarism, thus it served the cause of France. A neutral German state on the Rhine and a union of Austria with Germany both worked to offset Prussian power. The justification for a Rhenish Republic on religious, geographical, and cultural grounds appeared a bit suspect because he characterized the Rhenish population as "Germanized Celts!" This curious pragmatic blend of idealism and realism in foreign policy had the obvious purpose of protecting France. Despite an admission that some terms were too harsh, Hervé believed that France should occupy more German territory to reduce Prussian power if Germany refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.[20]

After the war Hervé supported the moderate socialist program of the Weimar Republic. Almost immediately he saw the need to revise the Treaty of Versailles in order to create a Franco-German *rapprochement* to prevent war. Such a revision would contain and isolate the Bolshevik Revolution, "the main cause of international disorder." Despite the moderation inherent in his early post-war foreign policy positions, it did not take long for intermittent anti-Germanism to reappear in *La Victoire*. The desire for peace and the needs of France allowed Hervé to support moderate socialism outside France and demanded that he attack Bolshevism everywhere. When German and French interests diverged, Hervé's internationalism was jettisoned. When Germany became a serious threat in the 1930s, fear led Hervé back to increasingly moderate positions toward the defeated

neighbor. However, well before the coming of the Great Depression and the rise of Adolf Hitler, Hervé periodically returned to his pre-World War I panacea for a Franco-German *rapprochement*. Though he had been instinctively fearful about the consequences of Nazism once he was cognizant of it, Hervé was sympathetic to "Bonapartist" governments in Europe to the point that he hoped that France could emulate them. Despite his sympathy for both fascism and Nazism as varieties of Bonapartism and antidotes to communist disorder, almost alone on the French Right, he eventually supported an alliance with the Soviet Union to dissuade German aggression.[21]

Though Hervé called the League of Nations the best, most coordinated, and most realistic effort to end war in history, he attacked Wilson's meddling in delicate European situations that he did not understand. Wilson's idealism was praiseworthy, but it fell short in the League Charter which had unfortunately sanctioned the Monroe Doctrine and did not include a statement on the equality of nations and races. Japan would now believe that the West continued to accept the reality of the "Yellow Peril." Hervé believed that Wilsonian views were helping to create a coalition of Japan, Italy, and Russia which would soon look to Germany in an effort to solve their grievances! Thus Wilson was creating a dangerous coalition which was the very thing capable of destroying his own idealistic hopes and creations.[22] Throughout the interwar era the goal of his foreign policy remained French national interests, such as he saw them. On colonial questions, he generally supported the status quo. He favored a firm policy in Morocco, in blatant contrast to his stances during the heyday of Hervéism. During the centenary of the French annexation of Algeria, he expressed pride in the achievement even if he worried about the dearth of colonists and covetousness of other countries like Italy. He hoped that the situation in Indo-China could be resolved through an intelligent protectorate and allowances made for Vietnamese culture, but he recognized that demands for independence were to be expected.[23]

By the time of the Kapp *Putsch* in Berlin in March 1920, it was becoming clear that Hervé had developed two separate measures to interpret events: one for domestic and the other in foreign affairs. Yet, both measures were tied to the demands of French security. Hervé supported German socialists against Pan-German attempts to gain control of Germany. Because French workers considered German socialist leadership to be anti-Bolshevik and because French middle classes and peasants were against any intervention in German affairs, Hervé believed the Germans had to settle their own problems. A French intervention in 1920 could only aid German Bolsheviks. French weariness plus France's interest in having a pacific and moderate socialist government in Germany led *La Victoire*

simply to threaten an occupation of the Ruhr if events in Germany prevented the fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles.[24] The director of *La Victoire* rejected S.F.I.O. claims that the Kapp *Putsch* had failed due to a general strike by German workers. The true cause of the reversal of the Pan-Germans was the German civilian and military fears that revenge against France and a reversal of Versailles would lead to Allied responses. The general strike succeeded in Germany only because the German army had no desire to fight on the Rhine. Hervé told French workers that their own general strike notions would backfire without the support of the French army.[25]

Though Hervé's foreign policy ideas were tied to his national socialist domestic program, they were often at odds with the ideas of the French Right and the *Bloc National*. After the failure of the Kapp *Putsch*, Hervé attacked the French Right for wanting a divided, subservient, and punished Germany. Such an imperialist policy could not get Allied approval, and it would not reverse German unity which was "here to stay." The foreign policy of the *Bloc National* was attacked as contrary to "the spirit of Versailles" in Hervé's view. The treaty was "hard on Germany" so it should be interpreted reasonably and with consideration for German economic and political troubles. In the interest of justice, humanity, and French security, France had to support the birth of the Weimar Republic.[26] Hervé's support for moderate German socialists depended on their determination to subdue German Bolsheviks and check them in Russia. In July 1920 Hervé disapproved of a proposed French occupation of Frankfurt without the cooperation of Britain. He believed that France and Britain had to unite against a Bolshevik danger which was the greatest threat to European peace. Eventually, the Director of *La Victoire* accused the German socialists of ending the *Union Sacrée* in Germany and thus increasing the Bolshevik danger there. He then agreed with Winston Churchill on the role of the German army as the last defense against Russian Bolshevism if Poland and Eastern Europe were to fall.[27] Hervé rejected German disarmament in 1921 because this would weaken "Europe's chief defense against Bolshevism." Though he saw the danger of allowing militarism to flourish in Bavaria and East Prussia, this was much less dangerous than allowing Bolshevism to take Poland and Germany.[28]

Hervé supported German socialists only as long as they were determined not to be "led down the path to Bolshevism." The Weimar Republic needed to be encouraged because German economic hardships could lead to nostalgia for Germany's lost Imperial grandeur, to a Bolshevik Revolution in Germany, and even to a German *rapprochement* with Russia.[29] For the same reasons *La Victoire* initially preferred the foreign policy of Briand to that of Poincaré. Hervé considered

both men supporters of the Treaty of Versailles, but Poincaré's strict and belligerent policy would cause more friction while Briand would work patiently for a peaceful fulfillment of reparations and the restoration of the formerly occupied French *départements.*[30] Hervé attacked the political extremes within Germany and praised the German *Bloc* of democratic parties which approved of Versailles. "The political extremes touch one another because they each favor a *politique du pire* in the crazy hope that if things go poorly in Germany their hour would come."[31] After the murder of Matthias Erzberger in 1921, Hervé supported the response of the Weimar Republic, but he cautioned the Germans about creating socialism too quickly because this would frighten the Right and bring back the monarchy. For Hervé a true Republic in Germany would lead to a smooth reconciliation of Franco-German problems.[32] The murder of Walter Rathenau in June 1922 increased fears at *La Victoire* of a German counter-revolution and a return of the Hohenzollerns.[33]

Hervé vacillated in foreign policy throughout the interwar period, in part, became his fairly consistent support for concessions to Germany was coupled to a belief that Germany could never be allowed to demand such concessions. Early in the interwar era Hervé equivocated on the questions of French occupation of German lands as well as the issue of reparations. If Britain and America could not guarantee French security and if America would not cancel French war-debts, he had reasons for accepting strict policies toward Germany.[34] As the economic situation in Germany deteriorated in 1922, he argued that "the method of military sanctions and even economic sanctions are radically powerless and grotesque."[35] Such policies could lead to German bankruptcy when France needed German financial health in order to pay reparations. Hervé called for an international loan to Germany to be followed by a reduction in German reparations. He also wanted the Left Bank of the Rhine evacuated by the French.[36]

Poincaré's penchant for occupying German territory as security against German debts was not favored by *La Victoire* because such a policy increased France's international isolation. Hervé preferred a Rhenish Republic as a barrier between France and Germany over Poincaré's policy demanding an occupation of the Ruhr. Yet, both a Rhenish Republic and a Ruhr occupation threatened the Franco-British Alliance which Hervé considered absolutely essential to French security.[37] During and after the war Hervé occasionally sympathized with Irish nationalism, yet such a stance put *La Victoire* at odds with what he still regarded as a necessary Franco-British partnership.[38] Hervé's approval of the French occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 was temporary. The contradictions in Poincaré's policy were soon noted. Though Hervé considered the victory of the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1924 a national disaster in terms of French domestic policy,

he eventually realized that the *Cartel's* foreign policy would better "facilitate the Franco-British reconciliation" which Poincaré had so egregiously sabotaged.[39]

In the years after 1919 France alternated between policies of conciliation and harshness toward Germany, neither of which was able to mollify or intimidate Germany sufficiently to ensure French security. It may have been that either policy would have been a failure even if it had been consistently implemented. The bill for wartime damages meant that the Germans had to pay reparations of 132 billion marks. Initial violations of the Versailles Treaty in 1920 and 1921 led to French military occupation of key German cities and open encouragement for Rhenish separatist movements. In January 1922 the fairly conciliatory Briand fell from power, but soon the more aggressive Poincaré became Prime Minister, the first former president to land back in that office. Poincaré was determined to make Germany pay. After the assassination of the accommodating German Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, on June 24, 1922, the Weimar Republic refused to pay. Two international conferences failed to end the impasse. On January 11, 1923 Poincaré sent in French troops, accompanied by those from Belgium, to occupy the Ruhr Valley. Passive resistance by Germany proved to be an effective tactic against the French, who gained little for their efforts. Although Germany managed to thwart the French, the Weimar government's resort to printing money to pay resisting workers led to a standstill for the German economy. Those Deutschmarks soon became so worthless that by November 1923, one dollar was worth 4.2 trillion marks! France faced financial problems too. Already weakened by the war, the franc lost another 46 percent of its value in the first twelve months after the Ruhr occupation.[40] An austerity package got through the French Chamber in early 1924, but it failed to pass the Senate. At that point, the franc faced severe speculation; the result was a new low for the franc at 28 to the dollar by March 1924. Then, the French had to accept an international agreement to settle the reparations issue. While the French gained international guarantees dealing with German reparations payments, they had to agree to reductions in reparations, to be renegotiated by an international committee headed by the American banker Charles Dawes. "Thus began the problem of 'markets'—or 'capital' as it was called at the time—dictating policies to governments. The left soon called this the 'wall of money'."[41] "More significantly, the Ruhr crisis showed that France lacked the power to impose its interpretation of the postwar settlement on the rest of Europe."[42]

France differed with Britain over more than the enforcement of the reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The two nations also had divergent perspectives over global interests in the Near East: over oil, relations with the Arabs, and issues involving Graeco-Turkish relations. They also disagreed over recognition of

the Soviet Union, especially due to Russia's unsettled pre-war loans. Then there was the contentious question of naval armament. Such differences made Poincaré's policies appear militaristic, nationalistic, and at odds with the spirit of Geneva. When Millerand, in the generally neutral office of the President, came out in support of Poincaré's vigorous national policy, republican forces were galvanized to respond due to three fears: (1) expanding executive power, (2) rising clericalism, and (3) Poincaré's aggressive foreign policy. Thus, Radicals and Socialists formed a left-wing *Bloc*, akin to the one from 1902 to 1904, called the *Cartel des Gauches*. The return of the Right with its clerical policies, the growing differences with Britain, and the unprecedented politicization of the office of President by Millerand in the 1924 elections had all raised concerns on the Left and galvanized the republican forces, minus the Communists, to create a kind of renewed Left-wing *Bloc*.[43]



Figure 41. Aristide Briand (1862–1932) probably sometime after World War I. Bnf.

The Ruhr Crisis obviously failed to enhance the popularity of the Poincaré government, and his coalition fell following the 1924 elections. The new *Cartel des Gauches* won a clear majority even though the S.F.I.O. would not actually participate in the government. The Radical Mayor of Lyon, Édouard Herriot, became the next *Président de Conseil* and quickly moved toward an accommodation with Weimar Germany, where Gustav Stresemann, the new German Chancellor, favored a repudiation of the passive resistance to the French-Belgian occupation. Herriot not only agreed to the Dawes Plan for reduced reparations, he withdrew French troops from the Ruhr. That was certainly "a step in the direction of a return to the spirit of peace and the League of Nations." Negotiations would eventually begin which would culminate in the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, engineered by Hervé's former attorney, the eminently *ministrable* Briand, who had become Foreign Minister in 1925 and held that post almost continuously until 1932. With Briand in charge at the Quai d'Orsay, France generally pursued conciliatory policies. The resulting Locarno Pact meant that France and Germany agreed to respect each other's borders. Briand and Stresemann went on to win the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts at Locarno. The Herriot government also "officially recognized the existence of the U.S.S.R., virtually giving up support for the white counter-revolution and demands for the repayment of Russian loans."[44]

Before the Locarno Accords were enacted, Hervé realized that one of the chief problems facing Europe was the conflict presented by an idealistic League of Nations existing in a world of power and force.[45] He had grown increasingly troubled by British vacillation and their perpetual efforts to divide continental powers.[46] British disinterest in Central European problems at Locarno was evident by their refusal to form new alliances or guarantee the Eastern borders of Germany. That led the former *Sans Patrie* to call on France to demand a more independent foreign policy and a separate *rapprochement* with Germany. A reconciliation with Germany would release France from dependence on Britain and would work to solve some of the "trouble spots" which made war almost inevitable.[47] Once the United States and Britain refused to maintain their support for France as promised by the Versailles Treaty, a *rapprochement* between France and Germany was even more necessary in Hervé's view.[48] However, he would never consent to French disarmament due to "the Pan-German ties" with Bolshevik Russia forged at Rapallo in April 1922. In 1926 and 1927 Hervé did not trust the pacific intentions of Stresemann and Hindenburg. Occasionally, he even had misgivings about Mussolini's foreign ambitions.[49] In the era after Locarno, Hervé increasingly worried that Briand's noble efforts were merely a temporary victory. In 1927 he argued that Germany and Russia were the only two European countries which

sought war. For the moment Russia was simply too disorganized to act; Germany, on the other hand, was just waiting for the chance.[50] Later in 1927 Hervé criticized Briand's treaty with Yugoslavia because that would prevent closer relations between France and Italy thereby wrecking all chance of a "Latin Union."[51]

In early 1928 Hervé answered a query by *L'Humanité* as to how he could favor the Left in Germany and the Right in France. His response noted how the Left was pacific in Germany; in France all parties were for peace but only the Right wing parties did not have blind faith in the League of Nations.[52] In keeping with this internationalist realism, Hervé called the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact "more pacifist bleating."[53] He was reassured by the German elections of 1928 because the German nationalist parties had suffered a sharp decline. Now a Franco-German reconciliation was a greater possibility. *La Victoire* urged the French to evacuate the left bank of the Rhine in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles as a sign of good faith to Germany.[54] Hervé soon assailed the various elements of the French Right for their refusal to utilize the political and moral change in Germany in order to create a lasting reconciliation between French and Germans. He did not want the Right to allow such an opportunity to pass otherwise another *Cartel des Gauches* in 1932 could reap the moral benefits of such a *rapprochement*.[55] If France ended its occupation of the left bank of the Rhine out of sympathy and without cajolery, the Weimar Republic would be solidified, German militarism would suffer a fatal blow, and the Imperial claims of the Hohenzollerns would be dashed.[56] Of course, Hervé expected Germany to recognize its Eastern boundaries, end the Treaty of Rapallo, and defend "civilization" against an attack by Russian Bolshevism if France agreed to the *Anschluss*, concessions on the Rhine, and territorial adjustments at the expense of Poland.[57]

Julian Jackson made the fascinating point that Franco-German reconciliation and later collaboration did not begin in 1940 with Pétain at Montoire. In fact, you could see it with Caillaux in 1911, with Briand in 1925, and with Hervé periodically throughout the interwar era. Of course, Hervé and Briand had crossed paths since 1901, and they may have met periodically in the interwar era.[58] Moderate French politicians like Pierre-Étienne Flandin, Pierre Laval, and Joseph Barthelémy "advocated reconciliation with Germany in the 1920s, and did not revise their views in 1933 or 1940."[59]

Hervé assumed that reconciliation with Germany would not only protect Europe from the dangers of Bolshevism, it would also end French isolation as the only country still seeking to apply the clauses of Versailles. Such a *rapprochement* would also thwart the German-Russian diplomatic ties which were so dangerous to France. If France did not make concessions, Hervé believed it would be

responsible for the next war. Such concessions now included a cancellation of reparations as long as the United States annulled inter-allied debts. The plebiscite set for the Saar in 1935 also needed to be renounced.[60] Germany was to be granted military equality because disarmament was only an illusion. Hervé hoped that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland could form a federation and defend themselves without the need of France. The retrocession of the Polish Corridor and the Sudetenland along with the *Anschluss* were no longer simply desired concessions to Germany. They were demanded of the Eastern Europeans.[61] "Briand's method, with its delays and timidities, is a powerless, inoperative, and inefficacious method which exasperates the Germans instead of pleasing them. It can lead to a catastrophe over the Polish question at any time."[62] Hervé justified such a policy as a "true love of Poland" because it would reduce tensions for Poland, caught as it was between Germany and Russia.[63] Concessions to Germany were justified on the basis of the nationality principle. Such concessions would end the threat of war, the catalyst in the spread of Bolshevism.[64] Domestic fears affected the nature of the reconciliation since Hervé now admitted that France and Germany each had more to fear from their own leftist parties than from each other.[65]

Reconciliation with Germany would not only prevent war, it would prevent Bolshevism. In 1930 and 1931 one of Hervé's strongest arguments to the French Right was that a failure to achieve a *rapprochement* with Germany would provoke a victory by the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1932. Only the S.F.I.O. and the P.C.F. would benefit if anti-war idealism were allowed to be monopolized by the Left.[66] Despite the obvious regressive domestic political implications of Hervé's foreign policy, he still hoped his international goals could appeal to Marxists, leftist idealists, as well as Christian, Protestant, and Jewish humanitarians.[67] The complexities of Hervé's foreign and domestic policies were illustrated in 1931 when he supported Briand above Paul Doumer for the French Presidency. Hervé favored Briand despite the "errors and timidities" of his Locarno policies because "Briand incarnated the profoundly pacific spirit of France."[68]

Hervé claimed that the Nazi election victories of 1930 were an omen of a new war,[69] yet he followed such an assessment with a call to the French to duplicate the feat of the Nazis, except for their anti-Semitism. After repeated failures of his own in domestic politics, Hervé both feared and admired the Nazi abilities to activate the "masses" and to promote their movement. He assumed his own national socialist search for order, harmony, and peace was what Hitler was seeking, only more flamboyantly and more successfully.[70] In his comparison of the N.S.D.A.P. and the P.S.N., Hervé was guilty of obvious wishful thinking and a strong measure of projection because he failed to see the many differences

and merely assumed that Hitler's anti-Semitism was pure demagoguery which would eventually disappear.[71] His campaign for a French-German understanding was based on a number of erroneous assumptions. He had always been guilty of projecting politics in France onto politics in Germany, but in 1930 his equation of the P.S.N. with Nazism was ludicrous. It may be fair to see his efforts to reach a reconciliation with Germany as a product of his vacillating yet persistent international ideals as well as the failure of the P.S.N. in the 1928 elections. Initially, Hervé's talk of reconciliation was a positive and optimistic sign that he had confidence in the Weimar Republic. After the rise of the Nazis, his frantic search for reconciliation was undoubtedly guided more by fear for France than an altruistic international brotherhood. In the era after 1930 Hervé's domestic policies approached the program of fascism without succumbing to most of its most reprehensible characteristics. The international and domestic turmoil of these years made it almost impossible to judge events accurately from Hervé's primary aim of French security. Torn between a fear of rising Nazi power and the need for France to emulate that power, Hervé's search for peace, guided as it was by hopes and fears for France, ended with a dangerous misjudgment of the nature of Nazism and a rather naïve and feckless attempt to duplicate fascism.

26

Gustave Hervé and Anti-Semitism

Political reality is seldom as simple, clear, or consistent as the labels employed to describe it. Generally, Hervé's contemporaries considered him to be a philo-Semite rather than an anti-Semite. That is the position of his biographer, Gilles Heuré,[1] a view which has been upheld in a recent study of Hervé's national socialism by the Dutch scholar Daniel Knegt.[2] Throughout most of his career Hervé vociferously assailed anti-Semitism wherever he found it.[3] However, his pre-war and interwar editorials as well as articles by other writers on *La Guerre Sociale* occasionally included anti-Semitic allusions, and there is evidence of blatantly anti-Semitic contingents close to *La Victoire* in the 1930s. Hervé's pre-war lapses into anti-Semitic tones sometimes have been considered premonitions of his later "fascism." Ironically, his pre-war enemies often accused him of having sold out to Jewish money and interests, a charge that was repeated by *L'Action Française* during the interwar. It is even more ironic that some of Hervé's other rivals on the extreme French Right during the interwar may have employed "dirty tricks" to try to taint the former *Sans Patrie* with anti-Semitism so that he might lose what little support he still had around 1935.[4]

A number of authors have associated Hervé, *La Guerre Sociale*, and *La Victoire* with anti-Semitism. Paul Mazgaj, Zeev Sternhell, Richard Millman, and Pierre Birnbaum have not been reticent in stressing such associations. Mazgaj

emphasized how *La Guerre Sociale* assailed Jaurès and his allies for fearing to offend Baron Rothschild at the time of the Railway Strike of 1910. Although Hervé later claimed, "There are no anti-Semites here!", the same article described the Rothschilds as "dominating the Parliament, mastering the press of the whole country, publicly treating ministers as lackeys, driving to poverty and hunger three thousand working class families that have committed no crime—and this out of pride—you catch yourself detesting Drumont a little less."[5] In *Ni Droite Ni Gauche* Zeev Sternhell also tied the Insurrectional socialist Hervé to anti-Semitism. "Anti-Semitism did not just rage on the nationalist right. At the turn of the century, it was a fundamental element of the ideology of *Les Jaunes*, the revolutionary syndicalism of a Sorel or a Berth, or even of a certain extreme left non-conformism (*La Guerre Sociale* of Gustave Hervé and *Le Mouvement Socialiste* of Lagardelle, for example)."[6] As Millman explained it, Hervé belonged in "the anti-Semitic camp" during the interwar era.[7] For Birnbaum, Hervé's pro-Zionist position was an offshoot of the idea of French exclusivity, *La France aux Français*.[8] More recently, Dietrich Orlow stated: "The Nazis noted with approval the increasingly anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi editorial line of *Le Matin*, *La Victoire*, *Gringoire*, *Je Suis Partout*, and *La Libre Parole*."[9] Certainly, compared to the Drumontesque rantings of *L'Action Française* during the Popular Front, Hervé and *La Victoire* were measured, restrained, and benevolent regarding Jews.[10] Though Hervé seemed generally philo-Semitic throughout his career, certain images, tones, and hints imply a more ambiguous picture.

Any inquiry into Hervé's relationship to anti-Semitism must begin with the realization that anti-Semitism itself often transcended the political divide.[11] Anti-Semitism had a long history in France before the Dreyfus Affair, but there is little doubt that the turmoil unleashed by the French Revolution's emancipation of Jews, the increased economic competition, and an accelerating pace of modernization combined to create updated versions of traditional images of the Jews.[12] Stephen A. Schuker claimed that "anti-Semitism flourished as an ideology on both the Right and the Left in nineteenth-century France." On the one hand, modern Jews were often stigmatized by elements of the Right as agents of a social order based on wealth instead of hierarchy and religious sanction. On the other hand, leftist elements often demonized Jews as grasping financiers who subverted social bonds.[13] To wit, many scholars associate anti-Semitism as a popular, mass movement before the Dreyfus Affair with the extreme Left. That helps to explain why French socialists, including Jean Jaurès, were so slow to respond to the Affair, and some were initially even anti-Dreyfusards.[14] Although anti-Semitism became "politically incorrect" for most socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists by the early

1890s, once it was adopted by the radical Right as a tool to gain popular support, it never disappeared on the Left, especially among those extremist elements who allied with the radical Right in a *politique du pire* against the Republic.

Before World War I Hervé discussed Baron de Rothschild with traditional socialist images associating Jews with capitalist greed, gold, and power. Some scholars have found evidence of political anti-Semitism during the era of Hervéist ascendancy at the time of the rail strike of 1910 when the Rothschilds became symbols of capitalist domination. Between 1908 and 1911, *La Guerre Sociale* printed several anti-Semitic articles by syndicalist Émile Janvion, who was working secretly for *L'Action Française* in its attempt to win over syndicalist workers. Paul Mazgaj and others stress how Hervé, Victor Méric, and several important contributors to *La Guerre Sociale*, such as Francis Delaisi, either flirted with or ardently advocated anti-Semitism because of their sympathies with royalist assaults on the Republic, but Hervé, who had attained notoriety as an early Dreyfusard, soon rejected such anti-Semitic appeals and pulled back.[15] Ironically, in the prewar era some critics assailed Hervé for being a tool of Jewish money.[16] During and after World War I, Hervé was an especially strong voice for the Zionist position regarding a Jewish homeland.[17]

The new, popular anti-Semitic nationalism which emerged at the time of the Boulanger Crisis, flourished during the Dreyfus Affair, and was revived in the 1930s clearly straddled the political divide according to Zeev Sternhell's analyses. While most socialists, including Hervé, eventually engaged in a reflexive republican defense against the anti-Dreyfusard threat, thus contradicting their revolutionary rhetoric, Hervéism soon emerged as a violent critique of democracy due to the perceived betrayal of the working class by the Dreyfusards in power after 1899.[18] Sometimes anti-Semitic themes and allusions entered that critique. For Gilles Heuré, Hervé was no latent anti-Semite simply because he had attacked Dreyfusard perspectives in the *fin-de-siècle*. The *Sans Patrie* assailed Dreyfusism after supporting the Dreyfusard crusade because "for him it had become a convenient testimonial masking some abdications. For Hervé, past examples of courage no longer sufficed … to justify current cowardice." When he announced the "*mort du dreyfusisme*" in September 1908 during the aftermath of Clemenceau's repression at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, he was prompted not by any advocacy of anti-Semitism, but by a desire to reformulate social questions through a reawakened socialism.[19]

During and after World War I, Hervé was an especially strong voice for the Zionist position regarding a Jewish homeland. He wanted the area of Palestine to be liberated from the Ottoman Empire so that it could become a Jewish state.

He even hoped that this could be an official allied war aim.[20] Heuré argued that this support for the Zionist cause was much more sincere for Hervé than it was for many other French citizens who were more motivated by their desire "'to mobilize the Jewish world in order to get the latter to contribute to maintain Russia on the side of the Allies.'"[21] In her account of Zionism in France in the early twentieth century, Catherine Nicault echoed that idea by describing Hervé as the "best recruit" for Zionism while *La Victoire* was a veritable "pro-Zionist tribune."[22] Heuré showed how Hervé was, in fact, something of a "contact man" during the war between government officials like Théophile Delcassé and Aristide Briand, and important French Zionist leaders.[23] During World War I, as part of his efforts to solidify the *union sacrée* and, one suspects, because he spoke "straight from the heart," Hervé ridiculed the base prejudices of French xenophobes by mocking their anti-Semitic lexicon. "Hold on there, these are the 'youpins', as you say in your vulgar language [...] You recognize them by their noses! Look at them, Jew-Baiter! They had their nation stolen from them 2000 years ago; since then they have become scattered throughout the world; scorned and held in contempt by the anti-Semitic rabble." According to French police sources uncovered by Heuré from that epoch, the Jews of the 4th *arrondissement* "'had a great confidence in Hervé.'"[24]

In the interwar era Hervé repeatedly rejected anti-Semitism by recalling the many French Jews who had died in World War I including the singer Léon Israël, "the bravest of all the pre-war *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*." He periodically reminded French nationalists that on August 3, 1914 a battalion of foreign Jews was organized in Paris under the auspices of *La Guerre Sociale* and was later decimated at Carency in 1915. After the war he certainly did not spare ethnically Jewish freethinkers from his religious message any more than he spared backsliding French Catholics and wayward Protestants when he urged them to return to synagogues and churches. Yet in early 1931, while rejecting the use of anti-Semitism to generate support for *La Victoire*, Hervé admitted that some supporters wished him to use it. "At any rate, we are not an anti-Semitic paper as some people increasingly wish that we were."[25] In his assault on Nazi anti-Semitism in the 1930s, after noting how "Nazi anti-Semitism was a throwback to an earlier age" that discredited the German regime, Hervé, nevertheless, admitted that there was "some blame for Jews who engaged in anticlericalism and Marxism. But this is no excuse to hold an entire race responsible for an excess of zeal and a lack of tact which a few Jewish intellectuals and politicians exhibited in their actions supporting Marxism."[26]

In August 1933 he again rejected anti-Semitism and displayed the "political and racial limits beyond which he did not intend to go."[27] "Our national socialism

is neither a fascism of the police nor a racial fascism. A fascism of the police would not last long given an individualistic and evolved people like the French. A racist fascism would seem to us not only odious and outdated in its anti-Semitic form, but grotesque in a country like ours whose Celtic race is so mixed with Scandinavian elements in Normandy, Latin elements in the Southeast, and Levantine or Moorish elements in the South."[28] On October 7, 1933 Hervé reacted angrily to an anti-Semitic act in Paris which culminated in the suicide of a young girl who tried to defend her little brother when a bar owner attempted a strip search to see whether he was Jewish! After that episode there were threats to the family and a police visit which led the young woman to panic from the fear that her mother would be sent to jail. After such episodes Hervé had to admit that some people thought that the Right needed anti-Semitism to unleash a popular wave to get rid of the parliamentary republic, yet he warned that such a strategy would backfire since it would be immediately denounced as a reactionary and clerical enterprise which would provoke a counter-wave by the extreme Left to sweep away the last vestiges of religious and educational liberties. This was the lesson of the Dreyfus Affair. Catholics needed to avoid past errors because they led to trouble. For Hervé that meant that French national socialists must be among the first rank of those who combat vile anti-Semitism![29]

At the time when Hervé and Bucard launched the *Milice Socialiste National*, André Lichtenberger wrote an article titled "L'indice juif," which claimed that "the moral disequilibrium of a country is measured exactly by the degree of its anti-Semitism." Lichtenberger, like Hervé, sought to explain Nazi anti-Semitism in terms of Nazi frustration at not being able to attain power, and he, like Hervé, predicted that power would reduce its anti-Semitism.[30] Another interesting development should be noted. Hervé was often charged by some of his enemies and competitors on the Right with ties to occult Masonic and Jewish influences. Following the spring election in 1932, in which he had supported the editor-in-chief of *L'Echo de Paris*, the conservative nationalist, Henri de Kerillis, in the second round of voting, Hervé was the object of an unsigned notice which appeared in Coty's *L'Ami du Peuple*, accusing him of being the tool of occult forces and the revolutionary Left. Hervé may have taken that as an accusation of subservience to the Masons and the Jewish bank. That was not quite the harmony he had been hoping would emerge from the extreme French Right.[31]

The director of *La Victoire* was horrified by the notorious attack on Blum in mid-February 1936 during the Popular Front election campaign and wished him a speedy recovery. While he decried the rhetorical excess of *L'Action Française*, he also argued that Blum himself was guilty of using volatile language. Hadn't the

socialist leader brandished violent rhetoric in the *Chambre* claiming to "hate" the moderates, called for a "vacation from legality" in an article in *Le Populaire*, and continued to employ Marxian jargon including the term "dictatorship of the proletariat"? Yet what was more worrying for Hervé was the rhetorical excess on the Right which could easily backfire, instigating the "mystique of the Left." Such a scenario would "cast a giant shadow" on the supposedly positive, restrained, and noble groups and forces including the *Croix-de-Feu*, Henri de Kerillis, *La Victoire*, and even the Church which would all be blamed for the sins of "reaction."[32]

In early June 1939 Hervé wrote a moving lead editorial devoted to the fate of the 918 Jewish refugees on board the *Saint-Louis* seeking asylum in Havana, Cuba. A week later he returned to the same theme, after the refugees were refused asylum and many of them to vowed suicide rather than return to Hamburg. He also called on France to open its doors to these unfortunate victims and for all religious groups to come together to assist them. Again recalling the heroic actions of the foreign Jewish legion that he helped organize at the beginning of World War I, Hervé blasted France's leaders for doing nothing for the refugees because he thought France was missing its chance to send Europe and the entire world a message about "the disgusting and profound horror of anti-Semitism." Such a tragic tale did not stop him from taking the credit for awakening the French press to the plight of the asylum-seeking Jews.[33]

Even though he almost always expressed his horror at anti-Semitism, throughout the interwar era Hervé drew clear parallels between his parties and movements and those of fascism and Nazism. In 1932 he created *La Milice Socialiste Nationale* which some have called fascist and which was certainly the most extreme version of his various attempts to form a national socialist mass movement between the wars. Nevertheless, he trusted that the M.S.N. could act with military discipline in order to help elect a great popular wave above parties which would then work "to erect a new regime, without castor oil or tar as in Italy, without anti-Semitism as in Germany, and with a minimum of damage and disorder."[34] When Marcel Bucard came to *La Victoire* in November 1932 to lead the M.S.N., he displayed none of the anti-Semitism later associated with his mimicry of fascism called *Francisme*. For Bucard, the M.S.N. was a crusade for French renewal which even included Jewish members.[35] One of Bucard's first editorials in *La Victoire* featured an image of a "*faisceau des forces spirituelles*" which included a rabbi, a priest, and a Protestant minister at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.[36]

At the time of the Stavisky scandal in 1933, Hervé connected Nazi anti-Semitism and French corruption to "'the waves of scheming Eastern metics of all

ethnic origins who flocked to Berlin, bringing all the vices of the Orient, transforming the German capital into a cesspool!" He went on to contrast such alien schemers with "typical hard working Jews." However, after blatantly justifying Hitler's attempt "to sweep away all that filth and cleanse Berlin," he added the following clear parallel message. "We have inherited, along with the proscribed political victims of Germany's civil struggles, all the refuse that we have been receiving for 25 years, as if we did not have enough of the Staviskys. To count on our parliamentary regime to remove this rottenness would be naïve since we have to begin to get rid of the parliamentary regime itself, first of all."[37] It is certainly true that only three months before Hervé had warned French nationalists about using anti-Semitism to unleash a great popular wave, and he claimed that his national socialists would be among the first rank to combat vile anti-Semitism. He also advised Catholics to heed "the lesson of the Dreyfus Affair" and "avoid past errors because they lead to trouble."[38] Still, the latter touches of humanitarian tolerance do not provide a complete portrait. One can certainly question Hervé's understanding of Nazi anti-Semitism after reading an early November 1935 editorial which compared Hitler's treatment of the Jews with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the more recent anti-Catholic laws under the Third Republic, and the longstanding British martyrdom of Ireland.[39]

At the approach of the Popular Front, which Hervé associated with all the evils of the Left going back to the Masonic influence on the Enlightenment and the later secularization of French education, he admitted that he had been a Mason in his youth.[40] If one can argue that Hervé was never an anti-Semite in the usual sense of the term, one cannot deny that he became anti-Masonic to the point of seeing the events of February 6 and the mysterious death of Albert Prince, the head of the financial section of the Parquet de Paris, in terms of a Masonic plot. It was quite a shift for a man like Hervé, who had been accused by the police before the war of being at the center of a vast Left-wing conspiracy of subversion and charged by the Right at the same time of working for a Judeo-Masonic-German cabal, to now claim that the police were harboring insidious and murderous Masons to defend the vile Staviskyite politicians of the Left and their corrupt acquaintances.[41] In the months preceding the victory of the Popular Front, one of Hervé's standard arguments was that the Masons had always led the way in the Third Republic and were responsible for the coming of *Le Front Populaire*. Of course, the Masons included many secular Jews.[42] The main enemy of France was not the P.C.F., whose evolution or disintegration was inevitable, but the Masons, whose ideas had led to immorality, anarchy, and depopulation.[43] Among the three major parties of the Popular Front, the P.C.F. was the least dangerous because it

was the S.F.I.O. and the Radicals who most expressed Masonic ideas in France, and Masonic influence had been paramount since 1881, first under the Radicals and then under the Socialists.[44] Anti-Masonic sentiments were one of Hervé's recurring explanations for French ills, including de-Christianization and depopulation, which created French decadence, materialism, and disorder.[45]

During the interwar era Hervé attempted to separate Jews from traditional images of financiers, speculators, and bankers,[46] but his editorials periodically associated Jews with Communism, Freemasonry, and anticlericalism, especially during the Depression and Popular Front. In late May of 1931 he wrote: "Around 1848 there appeared Karl Marx, a kind of errant Jew, an embittered, stateless *déraciné* who had little in common with our French Israelites, so well grounded in our national crucible."[47] The head of the Popular Front, Léon Blum, was also a Jewish Socialist of some renown in literary circles who became an obvious target for *La Victoire* and the rest of the extreme French Right.[48] Blum's ethnicity and religious background, rather than being attacked directly by Hervé, were constantly alluded to as explanations for some of the Socialist leader's unpopular policies. For example, Hervé tied the de-Christianization of Alsace in 1937 to Blum's Jewish heritage by wondering if Blum realized that such policies would unleash an anti-Semitic wave in Alsace. "Does Blum want to arouse Alsatian autonomist ideas? Does he think there is not enough anti-Semitism in Alsace? For a Jew, isn't this an amazing lack of tact? This is no time to excite French anti-Semites who have been calm since the 1914 *union sacrée*."[49] It must be stressed that the anti-Semitic images and clichés occasionally sprinkled into Hervé's editorials were almost always accompanied by nuances and clarifications which separated his writing from standard anti-Semitic fare.

If his interwar editorials vaguely touched on anti-Semitic themes with little apparent connection to his pre-war socialism, his continuing flirtation with anti-Semitism as he transformed his political vision seems worth mentioning. By 1935 it was not uncommon for Hervé to warn the Popular Front about a possible new anti-Semitic wave if the French Left persisted in its "revolutionary" program. He repeatedly warned Blum during the 1930s that his "extremist" views could lead to increased French anti-Semitism. In an article on April 22, 1936, Hervé said that "he hoped that France will not have a wave of anti-Semitism even if it is Blum who presides over the chaos to come." Then he predicted, "although he was not among the race of prophets as was Blum," a Popular Front victory "would unleash the greatest nationalist wave since Boulanger or the greatest Bonapartist wave since 18 Brumaire or 2 December."[50] Two months later he returned to the same themes. "People are beginning to cry *'La France aux Français'* which is the cry of the anti-Semites. It is odious to make our Jewish compatriots responsible

for the crime that Léon Blum has committed in leading France to civil war, when Germany lies so near and is rearmed and excited. Léon Blum must, nevertheless, know that in delivering France to anarchy, he, as a French Jew, is going to awaken the old anti-Semitism of certain Parisian milieux." Yet he went on to warn French patriots to avoid such an error.[51] In an article in *La Victoire* written six weeks earlier, "a Hungarian patriot" named A.L. Kossuth actually called racism a German and Jewish invention! He, too, predicted an increase in anti-Semitism due to the rise of Blum and the Popular Front. "If Judaism is responsible for Nazism and Léon Blum, evidently we must grant extenuating circumstances to the growth of anti-Semitism which one begins to catch a glimpse of in France. Such a development will be a lamentable but inevitable consequence of the increase in aberrations which we are now experiencing."[52] By early January 1937 Hervé predicted, rather than simply warned, that civil war, a military dictatorship, and a wave of anti-Semitism would result from the anarchy unleashed by Blum's sophistry and powerlessness.[53] If Hervé's treatment of Blum and the Popular Front in the 1930s can be associated with the heritage of French anti-Semitism, it also seemed to arise from an identification of Jews with the Left, which Stephen A. Schuker called the main source of anti-Semitism in this era.[54]

Although Eugen Weber did not discuss Hervé's anti-Semitism in his account of France in the 1930s, the so-called "Hollow Years", he included a photo of a purported P.S.N. poster with blatantly anti-Semitic headlines. Weber's use of the photo was presumably meant to describe the general French political landscape of the 1930s including the Popular Front era. The photo seems to imply that the poster was commissioned by Hervé or his associates, possibly without his knowledge or approval.[55] In fact, the photo was taken by the legendary Magnum photojournalist David "CHIM" Seymour and dates from May 1935 during the Paris municipal elections. It represents a typical election wall display of juxtaposed posters according to the more recent research of Dutch scholar Daniel Knegt, who tracked down that incriminating photo and knowledgeably conjectures that the poster might have been the result of "dirty tricks" by competitors on the extreme French Right, such as the *Jeunesses Patriotes* who may have worried that Hervé's campaign for Pétain might gain some traction at their expense.[56] The poster may have been placed almost at random and simply landed on one of Hervé's P.S.N. posters by chance or because the anti-Semitic flyer simply fit the location.[57] In reading *La Victoire* during this era, such crude anti-Semitic appeals were entirely absent. Several times Hervé directly cautioned and reprimanded friends and associates who apparently engaged in such base appeals, and he admitted that such people existed among his readers and followers. Before 1912 Hervé had allowed some of his more ardent followers to promote the idea of

a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, but he himself had to be cautious because he risked cutting himself off from his socialist base. Could Hervé have engaged in a similar tactic during the Popular Front era, allowing some of his more zealous admirers to employ overt anti-Semitism in order to increase support? Given his persistent aversion to Nazi anti-Semitism, it seems doubtful, though not impossible, that Hervé could have been hypocritical enough to employ such blatant racism for political or financial purposes. However, the word hypocritical is seldom employed in describing Gustave Hervé.



Figure 42. Posters from the Parisian Municipal Elections of May 5 and 12, 1935. Magnum photo by David Seymour.

Following Kristallnacht Hervé seemed to have finally recognized that there was no hope in bargaining with Hitler if he and his vile minions were capable of such "foul anti-Semitism." He also expressed the wish to fully partake with Jews "their indignation, their grief, and their humiliation. Since, in hours like these, one regrets not being a Jew, to suffer with them and to share their pain." The Director of *La Victoire* also hoped that France would open its doors to these persecuted Jews, and he blamed the German people collectively for "having allowed anti-Semitism, this leprosy, to poison their soul and heart."[58] Now even the Hohenzollerns looked like "angels of gentleness" and "models of humanity" compared to Hitler and his henchmen.[59] For scholars like Heuré and Michel Winock it was especially the issues of resurgent nationalism and anti-Semitism "that kept Hervé from blindly following Hitler and Nazism." If his philo-Semitism helped to keep him separate from Nazism, it would act in the same manner after 1940 regarding the Vichy Regime which soon sought to do more than accommodate with Nazism.[60]

For Gilles Heuré, "Hervé was not an anti-Semite and would never be one. From his first articles from 1900, in *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne*, he combated anti-Semitism. In *Leur Patrie*, he assailed "'Holy Russia where an entire race, the Jews, was outside the law.'" The first issue of *La Guerre Sociale* condemned Russian *pogroms* that involved violence against Jewish women. In an editorial dated March 15, 1911, Hervé assailed the "*matraque antisémitique*" in the following words: "Personally, I remain persuaded that anti-Semitism is the basest form of clericalism for some, of nationalism for the others, and of social conservatism for almost everyone." In the following month he returned to the topic in a more positive disclosure. "I am a philo-Semite because there are anti-Semites in France. My philo-Semitism is a protest against fourth-rate nationalism." Even though Hervé had been observing and denouncing various manifestations of anti-Semitism for a long time and had recognized Nazi anti-Semitism at an early date, Heuré was forced to admit that it had taken him far too long to realize that anti-Semitism was no mere political error.[61]

Cryptic comments by Hervé can be found in *La Victoire* which expressed concerns about anti-Semitic elements among his P.S.N. supporters.[62] In November 1938 he admitted that his recent articles attacking anti-Semitism had cost the paper some subscribers and created disaffection among some of *La Victoire*'s most faithful friends. Surprised by the number of anti-Semites among his readers, Hervé said he would not flinch, promising to go to a one page format beginning on December 1, 1938 rather than "side with anti-Semitism or back off on the Franco-Russian Pact, especially after Munich!" For Hervé, recent German pogroms and the papal pronouncements against anti-Semitism should have convinced everyone that

anti-Semitism was a shameful malady that needed to be extirpated from mankind. The Munich Crisis and *Kristallnacht* seem to have affected Hervé profoundly.[63]

Throughout the interwar era Hervé praised Judaism as a traditional faith which promoted unity and social harmony, he received important financial contributions from some Jews (one of his chief financial supporters among his *brigade de fer*, made up of ten leading backers, was Jewish), his editorials strenuously rejected Nazi anti-Semitism, and he was adamant about excluding anti-Semitism from his own political formations. Even the occasionally xenophobic appeals to French workers to join his *Syndicats Unionistes* around 1929–1931 did not single out Jewish immigrants for special censure. However, at the time of the attempt by the *Syndicats Unionistes* to win over syndicalist workers to Hervé's P.S.N., a 1930 article by Albert Cremieux did go so far as to accuse the Communist unions of "… building on the sands of Judeo-Mongol daydreaming, [while] we build on the hard rock of the French character."[64] There is some evidence of an attempt, apparently by a few of his associates, to use blatant anti-Semitism at the time of the Popular Front. If such tactics were employed by some of his followers, they may have been an unsanctioned attempt to broaden the appeal of his national socialism. If Hervé secretly approved such extreme anti-Semitism, he always strenuously rejected it in *La Victoire*. Despite his general rejection of anti-Semitism and his perpetual criticism of Hitler's anti-Semitic policies, Hervé thought that France needed its own version of Hitler or Mussolini to revise the constitution, create an authoritarian republic, and forge internal order as prerequisites for French unity, social harmony, and strength in the face of the revolutionary threat from the Left as well as the increasing menace from Nazism. Until the late 1930s, Hervé blamed Nazi anti-Semitism on Hitler's youthful and extremist followers, believed that power would eventually moderate the Nazi leader, and described Hitler as a German version of Danton, Napoleon, Boulanger, or Déroulède.[65] In *La Victoire* Hervé generally was vehement in his rejection of anti-Semitism, but occasional ambiguity on this issue persisted at both ends of his career.

Despite periodic episodes of xenophobia and anti-Semitism, a longstanding French tradition of welcoming immigrants dated from the revolutionary epoch. Following the Dreyfus Affair, despite the persistence of a generally politically incorrect anti-Semitism, there was a pattern of tolerance and acceptance of immigrants, including Jews, that continued until the Great Depression.[66] Vicki Caron associated "the anti-Semitic revival in France in the 1930s" with "real socioeconomic conflicts between Jews and non-Jews" which were exacerbated during the Depression, but she never mentioned Hervé's movement in her studies of that issue. The fact that Hervé's few anti-Semitic references seem most closely connected to general

xenophobic and anti-Communist themes does not mean that economic concerns were unimportant factors for his followers, some of whom undoubtedly carried anti-Semitism well beyond Hervé's vague allusions.[67] In fact, consistent patterns and documentation regarding Hervé's followers and subscribers have proven difficult to find. Ralph Schor's survey of French anti-Semitic leaders, groups, and publications during the anti-Semitic revival of the 1930s does not accuse either Gustave Hervé or *La Victoire*.[68] Such omissions are not surprising given Hervé's marginalization and episodic ambivalence on the issue of anti-Semitism.

Daniel Knegt in recent conversations and exchanges with the author has made several pertinent comments regarding the existence of anti-Semitism among Hervé's followers and the possible ambiguities and ambivalences. "I rather disagree with your point to include this [anti-Semitism] among Hervé's 'ambivalences'. I think that a single antisemitic diatribe (in 1927, on Marx) and a few 1936 warnings against Blum that his politics might cause a new 'wave of antisemitism' are not enough to be able to state this. In almost all occasions, Hervé manifested a hatred of antisemitism and he never hesitated to condemn it, even at the cost of possible readers. Of course, Hervé completely misinterpreted Nazism in claiming that its antisemitism was scandalous but that it would surely disappear within a few years."[69] Although Gilles Heuré described Hervé as a philo-Semite, he argued that the former *Sans Patrie*'s intellectual myopia and failure to understand the nature of ideology led to a crucial underestimation of the danger of Nazism and the central importance of its anti-Semitism. Because of this blindness and inveterate tendency to see the present in terms of the past, he could often dismiss Nazi anti-Semitism, however foul and noxious he described it, as an excess of youth and inexperience.[70]

One can profitably think about Hervé's philo-Semitism by contrasting it to the way Ian Kershaw talked about Hitler's anti-Semitic views in Vienna from 1907 to 1913. At that time Hitler seemed so much like everybody else that his anti-Semitism was not noticed.[71] In the interwar era and today, Hervé's philo-Semitic qualities stand out when compared to the norm. Although he may have had a natural sympathy for all underdogs, including Jewish minorities, occasionally even a philo-Semite could lapse into images which fit comfortably into an anti-Semitic *Zeitgeist*. Anti-Semitism must not have seemed to be as reprehensible before the Holocaust as it was later. Hervé's philo-Semitism stands out even more today with our generally presumed and, understandably, greater sensitivity to the issue. Whatever episodic ambiguity and ambivalence he might have displayed on the question of anti-Semitism could simply show that almost anyone is capable of racial and ethnocentric thinking, even someone normally considered beyond reproach.

27

The Stavisky Affair and the Events of February 6, 1934

As the impact of the Depression began to be felt, the French political arrangements supposedly became increasingly dysfunctional. Hervé certainly believed that, when he described the new *Cartel* government elected in 1932 as a reenactment of the incompetence and chaos of the 1924 *Cartel des Gauches*.[1] Because Radicals persisted in courting Socialists, despite their profound differences over economic matters, the latter group held a veritable "sword of Damocles" over every Radical ministry, making reform attempts precarious according to historian Pierre Miquel.[2] The Radicals generally wanted to cut expenditures and eliminate budget deficits, while Socialists thought that such policies would deepen the Depression. With falling revenues, growing deficits, and rising social expenditures, the *Cartel* was deadlocked, leading to seven ministries in eighteen months. Such political paralysis fostered increasing activism by interest groups which sought to protect their concerns, and that created a volatile situation ripe for the reappearance of the antiparliamentary *ligues*.[3] "Nothing was more troublesome in the heavy social climate of crisis than this political merry-go-round where the same war horses turned at an accelerating speed. A new scandal sufficed to carry antiparliamentarianism over the edge. The Stavisky Affair, following the Hanau and Oustric banking scandals of 1928 and 1930 respectively, which implicated deputies and financiers, managed to do that."[4] The Stavisky Affair confirmed the

prejudices and assumptions of many people that corrupt deputies were always ready to use their offices to enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers. Such clichés had become the staple of both fiction and journalism for years.[5]

For Maurice Agulhon the situation in France leading to the purported coup of February 6 was the product of a traditional political scandal rather than the slowly accelerating economic crisis. "Latent antiparliamentarianism had always resurfaced when political-financial scandals erupted—those affairs involving the classic types of swindler, the second-rate deputy trafficking in his influence, and the truly Parisian adventurer."[6] Kevin Passmore has documented how such assaults on the Third Republic as an unstable, mismanaged, and impotent political system which was "out of tune with history" rang out in France during the 1930s among journalists, politicians, and ordinary citizens. The solution was similar no matter which part of the political spectrum was queried: authority! And historians have tended to accept that judgment without much questioning: parliamentary instability must be some sort of an historical natural law.[7] The Stavisky Affair seemed to prove such charges. By the time the affair had run its course, the notorious Stavisky was dead, the Prefect of Police was sacked, several Radical governments had fallen, and a new moderate National Union Ministry under ex-President Gaston Doumergue had taken over, with legendary Marshal Philippe Pétain at the War Ministry and three token Radicals in place to create a semblance of unity and to defend the Republic.[8]

As 1933 ended, the French political and financial scandal usually called the Stavisky Affair erupted around the shady dealings of a character named Alexandre Stavisky, who used contacts with men in high places to swindle French citizens and then avoid prosecution.[9] Stavisky was a "a great con man" who happened to be a Ukrainian Jew and naturalized Frenchman. Not only did he manage to attract Radical parliamentarians as his lawyers, he was able to socialize in their elegant circles, gaining introductions among the political elite. By taking advantage of ties to politicians in charge of the city of Bayonne, Stavisky soon developed contacts with a major Bayonne bank, whose "managing director was arrested on 24 December 1933 for the sale of fake municipal bonds. The trail led to Stavisky, who was found dead on 9 January 1934. No one believed the official story of suicide. 'Stavisky', it was said, 'shot himself at point-blank range with a police revolver held by a policeman.'"[10] Fairly quickly the word spread that Stavisky had long been the subject of criminal proceedings, but somehow had managed to stay out of jail and even avoid prosecutions. In fact, he had already received 29 postponements in the prior eight years! The public prosecutor responsible, Georges Pressard, was the brother-in-law of the Prime Minister, Camille Chautemps, who was himself a Radical and

a Freemason. The brother of the Prime Minister was an attorney employed by one of Stavisky's companies. Almost immediately various right-wing groups including *L'Action Française*, their *Camelots du Roi*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, and *Solidarité Française* organized a series of protest meetings and violent demonstrations. The Affair was an obvious bonanza for the right-wing press given the associations involved in the scandal: Jews, Radical deputies, corrupt ministers, and Freemasons! With that incendiary mixture, a public uproar was created which led Chautemps to resign in late January 1934 just a few months after setting up his Ministry.[11]



Figure 43. The "Suicide" of Serge Alexandre Stavisky (1886–1934) at a chalet in Chamonix on January 8, 1934. (© photo 12/The Image Works)

In his sampling of moderate conservative newspapers during the Stavisky Affair, Kevin Passmore could find no mention that the swindler was a Ukrainian Jew. Significantly, Hervé and *La Victoire* were not quite so reticent in that matter. Although he periodically warned the French Right to heed the lessons of the Dreyfus Affair and avoid using anti-Semitism to win over voters,[12] during the Stavisky Affair he justified Hitler's cleansing Berlin of its "'waves of scheming Eastern metics of all ethnic origins … [who had transformed] the German capital into a cesspool!" Although he contrasted such alien schemers with France's "hard working

and orderly Jews" and explicitly rejected Hitler's anti-Semitism, he thought that France had inherited not only the "political victims of Germany's civil struggles" but also "all this refuse that we have been receiving for 25 years, as if we did not have enough of the Staviskys." For Hervé, the parliamentary regime was incapable of getting rid of the filth; only the elimination of the current regime could begin the remedy.[13] If the extirpation of the parliamentary regime was usually expected to be done legally; in this article the former *Sans Patrie* did not stress legality. "By the time of the 6 February riots hardly any conservatives were prepared to condemn the overthrow of a corrupt majority through action on the streets."[14]

The Stavisky Affair gave groups like *L' Action Française*, then in decline, the cause they needed to try to revive themselves and attempt to demolish the regime.[15] Hervé would later blame the royalists for the February 6 riots and deaths due to their extreme rhetoric in early 1934 in their daily newspaper.[16] Maurice Agulhon also described *L'Action Française* as the chief instigator in summoning what he termed the "revolutionary right" to battle the presumably corrupt and blameworthy regime and its political class. That "revolutionary right" was made up of various *ligues, groupes, partis*, and *mouvements* which *were* ideologically quite similar, but "were separated by competition and rivalry. This is probably one of the major differences between the French-style 'fascism', polymorphous and with many factions, and the single parties of Mussolini or Hitler, and one of the reasons why it was less efficient."[17] At any rate, a skilled polemicist like Léon Daudet had no trouble connecting the Stavisky scandal to themes from the Dreyfus Affair and references to the supposed "treason" of Caillaux-Malvy in World War I.[18] Before the Stavisky Affair some conservatives and moderates had thought that the volatile international scene necessitated working with Herriot's new Leftist Ministry of 1932 on things like rearmament despite the ministry's lack of success in combating the Depression. However, many industrialists and businessmen were skeptical and actually supported the extreme Right-wing press (*Candide*, *Gringoire*, and *L'Action Française*) and the violent action of various *ligues* (the *Camelots du Roi*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, the *Croix-de-Feu*, and the Greenshirts of Henri Dorgères in the West) in order to create "a climate of uncertainty destined to prepare that operation of their dreams: the revision of the Constitution in an authoritarian direction …"[19]

Gustave Hervé certainly fit the ideological profile of the fascist or nearly fascist "revolutionary right" but he was missing several critical components, namely their dynamism and propensity for violence. Though he shared many of the same grievances as the royalists (if not all their most odious anathemas) and the other components of the "revolutionary right," the former *Sans Patrie* had become much more cautious in the interwar era and that was probably due

to his age and experience. If he generally assailed moderates and moderation, demanded an end to decadence, saw the need to reform France, and argued for the revision of the Constitution by means of electoral campaigns led by organizations of combat and propaganda uniting the entire Right, he stressed that all such actions had to be legal. Certainly Hervé had lost hope in the parliamentary republic with its timid, partisan, or even anarchic political parties, and he demanded a leader with almost dictatorial control, coming to power by means of a massive popular movement above partisan politics.[20] In the days before the February 6 demonstrations and riots, Hervé engaged in such tortured verbal gymnastics to explain his political vision that one could certainly accuse him of blatant sophistry. After arguing that France could not be saved by street violence, he claimed that only a "plebiscitary leader" or "providential man" above politics arising from the depths of the nation, as has been done in Italy and Germany, could get rid of this shameful regime. He stressed that his "national socialists are not Bonapartists. They are Jacobin republicans who seek to save the republic that the parliamentary regime is killing and dishonoring, by borrowing from Bonapartism, which is in essence Jacobin and republican, the fecund idea of the plebiscite." Because he rejected the hereditary principle and because he called upon a popular wave to end the parliamentary system, Hervé could advocate a populist dictatorship and call it republican—his authoritarian republic.[21]

However, one could also argue that Hervé's ideas were not completely alien to those of that group of "political non-conformists" of the early 1930s like the conservative André Tardieu,[22] the "Young Turks" of the Radical Party, or the dissident members of the S.F.I.O., including the so-called neo-socialists. Some of these non-conformists sought a "Third Way" that was "neither Right nor Left" and was above traditional politics. They generally considered the political system to be dysfunctional and in need of remedies which would include a stronger, more effective executive who was less dependent on the whims of an increasingly unrepresentative parliament that was prone to inertia; a national economic plan, which some described as corporatism, to provide some form of central economic planning, using technocratic methods and assumptions; and a rejuvenated party system or at least a new broad-based conservative party.[23] Despite some parallels to the "political non-conformists of the 1930s", it must be admitted that Hervé's cautious yet ambiguous reactions at the time of the Stavisky Affair do not make it any easier to assess his relation to what Robert J. Soucy has called the beginning of the "second wave" of French fascism and the phenomenon which Soucy branded "republican fascism".

The Stavisky Affair was the catalyst for a series of demonstrations and riots that shook the foundations of the Third Republic culminating in the events of

February 6. A few days earlier, the Chautemps government had resigned following a demonstration on January 27, 1934 in which forces guided by *L'Action Française* had held onto the Place de la Concorde against the police. Just days after the fall of Chautemps, President Albert Lebrun asked the Radical leader, Édouard Daladier, to form a new government. Though he had a reputation for firmness and was untainted by the current corruption, Daladier refused to conduct an official inquiry into the Stavisky Affair.[24] What he did do was sack the director of the *Comédie Française*, whose earlier production of Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, with its themes of riot, war, political assassination, contempt for the common people, and demagoguery, incited the royalists and other sympathetic and supposedly "fascist" *ligues* to demonstrate. The theatre director was replaced by "the director of the *Sûreté générale*, the national criminal investigation bureau!"[25] Then Daladier turned to deal with the Prefect of Police, Jean Chiappe, who seemed to have become the government's scapegoat.[26] Chiappe had risen to prominence through close ties to important Radicals and was rumored to be incredibly corrupt. Despite his Radical connections, the new ministry considered Chiappe complicit with the Right, the *ligues*, and the January 27 demonstrators. Chiappe was apparently held responsible for the police silence regarding the dealings of Stavisky. Along with the Paris parquet and the *Sûreté Générale*, the Prefect of Police was thought to have been among Stavisky's circle of contacts.[27] In such a polarized atmosphere Chiappe's "flexibility" looked like disloyalty. So he became expendable. When Chiappe rejected an offer to become Governor-General of Morocco and resigned instead, Daladier and his Minister of the Interior, Eugène Frot, replaced him and named Adrien Bonnefoy-Sibour as the new Prefect of Police.[28]

Rumors then flew, with Daudet claiming that machine guns had been implanted in the *Chambre*, while other reports warned of tanks on the move toward Paris. Certainly troop movements and the use of armored cars were reported by the Parisian press in general. Soon two centrist ministers resigned and the *Chambre* was also in an uproar. Pierre Miquel argued that the *Croix-de-Feu* took the lead by February 6 in calling for action and was followed by *L'Action Française* and the other *ligues*.[29] Certainly the extreme Right's immediate responses to the fall of Chiappe created a more volatile situation, compounded by the fact that the Communists were eager to use the occasion to assail, if not bring down, the bourgeois republic. Reactions in the Palais Bourbon were led by André Tardieu, but Daladier still had the support of the Socialists. Out on the streets, protests against the government and its treatment of Chiappe "reached a point of paroxysm." By then, many in France wanted any solution, however drastic, to a political system that appeared inept, powerless, and corrupt.[30] The events of February 6 were immediately

described by the Left as a veritable attempt at a fascist coup. For example, *Le Populaire*, the S.F.I.O. daily, described the *ligues* in action on February 6 as "fascist" and "nationalist vermin" who were out "to destroy our working class organization" and defend their fallen, coup-favoring Prefect of Police, Chiappe.[31] For decades most scholars, apparently following the lead of René Rémond, hesitated to describe February 6, 1934 as some sort of attempted fascist coup. Pierre Miquel's assessment was typical of that tendency: "The 6th of February was a street riot and not a *coup d'état*, nor a revolution."[32] Such a conclusion fit traditional ideas about France's exceptionalism and supposed immunity to fascism due to the presumed greater stability and democratic political culture of the hexagon. In recent decades such arguments have been successfully challenged by many scholars who argue that the events of February 6 must be viewed more critically and with a bit more nuance.[33]

A stronger indictment of those events is certainly possible because so few "conservatives were prepared to condemn the overthrow of a corrupt majority through action on the streets." For Kevin Passmore: "A relatively minor financial scandal became a state crisis because it appeared to confirm that the governing class of the Republic was inadequate to its tasks. Since dislike of deputies was deeply rooted in the population at large, attacks on selfish deputies were always likely to resonate widely. The elites systematized this prejudice against deputies, together with their own resentments, into an objective critique of the parliamentary republic."[34] Weeks prior to the tumultuous February day of reckoning, even a moderate republican newspaper like the *Journal des Débats* "had compared the current atmosphere of moral corruption with that prevailing in the Directory prior to Napoleon's coup, and could not believe that now, as then, the 'honest and hardworking' country would not demand the application of the scalpel."[35] On the day of the demonstration, *Le Temps* called for a revision of the constitution following the dissolution of parliament and new elections. The author of one editorial, Lucien Romier, even spoke about the possibility of a "government of public safety."[36] Hervé's rhetoric easily fit the political climate then on the Right, among some moderates, and even by a few on the Left. Pierre Taittinger, the champagne magnate and founder of the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, published over a million copies of his tract "*Le pays réclame un chef*", while the neo-Socialists also demanded an authoritarian state and economic development. In such an incendiary atmosphere, the prospect of a *coup d'état* was expected and often welcomed by many across the political spectrum.[37]

Forceful responses by Radicals did little to mollify the extreme Right. On the fifth of February *Solidarité française* placarded a poster all over Paris which read: "'Daladier is leading you like a herd of sheep to the Blums, the Kaisersteins,

the Schweinkopfs and other Zyromskis.'" Attacking leaders on the Left by invoking the names of prominent Socialists who happened to be Jews or even by making up some foreign and Jewish-sounding names was a typical anti-Semitic and xenophobic tactic. The pernicious point obviously was that Jews and foreigners seemed to control the Left and were invading France. The Communists had their own grievances against the government and its Socialist allies. The policy of "class against class" was still in effect and references to Socialists as "social fascists" had not yet been abandoned. *L'Humanité* called for members of the Communist dominated veterans' group [*Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants* or A.R.A.C.] to "'protest against the regime of profit and scandal … against a government which, pretending to punish him, gives Chiappe the plum position of Governor-General of Morocco.'" Given their joint grievances with the republican government, the Right-wing *ligues* and the Communists on the extreme Left both joined the February 6 confrontation and arranged for the demonstration to coincide with the general rush and bustle at the end of the workday.[38]

Hervé had described the Republic a few weeks before the fall of Chautemps as a regime of parties and factions which fight for power instead of governing or solving problems. It was obvious to him that the Republic was infected by favoritism, nepotism, corruption, disorder, and anarchy which only a national revolution and a dictatorship by a national leader could prevent from sinking ever deeper into the quagmire.[39] Though he rejected the notion that agents of the Chautemps had killed Stavisky in January 1934 at a chalet in Chamonix, an idea he called non-historical and not objective, Hervé, along with "most serious minded" journalists, still assumed that Judge Albert Prince, the man who supposedly knew the story behind the scandal, was murdered on February 16, 1934 on the rail line near Dijon in order to silence him.[40] On the eve of the demonstration and riots, Hervé argued that Chiappe had been sacrificed due to the demands of the S.F.I.O. and "the snake Blum," yet he repeated his opposition to "demonstrations which risked degenerating into bloody conflicts with the police." He certainly wanted to avoid violence because he did not want the Left to be able to use the events to create a revolutionary excuse. "Even if the demonstration succeeded, it would go nowhere because the demonstrators had no numerous and solid organizations supporting them throughout the country." Though Hervé may have expected riots, he continued to place his hopes in the electoral and legal path "to sweep away the parliamentary regime without killing the republic." On February 6 he advised Daladier to let the marchers advance because many of them were veterans who had saved the republic in war, while the politicians dishonored it in peace and needed to resign at once.[41]



Figure 44. The French Chamber of Deputies, February 6, 1934. Bnf.

The day after the riots *Le Petit Parsien* included seven photos on its front page covering the events inside and outside the Palais Bourbon as well as activities on the other side of the Seine at the Place de la Concorde, nearby on the Champs Elysées, and close to the Hotel de Ville. Demonstrations, riots, marches, impromptu street harangues, student actions, and incidents affecting various bystanders and the curious occurred at various times all over central Paris on the night of 6–7 February. The presence of veterans was emphasized by the press, and it was also noted that they were sometimes treated more leniently than were the Communist demonstrators. The organizations and *ligues* active that night included: the *Camelots du Roi* of *L'Action Française*, the *Croix-de-Feu*, *Solidarité Française*, and the *Jeunesses Patriotes*.[42] The unofficial French Communist veterans association, A.R.A.C., promised to march with the right-wing and more nationalistic U.N.C. (*Union Nationale des Anciens Combattants*) but for different goals. They favored refunding of veterans pensions and benefits, yet were against Stavisky, Chiappe, imperialist war, fascism, and the corrupt Daladier government which was supposedly "in cahoots with crooks." The Socialists too were ready to respond, vowing to have active forces gathered and able to answer the fascist threat. The C.G.T., the *Union des Syndicats Confédérés de la Région Parisienne*, and the main non-communist

Left-wing veterans organization or F.O.P. (*Fédération Ouvrière et Paysanne des Anciens Combattants et Mutilés*) also prepared for any eventuality.[43] *L'Humanité* not only spoke of a *front unique* and activating Socialist or non-communist workers, but it vowed that Communists would eagerly meet the threat posed by fascist organizations.[44] The police and official forces active that day included mounted *Gardes Républicains, Gardes mobiles, Gardes mobile à Cheval, Gardiens de la Paix* (ordinary police agents), regular troops or the *Gendarmerie*, and *pompiers* (firemen).[45]



Figure 45. La Place de la Concorde, February 6, 1934. Bnf.

The main gathering point for the demonstrators was the Place de la Concorde where crowds started congregating by 2:00 p.m. Their chief object would be to cross the Pont de la Concorde in order to reach the *Chambre*. Therefore, police forces and vans immediately started to block access to the bridge and the Palais Bourbon. Increasing numbers of protesters filtered in as the afternoon progressed which resulted in more police reinforcements soon totaling 2000 police agents and other forces of order. However, the bulk of the demonstrators and curious only arrived after 6:00 p.m.[46] Other contingents of demonstrators from other locales eventually made their way to the Palais Bourbon or at least attempted to do so. The Hotel de Ville experienced its own hours of violence that evening, but after two hours many

of the *Jeunesses Patriotes* there headed for the Chamber, while the Communists remained, taking advantage of the situation there to loot the nearby stores around 10:00 p.m. according to *Le Temps*.[47] One long file of students was observed near the Boulevard Saint-Michel around 7:30 p.m. escorting two cars from which protruded a bundle of brooms with a sign which read "*Service de nettoyage de la Chambre*" (The Cleaning Service of the Parliament). *Le Petit Parisien* also mentioned the presence of hooligans who took any opportunity for senseless destruction.[48] Various groups attacked and engaged in violence but their actions were certainly not orchestrated.[49] In the end there were deaths and many wounded among the rioters as well as the police. The numbers were initially quite uncertain, but it was clear that hundreds were injured and several deaths were reported almost immediately. Once the police and the demonstrators heard about the deaths, violence by both sides appeared to escalate. Hundreds of vehicles were overturned and sometimes torched along with many kiosks. Barricades went up on the Champs Elysees made with benches, bushes, tree grilles, and debris from the kiosks as well as nearby shelters. Shattered windows, splintered glass, and broken gas lamps shooting flames could be found everywhere in central Paris. In these attacks paving stones, rocks, glass, bottles, parts of chairs, and pieces of metal were hurled at the police and the cavalry as they charged, pushing some ten thousand demonstrators back at one point. At several locations when the police charged, either on foot or horseback, both officers and their mounts were injured because some demonstrators came equipped with razors attached to their clubs and canes, while others used knives or daggers. Such weapons were used to cut the tendons of police mounts and sometimes even the hands among the forces of order.[50] At the Pont de la Concorde several assaults were made by the demonstrators against the police barriers. In general the police were able to bar the bridge and prevent the massive crowd from reaching the Palais Bourbon. But around midnight, on the point of being overwhelmed by the demonstrators, the *gardes mobiles*, the anti-riot police who had formed the barrier, opened fire thus extricating themselves. The police barrier facing the Boulevard Saint-Germain did not open fire there because the *Croix-de-Feu*, who formed the bulk of the demonstrators on the Left Bank, retreated rather than attack.[51] Violent episodes also took place until midnight on *les grands boulevards* between Montmartre and the Madeleine. The police and military forces were finally allowed to return to their barracks and normal routines between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m.[52]

With overturned and burned cars and buses, broken lampposts, and many injured horses, the Place de la Concorde looked like a battlefield by the end of the evening. Republicans were especially troubled not just by the *ligues*, which played the dominant role during the demonstrations, but by the participation

of veterans groups, even though many veterans groups were not much involved. Even as the demonstration and riot was proceeding, the Chamber gave Daladier a vote of confidence. After meeting with other government officials well into the night, further demonstrations were banned, more troops and police were positioned, and an order went out for the arrest of Charles Maurras. Leaving the Elysée around 3:15 a.m., the Minister of the Interior admitted that the forces of order had not been fully prepared, but they were now.[53] However, when Daladier tried to get the police to arrest the rioters, his supporters melted away, from the leading police officials to his own political associates. The next day he resigned, thus ending the briefest government of the Third Republic.[54] Ironically, Daladier, who was an honest man and untainted by the Stavisky corruption, found himself labeled a "gunman" for the police actions on February 6. Even though he believed that he had "defended … the integrity of the Republic in the face of rioters" and the identity of the rioters proved to him that there had been "an attempt at an armed coup against state security," Daladier was forced to resign "as if he were to blame, thus providing the demonstration with an unhoped-for success."[55]



Figure 46. Cavalry on the march on February 6, 1934. Bnf.

In the days ahead newspapers attempted to count the dead and wounded. Despite the uncertainty and inevitable inaccuracy, *Le Temps* sought to name the dead and

wounded as well as locate their hospitals. In all, the newspaper reported that 1435 people had been wounded and 15 had died, including one policeman.[56] In fact, within hours *La Victoire* cited similar statistics about the dead even if Hervé's explanations of the events was inevitably skewed.[57] *Le Petit Journal* blamed the violence simply on the extension of the rancorous habits of the Palais Bourbon out into the streets of Paris. That Parisian daily assumed that the events in the streets had been foreshadowed by the political hatreds, fist fights, angry exchanges, and the complete division within the Chamber to the point that the two sides were ready to square off in the seat of government. "What an example for the people of Paris!" Since the parliament and government could neither control themselves nor act with calm and decorum, the newspaper wondered how they could expect order in the streets of Paris.[58] *Le Temps* reported that several municipal councilors blamed the inexperienced Prefect of Police for the tragic violence.[59] Though Daladier thought the violence of February 6 was an attempted coup against the Republican government, *Le Petit Journal* stressed the chaos and uncertainty involved in those events. "In the extreme confusion of the events, it is rather difficult to follow their chronological order and to disentangle the various movements which, coming from different locations, mingled and became entangled in the total disorder." Although the most sensational actions occurred in Paris, there were disturbances throughout France from Arras to Algiers, from Lyon to Lille, and from Nancy to Nantes.[60]

The P.S.N. and *La Milice Socialiste Nationale* were not mentioned in any of the mainstream press reports surveyed here dealing with the events of February 6, and Hervé expressly opposed the demonstration, largely for pragmatic reasons. He assumed that the Left would be able to reap the benefits of an anti-fascist wave even though for him the demonstration was the result of disgust by largely republican patriots at the rottenness and decomposition of the current regime.[61] Before the February 6 demonstration, he advised caution to those groups upset by Daladier's actions because he sensed that nothing good would come of such street action. Veterans would be attacking veterans if the police confronted the people. Factions and parties were told to be silent and to avoid such dangerous confrontations. The security and harmony of France remained Hervé's main goal, and violence only created disorder, division, and chaos. To protect the nation the former *Sans Patrie* had advised Daladier not to provoke a violent confrontation.[62]

The day of the demonstrations and riots, *Le Temps* discussed the difference between force and opinion by making the convoluted point that deputies thought that they had the force and power to act because they were voted into office, yet they forgot rather quickly that opinion could change suddenly. Now the *Chambre* had left the people behind which had led to a growing gap between the parliament

and the people. That presumed divorce of the populace and their representatives accentuated the rhetoric of discord and division which *Le Temps* blamed on the Left, especially the Socialists and Blum. For the establishment daily the Socialist tutelage of the government had poisoned the political atmosphere and led to failure in the economic and international domains.[63] Following that bloody evening, *Le Temps* found it ironic that street protests by a wide assortment of groups, including those simply curious and the ordinary passers-by, spanning the political spectrum and with divergent views on many things, led to a temporary unity resulting from the violence, injuries, and deaths that occurred. The government's response to angry and disgusted citizens precipitated an over-reaction by the police leading to greater anger as well as spontaneous and even more violent reactions by participants and others drawn to the spectacle and carnage. The conservative newspaper argued that a timely resignation by Daladier could have prevented the bloody fiasco and now the government could do nothing but resign immediately.[64]

To many people on the Left, it seemed as if the *Chambre* had relinquished control in the streets to "fascists", and France was evidently heading toward a fascist dictatorship. Pierre Miquel argued that even if one still considered the leagues as fascist or proto-fascist, most of the supporters and certainly most people in the crowds and among the bystanders had not dreamed of launching a fascist regime. The presumed fact that the leaders of the *ligues* had not thought of instigating a coup attempt is critical to such an argument.[65] Historian Gérard Noiriel, on the other hand, is convinced that the riots of February 6 "'marked a crucial moment in the history of modern France, for they opened a period of violent confrontations between the extreme right and the extreme left, which would end in the collapse of the Third Republic and the triumph of the Vichy regime …'" In the aftermath of February 6, a majority was probably convinced that something like a fascist *coup d'état* had been attempted. "'Fascism is at our door', Léon Jouhaux told an emergency meeting of the CGT leadership the next morning."[66] For Brian Jenkins, February 6, 1934 was a "watershed moment" when "the French authoritaran Right largely abandoned old-style *putschism* for a more sophisticated strategy of subverting democracy from within."[67]

The day after the riots, Hervé blamed Daladier and his Minister of the Interior Eugène Frot for unleashing a riot that Tuesday night by inventing a plot to explain the events. They employed the mobile guards and other security forces to stop largely unaffiliated and unarmed patriots from showing their disgust with the regime and the injustices perpetrated by the new Prefect of Police and the administration at the *Comédie Française*. Below headlines of *La Victoire* which read "Assassins! Assassins! Assassins!" Hervé's lead editorial titled "*Après la boue, le sang*" called the victims of

the violence "patriots and heroes," "equal to those of World War I", except that the "heroes" of February 6 died "because of a regime in decomposition."[68] On February 8, following the resignations of Daladier and Frot, the former *Sans Patrie* called the tarnished leaders "evil imbeciles" whose idea of a royalist or fascist plot was pure invention. The fallen ministry symbolized all that had gone wrong with the parliamentary republic: *arrivisme*, intellectual mediocrity, and base spirit.[69] Eventually, Hervé would describe February 6 as "a massacre by a group of crazed and novice politicians" against "a monstrous demonstration in disgust" with the corruption and incompetence of the parliamentary republic, and not "a royalist or fascist riot."[70] Even though Hervé was against participation by his own forces in the events of February 6 and questioned the wisdom of such actions by others, he not only called the victims of street violence heroes, he saw the entire range of demonstrators as potential allies for his various national socialist formations and campaigns.[71]

One such potential and important ally was Colonel de La Rocque and his *Croix-de-Feu*. In the lead-up to February 6, La Rocque was ambiguous and cautious since he believed that the *Croix-de-Feu* had not yet taken sufficient root throughout France. If La Rocque felt it was risky to associate too closely with extremist groups like *L'Action Française*, he also realized that his movement would look ridiculous if it did not act. Though the *Croix-de-Feu* tried to keep separate from other leagues, there was some mingling. The *Croix-de-Feu* was involved in some of the violence, but casualties were much greater among *L'Action Française* and other *ligues*. After the events of February 6, La Rocque gave contradictory statements about the role of his formation, but Sean Kennedy believed that its goals then were fairly modest. Nevertheless, the demonstrations catapulted the *Croix-de-Feu* onto the national stage, and La Rocque would present mixed messages regarding his organization's tactics and goals in the future. Its actions came to affect the calculations of other groups, and often led to "serious rivalries and bitter enmities." If La Rocque's forces failed to prevent the coming of the Popular Front, for Sean Kennedy "that should not lead us to underestimate the challenge they had posed to the Third Republic."[72] The vagueness and ambiguity of La Rocque's views on democracy and political parties, his critique of the parliamentary republic, and his attacks on the traditional Right as well as the Left mirrored Hervé's ideas.[73]

After Daladier's resignation, former President of the Republic Gaston Doumergue headed a new National Ministry on February 9. His government was made up of Radicals, including Herriot, centrists, and conservatives; only the far Right, the S.F.I.O., and the P.C.F. were kept out. The new *Ministre de Conseil* named the seventy-eight year old Marshal Philippe Pétain as Minister of War, an appointment which launched "the hero of Verdun" on his political career. The Radical Party was

not pacified by the participation of several of its deputies in the new government. Paris remained in a state of effervescence which the P.C.F. capitalized on by organizing an anti-fascist demonstration on February 9 which proved to be unprecedented despite being banned by the government and leading to six deaths and hundreds of wounded. The Socialists then responded by supporting a general strike called by the C.G.T. on February 12 in which the Socialist and Communist rank and file demonstrated together for the first time in a decade, thus pushing their leadership toward a "unity of action" program.[74] That successful unitary strike became the veritable beginning of the French antifascist group a week after the events of February 6.[75] The demonstrations and strike activities reached beyond Paris to the *banlieue* and provinces with several more deaths in working class enclaves. Meanwhile, the government acceded to pressures from monied interests by resorting to decree laws and various deflationary policies including: job cuts, reduced pensions and salaries for state functionaries, and other budget balancing policies, such as drastically cutting the transportation budget. While Radicals were increasingly restive and many of their deputies abstained or voted against the government, on July 27, 1934 the Socialists and Communists signed the Pact of Unity. The impact of the Depression and the coming of Hitler were about to promote a transformation on the Left.[76] Though Hervé rejected calling February 6 a fascist coup attempt, he argued that the February 12 strike had several goals: to intimidate the Radicals in Doumergue's government, to protest against fascism, and even to bring about a Marxist collectivist regime. Such strikes actually provoked fascism according to the former *Sans Patrie*. Even though *La Victoire* failed to appear on the day of the strike, Hervé still called the strike a failure in the next issue, yet he admitted that it had created a *Front Unique* on the Left.[77]

For Julian Jackson the events of February 6 were the beginning of a French civil war that continued until Vichy gave way to the Liberation. On that fateful February night a demonstration had gotten out of hand causing the police to panic. "But since civil wars require the enemy to be demonized, the left interpreted the events of 6 February as an abortive fascist coup, the right as a massacre of fifteen innocent patriots by the Republic. The left also had its martyrs when six people were killed in a Communist counter-demonstration three days later in the Place de la République: this was the bloodiest week in French politics since the Commune."[78] Polarization increased markedly in French politics after the events of February. Even those non-conformists of the 1930s, who sought to transcend political divisions through ideas and programs which were "neither left nor right", found it harder and harder to reject political labels and to refuse to take sides though ambiguity never completely disappeared. "Reform proposals shattered

against political party divisions and the inertia of parliament." That result was a nation continuing to drift.[79] Even though French citizens had voted for the Left in 1932, the Right was in power by February 9, 1934 and it received the approval of a Chamber dominated by the Left. Something similar had happened in 1926, when Poincaré attained power despite a Chamber dominated by the 1924 *Cartel de Gauches*. However, in 1926 the crisis had been resolved; in 1934 the governmental crisis was just beginning. To meet the challenges posed by the Depression, deflationary policies and decree laws proved to be no more successful in France than they had been earlier in Germany. In 1926 the economy was flourishing and the antiparliamentary leagues soon faded. In 1934 the Depression was increasingly being felt in France and antiparliamentary agitation was rising.[80]

In an editorial dated February 9, 1934 *Le Temps* hailed the coming of the Doumergue National Ministry, and it blamed both the Chamber and the old ministry for the current state of France. The deputies, especially the Radicals, continued to be told to keep silent and await new elections because there was obviously a gap between the wise and upright French people and the discordant habits of the *Chambre*. The message must have been received at least initially because the Radicals ended their alliance with the Left and entered the National Union government.[81] Somehow, the writers at *Le Temps* thought that the demonstrations represented both "frightful days" and "signs of national vigor" at a time when foreigners talked about French decadence. If the demonstrations testified to the strength of the nation, *Le Temps* remained certain that the parliamentary system had to have its powers curtailed. The current *Chambre* had to be dissolved because only new elections would bring in deputies who better mirrored the newly enlightened French electorate. The coming of Doumergue was praised with a line very close to one that Hervé would soon borrow from an old Boulangist song in calling on Pétain to lead France to order and harmony: "One now sees in him the man that the nation needs." *Le Temps* also echoed Hervé in another way, however unconsciously, by calling for a dissolution of parliament and new elections as well as a Constitutional revision which would create a stronger executive. The parliament needed to accept a loss of power because its members were so inept and inadequate. Its manners were so deplorable and extreme that they had created the current national chaos.[82]

Hervé had not wanted the members of *La Milice Socialiste Nationale* to join in the violence, but *La Victoire* praised the demonstrators as "heroes, equal to those of World War I," and the paper included some cryptic comments about M.S.N. members who were wounded during the riots. One of the writers on *La Victoire*, André Chaumet, was at La Place de la Concorde on the night of February 6 shouting "A bas le Parlement!", "Chassons les voleurs et les financiers!", and "Nettoyer la République!"

One "fallen *Jeune Garde*" named Brochet had a mass said in his honor just after the riots, so he may have been one of the dead or seriously injured on February 6. Perhaps Hervé's advice of caution to the demonstrators on February 6 merely reflected the moribund and lethargic nature of his own movement. Groups affiliated with the M.S.N. like the *Jeunes Gardes Universitaires* and the *Jeunes Gardes Socialiste National* were having trouble getting their members to put up anti-parliamentary posters, their enthusiasm was lacking, and their membership lists were stagnant.[83] Nevertheless, Hervé still argued that France could cure its parliamentary republic by means of a legal constitutional revision for an authoritarian republic following elections which would have to be preceded by a lengthy, well-prepared and funded, antiparliamentary campaign. If that failed, a National Committee of Public Safety with "almost dictatorial powers" should replace the parliamentary system. For the present he was willing to settle for a restoration of stability, order, and confidence. Though he appeared to be far more moderate and far less sanguinary than most of his competitors on the extreme Right, Hervé was quite equivocal because for him the rioters were still "heroes", and he argued that France needed the kind of "strong medicine" that had supposedly "cured" the situations in Italy and Germany.[84]

The Director of *La Victoire* saw the coming of Doumergue and his National Union Ministry as the "calm after the storm". The new *Président du Conseil* may not have been a charismatic hero but he had the necessary stature to reestablish order and discipline.[85] Nevertheless, the new government was not quite the "strong medicine" sought by Hervé who did not expect much more than a "restoration of confidence" since such a collection of moderates and Radicals could "not solve the underlying problems of the parliamentary system." If he were happy that the new government included Louis Marin at the Health Ministry, he was disappointed at the paucity of technical experts and the invariable drabness and general blandness of the French moderates inside and outside the new ministry. For Hervé, "the moderation of the moderates" was a guarantee of failure. He also deplored the fact that several Radicals from the Daladier Ministry were still in place. Yet a week later he hoped rather than expected that Radicals and moderates could cooperate against the extreme Left in preparation for the next elections. For Hervé, this was a time for a national reconciliation even though it required "much stronger medicine" to remedy such severe political dysfunctionality. The new direction of Hervé's domestic program was intimated as he voiced warm approval for the inclusion of Maréchal Pétain in the new government. It was hoped that Pétain would give the government the necessary luster and panache. He also applauded the inclusion of the neo-socialist and "renegade" Adrien Marquet at the Ministry of Labor as "the most pleasing novelty of the *Union Nationale* Ministry."[86]

Hervé's hopes for the new ministry were soon deceived. The Doumergue government had promised reforms to defuse public discontent, but it delivered little. *La Victoire* was not the only voice on the antiparliamentary Right to assail the traditional Right, view Doumergue's efforts with disdain, and seek stronger measures.[87] The Center-Right saw Doumergue's proposed right of dissolution for the Prime Minister as an unacceptable threat to parliamentary sovereignty. "This opposition ensured the failure of constitutional reform and helped ensure Doumergue's fall."[88] The former *Sans Patrie* soon came to realize that even neo-socialism employed too many old Marxist clichés for his taste. *La Victoire* characterized the situation after February 6 as the beginning of civil war due to Marxist attacks on right-wing groups. By late November 1934 *La Victoire* called upon the *Croix-de-Feu* to control the forces of the Left if the Right won the elections in 1936.[89] Nevertheless, to meet the domestic and foreign crises, Hervé was about to revert to his traditional panacea for order, harmony, and peace: a "providential man." On the first anniversary of February 6, Hervé claimed that the demonstration had been disunited, without a subversive goal, and without a doctrine. Its principal object was to show the general disgust with the Republic. Yet he had to admit that "for the first time since Boulangism of 1887–1889, the Third Republic had felt a truly dangerous popular wave unfurl against it."[90] On the eve of the Popular Front, he reiterated his arguments that the demonstrators had no program for national reconstruction and had no clear ideas on what they would put in the place of the parliamentary republic. Instead of blaming the violence of February 6 on a criminal government guilty of massacring a group of men disgusted with the Staviskyite Republic, Hervé now argued that the police had been poorly led after Chiappe's dismissal. The new Prefect of Police, Bonnefoy-Sibour, had been incompetent. The former *Sans Patrie* claimed to have met the new police head before the war and recalled him as an idealistic, good-intentioned, yet ambitious and inexperienced young man, who had then been active in revolutionary circles.[91]

After describing Hervé as "the leader of the fascist *Parti socialiste national*", Charles Sowerwine, with no commentary or explanation, argued that the former *Sans Patrie* assumed that the Stavisky scandal simply confirmed his belief that France needed "'a great wave of people to wash and clean' the Republic: 'How to get rid of this regime of impotence and rot? Who is the leader who will emerge in France as in Italy and Germany?'" Sowerwine implied that the Stavisky Affair generated Hervé's "first call" for the legendary "hero of Verdun," Philippe Pétain, to take power, which culminated in 1935 and 1936 with *La Victoire's* campaign based on the theme "*c'est Pétain qu'il nous faut.*"[92] If that were the case, that "first call" probably came with the nomination of Pétain to Doumergue's National Ministry.

However, when Hervé used the phrase "C'est un chef qu'il nous faut!" on February 2, 1934, there was no mention of any particular leader. One can certainly argue that Hervé's push for Pétain began with the disgust over the Stavisky Affair and events of February 6, 1934, but the name Pétain did not seem to emerge as a new "providential man" until the Stavisky Affair and the events of February 6 had passed.[93]

While some contemporaries, especially on the extreme Left, assumed that February 6 was a fascist coup attempt and that Doumergue's government was a sign that fascists had the upper hand, others used the withdrawal of La Rocque's forces on February 6 at a critical moment to argue that there had been no attempt at a coup, fascist or otherwise.[94] For Charles Sowerwine, Doumergue's policies were conservative rather than fascist.[95] For those on the Left, political-financial scandals were minor matters of little long-term importance. What they worried about were threats to the Republic and the parliamentary system themselves. As Maurice Agulhon saw it: "The antiparliamentary agitators of February 1934 passed for 'fascists' because the word was current, and because there was a vague similarity between their actions and protests and the pre-dictatorship turmoils in Italy and Germany." For Agulhon, the arguments against calling the February 6 demonstrations a fascist coup were persuasive despite the participation of elements still labeled fascist today by many scholars. However, "for the understanding of history, the importance lies less in the truth of later analysis than in the convictions that were held at the time. For it was conviction which launched the movement leading to 1936."[96] Rather than debating whether or not February 6 was a failed fascist coup, which amounts to "a sterile dialogue of the deaf" because no single definition of fascism can be agreed upon, and rather than judging the events according to their outcomes, perhaps it makes more sense to concur with Michel Dobry and Brian Jenkins regarding the nearly universal trend toward "right-wing authoritarian nationalism" in Europe during the interwar era.[97]

Doumergue's National Ministry was soon abandoned by its Radicals members and replaced by successive conservative governments under Pierre-Étienne Flandin and Pierre Laval, whose inability to meet the social and economic crisis made a victory by the Popular Front possible, coming as a result of that coalition of antifascist forces produced by February 6 and predicted by Hervé on the eve of the demonstrations.[98] When the Popular Front victory was finally sealed in the second round of voting on May 3, 1936, Hervé referred to February 6, 1934 as "a grave psychological error which led French workers to believe that the nation was threatened by reaction."[99] For Hervé, February 6 was no fascist coup attempt, but it was perceived as such; so the former *Sans Patrie* could logically argue that he had been correct all along. His superior vision had not been heeded and again disaster had resulted.

28

C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut!

Despite the apparent sincerity of Hervé's impending religious conversion, the eventual renewal of his Catholic faith seems impossible to completely separate from his ardent focus on France as the worldly embodiment of all that was made good by the Creator. At first glance his evolution in foreign affairs seems to have been in contradiction with his domestic policy, but because the fate of France was Hervé's primary concern, the adjustment was easily made in his own mind if in few others. The transition toward a sympathetic view of the Soviet Union was largely pragmatic. It may have been easier for Hervé after 1934 because he assumed that the emergence of the "neo-socialism" of Marcel Déat and "national communism" of Jacques Doriot entailed missions which would lead workers to national socialism. Déat was considered sympathetic to national socialism despite his lack of Christianity, his faith in democracy, and his failure to see the need for a single leader. Still, Hervé's long-standing suspicion of the S.F.I.O. initially made it more difficult for him to accept an evolution arising from it.[1] The transformations of Jacques Doriot and Déat were parallel to that of Hervé in some respects. Doriot's persistent sense of failure and rejection in the P.C.F. coupled with his activist mentality enable one to say that he and Hervé shared certain common characteristics. Déat's idealistic attack on Marxist routine and dogmatism also paralleled a similar strain found in the former *Sans Patrie*.

Doriot, Déat, and Hervé evolved toward fascism in different ways but all three men reacted to the moderation, the routine, the dogmatism, the lack of revolutionary élan, and the *embourgeoisement* of the leftist parties.[2] These vague signs of common patterns of evolution from the extreme Left to the extreme Right are but indications. Hervé's awareness of such transformations in 1934 may have given him renewed hope that the victory of national socialism was inevitable. Such political mutations could have helped him to rationalize his support for an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, his traditionalist and Catholic readers did not share Hervé's abilities at finding solace from mutations by Marxists and Bolsheviks inside and outside France. For Maurice Agulhon, the reunification of the C.G.T. and C.G.T.U. in March 1936, when socialist and communist trade unionists coalesced, coupled with the growing *rapprochement* of the entire Left, meant that the secessions of Neo-Socialists from the S.F.I.O. and the followers of Doriot from the P.C.F. were "of far less consequence."[3]

The French need for an alliance with the Soviet Union and the echoes of national socialism arising out of the S.F.I.O. and the P.C.F. did not alter Hervé's hopes for a "providential man" to save the dysfunctional French republic. Whatever the relation between religious expressions and political turmoil might be, Hervé's inclination or urge to return to the Catholic faith would not curb his search for a political savior. Hervé realized that the demonstration of February 6, 1934 had frightened popular opinion so much that it led to a "pact of unity for action" between the S.F.I.O. and the P.C.F. on July 27, 1934. The purported fascist coup against the Republic on February 6 had been catastrophic in Hervé's view because it created fears by the French Left that the state was threatened by reaction. He repeatedly stressed how the events of February 6 had reactivated the *mystique* of the Left. To counter that spirit he hoped to create a *mystique* of order and authority symbolized and personified by his latest "providential man," Marshal Philippe Pétain.[4]

Hervé was not alone on the Right in thinking that Pétain could become a French savior. "At the time of the Popular Front, Pierre Laval and others had looked to Marshal Pétain as a potential head of a Right-wing government, but Pétain was suspicious of Laval and determined not to act in an unconstitutional manner."[5] On January 11, 1935 the Parisian daily *Le Petit Journal* announced the results of its recent poll seeking to uncover French views on the most suitable future French dictator. The newspaper claimed it had no opinion of its own, it simply sought to probe the views of its readers just in case such a situation did arise. The winner of that less than scientific poll was Marshal Philippe Pétain, with Pierre Laval a not too distant second, Gaston Doumergue a respectable third, and

Marianne a decent fourth, perhaps a sign that not all of the French population had lost its sense of humor. Evidently, this era was not a time of crisis for everyone.[6] Except for Franchet d'Esperey, Pétain was the only surviving French marshal. For that reason, the legendary savior of Verdun "began to attract a cult following from sections of the press, various right-wing organizations and some politicians. Comparisons were even made between Pétain and Joan of Arc as symbols of national unity and potential saviors of their country."[7] On the eve of the Popular Front and following an interview by Pétain in *Le Journal*, the former *Sans Patrie* took issue with his hero's argument about France having lost faith in its own destiny. For Hervé, France had been engaged in a forty-year collision of two *mystiques*, that of the Left and that of the Right. For almost twenty years *La Victoire* had been trying to unite both *mystiques* to no avail. In Pétain, "we have found a pilot who could unite both mystiques but no one has heard us."[8]

Gilles Heuré thought that Hervé had arrived at his assessment that France needed a Pétain dictatorship by a process of elimination rather than by any spontaneous choice. Heuré claimed that Hervé's first mention of Pétain in the role of "providential man" came in an editorial in *La Victoire* on February 14, 1935. The exact date of Hervé's first promotion of Pétain into the role of national savior matters little, but it is important to realize that he was not the first or only person to have thought of Pétain in that role. Besides the readers of *Le Petit Journal* in January 1935, other people were certainly thinking along the same lines at about that time. Heuré himself mentions two other advocates for Pétain to become France's leader: Pierre Cot, the future Air Minister during the Popular Front, writing in *Vu* in late November 1935, and Wladimir d'Ormesson writing in *Le Figaro* on March 16, 1936.[9] Just after Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in early March 1936, Hervé tried to re-activate his Pétain campaign by calling for a new *Union Sacrée* under Pétain, and he cited recent articles in *L'Ami du Peuple*, *Le Jour*, and *Le Figaro* in support of such an effort.[10] If Hervé's campaign for a Pétain-led *République Autoritaire* in any way had a major impact on these other writers and newspapers, Heuré does not say so. But the director of *La Victoire* was far from alone in thinking that an ageing French military hero could become the latest incarnation of that "man on horseback" again called upon to fulfill a magical role as a French national savior in another "time of troubles." Jean-Jacques Becker placed the campaign for Pétain by Hervé and others in a long-term context. "For Pétain, who—contrary to that which has often been said—had not particularly sought to attain power at the end of the 1930s, a great deal of what the National Revolution must act against was not just the bitter fruit of the inter war years but indeed the legacy of a republican culture anchored in the eighties of the previous

century. The idolatry which rapidly surrounded the person of the Marshal was not addressed only for the war leader but clearly to the redeemer ..."[11]

What was Petain's reaction to the excitement being generated around his potential role as a national savior? Apparently the Marshal betrayed no emotion at all in giving his terse but rather neutral statement to Philippe Boegner of *Le Peit Journal* in January 1935 at a restaurant near Les Invalides, a short time after the newspaper's polling results were known regarding a potential French dictator. "I thank you, sir, for troubling yourself to communicate this news. I am very flattered by the confidence that the French people have placed in me. I continue, nevertheless, to say that I will not take advantage of it."[12] Other reports show that Pétain was not quite as impassive as *Le Petit Journal* implied. At some point, an agitated Pétain apparently wondered: "'What are they doing in making an appeal to me?'" The "old soldier" may have assumed that such offers only went to defeated generals. Yet he was also reported to have confided to his friend, Doctor Ménétrel, that he would not rule out the possibility. If France were in a state of crisis, even worse than the present, then, "he could, with the help of a few trusted men, take command of certain tasks of governance."[13] For Hervé, Pétain's consent was not the critical factor because the aged hero could be urged to follow popular demand out of a sense of duty and a love for his country. And what if Pétain died or could not serve? Herve had the foresight to envisage "passing the flame" on to General Weygand, "a decent second on this rather limited list of possible leaders."[14]

In all likelihood, Pétain followed Hervé's rowdy campaign exclusively as a "spectator".[15] After the Second World War in an article in a Brest newspaper, Charles Chassé let out some pertinent information which he recalled from his 1935 interview with Hervé. Although Chassé thought that Hervé had become "frantically anti-Hitlerian" and "anti-Pétainist" later on, at the time of the interview, Hervé had insinuated that there was something behind his earlier Pétain campaign that he had been reticent to share previously. After Chassé queried him about his connection to Pétain, Hervé pointed to a nearby pile of his Pétain brochures and said: "Do you believe [...] that we would have taken on all these expenses if Pétain would not march?"[16]

Whether those comments meant that Pétain was secretly on board or that Hervé somehow assumed he was is uncertain. Gilles Heuré took such an offhand comment based on a distant memory as verification that Hervé at least believed, correctly or incorrectly, that sooner or later the Marshal would yield to the appeals of his Pétain initiative. It seems just as likely that Hervé's hint about his having some sort of assent or guarantee by the general or those close to him was nothing more than veiled bragging based on hopes, not realities, or was simply a spontaneous

response to ward off the negative implications of a touchy topic. How could any editor admit that a major press campaign was based on no more than the wishes, dreams, and financial needs of a sagging newspaper? And what about the financial sources behind the campaign? The money must have come from somewhere but Heure admitted: "We have to recognize that we have not found the origins of it."[17] One of those most affected by the denouement of the Pétain Affair and, because of that, not necessarily the most detached observer, was the last *Ministre du Conseil* of the Third Republic, Paul Reynaud. In his deposition at the Pétain trial on July 23, 1945 and in his memoirs, Reynaud assumed that the money collected by Hervé for the campaign was proof enough of collusion.[18]

In 1935 and 1936 Hervé wrote two brochures entitled *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut!*, the first of which was essentially a collection of recent articles from *La Victoire*, while the 1936 version was a thematic summary of his ongoing authoritarian arguments written sometime after the victory of the Popular Front and which blasted moderates and conservatives for their lack of imagination and audacity in the face of national disaster.[19] On May Day 1935 the former *Sans Patrie* announced the appearance of the first brochure, which was sent to friends of the newspaper and was also meant for sale to veterans and sympathetic citizens. He admitted that the major Parisian press and political parties were too closely allied to the parliamentary regime to help *La Victoire* launch a *République Autoritaire* under Marshal Pétain.[20] These two lengthy polemics differed marginally from each other in content, but they represented almost exactly the same ideas that Hervé had been developing since the end of the war. The revisions to the constitution described in 1925 in *La République Autoritaire* were simply refined and elaborated. Virtually all that had changed in Hervé's program since 1925 was the name of the "providential man." What was new was the inspiration. Now, more than ever, France needed to be reformed and reawakened due not only to the internal menace on the Left, but because of the new threats posed by a reawakened Italy and Germany under their own "providential men." "Only a dictatorial regime," with full powers for Pétain, "would have the authority and prestige to achieve a Franco-German reconciliation."[21] In the 1935 brochure, Hervé's satirical comparison of the rather bland conservative Pierre-Étienne Flandin to Mussolini and Hitler sought to make it obvious that Pétain, a man from outside parliamentary politics, was necessary for French renewal.[22]

Pétain was equal to or even better than a man like Clemenceau because "the hero of Verdun" was no anticlerical! As a military man to boot, he could rescue France from both external and internal menace. In the confrontation between the two irreconcilable *mystiques*, that the Left and the Right, then symbolized by Blum and Pétain respectively in Hervé's mind, the latter had to win.[23] To cure

the pessimism embodied in the pitiable and decrepit parliamentary state, France needed a new commander, a man of action, decision, and leadership. To end financial catastrophe, decadence, depopulation, anarchistic government, press license, and an errant foreign policy, France had to create a campaign to bring Pétain to power in 1936 under a *République Autoritaire*. To accomplish such a feat, Hervé hoped that one-half million copies of the 1935 brochure could be distributed before the May 1936 elections to help create that vast popular wave for Pétain.[24] On July 3, 1935 Hervé claimed to have already sold 40,000 copies of his Pétain brochure.[25] After the second brochure came out, the director of *La Victoire* claimed "to have distributed or sold nearly one hundred and fifty thousand copies of our new Pétain pamphlets."[26]

To save the country in its imminent shipwreck, France needed a lifebelt (*bouée de sauvetage*) or a lifeboat (*bateau de sauvetage*). For Hervé, that would now have to be Pétain.[27] In fact, a better image for what Hervé demanded was an old ship-of-the-line in dry-dock being completely refurbished with the sleekest new hull and what he assumed were the most advanced yet the most durable equipment, manned by a uniform and obedient crew under a new captain who had weathered many storms. The passengers did not matter as much once the ship was out to sea because instead of casinos or café-concerts to tempt them, this ship would abound in chapels of all the major French religions to keep the populace thinking of their salvation rather than immediate pleasure or thoughts of mutiny against the restrictions.

As the campaign unfolded in February 1935, Hervé described Pétain's many noble qualities. He was a great soldier; a leader who could achieve a Franco-German reconciliation; a man with great moral authority; and an experienced and sturdy individual from outside the political arena, therefore untainted by harmful political interests. When Hervé compared Pétain to other possible rivals for leadership, it was not difficult to guess who came out on top. Édouard Herriot was too far to the Left. André Tardieu was too far to the Right. Colonel de La Rocque did not have much of a program. Gaston Doumergue was too tied to the French parliament. Philippe Pétain was just right for France, far superior to all the aforementioned, less than perfect possibilities. One might think that Pétain had much less of a program than did Colonel de la Rocque, but Hervé certainly assumed that *La Victoire* already possessed an excellent plan ready for use by the Marshall. As Gilles Heuré summarized the situation, the millions of supporters which Pétain would have behind him would permit the implementation of a plan that *La Victoire* had been unsuccessfully proposing for fifteen years. The failure of the P.S.N., the *Parti de la République Autoritaire*, and the M.S.N. could be overcome by a successful campaign for the aged Marshal. "This time, Hervé envisaged staking everything

on Pétain and demanding a kind of exclusivity vis-à-vis the other competitors. *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut!* was clearly also a commercial wager, or at least solid propaganda for *La Victoire* to become the echo chamber of a candidate able to receive the approval of many of the parties on the Right and the extreme Right."[28]

The plan devised by Hervé was rather simple and straightforward. Backed by a vast popular wave to elect him, "the hero of Verdun" would gather as many deputies as possible behind him. Then he would turn that acclaim into a "dictatorship of public safety, draft a new Constitution, and enact whatever emergency laws were necessary." These would undoubtedly include: "press censorship, the suspension of the right to strike, strict discipline for the civil service, an end to the laws against the religious congregations, the re-establishment of freedom in education, and other measures, not yet able to be specified, designed to curb unemployment and jump-start the economy."[29]

On the surface Hervé's program seemed logical but upon closer examination the whole project for a *République Autoritaire* led by a providential leader like Pétain was rife with contradictions. Pétain was to be the French equivalent of Hitler and Mussolini, yet it was against their dynamic and aggressive regimes that France needed protection. The difference was explained to the satisfaction of Hervé, if not to later historians, with the claim that his revisionist campaign was a modernized and rejuvenated version of Bonapartism, with all due recognition made for professional organizations and the spirit of both republicanism and national socialism.[30] Hervé was terrified by internal anarchy, but he implied that Hitler himself was the product of demagogic democracy. How could an aged former general brought to power through legal means hope to meet the forces of external and internal chaos which Hervé believed were threatening France?[31] He expected a great popular wave and the zeal of youth to reform France through non-violent and legal means including universal suffrage. In foreign affairs, he had been forced to look to the source of Bolshevism to guarantee international peace. In internal affairs, order, harmony, and unity apparently demanded a potentially demagogic appeal to youth to peacefully and democratically dismantle parliamentary government. Hervé's means, a vast and peaceful, national wave above parties, politics, and political labels, almost demanded that his goals of unity, discipline, and order, already be realized.[32] When Hervé compared the role of Pétain in 1935 to that of Hindenburg in 1925, the futility of such a mission should have been transparent.[33] In January 1936, as a Popular Front victory loomed ahead and as his own campaign to rally the Right behind Pétain gained little traction, Hervé pulled out all stops to rally the Right by comparing his ideas for a *République Autoritaire* with the similar ideas of Mussolini, Hitler, and Roosevelt![34]

Hervé hoped that the *Union National des Combattants* as well as the *Croix-de-Feu* would support his campaign for Pétain. Yet *La Victoire* attacked the lack of political organization by these two groups, and he cautioned Colonel de La Rocque about the military character of the *Croix-de-Feu*. In 1935 and 1936 Hervé feared civil war, and he worried that a violent coup attempt by the French Right would only activate the Republican *mystique* of the Left thereby provoking a powerful "red wave" instead of one for Pétain. The notorious physical attack on Léon Blum on February 13, 1936 on the Boulevard Saint-Germain, where the socialist leader was dragged from his car and beaten by right-wing students who were members of the *Camelots du Roi* at the time of the funeral services for Jacques Bainville, was seen by Hervé as a disaster for the Right because it was bound to cost it at least a half-million votes. By March 1936 Hervé must have worried about Pétain and the French Right's chances for success because, once he heard that Germany had reoccupied the Rhineland, he hoped that the spring elections could be suspended and a new *Union Sacrée* forged.[35]

After the Popular Front victory in the 1936 elections, Hervé tried to put new life into the P.S.N., and renewed his promotion of Pétain as the "providential man" by asking all Frenchmen to join a *Front Pétain* designed to meet the threat of the *Front Populaire*.[36] This *Front Pétain* was meant to be a kind of revisionist party seeking to alter the Constitution on the strength of a massive wave of support for the Marshal.

> "More than a party, it was still a question of a propaganda organization which would continue to preach for an authoritarian republic. To make himself better understood, Hervé situated his program between Bonapartism, for the authoritarian display, and the American republic, for a republican alibi. The 'fundamental bases' of society must be conserved. 'It's not a question of imitating Mussolini or Hitler in France … it is necessary for us to make a French operation,' he affirmed."[37]

The kind of republic that Hervé wanted focused on the role of the head of state. However, over the course of time his proposed government was described in an ambiguous or even contradictory manner. In 1935 he argued: "Christian civilization, which means all of Europe, will be condemned to death if a dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial regime does not arrive in time in every country to reestablish all the necessary disciplines and erect a barricade of indispensable measures of Public Safety in the face of unleashed human stupidities."[38] The following year he described the future Pétain-led regime with a reverse argument. "It is, therefore, not a question of a dictatorial regime, but an authoritarian regime, where the authority of the national leader is painstakingly limited and controlled."[39]

The second edition of *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut* appeared sometime after the Popular Front victory and certainly by the fall of 1936. This brochure was not simply a collection of old articles, but was a response to the disaster which Hervé assumed was unfolding and which he feared would only get worse unless moderates and conservatives acted immediately to promote a revisionist wave and a Pétain-led *République Autoritaire*. The brochure included chapter titles such as "*La Vague Rouge*," "*Le Barrage: La République Autoritaire À Base Professionnelle*," "*L'Homme Providentiel: Pétain*," "*Le Front Pétain*," and "*Ce Que Fera Pétain Au Pouvoir*." Despite the initial call to action and alarm as well as the general rehashing of earlier arguments, he must have realized his rhetoric about a dictatorial regime was counterproductive because he clearly backed away. The ideas presented in the latest brochure were basically a "historical" analysis of the evil *vague rouge* from its origins in the Enlightenment and French Revolution to its remedy by means of a *République Autoritaire* led by Pétain. It was meant to be easy to understand by ordinary readers. The author claimed that almost 150,000 of the new Pétain pamphlets had been distributed or sold since October 1936. By the end of the year, 190,000 pamphlets had been distributed, which by his calculations meant around 3–4000 on average in each department (sic). The former *Sans Patrie* hoped to send out at least one million new pamphlets with the help of subscribers who would help form revisionist committees in each *arrondissement*.[40]

The ideas presented in this latest brochure represented the limits of Hervé's political evolution until World War II. The same ambiguities remained. The Roman Empire, the *coups d'état* of *18 Brumaire* and *2 Decembre*, as well as the experiences of Mussolini and Hitler were all described as "Bonapartist" regimes which had created domestic peace and order. Yet Hervé claimed that the *République Autoritaire* did not seek to imitate or duplicate the regimes of Bonapartism, fascism, or Nazism. Though he argued that the core of his revisionist movement would be Bonapartist, its features would be republican. It would not create a police state but would be somewhere between Bonapartism and the American Constitution. Its corporative basis would look like fascism, but there would be no brown, black, or blue shirts. It would not organize a religious state, but religion would play an instrumental role due to its great services. He expected the revisionist movement to create a *Front Pétain* after the next dissolution of parliament which would enable the issue of constitutional revision to come before the voters in the next election. Everything about the brochure was familiar, including the equivocations and paradoxes.[41]

Gilles Heuré thought that the second brochure "marked an evolution" in Hervé's argument. Rather than focusing on ending the internal anarchy, an authoritarian republic led by Pétain would confront the external menace as well,

with Petain as a kind of "talisman" who could meet the German challenge "under the authority of the League of Nations." In fact, Heuré cited an editorial in *La Victoire* dated May 5, 1935 to support his case but such a date indicates that Hervé had been considering Pétain's dual role against disorder both inside and outside France for some time. More interesting is Heuré's insight that the *Front Pétain* was reminiscent of Hervé's calls for a *Bloc*, thirty-five years before.[42] He hoped that the *Front Pétain* could rally not only the Radical-Socialists of Herriot and Daladier and the Republican-Socialists of Paul-Boncour but even the Communists who would then renounce their class struggle *mantras*. He even speculated that the increasingly supple version of the Masons (on secular education) might be able to rally behind Pétain. All other groups all the way to the extreme Right should be able to follow suit.[43] With such prestige and authority, Hervé assumed that the legendary war hero "without ruckus" could forge a republic which would reconcile all formerly opposed forces and groups, sealing "the *entente* among religions, philosophies, capital and labor, and forming a republic … whose members would, with elation, see twinkling on the horizon the glow of a 'national reconciliation'". Hervé assumed that *La Victoire* had set up this sun-drenched picnic for Pétain; all that was needed was for the aged Marshal to open the basket lying there.[44]

In the midst of profound national and international crises, Hervé probably assumed that a parliamentary dissolution was imminent, because it seems impossible that he could seriously have expected anyone to join a *Front Pétain* and await the 1940 elections for the purpose of electing 450 Deputies, who would revise the constitution and choose Pétain to head a *République Autoritaire*. Hervé continued to demand a *Front Pétain* in the years before the war, but gradually the Nazi menace and the need for a Franco-German reconciliation dominated all other concerns.[45] This was Hervé's last published book or brochure before his death. *La Victoire* had been on the verge of financial collapse since 1932 so it was probably remarkable that the paper continued to comment on critical events until the war. Despite his perpetual failures, Hervé would never be convinced or at least he would never openly acknowledge that he might not be heeded or that there was something erroneous about his solutions to French problems.

In 1944 André Schwob wrote a book that explained the advent of Pétain in June 1940 in terms of a vast interwar plot by counter-revolutionaries not just in France but throughout Europe, from Spain to Finland and passing by way of Hungary, Germany, Austria, and Italy, before culminating in defeated France. Schwob connected this international conspiracy to European reactionaries opposed to various popular movements that had sprung up after the Bolshevik Revolution. The book was written just months before the Allied invasion but it

came out as fast as it did because the provisional government of France after the summer of 1944 wanted all the documents and witnesses of Pétain's treason to be presented to French authorities as soon as possible. Though Schwob described Hervé as Pétain's manager, his P.T. Barnum, and his street entertainer, he never assumed that Hervé had acted alone in the French phase of the plot. "The role of Gustave Hervé in the propaganda for Pétain must be that of a mountebank, who would launch the name of Pétain so forcefully that you could hear endless echoes from it." Arguing that Hervé was funded by German and pro-Nazi money and had been in cahoots with certain French publishers who eventually worked for the Nazi regime in World War II, Schwob summed up his conspiratorial thesis by placing Hervé at its center. "But, in reality, Pétain and his minstrel Hervé were the instruments of a conspiracy still more vast: International Fascism."[46]

As Schwob told the tale, when Hervé's first articles in 1935 began calling for some kind of authoritarian regime headed by Pétain, they were reproduced in the *Voix de Combattant*, the official newspaper of the *Union Nationale des Combattants*. Then, they appeared in *Le National*, the official newspaper of the *Jeunesses Patriotes*. Soon after that, they could be found in *Le Petit Journal*, the organ of the *Croix-de-Feu*, which evidently had received its marching orders. Not to be left behind, Leon Bailby's right-wing newspaper, *Le Jour*, skillfully revamped Hervé's arguments. To make it look good and not too obvious, variations on the theme were presented by papers whose venality seemed obvious to Schwob. Even though the victory of the Popular Front showed the failure of Hervé's campaign for Pétain and all the efforts to discredit the parties of the Left, the director of *La Victoire* did not give up. In fact, according to Schwob he doubled down with another Pétain pamphlet launched on a much greater scale, adding more material to discredit the republic, democracy, and the heritage of the French Revolution: all to get a Pétain presidency for ten years.[47]

Heuré referred to Schwob's charges as he pondered whether one could, in fact, uncover Hervé's influence in the constitutional measures drafted by Pierre Laval as well as Raphaël Alibert and then authorized by the National Assembly on July 10, 1940. Despite his inclusion on the extreme Left before World War I, the malleable Laval later became the *Ministre du Conseil* several times during the Third Republic and later filled that position under Vichy. Alibert was the counsel of the *Conseil d'État* in June 1940, later becoming an Under Secretary of State in the first Pétain cabinet and eventually the Vichy Minister of Justice. Hervé's programs in 1935 and 1936 and that of Pétain in 1940 each seemed to call for an authoritarian state (Heuré called it totalitarian), which entailed a head of state amassing many powers, ministers reduced to the level of rather docile legislative

assistants, and a minimal level of popular representation. Despite his persistent search for an authoritarian republic, Hervé was certainly not alone seeking such a system. If the Vichy Regime seemed to fulfill his decades-long dreams, Hervé never had the power and importance to effect such a drastic change. He had simply been one of the voices in the anti-parliamentary chorus which helped to usher in Vichy and Pétain.[48] As Marc Ferro saw it, "Schwob made Gustave Hervé a kind of impresario for Pétain, which was completely unreal."[49]

Though he may have been a minor actor in the events that ended the Third Republic, Hervé's notorious reputation had preceded him, and his campaign for Pétain had created something of a stir. Marginalized as he was during the interwar era, he at least managed to put himself temporarily back into the limelight in the 1930s only to later become an easy target as the center of another vast plot, on the Right this time,[50] to bring Pétain to power and demolish the Republic. But Hervé's latest purported infamy proved to be posthumously recognized. In the act of accusation, delivered on July 23, 1945 during the Pétain trial, the theory of a pre-war plot was advanced, with Hervé, by then deceased, in a leading role, blamed for orchestrating a Pétain takeover of the French state. "Hervé was accused, not without foundation, of having brought the syringe …" for what one commentator described as the "morphine of Vichy." In Schwob's 1945 volume, the former *Sans Patrie* was held responsible for the pre-existing "anaesthesia" that made Vichy possible, and that text furnished the arguments for the charges in the Pétain trial of 1945 according to Heuré.[51]

Schwob described the French plot as beginning in 1935 and connected to Hervé's first Pétain pamphlet, with the former *Sans Patrie* filling the presumed role of "promoter" and "manager" of Pétain. The accusatory text recalled Hervé's interwar history, his pleas for a *République Autoritaire*, his letters exchanged with Hitler, and his two books on the Franco-German reconciliation which were translated in Germany by the pro-Nazi publisher Batschari. Hervé's blueprint for a constitutional revision was supposedly later mined by Alibert when he became the Vichy Minister of Justice. Schwob also compared the two constitutional proposals and other measures taken by the Vichy government in order to show the obvious similarities. As we have seen, on the surface Pétain did not give much weight to Hervé's campaign, but it actually affected him more than he had let on. Heuré stressed several obvious mistakes in Schwob's accusations such as giving an incorrect date for Hervé's original proposals on constitutional revision, which were drafted in 1924 as the political program for his *République Autoritaire*.[52]

If Alibert were at the center of the Vichy constitutional revisions, there is no proof he had any contact with Hervé, despite the resemblances between the Vichy

revisions and Hervé's earlier blueprint. Heuré noted that two of the people closest to Hervé during these years, Georges Émile Dulac and Lucien Leclerc, each vehemently denied any contact between Alibert and their boss. One thing is certain. In 1935 no more than in 1940 did Herve fit the role that Schwob and others had given him. He was not a man behind the scenes at the center of French political power. He was "outside the loop" and knew little of the inside secrets of power politics at the time. "He was indeed an 'isolé' and never belonged to what Herbert R. Lottman called the 'société du maréchal'. Once Pétain was in place, Hervé was no place to be found."[53] As Dulac and Leclerc wrote in their postwar book *La Vérité sur Gustave Hervé* which sought to rehabilitate their friend and former employer from the charges of critics: "If Hervé had ever been in collusion [with] Pétain, you would have seen him associated with the government, [and] people would have asked for his advice or his cooperation. However, Hervé never was in contact with the Vichy government. He never figured among the list of profiteers, [and] they never mentioned his name."[54] Heuré argued that the former director of *La Victoire* would have found moving to Vichy inconvenient, and he would certainly never have fit in among the patriotic bureaucrats, the troubled soldiers from a defeated army, or the plotters and fortune seekers, many of whom were not at all troubled by the Nazi arrival. The former *Sans Patrie* never enjoyed the fall of the Republic through military defeat and never thought that the events of June 1940 were a "divine surprise," as Maurras did. Hervé would have been the "odd man out" if he had resided at Vichy and never would have dedicated himself to life among the types of frantic zealots at publications like *Je Suis Partout*. He was now a kind of non-entity whose very presence would have spoiled the show. None of this seemed to matter after the Liberation and his own death in October 1944 because "on August 11, 1945 in the trial of Marshal Pétain, the Prosecutor of the Republic, Mornet, nevertheless, placed the name Hervé among the first rank of those who had backed Pétain."[55]

Even though the thesis of a plot orchestrated by Hervé to get Pétain into power seems a bit outlandish today, he was in some ways an ideal person to have been assigned such a role. He was one of chief voices who launched the name Pétain, plucking him from relative obscurity at the French embassy in Spain. A person like Hervé also provided the added advantage of allowing the political class to absolve itself of responsibility for Vichy. As Heuré described it, the Hervé plot was almost like having providence manage public affairs rather than being subject to faulty decisions by people in power. The advent of Pétain could be assigned to a few culpable agents like Hervé, who would thus come to personalize "what was above all a collective responsibility [of] the National Assembly which voted the Marshal

full powers. From this perspective, one singles out the most boisterous, the most agitated, the most seething of the zealots for Pétain, Gustave Hervé, granting him *a posteriori* a role with a scope that he, without a doubt, did not have." One of the great ironies of the postwar era was that Hervé somehow had become "a political and constitutional authority inspiring everyone across the board from Bucard to Alibert. That Hervé was able to become a political reference at this point is initially an indication of the intellectual drought of the antiparliamentary Right, [which was] more fascinated by the neighboring dictatorial regimes than fertile with an exact elaboration of a political regime that they summoned from their desires." For Hervé, Pétain symbolized the illusion of a long, lost past epoch resurrected. The marshal, thus, represented "the opportunity for a national renewal tuned more toward the pre-war than toward a future undoubtedly too uncertain."[56]

Despite some later accusations that Hervé created a conspiracy with Pétain to overthrow the Third Republic, there is no evidence that the director of *La Victoire* had ever talked to Pétain, much less had been his paid agent.[57] Hervé himself admitted as much.[58] Jean Quéval in his account of the collaborationist press said that he had initially expected to uncover a connection between this campaign for Pétain and Hervé's earlier association with Marcel Bucard, who was a long-time Pétain admirer and had actually been decorated by him during World War I. However, Quéval was forced to admit that Hervé's campaign was too preposterous for the general to even bother to scuttle it.[59] Quéval cited an article by André Truchard which appeared in *Le Franciste* in 1943 documenting how Bucard first wrote about *Francisme* in an article in *La Victoire* dated August 20, 1933. Since that association was known at the time and has been commented on for decades since the end of World War II, all we have here is Quéval's initial surprise at his post-war discovery of such a limited connection which amounted to a mere coincidence. The contacts among Hervé, Bucard, and Pétain were not conspiratorial but simply separate mutual associations which Quéval ultimately recognized. This coincidental association was no sinister guiding thread running through the years of collaboration. Hervé cannot be blamed for what Bucard did years later even if his own earlier call for a Pétain dictatorship was an indication of reactionary politics and a dangerous as well as naïve reading of what it would take to both emulate and counter fascist dynamism.[60] Quéval concluded that Hervé's efforts for Pétain were not seen for what they were, "the last craze of a journalist without tact or judgment."[61]

29

The Popular Front and Hervé's Return to His Ancestral Faith

The Popular Front began as a coalition of the Left against the menace of fascism and only later became a coalition government. It was a product of both the Depression and the rising fear of fascism. Robert O. Paxton recently described the coming of the Popular Front this way: "The economic goals of the three parties [Radicals, Socialists, and Communists] were in conflict, but they were pulled together by a desire to defend the French Republic against fascism. United mainly by this political cause, they found themselves obliged to deal primarily with economic depression."[1] It certainly aroused hopes that instigated a wave of sit-down strikes which were the largest popular uprisings since the Commune. However, the Popular Front did not involve that collection of revolutionaries, that ghastly specter so glibly conjured up by the Right. It was a coalition of anti-fascists. One could argue that the Popular Front was a success because fascists did not take power. However, the Popular Front aroused such great unmet expectations that many of its supporters soon became disillusioned.[2] The vote totals on the Left had not changed much since 1932, but their distribution had shifted markedly toward the more extreme Left. What was especially novel was that the Radicals, who had been the dominant force on the Left for decades, were now displaced as the major party by the S.F.I.O., much as the Radicals had displaced the Opportunists forty years earlier. The Communist vote doubled and the Socialists became the largest

party. For the Right and obviously for Hervé, this was the hour of dreaded collectivism, and the Socialist Léon Blum epitomized that nightmare.[3]



Figure 47. Léon Blum (1872–1950) speaking at a Socialist Congress in 1936. Bnf.

Ironically, it was future collaborator, Pierre Laval, who made the P.C.F. entry into the Popular Front more possible by signing the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance in early May 1935. Now French Communists could enthusiastically espouse a Jacobin nationalist stance and move toward the Radicals, who had less to fear from subversion by the Communists. Many Radical voters supported this evolved P.C.F. in the early May 1935 municipal elections, and by July 2, 1935 their party entered a pact with the Socialists and Communists. On Bastille Day 1935 Blum, Édouard Daladier, and Maurice Thorez led a massive parade and made a pledge which would become the basis for the Popular Front which was formally ratified in September. In October of that year a Radical Party congress gave the go-ahead for the party's support of a Popular Front.[4] In January 1936 all three major Popular Front parties agreed on a joint electoral program. Support for the Popular Front was generated by the Depression and Laval's failing deflationary panaceas as well as by the antics of groups like the *Croix-de-Feu*.[5] Fearing that upheaval could frighten Frenchmen and help Hitler, the Radicals and the

P.C.F. rejected Socialist calls for nationalizations. Nevertheless, the joint program included major reforms such as: actions against the "fascist" *ligues*, women's right to work, raising the age for leaving school, a state unemployment fund, a reduced work week, a large scale public works program, a national grain board to maintain wheat prices, effective control of the Bank of France, and a reassessment of colonial policies.[6]

For Hervé the spring municipal elections of 1935 were ridiculous because in larger cities no one knew each other, and instead of being able to solve local problems, elections simply put parties into power which governed by intrigue and favoritism. Although he often argued that his *République Autoritaire* was not a centralized state, here he argued that the head of state should appoint men with a sense of authority and administrative skill to function at the municipal level. Such urban prefects could be assisted by Consultative Councils made up of the representatives of various crafts and professions. Given that such a system was not yet in place, Hervé advised his readers to vote for anyone except those on the *Front Commun*, which he termed basically a *Front Communiste*. That meant voting for conservatives, moderates, and even some "National" Radicals. Pierre Étienne Flandin's *Alliance Démocratique* and Louis Marin's *Fédération Républicaine* certainly qualified. Sometimes he even urged support for the increasingly "Nationalist" Radicals like Herriot, if only they could get rid of their anticlericalism. Even though parliamentarians like these were not going to reform France, they were the best that one could expect for the present.[7] In general, he was skeptical about all political parties because they promoted national disunity and simply sought political spoils, but he was ready to support anyone who could prevent a victory by the *Front Commun* even if that meant a blatant dictatorship.[8]

Even though the former *Sans Patrie* generally described the *Croix-de-Feu* and later P.S.F. as moderate, non-violent, and republican, despite "the foolish talk of 'H Hour' and paramilitary parades,"[9] the approaching Pact of Unity moved Hervé to caution La Rocque and the U.N.C. veterans about any moves toward a violent coup led by paramilitary formations. The former Insurrectional activist was convinced that only a legal popular wave bringing Pétain to power in a new *République Autoritaire* could prevent a reinforced *Cartel* from overwhelming the Right in the 1936 elections. Since France was not going to experience a *coup d'état*, the choice was between Pétain and the impending *Cartel*.[10] About that time, the independent leftist newspaper *L'Œuvre* expressed puzzlement that Hervé was against a civil war and had actually cautioned the *Croix-de-Feu* concerning violent street actions. The former Insurrectional firebrand responded by requesting that *L'Œuvre*

get the Communists to cool their own troops thereby preventing bloodshed and saving their "beloved" republic. Putting the cart before the horse, Hervé argued that workers could be won over to a national socialist regime after a massive electoral wave for Pétain who would then initiate the social legislation demanded by workers. Whatever the shortcoming of his logic and political ideals, Hervé was genuinely concerned for the fate of the nation, and he was most anxious to avoid violence.[11] He was so troubled by the newly united Left and the apparent threat of eventual "Bolshevization" that he was willing to entertain the possibility of a nationalized organization of key industries and credit institutions if a non-partisan government could be formed with the support of all factions. After admitting the defects of capitalism, including automation, overproduction, under-consumption, and unemployment amidst the deepening Depression, Hervé envisaged his own statist solution. But his proposed "National Dictatorship of Public Safety" was none other than a Pétain-led *République Autoritaire* as opposed to a "*Cartel* Dictatorship" from the Left which would simply bring on a civil war.[12]

In keeping with his tendency to engage in verbal legerdemain to hide his intentions or to pacify the opposition, Hervé praised the republic in its dictatorial form while calling for it to be strangled in its parliamentary form. Although he generally was disgusted with the political intelligence of average voters, his populist wave for Pétain depended on them. A six month *République Autoritaire* on a corporatist basis would be led by Pétain for a ten year renewable plebiscitary presidency involving decree laws, checks by the Council of State, and popular referenda. That initial six month temporary dictatorship might have to last as long as the crisis persisted. Such a system would not be a police state or a Third Empire; it would be a regime for national renewal seeking constitutional revision, social justice and international peace, a United States of Europe and then the world by means of the League of Nations and several reconciliations: Franco-Russian, Franco-German, and church and state. That was the only way to avoid a civil war![13]

As the 1935 summer hiatus of *La Victoire* approached, Hervé called on the Right to back off its rhetoric about impending civil war because he now was witnessing Radicals, Socialists, and even Communists evolving toward national socialism as a valid means of defending the republic, thereby rejecting Bolshevist expropriations. The evils of capitalism could be remedied without fascism, Nazism, or Bolshevism by supporting a Pétainist *République Autoritaire.* Though Hervé's propagandistic rhetoric expressed hopes that the Left or some of its components could rally to Pétain and constitutional revision to avoid civil war, his extreme fears of the *Front Commun* were apparent. Occasionally, he even admitted that there were no signs of a popular wave for Pétain. Because the Left employed powerful

ideals about social justice, peace, and saving France amidst crisis, Hervé was convinced that the Right had to employ its own ideals by recognizing that political parties and politicians had become discredited and that the nation needed to rally to Pétain as a single, non-political, national leader and savior.[14] Hervé argued that the Left was guilty of employing scare tactics by accusing the *ligues*, especially the *Croix-de-Feu*, of preparing a *coup de force* against the republic. La Rocque's preparations were simply meant to counter any communist coup. Yet the former *Sans Patrie* constantly cautioned the *Croix-de-Feu* leader by pointing out that the real danger was a legal conquest of power on the basis of a minimum program agreeable to the Radicals. The major criticism of nationalists and veterans like La Rocque by *La Victoire* was their perpetual equivocation and scorn for political engagement which could renew the republic. Nevertheless, from time to time, Hervé admitted the actions and rhetoric of the *Croix-de-Feu* left it open to attack.[15] At the time of the Radical Party Congress in late October 1935, Hervé cautioned the Radicals about leading France to catastrophe if they withdrew their support from Laval if he failed to ban the *ligues* including the *Croix-de-Feu*. He could not understand how old Radicals like Herriot, Caillaux, Sarraut, and Malvy could not see the vile effects of de-Christianization and the impending dangers if the three major left-wing parties succeeded in their legal conquest of power.[16] Though Hervé almost always argued for a peaceful path to power, on November 4, 1935 he threatened the possibility of "dangerous and risky surgical means" if a legal path to power for the Right were impossible due to its disunity and lack of energy.[17]

Hervé considered the coming of the Popular Front as a continuation of a pattern that went back to the former *Bloc des Gauches* before 1905 and the interwar *Cartel des Gauches*, which were gatherings of the Left whenever the republic was perceived to be in danger.[18] As the electoral preparation began during the winter of 1935/6, at times Hervé became quite hysterical, assuming that the Radicals would allow the Socialists to destroy French savers and *rentiers* through devaluation and inflation, sowing a panic and leading to a civil war. If they let the Communists into the government, a red terror would result. In either case the Radicals would be destroyed, so logically the former *Sans Patrie* claimed that Radicals ought to join Pétain for national reconciliation under a *République Autoritaire*.[19] Recalling *La Victoire*'s lack of foresight and clarity prior to the disaster that occurred on February 6, 1934, Hervé urged the *Croix-de-Feu* and La Rocque to enter the political arena and support a popular wave for Pétain. Shopkeepers, small factory owners, engineers, Catholics, and especially peasants led by someone like Henri Dorgères could join La Rocque and other nationalists in promoting such a campaign. Any more street violence would simply promote the *rassemblement* of the

Left and a great mystical, popular wave in defense of the republic.[20] Occasionally, Hervé was able to transcend his own polemical rhetoric in an apparent attempt at objectivity. Thus he could analyze how Radicals were caught in a dilemma: they needed the votes of the S.F.I.O. and P.C.F. during the second electoral rounds in some constituencies, yet men like Herriot were good patriots who might yet join in the national reconciliation proposed by *La Victoire*.[21] As the new year commenced Hervé was especially concerned about the lack of political engagement by the *Croix-de-Feu* as well as the divided nature of the nationalists, moderates, and conservatives, all of whom lacked a clear program and were unprepared for the electoral campaign. If La Rocque simply intended to turn his forces into a parliamentary party to perpetuate this regime of factions, *La Victoire* was uninterested.[22]

The former *Sans Patrie* found it ironic that he agreed with the Left on foreign policy, yet the moderate and conservative Right was unable to align with France's true national interests, either foreign or domestic, because they would not back the pact with the U.S.S.R. and would not support his *République Autoritaire, corporative et chrétienne*.[23] Even though Hervé realized that his own parties and movement had failed to gain traction, he expected La Rocque, the veterans, other nationalists, and moderates to get behind "*La Victoire*'s ideas and tactics which have impregnated nationalist circles since the war by means of millions of tracts, whose source they knew not." For Hervé, the situation boiled down to a simple reality: he had the ideas and experience; La Rocque had the followers.[24] By the beginning of February 1936 he went so far as to describe his *République Autoritaire* as a tricolored French fascism, the only thing that could prevent either a Popular Front victory or the same disordered Republican concentration with its ministerial changes every six months coupled with its perpetual slide toward Leftist values.[25] Several months later, in rejecting charges by the Popular Front that France was threatened by an imminent fascist assault, Hervé lamented the nation's lack of a fascist movement or leaders like "Mussolini and Hitler who could create order, cleanliness, and social justice in this parliamentary chaos." The former *Sans Patrie* assumed that fascism and Nazism could be blamed on Italian and German communism, yet in France the Popular Front was somehow the product of a necessary yet still non-existing or embryonic French fascism![26]

The rhetoric of the election campaign included violently anti-Semitic and threatening language against Blum by much of the French Right. As has been seen above, the sixty-four year old Blum was brutally beaten on February 13, 1936 and needed a month to recover. Such an action discredited the right-wing leagues and did nothing to alter the government's unpopularity due to its failed deflationary economic policies and abortive appeasement of Mussolini after his

invasion of Ethiopia. Hervé used the occasion to censure both Maurras and Blum. The director of *L'Action Française* was assailed for his intemperate personal attacks going all the way back to the Dreyfus Affair, the instigation of the assassination of Jaurès, and his daily slings at *La Victoire*. Such polemics and attacks hurt the Right because they could be so easily exploited by the Left. Although the former *Sans Patrie* hoped for Blum's speedy recovery, he could not dispense with criticism of the Socialist leader's rhetorical excess, class struggle ideas, promotion of civil war, calls for a dictatorship of the proletariat, and Marxism. By telling moderates in the Chamber that he hated them and employing rhetoric in *Le Populaire* about taking a "vacation from legality", Blum too shared in the dangerous growth of extremism which had to be disarmed in the interest of a reconciliation of the extremes. Hervé took the occasion to blast the Right for its lack of imagination and failure to attain unity in the face of the swelling Red Wave, and he singled out French monied interests who distrusted his socialism despite its being national and corporatist.[27]

The attack on Blum instigated a huge Parisian rally on February 16 in which hundreds of thousands of leftist demonstrators marched from the Pantheon to the Place de la Bastille. Hervé cautioned the Left about the dangers of inciting the Right to instigate an empire, and he worried that such rallies could also provoke the authoritarian powers to take advantage of French internal divisions and quarrels to remilitarize the Rhine, using the Franco-Soviet Pact as a pretext.[28] Hervé's analysis seemed prescient because the French government's preoccupation with domestic issues may have stymied its response to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. In mid-March the former *Sans Patrie* pleaded with Albert Sarraut, the Radical minister and current *Président de Conseil*, to call off the elections and create a new *Union Sacrée* because it was again time to proclaim *la patrie en danger* and not give Hitler a chance to see another lamentable French electoral spectacle that could only encourage his aggression.[29] As *La Victoire* prepared for the spring elections, Hervé could only advise his readers to vote for candidates who would revise the constitution and institute an authoritarian republic to meet the threat posed by Hitler's authoritarian regime.[30] He repeatedly rejected the Popular Front's charges blaming "the two-hundred families" for the French economic situation and its nightmares of an imaginary, imminent fascist coup. The Director of *La Victoire* assailed the Popular Front for their anti-religious laws, their collectivism, and their disastrous financial policies which were responsible for France's lamentable state at home and abroad. Their program would only lead to civil war. His attack on the parliamentary republic's factionalism gave Hervé a chance to blame all parties on both the Left and the Right unwilling to revise the constitution and support an authoritarian republic.[31]

That was the situation on the eve of the late April/early May elections in 1936. The Communist leader Maurice Thorez had long shown signs of opposing both the isolation of the P.C.F. and the Comintern policy of "class against class", but he was a loyal communist willing to tow the Moscow line. He was also deeply suspicious of the S.F.I.O. During the election campaign he made every effort, even employing radio in an unprecedented manner, to appeal to a broader constituency including Catholics, veterans, women, and even youth despite the unlikelihood or impossibility of most of the latter groups voting communist. Thorez even tried to integrate the ideals of the tricolor with the red flag of the International which had become easier after the rise of Hitler and the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed on May 2, 1935. Having been outside power, the P.C.F. sought to present itself as moral, patriotic, and untainted by corruption. Using the popular bogeyman of "the two-hundred families" who were presumed to exercise excessive influence on the financial, economic, and political affairs of the nation, the Communists could appeal to disgruntled elements often prone to conspiratorial explanations involving the designs of the wealthy and privileged few against the mass of the citizens.[32]

Although Hervé recognized that both the Socialists and Communists had begun to evolve toward a patriotic socialism, they were still equivocating. Much as his propaganda was geared to bring the extreme Left over to national socialism, his profound distrust could not be allayed. So the editorials in *La Victoire* advised voters against voting for the Left on the first round of the impending elections since the extreme Left still preached "*la guerre sociale*." Even though the Radicals were clearly patriotic, they, too, should not be supported because they were anti clerical and promoted depopulation, a major source of Nazi temerity toward France. Hervé advised voters to vote only for nationalists, but not those who failed to support the pact with Russia.[33] Periodically he admitted that *La Victoire* did not have the funds to get more involved in the elections other than simply staying afloat, and he lashed out at the elites which had failed to support his efforts.[34] He also argued that even if the Popular Front won the elections, France would soon get a *Union National* government to extricate itself from the fiasco because there would still be a general lack of confidence, inevitable economic fears, and the ongoing Nazi threat.[35] As the election neared, Hervé attempted to strike fear in French voters by asking them if they wanted France to duplicate the disastrous course of the Popular Front in Spain.[36] That message was made concrete in *La Victoire* a few days later in a drawing by PEM showing Spain dying for having voted for the Popular Front.[37] Since the S.F.I.O. was now ready to join the government, Hervé predicted that a Blum ministry with its public works projects, its plans for a shortened work day

with the same pay, its collectivist agenda, its inflationary policies, its ideas about nationalizing the Bank of France, its plans for controlling agricultural prices, and it paltry funding for defense would actually create the greatest nationalist and Bonapartist wave in France since 18 Brumaire and December 2. He also warned the Jewish Socialist leader personally that his victory would lead to a civil war, the rise of a French version of Hitler, a military dictator, and perhaps even a wave of anti-Semitism.[38] Since Hervé seemed to want a French dictator to resolve the anarchy of the parliamentary republic, why wasn't he more euphoric? The obvious answer was that the fate of France was his primary value, and that was in jeopardy as he saw it.

As the elections drew nearer, he began to hope that the Nazi reoccupation of the Rhineland might wake up French voters enough to get a nationalist victory.[39] However, the very next day he was again despondent because he realized that neither the Left nor the Right were capable of saving France since neither side was able to refrain from squabbling in order to deliver the only remedy for French ills: a *République Autoritaire à base corporative.* "Whoever wins the elections will still see France slide into the abyss and death."[40] After the first round of voting Hervé was mildly encouraged, at least initially, because the nationalists had resisted the Popular Front and actually gained voters compared to 1932. But he was full of trepidation for the second round because he expected the Left to display discipline by desisting in favor of first round vote winners in the Popular Front coalition, while the Right traditionally displayed a blatant lack of electoral discipline. Once the complete results of the first round came in, he realized how deplorable the situation was for the Right. And he lashed out at mainstream newspapers, moderate and conservative nationalist leaders, the "two hundred families", and the hundreds of thousands of wealthy French who failed to support his campaign for Pétain, thereby failing to meet the electoral challenge.[41] Although he expressed hope that the second round might not be a complete disaster, he continued to reassure himself with a more logical prediction, however ominous. The inevitable failure by the Popular Front would foster the same kind of national reaction which had happened in Italy and Germany. With the Popular Front victory sealed on the second round, the former *Sans Patrie* was certain that a panic by savers and investors was imminent due to the new government's disastrous plans for the economy which could only sow poverty, disorder, and civil war. The coming of a "national dictatorship of public safety" was only a matter of time, yet Hervé wanted it to be temporary and not a permanent barracks regime such as those by Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin.[42] If Hervé's prognosis was generally bleak, on the feast for Joan of Arc he entertained the fantasy about French communists joining Christians and the extreme Right in a general paean to

the "grand ideal of social and moral beauty" thereby saving France.[43] But even that fantasy could not survive the week unscathed because *La Victoire* largely agreed with Pope Pius XI's denunciation of communism in all its forms.[44]



Figure 48. The Soviets Pull the Strings of the Popular Front: Communist Marcel Cachin, Radical Édouard Herriot, and Socialist Léon Blum. Bnf.

During the spring elections the three Popular Front parties gained 37 seats overall, but the Socialists emerged as the largest party in the coalition, so Blum became Prime Minister, the first Socialist in French history to hold that position. For Hervé, that spelled disaster because Blum was simply a Marxist rhetorician over the age of sixty who might be full of academic knowledge but lacked essential wisdom. This was a blueprint for bankruptcy, chaos, and revolutionary convulsions.[45] André Lichtenberger echoed Hervé's charges by calling Blum "a rhetorician, a mystic, a humanitarian dilettante, a hateful prophet," and "the worst possible leader of the French state."[46] In the days ahead the former *Sans Patrie* continued his assault on Blum by describing him as incapable of leading France because of "his culture, ideas, and fragile nervous system." He coddled workers when he

should have threatened to resign in twenty-four hours if the occupations of the factories continued. What did Blum do? He said he would never use force and he never hinted at resignation. That was not leadership according to the director of *La Victoire*.[47] "France needed a man of action, not a rhetorician, a sophist, and a literary scholar."[48] How could the President of France call on Blum who believed in collectivism and class war while France's constitution extolled the virtues of private property? How could Blum be given power when his party received only 1.8 million votes out of 10 million? What sort of insane regime was this![49] "It is necessary to choose between Bolshevism and fascism, between red fascism and tricolor fascism."[50]

Even though the former *Sans Patrie* was capable of recognizing Blum's oratorical skills and essential caution, he assumed that the owners of property and savers would quickly reject Blum's governmental program with the resulting "business stagnation, unemployment, general discontent, and insecurity inside and outside France under a new ministry every three to six months."[51] At times Hervé described the Popular Front as a Masonic creation, in part, because both Blum and Daladier were Masons.[52] Quoting the old Radical chief Herriot, Hervé agreed that: "The Popular Front was a leap into the unknown" by plutocratic revolutionaries who live in chateaux where they explicate discourses about the poor.[53] In fact, for Blum the exercise of power was far from the conquest of power, so he rejected a revolutionary program as inappropriate and chose not to attempt "an experiment in socialism." The Popular Front tried "to strengthen democratic institutions and restore economic prosperity." It was assumed that the economic crisis could best be dealt with by making capitalism work and by modernizing the liberal state.[54] To deal with the problem of aroused expectations, Blum developed the concept of the "occupation of power" which recognized that "socialists held power as part of an anti-fascist coalition" and that meant legalism. Yet the enthusiasm and hopes of his followers were undiminished. With the reunification of the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U., workers seemed poised to renegotiate the very conditions of society. That led to the largest strike wave in the history of the Third Republic from May through June 1936 with almost two and a half million workers involved in a six week period.[55]

Following the elections and the excitement generated by the annual *Semaine Sanglante* commemorations at Père Lachaise, Hervé was hardly surprised that Parisians did not even wait for Blum to take power before they spontaneously struck and occupied factories demanding a forty-hour work week with no reduction in pay. He admitted that the P.C.F. was not behind the strikes and occupations, and, in fact, could not have curtailed the events if they had tried. After

predicting something like this before the elections, Hervé expected not a Marxist Revolution but a nationalist revolution as in Italy, Germany, Hungary, Austria, and Poland: in other words a fascist or authoritarian regime of some sort.[56] An editorial on May 30, 1936 sarcastically called the factory occupations "quite a joyous welcome for the Popular Front", but Hervé spread the blame around by indicting not only the workers and the extreme Left who lost control of them, but the French elites whose utter lack of political sense had brought France "close to the dictatorship of the proletariat." Implicitly, the elite failure to support the campaigns of *La Victoire* was an obvious factor in the current predicament.[57]



Figure 49. The Renault factory after a six day strike during the Strike Wave in June 1936. Bnf.

Charles Sowerwine called this strike wave and factory occupations a perfect illustration of Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly's arguments about the evolving nature of French strike activities over the course of more than a century. In general, the authors found that workers at the time of the Popular Front went on strike "to get a new political deal" since it had become "apparent to the working classes as a whole that a point of critical importance for their own interests [was] … at hand in the nation's political life."[58] Several incidents of fired workers led to spontaneous

strikes and factory occupations. Stimultaed by the Popular Front election victory, the number of French strikers was 1.8 million by the end of June, some half a million more than the previous high during the postwar strikes of 1920.[59] Workers sensed the weakness of the employers and believed they could push Blum to act in their interests. At the beginning of June, the strikes increased and so did factory occupations. Workers were in a festive and almost exhilarated mood. The Socialists and their unions were being overtaken by events. Conservatives saw this as the precursor to revolution and blamed the Communists. Even though the latter soon tried to take credit for the events, they did not instigate what were spontaneous happenings. For Pierre Monatte, "'Slavery in the modern factory, the accumulated suffering … imposed since the workers' defeat of 1919–20 … [and] the economic crisis' were the profound causes; the immediate cause was 'the arrival of the Popular Front government. Finally the police would no longer be at the boss's service! Finally the government would be … at least neutral.'"[60] If French workers had rather formless ideas at this point, they were thinking about remaking society rather than wages and working conditions. That helps to explain "the apparent paradox that the strikers rarely formulated demands until after they went on strike, if at all … Workers knew that they wanted wage rises, 40-hour weeks and paid holidays, but they were going on strike for something more, hoping, as [Simone] Weil put it, to lift the yoke. In this, the strikes of 1936 resembled the Commune. But unlike the Commune, ordinary people did not take power and deliberate on the future of society. Legally constituted authorities—governments, parties, unions—were already in place. They saw their task as resolving the dispute within the existing framework."[61]

Hervé rejected initial arguments calling the strike wave simply a manifestation of legitimate economic demands. He agreed that it was spontaneous, but he was certain that the strike aims were political and dangerously revolutionary actions. Given his bias against the S.F.I.O., Hervé especially blamed Blum and the Socialists for their refusal to give up the talk of class struggle and collectivism as the major source of working class activism. The result was that the leaders of the extreme Left were being led by ordinary, overexcited but short-sighted workers. "The arrival of Blum, not orders from Moscow, set the stage for the factory occupations. Other demands are sure to follow with the owners so terrorized." Demands such as increased wages, greater workers' benefits, public works projects, the defense of the republic against "fascist" *ligues* including those of *La Victoire*, and French disarmament could only lead France to ruin. The only consolation that Hervé still maintained was that the Popular Front would be short-lived because the Marxism of the S.F.I.O. was possibly leading France toward a Third Empire or at the least

to a Radical or National Union Ministry to rescue the nation.[62] Having gone to school with Blum for a year at the Lycée Henri IV, Hervé admitted that Blum spoke very well, "just like we all did at age 18." The former *Sans Patrie* argued that wage increases could never solve workers' problems because capital was going into hiding, the budget deficit was increasing, and printing money would create drastic inflation that would decrease buying power. Such economic disorders could only play into Hitler's hand; *L'Humanité* realized that, even if Blum did not.[63] For Hervé the cause of the disorder wasn't the U.S.S.R. or Germany, as *Le Temps* seemed to argue, but his old bugaboos: the French Revolution, the secularization of education, and the de-Christianization of France which led to materialism and the decline of discipline. In the last forty years Marxism, with its collectivist and class struggle ideas, aggravated the situation to be sure. The crowds of today may not be seeking revolution but neither were those of 1789. Even though the S.F.I.O., P.C.F., and C.G.T. were trying to brake the situation, they could not stop the movement they had created.[64]

From June 5 through June 9, *La Victoire* along with many other newspapers failed to appear due to a strike at the Messageries Hachette which had a near monopoly of newspaper distribution in Paris, the *banlieue*, and the provinces. The newspaper sellers as well as the kiosk owners and bookstores also joined the strikes. Since all the services at *La Victoire* were with Hachette, the paper temporarily stopped publication. Initially *La Victoire* could not pay the new rates demanded due to its poverty. When publication somehow reappeared on June 10, Hervé claimed that "as national socialists we accept in principle a forty hour day, paid vacations, and collective contracts. We agree to wage increases if employers can survive." Though he claimed to accept the workers demands, he regretted their methods of demanding them. The former *Sans Patrie* was troubled by the revolutionary factory occupations, the collapse of owners' resistance, and the ease with which "most workers followed their leaders like sheep." Once the authorities failed to punish the first factory occupation, the "infectious epidemic" spread. The owners capitulated, thinking this would halt the social revolution, but the strikes continued, resulting in an accelerating economic and financial crisis replete with inflation and the collapse of export industries, leading to the ineluctable ruin of those on fixed income and small savers. He was especially troubled by the collapse of all authority not just by the government, police, and the state bureaucracy, but among the liberal professions and the owners of industry, commerce, and agriculture. Since the owners represented some of the last authorities left in France, that spelled national danger amidst heightened international threats.[65]

Assuming that the Popular Front was becoming the ultimate disaster for France, Hervé lamented the collapse of his own remedies for disorder, the P.S.N. and the *Syndicats Unionistes*, which had faded for lack of funds years before the gangrene had finally rotted the nation. Such organizations could have created an *entente cordiale* of capital and labor preventing the factory occupations which he considered a genuine tragedy for French workers. The director of *La Victoire* bemoaned the wasted funds and efforts that had gone into sustaining Coty's *L'Ami du Peuple*, Valois's *Le Faisceau*, and La Rocque's *Le Croix-de-Feu* instead of supporting Hervé's "more sound crusade for French renewal." The nationalist *ligues* and newspapers had failed to create viable alternatives for French political reform, so their resources should have gone to *La Victoire* "since it is clear that they don't know how to use them wisely."[66] Given the organizational problems of the extreme Right, it seemed almost ironic that in June 1936, the French government ordered the dissolution of the *Croix-de-Feu*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, the *Francistes*, the *Solidarité Française*, and their associated organizations. The dissolutions may not have been much of a surprise, but the groups affected screamed their indignation, convinced that such actions could only be "'part of a plot to leave patriotic Frenchmen more defenseless before the attacks of Moscow's well-armed, well-organized henchmen.'"[67]

For Maurice Agulhon, "The Popular Front … was … not a 'working class' government, swept to power by a social movement, rather, the social movement was unleashed by the facility given to it by a political swing. It all happened as if the working class, by demonstrating its strength, had wanted to make sure that it would not be thwarted in what it might expect from a favourable situation; as if it wanted to present the entire gamut of its demands to a friendly government, and in an exceptional circumstance. That objective, in the end almost plaintive (you, whom we have elected, this time don't forget us), appeared to the right to be triumphalist and almost subversive: after all, occupying factories was an attack on the authority of the employers, and almost on their property."[68] Under pressure, the government introduced reforms. By the Matignon Agreement of June 8, 1936, employers agreed to differential wage increases, the recognition of union rights, the recognition of union shop stewards, collective contracts, non-retaliation against strikers, compulsory arbitration, and other workers' demands.[69] Even if the strikes and occupations represented more an "expression of enthusiasm after an electoral victory" rather than a "revolutionary movement", something had changed. A new working class was being born, arising not just from structural changes in the economy and society but conjuncturally due to the Popular Front with its optimism, growing union membership, and increasing party affiliation on the extreme Left. As Julian Jackson saw it: "The patterns of authority in the

factory had been irremediably breached ... the Popular Front represented a massive shift in power towards organized labour."[70] However, many French citizens experienced the Popular Front as a very divisive era, a polarizing epoch in which many aspects of French life were politicized. People seemed to have to choose sides even though many simply wanted life and business to go on as usual. The results for all too many were despair and fear of the future.[71]

Blum won a vote of confidence on June 6, 1936, but his ministry was not the broad-based coalition he had hoped for, since the P.C.F. as well as some Radicals and labor leaders refused to accept portfolios. Even before he had formed his government, Blum heard from a delegation of employers who were in a panic due to the strikes. Their hopes for negotiations with the C.G.T. had culminated in the aforementioned Matignon Agreements which accepted all syndicalist demands. As Charles Sowerwine saw it, no government of the Third Republic had ever acted so boldly, passing 133 laws in 73 days. A new power balance leaning toward labor now existed. Despite the agreement, strikes continued and peaked which substantiated their fundamentally political nature. However, they did not usher in a revolution because that would have alienated Radicals and possibly enhanced the chance that the middle classes would gravitate toward fascism. Once the government rushed to implement the promised reforms and the P.C.F. pushed for a return to work, the strikes triumphantly ended by late June.[72]

The strikes may have been an explosion in expectation of change, but the international environment subverted any revolutionary potential that they may have had. Certainly, the February 1936 Popular Front in Spain triggered a civil war there on July 17, and that soon put the French Popular Front in jeopardy.[73] Much as Hervé applauded Franco's military *pronunciamiento* in Spain, he knew that such a remedy was precluded in France as long as no French-German reconciliation had occurred. For the moment, France would have to rely on universal suffrage to save the nation from its tragic situation.[74] As the summer wore on, the situation in Spain left Hervé increasingly worried that the continuance of the Popular Front would soon lead to civil war which would make a foreign war inevitable.[75] At a time when *La Victoire* blamed French Radicals for inflaming the free-thinking and Voltairian Spanish bourgeoisie, thereby encouraging their assaults on religious obscurantism and social hierarchy on the other side of the Pyrenees, and while Hervé continually stressed his sympathy or propagandistic wishful thinking for the increasingly pragmatic Communists of France, presumably poised to divest themselves of Marxism and join his truly French version of socialism, *L'Humanité* included Hervé and his publication among those French fascists currently helping the fascists of Spain.[76]

On July 29, 1936 in response to such charges from the Left, Hervé openly proclaimed the P.S.N. and *La Victoire* not fascist. In rejecting the Communist accusation of fascism, Hervé admitted that "all doctrines of authority" shared certain resemblances, but he denied being a fascist because he was against the use of violence. He disapproved of right-wing violence because for him the regime had to be changed legally. France had much more political maturity than did Italy where Mussolini's violent methods were a necessary remedy. The former *Sans Patrie* actually argued that his soon to be reconstituted P.S.N. could not be fascist because France had gone beyond the stage of nationalism and had arrived at a superior stage of humanity which sought a United States of Europe based on revolutionary and Christian values![77] Yet the same man a few months later would argue that "the parliamentary regime has led France inevitably to a dictatorship by the most ignorant, envious, and violent." Such was Hervé's faith in France and its mature political traditions. At that time, he repeated his longstanding argument; in such a crisis only a revisionist wave led by a man like Pétain could save France.[78]

One sign of the accuracy of Hervé's denial about being a fascist might be the episode over Roger Salengro, the Jewish Minister of the Interior for the Popular Front. While the general pack of right-wing extremists assailed Salengro's war record, driving him to suicide, Hervé rejected and regretted the accusations, fearing that the Popular Front would actually gain a moral victory from the unfortunate episode.[79] Whether such a testimonial proves that Hervé was no fascist, as Heuré intended by his account of the latter events, is open to debate. What is less debatable is the difficulty of pigeonholing Hervé in any pre-established categories. When Salengro committed suicide in November 1936, following the attacks on his war record and the death of his wife eighteen months earlier, Hervé was proud that *La Victoire* had assailed the Right for such a defamatory campaign against the Minister and continued to stress that there was no proof of the charges against Salengro's war record. However, the former *Sans Patrie* was less than charitable to the suicide victim when he used the occasion to say that even though Salengro had not deserted in World War I, both he and Blum were guilty of not doing their duty by resigning in the face of the factory occupations and strikes during the Popular Front.[80]

For Hervé the victory of the Popular Front was a catastrophic "tidal wave", and he reacted as if the revolutionary moment had befallen France. Despite his genuine horror, he claimed that he did not want a violent fascist coup to get rid of the danger because legal means were available to ward off the threat. "The proof of his good electoral will is that he" talked about reconstituting "his P.S.N. at the end of July 1936, after three years of hibernation."[81] In the spring and summer of 1936, the "Red Menace" and the Nazi threat coupled with the need to maintain

the Russian Alliance complicated Hervé's reactions to events. *La Victoire* attacked Blum's suppression of those who opposed him, and Hervé labeled the actions of French workers an anarchistic disaster. Even though the former *Sans Patrie* called the workers' occupation of the factories a revolutionary situation, he had initially accepted their demands. He regretted that such social progress had not been realized in an era of concord even though he had almost always opposed such reforms earlier during the interwar. Workers would now interpret the amelioration of their conditions as a conquest enacted against the egoism of French capitalists.[82]

By mid-June, when Hervé could see that the strikes were ending in Paris, even though the provinces were increasingly active, he threw around words like "terror" and "panic" as he blasted the cowardice and lack of leadership of Blum's ministry which had witnessed "the most total collapse in French history." If only workers had been more reasonable and owners had displayed more backbone, things would not have become so anarchic. He continued to assume that with a bit of funding and a few more men it was not too late for *La Victoire* to organize the resistance "legally and without being reactionary." For Hervé the days of the Blum ministry were numbered because it could not prevent the riots and panic which were set off by working class intemperance. "Surely," he argued, "no one could take such a ministry seriously." If Hervé thought the strike wave was fading, he was still willing to employ any remaining "anarchic" episodes to play on the fears of owners to get them to fund his newspaper and formations, before it was too late. Just as Mussolini and Hitler had received support from frightened elites in Italy and Germany in order to rescue their countries, Hervé hoped to get similar support to launch his revisionist wave to create an authoritarian republic.[83]

When the Popular Front dissolved the *ligues*, Hervé advised La Rocque not to turn the *Croix-de-Feu* into a political party but to use his resources and supporters to back the P.S.N. Apparently, the former *Sans Patrie* had met La Rocque seven or eight years earlier after a dinner with Marshal Lyautey and Lichtenberger at which Hervé complained about his lack of support. During that repast the director of *La Victoire* asked the former French Resident-General in Morocco whether he could get several hundred men from his colonial forces to back the P.S.N. A week later Colonel de La Rocque, a former French officer under Lyautey, met Hervé but was not particularly moved to act in conjunction with the P.S.N. However, Hervé eventually sent La Rocque allies which the P.S.N. did not have the funds to help, and he rejoiced at La Rocque's success. Sadly, thought Hervé, the former colonial officer was no more knowledgeable about politics than other conservative and moderate men on the Right, and he, too, failed to successfully appeal to the

Left. Yet the leader of the P.S.N. had no doubts that if Lyautey were still alive in 1936, he would have urged La Rocque to join *La Victoire*'s crusade, which had the winning strategy but only needed material support. From Hervé's perspective, the sole explanation for his own lack of support was the infamous image of the "flag in the dung pile."[84]

Throughout the summer of 1936 Hervé called for Blum to resign,[85] predicting and hoping that French Radicals would leave the government, yet he believed they would have to revise their ideas completely if they were to remedy the disaster their socialist-led Popular Front had wrought. Of course, Radicals could never help to remedy the disastrous parliamentary system on which they depended. What Hervé still counted on was not a politician chosen by competition among parties but a genuine, dynamic political leader who would impose himself on events as Mussolini, Hitler, as well as the two Napoleons did, and Pétain could do now. Moderates and Radicals could never cultivate such a leader.[86]

At a Radical congress in October 1936 there was marked opposition to the Communists. Speakers who were too favorable to the Popular Front were heckled, and some delegates raised their arms in fascist-like salutes. Even though the Radicals were not yet ready to abandon the Popular Front, they "had already begun to distance themselves from it." Fear of fascism was being displaced by a fear of communism by many of the small town and middle class supporters of the Radicals. Some Socialists and trade unionists were reacting the same way, fearing Communist colonization of their organizations as well as the long-term implications of anti-fascism for foreign policy.[87] Michel Winock claimed that the Matignon Accords and the social legislation that ensued, especially the forty-hour week, provoked the failure of Blum's ministry because many Radical senators revolted and the Radical Congress rebelled as well.[88]

For the French Right and certainly the extreme Right including Hervé, the Popular Front was experienced "as an assault on bourgeois society in all its forms." By "breaking down the barriers," the Popular Front seemed to assail those things which guaranteed bourgeois distinctiveness. The strikes and urban demonstrations seemed to be invasions of several types of privileged space which threatened the propertied classes and radicalized the Right. One result was the formation of the Secret Committee of Revolutionary Action, the C.S.A.R. or *Cagoulards* founded by Eugène Deloncle, who advocated terrorism and counter-revolutionary preparations to meet the Communist threat.[89] The *Croix-de-Feu* was banned but evolved into a legal party, the P.S.F., which had up to one and a half million members by 1937, making it the nation's largest political actor at the time, an obvious indication of the growing polarization of politics. Even though La

Rocque disbanded his paramilitary forces and renounced violence, he remained ambiguous regarding his commitment to democracy. Even a former Communist like Doriot quickly evolved from within the P.C.F. and then the Popular Front itself to create a unique, complex amalgam of anti-Communism, French fascism, and eventual Collaboration. Some disillusioned Maurrassian intellectuals also evolved in the direction of fascism and pro-Nazism reacting to the Popular Front and stimulated by the ascendancy of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Meanwhile the *Fédération Républicaine*, joined by conservative Catholics and antidemocratic extremists, shifted sharply to the Right thus "blurring the boundaries between the parliamentary right and the extreme right." The conservative republicanism of the 1920s was a fading fashion by 1930s. Even if Radicals were not yet ready to break with the Popular Front, actions at their October 1936 Congress indicated a conscious distancing from the Popular Front. Usually when Radicals shifted to the Right it was due to financial issues, but now a formidable wave of anti-communism erupted from their base. There was also a reaction by Socialists and trade unionists against the Popular Front "marriage of convenience." The S.F.I.O. and the syndicalists feared that the Communists were colonizing their organizations. Some Radicals and Socialists also believed that Communists were leading them to an inevitable war.[90]

Blum hesitated to devalue the franc, but he eventually did so, thus fulfilling Hervé's incessant fears and predictions. While that measure had some positive economic effects, they were insufficient, and it was psychologically, and thus politically, disappointing. Gold exports did drop, industrial production increased, and so did employment rates, but when the forty-hour week finally took effect, the production of wealth declined according to Alfred Sauvy. The more than 25% devaluation of the franc on September 25, 1936 meant that real wages for workers were reduced despite their recent wage increases. Also, the Bank of France had lost most of its gold reserves in defense of the franc. Once Blum announced a "pause" in social reform on February 21, 1937, the Left was in shock, while the Right was ready to pounce. Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations led to violence and soon the government was out of energy and remedies.[91] On March 16 when La Rocque's P.S.F. held a meeting in the Communist stronghold of Clichy, the Leftist workers responded with a counter-demonstration, and a battle erupted between the police and the proletarian militants causing six killed and some 200 seriously wounded, mostly among the Socialists, the P.S.F. militants themselves having managed to leave before the riot took place. Those involved blamed each other, but it was noteworthy that the Popular Front's police attacked some of the government's presumed supporters.[92]

"Sensing the government's weakness, markets lost confidence or, in the language of the day, capital went on strike: a major Treasury bond issue was undersubscribed." When Blum sought special financial powers on June 21, 1937, the Senate balked, and Joseph Caillaux played a leading part in toppling Blum. A weary and discouraged Blum resigned rather than urge his supporters to demonstrate against the Senate, perhaps forcing their submission. Defeated by the "*mur d'argent*", Blum then became Deputy Prime Minister in a fairly similar ministry under Chautemps, a man who had helped thwart aid to Spain. The Popular Front was not yet dead, but its supporters were disillusioned. The economic situation failed to improve, and this sparked the strikes which returned in the fall of 1937. Soon those strikes increased Socialist and Radical tensions which destroyed the government in January 1938. Following a ministerial crisis, Chautemps created a homogeneous Radical government which Socialists soon rejected. Chautemps resigned again in March 1938, just when Hitler launched the *Anschluss*. So, without a government, France was in no position to act.[93]

When Blum was asked to form a new government to deal with the international crisis, he could get no Communist or moderate Right support for a national union ministry, so he reverted to a Socialist and Radical government akin to his most recent team. When the Senate rejected a government financial measure a month later, the last Blum ministry, now without much popular support, was finished. At that point, Radicals led by Édouard Daladier formed a new government, without Socialist support but they had little trouble pivoting to the Right for help.[94] Throughout the Popular Front era, Hervé chastised the Radicals for their application of the dogmas of the French Revolution which destroyed French unity, assailed France's religious heritage, and led to a decline in population, morality, and discipline. Though he had long predicted that the Radicals would bolt from the Popular Front, the former *Sans Patrie* had no hope that Radicals could remedy the ravages they had wrought unless they could finally rally to Pétain.[95] Even before 1940 there was a noticeable crisis in confidence on the Left over the traditional conception of the Republic. Even on the extreme Left there was also a variegated but resolute camp with anti-war and anti-Communist attitudes, and they "would not be shaken by their effective convergence with the position of the pro-fascist Right."[96]

Even though the Popular Front had managed to strengthen republican values among some middle class Radicals (while terrifying the bourgeoisie in general), preempt fascism in France, maintain state power, and get the entire Left to unite, it turned out to be "a government like the others."[97] While the Popular Front became a "transforming cultural moment" which drew intellectuals into politics on

a scale not seen since the Dreyfus Affair and managed to rally many nonconformists of the 1930s previously often uninterested in politics, its failure would simply reinforce their skepticism about the parliamentary republic.[98] In the words of Joel Colton: "What Blum himself said in later years of the failure of Lamartine and the men of 1848, could be said of him: They had refused to be identified with the idea of revolution 'for fear of spreading fear, of frightening some sector of French society, of frightening Europe'. They forbade themselves 'any step that could be held as a usurpation'. The result had been failure. The year 1848, he noted, was remembered not for its accomplishments, but for its promise—'the immense hope that it raised'. That conclusion could serve as an epitaph for his own Popular Front government."[99] The Popular Front radicalized the French Right and ushered in a recomposition of the French Left because many Radicals, as well as some Socialists and syndicalists, came to fear the threat of communism more than fascism.[100]

For scholars like Ernst Nolte, anti-Marxism was the critical feature of fascism. However, there was at least one European national socialist with higher priorities than anti-Marxism. Not only did Hervé seek "transcendence" in the more traditional way, through an organized religious faith, he also put the fate of France above all political questions. Throughout the era of the Popular Front, Hervé periodically attacked conservatives and reactionaries who willingly sacrificed the "Russian Republic" to German domination. He cautioned the French Right against "the politics of suicide, just at the moment when he thought Russia was evolving toward a national socialism, at a time when French Communists were doing the same, and when their *L'Humanité* was in the process of becoming almost as national socialist as *La Victoire*."[101] He periodically lambasted French nationalists for having no consistent or unifying program except anticommunism and for not joining his revisionist campaign.[102] Despite it propagandistic aspects, rhetorical excess, and blatant wishful thinking, Hervé believed much of his own verbiage.

Hervé's support for the Russian Alliance may not have been completely pragmatic, however. In the 1920's and 1930's, intermingled with his fears of Bolshevism, Marxism, communism, chaos, anarchy, and disorder, there were repeated, rhetorical appeals to communists as brothers and descendants of Hervéism. In March 1937 Hervé called Blum, the S.F.I.O., and the Radicals much greater dangers to France than were the Communists.[103] A cartoon in *La Victoire* on April 7, 1937 depicted Blum as a French Hitler leading a band of *chemises rouges* with their fists raised akin to Nazi brownshirts.[104] At that point Hervé's propaganda was replete with rhetoric claiming to have more sympathy for the *illuminés* and zealots of communism than for the supposedly duplicitous and contradictory heirs of Guesdist

dogmatism and Jaurèssist anticlericalism in the S.F.I.O. The former Marxist sympathizer, Hervé, often claimed to be far more receptive to the purity and idealism of the most extreme solutions. He was usually most hostile to the tergiversations, the *nègre-blanc* mentality, and the self-deceptions of moderates as well as moderate Socialists (updated opportunists), who mouthed idealistic formulas yet acted for self interests. Yet the former *Sans Patrie* occasionally displayed an inveterate, recurring fear of communism such as when he explained the success of Roosevelt's deficit spending and devaluation of the dollar by pointing out that the American presidency possessed great powers and did not have to fear a strong Communist presence.[105] He also found it difficult to fit his rhetoric about incipient national socialism in the P.C.F. and in the U.S.S.R. with what he presumed was Communist provocation at La Rocque's P.S.F. festival at Clichy in mid-March 1937. In the end he managed to blame French Radicals, not Marxists, for the Popular Front and the ideas that inspired it.[106]

At one point during the Popular Front, confronted with a presumed choice between democracy and dictatorship posed by the policies of the Radical leader Daladier, Hervé became so exasperated that he blasted parliamentary democracy as "a disgusting anarchy … All civilized peoples [in Italy, Germany, Spain, and Poland] choose dictatorship. We at *La Victoire*, however, do not want a dictatorship; we do not want a Bonaparte. We want Pétain and a *République Autoritaire*."[107] He became so discouraged by the failure of his efforts to generate a revisionist wave to create a *République Autoritaire* led by Pétain that he lamented the prior failures of Boulanger and Déroulède to rectify French anarchy and decadence.[108] In fairness to Hervé, sometimes he did stress that France's dictatorship was meant to be temporary, and that all Frenchmen were democratic. But that refrain was intermittent at best, and his democratic stipulations were described in terms of an oxymoronic "controlled liberty."[109]

In the immediate years before the war, Hervé continued to hope for a *Mouvement Révisionniste*, a *Front Pétain*, or a Bonapartist wave which would create a government that would revise the French Constitution in a plebiscitary and authoritarian direction. Then France would be guided by the apolitical "hero of Verdun" as the national sovereign in a regime without parties and divisions. Yet, he continued to deplore the French Right's division, lack of courage, and ineptitude. For Hervé the parliamentary republic benefitted the Left because all men became envious and selfish after the decline of religion. That meant that demagogues on the Left would always get more votes. The anarchy of the Popular Front should finally have opened the eyes of French elites to the grave dangers and led them to support the revisionist wave. Sadly for Hervé, the *haute bourgeoisie* repeated

their errors of 1924, 1932, and 1936 and failed to deliver, putting their trust in the moderate Left, especially Radicals like Édouard Daladier and Camille Chautemps instead of a revisionist wave.[110] *La Victoire* continued to profess the belief that Maurice Thorez and the P.C.F. were evolving toward national socialism, and gradually Hervé even came to be more favorable to Léon Blum due to changes he detected in his positions. In late December 1938 the former *Sans Patrie* compared Blum's "new patriotism" to his own evolution before 1914, so he favored Blum over Paul Faure as the leader of the S.F.I.O. Though Hervé still spoke of French decadence and the need for a *République Autoritaire* led by Pétain, his general tone was to support the government in power as a kind of *Union Sacrée* response to *la patrie en danger*. It was again time for France to "disarm hatreds."[111]

In his 1895 book *The Psychology of Crowds* Gustave Le Bon had written: "Any study of the philosophy of history should begin with this fundamental point, that for crowds one is either a god or one is nothing."[112] Rejected by the crowd, the former crowd-pleaser turned to God. Perhaps it was fitting for a man, who failed to lead the masses in an antimilitarist crusade to prevent war and then experienced nothing but rejection by French citizens in the post-war era, to return to his childhood religion. In an editorial on April 21, 1935, Hervé mentioned telling a friend that he had not yet made the full conversion to Christianity but day by day he was returning closer to the religion of his youth which he described as the overcoming of all of life's evils, temptations, and uncertainties by returning to a faith in which God was one's model.[113] On All Saints' Day in 1935, Hervé extolled religion by calling the belief in an afterlife a great consolation for life's problems and the certainty of death. A belief in the hereafter was an ancient human belief where men would be judged on the basis of their lives. Contemplating how the Enlightenment found it necessary to spit on this religious armature, the former *Sans Patrie* branded the materialistic and mechanistic world view as the source of the error which was exacerbated after 1793 with France leading the assault on religion.[114] In mid-December 1935 following a series of editorial letters to Communists extolling their shift toward a more patriotic stance, Hervé responded to the hateful tone of *L'Humanité*, which accused him of being bought by the "two hundred families" of France's business and financial elite, by arguing that his postwar national socialism was a move "toward evangelical Christianity" whose idealism could be detected even in Marxist messianism.[115]

It is not insignificant that a little over a month before the victory of the Popular Front, Hervé announced his reconversion to Roman Catholicism. This disclosure fit an interwar French pattern which John Hellman described as a 'religious revival.' "A wave of enthusiasm seems to have touched some school teachers, army

officers, priests, and a certain segment of the bourgeoisie nurtured by the religious revival that had been flourishing in France since the late nineteenth century."[116] On Easter 1936 he stated that his departure from the Church had commenced with the secularization of education when he was ten years old. He admitted to having been an atheist for thirty years, but for the previous twenty years he had gradually been moving back toward his original faith.[117] His actual reconversion had begun in the summer of 1935 and lasted for two years. The timing of the announcement is certainly more than curious. At the same time Hervé admitted that his earlier program for the re-Christianization of France had been largely pragmatic. He had assumed even before World War I that most men needed a faith to bear the trials and tribulations of daily existence. It had taken him more than two decades to regain his own faith which one assumes the events of the early 1930s, especially the coming of the Popular Front, must have accelerated.[118] However, several other events occurred which transformed Hervé's ardent desire to believe into an apparently sincere and active faith.

Even though he was an avowed atheist, he admired Christ, the apostles, Joan of Arc, and Saint Vincent de Paul. His entrenched atheism continued until January 1914 when, as mentioned above, a magistrate among his friends gave him several books on French depopulation, in which the authors tied depopulation to poor social legislation which Hervé felt was a rather weak explanation. From May 1914 he began series of articles in *La Guerre Sociale* on depopulation, yet reserved his pro-Christian conclusion for the end of the series because he feared that his Socialist readers would abandon him if he did not explain the problem clearly. Those ideas might have set off an explosion in September 1914 when they were scheduled to come out, but another explosion occurred on August 1, 1914 which interrupted that timetable. The second stage of his conversion journey was associated with tales of Breton soldiers holding their rosary beads as they bled to death praying on battlefields and in field hospitals during World War I. He was deeply moved by such stories of courage and faith. At that point he started to consider it criminal for the state to take away religious consolation from dying soldiers. At the time he pondered going back to the university or returning to his law practice, but he decided to keep *La Victoire* alive so that he could report about what he had learned concerning the devastating effects of de-Christianization. His true opening to a more mystical faith was to take another twenty years.[119]

Though he cited his religious friends and their prayers in 1936, he claimed that he was not particularly affected by his friendship with the Abbé Bordron and the readings that were given him. Nor was he inordinately moved by the prayers of his friend Stella? or those of other priests and Christians who were

"near and dear" to him. Neither reason nor prayer brought him back into the fold. He claimed that "his return to the faith" was achieved through a couple of miraculous "coincidences." Toward the end of March 1935, his younger brother, Dr. Victor Hervé, contracted a serious illness while working with his patients. For two weeks he was in danger of dying. "In my disarray while returning exhausted from the newspaper at night, walking beside the Church of Saint-Eustache near Les Halles—was it the holiness of the place?—I surprised myself by saying, as I said it as a child: 'Father, because I have defended your cause for twenty years without believing much in you, save my younger brother!'" Another letter from his eldest sister showed that the situation remained grave, so in desperation he went to mass that Sunday at the church near his apartment ministered by the Marist Fathers. At mass he prayed for his brother and for the newspaper, which was, as usual, in financial straits. That Sunday's sermon included a passage from the gospels in which Jesus said: "What you ask God in my name, he will give it to you." Under the circumstances it was not surprising that Hervé became convinced that the words of Jesus were meant for him, so he asked for the salvation of both his brother and *La Victoire*. When he got back to his office, the daily letter from his sister was there saying that his brother was saved. Soon news arrived that the paper furnisher had decided to provide refunds going back more than two years. Then Hervé claimed he heard a voice that said God had rewarded his defense of the Church for the past decades. Or was this just a marvelous series of "coincidences"? Throughout the following year, he went to church to meditate, and the result was his return to the faith by Easter 1936. A year after the events, Hervé was convinced that the earlier occurrences could not be explained by coincidence alone.[120]

Such relatively trivial "miracles" must have had an especially heightened impact for Hervé when the political events he most feared, the coming of the Popular Front and the increasing aggressiveness of Nazi Germany, were growing more and more inevitable. On All Saints' Day in 1936 amidst the "catastrophe" of the Popular Front, Hervé spoke about religious faith in both pragmatic and instrumentalist terms as well as in mystical and spiritual terms, displaying perhaps a bit of his former skepticism. "All civilizations rest on religious foundations which provide the basis of all morality. If religion is a human invention, that inventor needs to be rewarded. Religion is needed even if it is only an invention of man's collective genius. The attack on the religious idea in the eighteenth century was a base error which could destroy European civilization. Religion is an intellectual need of man, not a collective raving by primitive and collective humanity. There must be a source of order in the universe." For Hervé religion was the crucial

element that allowed mankind to bear life's inevitable hazards: the perpetual combats of life, the multiple forms of sickness, and the inevitability of death.[121]

On Easter 1937, two years after that fateful Lenten season conversion, Hervé continued to stress how reason and logic had not gotten him to believe. He did not try to rationally analyze the Incarnation, the Redemption, the Resurrection, or the Trinity. Rather, he trusted his heart, his feelings, and his intuition. He pondered the life of Christ and read Thomas à Kempis's famous book. The former *Sans Patrie* looked to Christ's social and moral doctrines as well as to the promise of life after death. He contemplated the saints and religious thinkers of all nations "since Christianity is not racist!" And Hervé was deeply moved by the suffering of the virgin who witnessed her own son's suffering. That reminded him of his Breton mother's suffering and incomprehension at her son's prison terms for ideas which seemed so outlandish to her.[122] The speed with which Hervé's prayers were answered and the happiness that he attained from the conversion reminded Gilles Heuré more of the conniving satisfaction of the stock character in Giovanni Guareschi's post-war tales of the village priest Don Camillo Tarocci, squabbling with his revolutionary opponents, rather than the happiness of a great mystic. Heuré also surmised that "the fervor that he put into his faith, without a doubt, also tempered that which he would have been able to place in fascism. The post-war Hervé had found his path."[123] One must agree with the French biographer on this point. Such a profoundly religious focus absorbed the energies of the former *Sans Patrie* and does seem to preclude the violence and ethnocentrism of fascism, but not everyone agrees.

30

Hervé's Interwar Reactions to Fascism and Nazism

The sincerity of Hervé's internationalism is difficult to question because his hopes for a Franco-German *rapprochement* arose almost immediately after the war. Yet throughout the 1920's Hervé became increasingly suspicious of Germany, at times regressing to his former almost instinctive anti-Germanism. In fact, Hervé's hopes for a reconciliation with Germany after 1928 were undoubtedly based on a pragmatic assessment of France's inability to enforce the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Almost immediately during the interwar era, the Polish Corridor, the *Anschluss*, the Saar, and the occupied areas of the Rhine were described as "trouble spots" that had to be settled as soon as possible. Hervé feared that the Treaty of Versailles could create another European war just as the Treaty of Frankfurt had done in 1870. In the course of the 1920's, he sometimes favored the evacuation of the Rhineland, the restitution of the Saar to Germany, the re-establishment of harmonious commercial relations between France and Germany, the restoration of German colonies which had been placed under French mandates, the acceptance of the *Anschluss* of Germany and Austria by the Allies, as well as the return of Danzig and Prussian Pomerania with the consent of Poland in order to give Germany contiguous territory up to the Russian border.[1] Of course, there was an anti-Bolshevik component in Hervé's hopes for reconciliation with Germany. Hervé's reactions to specific international events were subject to his usual spontaneous, emotional,

and idealistic tendencies, yet he could also be quite pragmatic. If he was capable of a realistic and pacific French foreign policy in the 1920's, moderation and consistency were easily disturbed by events. Nonetheless, the goal of his foreign policy remained French national interests as he perceived them.

The preservation of French security was to be achieved through the maintenance of peace as well as strength. While most of the French Right attacked German intransigence over Versailles, Hervé utilized a familiar mental exercise in order to reconcile with the traditional enemy. There were, in fact, two antagonistic Germanies. Hervé agreed with French nationalists in assailing the feudal, militaristic *Junkers* of Prussia, but he pointed out that there was another Germany of workers as well as bourgeois intellectuals, professionals, businessmen, and Jews. France had an interest in reconciling with this "other Germany" in order to preserve the peace and prevent a return of the Hohenzollerns. Pacifism, liberalism, and even socialist internationalism were noble in Germany yet evil in France because they promoted disorder and disharmony within France.[2] Hervé separated his own search for peace and internationalism from those of the S.F.I.O. and the P.C.F. because he favored a strong France, not disarmament, and internal harmony as a step to international harmony. At this level and on this issue, Hervé's program was quite coherent, but his views represented a "cult of one" rather than a great popular wave.

If Hervé made himself the "fervent suitor" of first Mussolini and then Hitler, he eventually grew suspicious of the Nazi *Führer* though not *Il Duce*. If he admired and envied all authoritarian regimes during the interwar era and began to champion Philippe Pétain as the neo-Bonapartist strong man necessary to bring order and renewal to France, he cooled toward his French providential savior by mid-1941.[3] However, there is no doubt that Hervé's internal politics as well as his foreign policies both flirted with fascism whether or not one chooses in the end to brand him with that epithet.

The fall of the Italian government of Luigi Facta to Mussolini and the Blackshirts on October 28, 1922 was greeted by Hervé in a rather benevolent manner. The former *Sans Patrie* saw the fascists as saviors of Italy, and he compared their leader's life and ideas to his own. He thought that the act of attaining power was a bit cavalier and more like a *coup d'état*, but such a youthful country needed to stop its Marxist minority from taking over. Because he did not want the fascists to feel the same exasperations he had felt until 1915 with the slow Italian support for the Allies in World War I, he expected France not to hesitate in supporting Mussolini, but he had some reservations. France may not have been as gleaming as Italy, but with its *Bloc National* to govern, with men like Clemenceau and Millerand to guide it, with its more secure economy, and its more established republican heritage,

the French did not need to follow the Italian example.[4] Nevertheless, Hervé never ceased reminding French governments including the *Bloc National* about what might happen if a parliamentary system proved "incapable of governing in the face of an 'ardent and quivering minority.' But he never ceased applauding the successes of the fascist regime … And the more Hervé denounced the failure of French politics, the more he pointed to the Italian possibility, to shower it with praise as much as to repulse it."[5] Gilles Heuré thought that Hervé's eager reception to Mussolini's coming to power was one of the crucial events in the long-term political evolution of the former *Sans Patrie* and a culminating event in his overall trajectory.[6]

When Giacomo Matteotti was assassinated by fascists with close ties to Mussolini in June 1924, Hervé deplored the crime and compared the actions to those of the Soviet Cheka, yet he described the perpetrators as mere "black sheep" despite the rather gruesome quality of the entire affair. He queried French Communists who protested the assassination concerning their failure to protest the millions of deaths in the U.S.S.R.[7] His editorial on December 7, 1924 was entitled "Toward Fascism". However, rather than being a heartfelt desire for fascism in France by the former *Sans Patrie*, it was actually more of a threat to French Radicals if they failed to shape up.[8] Nevertheless, the line between wishes and threats was never clear or consistent at *La Victoire*. That same month Hervé delivered an "elegy to fascism" which almost crossed that line by praising fascism as a remedy or "temporary measure of public safety" for any potential Bolshevik takeover of France. Mussolini "is, indeed, a veritable statesman and not the adventurer, the *condottiere*, which some people persist in imagining." But, as always, he claimed that no one in France had any intention of simply copying or importing Italian fascism. Above all, he wanted the French Left to know that there were national forces in France ready to clean up the political mess with extreme but quick and effective methods if no other choice was available.[9]

In his analysis of the place of Italian fascism in the perspective of the French press, Pierre Milza placed Hervé and *La Victoire* in the nationalist, anti-Marxist, and antiparliamentary camp which described for Milza a veritable French fascism. Unlike most of the conservative press, *La Victoire* was not usually worried by Mussolini's imperialism, in part, because Hervé had maintained his pre-war dream of a Latin Union based on race (generally meaning culture or ethnicity), language, and civilization which could become the vanguard of some sort of United States of Europe. In Hervé's move toward fascism, he brought a sincere internationalism with him which seems so anomalous today. The former history professor was generally guilty of projecting his own ideas for a *République Autoritaire* onto Italian fascism. Yet he knew enough to repeat that his *République* would never be "a slavish copy of the fascist regime." He naively assumed that a domestic program for order and

harmony within Italy could never be a threat to France. When he noted the similarities of fascism and Bonapartism, he usually stated that Waterloo and Sedan had inoculated France against fascism. "To the great majority of Frenchmen," Hervé wrote, "fascism seems to be associated with the menace of disorder and civil war." From time to time he became upset with Italian fascist violence, rhetoric, and imperialist adventurism, but he was convinced that fascism was a healthy response to anarchy, and he almost always found ways to explain or justify Italian fascist excesses.[10]

On November 26, 1926 Hervé argued that any attempted fascist coup in France would fail, and he uncovered certain troubling parallels between the "little journalist from Romagna" and the "little captain from Corsica" in their early relations with the Catholic Church and their expansionist tendencies, but he invariably pre-empted such concerns with references to his own dreams of a Latin Union and, at least after the Lateran Accords of 1929, with the realization that both charismatic leaders eventually settled with the Church. It was true that Mussolini was a free thinker and fascism was a form of mystical nationalism which could become bellicose, but the former insurrectional firebrand hoped that fascist adventurism and its ongoing conflicts with the Church were simply the results of "youthful zeal." Hervé was sure that Mussolini would soon "nip it in the bud."[11] In February 1927 he told of the editor of *L'Humanité*, Paul Vaillant-Couturier, that if it were necessary to choose between the evils of communism and fascism, he would take castor oil over the Bolshevik bloodbaths any day.[12]

He "alternated conniving enthusiasm with critical distance but was always very indulgent for the Italian model." Even when he reprimanded Mussolini and his henchmen, his admonitions were quite mild.[13] If Hervé was reticent about criticizing Mussolini and Italian fascism, part of the reason came from "a concern to do whatever was necessary to try to improve relations between the two countries."[14] That helps to explain why he called on the French police to tighten surveillance on the Italian anti-fascist exiles living in France. At the time of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, he could still not muster a serious criticism of Italian Fascism, assuming that such a violation of the League of Nations Charter did not meet the standards which might require an international military response. On October 2, 1935 Hervé argued that "France should not fight Italy over Ethiopia under any terms even if the League so orders." A few days later he called for the liquidation of the League of Nations rather than go to war or even agree to sanctions against Fascist Italy![15] Part of his "confused indulgence" toward Italy rested with his expectations that France's Latin sister remained a viable counter-weight to a rising Germany. Hervé viewed the mobilization of the Italian army to the threat of an *Anschluss* in 1934 as a very positive sign that nothing should be allowed to come between France

and its Latin neighbor.[16] Even though he initially viewed Hitler as a "disciple of Mussolini" and a "man of the people" whom "*La Victoire* alone has recognized [for] his great political intelligence," that assessment was haltingly modified by events. Yet the coming of the Axis was sometimes seen in a positive light because Hervé imagined that *Il Duce* could have a calming effect on the Nazi *Führer*.[17]

At the end of World War I, Hervé had no desire to see a defeated Germany humiliated and dismembered. In fact, the former *Sans Patrie* wanted the new German regime to resemble the very French republic he had, more often than not, come to loathe. He hoped that Germany could eventually learn to find its place among the states of Europe. That would enable it to finally live in peace with its neighbors. Though Hervé expected Germany to fulfill its obligations arising from the Treaty of Versailles and to pay for the war damages it had caused, he was always flexible on the implementation of the treaty. In this, Hervé ironically echoed the views of his former socialist compatriots who worried that continuing French intransigence could poison relations with Weimar Germany. The editor-in-chief of *La Victoire* was both hopeful and benevolent toward the defeated enemy, yet despite his generally enlightened post-war views regarding Germany, hard feelings dissipated slowly. "The Franco-German *rapprochement* to which he devoted a series of articles in the spring of 1922, only seemed conceivable to him if the Germans openly repented and carried out a 'solemn repudiation of their past.'"[18]

During the interwar era, Hervé saw the greatest danger to France coming from Bolshevik Russia but he never forgot that Prussian militarism had merely been defeated, not obliterated. Soon the increasing violence and agitation of German nationalists became major worries for *La Victoire*. The former *Sans Patrie* expected a "veritable German statesman" like Gustav Stresemann to deal forcefully with German nationalists.[19] Not only did Stresemann seem ready to seek a peaceful compromise with France, he also appeared to be capable of dealing with the pan-German danger epitomized by General Erich Ludendorff and that "adventurer Hitler" whom Hervé thought deserved to be shot after their failed "Beer Hall Putsch."[20] For the next few years, the director of *La Victoire* forgot about Hitler, and by the time of the German elections of 1928, it seemed as if the Weimar Republic had weathered the storms and was comfortably established in an increasingly safe and secure Germany. With the Nazi vote totals at 2.6%, it seemed as if the nationalist menace had passed. In that context, Hervé felt able to discuss the evacuation of two zones on the Left Bank of the Rhine as a way to launch his proposal for a Franco-German reconciliation even though it meant a serious loss of readers for *La Victoire*. Nevertheless, the following year he began to pay more attention to German nationalists, who were increasingly supported

by a good number of the nation's economic elite. Despite the more favorable reparations payment terms of the 1929 Young Plan, Germany was unable to fulfill its annual payments. In fact, many prominent Germans were deeply troubled by a plan which they believed was a national humiliation. "However, like many of his contemporaries, Hervé did not see that behind this dispute already loomed an extreme Right determined to bring down the republic."[21]

After the failure of the P.S.N. to gain any traction in French politics by 1928, Hervé started exchanging letters with Arnold Rechberg, a chemical magnate and decorated war veteran who was also a strong advocate of a French-German *rapprochement*. Following Rechberg's campaign in the French press for that cause, he met Hervé at the offices of *La Victoire*. The German soon put him in contact with Captain Ehrhardt, a man very well-connected on the extreme German Right, in order for Hervé to ascertain the minimum conditions necessary for German nationalist leaders to consider a *rapprochement*. Eventually Rechberg suggested a series of questions for Hervé to pose to the rising nationalist forces in Germany. "Through this correspondence, Hervé felt himself to be invested by a historic mission in favor of the dignity of peoples and the peace of Europe." His editorials in *La Victoire* confirm it.[22] While Rechberg helped spread Hervé's ideas among various right-wing publications in Germany, *La Victoire* published articles by various German nationalists who reacted to the Frenchman's proposals. If some German nationalists believed that the French national socialist journalist had the necessary stature to influence French opinion in such a path-breaking diplomatic effort, few in France shared those illusions unless they worked at *La Victoire*. By late July 1928, about the time that his contacts with Rechberg began, Hervé was already commenting on the many negative reactions by his readers to his campaign for a Franco-German reconciliation.[23] He would later claim that he had lost over half of his readership due to his campaign for a Franco-German reconciliation.[24]

Apparently many of those readers began to subscribe to François Coty's *L'Ami du Peuple*. Hervé was clearly troubled by the declining circulation, but he seldom allowed material considerations to alter a course that he believed to be necessary and true.[25] Since the French Right led by *L'Action Française* and *L'Echo de Paris* had reacted against his program for international reconciliation, sometimes even calling him a traitor or a fool, Hervé sought to convince the nationalists of both France and Germany of the need for a genuine *rapprochement*. Although he remained open to the possibility that the *Croix-de-Feu* could find common ground with their German counterparts, the *Stahlhelm*, they, along with the rest of the extreme French Right, were never convinced about such reconciliation during the interwar era.[26] Curiously, Pascal Ory's 1976 account of French Collaborators

includes Hervé's search for reconciliation with Germany as an example of one of the two main currents of the prehistory of collaboration. Those two strands of prefascism and incipient collaboration which arose around 1930 were described as: (1) former soldiers like Georges Scapini, and several "youths", and a former antimilitarist like Hervé who became chauvinistic by 1914, and (2) Young Turks like Jean Luchaire, who made his monthly *Notre Temps* available to future celebrated intellectuals and writers such as Pierre Brossolette and Bertrand de Jouvenel.[27]

The editor-in-chief of *La Victoire* assumed that questions dealing with rearmament could only be settled by a genuine reconciliation between the two nations. The Nazi success in the June 1930 elections and the collapse of the Weimar coalition led Hervé to some ambivalent positions. On the one hand, he seemed proud that his P.S.N. and German national socialism shared the same name, which seemed "to underline the precedence of his political clairvoyance."[28] Hervé could argue that the Nazi Party "… resembles us as a collection of workers, nationalists, and partisans of an authoritarian head of state." On the other hand, Hervé also claimed that Nazi anti-Semitism had nothing to do with the ideas and assumptions of the P.S.N. If he had mixed feelings about Nazism, the former *Sans Patrie* chose to stress the parallels. In the end, for him Nazism was "a popular, workers' reaction against collectivist and communist Marxism which poisons the mass of German workers … It is a brutal popular reaction against the newborn parliamentary republic which led to such waste and failure in a country accustomed to order and discipline. Germany fears that its miserable, party bickering, and crisis-prone republic is leading it to revolution."[29] Such a comparison of the P.S.N. to the N.S.D.A.P. may have been superficial and obviously self-serving at the time, but it certainly helped to synchronize Hervé's foreign and domestic political ideas, however temporarily.

Much as he wanted reconciliation, Herve was so troubled by pan-German reactions to the French withdrawal from the Rhineland in July 1930, that he threw Rechberg's latest letter into the waste basket, expressed a complete lack of confidence in the Germans, and told Briand to keep quiet about his failed Locarno Treaties.[30] Even though he often failed to appreciate the Nazi political program for what it was, since he seemed to fear the return of the Hohenzollerns more than the coming of the Nazis, he predicted that the Weimar Republic "will be violated and strangled one of these days."[31] Significantly, he assumed that members of other German nationalist and bourgeois parties would soon rally to Nazism, and he seemed to sanction any means necessary to prevent the continuing chaos within the Weimar democracy and the social revolution which the K.P.D. and S.P.D. were preparing.[32] By such logic the "two Germanies" seemed to be transforming themselves to fit Hervé's evolving reading of German events.

When German reactions to Hervé's campaign were reproduced in *La Victoire*, they did little to win over the extreme French Right. For his part, Rechberg pointed out the foolishness of French policy. Instead of giving the Weimar Republic some form of dazzling success and thereby strengthening it or dealing directly with the real power in Germany, the army, France had done neither. Being hostile to Weimar and avoiding any dealings with the German army helped sabotage the former and dishonored the latter.[33] When the founder of the *Stahlhelm*, Captain Franz Seldte, submitted his reactions to Hervé's Franco-German reconciliation campaign, the German showed that he was under few illusions about the French journalist's influence on French opinion. Seldte had various territorial demands including the *Anschluss*, and he expected an end to reparations as well as article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, the so-called "war-guilt clause." Hervé may have favored treaty revision, but beyond the German acquisition of Austria, at that point he was unwilling to go any further regarding territorial demands. He also assumed that the question of German guilt was beyond discussion by the French, yet he still hoped for some kind of reconciliation.[34] Three days later, when he was accused of trying to bargain with the Germans due to weakness, fear, and blackmail, Hervé appeared dumbfounded. How could anyone accuse the victors of the Marne and Verdun of cowardice![35] Nevertheless, on the last day of October 1930, he admitted that France could not fight over a potential *Anschluss* because de-Christianization, depopulation, and the decline of national disciplines had made France too weak to help its Eastern European allies.[36]

When Hervé returned from a six week vacation in 1930, his readers learned that the Nazi success in the September 1930 elections had startled and nearly shocked him. Even though he predicted that the German Right would go to war to overturn Versailles, and Italy would use the situation to attack France, while the U.S.S.R. would take the opportunity to attack Poland, such prescience did not prevent him from assuming that K.P.D./S.P.D. cooperation in a *politique de pire* would also lead to a revolution in Germany. Despite the foolishness of the latter assessment, war was predicted in both scenarios. For that reason, Hervé stressed how neither pacifism nor disarmament could solve France's security needs.[37] Yet his real laments seemed to be that "France did not possess a nationalist movement comparable to Nazism but without the disgusting anti-Semitism which spoils, disfigures, and mars" and that *La Victoire* had too little financial support and too few readers to support such a venture.[38] The following day the mercurial journalist shifted his ambivalence by arguing this his French national socialism differed from Nazism because Hitler "is brutal, aggressive, and does not respect other nationalisms", while "our nationalism is constructive … and seeks to defend both

our borders and honor …; it aims to renew our internal situation … not to attack or humiliate any non-French nation."[39] If Hervé sometimes appeared to be quite perceptive about Nazism as early as 1930, his analysis remained equivocal because his binary vision continued to place Hitler as a force promoting German domestic harmony. Nazi excess was simply due to youth, inexperience, and Hitler's excitable followers who had experienced the hecatombs of war, the bedlam of parliamentary bickering, and the deleterious effects of economic collapse.

Hervé claimed that the Nazi election victories of 1930 were an omen of a new war,[40] yet he followed such an assessment with a call to the French to duplicate the feat of the Nazis, except for their anti-Semitism. After repeated failures of his own in domestic politics, Hervé both feared and admired the Nazi abilities to activate the "masses" and promote their movement. He assumed that his own national socialist search for order, harmony, and peace was what Hitler was seeking, only more flamboyantly and more successfully.[41] In his comparison of the N.S.D.A.P. and the P.S.N., Hervé engaged in blatant wishful thinking in explaining how Hitler's anti-Semitism and expropriationist ideas were pure demagoguery which would eventually disappear.[42] *La Victoire*'s campaign for a French-German understanding was based on a number of erroneous assumptions. He had always been guilty of projecting politics in France onto politics in Germany, but in 1930 his equation of the P.S.N. with Nazism was ludicrous. It may be fair to see his efforts to reach reconciliation with Germany as a product of his vacillating yet persistent international ideals as well as the failure of the P.S.N. in the 1928 elections. Initially, Hervé's talk of reconciliation was a positive and optimistic sign that he had confidence in the Weimar Republic. In the era after 1930, Hervé's domestic policies certainly approached the program of fascism, without succumbing to most of its most reprehensible characteristics, even if his own assessment of fascism was superficial and myopic. The international and domestic turmoil of these years made it almost impossible to judge events accurately from Hervé's primary aim of French security. Torn between a fear of rising Nazi power and the need for France to emulate that power, Hervé's search for peace, guided as it was by fears for France, ended with a dangerous misjudgment of the nature of Nazism and a rather naïve and feckless attempt to duplicate fascism. Such a misguided assessment of the domestic and international situation is not explained by naiveté or wishful thinking alone, but must be tied to the persistence of a binary worldview that could only lead to distortion and misjudgement.

At some point Hitler's friend, Ernst Hanfstaengl, who was head of the Foreign Press Department of the Nazi Party by the beginning of 1930 and a writer for the *Völkischer Beobachter*, came in contact with "a not unfriendly journalist in Paris named Gustave Hervé" which led to "an exchange of open letters" between the

former *Sans Patrie* and Hitler "advocating Franco-German understanding."[43] Hitler's response to one of those editorial letters was printed in the Nazi newspaper on October 15, 1930 and reproduced by *La Victoire* on October 26. Hitler congratulated "the politician Gustave Hervé who was inspired by the magnificent idea of correcting the injustices and making the misunderstandings disappear." In his conclusion, the rising German demagogue seemed eager to reassure the architect of a French version of national socialism. "The Germany being announced by the national socialist movement will be either a nation respected as much as the others [...] or there will no longer be a Germany of order, but a Germany of Bolshevism." The Nazi leader's reaction was described as nuanced and cordial by the former French history professor, but it was clear, even to the director of *La Victoire*, that Hitler had no idea what the Frenchman meant by "reconciliation." The Nazi leader demanded that Hervé promote French arms reductions because "the Nazis would never upset the European equilibrium!" He also claimed that Hervé's idea of a Franco-German military alliance was unnecessary because peace could be better sought through the League of Nations! Hervé was upset by what he considered Hitler's failure to respond to his pleas for the guarantee of stable frontiers and a Franco-German reconciliation. He disagreed with Hitler's assessment of the Versailles Treaty, and he clearly rejected any idea of French disarmament in the present state of Europe where peace was tied to the League of Nations which was little more than a "joke." The notorious Breton concluded by asking Hitler to re-read the questions and to respond to them in the interests of a viable Franco-German reconciliation.[44] Apparently the Nazi leader failed to get the message, was too busy to respond, or thought that his initial reactions were clear enough.

Hervé should have known what Hitler thought even if he often projected his own assumptions onto the Nazi leader. The editor-in-chief at *La Victoire* periodically mentioned reading the *Völkischer Beobachter*, and he seems to have had the requisite skills in German to do so. On several occasions Hervé reported on how he had learned German by assiduous study during one of his pre-war "sabbaticals" in the Third Republic's splendid penitentiary institutions. Even though Hervé was probably reasonably well-informed about Hitler's speeches and writing, Gilles Heuré quite accurately argued that he failed to note "the contradictions in the Hitlerite program, alternately anticapitalist and antiproletarian, showing a revolutionary face or a conservative one, plunging with as much conviction into the limbo of the past as in the dreams of the future. What seduced Hervé about Hitler was that the latter seemed to situate himself outside the system." His positive reactions to Hitler may also have stemmed from his apparent admiration for "the resounding and richly colored propaganda" so crucial in the spread of Nazism.[45]

By 1930 and 1931 Hervé was becoming ever more apprehensive about the popular, anti-Semitic, anti-capitalist, and demagogic character of Nazism. Yet the editor-in-chief of *La Victoire* was under the illusion that nationalists of all countries including the Nazis could work together "to save Europe from the terrible Masonic and Marxist danger which menaces it."[46] Once Hervé realized that the Nazis were the wave of the future in Germany, he eased his stance on certain clauses of the Treaty of Versailles despite the negative reactions of the *Croix-de-Feu* and various veterans groups which charged him with both treachery and cowardice. On the other hand, Hervé accused France's extreme Right, moderates, and even some Radicals of being too cowardly to modify the treaty in the interest of peace.[47] Gilles Heuré described Hervé in these years as "hesitant and uncertain," preferring "the *Stahlhelm* over the 'popular and somewhat troubled wave' that supports Hitler."[48] However, there is no doubt that Hervé saw positive aspects in Nazism and generally stressed them. Whatever misgivings he may have entertained were almost always submerged by his overwhelming fears of the anarchy of Bolshevism and the chaos of parliamentarianism which Nazism, albeit as a last resort, was supposedly capable of remedying.

Because Hitler was categorized and pigeonholed as a German Boulanger or Déroulède, he was considered a German "providential man" who arose to defend order, discipline, and Christian civilization in the face of the great Bolshevik and Asiatic wave of international Marxism. Except for its anti-Semitism, Nazism, like French nationalism, was called the defender of *la patrie*, the army, religion, and property. As the leader of the P.S.N. saw it, German and French nationalists both felt the need to defend these basic aspects of civilized society. Nazism, like Boulangism, had the same ideas and the same anti-Semitism. Boulanger arose due to the *Diktat* of Frankfurt, just as Hitler was the consequence of the *Diktat* of Versailles.[49] "Our Boulangist wave was the distasteful gulp by the French nationalists in 1887 at the presence of the parliamentary mess installed in France by our Masonic Republic. Hitlerism is the supreme startled reaction of old patriotic and Christian Germany which stiffened against the Marxist Revolution and which does not wish to founder in Bolshevism like Russia. Hitler is like Boulanger, or because Boulanger did not have the spirit of a dictator, Hitler is a kind of German Mussolini … I know that once the Hitlerians obtain power, the Treaty of Versailles will be torn up at the first propitious occasion … This is the danger. It is because I have seen this danger grow on the horizon for three years, especially after the Hitlerian advance in September 1930, that I told our French nationalists …" to revise the conditions of the unenforceable treaty in order to make them acceptable to Hitler.[50]

In 1931 in order to promote a *rapprochement* before it was too late, Hervé collected articles from *La Victoire* written mainly in late 1930 and formed a book entitled *France-Allemagne: La Réconciliation ou la Guerre.*[51] He certainly knew that he had won over few of his countrymen with his reconciliation message. Someone like Emil Buré, writing in *L'Ordre* in late February 1931, called Hervé's campaign "a dangerous imprudence" because for Germany "generosity signifies weakness … Instead of discouraging Germany's revanchard zeal, [Hervé] encouraged it." Buré thought it was dangerous to choose uncertainty over certainty. And it was foolish as well as naïve to lose one's allies by trying to please an enemy "which thumbed its nose at us from the distance."[52] Certainly there is no evidence of direct Nazi funding of Hervé. Dietrich Orlow noted that the Nazis, even when they got power, still "did not routinely control [French] newspapers or bribe journalists" even if "they were not averse to using more indirect forms of financial influence to obtain good press coverage for the Third Reich [such as buying subscriptions, placing advertisement for things like German tourist agencies, promoting bilateral exchanges, or granting interviews with Hitler] … The Nazis complained that they still had virtually no success with the Parisian press, and only limited access to provincial papers."[53]

In the early summer of 1931, Hervé supported German views on the revision of the Young Plan and reiterated his admiration for Hitler's efforts to save his nation from Bolshevism.[54] Gilles Heuré wondered if domestic political setbacks might have accentuated support for Hitler at *La Victoire*. Was the increasingly marginalized journalist trying to generate support from various xenophobic (anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic?) forces on the extreme French Right? Could the radicalization of his nationalism have been an attempt to attract new sources of funding to cover the growing deficits of his newspaper? In Heuré's view, an editorial dated June 15, 1932 seemed to pass over some sort of threshold in his moves toward Nazism, even on the issue of anti-Semitism. That editorial took the Nazis at their word that they did not want to persecute the Jews, only those who infected Germany with Marxism. That version of Hitlerite anti-Semitism was much less odious to Hervé. Of course, his own national socialism was an updated version of the *Union Sacrée* which welcomed all religious groups. However, he concluded by stressing that: "It is not only in Germany but also in France that we wish to get rid of a socialism which is alien to our race and which no longer has anything in common with the idealistic socialism of our ancestors."[55]

After 1932 Hervé became increasingly conscious of the danger that Nazism posed for European peace. Whatever flirtation he may have had with anti-Semitism was always episodic, and he invariably stressed how it was a tactical error as well as a grotesque moral lapse. If Hitler remained a "marvelous agitator", he was still

a threat. Why else would Hervé have extolled strengthening the Anglo-French military alliance which was obviously directed against Germany?[56] Hitler not only had "the unemployed, the desperate, and the exasperated" behind him, he also knew that many of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles could only be enforced by war, which had become an unthinkable course of action for the French. On the other hand, Hervé considered the rise of Nazism as an aspect of capitalist and Christian civilization's self-defense against the forces of socialism and Bolshevism. In a choice between Nazism and Bolshevism, Hervé had no doubts about which polarity represented order and harmony. Much as Hervé feared the German resurgence, his own acceptance of a bipolar political view forced him to minimize the Nazi threat at least to his readers and among the French nationalists he continued to court. Even though he cautioned Hitler about Nazi anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and efforts to displace Hindenburg in 1932, Hervé persisted in projecting his own notions onto *Der Führer* so that the Nazi ascendancy was viewed as a march toward a German *République Autoritaire*.[57] That same year, Hervé argued that Nazism, except for its anti-Semitism, was a traditional authoritarian renewal which was necessary to create a "union of European nationalisms against the internationalist social revolution represented by the collectivist and communist disciples of Karl Marx and their allies from Radical Free-Masonry."[58]

The campaign for a Franco-German reconciliation did not cause Hervé's political marginalization on the French Right because his marginalization dated from the end of the war if not before. The apparent contradictions in Hervé's foreign and domestic policies are clear. He wanted an authoritarian regime for France yet he vacillated concerning the German attempts to destroy the Weimar Republic.[59] His search for order and stability in France and Europe led him to accept any leader or movement that he thought duplicated his own aims no matter what political positions happened to be propounded. At various times in the inter war period Hervé nearly equated Clemenceau, Millerand, Briand, Pétain, Boulanger, Déroulède, Mussolini, and Hitler. The fears of internal disorder and external menace led him to project his own ideas and solutions onto a variegated and motley assortment of strong political leaders who might become the providential figures to save their countries and Europe from chaos and anarchy. In this process Hervé showed tendencies to naïveté, despair, blind faith, or simple wishful thinking. His sincere search for international peace and social harmony, which did not lack a certain prescience, failed, in part, because his assumptions rested on a simple bipolar logic which was sometimes able to reverse reality itself. How else was Hervé temporarily able to see the chief symbol of modern nihilism and evil as a potential "defender of the faith?"

Hitler's coming to power vindicated Hervé's efforts to create a Franco-German reconciliation. The French Left had scoffed at the notion that Hitler could ever achieve power. The French Right had not followed Hervé's advice on a reconciliation with Germany. Rather than simply taking some satisfaction in the accuracy of his foreign policy prognostications, Hervé extolled the virtues of Nazism and called on the French to join the latest political creation promoted by *La Victoire*, *La Milice Socialiste Nationale*, a purported French equivalent of Nazism. Hitler had saved Germany the way Mussolini had saved Italy; France must support *La Milice* and put forward a leader from outside Parliament to act as had Hitler and Mussolini. For the moment, France had to revise the Treaty of Versailles in order to avoid war. "As bitter as Germany's *redressement* is to us, there is a consolation and a hope too."[60] Hervé's explanation did not quite fit his own serious worries. How could he be almost exultant when the events he had so long feared were about to occur? If Nazism equaled *La Milice* and *La Milice* was for harmony, national renewal, and peace, why the urgency? Why the exasperation? Why the excitement? Why did France need to protect itself against both internal and external dangers? Just three days after his apparent self-satisfaction and his triumphant congratulations to Hitler, Hervé was convinced that war was imminent because Hitler was about to bring back the Kaiser![61] Gradually Hervé realized that French national socialism and "the German variant" were themselves almost poles apart on critical questions, especially on the issue of anti-Semitism.[62] Herve's eventual support of a Franco-Russian Alliance would show that he was virtually alone on the French extreme Right to sense the real danger for his nation.

Although he often continued to see anti-Semitism as a mere tactical error, Hervé became increasingly sensitive to the rising complaints coming from Germany. To Hitler's claim that he did not want to kill the Jews, just boycott them, the former *Sans Patrie* wondered how anyone could live if they were not allowed to work. The stories of anti-Semitism coming out of Germany were not simply biased inventions of the foreign press which was upset with the Nazis. When an entire race, which counts among its ranks so many good and distinguished people, is assailed, anxious cries arise and humanitarian issues are raised. "What a rude shock to our views about German national socialism which we thought we agreed with on the essential issues. How can we talk of Franco-German reconciliation any longer? Hitler may have saved Germany from Marxism but he is leading it to other catastrophes."[63] If Hitler's actions increasingly raised doubts in the mind of his French admirer, the slightest relaxation in the persecutions had a calming effect. In April 1933 such a surge of hope and enthusiasm led Hervé to brag about being the first person in Europe to have used the national socialist label back in 1916 and to

dismiss all talk of another Franco-German war. At this point, anti-Semitism did not seem to be any worse to him than the Combist anticlerical wave. Hervé now claimed that Léon Blum threatened France with a social revolution which was a hundred times worse than anything coming from Germany.[64]

Three years after his book on Franco-German reconciliation and before formally naming Pétain as his latest "providential man", Hervé again attempted to create a Franco-German reconciliation. Once again he collected some of his editorials on French-German relations, this time from late 1933 and early 1934, in order to form the brochure titled *Une Voix de France*. This publication was immediately translated into German under the title *Eine Stimme Aus Frankreich*. This short volume was the first in a proposed series by *L'Action Internationale des Nationalistes*, a group which aimed to create a supranational order on the basis of self-sufficient and renewed national entities. The same group saw Nazism as one of the forces for national renewal and international peace! By then Hervé's position was much more ambivalent on the question of Nazism than his sponsoring group.[65] In his introduction to *Une Voix de France*, Hervé used the Depression as a touchstone to explain the failures of his national socialism and to disclose reasons for its inevitable success. French national socialism had failed due to prior French prosperity, stability, and wealth. The Depression demanded and made possible a strong French government, a *République Autoritaire*, to solve the domestic crisis and to reconcile with Hitler because a parliamentary government could not act consistently. Hervé cautioned the Germans to be patient for the arrival of a providential leader in France.[66] Conflicting ideas characterized Hervé's foreign policy positions after the Nazis came to power. He spoke about a Franco-Russian Alliance as early as May 1933, yet he never ceased demanding a reinforcement of the French army. The contradictions and conflicts vanish once it is realized that Hervé wanted French security in any manner possible.[67]

Hervé compared the Nazi Revolution to the French Revolution except that the German Revolution was less bloody. He also called Hitler a modern Danton or Desmoulins as well as a German Boulanger. Though he tried to accept Hitler as moderate and sincere, Hervé was increasingly troubled by Nazi excesses, especially its anti-Semitism. He wanted Germany to know that France would fight, but he told France's Eastern European allies that they themselves had better deal with Hitler because France would not fight for their "petty interests." Because Hervé could not believe that anyone such as Hitler, who was over thirty years old and had seen the horrors of war, could be as extreme as the rhetoric he employed, the French national socialist was tempted to blame Hitler's excesses on his youthful followers. At any given time after the rise of the Nazis, Hervé was apt to make excuses for Hitler, to try to understand the Nazi leader, or to lament having misjudged him,

but the general direction of Hervé's reactions was clear. He could see grave danger to France on the Eastern horizon.[68] Perhaps Hervé's frantic efforts to find security for France were not blameworthy, but such an incoherent analysis of Nazism could never offer a solution to France's predicament. Any of Hervé's assessments taken out of context could create a false impression, but the full range of Hervé's avenues to reconciliation with Germany in 1933 and 1934 did nothing to solidify a French position. Of course, it is now fairly clear that confrontation or war were the only actions that could have succeeded in stopping Hitler after January 30, 1933, but Hervé's entire program demanded peace and harmony whatever the price.

Hervé's foreign policy was inextricably bound to his domestic program because he assumed that a constitutional revision creating a *République Autoritaire* led by a "providential man" was the only means to create the French harmony and strength necessary for either reconciliation with Germany or a necessary defense of France against Nazism. Only such a leader could guarantee the rearmament of France. Hervé's domestic and foreign programs sought peace above all, but his version of internal harmony and French strength would have estranged the majority of Frenchmen and thus prevented the very French unity demanded and sought. Civil or social war was probably the only way to arrive at Hervé's solutions, but that had been ruled out axiomatically as anarchistic. For a utopian vision of almost any variety to be effected, a non-utopian avenue seems mandatory. Since 1912 Hervé had come to realize intuitively that violence was never a path to utopia. What he had failed to comprehend was that any implementation of his conception of harmony under the Third Republic would have ushered in the very chaos and disorder he wanted to avoid.

"From day to day, from week to week, Hervé went from confidence to fear, from blind enthusiasm to clear disgust."[69] In June 1933 he reaffirmed that his national socialism had nothing to do with anti-Semitism, and in October of the same year he promised that French national socialists would lead the way in combating the vile anti-Semitism that was gaining ground in France. Yet in February 1934, somehow Hitler was like Danton! In June that same year he worried about the return of the Hohenzollerns but had not yet given up on a Franco-German reconciliation. Nevertheless, with a growing measure of realism, he called for increased terms of military service and was even willing to look in the direction of Moscow if that could help France.[70] Anyone was welcome in his inventory of the forces which could help France meet the German threat. He had always assumed that Italy, as a kindred state, would be a viable partner against Germany, so he was generally dismayed to see the Axis emerge. He had continued to entertain the possibility of an Italian, British, and French coalition at the time of the Stresa Conference of April

1935 before the Ethiopian invasion came to dash that possibility. Because he was increasingly certain that Germany was a growing menace, he counted on England as a sure ally capable of giving Nazi Germany pause. However, he was able to criticize French foreign policy for seeming to encircle Germany, and throughout most of 1934 Hervé stressed how a Franco-German reconciliation was much more important than France's Eastern alliances. On the other hand, by late November 1934 he applauded the *entente* that was being formed with the Soviet Union. This apparent reversal in his ideas was justified by the assertion that the Soviet Union was now in a period of national socialism![71] After the declaration of German rearmament in March 1935, fear alone can explain Hervé's embrace of the Franco–Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance on May 2, 1935. His enthusiasm for the treaty was coupled with an attack on French conservatives for their hostility to it. He was willing to ally with the Bolshevik menace if that could protect France. Initially, he stressed how such an alliance was the best chance for peace, but gradually it became a necessity for war.[72]

La Victoire did not condemn the Italian attack on Ethiopia, but it was not happy about the end of the Stresa Front. Hervé believed that France had no moral right to censure colonial actions. If Europe faced a choice between a violation of the League of Nations and a European war arising from an attack on a "half-savage" African state, Hervé's choice was clear. On colonial issues Hervé was generally idealistic and humanitarian until the interests of French security were involved. When he cautioned Italy, the purpose was to pacify British feelings and interests. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the reactions of Britain, and the resulting Franco-British tensions over Italy's actions strained Hervé reactions because he wanted to maintain French ties to both European powers. Generally *La Victoire* accepted Italy's right to have "a place in the African sun" and supported all of Pierre Laval's maneuvers to obtain Italian cooperation, but he would do nothing to jeopardize French ties to Britain.[73] After the League failed to act against Japan over Manchuria and against Paraguay over Bolivia, *La Victorire* could interpret the League's sanctions against Italy as due to Britain's fears for its Mediterranean trade routes.[74] To resolve the problems over sanctions and to prevent a possible British-Italian conflict, Hervé called upon France to offer Italy half of Madagascar in compensation if they gave up their Abyssinian ambitions. Such pragmatic schemes were expected to solve French security needs rather than save Italians and Ethiopians from further bloodshed, yet they earned the former *Sans Patrie* ridicule on the French Right for his naïveté and apparent softness.[75] Hervé became so exasperated over the diplomatic fallout arising from the invasion of Ethiopia and the tension it placed on French security needs that he argued for the muzzling

of the press (including himself, apparently) under a *République Autoritaire* as the only solution to diplomatic imbroglios![76]

Persistent illusions or optimistic notions about Hitler and Nazism had not ceased to appear in *La Victoire*, but by 1934 and 1935 Hervé's sympathy for Nazism was contradicted by his own editorials. *La Victoire* hoped that France would obtain Italian cooperation to protect Europe from German belligerence. Whatever hesitation Hervé now expressed over the *Anschluss* arose from a reluctance to offend Italy. Hervé, of course, had sanctioned the *Anschluss* on the basis of national self-determination since the end of the war. *La Victoire* was hopeful that the Stresa Front could pressure Germany against rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles even though the former *Sans Patrie* for years had called rearmament questions an unenforceable aspect of the Treaty.[77] "Hervé was a vehement partisan of the revision of the treaties, but he condemned all the violations of them. In his view, Germany had to wait for France to propose such revisions."[78] As late as November 1935 the former *Sans Patrie* disagreed with Winston Churchill's anti-German goals for France and Britain, and he described the Nazi leader as "a hero not a monster." Britain and France should not block the *Anschluss*, if that's what Austria wanted, but they should reconcile with Nazi Germany. For Hervé: "All the Germans in Austria are not worth the bones of one French *fantassin*."[79]

Maurice Agulhon thought that the renewed contacts with the U.S.S.R. and tightening of links with France's natural allies in Eastern Europe were engineered by Louis Barthou once the fascist menace at home and abroad was perceived. The antifascist policy pursued by Barthou was dealt a blow and the expectations of France's Eastern allies were shattered by the assassination of the Foreign Minister during the visit of the Yugoslav King Alexander, who was the actual object of the attack, on October 9, 1934 in Marseilles. Unlike Barthou, Pierre Laval, who replaced him at the Foreign Ministry, "had almost no faith in any backing to come from central Europe." And Laval was ready to find common cause with Italy, which led to the Stresa Front in April 1935 to oppose Hitler's proposed rearmament and efforts to placate Italy over Ethiopia even at a sacrifice of international law and morality.[80] Divisions on the French Right were symptomatic of the extent to which ideology was coming to override traditional foreign policy alignments. Thereby, new political configurations were created which anticipated the Vichy era. "Although the Briand consensus had blurred the distinction between left and right over foreign policy, the right had remained more suspicious of Germany. When Doumergue came to power in 1934, his Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, ended disarmament talks and started to explore *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. This was a traditional conservative policy to recruit allies irrespective of

ideology like Republican France in her pre-1914 alliance with Tsarist Russia." After Barthou's assassination, Laval inherited his preparations for a pact with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, initially it failed to pass the Chamber because 164 conservative deputies rejected it. Their fear of Germany was outweighed by their suspicions of the Soviet Union and their dread of communism at home.[81]

On the eve of the Popular Front, Hervé hoped that France and its allies could promise Germany enough concessions that there could be a reconciliation among France, Germany, and the U.S.S.R. If Hitler then still pushed for war, everyone would be able to see how France had done all that it could to avoid war. Yet Hervé worried that the Left was just as distrustful of Hitler as the Right was distrustful of the Pact with Russia. That boded ill for France's long-term interests. If only the nation could get rid of its parliamentary regime the way Germany did, then the two countries could gain a lasting reconciliation![82] When the Franco-Soviet Pact finally came, it "gave Hitler a new line of credit among the French right. The French right, both moderates and extremes, were vehemently opposed to the pact … If the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact added substantially to Hitler's stock of good will … among French fascists, the dictator's decision to invade the demilitarized Rhineland put a severe drain upon it" at least in the short term.[83]

"The Popular Front changed conservatives' attitudes on foreign policy. A war against Italy or Germany in alliance with the Soviet Union would, they now feared, pave the way for a Communist takeover of France."[84] Much as Hervé opposed Marxism and Communism, his overriding fear of Germany made him enthusiastic about a Franco-Russian Pact even as he continued to call for reconciliation with Germany to avoid war. On February 10, 1936 he assailed French conservatives and moderates for failing to support a Russian alliance and predicted a future Nazi-Soviet Pact if France did not maintain its pact with Russia.[85] He was even willing to introduce the "Yellow Peril" as a motive to get the French Right to support the Russian pact.[86] Much as he feared a Popular Front, he had predicted such an occurrence after February 6, 1934. Just weeks before the Popular Front victory Hervé lamented the Right's fears for the Franco-Soviet pact and he cautioned the Left about its lack of willingness to give Hitler a chance. On February 29, 1936 the former *Sans Patrie* contrasted Hitler's simplicity, sincerity, and South German *bonhomie* with traditional Prussian severity.[87] Despite such contradictory rhetoric and perpetual tergiversations, Hervé's flexibility over French relations with the Soviet Union was undoubtedly tied to his fears of Nazism.

Gilles Heuré thought that Hervé's rupture with Hitler and the end of any realistic hope for a Franco-German reconciliation came with reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936.[88] However, such deadlines and thresholds never fit

Hervé's mercurial personality and spontaneous editorials. In fact, at the beginning of March, he had been ready for any territorial concessions in Eastern Europe if they could prevent war. A return of German colonies was even broached as a means to placate Nazi appetites.[89] Even though Hervé had often called Hitler and Nazism "safety valves" against threats from the German Left, he was greatly troubled by Hitler's brutal reoccupation of the Rhineland. The former *Sans Patrie* thought that Hitler's violent act was just like the violation of Belgium in 1914 and had sabotaged any chances for a Franco-German reconciliation. This was nothing less than a repudiation of Locarno and a clear signal about the fading prospects for peace. It was becoming clear to the director of *La Victoire* that a "disloyal, faithless, and lawless" Nazi government was engaged in policies which could only lead to war. It was again time for Hervé to burn his dangerous volumes as he claimed to have done in 1914, but this time he confessed to burning the ones demanding "reconciliation or war."[90] Hitler needed to be sent a clear message by the League of Nations because continuing German expansionism now seemed inevitable. At times he even argued that France and the rest of Europe should run the risk of war rather than wait and give Hitler time to swallow up all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Though the League had the right to employ military sanctions against Germany, Hervé was willing to settle for economic and financial measures to force the withdrawal of German troops because France should not be made to appear to be an aggressor.[91]

He now seconded Churchill's exasperation with the British reluctance to fulfill its obligations. How could the British government fail to see that "Kaiser Hitler" was issuing "*Diktats*"?[92] For Hervé, it was now time for Britain to support French security needs just as France had supported British interests in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.[93] *La Victoire* assumed that Hitler was bluffing, but the British methods of response simply encouraged an accelerating pace in Nazi demands which would be impossible to stop.[94] After the London Conference of the Locarno powers toward the end of March 1936, Hervé blasted Britain as "the saboteur of European peace" because its stance "has increased the chances of general war ten-fold."[95] Lamenting that British guarantees to France and Belgium meant little because Britain was not committed to defend East European powers from German aggression as was France, Hervé demanded a general European mutual assistance pact or international gendarmerie to save the peace.[96] If the former *Sans Patrie* still interpreted the priorities and actions of the League of Nations from the narrow perspective of French interests, his vacillation toward the League declined and his outright hostility ended. The founder of the P.S.N. now lamented the "collapse of the beautiful dream," seeing parallels between the demise of the League and the collapse of the Second International in 1914.[97] One

month after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Hervé described Mussolini's earlier attack on Ethiopia as the beginning of the decline in international order. The League of Nations had allowed one of its members to be attacked without suitably punishing the aggressor.[98] Though the tone of Hervé's editorials had dramatically changed after the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, that was far from his final word on Hitler and Nazi Germany. Much as he wanted France to act decisively in the face of the Nazi threat, the former *Sans Patrie* never ceased to lament that France had become a "second rate power" due to the decadence and depopulation brought on by de-Christianization and the secularization of education which exacerbated France's functional weakness arising from parliamentary factionalism, demagoguery, and the concomitant budgetary irresponsibility.[99]

When Blum refused to sell arms to Republican Spain because Britain refused to support France in the event of a general war, popular support for the Popular Front started to erode. Blum assumed he had no alternative policy on Spain because the Radicals threatened to leave the government if the English connection were jeopardized. Even though most people knew that the Germans and Italians were violating the nonintervention agreement, Blum's hands were tied and many of his supporters lost faith in the Popular Front.[100] "The line between pro- and anti-interventionists passed not between the right and the left, but through the left itself: between the Communists, some Socialists, and a few Radicals favoring intervention, and many Socialists … and most Radicals who opposed any action which might lead to European war. Blum was caught in between, his heart for intervention, his head against. In this case his head won out."[101]

The Spanish Civil War was also an issue that complicated Hervé's ideas on international politics. He was unable to maintain a consistent course because he wanted peace above all else and because the Spanish Civil War broke out to threaten his position concerning the Soviet Union. With Spain now embroiled in turmoil, *La Victoire* began to vacillate on the role of the Soviet Union in international events. Hervé blamed the Comintern and the Bolsheviks for sabotaging the Franco-Russian defensive alliance by their reckless actions in Spain. Franco was too close to his image of a "providential man" for Hervé not to support the nationalists in Spain.[102] Hervé was bound to interpret the Spanish Civil War from his narrow binary perspective which placed Franco and the nationalists on the positive side of unity, order, and harmony, which meant that the republicans were relegated to the negative pole and described as anti-national, anti-religious, and collectivist.[103] "Hardened by his authoritarian ideology, he rose up against the 'Voltairian Spanish' bourgeoisie and applauded Franco's *pronunciamiento*." Spanish Nationalist troops received all the moral and political support necessary

from *La Victoire*, even though German and Italian aid to *El Caudillo* was too blatant and provocative for Hervé's taste. He may have felt pity over the "agony of Barcelona" and even recommended clemency and material assistance for the starving and defeated of Catalonia, but he wanted France to recognize Franco and congratulated his latest providential hero, Pétain, on a successful mission to Spain.[104]

Vacillation over Nazism and Hitler was now paralleled by his vacillation over the Soviet Union. It was soon clear that Hervé had not relinquished his hopes for reconciliation with Germany. An alliance with the devil in Moscow could not be given up, but reconciliation with the devil in Berlin was still a possible avenue to peace in Hervé's view. He failed to realize that French attempts to placate both totalitarian powers at the same time could increase the chances of war. In the words of Maurice Agulhon, "By a complete inversion of what had been the moral situation in 1923–4, it was now the right that could accuse the left of war mongering [over Spain and Nazi Germany]."[105] The German-Japanese Alliance, announced in late November 1936, seemed to exacerbate the danger of war, according to Hervé, because France's ally Russia was right in between the two allied dictatorships and that could draw France into an unnecessary and dangerous war. After cautioning the Russians about their revolutionary propaganda which could give the Germans and Japanese a pretext for war, the former *Sans Patrie* immediately began to entertain the hope that the pact between Germany and Japan might at least help to bring France, Britain, and the United States closer together.[106] *L'Humanité* was quick to respond to these anti-Soviet arguments by branding *La Victoire* a pro-war newspaper allied to the Hitlerian General Franco and crusading under the sign of the swastika.[107]

When Hervé got wind of the purges and show trials in Moscow, he still claimed that Stalin was a thousand times more correct and realistic than Trotsky, who was considered an ideological zealot. The troubles in Moscow, like the troubles in Nazi Germany at one point, were blamed on terrorists or doctrinaire communists apparently guiding Stalin. For Hervé, Stalin needed to return private property in the countryside and resurrect the capitalist system or the Soviet Union would be headed for a military dictatorship. Of course, that might not be all bad because the Red Army would cure Russia of communism. Apparently borrowing an increasingly outdated as well as threadbare image, Hervé described the U.S.S.R. as "a radish, red on the outside, white on the inside."[108] Obsolete images, misguided projections, historical anachronisms, contradictory perspectives, and clever insights merrily co-existed on the pages of *La Victoire*.

The Maginot Line responded both to the French weariness with war and the continuing pacifism throughout most of the political spectrum. The very

investment in that defense system would drain resources which should have gone toward a modernization of weapons and tactics which Charles De Gaulle was then trying to promote against the wishes of a gerontocracy led by De Gaulle's superior and Hervé's hero, Marshal Pétain.[109] Even the director of *La Victoire* realized that the next war "will be a war of gas powered vehicles and air power," although he expressed confidence in the Maginot Line as one of the factors which gave France security and just might prevent war.[110] Such contradictory perspectives were not unusual at *La Victoire*. Having read *Mein Kampf*, Hervé was well aware that Hitler planned to deal with France before attacking the Soviet Union, and he assumed that the Germans would simply skirt the Maginot Line by way of Belgium.[111] Ironically, events in Spain reassured Hervé that France was secure behind its Maginot Line because if German forces "had so much trouble around Madrid against the fellows of the International Brigade, it will have much more trouble with the Maginot Line with the French army inside in a better state than in 1914."[112]

"Favorable in the 1920s to a policy of firmness, the French right in its vast majority rallied imperceptively to anti-war options whose ulterior motives were rather well-expressed by the straightforward Léon Bailby, the Director of *Le Jour*, when he exclaimed at the peak of the Munich Crisis: 'We don't want war now; we need a respite which will give us time to get rid of our rotten leaders.'"[113] After the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Hervé was far more skeptical of German intentions and the possibilities for reconciliation, but he had not given up hope. "We need to reject article 231—the war guilt clause, give back German colonies, and return Danzig and Austria to Germany if Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia agree."[114] France was unable to halt German actions through either force or reconciliation. The key issues left unresolved by the allies during the interwar had been the cancellations of war debts, arms equality, the Saar prior to plebiscite, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland. At the moment, in order to attend to even more dangerous situations in the Polish Corridor, Silesia, Danzig, and the *Anschluss*, Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and Italy needed to reconcile to stop Hitler. A reconciliation could then proceed with Germany, but first France itself would have to reconcile internally behind Pétain.[115] In the years before the war, Hervé also wished that the Popular Front government could urge the Little Entente to agree to revise the Treaty of Trianon so that Germany and Hungary would have less reason to combine for treaty revision by force. He did not want to admit that those disputed lands meant as much to the countries involved as Alsace-Lorraine had meant to France. The former history professor also maintained his nostalgia for some sort of recreation of the former Austria Empire involving the Danubian states as a way to solve some of the current territorial grievances.[116]

With the growing threat of war, Hervé's combative rhetoric began to echo his tone during World War I. He did not want Hitler to think that he could get away with anything, so he demanded that France and Britain not act like "dead dogs." Though the former *Sans Patrie* could see the "war clouds gathering over Europe," the hope for peace lingered on. His prediction concerning the inevitability of the *Anschluss* was hardly a call to war or an end to thoughts of compromise especially since he described Hitler's aims over Austria as a fairly obvious desire "by a nation which wanted to round off its unity."[117] If compromise were still possible, its manner of attainment and implementation remained crucial. It was becoming increasingly clear even at *La Victoire* that Hitler was oblivious to such forms and niceties.[118] Though Hervé wanted France to be ready for war with Germany, such an assessment never led to a critical analysis of the Nazi system according to Gilles Heuré. Hervé's efforts were directed at protecting France and resisting Hitler's claims in order to prevent the chaos of general war. Even though he had given up hope in Hitler, his own reactions to events were still capable of going full circle in a matter of days.



Figure 50. Édouard Daladier (1884–1970) and Georges Bonnet (1889–1973) traveling by car in Paris after their return from Munich in September 1938. (© Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Throughout most of the interwar era, Hervé was generally ready to amend the errors and naiveté of Versailles especially as it dealt with Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig. But he had always stressed that the revision of the treaties should not be done by force.[119] During the interwar era Hervé had fairly consistently accepted the *Anschluss* as a just German claim. Yet on the eve of its enactment, he became strangely less amenable. Concessions to Germany were justified, but Hervé still insisted that any revisions to the Treaty of Versailles be mutually agreed upon. He was not surprised by the disappearance of Austria in March 1938, but he was distressed by the brutal manner of its enactment.[120] German ruthlessness did not cause Hervé to hesitate on the question of German claims to the Sudetenland, at least initially. Much as he feared for the fate of the Czechs, he saw no reason to risk war over a valid German claim. In the summer of 1938, *La Victoire du Dimanche* supported German claims to the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor, and Danzig. Hervé was at least consistent in citing the nationality principle as his guide during the interwar period.[121]

In 1938, like almost the entire French Chamber, minus the Communists, Hervé favored all possible concessions and was unwilling to fight over any of Hitler's Eastern European demands. Before the Munich Crisis was over he seemed to thank everybody "under the sun" for France's escape from war over the Sudetenland.[122] However, once he realized that Britain and France had appeared both weak and cowardly, he pivoted quickly, calling Munich a capitulation and denouncing the defeatism of "certain Frenchmen blinded by the hatred of Moscow and other communists." So it was the humiliation arising from the Munich Crisis of September 1938 that led Hervé to start to accept the inevitability of war. After the German seizure of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hervé claimed to have no more illusions about Hitler. The German entry into the rump Czech state on March 16, 1939 was labeled "the assassination of a nation."[123]

For Pascal Ory, "The Munich Crisis retrospectively appears to have been the bond of future collaborationist solidarity. A great fault line, it ran the gamut of the French political world, without respect to traditional cleavages."[124] If that were so, Hervé quickly moved to the other side of the political fissure. Hitler's turgid autobiography *Mein Kampf* was finally taken seriously by *La Victoire*. Hervé now demanded a British Alliance with Russia, perhaps not understanding that Munich meant that the "Mutual Assistance Pact with Russia was now meaningless."[125] He finally realized the futility of Chamberlain's conflicting efforts to soothe and intimidate Hitler. *La Victoire* supported Anglo-French guarantees to Poland. Hitler was now labeled a "dangerous fool" and Mussolini was a traitor to all that a "providential man" was supposed to be.[126] By the time of the Munich Crisis, many

French leftists feared that the Communists might be trying to drag France into war. In the words of Julian Jackson: "If the anti-communism of many conservatives had led them to pacifism, the pacifism of many Popular Front leftists had led them to anti-communism."[127] However, for a patriot like Hervé it was time to forget old hatreds and resurrect the *Union Sacrée* because once again French citizens found *la patrie en danger*.

31

Hervé, World War II, and Vichy

With war imminent Hervé's thoughts about a new Bonapartist wave and a revision of the French Constitution under Pétain gradually faded. He certainly continued to deplore the French Right's division, lack of courage, and ineptitude. If fears for French decadence and hopes for a *République Autoritaire* were never forgotten, they were increasingly dormant, because it was obviously time for a new *Union Sacrée* and another program for the *désarmement des haines*. The situation was so grave that the focus had to be, once again: *la patrie en danger*. There was no room for defeatism at *La Victoire*. Before the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Hervé had placed much hope in Communist forces at home and in Russia to stop the unhinged Nazi leader. Once Hitler and Stalin had reached an accord, Hervé was mortified (rather than relieved like Colonel de La Rocque),[1] but he cautioned those who wanted to declare war on the U.S.S.R. at a time when Nazi Germany might welcome a full military alliance with the Russians. His immediate reaction to the Pact was an expression of confidence in the patriotism of the French Communists. When the P.C.F. soon showed signs of antipatriotism, he was quick to castigate them. But he quickly dismissed talk of Communist defeatism as mere rumors which could only hurt French morale. The eventual P.C.F. alignment behind Moscow led Hervé to claim that "this is the first time since the birth of modern France that a workers' and popular party has exhibited such treason."[2] Rather than wallow in what has

been called the predominantly anti-Communist tone in France between 1939 and 1940,[3] once war was declared, Hervé made a complete return to his attitude of August 1914, and he rallied fully behind the government. *La Victoire* now sought to sustain the morale of the entire nation. Ministerial crises and constitutional revision could only damage the war effort. However, in December 1939 *La Victoire* fleetingly entertained the idea that a recess of parliament for the duration of the war might be an advantage. When military defeats and setbacks came, his general response was the same as in *La Grande Guerre*: "France would win, just wait!" The emergence of Pétain on the eve of defeat seemed to catch even Hervé by surprise. Whatever vindication he might have felt was offset by the fall of France.[4]

In the months before the war, Hervé again readied his readers, few as they were, for the difficult days ahead. Again his headlines would read: "La Patrie en Danger!" But the enemies at the gate, just a short time before had been the objects of much praise in the editorials of *La Victoire*. As war approached in 1939, Hitler became the "murderer" or "madman of Berchtesgaden" after his assaults on the Czechs and Poles in 1939. Now the editorials of Hervé echoed the tones of battle from the days of World War I as he appealed to the Russians, prior to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, to join France against the Germans and promoted a new *Union Sacrée* for an expected "fight to the finish" against the Nazi menace.[5] In early September 1939 the former *Sans Patrie* wrote an editorial calling on his countrymen to pray for their own safety or, better yet, for the troops. If they were unbelievers, he told them they could hum a patriotic song instead. Then he unleashed every expletive against Hitler that he felt he could print. The dynamic and charismatic *Führer* had become a bandit, a bastard, an ignoble brute, an abominable savage, a murderer, a crazy sadist, someone who was unhinged, a man off his rocker, a bloody nut, a ninny, an idiot, a cretin, a cow, a jackass, and an extraordinary hypocrite. Hervé gloried in reenacting the role he had played in *La Grande Guerre*. He did not even mind refurbishing his editorials with all the accoutrements of "*le bourrage de crâne*" if that could prevent France from becoming overwhelmed by "all these grumps, these critics, these extinguishers of ideals, devotion, and the spirit of sacrifice, these neurasthenics who display their skeptical attitudes, their nervous laughter, and their demoralizing spirits."[6]

If Hervé was sometimes troubled and confused by Communist reactions during the immediate *avant-guerre*, his ideas about Mussolini were also ambiguous. If he had become extremely bitter with Mussolini by 1940, his reactions to the Italian *Duce* still seemed equivocal. In an editorial dated March 1, 1940 he tried to contrast two ways to deal with the unfairness and inequality of the world. There was the democratic and Christian spirit of fairness and charity and there

was the Marxist method of state expropriation and force. The trouble was that he had to admit that a third method of conquest and violence also existed, associated most recently with Imperial and Nazi Germany. Since Hervé still seemed to place Mussolini's Italy in the democratic and Christian camp, there was something contradictory and unresolved about his political logic. In the end, echoing the apostle Thomas, he said he could not believe that Mussolini would ever side with Hitler unless he saw it for himself! "And still, I would not believe it!" The "doubting Gustave" could not fully comprehend the world around him because he found it so difficult to jettison his anachronistic and binary political calculus.[7]

The same myopia was on display in his analysis of France's internal politics because he argued that Blum and the Popular Front had spent so much time assailing the 200 families and promoting the forty hour work week that they had neglected the army. One key problem was that he seemed to assume that the impending war would replicate the Great War.[8] As the battle of France unfolded, Hervé still talked about machine guns, trench cannon, and a defensive war! He seemed dumbfounded at the speed involved in a war of movement and was incredibly naïve about both the new technology of war and its accelerating violence. How else can one evaluate his assessment that "a child of thirteen" or "some motorcycle patrols" could easily deal with German parachutists. At the threshold of total defeat, on a day when *La Victoire* announced the death of long-time Hervé associate Émile Tissier after a two-year illness, Hervé expected or at least hoped for another miracle of the Marne. In reading his editorials throughout June 1940, there was little hint that France's military was about to collapse.[9] He went from "sovereign optimism" in seeing the tenacity of the French will to resist, all the way to "total annihilation when he guessed that the first German patrols were in sight of the Eiffel Tower."[10]

Jean Quéval, in his history of the Collaborationist press, described Hervé as "mentally prepared for the war, and when the enemy armies reached the Somme, his resolve was not weakened. He had explained the eminent justice of this war a hundred times, and [maintained] the trenchant certitude that we would win without changes in our slightest habits." Along with the bulk of the press of that era, *La Victoire* could not refrain from a "rather natural and naïve hope" backed by the luminaries of journalism along with the political leaders. "Consequently, there can be no personal reproach directed at Gustave Hervé. We emphasize simply that he took his place in the choir, that he sang his verse on the hereditary enemy with gusto, that he did not lack appetite [for the events]."[11] Gilles Heuré argued that there was no sense of jubilation or gloating by Hervé that his fears and predictions had come to pass; there was no sense of vindication upon seeing

the results and knowing that his advice had never been heeded. Because this was the "hereditary enemy" within the gates, he could not exult over a supposedly well-deserved collapse, as did Lucien Rebatet in *Les Decombres*, by blaming France's politicians, military leaders, and Jews for the defeat.[12] If Hervé failed to gloat, there was no immediate backing away from his general indictment of the parliamentary republic.

While most papers followed the government's advice and left Paris before the arrival of the Germans, Hervé remained in 1940 as he had in 1914. Jean Quéval explained that decision in terms of Hervé's recognition that the war was lost. Since the director of *La Victoire* myopically assumed that the situation would repeat the history of prior wars, occupations, and *revanche*, it was important for "a newspaper of ideas" to stay in the capital at that critical time. Although Quéval uncovered more naiveté than cunning in Hervé's stance, he wondered whether the right-wing journalist could also have been cynically factoring in the possibility that *La Victoire* might sell a lot better without the competition. Nevertheless, Quéval suspected that the episode boiled down to the "pride of an old man." In fact, the author was forced to admit that the role of Hervé and his newspaper during the occupation was very insignificant. What sin there was in terms of collaboration was "the sin of intention."[13] Quéval's indictment of Hervé spoke to his entire career even if the chronological account of that evolution was highly flawed. The founder of *La Victoire* was described as renouncing his international pacifism (sic) in 1914 under the protection of Briand. Then, in 1914 he, supposedly, quickly switched from sounding like Bakunin to echoing Déroulède. While in 1940, "with the same suddenness and the same equanimity", the tone of his voice quickly shifted from one that sounded like Déroulède to one reminiscent of Briand. In 1916 one would have thought he could have chosen a more circumspect title for his renamed newspaper, "but this fellow has never been very sensitive to ridicule, and that is why he so greatly deserves to have the leading role in our farce." If Hervé sounded a note of farce at the beginning of the era of collaboration, the laughter quickly subsided.[14]

Hervé's June 12 announcement that he would remain in Paris and continue publishing *La Victoire* as the Germans approached was coupled with claims that his newspaper would be the only one that would not depart. His reasons for staying in the French capital were certainly mixed and at times bordered on the delusional. "In the time of war, newspapers of our kind, which are detached from partisan politics[!], are they not something of a public service, a public service which maintains the morale of patriots?" His editorials sometimes included mixed messages: even though his articles recognized that the war had ended, the author's

words gave the impression that he expected the conflict to continue as in 1914. By remaining in Paris, he expected to lessen the confusion, chaos, and disorder. Perhaps he simply did not want to inconvenience himself by leaving. He argued that he hoped to share the fate of many who could not leave due to the essential nature of their jobs, a lack of resources, or the need to care for family elderly and invalids. He tied his decision to his earlier socialist concern for the poor, the powerless, and the humble which he now connected to Christian fraternity and the love of mankind. "Ah! It is beautiful, human fraternity in this moment, since [the rise of] Nazism and fascism!" He assumed that German propaganda would assail the Jews and France's allies, and he argued that *La Victoire* should be there to respond. There was little doubt in his mind that Parisians would respond properly when the time came.[15]

Even before the Germans arrived in Paris, the newspaper's printer's had disappeared from the scene, causing *La Victoire* to fail to appear for several days. By June 12 most Parisian newspapers stopped appearing and twenty-nine of them left the city. The arrival of the Germans in Paris on June 14, 1940 caused the further suspension of *La Victoire* for a few days.[16] On June 13, a day prior to the Occupation, Hervé rejected any type of collaboration with the occupier, but he foresaw the possibilities of arrest and grave troubles ahead. Then he sent a kind of ultimatum to the Germans. "But one must be very clear in saying this: If we do not manage to satisfy the transitory masters who will, perhaps, govern Paris tomorrow, it will be a great joy for everyone on our staff to die for France." That may have been bravado, but at that moment those trenchant lines seemed fitting. Nevertheless, that final sally was preceded by a familiar explanation of the disaster befalling the nation which connected defeat to the restriction of births and the concomitant materialism, pleasure-seeking, and loss of religious faith afflicting almost all groups in the country. Such decadent habits resulted in a weaker France: militarily, morally, and spiritually. That assessment could not help but extend the rancor of the interwar into the Occupation, even though Hervé would soon back away from many of those future collaborators who had shared his assessment and had recently been expected to renew the nation.[17]

By June 16, Hervé had gained permission from German occupation officers to continue publishing. On June 17, *La Victoire* and *Le Matin* were the only newspapers printed and sold in the capital, but Hervé's paper did not survive for long.[18] Jean Quéval thought that the appearance of *La Victoire* in the hour of defeat was seen by many as something of a joke. "A French journalist was found to take Chancellor Hitler under his protection and to remake Europe with an assured pen. One could believe that this was a dialogue between Machiavelli and Tartarin.

But the reversal of position was too rapid to convince the occupier, and of what use did he have for this nut who uttered, decided, and pompously predicted in the clouds; too much a laborer to be a nitwit, too much the nitwit to be a laborer."[19]

It must have been bizarre for Parisians to hear the *camelots* shout "*La Victoire*" as they tried to hawk Hervé's reactionary paper in the streets of occupied Paris. There was nothing contradictory for the paper's director because he chose not to acknowledge complete defeat, or, admitting the incredible collapse, he tried to raise the struggle to a transcendent realm but could not avoid returning to his pre-war rants almost as if nothing had happened. He continued to cast blame and assail enemies who, besides the Germans, were the same ones he had been deriding for two decades and more. In multiple articles on the 17th of June, he got out his multiple messages. In the military sphere, he recognized the obvious defeat. Perspicaciously, he finally realized that 1940 was not the same as 1914; the Marne could hardly be repeated without the Russians drawing enemy fire in the East. Then he returned to some familiar political, moral, and spiritual explanations of the disaster. "We are going to pay for 60 years of de-Christianization, depopulation, the lapse into paganism and materialism, and the fall into the anarchy of politicians … We are going to pay dearly … Providence gave us 25 years of respite and delay to straighten ourselves. We returned to our free-thinking, materialistic vomiting, to our moral and political anarchy of the Popular Front … *Parisiens*, my brothers, *Parisiennes* my sisters, from now on we all need to consider ourselves as prisoners … Hold your emotions until the day when peace will return, if it is an honorable peace … Ah! What an example are the German virtues! Without having to lose your great French qualities, cure yourselves a bit of your carelessness, of our French tendency to a kind of slovenly artist's appearance, grumbling, and anarchy!"[20]

His immense headlines of June 18, 1940 was "*C'est Petain qu'il nous fallait!*" which could be read in two senses as Heuré saw it. "It is indeed time or it is too late."[21] The next day Hervé spoke straight to the German occupiers as he stretched the truth, exaggerated his own role, omitted most of his usual chauvinism, claimed an almost perfect clairvoyance, and said almost everything imaginable to ingratiate himself. To show his positive attitude he rehashed the history of his search for a Franco-German reconciliation. "When Germany was at rock bottom, one voice rose up in France, only one, to extend the hand of France to lift it up and so that the Treaty of Versailles was revised in acceptable and honorable conditions for the conquered. That was the voice of our own *La Victoire*." He ascribed his failure to get the attention of the mass circulation press for a Franco-German reconciliation as due to the latter's "cowardice" and "incomprehension." After seeming to be

"speaking in the desert" in most of the period, Hervé noted how the provincial press eventually cited *La Victoire*, and even *Le Matin* began to use his message without giving him credit. Then Hervé went a bit beyond mere pleading. "We admit it to you, beneath it all, we were very favorable toward Hitler, with the man, with the German patriot, not only because we ourselves wanted an authoritarian regime in France, authoritarian in a French manner, but because we found it very well, on his part, that he asked for everything that was German, and he wanted to deliver his people from 'the chains of Versailles', as he said. We admit that we were in agreement with him, beneath it all, despite our reserves about the form, through Munich and even until March 15, 1939, the date of his occupation of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia." What Hervé refused to countenance was the subjugation of entire European states, whether large or small.[22]

"After such an admission, Hervé could indeed demand the right, as he did, to 'plead the cause of conquered France before Hitler and the new Germany, with his head high.' The hope and the obstinacy to be able to continue to publish prevented him, in this issue, from disappearing with dignity." Heuré wondered how Hervé could admit, or pretend to admit, that he had supported Hitler until mid-March 1939. How could he, in fact, deny what he had actually written? Was he simply showing the Germans his credentials to get their permission to continue publishing? Did he think that his future editorials could have such positive effects that his obsequious manner could be forgotten or forgiven? "Was it a question of a provisional calculation, of a total abdication, [or] of an unconscious desire to collaborate?" These are crucial questions which Heuré pondered as he analyzed Hervé's actions and reactions in June 1940. Certainly, the director of *La Victoire* could not bear to see his newspaper disappear. At the age of sixty-nine, he "had no other ambition than to do what he knew how to do: write, assail the enemy for one day, reconcile with him the next day, and ransom an actuality about which he no longer understood the real human implications nor the genuine ideological consequences. Pressed by time, menaced by the German occupation, he alternated indignations and resignations."[23]

On June 20, 1940 Hervé's last editorial in *La Victoire* was censored, so he replaced it with an article on *La République Autoritaire* which had appeared several years earlier. The original proofs of the censored article can be seen with the clearly visible red slashes of the censor.[24] In the censored article entitled "Three Obstacles to the Peace", Hervé advised Pétain against any peace that did not maintain the honor of France. Such an attitude was too much for the Germans, and that issue of *La Victoire* was the last one published by Hervé. In his final censored editorial Hervé instructed the Germans that his own ideas for a *République Autoritaire* as

early as World War I had actually foreshadowed fascism and Nazism. Yet Hervé was not censored for a faulty memory, exaggeration, or megalomania. *La Victoire* was banned because Hervé had advised Pétain to follow three steps to preserve French honor. France should accept: (1) no loss of territory, (2) no government imposed by the Germans, and (3) no peace unless the British approved. That final point amounted to a continuation of the Anglo-French Alliance. For Hervé the defeat of France simply meant that the stage of Franco-German reconciliation had to be replaced by an era of French-British-German reconciliation. He seemed certain that Pétain would leave France and continue the war from Africa rather than dishonor France by accepting a dishonorable peace treaty. He was wrong.[25]

Two things struck Heuré about this article which illustrated Hervé's "state of mind" at the fall of France and "his total incomprehension of the situation." The man in charge of *La Victoire* still viewed events from the perspective of 1914, and he assumed that nationalism would outweigh everything else, including all other ideologies. His assumption that the French government could emigrate to Africa and continue the war from there illustrated how out of touch he was with the intentions of the Vichy regime. Whether Hervé should have been able to anticipate those intentions, as Heuré assumed, is another matter.[26] At this point Hervé could not imagine where Vichy France would ultimately lead the country.

In the words of Robert Paxton, "Collaboration was not a German demand to which some Frenchmen acceded, whether by sympathy or trickery. It was a French proposal that Hitler ultimately rejected."[27] Hervé saw France's defeat as devastating but not hopeless. He certainly never thought of Vichy as a "divine surprise." If he assumed, like most of the French and certainly those who accepted the Vichy regime, that the French defeat was decisive, he did not conclude that Nazi Germany represented the future. If he assumed that the Nazi victory meant it was time to accommodate, he placed certain limits on it. Others did not. Without blaming Hervé for what happened between 1940 and 1944, it is difficult to not see some connection between Hervé's *République Autoritaire* and Vichy France. If Vichy was glaringly anti-Semitic and obviously "complicit in the Holocaust," Hervé's possible episodic ambiguity on anti-Semitism had little to do with it. Nevertheless, "Vichy's National Revolution, as Sternhell put it in 1986, 'can really be understood only in relation to' the development of 'antiliberal, antidemocratic, and anti-Marxist [thought]' in the half century before the defeat of 1940." And Hervé was certainly no stranger to many of the ideas and forces which attained their fruition in Vichy.[28]

The constitutional and legislative measures taken by Vichy, at least initially, as well as the religious and social values that the new regime embodied seemed to

fulfill everything the marginalized Christian national socialist had been looking for since the end of World War I. Even if he did not follow Pétain for more than a few paces after 1940 and had no role in all the vile and criminal actions undertaken before the collapse of the Vichy Regime, "Hervé undoubtedly participated in what Pascal Ory called the 'enterprise of Hitlerite subversion in France' … But as far as Pétainism, Hervé was no *jusqu'au-boutiste*. And one may reasonably presume that if he had had the means to make himself more heard and read, between 1940 and 1944, he would not have joined the pro-Nazi collaboration into which Vichy toppled."[29]



Figure 51. May 1941: The Opening of the Institute of Jewish Questions and the Arrival of a Photo of Marshal Philippe Pétain (1856–1951). (© Roger-Viollet/The Image Works)

Ory's account of French collaborators included Hervé at the beginning of a chapter titled "The Children of Paradise: A Socialist and National Left". The Director of *La Victoire* was grouped among an increasingly reluctant group of anarchists like Jules Rivet, Hermann-Paul, and Sebastien Faure who "had fallen into a series of traps more or less in all innocence and speed", hoping "to continue to make a living by their pens no matter what." Among the former Leftists included within Ory's vast panorama of collaborators, whose paths had crossed Hervé's before and sometimes after 1914, were Francis Delaisi, Georges Dumoulin, Ludovic-O. Frossard, Adéodat Compère-Morel, Georges Yvetot, René de Marmande, and Hubert Lagardelle.[30] If some former Socialists and syndicalists convinced themselves that "German socialism had conquered Europe, but, in the meantime, was conquered by it",[31] Hervé was under no such illusion. Studies of public opinion and French society under Vichy "have challenged overly simplistic categorizations of opinion" based on the "dichotomy between 'resistance' and 'collaboration' which is too crude to accommodate the multiplicity of responses to the regime." In fact, "confusion, changeability, and complexity of public opinion" existed from 1940–1944.[32] In his essay on "propaganda" in the second volume in the *La France des Années Noires*, which dealt with the Occupation, Claude Lévy only mentioned Hervé once, by noting the very brief reappearance of *La Victoire* after the fall of France and the "unclassifiable" nature of its director.[33]

His own checkered evolution did not prevent L.-O. Frossard in the midst of the Second World War from musing about the end of *La Victoire* and the fates of former Hervéists. "The war of 1939 delivered the fatal blow to the unfortunate *La Victoire*. Where is Hervé? In Paris, without a doubt. Perhaps retired, this time for good, in a real monastery. He is seventy two years old. His former companions in arms have almost completely disappeared: Miguel Almereyda, strangled in the prison of Fresnes in 1917; Victor Méric, prodigiously able journalist, who read and retained everything, impenitent antimilitarist, naïve soul with a tender heart; Eugène Merle, an extraordinary organizer, an incomparable 'promoter of newspapers'; both of them dead, like so many others who, before 1914, had irritated and frightened the most 'stay-at-home' *bourgeoisies* of the world."[34]

After *La Victoire* was banned from publication, Hervé continued to visit his offices at 24, Boulevard Poissonnière at the edge of the 9th *arrondissement*. His wartime journalism involved the preparation and distribution of twelve clandestine letters, numbering around one-hundred thousand copies in total, to his former subscribers.[35] Despite the newspaper's banning, the offices of *La Victoire* were sometimes visited by former readers who were then given the whole series of clandestine letters if they had not received them through the mail. Gilles Heuré

thought that those clandestine letters were mainly intended to allow his closest associates to have work. "Besides, they did not amount to attacks against Germany, but [were] a constantly repeated attempt to seal a national *entente* in preparation for the post-war era."[36] It is unclear how much resonance these letters actually had, but the collaborationist press, at least, was paying attention to them and denounced their ridiculous quality rather than becoming truly angered. Collaborationist newspapers like *Gringoire, Candide*, and *Je Suis Partout* attacked Hervé during the Occupation for his sympathetic attitude toward De Gaulle and his defense of the Jews. Such publications had become increasingly fascinated by Nazism and employed a rhetoric of civil war fitting the polarization of the pre-war era according to Julian Jackson.[37] On January 16, 1942 *Gringoire* blasted Hervé for giving Pétain and De Gaulle equal billing, for attacking Admiral Darlan, and for defending both the Jews and the English. The paper concluded by calling the former *Sans Patrie* an "old scoundrel who ought to be sent to a concentration camp." In February 1942 *Je Suis Partout* called Hervé a "garbage collector" and a "poor man's Kerillis", while his clandestine letters were lampooned as "Gustave's jokes." That same month the paper welcomed the "sly and muffled return of this old clown Gustave Hervé" by assailing his clandestine letters whose goal was "naturally, to undermine the politics of collaboration." The March 5, 1943 issue of *Je Suis Partout* expressed premature joy at not having to see or hear anything further from these clandestine letters. On April 30, 1943 the same paper assailed "this old fogey Gustave Hervé … the pious convert from *le drapeau dans le fumier* … [who] insists on addressing the former subscribers to his defunct *La Victoire*." The punishment recommended for such temerity was a "nice cold shower and a good straight jacket in moments of crisis." The final clandestine letter was, in fact, dated December 29, 1943 when Hervé reported on the paper's financial situation and called the German orders to stop producing the clandestine letters, a *Diktat*.[38]

Whatever Hervé's intentions were in these clandestine letters, he pleased neither the French collaborators nor the German authorities. "On the 23rd of April 1941 he was summoned to the Quai des Orfèvres for a 'seditious tract.' On the 26th of June 1943 he was instructed to stop his 'attacks' against the Marshal."[39] During the war Hervé was required to appear before German courts three times, and there was a perquisition of the newspaper's offices on August 31, 1943, which led to a three-hour interrogation the following morning in the Parisian Gestapo headquarters at 93, Rue Lauristan. Although nothing incriminating was found, the night before that appearance "he sent a letter to Fernand de Brinon, the Vichy Ambassador to the German authorities in Paris. He asked this valued collaborator with the Germans to inform them about his past as a pioneer for Franco-German

reconciliation and his activity in favor of Pétain, and let it be understood that the London radio, if he were arrested, would not fail to become ironic about the incarceration of the author of *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut*." At any rate, he was not arrested and did not stop his mimeographed letters until the end of December 1943 following renewed German threats.[40] On another occasion he had to appear before a French court due to complaints by *Miliciens*. Vichy police also visited his apartment and ransacked it due to his increasingly hostile attitude toward Pétain. The Gestapo, too, may have searched his apartment. The last reported trouble he had with German authorities occurred in 1944 when someone turned over a copy of one of his clandestine letters. Again, he was questioned and released.[41]

In their brief hagiography Georges Émile Dulac and Lucien Leclerc reported that *La Victoire* was banned only after Hervé had told the Prefect of Police and the head of the German authorities, whose hand he refused to shake, that he would not be subject to any constraint and that he had the firm intention of producing a "100 per cent French" newspaper.[42] Although the wartime clandestine letters are unavailable today, Dulac and Leclerc had access to them when they wrote their book in 1949 and what they reported about those letters seems to agree with Maurice Rotstein's research which included access to some of those documents. In a letter addressed to his former subscribers dated January 17, 1943, Hervé recognized that the Vichy Regime had certainly echoed some of the features and goals of his attempts to renew the French political system during the interwar era. However, he demurred from taking the blame for Vichy's sins by pointing out that his program sought a "spirit of national union" and demanded the "cooperation of all republican leaders."[43]

> "After June 1940, this policy of national reconciliation was all the more necessary in the frightful ordeal of the collapsed nation, [in which] all the French shared responsibility; and if the political leadership had the greatest role, the military leaders had themselves shined neither in genius nor in simple clairvoyance. Now, it was the atmosphere of hatred against the old parties of the Left and their leaders, through trials pursued against the former ministers, through base persecutions against Freemasonry, amidst the stench of anti-Semitism, with the great reinforcement of special laws and extraordinary tribunals, and in erasing even the name of the republic from official actions, that the Vichy government has claimed to restore the assurance of France [...]. At once, the moral authority of the Marshal was found to be gravely affected."[44]

Maurice Agulhon noted that labeling and categorizing levels of collaboration or resistance is often pointless and illusory because "... any classification or picture made at one moment would be false the next day. Positions would change with time and awareness ... It seems that, little by little, from the middle of 1941 opinion began

to swing. As the war became general, it was impossible to believe that Germany would win."[45] Nevertheless, Heuré did not fail to note several salient points where Hervé's views and the Vichy experience seemed to coincide at least initially. "The Constitution at the service of the Family, the Nation, and Work must have suited him. Hervé was not able to refrain from agreeing with certain speeches by Pétain lamenting depopulation (speech of June 20, 1940), denouncing the 'spirit of pleasure-seeking' (speech of June 25, 1940), or extolling the 'new order' of the nation (speech of October 11, 1940)."[46] Nevertheless, even though Vichy's National Revolution seemed to fulfill much of Hervé's aspirations for a *République Autoritaire* based on religious faith, patriotism, and natalism, there were many actions by the new regime that troubled him.

On May 26, 1941 Hervé sent a letter to Marshal Pétain formally separating himself from the elderly "hero of Verdun" and demanding that France re-enter the war against Hitler. "We have the immense sadness to not follow you, despite the veneration which we still hold for you as a person." The ageing P.S.N. founder took the opportunity to disagree with several ideas and policies propagated by the Vichy Regime. It was erroneous, he believed, to claim that England had pushed France into war; the reverse was closer to the truth. Britain should not be blamed for Dunkerque; the defeat of France was due to French generals who had prepared to re-fight World War I in 1939. Hervé even justified the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in French Algeria on July 3, 1940. He accused France of cowardice for not continuing to fight the Germans in June 1940. Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel should have been heeded, and France should have continued the war "à outrance" from North Africa as Gambetta would have done. Hervé also wondered whether Pétain was being controlled by the Laval-Darlan-Brinon combination, and he accused *Le Maréchal* of betting on the barbarous Germans when he should have realized that Britain and the United States represented the spirit of democracy and Christianity.[47]

> "We ourselves bet on Britain and America, not only because we believe firmly in their final victory, but because they are our allies, because they defend the democratic ideal, Christian civilization, [and] human liberty. We would rather endure all the privations, we would rather see France perish with England and the United States, than live dishonored as a German protectorate. We are no longer able to follow you, *Monsieur le Maréchal*!"[48]

By some estimates 90% of the French supported Pétain in 1940 and a virtual personality cult formed. Yet Pétain began to lose support by mid-1941 as the hardships of the continuing war took their toll in France. If that is true, then Hervé's rejection of Pétain was part of a larger pattern.[49] Still, Hervé had separated himself

from his own "providential man" well before it was safe to do so. No "providential man" could long have satisfied a man who was in some ways the perpetual rebel against all politics, apparently even when it came to his own chosen political saviors. Still, Pétain and De Gaulle had much in common, so any clear dichotomy or choice between the two was going to be ambiguous. Gilles Heuré argued that Hervé found it impossible to choose between the two Frances which opposed each other. He placed "his nationalist hope and his religious faith in a virtual reconciliation of the two." At the end of July 1941 Hervé referred to the split between Pétainists and Gaullists, and he advised both groups to tread warily. To the former group, he urged them to avoid "uncontrolled anti-Semitism" and to reject their policy of walking away from France's natural allies, the English. To the latter group, he advised them not to target "the Maréchal, who remained the highest authority in the existing French state." On December 2, 1942, eight days after the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon, Hervé wrote to General Brécard, the Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor, begging him to use his influence to pressure Pétain to re-enter the war, to pardon De Gaulle, "the glorious rebel of the first hour", and finally to "save his honor" by doing the right thing by becoming a German prisoner of war.[50]

In his clandestine letter dated December 12, 1942, Hervé expressed great confidence after recent events. He assumed that "the Anglo-American landings … are the worst blow the Axis has received since Russia entered the war … You will see that soon enough we shall be obliged to ask for mercy for Germany. I think that the occupation of our entire country … has instantaneously reunited France. It is true that the Marshal's prestige has suffered and that it will be necessary for us to reconsider the entire post-war political problem … I think that the scuttling of our fleet … has begun to revive our military honor … Finally, I think that … we should thank God who … has not abandoned us."[51]

Hervé found it impossible to turn his back on Britain and the United States because they represented the defense of Christian civilization.[52] The Second World War was not a struggle between democracy and fascism in Hervé's view. It was a "crusade for the defense of Christian civilization and for the advent of what Christians call the 'Kingdom of God'."[53] From the end of World War I, while he sought a political solution to the division, disorder, and disharmony in France and the world, Hervé had actively sought to regain the faith in God that he had lost as a student in Brest. While his political solution pragmatically considered the need for religion as a means to restore order, discipline, self-sacrifice, and morality in the interest of France, Hervé sincerely felt an inner need to attain the faith demanded by his political vision. As we have seen, amidst the domestic and foreign

turmoil from 1935 to 1937, Hervé's faith returned "miraculously" he believed. The parallels and associations between religious belief and political ideology are undoubtedly complex, controversial, and confusing. Hervé certainly employed religious metaphors throughout his career when he spoke of politics. He candidly admitted his need for a faith and constantly sought to forge one or gravitate to one, much like Eric Hoffer's fabled "true believer".[54]

During the latter days of the Occupation after reading and re-reading Saint Paul's *Epistles*, Hervé composed a series of ten epistles to unbelievers and ten to believers. These epistles were gathered and published by Dulac and Leclerc in 1949, five years after Hervé's death. *Les Epîtres* represents the full range of Hervé's lifelong search for truth, harmony, perfection, and faith. It includes the same simplicity, anomalies, naïveté, polemics, idealism, and pragmatism found at every stage of his life. Hervé blamed the defeat of France in 1940 on free thinkers, Free-masons, and atheists. The two World Wars occurred due to the wrath of God resulting from de-Christianization. The source of all evils for humanity was the revolt against divine law and the rationalistic attack upon religious faith. Reason was a poor substitute for faith because man had to have a solace to bear the pain and suffering inevitable in earthly existence. "The great motive of humanity is not reason or national interest … It is feeling, passion, instinct, a whole collection of forces over which reason and science are not able to surpass." The human soul fears death and nothingness. It needs a consolation and it decries life's tribulations. The soul of man searches for an ideal and perfection. When one religion is destroyed, another one rises up to replace it. Christ was called the spirit of charity and justice now incarnated in the Republic and in socialism. Christianity, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution were all expressions of the aspiration of the human soul toward social justice and the Kingdom of God. Hervé now claimed that he had never rejected the Republic or socialism; he had only rejected free thinking and irreligion. Religion represented discipline and social cohesion as well as the transcendental search for harmony, perfection, and the absolute. Hervé told Catholics that they must enter politics after the war in order to create a *Parti Socialiste Chrétien*. Thus Catholics could work for the "gradual" socialization of the means of production, an International *Gendarmerie*, and an International Federation of Nations.[55]

Amidst World War II, Hervé still continued to speak of something approaching a United States of Europe. Because this was a longstanding aspiration within Hervé's political repertoire and rhetoric that transcended his transformation, one must believe that such a goal was more sincere and less cynical for him than it was for some French fascists and much of the Nazi press which employed a similar

rhetoric to speak of the New Order created by Germany.[56] Hervé's final message to the world was thus a mixture of politics and religion, the material and the spiritual, realism and idealism, regression and progression, as well as nationalism and socialism. The political epitaph of Hervé as witnessed in *Les Épîtres* was summed up by Heuré thusly: "The flag, the extreme Left, philo-Semitism, the *Union Sacrée*, and the nation." He certainly continued to reject the anti-Semitism of the Right and to recognize with pride the eternal gratitude that Jews would always have for the France of the 1789 Revolution which liberated them.[57] At the time of his death, Hervé, like most men, continued to exhibit a mélange of ideas and values that defy all neat bipolar systems of analysis, including his own. Given Hervé's supposed philo-Semitism, one can only wonder how he so confidently trusted in his reawakened Catholic faith when there was so much evidence of Catholic anti-Semitism in France.[58]

By the end of the Occupation, Hervé's *Parti Socialiste National* had become a largely imagined *Parti Socialiste Chrétien*, whose new emblem was a tricolor ribboned in red and adorned with the Cross of Lorraine as a new addition. His program involved re-Christianization, the founding of a republic, and some sort of socialism. "It was not without surprise that one could read these last texts. In them, Hervé preached the nationalization of the banks and the key heavy industries, with equal representation in the administrative councils." On the international plane, the new *Parti Socialiste Chrétien* sought a genuinely reinforced "*international gendarmerie*." He assumed that such a device was the only thing that could prevent new Hitlers from "starting new world catastrophes" in the future. At the end of *Les Épîtres* Hervé looked beyond politics to God and religion: "To love God and your neighbor, isn't that, after all, the supreme commandment of Christ and of his Church?"[59] Hervé would not be the last man to naively assume that religion could somehow spare man from his self-destructive tendencies which are invariably embodied in the same religions, nations, and ethnic identifications that Hervé found so comforting and meaningful.

Soon after the Occupation began, as Hervé grew disillusioned with Pétain, he looked about for a new "providential man." The transference of his hopes from Pétain to De Gaulle was probably smooth because Hervé was not required to relinquish his aspirations for a Christian Authoritarian Republic.[60] After the liberation of Paris, Hervé received no response to his request that *La Victoire* be placed on the list of newspapers to be permitted to reappear. Growing impatient, on September 21, 1944, he sent a letter to De Gaulle reminding him of the protest made by *La Victoire* on June 20, 1940, rejecting a dishonorable peace. He stressed how he had never met with Pétain, had never received the latter's permission to start his

campaign in 1935, and assumed that *Le Maréchal* was a republican because Painlevé and Doumergue had supported him. He told De Gaulle of his gradual disillusionment with Vichy, his clandestine letters, and his treatment by the Germans as well as the supporters of Vichy. In Hervé's opinion, he was being banned in 1944 for his attacks on the *Cartel des Gauches* and the Popular Front in the interwar period. He dismissed any responsibility held against him for Pétain by saying that the Vichy leader had sabotaged the revisionist program of *La Victoire* with a reactionary, anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic, and anti-Republican program. Hervé claimed to support De Gaulle because he was a proponent of social order as well as social justice. The former *Sans Patrie* rejected the idea that he had been either a collaborator or a fascist. To prove the point, he mentioned the perquisition, the three appearances before German judges, his appearance before a French judge, and his interrogation at Gestapo headquarters. But he would not rescind his assessment of the Third Republic as a regime of conflicting factions symbolized by the Popular Front.[61] "Stretching the truth" and a questionable memory had always characterized Hervé, but this account of events was blatantly self-serving even if it possessed a certain logic.

The most telling and startling aspect of Hervé's letter to De Gaulle was his claim that "*La Victoire* … began the resistance." Hervé himself also claimed to have been "the first Gaullist of the interior, a Gaullist before the event."[62] Despite the hint of megalomania entailed in this self-image, it had a certain ludicrous coherence. It was fitting that the man who could easily be called "the first Pétainist" and often claimed to have been "the first Bolshevik"[63] as well as "the first fascist" should also claim to be "the first member of the Resistance" and "the first Gaullist." In the course of the war, having read Saint Paul and composed his own *Epîtres*, perhaps Hervé also thought of himself as "the last apostle."[64]

In his *Epîtres* Hervé referred to the Catholic Breton missionaries among the Hervé family ancestry. He compared the mission of *La Victoire* to that of Christ, and he admitted that he would have been a Christian missionary if it had not been for the secularization of French schools and his own transference of faith to socialism. During the Occupation, Hervé met each month with former socialist, perpetual minister, and one-time French President, Alexandre Millerand, in order to discuss religious issues.[65] Hervé's life could be characterized as a succession of failures, yet it had produced fifty years of articles, pamphlets, books, speeches, parties, and organizations that supplied meaning and direction for himself and many others. Certainly, his ideas, policies, and programs were never implemented, at least not by him. The only time that his vision seemed to be fulfilled was 1940, but that came with the very defeat that all his contradictory notions had

been meant to prevent. When his "providential man" finally arrived, he proved to be a great disappointment, which should have disabused and disillusioned the former *Sans Patrie* concerning his faith in a charismatic leader. His reversion to religion must have cushioned the pain that he must have felt with his disappointing secular faiths which never succeeded in fulfilling his visions.

Gilles Heuré described Gustave Hervé as a man of the pre-war era, World War I that is. The political system he praised arose less from deep political reflections and more out of weariness. Hervé was tired of the discord, disunity, disharmony, and contradictions that he associated with the parliamentary regime. His rejection of political pluralism and debate was, in fact, a rejection of politics per-se, but his only solution was to copy foreign models or, rather, his misreading of them in terms of French history, with its "men on horseback" and Napoleonic heritage. Rather than the denunciation which the Louis-Ferdinand Celines, the Drieu La Rochelles, the Jacques Doriots, the Lucien Rebatets, or the Robert Brasillachs utilized in their mocking, sneering, or exultant manners, Hervé "remained incontestably in retreat. That which was a pallor of ideas, he called serenity, and that which was ultimately only a fearful intolerance, he made pass for ideological virulence. His protests were sighs of fatigue: he sermonized and complained more than he revolted." If Hervé seemed more like a pathetic than a tragic figure to Maurice Rotstein in his 1956 study, for Heuré that was because the political panaceas which he flaunted were based on foreign models which functioned as a kind of taxidermy. "At least this art of conservation preserved in him a form of virtue: in these somber years he was never tempted to let himself slide into the gutters of ordinary hatreds."[66]

On October 25, 1944 Hervé died suddenly of a heart attack at his apartment on the Rue de Vaugirard two weeks after the death of his life-long companion, Madame Marie Dijonneau.[67] When Dulac[68] and Leclerc got to his home, they found him stretched out on his bed, a crucifix in his hands, surrounded by Marist Brothers, his neighbors. The two men received some old clothes, books, papers, and other items, including the manuscript for *Les Epîtres*. After his death a religious service was celebrated the following Saturday, October 28 at 8:45 in the morning at the church Notre-Dame-des-Champs on the Boulevard de Montparnasse.[69]

The press was rather circumspect about his death, especially due to the lack of space in the wartime *recto-verso* format. Not surprisingly, the recently resurrected *L'Humanité* failed to mention it, given so many major events cascading daily. The day after his death *Le Figaro* described Hervé as a "polemicist" who had belonged to "the most advanced parties of the Left" before the war but he later rallied to "nationalist doctrines". The paper also mentioned that Hervé had published "a

clandestine paper in the form of letters" during the Occupation. Two days following Hervé's death, there was a reference in the Communist newspaper *Franc-Tireur*, regarding his crucial role in promoting Pétain's rise. That article reminded its readers of Hervé's evolution, especially since 1934, which made him "number one" among those guilty in conspiring to get Pétain into power. On June 28, 1946 Jean Galtier-Boissière cuttingly wrote in his journal how Hervé "was adored by his associates, the same as [the legendary anti-Semite] Drumont."[70]

Hervé was buried in 1944 at the Cimetière de Montrouge, but, apparently, a request by the Dijonneau family led to his exhumation there in November 1966 and his transference to the Cimetière de Lavallois-Perret. Today Hervé's body lies, virtually undiscoverable and certainly unnoticed, in the Dijonneau family crypt not far from the tomb of Louise Michel.[71] Hervé is not deserving of adulation, much less apotheosis, so the difficulty of finding his exact gravesite, when this writer searched in 1994, could be seen as fitting. Nevertheless, a monument, pilgrims, and adulation for "*la petroleuse*" Louise Michel near an almost anonymous grave for Hervé, "*l'homme du drapeau dans le fumier*", signifies far more than a form of historical justice. This study considers the relationship of the grave sites of these two political figures as another bit of evidence for the persistence of a moralistic and bipolar method of ordering political reality. The binary system of analysis and discourse embodied in the image of the political spectrum certainly functions as a convenient, simple, but at times misleading tool for political analysis and description. However, because a common set of generally contradictory values spans the spectrum, it can also be utilized, at least in part, to support as well as justify almost any action, program, or elite. The tendency to label a man like Hervé probably serves far more to dismiss his life than to elucidate any lessons that could be drawn from it. This "extended glance" back at his career should caution us about facile explanations. Hopefully, it can help to elucidate more than just the transformations of one particular activist. The life of Hervé such as it was certainly touched major ideas, movements, figures, and events. He may have been a marginal figure for much of his political life, but his sensational antics and simple, generally binary, messages, whether or not he was in the limelight, help us to see that epoch with a bit more nuance. Though he has been gone for more than seventy years, some of the forces that affected him and even the ideals for which he fought continue to act and resonate today even if in mutated forms.

In his study of Hervé's national socialism, Daniel Knegt cited Hervé's ambivalent and indulgent reactions to the violence of the Cagoulards at the time of the Popular Front to question the former *Sans Patrie*'s attitude toward violence, his ambiguous attitude toward republican legality, and his relationship to fascism.

For some time Hervé interpreted the plans, plots, and violence of the Cagoulards in terms of a justified defense of the nation and he was temporarily unwilling to see their terroristic methods as anything more than the "unwise" but "understandable reactions of some hot-headed former members of the *Croix-de-Feu*." After calling the Cagoulards martyrs, once he had all the evidence of their involvement in several Parisian bombings, he withdrew his support.[72] Knegt certainly has a point. From either extreme during his political career, Hervé was ambivalent regarding violence, whether by Liabeuf, the Bonnot Gang, the rioters of February 6, or the Cagoulards. He certainly sanctioned non-lethal sabotage in the heyday of Hervéism and almost apologetically explained the reasons for fascist and Nazi takeovers during the interwar era. Despite misgivings and tergiversation, he periodically entertained the idea of a coup or uprising to prevent a Communist or revolutionary takeover in France, yet over the long term he always backed away from actual violence as a method, however equivocal or indulgent his rhetoric could become.

In their biography of Hervé's nearly lifelong friend, the anarchist and Breton regionalist, Émile Masson, the Girauds implicitly contrasted Masson's rejection of both violence and authority as means to utopia with Hervé's generally contrary tendencies. For Masson such means for the attainment of any utopia whether by a Church, a state, or an academy, whether in the name of revolution or its antithesis, was contradictory. For Masson, utopia could never be very near or very easy because it depended on individual and local transformations. However distant Masson's utopia may have been, to him it was far closer than the chimerical visions of Hervé and countless others, with their far more universal and grander, but inevitably impossible, goals. For Masson, "The revolution did not amount to going into the streets: it meant delving into oneself. It did not even mean reading Karl Marx …" If you are seeking "… reality, truth, [or] life, comrade, the revolution—it's you …" Throughout most of Hervé's career, revolution or its antithesis meant following him, wherever he led, whenever he had found the guide, and whatever the path happened to be. In fact, Hervé's visionary quests invariably ended in France, whether revolutionary, counter-revolutionary, or sacred. For Masson, any nation, in itself, even France, could never be more than an oppressor: of the individual, the locale, and the region.[73] Individual or collective? Hervé and Masson had made their choices, but in the world in which we live, one still must possess the art "to thread the needle of … binarism."[74]

Appendix A

A Sociological and Prosopographic Analysis of the Drafters and Signers of L'Affiche Rouge

The average age of these antimilitarist activists and leaders was 32.8 years of age. As one might expect, this was much older than typical A.I.A. members cited in other police sources. Seventeen of the thirty-one signers were currently members of the C.G.T. At least fifteen of the militants signing the poster were born in Paris. A surprisingly high number of signers (seven) were foreign born, the sons or daughters of immigrants, or from Algeria. Boche was from Oran and Ryner was from Nemours in Algeria. Almereyda (de Vigo) from Béziers in Herault was variously given a Catalan, Spanish, French, Italian, or Andorran ancestry. Félicie Numietska (Teutscher) was the daughter of Russian Jewish immigrants. Eugène Merle (Merlo) was Italian with a father who had been deported. Bontemps (Bontempi) had Italian immigrant parents. Amilcare Cipriani was from Rimini in Italy, but his true nationality seems to have been the revolution wherever it was taking place. Eugen Weber has noted how Italians, above all other non-French ethnic groups, were the leading oppressed minority in *fin-de-siècle* France.[1] There were at least two Bretons: Hervé from Finistère and Le Blavec from Morbihan. If other "minority" elements were represented, it was not immediately decipherable from the report.[2]

Parisian Police had long studied residential patterns as clues to criminality. In 1905 the police discovered that signers not living with their parents almost all paid yearly rents. If rent were a measure of wealth then the "richest" antimilitarists

were Gohier, Tailhade, and Hervé[3] in that order, who paid roughly double (or more) the yearly rent of the next "wealthiest" antimilitarists Pataud, Yvetot, Le Guery, Ryner, Cipriani, Le Blavec, Chauvin, and Desplanques.

At least four paid monthly rents which might indicate less permanent arrangements. One anomaly in these matters was Coulais who had no known address and no fixed profession. He did anything to make money, but he did have a job in the C.G.T. bureaucracy. He was said to move often and to be violent. Coulais was also described as a former anti-Semite and nationalist during the Dreyfus Affair, but was now an "anarchist" with several political offenses on his record. Gohier too was a kind of anomaly. He was the wealthiest antimilitarist and lived with his sister. As a former monarchist he had written for *Le Soleil*, but he underwent a change of views during the Dreyfus Affair. He had a favorable personal life but had been charged with political, literary, or press violations. Zeev Sternhell would describe Gohier as the most famous living French anti-Semite on the eve of World War I.[4] At least fourteen of the signers had been involved in prior criminal proceedings, but only Almereyda had been found guilty of a common law crime. Thus many of the signers of the *Affiche Rouge* had police records, but those records were generally for political and press violations. Only Tailhade, Almereyda, and Frontier were listed as having unfavorable moral reputations. Yet many of the signers were called extremists. As a Communard, Cipriani had been exiled in 1871 and then deported after his return to France due to new political violations.

The most surprising findings in these files were related to occupation. Fifteen of the seventeen men listed as C.G.T. members were actually union officials. Does this imply a large working class presence in the A.I.A. leadership? The notion of class is a hazy analytical tool at best. Certainly the role of union officials was far different than that of workers themselves. A look at the professions or former professions of the signers of *L'Affiche Rouge* might lead one to question the proletarian origins of the union officials. Among the signers of the poster there were two printers, one typographer, two carpenters, one tailor, one coiffeur, three jewelers, one diamond worker, one goldsmith, one wood sculptor, one book broker, one blacksmith, one barber, one photography worker, and one public works employee. There was also a metalworker, an electrician, a wheelwright, and a factory day laborer on the list. There were at least thirteen journalists of one kind or another, most of whom had ancillary jobs. Hervé, Tailhade, Gohier, and Ryner were journalists who also published books on historical, political, or social subjects. Three of the signers, Hervé, Teutscher/Numeitzka, and Ryner, were suspended, retired, or "on leave" from the teaching profession. The concentration of journalists, writers,

professors, as well as workers in luxury trades, printing, and hair care may be a normal Parisian cross-section or sample. The singularity of the Parisian economy as well as the retarded and uneven aspects of French modernization may be reflected in this data. Despite the presence of some modern industrial workers, one could argue that this collection of occupations seem to be characterized by the proverbial *déclassé* intellectuals and artisans, many of whom found their way into union jobs?[5] The men who signed one of the most incendiary posters in France before World War I were certainly among the most active revolutionary militants of France, yet their socioeconomic makeup is not far different from descriptions that have been used to characterize French extremists of all types including those who supported fascism.

The overall occupational patterns indicated two, three, four, or five vocations at the same time. This suggests that many, perhaps most, of these antimilitarists were professional political activists who survived in whatever manner was necessary. For example, Eugène Merle, the son of an immigrant, was listed as a book broker and a journalist who had no fixed residence. He wrote newspaper articles, but he also did a lot of traveling, selling or distributing revolutionary tracts and books and perhaps delivering revolutionary speeches as well. The police saw him as an itinerant political agitator. The artisan backgrounds of so many of the signers might suggest individuals from threatened occupations—trades that were declining in importance, or this pattern simply may reflect the economy of early twentieth century Paris. The existence on this list of several alleged anti-Semites, formerly at least, and a former monarchist might be significant as could the number of foreigners and children of immigrants. A further study of the earlier and later personal histories of all these individuals might be rewarding. A man like Yvetot was the orphaned son of a policeman and Hervé was the son of a naval official. Both men as children had strict Catholic educations. Almereyda was the product of "an ill-fated marriage between noble and commoner." Roger Sadrin reported that his revolutionary ideas arose as he saw the oppression of the workers in his father's factory![6] Victor Méric was not included in the files given to M. Flory, but his role in the creation of *L'Affiche Rouge* was well documented by the police. Méric was the son of Senator Victor-Sylvain Méric of Var and fear of embarrassing his father may explain his name's absence on the poster.[7] Of course, the conclusion to be drawn concerning the socio-economic background of the signers of *L'Affiche Rouge* may be simply that social analysis often shows the great mixture of classes in many political groupings.[8]

Many of the signers such as Hervé, Merle, Almereyda, Cipriani, Desplanques, Numietska, Sadrin, Yvetot, and Bousquet seem to be categorized best as

professional revolutionaries even if they had or formerly had jobs as teachers, professors, journalists, or union officials. Could some of the signers of this provocative antimilitarist poster have been seeking to make themselves better known and to rise in stature within the ranks of the revolutionary "class" as much as, or even more than, they were trying to create a revolution as some police implied?[9] Since it is uncertain just how serious the commitment of each of these militants was to antimilitarism even in 1905, we have no grounds for assuming unanimity among signers who were among the most politically extreme individuals of that era. This cross-section of ages, occupations, incomes, behaviors, and statuses, in itself, might provide some clues to the makeup of the A.I.A. and perhaps to other extremist political groups as well.[10] The interchangeability of leadership on the extremes of the political spectrum is a provocative concept, but the evidence presented here seems far too complex and limited to create any conclusive pattern.

Appendix B

The Lyrics of "Le Chant des Jeunes Gardes" by Gaston Montéhus

Nous somm's la jeune France
Nous somm's les gars de l'avenir,
El'vés dans la souffrance, oui, nous saurons vaincre ou mourir;
Nous travaillons pour la bonn'cause,
Pour délivrer le genre humain,
Tant pis, si notre sang arrose
Les pavés sur notre chemin

Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
Vous les sabreurs, les bourgeois, les gavés, et les curés
V'là la jeun'garde v'là la jeun'garde qui descend sur le pavé,
C'est la lutte final' qui commence
C'est la revanche de tous les meurt de faim,
C'est la révolution qui s'avance,
C'est la bataille contre les coquins,
Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
V'là la jeun'garde !

Enfants de la misère,
De forc' nous somm's les révoltés,

Nous vengerons nos mères
Que des brigands ont exploitées;
Nous ne voulons plus de famine
A qui travaille il faut des biens,
Demain nous prendrons les usines
Nous somm's des homm's et non des chiens

Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
Vous les sabreurs, les bourgeois, les gavés, et les curés
V'là la jeun'garde v'là la jeun'garde qui descend sur le pavé,
C'est la lutte final' qui commence
C'est la revanche de tous les meurt de faim,
C'est la révolution qui s'avance,
C'est la bataille contre les coquins,
Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
V'là la jeun'garde !

Nous ne voulons plus de guerre
Car nous aimons l'humanité
Tous les homm's sont nos frères
Nous clamons la fraternité
La République universelle
Emp'reurs et rois tous au tombeau ! …
Tant pis si la lutte est cruelle,
Après la pluie le temps est beau.

Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
Vous les sabreurs, les bourgeois, les gavés, et les curés
V'là la jeun'garde v'là la jeun'garde qui descend
sur le pavé,
C'est la lutte final' qui commence
C'est la revanche de tous les meurt de faim,
C'est la révolution qui s'avance,
C'est la bataille contre les coquins,
Prenez garde ! prenez garde !
V'là la jeun'garde !
1910

"The Song of the Young Guard" by Gaston Montéhus

We are the young France
We are the men of the future,
Raised in suffering, yes, we will conquer or die;
We work for the just cause,
To deliver mankind,
Too bad, if our blood is spilled
On the street paving stones.

Beware ! beware !
You, the swordsmen, the bourgeois, the overfed, and the priests
Here come the young guard striding down on the street,
This is the final fight that's beginning,
This is the revenge of all the starving,
This is the revolution that is coming,
This is the battle against the rogues,
Beware ! beware !
Here come the young guard!

Children of poverty,
By necessity we have become rebels,
We will avenge our mothers
Whom Brigands have exploited;
We do not want to starve
Those who work need goods,
Tomorrow we will take the factories
We are men not dogs

Beware ! beware !
You, the swordsmen, the bourgeois, the overfed, and the priests
Here come the young guard; here come the young guard striding down on the street,
This is the final fight that's beginning,
This is the revenge of all the starving,
This is the revolution that is coming,
This is the battle against the rogues,
Beware ! beware !
Here come the young guard!

We no longer want war
Because we love mankind
All men are our brothers
We cry for brotherhood
The universal Republic
Emperors and kings must die ! …
Too bad if the battle is cruel,
After the storm comes good weather.

Beware ! beware !
You, the swordsmen, the bourgeois, the overfed, and the priests
Here come the young guard the young guard striding down on the street,
This is the final fight that's beginning,
This is the revenge of all the starving,
This is the revolution that is coming,
This is the battle against the rogues,
Beware ! beware !
Here come the young guard!
1910

YouTube has a 1936 recording of part of the song: *https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fG7dxCvfYek*
Wikisource: la bibliothèque libre includes the complete 1910 lyrics. *http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Joven_Guardia*

Notes

Introduction

1. James Olney, *Metaphors of Self: The Meaning of Autobiography*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 36.
2. Roger Shattuck, *The Banquet Years—The Origins of the Avant Garde in France—1885 to World War I*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968 [1955]).
3. Stephane Gerson, Review of Julian Wright, "The Regionalist Movement in France, 1890–1914: Jean Charles-Brun and French Regional Thought," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 77, No. 3, September 2005, 815.
4. Jonathan Almosnino, *Miguel Almereyda (1883–1917) : De l'Anarchisme à l'Union Sacrée*, (Saarbrücken, Germany: Éditions universitaires européennes, 2012), 4. Almosnino cited François Dosse, *Le Pari biographique: écrire une vie*, Paris : Édition la découverte, 2005.
5. Roger Eatwell, "Towards a New Model of Fascism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4(2): 165–166, 161–194 (1992). Roger Eatwell stressed how "some fascist leaders were converts from the left, who believed that" World War I had verified that nationalism and not the proletarian revolution "was the great mobilizing myth." Fascism also "borrowed from left-wing group activity, believing that its message could only be popularized if it moved away from the cadre-elite form of party organization which had characterized most earlier right-wing parties."
6. Tony Judt, with Timothy Snyder, *Thinking the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Penguin, 2013 [2012]), 243–244, 343–345, 383–384.
7. Judt, op.cit., 160–178. Judt used Sternhell's phrase "Neither Left nor Right" and argued that both traditional explanations for fascism—from the Right and from the Left—might have been a bit anachronistic because that generation "refused to be defined within the French revolutionary lexicon which had for so long provided the parameters for modern political geography." 162. One could argue that the key might be that fascists sought a revolution of

some kind no matter what their pedigree was. To the extent they were regressive or reactionary, they were not fascist. That does re-open a longstanding debate and presents semantic issues as well.

8. Edward Berenson, *The Trial of Madame Caillaux*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
9. Paul B. Miller, *From Revolutionaries to Citizens: Antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002). It has also been helpful to have Jonathan Almosnino's brief study of the life of Miguel Almereyda available for reference.
10. John Cerullo, *Minotaur: French Military Justice and the Aernoult-Rousset Affair*, (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011).
11. Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2004); idem, "The Five Stages of Fascism," 105–128, in Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 107–112. For Paxton most historians look for a fixed essence or fascist minimum and they "consider fascism in isolation, without sustained reference to the political, social and cultural spaces in which they navigate. Together these two common errors of approach produce what we might call 'bestiaries' of fascism. Like Medieval naturalists, they present a catalogue of portraits of one beast after another, each one portrayed against a bit of background scenery, and identified by its external signs." 112.
12. *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne*, July 20, 1901, "L'Anniversaire de Wagram," *Sans Patrie*, Hervé's image referred to the flag of the local army regiment at Auxerre in Yonne "guilty" of commemorating the 1809 Napoleonic victory at Wagram. Tried and acquitted for an earlier article entitled "Aux Conscrits" in 1901 with Aristide Briand as his defense counsel, Hervé was never prosecuted for "L'Anniversaire de Wagram" because the Ministry of Justice could find little objectionable. The notoriety gained from both articles did cost Hervé his position in the Republic's educational system.
13. Jean-Pierre Azéma and Michel Winock, *La IIIe République (1870–1940)*, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1976 [1970]), 158–159; Edouard Dolléans, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier, 1871–1920*, Vol. II, 6th edition, (Paris: Librairie Armand-Colin, 1967); Madeleine Rebérioux, *La République radicale? (1898–1914)*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975), 256–276; Jacques Chastenet, *Histoire de la troisième république-Volume 2—Triomphes et malaises*, (Paris: Hachette Littérature, 1962 [1954]); Norman Stone, *Europe Transformed, 1878–1918*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Judith F. Stone, *The Search for Social Peace: Reform Legislation in France, 1890–1914*, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985).
14. Hervé knew the difficulties of creating revolutionary unity because each of these groups was divided. The diversity of the French Left reflected bitter ideological differences, but philosophical disputes over programs and tactics were often exacerbated by journalistic rivalries, personal antagonisms, and organizational jealousy.
15. It far from clear whether his revolutionary goals and tactics were means to political power or were largely efforts at self promotion.
16. Michel Winock, *La Belle Époque: La France de 1900 à 1914*, (Paris: Perrin, 2002), 16.
17. Maurice Rotstein, ""The Public Life of Gustave Hervé," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1956. This study, focusing on Hervé's personality, explained his contradictory ideas in terms of a deep-seated need for power and an "almost psycho-pathological" personality. Rotstein's stress on emotions and feelings, as opposed to reason and ideas, has become a standard explanation for such reversals. In fact, Hervé, apparently, had a remarkably stable personality which belied his tempestuous career. Rotstein himself uses the term sanguine to describe his personality and the word iconoclastic to describe his political ideas, yet he concludes that it is easier to uncover what Hervé sought to destroy than what he hoped to construct. In the end he was "a French fascist who finally chose his country's welfare above all other considerations." 225, 233–234.

18. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 384.
19. His private life was without scandal; he lived with the same widow and her children for over forty years in an apartment on the Rue Vaugirard. Despite his tempestuous public life, Hervé devoted himself to his newspaper, had regular personal habits, and was blessed with untroubled sleep even in prison. In 1919 Hervé refused to present himself in parliamentary elections despite Alexandre Millerand's entreaties. George Emile Dulac and Lucien Leclerc, *La Vérité sur Gustave Hervé*, (Paris: 1949), 3; Rotstein, op.cit., 230–232.
20. A.N., F7 13325, M/5121, note of January 20, 1911; L.G.S., March 8–14, 1911; A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly Reports of the Prefecture of Police; Ba/1491, Ba/1601, Ba/1604. It is easy to document Hervé's obsession with leftist infighting long before his transformation; he blamed malevolent rivals for the failure of Hervéism.
21. Alexandre Zévaès, *Histoire de socialisme et du communisme en France de 1871 à 1947*, (Paris: 1947), 322. "Hervé throws firecrackers to startle the onlookers."
22. Victor Méric, *A travers la jungle politique et littéraire*, Series I, (Paris: 1930), 198–200, 214–217; idem, "Vielles choses, vielles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, 8 (July 15-August 15, 1926), 592–593; Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer—Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, (New York: 1951), 84.
23. Gilles Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1997).
24. This undocumented charge was made during the war by Jean Goldsky, a former activist at *La Guerre Sociale* who was later implicated in the Affair of *Le Bonnet Rouge*. Jean Goldsky, *La Trahison de Judas ou les trente deniers de Gustave Hervé: Histoire d'un trahison*, (Paris: Éditions de la Tranchée Républicaine, 1917). Though not cited, Rebérioux must have referred to Goldsky's dubious charges.
25. Madeleine Rebérioux, "La gauche socialiste française: *La Guerre sociale* et *Le Mouvement socialiste* face au problème coloniale," *Le Mouvement sociale*, 46 (January–March 1964), 91–103.
26. This was explained by three factors: 1) the strength of the Jacobin tradition, 2) the diluted Marxism of the *Parti Ouvrier Français*, and 3) the growing tendency among industrial workers to look to the state for aid and protection. The success of the socialists in the elections of the 1890's and their expectations for state intervention into economic affairs through social legislation and nationalization convinced most socialists that they would eventually gain power through elections. Madeleine Rebérioux, "Les tendances hostiles à l'état dans la SFIO (1905–1914)," *Le Mouvement social*, 65 (October–December, 1968), 21–37.
27. This antistatist mentality weakened progressively after 1911 for several reasons: 1) The greater responsiveness of the Republic to calls for social legislation, 2) the evolution of the C.G.T. to reformism, 3) the growth of syndicalism among state bureaucrats, and 4) the progress of industrial concentration making nationalization more possible. Ibid., 21–37.
28. Jean-Paul Brunet, *La police de l'ombre: Indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 151–185.
29. Ibid., 183–185.
30. Heuré, op.cit., 127.
31. Zeev Sternhell is not the only recent scholar to call Hervé a fascist. See Robert Tombs, *France: 1814–1914*, (New York: Longman, 1996), 58.
32. "Since fascist politics was a novel and late-blooming form, a large proportion of fascist leaders and even ordinary activists began their political careers in association with nonfascist groups, usually either of the radical left or Catholic or authoritarian right. The transformation that issued into fascist politics and organization was rarely instantaneous and complete. Sometimes a long evolutionary period of five years and more was required for the transformation into fascism, and sometimes that metamorphosis was never complete, stopping short at the boundary of a kind of partial protofascism." Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 199; idem, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).

33. Christopher Hitchens' recent memoir included the following insight regarding political reversals or changes of mind. "Given the absolute certainty that this process will be undergone by any serious person at least once, it is rather surprising to find out how much is made out of it, and how many critics try to confect a mystery where none exists." Christopher Hitchens, *Hitch 22: A Memoir*, (New York: Twelve, 2010), 405. Hitchens cites his estranged brother Peter's volume, *The Broken Compass: How British Politics Lost Its Way*, (London: Continuum, 2009), for inspiration and praise on this point. If one must change one's mind when circumstances change, as Christopher Hitchens stresses, why do such changes so often seem to follow binary patterns? Hitchens did not address that problem.
34. It is interesting to compare Hervé's values and themes with fascists and collaborators such as Déat, Doriot, de Man, and Bergery. Philippe Burrin notes how peace, social justice, and European unity were idealistic goals which some men of the Left, however misguidedly, continued to hope to fulfill by copying or working with fascism and Nazism. Burrin, Philippe, *La Dérive Fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986), 356–7, *passim*.
35. Paul Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 155. Mazgaj cited *La Guerre Sociale*, February 8–14, 1911, "La Réponse des Rothschild," *Un Sans Patrie;* Zeev Sternhell, *Ni droite ni gauche: L'idéologie fasciste en France*, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1983), 60; Richard Millman, *La Question juive entre les deux guerres : Ligues de droite et antisémitisme en France*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), 165; Pierre Birnbaum, « *La France aux Français » : Histoire des haines nationalistes*, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1993), 237–258.
36. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968²/25337, Note from the *Prefect de Police*, Paris, April 20, 1911, and a letter dated March 15, 1911 from Jean Longuet to Gustave Hervé at La Santé. In the letter Longuet talked about the anti-Semitic inanities of Méric, however whimsical, and Janvion. Longuet was happy that L.G.S. would be less hostile to the S.F.I.O. Hervé stated forcefully, to the chagrin of *L'Action Française* which was trying to recruit anti-Republican elements on the Left, that he was a philo-Semite and a friend of the Masons. Maurras and Pujo thought that Jews were funding the J.G.R. and that the Prefecture of Police would be too.
37. Michael Roger Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot: A Study of the Young Gustave Hervé, 1871–1905," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1972, 146–160.
38. Jean Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français*, vol. 13, (Paris: 1964), 47–53. The section on Hervé was co-written by Madeleine Rebérioux and J. Raymond.
39. Jean Touchard, *La gauche en France depuis 1900*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1977), 52–54; Maurice Charnay, *Les Allemanistes*, (Paris: Rivière, 1912); Peter Stearns, *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause Without Rebels*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univeristy Press, 1971); Bernard H. Moss, *The Origins of the French Labor Movement, 1830–1914: The Socialism of Skilled Workers*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Barbara Mitchell, *The Practical Revolutionaries: A New Interpretation of the French Anarchosyndicalists*, (New York: The Greenwood Press, 1987). The Allemanists were described by Jean Touchard as one of the five major tendencies of French socialism before unification in 1905. The others were the Guesdists, the Blanquists, the Broussists, and the Independent Socialists. Hervé would be influenced, but hardly limited, by the Allemanist program.
40. Zeev Sternhell, "The Roots of Popular Antisemitism in the Third Republic," in Frances Malino and Bernard Wasserstein, eds., in *The Jews in Modern France*, (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1985), 103–134.
41. Both Blanqui (1821–1881) and Hervé experienced numerous prison sentences for their political ideas. Just as Blanqui defended France against the Germans in 1870, Hervé, too, demanded that the revolutionary Left defend *la patrie en danger* in 1914. Hervé and Blanqui were not the only revolutionaries to justify the defense of France in terms of a defense of *la patrie de la révolution*. Patrick H. Hutton's research on French Blanquists has no mention of Hervé or his

Insurrectional socialism probably because Hervéism arose as an organized political force well after the disintegration of historic Blanquism in the 1890's. Hervé had some ties to Blanquist strongholds of Paris, and he had fairly good relations with Blanquists under Édouard Vaillant who were integrated into the new S.F.I.O. The demise of the Blanquists in the 1890's did not witness the dissolution of "the cult of the revolutionary tradition." Even if the Blanquist "cult" was not formally handed down to Hervéism, aspects of it may have been passed on in mutated form. Insurrectional socialism included many elements common to that tradition such as: ritual, sacred times and places, the division of the world into sharply drawn camps of good and evil, comradeship, the myth of the Commune, ceremonial revolutionary exercises, and anachronistic insurrectional tactics. Patrick H. Hutton, *The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1864–1893*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); idem, "Popular Boulangism and the Advent of Mass Politics in France, 1886–90," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (January 1976), 85–106; idem, "The Role of the Blanquist Party in Left-Wing Politics in France, 1879–1890," *Journal of Modern History*, 46 (June 1974), 277–295; Paul Mazgaj, "The Origins of the French Radical Right," *French Historical Studies*, 15, 2 (Fall 1987), 287–315.

42. Jacques Julliard, "La CGT devant la guerre (1900–1914)," *Le Mouvement social*, 49 (October–December, 1964), 47–62.
43. Miller, op.cit., 212.
44. As we learned by the later twentieth century, citizenship all too often amounts to the passive acceptance of material rewards and diversions in exchange for the decline of activist hopes and expectations, which arguably are the driving force to genuine citizenship.
45. Benoît Frachon, *Pour La CGT: Mémoires de Lutte, 1902–1939*, (Paris: Messidor-Éditions Sociales, 1981), 36.
46. Robert Tombs, *France: 1814–1914* (New York: Longman, 1996), 57. Tombs called 1912 the time of Hervé's shift which he associated with the phrase "revolutionary militarism." In fact, his ideas on disarming hatreds on the Left and entering the army can be tied to the aftermath of the 1910 Railway Strike. In some ways "revolutionary militarism" was simply an old idea, shared by many, updated and repackaged.
47. Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France*, translated by Jane Marie Todd, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998 [1990]), 252.
48. By 1909 some of Hervé's associates actively began to promote a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. As a socialist Hervé could not acknowledge such a venture until success was guaranteed because a new party would force his exit from the S.F.I.O., thus threatening the base of his movement.
49. Hervé rejected the abstentionist campaign of anarcho-syndicalist Hervéists, he admitted the efficacy of electoral politics, and he worried about socialist reactions to the proposed *Parti Révolutionnaire.*
50. As 1910 ended, he still spoke about a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, but now the "revolutionary party" was described as the vanguard of the entire Left. Hervé also claimed to fear that Bonapartism was as likely as social revolution.
51. By early 1912 he had abandoned all pretense concerning a proposed "revolutionary party."
52. Eugen Weber, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905–1914*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968 [1959]). Weber placed Hervé's transformation within the context of France's "nationalist revival" before World War I.
53. Sternhell implied that Hervé's socialism echoed many of the antidemocratic, elitist, and combative qualities of the idealistic socialism of Georges Sorel and Hendrik de Man which evolved into fascism. Zeev Sternhell, with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, trans. David Maisel, *The Birth of the Fascist Ideology*, (Princeton, New Jersey: 1994 [1989]), 4–5; Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914: Les Origines françaises du fascisme*, (Paris: 1978), 318–347; idem, *Ni Droite ni gauche*, op.cit., 15–43, 136–159; idem, "Morphology of Fascism in France," 22–64. In Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
54. Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*, op.cit.; idem, *Ni Droite ni gauche*, op.cit.

55. Mazgaj, "The Origins of the French Radical Right …" op.cit., 302.
56. Ibid., 287–315.
57. Zeev Sternhell, "Morphology of Fascism in France," 27–35. In Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
58. René Rémond, *La Droite en France de la première Restauration à la Ve République*, 2nd edition, (Paris : Aubier-Montaigne (Collection historique), 1963), 224.
59. William D. Irvine, "Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu," *Journal of Modern History*, no. 63. (June 1991): 271–295; Robert J. Soucy, *French Fascism, The Second Wave, 1933–1939*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 1–25.
60. Jenkins, "Introduction: Contextualizing the Immunity Thesis," 1–21. In Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism*.
61. Jenkins, "Conclusion: Beyond the 'Fascism Debate'" 206. 200–218. In Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism*.
62. Samuel Huston Goodfellow alluded to a veritable fascist "spectrum" in commenting to the author about the multiple influences, associations, and cross-currents increasingly uncovered in the historiographical debates on the problem of defining fascism. September, 2015.
63. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 151–153, 164–167, 151–199. In Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism*.
64. Ibid., 151–154, 151–199. Hoffmann intentionally or inadvertently provided "legitimacy for the Fifth Republic."
65. Ibid., 162. The stalemate society assumes that modernization is the goal and the direction of history, an assumption that is speculative and full of hopes but cannot be proven according to Passmore. Thus, scholars such as Michel Winock have assumed that the great majority who attacked parliamentary dysfunction "were merely concerned citizens [acting to reform a dysfunctional system] and not fascists" 162.
66. Ibid., 151–154, 151–199.
67. Ibid., 159.
68. Ibid., 152.
69. Jenkins, op.cit., 204–205.
70. Michel Winock, "Retour sur le fascisme français: La Rocque et les Croix-de-Feu," *Vingtième Siècle, Revue D'Histoire*, 90, April–June 2006, 3–27.
71. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 30–34, 21–43. Griffin described Sternhell's revised views on de La Rocque's Croix-de-Feu as well as the P.S.F., Dorgères and the Greenshirts, and Vichy along with Pétain & associates as contradicting his original definition of fascism as a synthesis of an antimaterialistic revision of Marxism with an organic Right-wing nationalism. That led Sternhell to postulate two types of fascism where his original version, Type A (Sorel, Hervé, Valois, Déat, Doriot), prepared the groundwork for Type B which had no Left-wing features (De La Rocque, Dorgères, Pétain). Also, by rejecting Nazism as a case of fascism, Sternhell was also seen to have become mired in illogical thinking and polemical self-justification.
72. Charles Sowerwine, *France since 1870: Culture, Society and the Making of the Republic*, 2nd edition, (New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2009 [2001]), 188.
73. Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*, op.cit., 319, 322–324, 327, 337, 363, 377, 402–403, 406, 415; idem, *Ni Droite ni gauche*, op.cit., 22, 27, 29, 30, 32–33, 56, 60, 62, 67.
74. Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 9–11; Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1992). Cited by Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 24.
75. Roger Eatwell, "Towards a New Model of Fascism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4(2): 189, 161–194 (1992). For Roger Eatwell, "most attempts to produce a generic definition of fascist ideology have been linked to a particular conception of where fascism stands on the left-right spectrum. It is normally seen as 'extreme right', though right-wing terminology

is often used erratically, and fascism is sometimes also conceived as 'radical right', 'far right' and 'ultra right'. Moreover, left-right terminology fails to bring out that ideologies are better seen as multidimensional, and that at some levels there can be significant overlaps between ideologies." Eatwell argues that Soucy's definition of fascism (as "primarily a new variety of authoritarian conservatism and right-wing nationalism which sought to defeat the Marxist threat and the political liberalism which allowed it to exist in the first place.") remains almost totally oblivious to the radical side of fascism. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Sternhell and others have postulated a fascism as "Neither Left nor Right" which implies that fascism was "a doctrine of the 'revolutionary center.'" However, the latter approaches fail to stress the right-wing aspects of fascism.

76. Griffin, op.cit., 34–36. Griffin was rather harsh with Paxton's "thoughtful challenge to a new consensus" epitomized in his "Five Stages of Fascism" and by implication his related synthetic study *The Anatomy of Fascism*. For Paxton, the "new consensus" overly stressed doctrine and he challenged its "essentialism." For Griffin, the latter point was off the mark since an 'ideal type' is obviously consciously constructed for heuristic purposes. Paxton accused the "new consensus" historians of focusing on intellectual-cultural history and failing to use all the social sciences. The remedy for Paxton is a "functional definition" of generic fascism with an evolving set of five potential stages. For Paxton fascism is "a system of political authority and social order intended to reinforce the unity, energy, and purity of communities in which liberal democracy stands accused of producing division and decline." For Griffin that was similar to the very essentialism of which Paxton accused the new consensus historians, and his inclusion of seven "mobilizing passions" amounted to a virtual restatement of "the myth of rebirth in the dynamics of fascism" central to the developing "new consensus." Paxton was placed among a group scholars concerned with a comparative generic fascism who stressed the "system" or "regime" concepts of fascism in contrast to older views constructed under the context of "totalitarianism." In this view scholars like Paxton, De Grand, Gregor, and Sternhell "all introduce ideological criteria for the identification of fascism which correspond to the new consensus" however unwittingly or unintentionally.
77. Brian Jenkins, "Introduction: Contextualizing the Immunity Thesis," 4, 1–21 and Robert O. Paxton, "'The Five Stages of Fascism," 111–116, 105–128, in Brian Jenkins, ed., *France in the Era of Fascism*. Also see Jenkins, "Conclusion: Beyond the 'Fascist Debate,'" 205.
78. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, op.cit., 25–26, 21–43. Roger Griffin and others have characterized Soucy's denial of any revolutionary dimension to fascism as part of the traditional theory of fascism which echoes a critical feature of the Marxist account of fascism.
79. In order to keep fascism firmly on the Right, Weiss described the fascist tradition as "that peculiarly modern political anomaly, revolutionary conservatism." John Weiss, *The Fascist Tradition: Radical Right-Wing Extremism in Modern Europe*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). 92.
80. Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956: An Analytic Framework*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Scholars such as Weiss and Mayer are so insistent on contrasting revolution to counterrevolution that they represent the very Manichaean tendency so apparent at the political extremes. That characteristic itself may make the convergence of political extremes more possible.
81. Dietrich Orlow, *The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe: German Nazis, Dutch and French Fascists, 1933–1939*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 1–3. Orlow also cited István Déak, *Essays on Hitler's Europe*, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 16.
82. Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 6, 13–21. Cited in Robert O. Paxton, "The Uses of Fascism," *New York Review of Books*, November 28, 1996, 48–52.
83. Gilbert Allardyce, ed., *The Place of Fascism in European History*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 17; idem, "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," *American Historical Review*, 84 (April 1979), 367–88.
84. Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*, (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1964).

85. Eatwell, op.cit., 177.
86. Orlow, op.cit., 2–3.
87. Robert J. Soucy, "The Nature of Fascism in France," *Journal of Contemporary History*. No. 1, 1966. 27–55; idem, *French Fascism: The First Wave, 1924–1933*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 217–32; idem, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 316–18. (1) "The economic crisis in France in 1926 was not as severe as those in Italy in 1922 or Germany in 1932." (2) French "middle classes were less threatened by big business and big labor." (3) "The threat from the revolutionary left was much weaker in France." (4) Poincaré was able to defuse the appeal of fascism in 1926 "by protecting conservative economic interests through parliamentary means." (5) Conservatives and Radicals acted to "humble the socialist left without resorting to dictatorship." (6) Events in Germany, Italy, and Spain had cautioned many French conservatives and galvanized the French Left to antifascist action. (7) The impact of the Depression hit France less severely due to its relatively gradual process of economic modernization. (8) French fascism was associated with Catholicism which most people did not practice. Payne's association of fascism with a modern form of "immanent secular or atheistic transcendence" differs markedly from Soucy's association of fascism with traditional Catholicism. If there is no necessary connection between religion and fascism, it seems too much to say that fascism must entail a secular form of transcendence. Payne, *A History of Fascism*, op.cit., 9, 245–289, 300–302.
88. Soucy, *French Fascism: The First Wave*, op.cit., 114–125, 191; idem, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 205–208, 230–245. Soucy rejects most populist pronouncements employed by fascists as "double-talk." He makes a reasonable case showing the strained nature of the socialist rhetoric employed by fascists.
89. Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 309.
90. Robert J. Soucy, "France," in Detlef Muhlberger, *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*, (London: 1987), 190–212; idem, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 312. Soucy stresses the domination of French fascist leadership by men from middle class, aristocratic, and military backgrounds. The rank and file were drawn especially from petty bourgeois, white-collar, and peasant elements. He concentrates on the middle and lower middle class bases of French fascism as well as the role of big business in supporting fascist groups.
91. Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 17, 20. Though Soucy makes a plausible case supporting the traditional explanations of fascism, the fact that Hitler and Mussolini courted conservatives and sometimes spoke moderately does not prove that fascism was a form of extremist conservatism.
92. Jacques Julliard, "Sur un fascisme imaginaire," *Annales ESC*, no. 4, July–August, 1984, 859, 849–861.
93. Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 4.
94. Roland N. Stromberg, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Fourth Edition, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 1997 [1980]), 325.
95. Samuel Kalman, *The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008).
96. Roger Griffin, "The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies," *Journal of Contemporary History*, January 2002, Vol. 37 (1), 21–26, 38, 21–43. See also Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, op.cit.; idem, *Fascism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; idem, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus*, (London: Edward Arnold 1998); idem, *Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, edited with Matthew Feldman (London: Routledge, 2004); idem, *Fascism, Totalitarianism, and Political Religion*, (London: Routledge, 2006); idem, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, (New York: Palgrave, 2007).
97. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, op.cit., 27.
98. Ibid., 201.

99. Griffin, "The palingenetic core of generic fascist ideology," published in Alessandro Campi (ed.), *Che cos'è il fascismo? Interpretazioni e prospettive di ricerche*, (Roma, Ideazione, 2003), 97–122.
100. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, op.cit., 24, 36–37.
101. Ibid., 21–26, 21–43. An average American history buff might assume that Griffin was talking about a peculiarly Alaskan hybrid of know-nothing American nationalism. Griffin's "palingenetic ultra-nationalism" has been modified as follows: "Fascism is a genus of modern politics which aspires to bring about a total revolution in the political and social culture of a particular national or ethnic community. While extremely heterogeneous in the specific ideology of its many permutations, in its social support, in the form of organization it adopts as an anti-systemic movement, and in the type of political system, regime, or homeland it aims to create, generic fascism draws its internal cohesion and affective driving force from a core myth that a period of perceived decadence and degeneracy is imminently or eventually to give way to one of rebirth and rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order."
102. Payne, *A History of Fascism*, op.cit., 7–9.
103. Ibid., 3–14.
104. Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France*, translated by Jane Marie Todd, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998 [1990]), 253.
105. Catherine Grünblatt, "Le socialisme national de Gustave Hervé et de '*La Victoire*' (1916–1940)," Paris: Mémoire de D.E.A. d'Histoire Contemporaine, September, 1982, *passim*. On file at the Musée Social, 5, rue Las-Cases, 75007, Paris.
106. Alain Deniel, *Bucard et le Francisme-les seuls fascistes français*, (Paris: Éditions Jean Picollec 1979), 21–25.
107. Grünblatt, op.cit., 39–40, 56, 77. Grünblatt admitted that Hervé's idealistic foreign policy calling for revision of the Treaty of Versailles and reconciliation with Germany made even the classification Neo-Bonapartism troublesome.
108. Jean-Jacques Becker, "Antimilitarisme et antipatriotisme en France avant 1914: Le cas de Gustave Hervé," found in *Enjeux et puissances: Pour une histoire des relations internationales au XXe siècle: Mélanges en l'honneur de J.-B. Duroselle*, (Paris: 1986), 101–113; *idem*, "Gustave Hervé: Vom revolutionären Syndikalismus zum Neobonapartismus," *Die geteilte Utopie*, (1985), 109–119.
109. Irvine, op.cit., 279; Soucy, "The Nature of Fascism in France," op.cit., 29–30; idem, *Fascism in France: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 85.
110. Orlow, op.cit., 1. Orlow cited Tim Mason, "Whatever Happened to Fascism?" in *Reevaluating the Third Reich*, Ed. Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993), 253–262. That article originally appeared in *Radical History Review*, #49, winter 1991. Mason thought that the radicalism of the 1960s and its expansion of the fascist label as well as the implications of feminism and the Holocaust all helped to undermine generic fascism or render it passé.

Chapter 1

1. "A typically stubborn Breton."
2. Ernest Renan, *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, n.d.), 60. Renan was born in Tréguier in the department of Côtes-du-Nord in the Trégorrais, a region described by André Siegfried as the most mystical and visionary region of Brittany. The Trégorrais "is more Catholic than clerical, more religious than Catholic, and deep down always a bit pagan and Druidic in his poetry and persistent adoration of natural forces. A Celtic substratum, older than Christianity, persists in these souls which is both very ancient and quite new." André Siegfried, *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République*, (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1964), 155.

3. Michael Roger Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot: A Study of the Young Gustave Hervé, 1871–1905," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1972, 132–139.
4. Renan, *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse ...*, 67–81. Unlike the undiluted Breton heritage of Hervé, Renan was Gascon on his maternal side, and he thought that this non-Breton heritage tempered his idealism with a certain gaiety, if not irreverence.
5. This phrase has no parallel in English known to the writer. Generally, it means "a typically stubborn native Breton speaker." This phrase may have been borrowed from Victor Méric, *A travers la jungle politique et littéraire*, Séries I, (Paris: Librairie Valois, 1930), 223; Jean Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français*, (Paris: Les Éditions ouvrières, 1964), Madeleine Rebérioux and Raymond Vincent, "Gustave Hervé," vol. 13, 48, 47–5.
6. *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français*, op.cit., vol. 13, 47.
7. Siegfried, op.cit., 131.
8. Ibid., 131.
9. Ibid., 130–133, 157–8.
10. Ibid., 147–148.
11. Francis Jourdain, *Sans Remords ni Rancune: Souvénirs épars d'un viel homme "né en 76,"* (Paris: Corrêa, 1953), 11.
12. Ibid., 91.
13. Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation d'un tempérament politique (1871–1899)," *Jean Jaurès Cahiers Trimestriels*, No. 140, (April–June 1996), 22–3.
14. Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), Ford, 75.
15. Jacques Cambry, *Voyage dans le Finistère ou état de ce département en 1794 et 1795*. 3 vols., Paris: Librairie du Cercle Social, Vol 1: 71. Cited in Catherine Ford, op.cit., 69–70.
16. Gabriel Le Bras, *Introduction à l'étude de la pratique religieuse en France*, vol. 1, 83. Cited in Ford, op.cit., 70.
17. Ford, op.cit., 14, 29.
18. Siegfried, op.cit., 211.
19. Ibid., 210–215.
20. There is some debate on whether one should call the mid-nineteenth century agricultural changes a "revolution." Ford, op.cit., 45.
21. In many ways the Breton pattern of agricultural development may not have been as radically different from the national pattern as was assumed. Ibid., 49.
22. Michel Launay, *Le syndicalisme en Europe*, (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1990), 3.
23. Ford, op.cit., 30; Hudson Campbell Meadwell, "Brittany Always: Ethnic Collective Action in Brittany during the Third Republic." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Duke University, 1988, 118–33.
24. Ibid. There was a massive increase in emigration after 1850 from almost all Breton departments except Finistère, where there was a reluctance to emigrate until after World War I. Meadwell, op.cit., 116.
25. Siegfried, op.cit., 210.
26. Ford, op.cit., 50.
27. Ibid., 7.
28. Ibid., 59–65.
29. Ibid., 34.
30. Ibid., 37–8. Elevated birthrates, comparatively low levels of out-migration, and weak urbanization meant that rural communities were far from isolated. High birthrates also assured the existence of a plentiful agricultural labor force which drove wages down and created increased competition for land and leases. Finistère had an agricultural population of 57 percent in 1901, with 16 percent employed in manufacturing and more than 10 percent by the French state. Excluding Brittany, in 1901 France as a whole employed almost 40 percent of

its working population in agriculture, 30 percent in manufacturing, and only 6.5 percent in government services. Meadwell, op.cit., 110–1. Ford claimed that 62% of the department's population were actively engaged in agriculture in 1901.

31. Ibid., 41.
32. Ford, op.cit., 36.
33. Siegfried, op.cit., 195.
34. Ibid., 196, 208.
35. Ibid., 208.
36. Ibid., 196–207, 218–220, 224–226.
37. Ford, op.cit., 60, 62. One rural canton in Central Finistère had an illiteracy rate of 48 percent in 1899. Earlier in the century Finistère had the highest illiteracy rates in France except for Allier and Corrèze in the Massif Central and Morbihan.
38. J. Foucher and George Michel Thomas, *La vie à Brest de 1848 à 1948: Vol. 1. Les événements*, (Brest: Éditions de la Cité, 1975), 64.
39. Georges-Michael Thomas, *Brest la Rouge, 1846–1806*, (Brest: Éditions de la Cité, 1989), 10, 20–37, 55–63; J. Foucher and Georges-Michel Thomas, op.cit., 59–64.
40. Ibid., 55.
41. Ibid., 10–11.
42. Jean Foucher and Georges-Michel Thomas, op.cit., 175–179; Georges-Michel Thomas, *Brest la Rouge*, op.cit., 10.
43. Georges-Michel Thomas, *Brest la Rouge*, op.cit., 11–41.
44. Jean Foucher and George-Michel Thomas, *La vie à Brest, 1848–1948: Vol. 2, La vie quotidienne*, (Brest: Éditions de la Cité, 1976), 9–13.
45. Ibid., 9–11; Georges Duby, ed., *Histoire de la France urbaine*, Vol. IV, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1983), 309.
46. Meadwell, op.cit., 108.
47. Siegfried, op.cit., 216.
48. Scher, op.cit., 133–134.
49. Siegfried, op.cit., 226.
50. Scher, op.cit., 132–134.
51. Masson's family lived in Recouvrance in a house at 6, rue de la Porte, near the Hervés who resided at 5, rue du Pont. He was two years older than Hervé and lost his own father in January 1885, a loss felt deeply for the rest of his life. Masson's friendship with Hervé probably dated from their years at the Lycée of Brest, though it might have blossomed later when their paths crossed at Saint-Brieuc and Paris. Masson used many pseudonyms throughout his writing career in an eccentric or naive attempt to evade the domination of the social system. Émile Masson, *Antée, les Bretons et le Socialisme*, Presentation and notes by Jean-Yves Guiomar, (Paris: François Maspero, 1972), 20, 24–27; Scher, op.cit., 147.
52. Ibid., 195.
53. Ibid., 23–27.
54. Scher, op.cit., 132–134. Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français*, op.cit., 48, 47–53.
55. In his reminiscences the historian Jacques Le Goff, a son of a native of the Léon region of Finistère, recalled how antimilitarist and anticolonial feelings inspired him growing up in the port of Toulon due the colonial violence of the military. Jacques Le Goff, *Une vie pour l'histoire*, Interview with Marc Heurgon, (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), 19–20. Cited by Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse …," op.cit., 24.
56. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935. Charles Chassé interview of Gustave Hervé.
57. Scher, op.cit., 141–142.
58. This region near Lesneven included approximately 16% large, 40% medium, and 44% small proprietors in 1884. Siegfried, op.cit., 182–183.

59. Ibid., 217.
60. Scher, op.cit., 140–146; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935. Victor Méric wrote in the second issue of *Les Hommes du Jour* of 1908: "In the port where he was employed as a *pavillonneur*, the grandfather made many of the flags that his grandson one day would plant in the dungpile." *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908.
61. The man who planted the flag in the dungpile.
62. Maurice Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et l'affaire du drapeau dans le fumier," *La Révolution prolétarienne*, no. 92 (Mars, 1955), 22. See Also: Maurice Dommanget, *L'Histoire du drapeau rouge des origines à la guerre de 1939*. (Paris: Éditions, Librairie de l'Etoile, 1966), 275.
63. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935.
64. Scher, op.cit., 145–146; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 25.
65. Ibid., 141–143; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 25–26.
66. Ibid., 147–148; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 25.
67. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé.
68. Scher, op.cit., 149.
69. Ibid., 149–150.
70. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 27. note.; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
71. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
72. Scher, op.cit., 152–153.
73. Ibid., 148; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
74. *La Victoire*, #7266, November 30, 1936, "Frère Florin," G.H.
75. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
76. Gustave Hervé, *Les Epîtres de Gustave Hervé aux Incroyants et aux Croyants*, (Paris: Éditions De La Société Nouvelle '*La Victoire*', 1949), 57. To Chassé he referred to his uncle. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935.
77. Ibid.; Scher, op.cit., 155.
78. Scher, op.cit., 155.
79. *La Victoire*, #4269, September 12, 1927, "A propos de Gustave l'Ermite," G.H.
80. Hervé, *Les Epîtres …*, op.cit., 47.
81. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
82. Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 230.
83. Patricia A. Tilburg, *Colette's Republic: Work, Gender, and Popular Culture in France, 1870–1914*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 8.
84. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe, l'enseignement pacifique par l'histoire*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Education, 1903), 388.
85. Gustave Hervé, *Nouvelle Histoire de France*, (Paris: Fayard, 1930), 7.
86. Scher., op.cit., 156.
87. *Dictionnaire biographique*, op.cit., vol. 13, 47; *La Dépêche de Brest*, December 28, 1907; Scher, op.cit., 159–166.
88. A *pion* was a tutor, study hall monitor, or proctor. Hervé was thus at the bottom of the educational hierarchy.
89. A.N., F7 15968[2], Telegram from *Le Matin* to the Léon region of Brittany at 55 rue de la Comédie, Lorient, dated September 18, 1907 dealing with the paper's desire to get Gaston's comments on his brother. *Le Matin*, September 22, 1907, "Leurs Frères: Que dit le commandant Jaurès? Que pense le capitaine Hervé?" *Le Matin* tried to interview the military brothers of the two famous socialists, Jaurès and Hervé, but Jaures's brother cited the rhetorical assaults by his more famous sibling against Hervé at Nancy. Gaston had already left for colonial duty in Cochin-China so soldiers formerly under his command were interviewed. They reported that Captain Hervé thought his brother's ideas were horrendous, but he had filial affection for him. The captain was said to be a strict but fair disciplinarian.

90. Scher, op.cit., 159–165; Heuré, op.cit., 26; *La Victoire*, March 4, 1916; *Le Matin*, September 22, 1907; A.N., F7 15968², letter from Victor Hervé to his brother dated January 18, 1911.
91. Scher, op.cit., 157–165; *La Victoire*, July 6, 1916.
92. Scher, op.cit., 166; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation," op.cit., 27; *La Dépêche de Brest*, December 28, 1907.
93. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10 and 11, 1935.
94. *Dictionnaire biographique* … op.cit., vol. 13, 47.
95. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
96. Scher, op.cit., 165–170. His continual resistance to the school's disciplinary system suggested to Scher that Hervé could not accept rules of behavior which were less strict than the rule at the communal religious schools. Scher wondered whether Hervé ever completely bridged the gulf between himself and the Lycée. He always kept his ability to compartmentalize his life in order to survive. Good grades were thus accomplished in spite of his problems of fitting in. If the values of the republic were not necessarily the problem, issues of adjustment may have occurred due the educational system itself, as Scher implied. However, it might make more sense to ascribe any adjustment problems to the personality of the student.
97. Méric, *A travers la jungle politique et littéraire*: Séries I, 198–200, 214–217.
98. "When Gustave changed from being a student of the scripture to a 'fervent anticlerical' studying modern history, his lifelong search to understand and actualize a moral conception of truth never wavered. Just as it is a rhetorical question to ask how the same family could produce a patriotic soldier and an antipatriotic antimilitarist, so is it to miss the point by asking how the same young man could mull over Taine as passionately as he could over Matthew, Mark, and John. Everything that Gustave or any of his siblings had ever learned in a Breton church or in their Breton home prepared them to seek a unifying ideal in the universe and then to be prepared to die for it." Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 168–169.
99. Scher, op.cit., 169.
100. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 12, 1935.
101. Scher, op.cit., 171–176. Scher made much of a dream Hervé had in his last year at the Lycée of Brest about a pregnant teenager. In the dream, instead of being disgraced by the community, she was rescued through an abortion performed by Doctor Hervé. During a trial for the abortion, he described the act as meritorious, yet the flamboyant confession confirmed the girl's disgrace, just what he had sought to alleviate. Scher stressed the secrecy, mission of rescue, disguise, guilt, and barely veiled sexuality of the dream.
102. Ibid., 176.
103. Ibid., 177. Scher said she was married with six children, though at least one died well before she and Hervé became close, if not yet a couple, sometime in 1891, a short while after the death of her husband. Heuré claimed that Marie had three children [still living?] when they met. Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire* …, op.cit., 336.
104. Ibid., 176–178. Scher interviews with Mme. Baudy, Geneviève Hervé, and Gaston Hervé, Jr. in 1970 and 1971.
105. A.N., F7 15968², Brest, note of July 23, 1909.
106. Scher, op.cit., 178–179.
107. Ibid., 179.
108. Ibid., 180.
109. *Le Petit Parisien*, February 8, 1906.
110. Fonds Pantheon, F7 15968², Note from Le Préfect of Yonne, November 24, 1908, Auxerre.
111. A.N., F7 15968², F 2740 Paris, Note of July 5, 1916.
112. *Dictionnaire biographique* …, op.cit., vol. 13, 47.
113. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 27.
114. Le Familistère de Guise was neo-Fourierist rather than Marxist; in fact Engels called it an exploitative enterprise.

115. *La Dépêche du Brest*, July 11, 1935; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 3.
116. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 27–28. Heuré did not take such criticism as anti-Semitic.
117. Ibid., 28; Émile Masson, *Korig, roman autobiographique*, cited in J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, *Emile Masson, professeur de liberté* (Chamalières: Éditions Canope, 1991), 46.
118. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 57–58.
119. *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, "Gustave Hervé," Flax (Victor Méric).
120. *La Dépêche du Brest*, July 11, 1935; Scher, op.cit., 181–182.
121. Michael Roger Scher, "Un jour qui dura un an et demi: Gustave Hervé au Collège de Lesneven (1893–1895)," *Les Cahiers de l'Iroise*, no. 3, (1973), 157–161. Hervé arrived in April 1893 and his year and a half was up by September 1894. ! So the title of Scher's article has an error in the date.
122. Scher, *Les Cahiers*, op.cit., 158.
123. Eugène Corgne, *Histoire du Collège de Lesneven, 1833–1914*, (Brest: Imprimerie du Courrier du Finistère, 1922), 88.
124. *La Dépêche du Brest*, July 11, 1935.
125. Scher, *Cahiers*, op.cit., 158; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 182. Scher assumed that Hervé's republicanism was crucial.
126. Corgne, op.cit., 89. Hervé letter to Charles Chassé from the Concièrgerie dated January 1912.
127. Ford, op.cit., 88, 132n, 173, 179.
128. Corgne, op.cit., 89. This passage was cited from Hervé's letter from the Concièrgerie dated January 1912 to Charles Chassé found in Charles Chassé, "Les derniers prêtres universitaires: Le College de Lesneven," *Mercure de France*, no. du 16 avril 1913, 711–714; Scher, *Cahiers* …, op.cit., 158.
129. Ibid., 90. Corgne cited Hervé's 1912 letter to Chassé.
130. Ibid., 89. He cites Chassé.
131. Scher, *Cahiers*, op.cit., 159. Note cited also in Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 30.
132. Corgne, op.cit., 90. Corgne cited Hervé's 1912 letter to Chassé; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
133. *La Dépêche de Brest*, April 19, 1937, "De Gustave Hervé au Général Le Flo," François Menez; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 30.
134. Ibid.; Scher, *Les Cahiers*, op.cit., 159; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 185.
135. Scher, *Cahiers*, op.cit., 158.
136. Corgne, op.cit., 90. Corgne cited Hervé's 1912 letter to Chassé.
137. *La Dépêche de Brest*, François Menec, April 19, 1937; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 184–185.
138. Scher, "The Antipatriot …, op.cit., 185; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 31.
139. *Les Hommes du Jour*, No. 2, 1908, "Gustave Hervé," Flax (Victor Méric).
140. Corgne, op.cit., 89; Chassé; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935. Both ítems referred to Hervé's January 1912 letter to Chassé from the Concièrgerie regarding his memories of Lesneven; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 182; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 29.
141. Gustave Hervé, "Toast de M. Gustave Hervé" *En Avant-Bulletin mensuel de l'Institut St. Français et de l'Association Amicales des Elèves et Maîtres du Collège de Lesneven*, (Lesneven: August 1933).
142. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," 30–32; Gilles Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, (Paris : Éditions La Découverte, 1997), 19–20.
143. Scher, "The Antipatriot … ", op.cit., 187–188.
144. Corgne, op.cit., 91–92. He cited Hervé's 1912 letter to Abbé Colin.

145. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 30.
146. Corgne, op.cit., 90–91. Hervé's January 1912 letter to Chassé from the Concièrgerie regarding his memories of Lesneven.
147. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
148. Corgne, op.cit., 91. Hervé letter to Charles Chassé in 1912; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 189; Scher, *Cahiers* …, op.cit., 160; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 29, note; Maitron, *Dictionnaire* …, op.cit. 48.
149. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 31–32.
150. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935; Maurice Rotstein, "The Public Life of Gustave Hervé," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, March 1956, 6. Rotstein reported that Hervé worked for awhile at the lycée at Bourg-la-Reine.
151. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 189; Méric, Séries I, op.cit, 223.
152. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 32; J.-D. and M. Giraud, op.cit., 55–58.
153. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 57–58.
154. Jules Isaac, *Expériences de ma vie: Péguy*, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1959), 37–38.
155. Isaac was a student at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris in 1896–1897 when Hervé became a *répétiteur* (tutor) there. Ironically, in 1903 Isaac succeeded to Hervé's former teaching position at the Lycée of Sens. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 32.
156. Isaac, op.cit., 37–38, 46–47.
157. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 33.
158. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., viii.
159. A.N., F7 15968², Notes of February 12, 1896 and February 19, 1896.
160. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 189–190; *Les Hommes du Jour*, No. 2, 1908, "Gustave Hervé," Flax (Victor Méric). There is also a reference that he worked for a time in 1895 as a *pion* at Bourg-la-Reine.
161. Jules Isaac, op.cit., 69.
162. A.N., F7 15968², Note M/695, June 7, 1901. At this time Hervé was the subject of separate administrative and judicial proceedings related to several provocative newspaper articles in socialist newspapers in Sens. He won the trial but lost the state educational proceedings which cost him his latest academic post at the Lycée of Sens and any chance for future teaching positions.
163. Masson, *Les Bretons et le Socialisme*, op.cit., 16.
164. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 33.
165. Maitron, *Dictionnaire biographique* …, op.cit., vol. 13, 48.
166. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 189.
167. *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, "Gustave Hervé," Flax (Victor Méric).
168. *Le Travailleur Socialiste de l'Yonne*, June 22, 1901; Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 191.
169. Scher, ""The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 191–193.
170. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 34.
171. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 192–193. On November 13, 1901 Sarthou, as a witness for Hervé at the trial for an article in *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*, described his former colleague as having "advanced ideas" at the time of their tenure at Rodez and Alençon. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 34.
172. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 193. Scher's assessment is a bit more categorical. "Hervé's interpretation of his stay in Rodez was, from all that can be determined, a fabrication built up from rather insignificant events. Méric's report can be discounted since his source of information was undoubtedly his friend Gustave. To make a point, to put himself into the center of a storm that was enveloping the nation, Hervé was willing to recreate events by creating them. The example is instructive. For Hervé, throughout his career, the line between what he knew to be true and what he would have liked to be true was only vaguely marked."

173. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 35.
174. Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1973], [1975] 1984), 205 in the English Combined Version; Barbara Mitchell, *The Practical Revolutionaries: A New Interpretation of the French Anarcho-syndicalists*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). Mitchell noted how the *universités populaires* were often apolitical educational centers which attracted members from the middle classes as well as the working classes. Mitchell, 79–81.
175. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 194–195.
176. L.T.S., November 16, 1901. Cited in Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 35–36.
177. *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, op.cit.
178. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
179. Scher, "The Antipatriot …," op.cit., 195.
180. Renan, op.cit., 195.
181. Ibid., 24.
182. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 36.
183. A.N., F7 15968[2], Fonds Panthéon, Undated loose note, probably from sometime in late 1910.
184. Alexandre Zévaès, *Histoire de socialisme et du communisme en France de 1871 à 1947*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1947), 322.
185. *L'Action Directe*, April 15, 1908.
186. *Le Matin*, August 14, 1907; Parti Socialiste, S.F.I.O., 4th National Congress, Nancy, (Paris: Compte Rendu Sténographique, 1907), 261–262; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé: Jeunesse et formation …," op.cit., 37.
187. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 190–210; idem, "Vieilles choses, Vieilles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, no. 8. July 15-August 15, 1926, 592–593; *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 190, September 9, 1911, "Gustave Hervé," Victor Méric.
188. This description may be dated since it is based on an October 2002 visit.
189. Ernst Renan, *Recollections of My Youth*, Translated by C.B. Pitman, Introduction by G.G. Coulton, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), 70–71.
190. A seafaring as well as peasant and Catholic heritage, a military family background, an early religious then secular education, more than a decade serving in various positions in the French educational system, and the acceptance of an international socialist ideology may have acted to blend several divergent systems of values and ideals. Initially, Hervé may appear to have transcended his roots, but one wonders whether his experience simply cloaked more longstanding yet dormant traits. Hervé's career had little to do with the accommodation and acculturation which Ford described in her analysis of the social Catholic movement in Brittany, but by the end of his life, Hervé had arrived at a political philosophy that was in many ways another French variant of Christian socialism. Ford, op.cit., 5–7.
191. J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1952), 1–13. Hervé's jaundiced view of human nature, his antimaterialism, and his skepticism about democracy make Talmon's insights about totalitarian democracy worth considering but not quite satisfactory when analyzing the subject of this study.

Chapter 2

1. Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot," op.cit., 11.
2. Gustave Hervé, *Mes crimes, ou onze ans de prison pour délits de presse, modeste contribution à l'histoire de la liberté de la presse sous la 3e République*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Guerre Sociale*, 1912), 4.

3. *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, op.cit.
4. Scher, op.cit., 12.
5. Scher, op.cit., 94–104.
6. *Echo de Paris*, February 24, 1906; Scher, "The Antipatriot …" op.cit., 104.
7. Patricia A. Tilburg, *Colette's Republic: Work, Gender, and Popular Culture in France, 1870–1914*, (NewYork: Berghahn Books, 2009), 3, 26; Raymond Grew and Patrick Harrigan, "The Catholic Contribution to Universal Schooling in France, 1850–1906," *Journal of Modern History*, 57 (June 1985), 238.
8. Scher, op.cit., 104.
9. Scher, op.cit., 104–109. Major cities increased by eight percent, while the department itself decreased by nine percent. Between 1851 and 1901 emigration from Yonne was twenty-five percent.
10. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 27. Miller, op.cit., 16, 64, 120, 139; Sowerwine, op.cit., 27, 86. Even though the *Chambre* passed a military service law in 1872 mandating universal male conscription for five years, its unevenness and unfairness was only gradually remedied, based as it was on standards and exemptions tied to one's class and ability to pay. A three year law was passed in 1889 which generally rectified the inequities, but following the Dreyfus Affair a new Two Year Law was enacted in 1905 which did nothing to improve army morale at a time of increasing national polarization. The increasing threat of war and the so-called national revival led to a new Three Year Law in 1913.
11. Wright, *France in Modern Times*, op.cit., 266.
12. Scher, op.cit., *passim.*
13. Touchard, *La Gauche en France depuis 1900*, op.cit., 52–54; Charnay, *Les allemanistes*, op.cit., 92–102.
14. Derfler, op.cit., 41–50; Stafford, op.cit.
15. Scher, op.cit., 112–3.
16. Ibid., 114.
17. Hutton, *The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition*, op.cit., 116.
18. Scher, op.cit., 114–6; Claude Willard, ed., *La France Ouvrière: Des Origines à 1920: Tome 1, Deuxième Partie—1871–1914*, by Rolande Trempé, (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier, 1995), 351.
19. Maitron, 1975 I, op.cit., 292–293.
20. Christophe Prochasson, *Les Intellectuels, Le Socialisme, Et La Guerre, 1900–1938*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1993), 38.
21. Theodore Zeldin, *A History of French Passions. 1848–1945. Vol. 1. Ambition, Love and Politics*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), 757.
22. Scher, op.cit., 114–6.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. Ibid., 114–6.
25. Ibid., 14.
26. Ibid., 119.
27. Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire Biographique Du Mouvement Ouvrier Français*, Vol. 13, op.cit., 48.
28. Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 119.
29. Miller, op.cit., 55–56.
30. L.T.S., August 11, 1900; Scher, op.cit., 122.
31. L.T.S., March 16, 1901.
32. Scher, op.cit., 16.
33. Gerard Noiriel, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France (xixe-xxe siècle): Discours publics, humiliations privées*, (Paris: Fayard, 2007); Eugen Weber. *Peasants into Frenchmen*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1981).
34. Scher, op.cit., 122–4; L.T.S., February and February 23, 1901.
35. L.T.S., June 1, 1901; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 124.
36. Scher, op.cit., 124–5.

37. Ibid., 16.
38. L.T.S., April 7, 1900.
39. L.T.S., April, 21, 1900.
40. Scher, op.cit., 19–20.
41. L.T.S., April, 21, 1900; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 19–20.
42. L.T.S., July 14, 1900.
43. Scher, op.cit., 21.
44. L.T.S., May 12, 1900.
45. Scher, op.cit., 22.
46. Moss, op.cit., 134–5.
47. Ibid., 133.
48. Scher, op.cit., 24.
49. Biribi was a reference to France's North African military prisons.
50. L.T.S., October 23, 1900, "Aux Conscrits," Sans Patrie; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 24–25.
51. Scher, op.cit., 165–170; Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 224–5.
52. Ibid., op.cit., 25; BB[18] A-1901 108–128 Dossier: 128 A-1901 Journal *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*: Injures á l'armée; Document Minister of Justice to Attorney General (Paris March 19, 1901)
53. Ibid.; A.N., BB18 A-1901 108–128 Dossier: 128 A-1901 Journal *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*: Injures á l'armée; Document Minister of Justice to Le Procureur Général, (Paris March 19, 1901); Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., "In April 1901, moreover, Le Procureur Général at the Paris Cour d'appel agreed with the advice of his deputy in warning the Minister of Justice about the inadmissibility of the complaint made by the Minister of War" because the active military was not mentioned, just conscripts who were not yet inducted. 35. A.N., BB18 2179/128-A-1901. Procureurs Généraux or Attorneys General existed at all levels or districts of the French judicial apparatus and they had deputies or assistants.
54. Ibid., 26; Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 28.
55. An archpriest is a priest whom a bishop delegates as the head of one of the *circonscriptions* of his diocese.
56. Scher, op.cit., 26–35.
57. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 28.
58. Ibid., 28–29; L.T.S., November 10, 1900; Gilles Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," *Jean Jaurès: Cahiers Trimestriels*. No. 145, 11–13; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 26–33.
59. Ibid., 29; Charles Péguy, *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, II-15, July 23, 1901, 23–71; Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," *Bulletin de l'Amitié Charles Péguy*, No. 78, April–June 1997. 60.
60. Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 36.
61. Ibid., 37. Scher cited L.T.S., June 1 and June 8, 1901.
62. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," op.cit., 63; T.S.Y., September 28 and November 9, 1901; A.N., "Panthéon" 25338/46, Note M/1926 of November 29, 1901.
63. Scher, op.cit., 36.
64. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 34; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 37–38. See A.N., BB[18] 2179 A 1901, 108–128, Dossier: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*: Documents, *Procureur Général* to the Minister of Justice, April 7, 1901 and *Procureur Général* to the Minister of Justice, June 7, 1901. By June 1901 charges were brought against three officials at *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. The figurehead editor Citizen Thomas was a hunchback, thus exempt from military service, hence not subject to punishment for antimilitarism which would take place in military prisons. Monneret was the second editor, and Rousseau was a former teacher who acted as the paper's administrative head. Monneret's home was raided but no evidence turned up revealing the identity of *Le Sans Patrie*.

65. Ibid., 34–35; A.N., BB[18] 2179/128-A-1901. Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 37–38.
66. A.N., F17 23A, Copied version of notes from Charles Adam to the Minister of Public Instruction; Pierre Miquel, *La Troisième République*, (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 437–444.
67. Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire Biographique …*, op.cit., Vol. 13, 50.
68. Scher, op.cit., 38.
69. Ibid., 38–9; *Annales de la Chambre des Députés, Débats Parlementaires*, December 9, 1901, 2704.
70. Ibid., 39.
71. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 30.
72. Ibid., 34; A.N., BB[18] 2179/128-A-1901. Scher cites July 25, 1901 as the date for the *non-lieu* (dismissal for lack of evidence). That would mean that his Wagram article came a few days before his dismissal for "Aux Conscrits" in *Le Pioupiou* case, which seems a bit illogical given Scher's argument. See Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 41–42. A.N., BB[18] 2179A 108–128, Dossier *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* Document P.G.-M.J. July 25, 1901 and P.G.-M.J. August 5, 1901. Heuré uses the date June 25, 1901.
73. Scher, op.cit., 42.
74. Ibid., 42–3; Maurice Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et L'Affaire du Drapeau dans le Fumier," *La Révolution Prolétarienne*, No. 92, March 1955, n.p.
75. L.T.S., July 20, 1901.
76. Scher, op.cit., 43.
77. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 30.
78. Hervé, *Mes crimes*, op.cit., 3–6, 23.
79. Scher, op.cit., 60.
80. Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et L'Affaire du Drapeau dans le Fumier," op.cit., n.p.
81. Alexandre Zévaès, *Histoire de socialisme et du communisme en France de 1871 à 1947*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1947), 322.
82. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 214. Méric's account was based on later reactions by Hervé; in 1901 the two men were not yet acquainted.
83. Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et L'Affaire du Drapeau dans le Fumier," op.cit., n.p.
84. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
85. *L'Œuvre*, November, 1907, 20, *passim*; *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, 7e Cahier, 3e Séries, « M. Gustave Téry, » 1–50; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 75.
86. *L'Œuvre*, November, 1907, 20, *passim*; Suarez, op.cit., 350.
87. Ibid., *passim*, 31.
88. Marc Tardieu, *Charles Péguy, Biographie*, (Paris: Éditions François Bourin, 1993), 110–112, 155.
89. Ibid. Péguy, like Hervé, chose to stand outside the mainstream of socialism and to lead a life of sacrifice. Both men promoted publications which needed funds, and both were idealists and a visionaries who returned to versions of Christian idealism under the influence of Pascal. 160–167.
90. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," op.cit., 58–73, 59–62. Heuré argues that Masson and Péguy were the most insightful observers in grasping the complex personality of Hervé. For Heuré the works of Péguy "are essential in understanding the journey of Gustave Hervé, that which occurred up to 1914 and that which developed until his death in 1944." 58.
91. Charles Péguy, *Notre Jeunesse*, (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1933 [1909]), 120–1. Péguy also accused Téry of being an *arriviste*. Tardieu, *Charles Péguy*, op.cit., 173, 182, 211.
92. Tardieu, op.cit., 166–185. Tardieu mischaracterized Hervé as a pacifist which he never was. Many on the Left at that time, including Téry, knew it. 193–194. Part of the problem for Péguy and others was that "the Dreyfus Affair had escaped the logical right–left opposition,

… [yet that polarity] was found inscribed in the foundational texts of socialism and … [was embedded in] … the irreducible logic of the class struggle." Tardieu recalled that the conservative *Le Figaro* was Dreyfusard while the rabidly anti-Semitic *La Libre Parole* could tap into traditional anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois rhetoric of socialism, which had been markedly anti-Semitic, and only later became "the socialism of fools." Among Péguy's new heroes were Georges Sorel, Henri Bergson, Bernard Lazare, Daniel Halévy, and, for a time, Romain Rolland, 132, 167–170, 184–190. Julian Jackson described *Notre Jeunesse*, in which Péguy defended the battles of his youth, as a response to Daniel Halévy's *Apologie pour Notre Passé* which wondered whether the Dreyfusards had been duped. Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 47.

93. David Carroll, *French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 43–70.
94. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," op.cit., 64. Heuré cited a Letter from Péguy to Millerand dated July 17, 1905. See Auguste Martin, "Péguy et Millerand" in *Feuillets de l'Amitié Charles Péguy*, No. 77, May 1960 and Charles Péguy, Œuvres Complètes, (Paris: Gallimard, coll. « Bibliothèque de la Pléiade »), t. II, 1358. At this time Péguy started calling Hervé a traitor, at which point people like Émile Masson and Paul Reclus reacted violently and distanced themselves from Péguy.
95. Tardeau, op.cit., 193–197.
96. Ibid., 151; Guy Chapman, *The Dreyfus Case*, (London: Hart-Davis, 1955), 323.
97. Péguy, *Notre Jeunesse*, op.cit., 151.
98. Ibid., 171–2, *passim*.
99. Charles Péguy, *Par ce demi-clair matin*, (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1952), 264–5, 277–8.
100. Suarez, op.cit., 359, 351.
101. Agulhon, op.cit., 125.
102. Hervé, *Mes Crimes …*, op.cit., 1–3.
103. Othon Goepp Guerlac, *Les Citations françaises*, (Paris: Colin, 1961 [1952]), 291; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 33; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 44.
104. L.-O. Frossard, *De Jaurès à Léon Blum: Souvenirs d'un militant*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1943), 153–4.
105. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 196, 214–217.
106. Scher, op.cit., 45–6.
107. Mark Federman, "What is the Meaning of The Medium is the Message?" July 23, 2004. http://individual.utoronto.ca/markfederman/article_mediumisthemessage.htm
108. Robert Darnton, "How to Become a Celebrity," *New York Review of Books*, May 21, 2015, 8–10.
109. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 11, and 12, 1935; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 32.
110. Scher, op.cit., 46.
111. L.T.S., August 3, 1901; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 32–33.
112. Ibid.; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 46–48; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 34–35. Had this letter to the *Procureur de la République* of Auxerre been sent in the mail earlier? Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire Biographique*, Vol., op.cit., 50.
113. L.T.S., August 3, 1901.
114. Any attempt to separate all Hervé's possible and potentially interconnected motives is probably as fruitless as trying to judge the motives and intentions of Edward Snowden today.
115. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 35.
116. Scher, op.cit., 50. Scher referred to BB[18]/2179 A. 1901, 108–128 A., Dossier: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*: Document: Procureur Général to the Minister of Justice, August 9, 1901; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 32. Heuré cited BB[18]/2179/128-A-1901, 108–128.
117. Ibid.

118. Agulhon, op.cit., 110–111.
119. Suarez, Vol. I, op.cit., 355–8.
120. Gustave Téry, "Aristide Briand dit Aristide-le-cynique," supplément de *L'Œuvre*, April 15, 1909.
121. *La Révolution prolétarienne*, August–September 1947, 7, "Fernand Pelloutier et Aristide Briand," by Pierre Monatte, cited from Maurice Dommanget, *La Chevalerie du travail française, 1893–1911: Contribution à l'histoire du socialisme et du mouvement ouvrier*, (Lausanne: Éditions Rencontre, 1967), 397–398.
122. Dommanget, op.cit., 402–403.
123. Ibid., 401. Dommanget cited Aristide Jobert, *Souvenirs d'un ex-parlementaire (1914–1919)*, (Paris: Éditions Eugène Figuière, 1933), 201.
124. Hervé and Briand would later go separate ways, becoming antagonists before the war when Briand entered the government. They eventually had more amicable relations during the war and later when Hervé had evolved to an iconoclastic right-wing position and Briand was an advocate for peace as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the 1920s.
125. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 36.
126. L.T.S., November 16, 1901.
127. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 36–37. Heuré cited an article in *L'Yonne*.
128. Scher, op.cit., 51–2; Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 37; Suarez, Vol. I, op.cit., 361; R.E.P., November 24, 1901.
129. Heuré, *GH : Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 37–38.
130. Scher, op.cit., 53–4.
131. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 37–38. Heuré cited Raymond Escholier, *Souvenirs parlés de Briand*, (Paris: Hachette, 1932), 42.
132. Ibid., 39; Scher, op.cit., 53; L.T.S., November 16, 1901.
133. Suarez, op.cit., 364.
134. Scher, op.cit., 53–4. Jury trials were an innovation of the French Revolution, and they led to an acquittal rate of 28 percent at the cour d'assises during the Third Republic, while decisions before the three judge *cours correctionnelles* (lower magistracy courts) had acquittal rates of less than 10 percent. To obtain more convictions there was a growing trend after 1842 toward correctionalisation. Benjamin F. Martin, *Crime and Criminal Justice Under the Third Republic: The Shame of Marianne*, (Baton Rouge: Louisian University Press, 1990), 3–4.
135. "Throw down your weapons! Don't shoot on your brothers in case of a strike!"
136. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 38–39.
137. Scher, op.cit., 54.
138. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 39. The Salle de Chamilles was described more recently as a "dance hall and reception rooms at the site of the present Casino Cinema." http://excerpts.numilog.com/books/9782812909467.pdf
139. Ibid., 40; Scher, op.cit., 55–57.
140. Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," op.cit., 58–73, 59–62. Heuré argues that Masson and Péguy were the most insightful in grasping the complex personality of Hervé. For Heuré the works of Péguy "are essential in understanding the journey of Gustave Hervé, that which occurred up to 1914 and that which developed until his death in 1944." 58. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 42–43; Charles Péguy, Œuvres Complètes, (Paris: Gallimard, coll. « Bibliothèque de la Pléiade », « Témoignage : le cas Hervé », t. I, 855, 859, 868–880, 889; « Polémiques et dossiers, réponses particulière, » 880–899; Charles Péguy, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, October 1, 1901, 3rd Cahier, 1st séries; Charles Péguy, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, January 16, 1902, 7th Cahier, 3rd séries, 18. Scher listed the following *Cahiers*' pages devoted to «The Hervé Affair» as: Charles Péguy, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, 1e Cahier, 2e séries, «Attentats dans l'Yonne, » 55–70; 15e Cahier, 2e séries, « Attentats dans

l'Yonne, » 23–71; 6e Cahier, 3e séries, « L'Affaire Téry, » n.d. 68–72; January 16, 1902, 7e Cahier, 3e séries, « M. Gustave Téry, » 1–50; 5e Cahier, 3e séries, « L'Affaire Hervé, » n.d., 47–64.

141. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 40, 42–43; Péguy, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, January 16, 1902, 7th cahier, 3rd séries, 18.
142. Ibid., 42–43.
143. Ibid., 43.
144. Ibid., 40; A.N., "Panthéon," 25338/46.
145. Scher, op.cit., 66–7; *La Lanterne*, December 8, 1910, "L'Affaire Hervé."
146. Ibid., 68.
147. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 40.
148. Scher, op.cit., 68–9.
149. Ibid., 69; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 40–41; *La Lanterne*, December 8, 1901, "Pièces Secrètes" and "L'Affaire Hervé."
150. L.T.S., December 7, 1901.
151. *La Lanterne*, December 8, 1901.
152. Ibid., "Pièces Secrètes" and "L'Affaire Hervé."
153. Scher, op.cit., 70; *La Lanterne*, December 8, 1901, "Pièces Secrètes" and "L'Affaire Hervé"; *L'Aurore*, December 8, 1901, "L'Affaire Hervé," Francis de Pressensé; *La Petite République*, December 1901; *La République Française*, December–January 1901–2.
154. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 41.
155. *La Petite République*, December 10, 1901.
156. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 43; ADY, 3/M1/303, report of the sub-prefect of Sens, October 24, 1907 and A.N., F7 13323, "Principle acts of Antimilitarism, 1900–1909."
157. Interpellations were originally confined to asking questions, after due notice, on some affair of state. They had become, however, the chief means to challenge the policy or action of a ministry. An interpellation could be brought on without the consent of the minister challenged; it was usually made the subject of a general debate, and generally ended with a vote of confidence, for or against the ministry. The right of permitting an interpellation rested with the Chamber.
158. Scher, op.cit., 70; *La Lanterne*, December 8, 1901, "A La Chambre: Les droits de la défense—M. Viviani interpelle"; *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*, December 9, 1901, 2002.
159. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 41; Scher, op.cit., 71; *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*, December 13, 1901, 2699–2705.
160. *La Lanterne*, December 15, 1901, "Les Garanties De L'Accusé" and "A La Chambre: L'Affaire Hervé."
161. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 41; *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*, December 13, 1901, 2699–2705.
162. Ibid.; Scher, op.cit., 72–73; *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*, December 13, 1901, 2766–2767.
163. Scher, op.cit., 73–75.
164. Ibid., 76–7; L.T.S., December 14, 1901. Article reprinted in the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, Cahier 7, séries 3, 47; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 46–47.
165. Ibid., 82–3.
166. J.D. and M. Giraud, op.cit., 99. See *Pages Libres*, "Réponses à l'enquête sur la liberté des Professeurs," No. 69, April 26, 1902.
167. L.T.S., October 5, 1901.
168. Scher, op.cit., 62.
169. Renato Poggioli, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Translated by Gerald Fitzgerald. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968 [1962]).

Chapter 3

1. A Traveling Salesman for Socialism.
2. Scher, op.cit., 85.
3. Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé. Un propagandiste sous la IIIe République (1871–1944)." Thèse. Paris-II, 1995. 211.
4. Hervé, *Mes Crimes*, op.cit., 6.
5. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 210. Heuré thought that Hervé must have read or heard about Masson's *Jean Coste, ou l'Instituteur de village* or *Yves Madec, professeur de collège* as well as other eye opening accounts of the teaching profession in that epoch.
6. T.S.Y., December 14, 1901.
7. Ibid.
8. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 183–184. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 45.
9. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 45.
10. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 184–185. "Hervéism was first of all a movement of the depths which found its expression in the crests of the waves. And Gustave Hervé showed, from the years of his apprenticeship, a prodigious ability to surf the heavy swell that he let loose."
11. Ibid., 185–186. Heuré in a note discusses how Yonne socialism may have shown signs of moderation in that many people joined mutual aid societies and some must have been socialists.
12. Ibid., 186–187. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13346, note from Auxerre dated August 5, 1913; A.D.Y. 3/M/1/303, Report from the sub-Prefect of Sens dated October 24, 1907; and A.D.Y., 3/M/1/352.
13. In A.N., F 7 13323. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 45.
14. Ibid., 187–188; A.N., F7 13346, letter dated October 23, 1913 from the Director of the *Sûreté* to the *commissaires* in the cities.
15. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 25, 1906. "Les Révolutionnaires de Yonne," Henri De Noussanne.
16. A.D.Y. 3/M/1/303, Report from the Sub-Prefect of Sens dated October 24, 1907. Cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 43.
17. Luc Froment would use the name Lucien Leclerc when he wrote for *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Victoire*. Froment remained faithful even after Hervé died because he co-authored a laudatory biography of the notorious journalist and helped publish his posthumous *Epîtres*.
18. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 164, 191.
19. A.N., F7 13567; F7 12889; F7 13323. "Les Bourses du Travail et l'antimilitarisme" situation on October 10, 1907 and note of November 25, 1907; A.N., F7 13623, Note of October 26, 1907 from the Prefect of Yonne. The latter notes indicated that the Sens Municipal Council had a membership which was one third Hervéist and the Bourses du Travail had some close ties to Hervéism. At Auxerre the situation was comparable. A.N., F7 13623, F7 13323, and F7 13053 include other indications concerning Auxerre and Yonne in general. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 191–201.
20. T.S.Y., April 23, 1904, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 199.
21. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 184.
22. Miller, op.cit., 91, 97, 100, 107, 117, 121, 135, 140, 145, 188, 197; *L'Echo de Paris*, February 24–27, 1906. See the four consecutive lead editorials by Henri De Noussanne.
23. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 24, 1906, "Les Révolutionnaires de Yonne," Henri De Noussanne. The new poster echoed and supported the *Affiche Rouge* antimilitarists who had been tried in late December 1905. See Chapter IV.
24. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 24, 1906, op.cit. The next day the Director of *La Bourgogne*, when asked about the impact of clericalism, pointed to the Jansenist origins of anticlericalism and indirectly for Hervéism. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 25, 1906, op.cit.

25. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 25, 1906, op.cit.
26. *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, op.cit.
27. Scher, op.cit., 255.
28. Ibid., 377; A.N., F7 13075.
29. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 212, note no. 4.
30. Scher, op.cit., 380–381.
31. Ibid., 252–261; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 212–213. Hervé's law degree was granted by July 1, 1905 but his trial and prison sentence for *L'Affiche Rouge* soon jeopardized his chances for a law license.
32. Ibid., 260–261.
33. T.S.Y., November 23, 1901, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 215.
34. Ibid., 214.
35. Ibid., 215. Heuré cites T.S.Y., November 23, 1901.
36. Ibid., 212.
37. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op cit., introduction; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 220–221. Heuré included a rough itinerary for this period giving the months and distances covered monthly. Conservatively, he seems to have travelled an average of 228 kilometers a month just for these *tournées,* but the monthly totals varied considerably.
38. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 215–216; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 47–48; Scher, op.cit., 262, 270; T.S.Y., November 30, 1901 and January 4, 1902. Scher and Heuré had different information on the origins of the first *tournée.*
39. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 245–246; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 222–223, 232; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 50. The *tournée* formats, subjects of discussion, as well as the size and reactions of the local audiences were described in detail by *Le Travailleur Socialiste* as well as the French police.
40. Gustave Hervé, *My Country, Right or Wrong*, translation of *Leur Patrie* by Guy Bowman, (London: A.C. Fifield, 1910), 221.
41. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 47.
42. *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 263, 276. At the beginning of May 1904 he prepared for his law exams. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," 211, 219–221, 226; T.S.Y., April 30, 1904; T.S.Y., April 26, 1902; T.S.Y. June 14, 1902. Altogether Hervé presented these conferences for twenty-seven months from 1901 until May 1905. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 50.
43. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 223, 231. These two joined him on his *tournées* in Puisaye in December 1904. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 45–46.
44. Scher, op.cit., 262–267; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 221, 232; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 45–46.
45. Ibid., 267, 262–267; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 221, 232.
46. Ibid., 273. Hervé was not alone in presenting the socialist message to Yonne's rural population. During 1903 and 1904 Maxence Roldes and Jean Lorris did the same thing, if not with the same discipline and fanfare. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 219.
47. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 223.
48. Ibid., 223–224, 232.
49. Ibid., 221–226. Women were singled out because socialists often hoped that neo-Malthusian and antimilitarist ideas would influence them. T.S.Y., February 27, 1904.
50. T.S.Y., January 25, 1902. Cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 227, 232.
51. T.S.Y., May 31, 1902 and T.S.Y., January 16, 1904, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 228. Normally local religious leaders did not enter the debates in order to prevent people like Hervé from gaining support from anticlerical republicans.
52. Scher, op.cit., 269–271; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 232.
53. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 229.

54. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 249–263; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 229–230. Heuré estimated the weekly costs as varying from ten to fifty francs. Each yearly subscription was five francs and six months was half the cost. Heuré admitted that it was impossible to be certain about the expenses, subscriptions, and numbers of people who attended the *tournées*. He estimated that if 500 people a week attended the conferences, then during his four years of Hervé's peregrinations into Yonne's hinterlands around 56,000 people attended.
55. T.S.Y., February 22, 1902, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 229–230.
56. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 207–208; *Les Hommes du Jour*, no. 2, 1908, op.cit.
57. Scher, op.cit., 272. Letter from Hervé's friend Stanislas Millet of Sens dated January 17, 1916. Scher was allowed to copy the letter with the permission of Professor G.M. Thomas of Brest.
58. Ibid., 272. Scher had an interview with Hervé's niece, Geneviève Hervé, on February 6, 1971.
59. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 167–171. The funds for the paper came especially from subscriptions, but donations were also important. A note of the *Commissariat spécial* of Auxerre to the Minister of Interior dated February 11, 1912 listed the names of 179 contributors from Yonne and described their conduct and morality, with a few rare exceptions, as relatively good. Financially, most were rather well off. An analysis of the geographic origins of the subscribers verifies that *Le Pioupiou* had a national as well as a provincial reach. Since 17% of the contributors came from the Yonne, that meant that 83% were from the rest of France. This belied the paper's declaration, given to avoid prosecutions in less friendly regions, that it was sold only in Yonne. Of course, the authorities were well aware that the paper was available outside Yonne. By 1913 there were signs that the paper had run out of steam. Was this a reflection of the volatile international situation and the so-called "national revival?" A.D.Y., 3/M/1/352; A.N., F713326; A.N., F7 13333, M/3542, Report dated September 30, 1909; A.N., F7 13344, report no. 1642 by the Commissariat of Auxerre, dated March 9, 1913.
60. Scher, op.cit., 288–289; A.N. BB^{18} 2179, 128 A, 1901. Dossier: Journal: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. Document: *Procureur Général* to the *Ministre de la Justice*, November, 16, 1901. On November 16, 1901 the State Prosecutor informed the Minister of Justice that the second issue of *Le Pioupiou* had been on sale as early as November 12 and 13, 1901. T.S.Y., January 4, 1902; T.S.Y., January 18, 1902; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 136–138, 163; A.N., BB^{18} 2179, Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Prosecutor's Office at Auxerre, dated November 16, 1901. Letter from the *Procureur Général* to the Minister of Justice dated December 18, 1901 and letter no. 316 from the Minister of War on January 17, 1902; Letter dated February 8, 1902 from the *Procureur Général* to the Minister of Justice. The periodicity of *Le Pioupiou* is difficult to account for. Rather than appearing twice yearly, as had originally been proposed, the paper failed to appear from 1906 until 1908 and then it appeared only once in 1909 and twice a year after that until 1913 when its only issue was its final one.
61. Ibid., 289; A.N., BB^{18} 2179. Dossier: Journal: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*; Document: Minister of Justice to the State Prosecutor, December 16, 1901; T.S.Y., January 18, 1902; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 136–139.
62. Ibid., 289–290; A.N., BB^{18} 2179, 128 A, 1901. Dossier: Journal: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. Document: *Ministre de la Justice* to the *Procureur Général*, December 16, 1901 and *Procureur Général* to the *Ministre de la Guerre*, February 8, 1902.
63. Ibid., 291; R.E.P., February 16, 1902; A.D.Y., III MI. 316, Prefect of Yonne to the Minister of the Interior, February 7, 1902; T.S.Y., February 8, 1902, cited by Heuré, 139.
64. Ibid., 289–290; A.N., BB^{18} 2179. Dossier: Journal: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*; T.S.Y., January 11, 1902 (sic), cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 139. Despite charges placed by the Minister of War, the government chose not to indict *Le Pioupiou III*'s authors, Hervé, Rousseau, Monneret, and Thomas, for ten articles which were previously tried and acquitted.
65. Ibid., 293–295.

66. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 139–140; A.N., BB[18] 2179, Letter No. 16771, dated November 23, 1903; Scher, op.cit., 291–296. Scher seemed to contradict himself by saying that *Pioupiou's* III, IV, V, and VI were not prosecuted. 290.
67. Suarez, Vol. I, op.cit., 367; Scher, op.cit., 289–290, 350–356; A.N., BB[18] 2179. Dossier: Journal: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. Document: Note from the Minister of Justice, November 12, 1903, letter dated November 13, 1903 from the Minister of Justice to the Minister of War, and letter from the Minister of War to the Minister of Justice dated November 23, 1903. Scher seems to say that *Pioupious* III–VI were not indicted or he stresses the government's reluctance to indict.
68. P.P.Y., #5, early 1903, "Conseils aux Conscrits," G.H.; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 216–218; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 48–49.
69. Suarez, Vol. I, op.cit., 367; Scher, op.cit., 350–353; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 216–218; P.P.Y. no. 5, early 1903, "Conseils aux conscrits," G.H. Briand also defended Thomas, Monneret, and Lorris. Still highly regarded by socialists, the pragmatic Briand had vacillated earlier that spring over Millerand's expulsion at the P.S.F. Congress of Bordeaux.
70. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 175, 216–217; Suarez, Vol. I, op.cit., 367.
71. Hervé, *Mes crimes*, op.cit., 7; Scher, op.cit., 350–356.
72. Scher, op.cit., 355–367; Heuré, "G.H.: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 218–219; Gilles Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," *Jean Jaurès, Cahiers Trimestriels*. No. 145. 11–26.
73. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 163–182.
74. *Le Figaro*, March 26, 1905, in A.P.P., Ba/1495; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 172–173.
75. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 173; A.N., Panthéon 25337/45 and *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 183; T.S.Y., November 19, 1904, "Lettre à un ami."
76. Ibid., 173.
77. Ibid., 136–138, 163.
78. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 261–262.
79. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 163, 174; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 43–44.
80. Ibid., 164–166.
81. A.N., F7 12844, note of January 18, 1912.
82. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: L'enseignement pacifique par l'histoire*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Education, 1903). The Forward was cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 233, 236. In July 1904 a new edition was published which deleted two sections that Minister of Public Instruction Chaumié found objectionable.
83. Prochasson, op.cit., 101–104.
84. Jean-Yves Mollier and Jocelyne George, *La Plus Longue Des Républiques, 1870–1940* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 313–315, 325; Mona Ozouf et Jacques Ozouf, *La République des instituteurs*, (Paris, Gallimard, 1989).
85. Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe …*, 1903, op.cit., 35, 41, 388, 397, 400, 401, 476; cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 234–235; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 342–349.
86. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: L'enseignement pacifique par l'histoire*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Education, 1904), 476.
87. Scher, op.cit., 343–344; L.T.S., August 3, 1903.
88. Gustave Hervé and Gaston Clemendot, *Histoire de France: à l'usage des Cours Elémentaire et Moyen*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Éducation, 1904), 2.
89. Scher, op.cit., 342–349.
90. Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: l'enseignement pacifique par l'histoire*, … 1904, op.cit.; Hervé and Clemendot, *Histoire de France*, …, 1904, op.cit. This was a grammar school and *lycée* textbook mainly intended for youngsters in rural areas. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire*

de France et notions d'histoire générale, à l'usage des cours supérieurs et complémentaires et des écoles primaires supérieures, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Éducation, 1904). In July 1904 this textbook appeared and was almost an exact copy of Hervé's first textbook. Herve also published *Histoire populaire de la France*, (Paris: Perceau, 1908)) and *L'Histoire de France pour les grands*, (Paris: Éditions populaire de *La Guerre Sociale*, 1910). Repetition characterized these pre-war textbooks. His two post-war histories were *Nouvelle Histoire de France*, (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1930) and *Nouvelle Histoire de l'Europe*, (Paris: Éditions de La Victoire, 1931). These latter two interwar histories simplistically reversed most of the binary positions of the pre-war histories. Binary logic, simplicity, and naïveté characterized Hervé's histories from either perspective.

91. Hervé met Clemendot during one of his first surveys at Mélisey sometime in November or December 1901. This country teacher would not only become a personal friend, he would epitomize for Hervé the sacred calling of secular education as the most powerful means to foster democratic freedom. T.S.Y., December 14, 1901, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 237.
92. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 237–238; Hervé and Clemendot, op.cit. 44.
93. Ibid., 237–238; Hervé and Clemendot, op.cit. 11, 196, 246, 273. Perhaps this critique is a bit harsh because Hervé's histories were discussed in the Chamber, however harshly. Clemenceau's Senate speech dealing with educational freedom in mid-November 1903 mentioned Hervé's writings in the company of those by Francis de Pressensé, Bernard Lazare, and Marcellin Berthelot. Three weeks later Péguy's *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* noted the reference. To be included among such a collection of prominent Frenchmen must have been a rather heady experience for the young revolutionary activist. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau*, (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 475.
94. (See Ch. 19)
95. Scher, op.cit., 296–299.
96. Ibid. Yonne, along with other autonomous federations such as Doubs, Haute-Saône, and Seine-et-Oise, had been involved in negotiations for the creation of the P.S. de F. in June 1901. By November 1901, Yonne, along with its delegate Hervé, returned to the fold of the P.S.F., and they represented one of the three tendencies which composed it, the "unitary antiministerial" tendency. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 239–240. Heuré cited Daniel Ligou, *Histoire du socialisme en France (1871–1961)*, (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1962), 161–163; Mollier and George, op.cit., 300; Rebérioux, *La République radicale?*, op.cit., 54–56.
97. Ibid. The founding of the P.S.F. can be traced back to a meeting in Paris in 1899 and several other meetings including the 1901 Lyon Congress of Socialist Organizations, but the party's program and organizational statutes were not adopted until the Tours Congress of March 1902, often regarded as the founding date. Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879–1992*, Translated by Antonia Nevill, (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1995 [1990]), 100.
98. Agulhon, op.cit., 100.
99. T.S.Y., March 8, 1902, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 238–239.
100. *Quatrième Congrès Général du Parti Socialiste Français Tenu à Tours du 2–4 Mars, 1902*, (Paris: 1902), 131; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 238–239; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 54; A.N., F7 12522, the prefect of Indre-et-Loire noted that "Hervé, from *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*, made an in depth attack against militarism." Letter dated March 2, 1902 to the Direction de la Sûreté Générale; A.N., F7 13072, Note M/521.
101. Pierre Miquel stresses how Briand was becoming a faithful lieutenant of Jaurès as early as the Salle Japy Congress, though he had not given up revolutionary tactics. Miquel, op.cit., 480.
102. Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 11–26.
103. Scher, op.cit., 299–312; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 239.
104. Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Les Socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre, 1870–1914*, (Genève: Librairie E. Droz, 1953), 80–84.
105. Scher, op.cit., 323.

106. Harvey Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaurès*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 300.
107. Scher, op.cit., 325.
108. Goldberg, op.cit., 309–310; Scher, op.cit., 326–327.
109. Scher, op.cit., 326–327.
110. Goldberg, op.cit., 310; Aaron Noland, *The Founding of the French Socialist Party: 1893–1905*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 149.
111. Scher, op.cit., 330.
112. *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux, Dix Discourses*, 12, 13, 14, April, 1903 (Paris: L'Émancipatrice: Imprimerie Communiste, 1903), 35.
113. Scher, op.cit., 328–333.
114. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 240–242. Heuré cited *Le Congrès de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 5–33 and *Bulletin officiel du Parti socialiste Français.*
115. *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 33. Not everyone was convinced about Hervé's attitude toward Millerand. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," 243–244.
116. T.S.Y., March 28, 1903, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 244.
117. *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 33–41; Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 54–56.
118. Ibid., 33–41.
119. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 244–247; *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 33–61; Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 54; A.N., F7 13075. Includes an official copy of the P.S.F. *compte rendu stenographique du bulletin official.*
120. Ibid., 247. Heuré cited *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 63–89. By late 1910 Hervé's new course would entail socialists entering the army to win it over to the revolution and a disarmament of antagonisms on the Left, two tactics then seen by most as a repudiation of Hervéist Insurrectionalism.
121. Scher, op.cit., 333–334.
122. *Congrès Socialiste de Bordeaux*, op.cit., 147–149; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 247–248; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 54–56; Scher, op.cit., 328–336. The most significant response to Hervé, in the opinion of Heuré, was a brief, biting assault delivered by Jean Beaudot which reminded the upstart about his lack of experience as well as the suffering undergone by older militants like Millerand.
123. Goldberg, op.cit., 310.
124. *L'Action*, April 16, 1902, cited by Scher, op.cit., 335.
125. R.E.P., April 26, 1903, cited by Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot ...," op.cit., 335–336. In the T.S.Y. of April 25, 1903 Hervé saw the dangers of blatantly opening fire on the reformists and joining a revolutionary faction out of opportunism, but he discussed the possibility of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* which would concentrate its funds, newspapers, and conferences exclusively on collectivism.
126. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 249–250. Heuré cited T.S.Y., January 16, 1904.
127. Scher, op.cit., 336–337; L.T.S., February 20, 1904; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 248–252.
128. T.S.Y., April 25 and October 10, 1903, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 248–249, 248 note 135.
129. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 248–249, Heuré cited T.S.Y., November 7, 1903; T.S.Y., January 9, 1904.
130. Ibid., 250–251, Heuré cited T.S.Y., February 20, 1904.
131. Ibid., 250–252. Heuré cited T.S.Y., August 27, 1904, and T.S.Y., December 17, 1904. In April 1905 several days before the Globe Congress, the departmental commission on unification met to vote for socialist unity.
132. Hervé, *Le Collectivisme—Propos d'un socialiste révolutionnaire*, (Paris: L'Imancipatrice: Imprimerie Communiste, January 1905); Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 53–54; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste ...," op.cit., 216, 252–253.

133. Ibid., 3–9. passim.
134. Ibid., 25, 41–42, passim.
135. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 256–258.
136. R.E.P., January 24, 1904, cited by Scher, op.cit., 356–359.
137. L.T.S., February 20, 1904.
138. Scher, op.cit., 360.
139. Ibid., 364–365.
140. R.E.P., March 27, 1904.
141. L.T.S., February 20, 1904.
142. Scher, op.cit., 365–373.
143. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 250–252. Heuré cited T.S.Y., August 27, 1904. And T.S.Y., December 17, 1904. In April 1905 several days before the Globe Congress, the departmental commission on unification met to vote for socialist unity.
144. Scher, op.cit., 375–383.
145. Ibid., 375. Scher cited R.E.P., December 20, 1903.
146. Ibid., 391–394.
147. *L'Humanité*, June 6, 1904, "Une Lettre Du Citoyen Hervé," Jean Jaurès; *L'Humanité*, June 7, 1904, "Les Déceptions de M. Lasies," Jean Jaurès; *L'Humanité*, June 8, 1904, "Une Nouvelle Lettre du citoyen Hervé." Jaurès was undoubtedly the writer. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 235; Scher, op.cit., 394–395, 401–403. In the R.E.P., Chauvelon was furious with *L'Humanité* and reprinted Jaurès's laudatory comments about Hervé at the time of the first *Le Pioupiou* trial. R.E.P., June 12, 1904.
148. T.S.Y., June 11 and June 18, 1904, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 236.
149. Scher, op.cit., 391–394. Later in June 1904, a few weeks after the debate in the Chamber, Hervé and Clemendot published *Histoire de France: à l'usage des Cours Elémentaire et Moyen*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Education, 1904).
150. Emile Bocquillon, *La Crise du Patriotisme à l'École*, (Paris: Vuibert and Nony, 1905); Scher, op.cit., 378–379, 383.
151. Scher, op.cit., 395–405.
152. Miller, op.cit.; Judith Wishnia, "Antimilitarism and the Left Before the First World War," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History*, Vol. 21. 1994. 201–210; Scher, op.cit., 381–382.
153. Scher, op.cit., 380.
154. Jacques and Mona Ozouf, "Le thème du patriotisme dans les manuels primaires," *Le Mouvement social*, No. 49, (October–December, 1964), 6; Scher, op.cit., 639.
155. Scher, op.cit., 384. In Scher's view this begs the question which the Ozoufs failed to ask. Why were Hervé's texts considered so dangerous if they were not that extreme, but, in fact, presented France in a fairly positive light?
156. Ibid., 409; A.N., BB^{18} 2268. Dossier: *Aux Jeunes Soldats*. Document: *Ministre de la Guerre* to *Ministre de la Justice*, January 26, 1904. Dossier: *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne*. Note. *Ministre de la Guerre* to *Ministre de la Justice*, June 4, 1904.
157. Ibid., 408–410.
158. Agulhon, op.cit., 106.
159. Scher, op.cit., 413–414.
160. Jean-Pierre Hirou, *Parti Socialiste ou C.G.T.? (1905–1914): De la concurrence révolutionnaire à l'union sacrée*, (Paris: Acratie, 1995), 7–21.
161. L.T.S., November 12 and 19, 1904.
162. L.T.S., November 19, 1904.
163. Scher, op.cit., 414–416; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 259; L.T.S., October 1, 1904.
164. L.T.S., October 8, 1904; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 259.
165. L.T.S., October 15, 1904 was cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 259.

166. L.T.S., November 12, 1904; L.T.S. November 19, 1904; R.E.P. November 27, 1904; T.S.Y. November 26, 1904; R.E.P. December 11, 1904; T.S.Y., December 10, 1904; cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 259–260.
167. Scher, op.cit., 417–418.
168. Hervé, *Mes crimes* …, op.cit., 7–8; Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 11–26. Heuré gives precise dating for Hervé's developing antimilitarism. He dates his antimilitarism from 1900–1905, his antipatriotism from 1905–1907, his evolution from 1907 until 1911, at which date his "*nouvelle hervéisme*" and "*militarisme révolutionnaire*" emerge, to be followed by his "*désarmement des haines*" in 1912. The present study would not quibble with such a chronology except to point out that precise dates for Hervé's shifting ideas is a bit misleading because the full range of his ideas never shifted abruptly.
169. L.G.S., July 9–15, 1913.
170. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 11, 1935.
171. Scher, op.cit., 423–445.
172. T.S.Y. January 7 and 21, 1905; R.E.P. January, 1905; cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 260.
173. Noland, op.cit., 174–178; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les français, 1900–1914*, (Paris: Éditions Richelieu, 1972), 230; James Friguglietti, "Gustave Hervé," 454–456, in Patrick H. Hutton, Ed., *Historical Dictionary of the Third Republic, 1870–1940*, A-L, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
174. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 57–58.
175. Agulhon, op.cit., 106.
176. T.S.Y. March 25, 1905, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 260–261.
177. T.S.Y. April 16, 1905; *Le Saint-Quentinois*, March 28, 1905 found in A.N., F7 12524, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 261.
178. *La Petite République* April 24 and 26, 1905, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 261–262; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 58.
179. Noland, op.cit., 188.
180. Scher, op.cit., 420; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 262; *L'Humanité*, April 27, 1905, "Le Meeting du Tivoli-Vaux-Hall."
181. *L'Humanité*, April 27, 1905, "Le Meeting du Tivoli-Vaux-Hall."; Scher, op.cit., 421.
182. Méric, Series I, op.cit., 201.
183. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 59.
184. *L'Humanité*, April 27, 1905; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 262; 262; Scher, op.cit., 420. *L'Humanité*, April 28, 1905, "Tout Le Socialisme," Jean Jaurès. Jaurès was too exhausted to be at the congress, but the next day he answered the charge made by M. Bourdeau in *Le Journal des Débats* that socialism was now a hybrid party. In his response, Jaurès did not really touch on the reformist-revolutionary divide.
185. Bocquillon, *La crise du patriotisme à l'école*, op.cit., 286; Drachkovitch, *Les Socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit., 89.
186. *La Petite République*, April 29, 1905, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 263–264.
187. *L'Humanité*, May 4, 1905, "L'Idée de Patrie," René Viviani.
188. T.S.Y., May 6, 1905. The T.S.Y. and several Yonne socialists supported Hervé and assailed Gérault-Richard and Viviani. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 264.
189. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 267–278; Scher, op.cit., 445–446.
190. T.S.Y., April 29, 1905 and Claude Willard, op.cit., 584, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 266.
191. R.E.P., May 28, 1905.
192. *L'Humanité*, May 20, 1905, "Le Parti Socialiste," Jean Jaurès; Scher, op.cit., 452.
193. *L'Humanité*, "Le Socialisme et la Patrie," May 28, 1905; R.E.P., June 4, 1905. The speeches by Jaurès, Hervé, and Libertad were published in *L'Humanité*, May 29, 1905, "A

L'Élysée-Montmartre: Le Socialisme et la Patrie: Un Débat Contradictoire." See also: Gustave Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Éducation, 1905). Some behind the scenes comments by Hervé can also be found in T.S.Y., June 3, 1905, "Les coulisses d'une conférence," by Jean-Pierre. See Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," 266–268; Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme"…, op.cit., 15–16; Scher, op.cit., 452–454. The police also had spies and agents in attendance and *L'Humanité* took note.

194. *L'Humanité*, May 28, 1905, "Le Socialisme et la Patrie"; *L'Humanité*, May 29, 1905, "A L'Élysée-Montmartre: Le Socialisme et la Patrie: Un Débat Contradictoire."
195. *L'Humanité*, May 29, 1905.
196. Ibid.; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 266–268.
197. Ibid.; Scher, op.cit., 452–455.
198. *L'Humanité*, May 28, 1905.
199. Ibid.; *L'Humanité*, May 29, 1905; Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 203–230.; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 268; Scher, "The Antipatriot as Patriot …," op.cit., 455–459.
200. Ibid.
201. *L'Humanité*, May 29, 1905, "À L'Élysée-Montmartre: Le Socialisme et la Patrie: Un Débat Contradictoire"; Scher, op.cit., 459.
202. L.T.S., May 27, 1905, cited by Scher, op.cit., 452.
203. *L'Humanité*, August 8, 1905, "Contradictions," Jean Jaurès; Scher, op.cit., 451; *L'Humanité*, August 18, 1905, "Quel est votre but?" Jean Jaurès.
204. Frossard, op.cit., 156.
205. *L'Humanité*, August 4, 1905, "Le Bout de l'Oreille," Jean Jaurès; *L'Humanité*, August 10, 1905, "Une Lettre de M. Bocquillon."
206. *L'Humanité*, August 11, 1905, "Réponse à M. Bocquillon," Jean Jaurès. Bocquillon had told Jaurès it was too late to disavow Hervé and that he seemed to have taken up Buisson's formula: *"ni Hervé, ni Bocquillon."* Bocquillon argued that Frenchmen all know that Jaurès is in complete agreement with Hervé, but they also prefer the brutal honesty of Hervé, to the cowardly sophistry of Jaurès.
207. Scher, op.cit., 476; L.T.S., June 24, 1905.
208. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 62–65.
209. Scher, op.cit., 477.
210. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 11–115, passim; Scher, op.cit., 477–479.
211. Ibid., op.cit., 9.
212. Scher, op.cit., 476.
213. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 212; Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, trans., Guy Bowman …, op.cit., 134–148.
214. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 63.
215. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 93–94.
216. Ibid., 69–71, passim.
217. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 64–65.
218. Jean Jaurès, *L'Armée nouvelle*, (Paris: Publications Jules Rouff et Cie, 1911), 450. Cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 64–65.
219. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op.cit., 5–6.
220. Ibid., 231–282; Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, trans. Bowman, op.cit., 149–159. His ideas on insurrection and reservists strike are not always clear. Generally, he separated a reservists' strike and desertion from an insurrection. He seemed to believe early on that the army needed to be conquered in some sense before an insurrection could succeed, yet assumed that desertion and a strike of reservists had more chance of success than a revolt of the army. Hervé was not consistent regarding desertion. Compare Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 78, with Hervé's ideas at the S.F.I.O. Nancy Congress of 1907.
221. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 66.
222. L.T.S., November, 4, 1905; L.T.S., November 11, 1905 cited in Heuré, *GH : Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 66–67.

223. R.E.P., May 28, 1905, cited by Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 264–265.
224. Scher, op.cit., 481–482.
225. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 265; Mona Ozouf, *L'École, l'Église et la République, 1871–1914*, see especially chapter VIII "De l 'école' sans Dieu' à l'école 'Sans Patrie,'" 195–204, cited by Heuré, note 181, 265.
226. Ibid., 265–266.
227. Ibid., 264–266. Heuré cited L.T.S., "Une infamie de Jaurès," July 1, 1905 and R.E.P., October 1, 1904, found in Christophe Prochasson, "Jaurès et les revues" in *Jaurès et les intellectuels*, Madeleine Rebérioux and Gilles Candar, eds., (Paris: Éditions de l'atelier-Éditions ouvrières, 1994), 119–132. Jaurès claimed that he only took the position under the stipulation that no one else would lose their job, and before he began writing for the R.E.P., he was not warned by anyone about any difficulties taking place at the publication. Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 11–26. Scher claimed that "Hervé was unwilling to blame Jaurès for what had happened because too many facts remained unknown …" Scher, op.cit., 482. See T.S.Y., July 8 and 15, 1905.
228. Scher, op.cit., 481, 483; L.T.S., July 1 and 29, 1905; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 97.
229. Ibid., 484.
230. Gustave Hervé, *Instruction civique*, (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Éducation, 1905).
231. Ibid., 3–5.
232. Ibid., passim.
233. *L'Humanité*, July 19, 1905, "Parti Socialiste"; Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 269.
234. Heuré, "GH: Un propagandiste …," op.cit., 270–271, Heuré cited Jean-Louis Panné, *Boris Souvarine*, (Paris: Laffont, 1993), 22; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 62.

Chapter 4

1. The International Association of Antimilitarist Workers or *Association Internationale Antimilitariste des Travailleurs* (A.I.A.).
2. Sudhir Hazareesingh, Review of Paul B. Miller, *From Revolutionaries to Citizens: Antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914*, *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 77, No. 3, September 2005, 810–812. "The events of 1914 did not occur in a vacuum: indeed, from 1792 onward, the republican left had generally supported the view that a defensive war was justified. If we add to this the powerful force of the Napoleonic legend in the French collective imagination, it is clear that pacifism and antimilitarism were always extremely marginal forces in nineteenth-century French political culture. Things did change by the turn of the century …"
3. H.L. Wesseling, *Soldier and Warrior: French Attitudes toward the Army and War on the Eve of the First World War*, translated by Arnold J. Pomerans, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000 [1969]), 1–6; Raoul Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815–1939*, (Paris: Plon, 1953), 176.
4. Agulhon, op.cit., 87.
5. Tombs, op.cit., 485–489. Rather than seeing the French Revolution as the "master narrative of modernity" and France as the torchbearer, Tombs saw episodes like the Boulanger Crisis, in part, in terms of a recurring Bonapartism which was resurrected with de Gaulle, who stood for a combination of "active authority and passive democracy," a kind of "republican monarchy" shorn of dynastic complications and now embodied solidly in the Fifth Republic. "The Third Republic's political principles were above all the conscious and deliberate antithesis of the Second Empire: weak executive, dominance of parliament and mediation by parties." Boulanger himself created too much commotion, insecurity, and fear, which Bonapartism was assumed to allay, at least until it brought on war.

6. Agulhon, op.cit., 127–8. For Agulhon, "When the forces of the right are beaten, set aside, not in a state to threaten the Republic, it is usual for the left camp to be able to allow itself the luxury of being divided. Indeed, it needed no more than the defense of the Republic to cause so many socialists in 1899 to tone down their socialism and fly to the support of the liberal bourgeoisie. But when the Republic was no longer in danger, the bourgeoisie—if one dare say so—was once more qualified as bourgeoisie, and held to account for anything that was not going well in the social and economic machinery." Perhaps Hervé easily fits Agulhon's insight "that if there was a three-party split in the French political setup, it was not between right, centre and left, but between right, left and something revolutionary which may at a pinch be called extreme left, but which for its own part challenges that conventional topography." 143.
7. Roland Trempé, "Deuxième Partie: 1871–1914," in Claude Willard, ed., *La France ouvrière: histoire de la classe ouvrière et du mouvement ouvrier français. Tome 1, Des origines à 1920*, (Paris: Ed. de l'Atelier/les Ed. ouvrières, 1995), 353.
8. Weber, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905–1914*, op.cit., 38; Miller, op.cit.; Juillard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre (1900–1914)," op.cit., 47–48; A.N., F7 13326. See the general report on antimilitarism in A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," situation on December 1, 1912; Agulhon, op.cit., 105, 132, and 141–143. Agulhon recognized the general fears regarding the dangers of antimilitarism, yet he pointed out its weakness, ambiguities, and minority status as well.
9. Almosnino, op.cit., 39, 51–52.
10. Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I*, (New York: Basic Books, 1999 [1998]), 93. France had 2.29% of its population in the army, Germany came next at 1.33%, but Britain was not far behind at 1.17%. Obviously, such numbers do not tell the whole story. The French Three-Year Law on military service which passed in July 1913 merely widened a longstanding French lead.
11. Jean-Pierre Azéma and Michel Winock, *La IIIe République (1870–1940)*, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1976 [1970]), 158–159.
12. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 32–33.
13. Theodore Zeldin, *A History of French Passions, Vol. 1, Ambition, Love, and Politics*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), 683, 757–772.
14. Azéma and Winock, op.cit., 158–159; Rebérioux, *La République radicale?* op.cit; Jacques Chastenet, *Histoire de la troisième république—Volume 2–Triomphes et malaises*, (Paris: Hachette Litterature, 1962 [1954]); Agulhon, op.cit., 99–105. Agulhon credits Millerand and Waldeck-Rousseau with popular social achievements and he rejects the traditional argument that anticlericalism was a diversion from socialism and working class aspirations. In this view, class consciousness actually inflamed anticlericalism. Clericalism and reaction were seen as roadblocks to social justice. For Agulhon there was a paradox regarding Jaurès's apotheosis and Combes's very negative image because the socialist leader had "backed this government to the hilt." Sowerwine, op.cit., 80; Pierre Sorlin, *Waldeck-Rousseau*, (Paris: Colin, 1966), 473–480.
15. A. Fryar Calhoun, "The Politics of Internal Order: French Government and Revolutionary Labor, 1898–1914," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1973, 158–159, 212–222; Dolléans, *Histoire du movement ouvrier, 1871–1921*, op.cit.
16. James R. Lehning, *To Be A Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 1–2. This was a debate about the nature, expression, and institutionalization of popular sovereignty.
17. L.T.S., July 20, 1901; Maurice Dommanget, "Gustave Hervé et L'Affaire du Drapeau dans le Fumier," *La Révolution Prolétarienne*, No. 92, March 1955, n.p.
18. Scher, op.cit., 258–262.
19. Benjamin F. Martin, *Crime and Criminal Justice Under the Third Republic: The Shame of Marianne*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1990), 40.
20. Jean-Marc Berlière, "The Professionalisation of the Police Under the Third Republic in France, 1875–1914," 35–54, In Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, eds., *Policing Western*

Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850–1940, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 75–80% of all *gardiens de la paix* and inspectors as well as half of the superintendents were required to have had more than four years of military service after conscription. How did this military background affect the police perspective? Does this imply more commonality than difference and rivalry in the French police? Martin, op.cit., 42. The Third Republic expanded the Second Empire's creation of a *police d'état* for major cities which were under the control of the Minister of the Interior. 47; Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State, System from Metternich to the Second World War*, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Liang argues that European police were evolving in the direction of an international police cooperation focusing on issues like anarchism, terrorism, international crime, and migration until the nationalism of the World War I era pushed them toward preparation for total mobilization.

21. Brunet, op.cit., 215–216, 200–202.
22. Henri Buisson, *La Police: Son histoire*, (Vichy: Imprimerie Wallon, 1949), 290.
23. Léon Ameline, *Ce Qu'Il Faut Connaître de la Police et Ses Mystères*, (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1926); Zeldin, op.cit., 573.
24. Jean-Jacques Becker, *Le Carnet B: Les pouvoirs publics et l'antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914*, (Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1973). Pierre Renouvin in the introduction pointed out that the police did not distinguish antimilitarism from antipatriotism even though most militants were hostile to the army because it was employed as a tool of repression of their economic and social demands. See pages 63–67 for Becker's insights into police infiltration of subversive groups and the latter's nonchalance at this as well as the relaxation of anarchist activities before the war while police vigilance remained high.
25. These were sites of confrontations between the army and workers.
26. The journalist Gohier is impossible to classify since he has been described as an anti-socialist, antimilitarist, and an anti-Semitic Dreyfusard. Frédéric Lavignette, *Histoires d'une Vengeance: L'Affaire Liabeuf*, (Lyon: Fage Édition, 2011), 25–26.
27. Jacques Élie Henri Ambroise Ner (1861–1938), also known by the pseudonym of Han Ryner, was an individualist anarchist, philosopher, activist, and novelist. He wrote for publications such as *L'Art Social*, *L'Humanité Nouvelle*, *L'Ennemi du Peuple*, *L'Idée Libre* of Lorulot; and *L'En Dehors* and *L'Unique* of fellow anarchist individualist Émile Armand.
28. A.N., F7 13326, "L'Antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," 1912, op.cit., 30–31, includes the text of *L'Affiche Rouge*; A.P.P., Ba/1512 once included many examples of the poster which were decaying rapidly in 1982. It eventually became clear that not all of the thirty-one individual signers of the poster actually gave their consent. A.N., F7 13324, notes of October 12 and November 30, 1905; A.N., F7 13323 I, "Principaux actes d'antimilitarisme: 1900–1909," 2; A.N., F7 12910, note M/1840, Agent "Louis." Unlike most of the other signatories, the twenty-eight year old Coulais, the Secretary of the Café Waiters' Union, was actually caught pasting the posters on the Boulevard Magenta. *Le Figaro*, October 8, 1905.
29. A.N., F7 13323; Almosnino, op.cit., 38–39.
30. Miller, op.cit., 67.
31. *L'Humanité*, October 9, 1905, "Le Départ du Classe: Les Affiches antimilitarists: Arrestations et perquisitions"; Almosnino, op.cit., 39. Among the arrested militants were: Gabrièlle Petit, Libertad, Miguel Almereyda, [probably not Léon] Blum, and Billaud.
32. *La Patrie*, October 8, 1905. *Le Figaro* complained that despite advance notice of the poster, the police only arrested unemployed "poor devils" hired by the antimilitarists. Several deputies even prepared interpellations of the Ministry for its "obvious" laxness. *Le Figaro*, October 8, 9, 10, 1905.
33. Miller, op.cit., 66.
34. A.N., F7 13323, Note M/811 on October 5, 1907. This report disagreed with General André's idea that antimilitarism would burn itself out if you just let it alone. "I do not agree

with the views of General André who believed that antimilitarism would burn itself out all by itself if you do not pay any more attention to it. It is imperative to act ruthlessly; but the propaganda will only grow if we continue to pursue the guilty with the current sanctions."

35. *L'Humanité*, October 9, 1905; Miller, op.cit., 66–67, 74. Miller argues that the nationalist and reactionary press was even less objective than the police regarding the threat posed by antimilitarism. Though Miller documents a complex and contradictory police assessment of antimilitarism, he seems to accept police concerns as valid. His study closely parallels arguments by Michael Roger Scher dealing with the young Hervé. Fascinating as Miller's arguments are, the evidence presented in this chapter documents a more ambiguous picture of police perceptions of the dangers from antimilitarism in pre-war France.
36. Hazareesingh, op.cit., 810–812.
37. Domela Nieuwenhuis, *Le Militarisme*, (Paris: Aux bureaux des 'Temps Nouveaux', [1901] 1913); Gustave Hervé, *Leur Patrie,* (Paris: Bibliothèque d'éducation, 1905); Maitron, *Le movement anarchiste en France, Tome I, des origines à 1914*, (Paris: François Maspero, 1975), 290–294; Dolléans, op.cit., 102–104; James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966 [1955]), 39, 133–134, *passim;* Francis Jourdain, *Sans Remords Ni Rancune: Souvenirs Épars D'Un Viel Homme* « Né en 76 », (Paris : Éditions Corrêa, 1953), 21–23; Harold Josephson, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders.* (London: Greenwood Press, 1985), 695–696. Hervé was never an anarchist nor a pacifist, while Nieuwenhuis advocated ideas of conscientious objection.
38. Francis Jourdain, op.cit., 20–28. Jourdain claimed that Niewenhuis attended several preparatory meetings in Paris before the Amsterdam meeting, but the original conception for the A.I.A was the work of Parisian anarchists, especially Émile Janvion, despite the latter's less than gregarious disposition. A.N., F7 12562. Note of June 4, 1904, Police Agent "Espagne." Nieuwenhuis attended a private meeting in Paris on June 4, 1904 to promote the impending Congress according to this police source.
39. A.N., F7 13324, *L'A.I.A, son but, ses moyens, son action*, (Paris: Association Internationale Antimilitariste, 1906), 7, *passim.*
40. Madeleine Meyer-Spiegler, "Antimilitarisme et réfus du sérvice militaire dans la France contemporaine: 1945–1962," 2 volumes, Thèse de doctorat de recherches d'études politiques, (Paris. 1975). Bibliothèque de la fondation des sciences politiques. Coll. 40 2185(46)0, Vol. I, 28–29.
41. Maitron, op.cit., Vol. I, 368–379; A.N., F7 13324.
42. Victor Serge, *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire de 1901 à 1941*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1951), 22, note 2. Armand was at first a Christian-Tolstoyan and then an anarchist individualist.
43. Almosnino, op.cit., 33–34.
44. Maitron, op.cit., Vol. I, 1975, 368–379; A.N., F7 13324. This *carton* includes a four page "History of French Antimilitarism" written by the Ministry of the Interior. A.N., F7 13053. This *carton* has individual files on many of these militants, but none of them is more interesting than Miguel Almereyda who became Hervé's chief lieutenant. Miguel Almereyda's name at his birth in 1883 was Eugène Bonaventure de Vigo. When he arrived in Paris as an adolescent he created the name Almereyda as an anagram of the phrase *y a (de) la merde.*
45. A.N., F7 13568, includes a biographical note on Yvetot dated October 23, 1908. Included in this *carton* was a document labeled *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs'"* which claimed that the A.I.A. was almost entirely made up of members of the Bourse du Travail of Paris and that its very existence was connected to the impunity experienced by the C.G.T. for its antimilitarism and antipatriotism.
46. Jourdain, op.cit., 20–28. In soliciting funds for the new antimilitarist organization in 1904, Jourdain approached the former Dreyfusard and future Minister of the Interior, Clemenceau, and actually managed to get a golden ten franc coin from him!
47. Julliard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre (1900–1914)," op.cit., 49, 47–62; Meyer-Spiegler, Vol. I, op.cit., 40–41; Maitron, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France*, (Paris: Société universitaire d'éditions et de librairie, 1951), 349; A.N., F7 13323 II, "Les Bourses du Travail et

l'antimilitarisme," situation on October 10, 1907; A.N., F7 13326, "L'Antimilitarisme ...," 1912, op.cit.

48. Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 368–379; A.N., F7 13324; A.N., F7 15053; A.P.P., Ba/1495, note 17432 of February 9, 1903, Police Agent "Foureur"; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 29, 1905; A.N., F7 12564, note of August 11, 1905, Agent "B.T." A.I.A. sections were free to decide their own policies regarding desertion.
49. Because of their violence and extremism Albert Libertad and Paraf-Javal were long suspected by other militants and later historians of being *agents provocateurs*. The magnetic and dynamic Libertad, born Joseph Albert, was a disabled orphan of uncertain parentage. He had come to Paris from the south, a virtual tramp, and died in 1908 after a brawl, something that he normally relished. He would never have suspected that his worn black shirt and shaved head would soon become fashionable. Paraf-Laval was later described by fellow A.I.A member, Francis Jourdain, as an anarchist individualist who thought in terms of logical abstractions rather than subtle realities. Jourdain also gave a concise analysis of the differences between *libertaires individualistes* and *libertaires communistes*. The former wanted to do away with all restraints and social solidarity while the latter called for a society organized on the basis of liberty and mutual aid. A.P.P., Ba/1495, note 17432 of February 9, 1903, Police Agent "Foureur"; Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 18–19; Jourdain, op.cit., 13–16.
50. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 29, 1905; A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T." Note of August 11, 1905; A.N., F7 13324. A.I.A. sections were free to decide their own policies regarding desertion. One Ministry of the Interior brochure on the origins of the A.I.A. reported that the various national committees were to aid domestic as well as foreign deserters and draft evaders. Local A.I.A. sections were to work with unions, cooperatives, and libertarian anarchist colonies to provide asylum for deserters and aid to their families. To ascertain the relative strength of antimilitarist forces, the A.I.A. International Secretariat sought lists of antimilitarists, sites of antimilitarist arms caches, and knowledge of military deployments. No date was given for the brochure but its latest entry was 1909.
51. Almosnino, op.cit., 36–37.
52. The A.I.A. was heterogeneous in membership because it included anarchists, various militants not tied to the C.G.T., as well as syndicalists like Yvetot. Some syndicalists had no difficulty in working for both the A.I.A. and the C.G.T. Yet Julliard stressed how the A.I.A. was outside the C.G.T., while Meyer-Spiegler noted that syndicalist collaboration on the A.I.A.'s *Affiche Rouge* of 1905 was not really representative of the syndicalist movement as a whole. Jean Maitron described the diverse character of the A.I.A., but was unwilling to label it a specifically anarchist organization. The Ministry of the Interior acknowledged the diverse makeup and anarchist influences on the A.I.A., yet the police administration usually labeled it as a C.G.T. affiliate. Despite this lack of consensus, it may be fair to conclude that the weakness of the A.I.A. reflected the shallowness of the C.G.T.'s commitment to antimilitarism and antipatriotism as well as the inability of the antimilitarist forces to overcome the divisions on the French Left. Maitron, 1951, op.cit., 349.
53. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 27, 1905 by M. Soullière, *Commissaire de Police; L'Éclair*, October 8, 1905.
54. Almosnino, op.cit., 35. Before and after this era Almereyda was generally associated with rather unsavory financial expedients and methods.
55. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 27, 1905, op.cit.; *L'Éclair*, October 8, 1905. The Committee included the following antimilitarists: Charles Malato, Paul Robin, Laurent Tailhade, Amilcare Cipriani, Urbain Gohier, Georges Yvetot, Han Ryner, Francis Jourdain, Victor Méric, Fernand Desprès, Jean Marestan, Liard-Courtois, Charles Aristide Desplanques, J. Latapie, Fortuné Henry (the brother of the more famous bomb thrower Émile), Clement Beausoleil, Miguel Almereyda, Amédée Bousquet, Léon Jouhaux, Roger Sadrin (Cibot was his name at birth), Pierre Monatte, Georges Pioch, René Mouton, Jules Charles Louis Auguste Grandi-

dier, Pierre Marie Le Blavec, Henri Duchemin, Léon Camille Clement (whose true name was Camus), A. Délalé, Gregoire, Mlle. Francine, Louise Michel, and Henriette Hoogeven. The Café Jules has been described by Victor Griffuelhes as a seedbed for revolutionary romanticism among syndicalists in the late 1890s. *L'Action directe*, April 23, 1908, "Romantisme révolutionnaire," Victor Griffuelhes. Cited in Dolléans, Vol.II, op.cit., 46.

56. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 27, 1905, op.cit.; *L'Éclair*, October 8, 1905. The unofficial slogan of the A.I.A. was "Plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre!" The dues for members were twenty centimes a month which were apportioned by giving ten centimes to one's section, five to the National Committee, and five to the International Committee in Amsterdam. Each member received a membership card with an emblem showing a pair of hands breaking a rifle in two. Around the emblem the words "*pas un homme, pas un centime pour le militarisme*" were written. Across the top of the *carte d'adhérent* was the heading, *Association Internationale Antimilitariste des Travailleurs.* However, by mid-October 1907, the police claimed that there were only two sections left in Paris, one was a merger of the 12th and 20th *arrondissement* sections and another in the 10th, but neither had more than 15–20 members, so the authorities were not very worried. A.N., F7 13324, "L'A.I.A.," October 12, 1907; Miller, op.cit., 97.
57. Maitron, 1951, op.cit., 349.
58. Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 371; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of April 26, 1906; Miller, op.cit., 97–98. In October 1907 Police Agent "Foureur" wrote that the A.I.A. at one point had over 17,000 registered members and over 500 sections with 3–4000 francs in receipts during some months, yet "Foureur" also called the A.I.A. a "flash in the pan" with few adherents, much less paying ones.
59. A.P.P., Ba/1512, *passim.* As early as August 17, 1904 police agent "Foureur" spoke of the weak response to A.I.A. membership drives since most socialist, syndicalist, and cooperative groups were not responding. "Foureur" believed that men like Almereyda, Yvetot, Janvion, Gohier, Malato, Ryner, and the editors of *Le Liberatire* could never create a new antimilitarist movement. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of August 17, 1904 by Police Agent "Foureur." On March 22, 1905 Police Agent "Finot" reported that the initial enthusiasm for the A.I.A. had faded, and its progress had stopped. Finot rejected the wild claims for A.I.A. influence then being made by Almereyda and *Le Libertaire.* The latter police agent called such bragging a bluff. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of March 22, 1905 by Police Agent "Finot." In other reports "Finot" underlined the A.I.A.'s lack of support. "Even anarchists saw that the antimilitarist organization was absurd." "Finot" acknowledged that antimilitarist groups existed all over France even in the army, but these were characterized as largely the work of socialist groups and anarcho-syndicalists in various *Bourses du Travail.* A.P.P., Ba/1511, notes of November 18, 1904 and July 4, 1905 by Police Agent "Finot."

    In testimony on December 29, 1905 during *L'Affiche Rouge* trial, Almereyda would not have failed to brag about A.I.A. strength, yet he listed only 5000 members in 150 sections. Scher, op.cit., 520. In an interview given to *La République Française* which began as a discussion of his July 1906 amnesty for his earlier conviction, Almereyda seemed to be trying to impress the readers with the importance of the A.I.A. He said it had 7000–8000 members, most of whom were young. Eight percent of its members were women and the organization included students, teachers, many soldiers, several gendarmes, and some non-commissioned officers. *La République Française*, October 5, 1906.
60. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of January 20, 1905 and note of April 24, 1905. Not only did the A.I.A. have trouble paying its rent at the Maison Commune and financing proposed newspapers and posters, it could not even collect the dues of its regular members.
61. Agulhon, op.cit., 74. "Thus, in the history of what is called 'the workers' movement' (parties claiming socialism, trade unions, co-operatives, mutual aid societies), and from its very origins, division was a constantly recurring theme."

62. Miller, op.cit., 96.
63. L.T.S., July 16, 1904. Hervé was especially disturbed that Germany was not among the nations represented on the A.I.A. General Committee. Scher, op.cit., 488.
64. L.T.S., July 16, 1904.
65. L.T.S., August 13, 1904.
66. Scher, op.cit., 488.
67. A.N., F7 16026[2], "Fonds Panthéon," Note dated November 5, 1904 from Paris, P.P. to Minister of the Interior-*Sûreté* and the Prefect of Lyon; Note of November? 1911 on Eugène Bonaventure Vigo, called Miguel Almereyda.
68. Almosnino, op.cit., 34–36.
69. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histoires," *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, I, December 5, 1925, 98–100; A.N., F7 12564, note of August 19, 1905, Agent "B.T."; A.N., F7 13324, note M1195, Paris, February 17, 1908; A.N., BB[18] 2373, note of March 13, 1908; A.N., F7 13053, Brochure entitled "L'Anarchie" dated April 1913; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of November 18, 1906 and *passim;* James Friguglietti, "Victor Méric: The Evolution of a Pacifist," 103, in *France and North America—"L'Entre deux guerres"—The State of Democracy*, Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium of French-American Studies, April 7–11, 1975, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, edited by Vaughn Baker and Amos E. Simpson.
70. Victor Méric, "Victor Méric …," op.cit., 98–100; A.N., F7 12564, note of August 19, 1905, Agent "B.T."; A.N., F7 13324, note M1195, Paris February 17, 1908; A.N., BB[18] 2373, note of March 13, 1908 on Victor Méric which claimed that *L'Internationale* began around June 1904. A.N., F7 13053, Brochure entitled "L'Anarchie" dated April 1913; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of November 18, 1906; Friguglietti, "Victor Méric …," op.cit., 103. Méric used anti-Semitic themes in his writing at least until 1914.
71. Friguglietti, "Victor Méric …," op.cit., 103.
72. Méric, "Vieilles choses, …" op.cit., 103.
73. Ibid., 107.
74. Ibid., 101.
75. *Les Hommes du Jour*, #180, July 1, 1911, "Almereyda," Flax (Victor Méric).
76. Miller, op.cit., 108.
77. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 135–136.
78. 1909 was the peak of Hervéist influence within the S.F.I.O. For a time Hervéists controlled around 15% of the delegates at socialist congresses. They had a majority in only one socialist federation, that of Yonne, but they had a large following in the Seine. The circulation of *La Guerre Sociale* often averaged 50,000 or more an issue before the war, but it created special editions in 1910 and 1911 of more than 100,000 copies. Jean-Claude Peyronnet, "Une exemple de journal militant: *La Guerre Sociale* de Gustave Hervé (1906–1914)," Paris: Mémoire de D.E.S. 1964, 122–126; L.G.S. #19, April 21–27, 1909, "Impressions de congrès," G.H.; A.N., F7 12843; A.P.P., Ba/131 and Ba/752; Gustave Hervé, *L'antimilitarisme*, (Paris: *Les Documents du Progrès*, July 1908); Gustave Hervé, *Le congrès de Stuttgart et l'antipatriotisme*, (Paris: *La Guerre Sociale*, 1907); Joll, op.cit., 133–139; Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit., 89–94.
79. Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., Vol. I, 27; Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 368–379, *passim*; Scher, op.cit., 27, 215–219; Jean Rabaut, *L'antimilitarisme en France, 1810–1975: Faits et documents*, (Paris: Hachette Sciences-Humaines, 1975), 71.
80. Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 265.
81. Ibid.; op.cit., 151–194, 343–439; Maitron, 1951, op.cit., 142–194, 250–262, 413–419, 433–444; Marie-Joseph Dhavernas, "La surveillance des anarchistes individualistes (1894–1914)," 347–360. In Vigier, Philippe. Ed., *Maintien de l'Ordre et Polices en France et en Europe au xixe Siècle*, (Paris: Créaphis, 1987).

82. Almosnino, op.cit., 36.
83. *Les Temps Nouveaux*, September 10–16, 1904 and September 24–30, 1904; *L'Anarchie*, June 1, August 3, September 28, and October 17, 1905; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 16, 1904; Miller, op.cit., 40–45; Scher, op.cit., 488.
84. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'in provocateur*, op.cit., 186–187. Heuré cited Maitron who stressed that anarchists often distinguished between the state and the nation, which they might love, and desertion, which they often favored, while Hervé did not.
85. Calhoun, op.cit., 516–518; Juillard, "La C.G.T …" op.cit., 49; A.N., F7 13966, Dossier on *Le Sou du Soldat—C.G.T. et armée,* 1912; Miller, op.cit., 48–54; Meyer-Spiegler, Vol. I, op.cit., 43.
86. Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., Vol. I, 27, 43; Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 368–379; A.P.P., Ba/1511, notes of May 19, 1903 and October 29, 1905; Ba/1495, note No. 17432 dated February 9, 1903 by Police Agent "Foureur" and note No. 17432 of February 9, 1903 by Police Agent "Finot"; A.N., F7 12564, note of August 11, 1905 by Police Agent "B.T."
87. The *Bourse du Travail* were labor exchanges or workers' councils which promoted mutual aid, education, and organization among the French proletariat in this era.
88. Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, 305–306; A.N., F7 13568. Includes a 63 page document on the C.G.T. which traces the origins and development of syndicalist antimilitarism.
89. Ibid., 320–324. Forged, day to day, in the crucible of the C.G.T. Central Committee, the new doctrine synthesized diverse contributions from the French extreme Left including anarchism, Allemanism, Marxism, and Blanquism.
90. Rebérioux, *La République radicale?*, op.cit., 170.
91. Leslie Derfler, *Socialism Since Marx—A Century of the European Left*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 21; Touchard, op.cit., 64–74; Julliard, "La C.G.T. …", op.cit., 47–62; Becker, *Le Carnet B* …, op.cit.; Jean-Jacques Becker and Annie Kriegel, *1914—La guerre et le mouvement ouvrier*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964); Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 135–138; Élie Fruit, *Les Syndicats dans les Chemins de Fer*, (Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1976), 189–206. At the August 1912 Chambery Congress of the *Fédération des Syndicats d'Instituteurs*, which had affiliated with the C.G.T. in 1909, the teachers union voted to create a fund for *Le Sou du Soldat*. Although such a prospect upset the government so much that it dissolved the unions, only 4% of France's 120,000 *instituteurs* had been unionized. Paul B. Miller describes this episode in terms of the government's overreaction because 35,000 teachers fought in World War I and 8419 of them died. That proved "that there was a difference between their conceptualization of the *Sou du Soldat* and that of the government." Miller, op.cit., 177–179; Weber, *The Nationalist Revival*, cited in Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, op.cit., 16.
92. Julliard, "La C.G.T. …", op.cit., 48–51, 47–62; Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., 41; Dolléans, op.cit., 129–130, 151–166.
93. Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 8.
94. French anarchism was quite complex and included several strands often differentiated by their focus on the following ideas, policies, and programs: cooperatives, communal utopias, anarcho-syndicalism, communist anarchism, and individualism.
95. Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, 310.
96. Ibid., 206–330, 343–382, 440–452; 376–379; Julliard, "La C.G.T. …", op.cit.; Albert, et al., Vol. 3, op.cit., 379; A.N., F7 13323, II, "Les Bourses du Travail …," op.cit.
97. Julliard, "La C.G.T. …", op.cit., 56; Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., 40–41; Jean-Jacques Becker, *Le Carnet B*, op.cit., 16–17. Becker's conclusions are certainly more nuanced than the above remarks would indicate. He believed that antipatriotism was reduced before 1914 because the July Crisis that year showed how alive patriotism was. But antimilitarism in a narrow sense was still important in 1914 as shown by the gains on the Left in the elections of May 1914 and the reactions to the Three Year Law. One did not attack France but one could assail the army. Becker stressed that "it was certain that there existed, if not a real risk of sabotaging the mobilization, at least the possibility of greatly harming it." Becker, op.cit., 67.

98. David E. Sumler, "Domestic Influences on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909–1914," *French Historical Studies*, 1970, 517–537. David E. Sumler argued that the "nationalist revival" should not be exaggerated because the Three Year Law campaign and the spring elections of 1914 had a lot more to do with struggles over electoral and tax reform than foreign affairs. Ferguson, op.cit., 16.
99. In analyzing the limitations of French antimilitarism before World War I, we can never forget the preponderance of rural and small town dwellers: "the ordinary peasant, the typical shopkeeper, and the artisan, here were the middle social strata who were more numerous than the workers—which partly explains the relative weakness of French socialism." Winock, *La Belle Epoque*, op.cit., 107. Because workers generally had rural origins, they often maintained the ideals associated with small proprietorship, to the detriment of class consciousness and any organized antimilitarism.
100. Almosnino, op.cit., 37.
101. A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of October 27, 1905, op.cit.; *L'Éclair*, October 8, 1905.
102. A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme ...," 1912, op.cit., 19, 30.
103. In fact, the *organisation de combat* began as a rather vague hope and expectation but it is questionable whether it ever became a very serious threat to French security or had much more than an ephemeral reality. Sabotage did exist, especially during the strikes of 1909 and 1910, and Hervé was not reticent to use those episodes to threaten the authorities, to demand satisfaction of worker demands, and to promote his newspaper, but he was careful to demand that saboteurs never jeopardize the lives of French citizens.
104. A.N., F7 13324, "Antimilitarisme et Révolutionnaires: Association Internationale Antimilitariste (A.I.A.)," document number 1284, Paris, July 31, 1905.
105. A.N., BB[18] 2372. Report on Victor Méric dated March 24, 1908; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of July 31, 1905 which discussed a meeting at the Maison Commune the previous day where Almereyda proposed a poster utilizing Hervé's theories to be signed by all the members of the National Committee; A.N., F7 13324, note labeled M/1195 and dated February 17, 1908; Méric, *"Vieilles choses ... "* op.cit., 107–111.
106. Almosnino, op.cit., 39.
107. Ibid., 36–37. Hervé and Almeryeda were both present at the funeral of Louise Michel.
108. Scher, op.cit., 493.
109. Gustave Hervé, *Mes Crimes: ou onze ans de prison pour délits de presse*. (Paris: Éditions *La Guerre Sociale*, 1912), 81.
110. Scher, op.cit., 485–486.
111. A.N., F7 13324, note number 1569, Paris, October 17, 1905.
112. Almosnino, op.cit., 38.
113. A.N., F7 13324, note number 1569, Paris, October 17, 1905.
114. Ironically, five days later Hervé was dressed in a black robe at the first chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal to take his oath to practice law.
115. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory, *Juge D'Instruction*, on November 1, 1905; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 69, 97–98. Whenever "the office of the *Procureur de la République* received an accusation involving a felony, the case was immediately communicated to an examining magistrate [*juge d'instruction*] for investigation and for the preparations, if appropriate, of an indictment." Martin, op.cit., 35. See Appendix A for a biographical as well as a cursory prosopographical analysis of the signers.
116. T.S.Y., July 1, 1905, "Hervé avocat." See Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 97–105 for a full account of Hervé's legal career. See also, Jacques Bonzon, *L'Affaire Hervé, l'avocat et la liberté d'opinion*, (Paris: Librairie Paul Rosier, 1906).
117. *Le Matin*, October 20, 1905; *Le Figaro*, November 18, 1905; *Le Liberté*, October 29, 1905, "Gustave Hervé, avocat," Jacques Evrard; L.T.S., November 18, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 492–497. Hervé's political views had already led to three unsuccessful prosecutions in Yonne before *L'Affiche Rouge*. Acquittals evidently had not absolved him in

the minds of all French jurists in 1905. He tried unsuccessfully to get Fernand Labori, Dreyfus's attorney, as his reporter. Jaurès would later reprimand Labori for his complicity in the actions against Hervé, a situation which Labori himself had almost suffered for his efforts during the Affair. The text of the decision blocking Hervé's request to be admitted to the bar mentioned his writings in the last few years, the decision of Superior Council of Public Instruction, passages from *Leur Patrie*, and passages from *L'Affiche Rouge*. The Paris bar assumed that by his "continuing provocation to acts which fall under the application of the penal code and which universal conscience condemns, M. Hervé himself blocked his access to a profession whose primary duty consists in respecting and observing the laws." Heuré, *GH : Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 100–101.

118. Heuré, *GH : Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 68.
119. *Deuxième Congrès National Tenu à Chalon-sur-Saône, Compte Rendu Analytique*, (Paris: Siège du Conseil National, 1905), 110–117; Eugène Fournière, *La Crise Socialiste*, (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1908), 188–192; *L'Anarchie*, November 9, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 497–498.
120. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 100–103; *Le Matin*, November 17, 1905. For a while the controversy was forgotten even though the court of appeal in February 1906 rejected many of the legal considerations of the November 14, 1905 decision. Nevertheless, that decision was never abrogated. When Hervé left prison after receiving an amnesty on July 12, 1906, he immediately reopened the issue with a letter to the President of the Parisian Order of Attorneys, Chenu, asking for admission as a *stagiaire* (trainee) in the Parisian bar. That letter, in which Hervé reasserted his radical ideas, was published in *L'Humanité* on July 19. Despite much pressure within the legal establishment and the mainstream press to maintain Hervé's dismissal, the bar association grudgingly admitted Hervé on July 24, 1906 because of the terms of his amnesty. *L'Humanité*, July 19, 1906, "Gustave Hervé et le Barreau." He made use of his new career as early as August 29, 1906 in helping to defend nine strikers in proceedings at the Correctional Tribunal of Saint-Étienne.
121. Jean Jaurès, *Oeuvres, Tome II, La Paix Menacée, 1903–1906*, (Paris: Éditions Rieder, 1931), 115; Scher, op.cit., 507–509. For Jaurès, Hervé's pernicious theories had to be countered by discussion and persuasion, not ostracism.
122. Scher, op.cit., 506.
123. A.N., F7 13324, notes dated November 30 and December 13, 1905; A.N., F7 12910, note M/1840, Agent "Louis"; L.T.S., December 16, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 508–512; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 69–70; A.N., F7 13323, I, "Principaux actes d'antimilitarisme: 1900–1909"; A.N., F7 13568, Agent "B.T.," Note of November 14, 1905; Meyer-Spiegler, Vol. I, op.cit., 41. A few syndicalist defendants may have been angry at continued A.I.A. militancy.
124. Almosnino, op.cit., 40.
125. Scher, op.cit., 511, 515. On the day the trial began *Le Rappel* described Hervé's attitude as that of a martyr ready to assume the role of an apostle. *Le Rappel*, December 26, 1905.
126. Some witnesses viewed the trial by contrasting fading revolutionary events in Russia with apparently growing revolutionary activities in France. *L'Intransigeant*, December 27, 1905.
127. Berenson, op.cit., 5.
128. Ibid., 34–35. Berenson cited "La psychologie du jury, enquête," *L'Opinion*, October 18, 1913.
129. *L'Intransigeant*, December 27, 1905; *L'Humanité*, December 27, 1905. The socialist daily was convinced that the chief prosecutor dismissed seven jury members as potentially too favorable to the defendants' views. Despite the many reporters, witnesses, jury, prosecutors, and sixteen defense attorneys, the courtroom was far from full due to security precautions. Scher, op.cit., 513.
130. *La Croix*, December 29, 1905; *L'Humanité*, December 27, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 513.
131. *La Petite République*, December 27, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 514.
132. *L'Action*, December 27, 1905; *Le Figaro*, October 27, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 514.
133. *La Petite République* and *Le Figaro*, December 27, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 514–15.

134. Agulhon, op.cit., 117; Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit. 171, 173. For two days twenty-three witnesses including Victor Griffuelhes and Sebastien Faure spoke in support of the defendants. Anatole France regretted his inability to testify but supplied a letter urging acquittal. Almosnino, op.cit., 40.
135. *Le Figaro*, December 28, 1905; *L'Humanité,* December 28, 1905; Miller, op.cit., 67–68; Scher, op.cit., 518.
136. *L'Humanité*, December 28, 1905.
137. Ibid.
138. Scher, op.cit., 519–520; *Le Gaulois*, December 28, 1905; *L'Echo de Paris*, December 28, 1905.
139. *Le Figaro*, December 29, 1905; *L'Humanité,* December 29, 1905; Miller, op.cit., 70.
140. Scher, op.cit., 521–2; *La Croix*, *Le Figaro*, *La Petite République*, December 29, 1905; *L'Univers*, December 30, 1905. At the end of the second day, Hervé had complained that ordinary workers were not being admitted to a half empty courtroom. When workers packed the courtroom the next day, the reactionary *La Croix* insisted that the crowd was there under the mistaken belief that Hervé would speak, not because of his complaint.
141. *Le Rappel*, December 26, 1905; *Le Figaro*, December 27, 1905; *Le Gaulois*, December 27, 1905; *La Lanterne*, December 28, 1905; *La Croix*, December 28, 1905; *L'Éclair du Midi*, December 30, 1905; *Le Petit Parisien*, January 1, 1906.
142. Scher, op.cit., 523; Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 204; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935. Hervé interview with Charles Chassé. According to *Le Gaulois* on December 27, 1905, Hervé's attire "seemed to drape his essentially civilian anatomy in a paradox." *L'Intransigeant* on the same day called Hervé the best proof "that the robe does not make the monk."
143. *L'Humanité*, December 30, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 522. Hervé said he would let his attorney, M. Lafont, deal with his notorious reputation.
144. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 133. During the trial a young lawyer, who was a *stagiare,* threatened Hervé with the guillotine.
145. *Le Figaro*, December 30, 1905; *L'Humanité,* December 30, 1905; Gustave Hervé, *Antipatriotism*, translated by Solon De Leon, (New York: New York Labor News Company, 1907), 8–29; *Le Libertaire*, January 6–13, 1906; Scher, op.cit., 525–8; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 68–71.
146. *Le Figaro*, December 30, 1905; *L'Humanité*, December 30, 1905; Scher, op.cit., 528–9.
147. *Le Libertaire*, January 6, 1906, "Etrennes Républicaines," Miguel Almereyda, cited by Almosnino, op.cit., 41.
148. *Le Figaro*, December 31, 1905; *L'Eclair*, December 31, 1905; *Le Matin*, December 31, 1905 and February 23, 1906; A.N., F7 13324, *Dossier: A.I.A.—Notes et Presse—1905*; A.N., BB[18] 2324–1-128/A/06; BB[18] 2349/2; BB[18] 2290; Scher, op.cit., 528–533; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 71.
149. *Le Matin*, January 1, 1906, "M. Hervé est radieux!" The speed of the verdicts led Hervé to accuse the judges of having prepared them in advance.
150. Miller, op.cit., 69.
151. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T.," Note from Paris, January 4, 1906, and Agent "Espagne," Paris, Note of January 23, 1906.
152. A.N., F7 12564, Note of February 6, 1906.
153. A.N., F 7 159682, "Fonds Panthéon," Notes of January 27 and February 6, 1906 from the Special Commissaire at Annemasse; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 73.
154. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "Espagne," Note from Paris, January 6, 1906.
155. Ibid., Note on January 13, 1906.
156. Almosnino, op.cit., 42; A.P.P., Ba/1511.
157. A.P.P., Ba/1512, Note of January 2, 1906.
158. A.N., F7 13324; A.N., BB[18] 2324–1–128/A/06, BB[18] 2349/2, BB[18] 12290. Cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 71–72; Almosnino, op.cit., 42; A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T.," Note from Paris on January 18, 1906, and Agent "Jean," Note M/285, February

13, 1906. The police claimed that the C.G.T. was hesitating to distribute a poster with 2000 signatures protesting the verdicts because they heard about police threats to arrest 20 leading signers. Some wanted all the signers to send their addresses and demand to be tried.

159. Almosnino, op.cit., 42.
160. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "Louis," M/45 Note of January 10, 1906, and Agent "Espagne," Paris, January 10, 1906, and Note M/157, Paris, January 23, 1906.
161. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 24, 1906, "Les Révolutionnaires de Yonne," Henri De Noussanne.
162. A.P.P., Ba/1495, note of February 21, 1906.
163. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T.," Note of January 19, 1906, and Note from Vannes and Paris? February 23, 1906. The Lorient poster was *Guerre à la Guerre*, which stressed anti-colonialism and was meant to coincide with the Algeciras Conference. A month later the local *Bourse du Travail* was asked to form a chapter of the *Comité de Defense Sociale* but it did not want to bother with antimilitarist propaganda. Agent "B.T." may not have been the best source for judging syndicalist views given some of his questionable information on Yvetot.
164. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T.," Note of February 2, 1906.
165. Ibid., Note M/357, February 24, 1906.
166. Almosnino, op.cit., 42.
167. A.N, F7 12564, Agent "Espagne," Note from Paris, February 17, 1906.
168. Dolléans, op.cit., 129–130; Julliard, "La C.G.T. …", devant la guerre (1900–1914)," op.cit., 50–51; Rebérioux, op.cit., 90–95, 111–116.
169. Scher, op.cit., 533; *La Libre Parole*, December 31, 1905.
170. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 72.
171. Scher, op.cit., 542; *La Raison*, January 7, 1906.
172. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 72.
173. *L'Aurore*, January 1, 1906 and *L'Humanité*, October 5, 1908.
174. *La Lanterne*, December 31, 1905, "Procès Absurde," Aristide Briand.
175. Scher, op.cit., 535;
176. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 72.
177. Scher, op.cit., 537.
178. Ibid., 536, 535–540; F7 12723, Agent "B.T.," Note from Paris, January 11, 1906.
179. Ibid., 536–544; *Le Libertaire*, January 6–13, 1906; *L'Anarchie*, January 4, 1906; *Les Temps Nouveaux*, January 6, 1906.
180. A.N., F7 13324, Note of February 6, 1906; A.P.P., Ba/1512, Note of March 14, 1906, Note of February 9, 1906 by Police Agent "Finot," Notes of February 13, 1906, May 11, 1906, and June 13, 1906 by Police Agent "Giroflé"; A.N., F7 13568, Agent "B.T.," Note of November 14, 1905; Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., 41. A few syndicalist defendants may have been angry at continued A.I.A. militancy.
181. The *repos hebdomadaire* generally meant one day a week of leisure.
182. The crisis was sparked by the Kaiser's March 31, 1905 visit to Tangier.
183. A.N., F7 13324, *Dossier: Notes et Presse: 1906*, Note M. 45 of January 10, 1906, and Note of January 9, 1906; A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme …," op.cit., 36–37. This booklet has a text of the C.G.T. poster *Guerre à la Guerre*; Dolléans, II, op.cit., 129–132; Scher, op.cit., 547–548. Fruit, op.cit., 175–178.
184. Julliard, op.cit., 47–62; *Le Gaulois*, February 13, 1906; Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste*, op.cit., 211–342.
185. J.D. and M. Giraud, op.cit., 135; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 130.
186. *La Victoire*, December 9, 1937.
187. Méric, Series I, op.cit., 197–230; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 130, 133. Hervé and his comrades may have been returned to La Santé later that year because during the interwar he contrasted the severe treatment there in 1906 with the much more lenient treatment later on. *La Liberté*, February 27, 1923. Files on prisoners and their visitors at La Santé prison are included in A.P.P., Ba/1512.

188. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 129–130.
189. Cibot had signed the poster as Roger Sadrin.
190. A.N., F7 12910, Special Commissioner to Minister of the Interior, Clairvaux, February 9, 1906. Presumably the other antimilitarists were sent on another train or incarcerated elsewhere because they were not mentioned in the sources uncovered.
191. A.N., F7 12564, Note M/284, Paris, February 13, 1906.
192. A.P.P., Ba/1495, May 11, 1906.
193. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 150–152. The *repos hebdomadaire* was voted into law in 1906, but the eight hour day had to wait until 1919.
194. Sowerwine, op.cit., 82; Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, *Strikes in France, 1830–1968*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 335–350, and *passim*. These scholars recognize that prosperity is sometimes associated with strike activity while economic hardship hinders it, but they agree that "a short-run economic downturn in the midst of prosperity promotes strike activity." 10. They also argue that "there is in France little direct relationship between trends in worker prosperity and trends in conflict." In fact, "before the First World War strikes rose with real wages; thereafter the opposite was true: strikes declined as real wages rose. One of the few consistent relationships from year to year was between strikes and employer prosperity." Tilly and Shorter, 341. Real wages rose by 6 percent from 1900 until 1915, but corporate profits were much higher. Derfler, op.cit., 78. The wave of strikes from 1906 until 1910 arose when "the May elections [of 1906] returned a substantial socialist contingent to the Chamber of Deputies." The strikes functioned to exert pressure directly on the political center at a time when such pressure, however erroneously, might presumably have found a more receptive audience. Tilly and Shorter, 344. The latter authors disagree with both Peter Stearns and Michelle Perrot's contrasting explanations of the causes of the acceleration of labor conflicts from 1900 to 1910 and their decline from 1910 until 1913. Note 1, 380. Tilly and Shorter stress political action as a source for strike activities linked to changes in social structure and in political participation. For them workers' organization is the critical variable which could galvanize both alienated and happy workers.
195. Accounts of the number of miners killed range from 1099 to 1300. Zeldin, op.cit., 705.
196. Agulhon, op.cit., 122–123.
197. Calhoun, op.cit., 279–389.
198. J.D. and M. Giraud, op.cit., 148.
199. Sowerwine, op.cit., 83.
200. Newhall, op.cit., 263–264.
201. Ibid., 264 265.
202. Almosnino, op.cit., 4–5.
203. May Day as an international day for working class action had been proclaimed in Paris in 1889 at a Congress creating the Second International. It was meant to commemorate the Haymarket Affair that occurred in Chicago on May 4, 1886.
204. Sowerwine, op.cit., 81–82.
205. Newhall, op.cit., 199, 256–263, 222–279. Despite several episodes in Clemenceau's career when he seemed destined for oblivion, he reemerged politically in March 1902 with his election to the French Senate, an institution he once wanted to abolish. Four years later he became Minister of the Interior in Sarrien's new ministry. Even though he would soon call himself or be known to the Left as "the strikebreaker," "*le premier flic de France*" and "the man on the other side of the barricade," it was Briand, his successor, who drafted the railway workers into the army in 1910, breaking their strike. Clemenceau's life seemed to follow a pattern of failure and loss of power followed later by resurrection which continued again following his 1906–1909 ministry. He would have to wait until the last year of the war when France was in crisis before being recalled to power.

206. A.N., F7 13323 II, "Les Bourses du travail et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit.; A.N., F7 13324, Undated brochure by the Ministry of the Interior on the Origins of the A.I.A. It was probably written near the time of the last entry date; F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme … 1912," 33.
207. A.N., F7 13324, *Dossier: "L'A.I.A.: Antimilitarisme avant 1905";* A.N., F7 13324, Police note of September 19, 1906. Eventually the A.I.A. evolved into or paralleled the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* by 1909. Miller uses the year 1908 and describes the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* as a "more narrowly defined anarchist group." It later changed its name to the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire* (F.C.R.) and then to the *Fédération Communiste Anarchiste* (F.C.A.) in November 1910 with an emphasis on direct action including sabotage. Miller, op.cit., 70, 149–150; A.N., F7 13326; A.N., F7 13053, "L'Anarchie"; A.P.P., Ba/1511, A.I.A., 1901–1909 (sic); A.P.P., Ba/1512; A.P.P., Ba/1499; Maitron, Vol. I, 1975, op.cit., 350. In late February 1906 the police reported the creation of a new antimilitarist group called *La Liberté d'Opinion* which met at the Café Jules and included several members of the A.I.A. including Félicie Numietska and several prominent syndicalists. A.N., F7 12564, M/357, Paris, February 24, 1906.
208. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Paris Note, February 13, 1906 by Police Agent "Giroflé."
209. A.N., F7 13323 II, *"Les Bourses du Travail et l'antimilitarisme,"* situation on October 10, 1907, 1–7; Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., 41; A.N., F7 13568, Note of November 14, 1905, Agent "B.T."; A.P.P., Ba/1511. Note of July 4, 1905; Police Agent "Finot," Note of January 18, 1905; Police Agent "Finot," Note of August 17, 1904; Police Agent "Foureur," Note of April 26, 1906.
210. Jean-Marc Berlière, "A Republican Political Police: Political Policing in France under the Third Republic," 27–55, 44, 49 in Mark Mazower, ed., *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives,* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997); Brunet, op.cit., 195.
211. Ibid., 44.
212. Ibid., 43. Berlière cited Jocelyne Masson-Fenner, thesis in preparation on "*La surveillance des étrangers,* 1914–1920."
213. Mollier and George, op.cit., 387.
214. Almosnino, op.cit., 37, 42–43. Almosnino argues that Almereyda's prison stay at Clairvaux with syndicalists and insurrectional socialists like Yvetot, Sadrin, Grandidier, and Hervé made him realize how much closer he was to them than to the anarchists.
215. A.N., F7 13568[2], Panthéon, Note of November 2, 1906. Almereyda was reported to be discouraged by the lack of antimilitarist dynamism in the past year compared to earlier years, yet he was uninterested in reorganizing the A.I.A. Rather, he expected to increase antimilitarist agitation among syndicalists because there was nowhere else to go.
216. Méric, "Vieilles choses …," op.cit., 110. *La Guerre Sociale* began in conversations among the political prisoners at La Santé as well as Clairvaux prisons in 1906 and in the deficiencies experienced by the A.I.A. well before *L' Affiche Rouge.* If Méric's memory can be trusted, it was Henri Fabre and Almereyda who promoted *La Guerre Sociale* while Hervé was at first quite reticent despite his later claims. *Le Matin,* July 15, 1906.
217. The present study assumes that French antimilitarism before World War I was so vague as well as weak that it would be foolish to chart its appeal statistically. Investigations conducted by the Ministry of the Interior in 1907 and 1911 indicated that less than half of the Bourses du Travail accepted antimilitarism. Juillard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre (1900–1914)," op.cit. Maurice Agulhon explained the difficulties of being less than patriotic and ardently antimilitaristic in a France where "the nation was to such a great extent the object of almost unanimous reverence!" Agulhon, op.cit., 75. Nevertheless, there are data concerning antimilitarism before the war. The French police had objective indications of antimilitarist strength beyond the subjective accounts of their spies, agents, and bureaucrats. In A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme … 1912," op.cit., 66, there is a table of French deserters and those guilty of insubordination from 1898 to 1911.

Year	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905
Deserters	1,904	1,990	1,873	2,318	2,223	2,194	2,316	2,674
Absent without leave	4,678	3,950	5,157	3,774	3,768	4,976	4,737	7,807

Year	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911
Deserters	3,169	3,437	3,129	2,682	2,626	2,548
Absent without leave	10,082	10,630	9,378	10,049	9,629	9,786

In 1907 the army commission in the French *Chambre* reported a rise in disciplinary infractions from 1,278 in 1898 to 2,052 in 1906, while citing a rise in common-law offenses from 4,238 to 6,323. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 106–107. Cerullo cites slightly different statistics from the Minister of War in a speech to the Chamber in 1908. See also, *Journal Officiel*, November 29, 1912, 2875. Adolphe Messimy, twice War Minister, scapegoated the antimilitarists in 1912 for army problems as he blamed desertion and insubordination increases on antimilitarist propaganda. The sharp increases in desertion and insubordination after 1904 seem to explain police fears about the A.I.A. even if it does not validate them. After 1905, such increases might indicate a failure of Clemenceau's repression, or it might imply that repression was a source. Paul B. Miller cited Alistair Horne's evidence that desertion among the territorials rose from 5000 to more than 17,000 from 1907 until 1909, while military court-martials doubled between 1906 and 1911. Miller, op.cit., 119, 132; Alistair Horne, *The French Army and Politics, 1870–1970*, (London: Macmillan, 1984), 28. In August 1914 War Minister Messimy estimated that desertion and draft evasion rates would be 10–20%; in fact, there were only 1600 deserters in August 1914, though they increased greatly as the war advanced. Mollier and George, op.cit., 410–411, 417.

218. A.N., F7 12564, Agent "B.T." Note of February 14, 1906.
219. A.N., F7 13324, 1910, *"Société secrète révolutionnaire"*; A.N., BB[18] 2443, *"La Lutte Contre Le Sabotage."* This was an eighteen page Ministry of Justice brochure produced after late 1911. A.N., F7 13326, *"L'antimilitarisme … 1912"* and Note of March 25, 1912, *"Les associations de malfaiteurs"*; A.N., F7 13323, II, *"Les Bourses du Travail …"*; A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs'"*; Shorter and Tilly, op.cit., passim, 118–122. In the summer of 1894, a Parisian trial of thirty anarchists called *Le Procës des Trente,* was also described as an "*Association de Malfaiteurs,*" but that trial led to an almost complete acquittal despite charges filed under the *lois scélérats.* For their efforts, police theories about anarchist plots were ridiculed at the time because the plotters had never been together except in that courtroom. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 53.
220. Trempé, op.cit., 375.
221. In contrast to historians like Julliard, Dolléans, and Mazgaj, several recent historians credit the French government (and the effectiveness of socialist reformism?) with steering French syndicalism in a reformist direction, almost as if the crisis in syndicalism were a product of governmental repression, thus explaining and justifying the latter development. In such an argument the role of the government seems to outweigh more general social, economic, and political realities affecting revolutionary syndicalism. Sowerwine, op.cit., 81–83; Miller, op.cit., 194–196.
222. Jean-Jacques Becker, *1914: Comment les Francais Sont Entrés dans la Guerre*, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977), 87.
223. Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 23.
224. Miller, op.cit., 141.
225. Weber, *The Nationalist Revival*, op.cit., 46.
226. Becker, *The Great War and the French People*, op.cit.; Ferguson, op.cit., 174–211. Of course, scholars like Becker and Ferguson document ambivalent views about the war. Ferguson even entitled one of his chapters "The August Days: The Myth of War Enthusiasm."

227. The present era shows how both overreaction and inaction in the face of dangers and crises can lead to grave problems. There do not appear to be any universal rules to follow except caution, skepticism, and observation.
228. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 133, 135, 137. See Masson's letter to Bourgeois dated March 2, 1906. Masson had ceased direct contact with Péguy.

Chapter 5

1. A.P.P., Ba/1511, Note of July 31, 1905.
2. Victor Méric, "Vieilles Choses, Vieilles Histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #2, January 5, 1926, 111.
3. A.N., F7 13324, Note number 1569, Paris, October 17, 1905; A.P.P., Ba/1512, Note of February 13, 1906, Police Agent "Giroflé" and Note of May 11, 1906 by Police Agent "Giroflé"; A.P.P., Ba/1495, Note No. 17432 from Paris, dated May 11, 1906. This appears to be a copy of "Giroflé's" note to be sent to the Ministry of the Interior. The continuing rivalry within the A.I.A. between Almereyda and Janvion and their followers certainly affected the creation of *La Guerre Sociale*. (See Ch. 4).
4. L.G.S., #33, August 14–20, 1912. His comments in the summer of 1912 came upon his release after more than two years in prison, in response to former syndicalist supporters upset with his new course.
5. Méric, "Vieilles Choses …," op.cit., 110; A.P.P., Ba/1512, Agent "Giroflé," Note of June 13, 1906; A.N., F7 13324, M/135, Note of April 3, 1907, "La situation actuelle de l'antimilitarisme"; L.G.S., #1, December 19–25, 1906.
6. Almosnino, op.cit., 46–48. Almosnino grants that the idea may have been germinating with Hervé all along. In fact, Fabre's money was just enough to cover the advertising posters for the first issue. The paper was in trouble financially from the very beginning and soon raised its price from five to ten centimes. Donations did come in coupled with rising circulation so that the newspaper overcame its initial problems.
7. A.P.P., Ba/1512, Note of June 13, 1906 by Police Agent "Giroflé. The generalizations in this conclusion are based largely on the general reports on antimilitarism written by the Ministry of the Interior cited in the previous chapter. Also important is A.N., BB[18] 2443, "La Lutte Contre Le Sabotage." This was an eighteen page Ministry of Justice brochure produced after late 1911; Scher, op.cit., 551–554; *Le Matin*, July 15, 1906.
8. Almosnino, op.cit., 46–48.
9. Ibid., 50.
10. Agulhon, op.cit., 124–125.
11. Newhall, op.cit., 86–87; Albert, 3:366–368, 408.
12. Albert, op.cit., 3:227, 234, 296, 316–317, 366–368, 408.
13. Ibid., 3:366–370.
14. Agulhon, op.cit., 115.
15. Berenson, op.cit., 209–211.
16. Ibid., 226–229; Albert, op.cit., 3:220–22, 301; Jacques Kayser, *Le Quotidien Français*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1963), 56.
17. Ibid., 229–230. In the decade after 1863, French newspapers including *Le Petit Journal* developed the technology that made the mass press possible. This breakthrough in mechanized rotary presses put French publishing ahead of other countries because the French presses were "smaller, lighter, more efficient, and less costly than the rotary presses" then used in Britain, Germany, and the United States.
18. Ibid., 230–231; Albert, op.cit., 3:84–94.
19. Mollier and George, op.cit., 277.

20. Noiriel, op.cit., 88.
21. Berenson, op.cit., 231–233.
22. Albert, op.cit., 3:297; Berenson, op.cit., 233–234. "In 1882, when France possessed only one mass-circulation daily, the *Le Petit Journal*, ninety different newspapers were published every day in Paris. In 1892, following the rise of *Le Petit Parisien*, the number had declined to 79 and by 1914, to 57. The number of provincial dailies declined more slowly, mainly because most were so local in scope that they did not compete with the major Paris journals." The provincial press that did compete with the mass Parisian dailies disappeared rapidly. The result was a virtual oligopoly by the *quatre grands* and with it an increasing centralization of journalistic expertise and mass culture in Paris. If regional diversity survived into the twentieth century, the national culture had become more homogenous than ever before by 1914. Berenson, op.cit., 234.
23. Berenson, op.cit., 211–216.
24. Madeleine Varin d'Ainvelle, *La Presse en France: Genèse et évolution de ses fonctions psycho-sociales,* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), 209. The freedom of the press which characterized the Third Republic was remarkable, but as Theodore Zeldin noted, the French citizen "continued to live within the powerful and authoritarian state Napoleon had organized. In some ways he was even more exposed, because the formal abolition of censorship was not balanced by any control of libel. The freedom of the press gave journalists, or those who could buy them, immense power to slander reputations, with virtually no means of redress. A libel law introduced in 1894 proved virtually impossible to enforce." Zeldin, *A History of French Passions*, Vol. 1, op.cit., 573.
25. Ibid., 196, 201–205.
26. Ibid., 204–206, 213.
27. Ibid., 208; Kayser, op.cit.
28. Ibid., 213. As the mass press developed, it took on aspects of the old rags (*canards)* sold by *colporteurs* dating back to the 16th century with their seductive page one displays of their contents.
29. Marcel Peju, "Comment vit, pourquoi meurt la presse libre," *Les Temps modernes*, no. 78, April 1952, 1748. Cited in Varin d'Ainvelle, op.cit., 211. For Varin d'Ainvelle the daily political opinion press was dead, with rare exceptions for a few political sheets which survived based on limited clientèle. However, given an increasingly complex and interconnected world, ordinary people, more than ever, need a weekly or monthly paper or periodical to explain and to help understand their place in the larger world. Such a press could help wisdom replace opinion. For Varin d'Ainvelle the press can never compete with television. Varin d'Ainvelle, 229.
30. Varin d'Ainvelle, op.cit., 220–221.
31. Ibid., 222–223.
32. Berenson, op.cit., 217.
33. Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," *Bulletin de l'Amitié Charles Péguy*, No. 78, April–June 1997, 69–70, 58–73.
34. A.P.P., Ba/1715; A.N., F7 12842; F7 12843. In 1908 the police reported that *La Guerre Sociale* had an office at 121, rue de Montmartre and a circulation of 28,000. Circulation would attain an average of at least 50,000 by 1911. The paper would have seven different office locations before it became *La Victoire* in early 1916 after which it had a circulation of 67,000 and 75,000 in November and October 1917. The war saw the paper temporarily recoup the circulation losses arising from Hervé's shift.
35. *Le Temps*, "M. Gustave Hervé admis au stage," July 26, 1906; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 101–102.
36. A.P.P., Ba/1511, Note of September 8, 1906.
37. A.N., F7 13324, M 2251, Note of December 14, 1906; A.P.P., Ba/1512, Notes of November 21 and December 19, 1906; A.P.P., Ba/1511, Note of October 14, 1907. There were many

other reports in Ba/1511 on the A.I.A. and the L.G.S. The A.I.A. bulletin had a circulation of 2000 while *La Guerre Sociale* would begin publication with a weekly circulation of 20,000. The A.I.A. was to have been given all of page two on the four-page paper. Despite the failure of this fusion, the A.I.A. continued to publish its bulletin and maintain relations, though sometimes strained, with the journalists on Hervé's weekly. The Hervéists at *La Guerre Sociale* expected to lead all the forces of the extreme Left, but they did not wish to worry about the expenses of groups like the A.I.A. since their newspaper had constant financial problems of its own with publication costs and extra expenses from legal proceedings arising from their journalistic excesses.

38. A.P.P., Ba/1512, Notes of November 14 and 21, 1906. In November 1906 Miguel Almereyda, the former Co-Secretary of the A.I.A. but the, then, head of the soon-to-appear *La Guerre Sociale*, was in charge of organizing a demonstration of A.I.A. members at a showing of the antimilitarist play *Biribi* then being jeered by the audiences. Almereyda's failure to follow through on plans to lead one hundred A.I.A. militants to the Théatre Antoine caused irritation among members of the A.I.A. and undoubtedly reflected Almereyda's more pressing duties on the eve of the launching of *La Guerre Sociale*. The relative scarcity of references to Hervé in documents on the A.I.A. in 1906 may reflect the reduced place of that organization among Hervé's new priorities. From now on Hervé's ties to the A.I.A. would be centered on *La Guerre Sociale*.
39. A.N., F7 13326. This *carton* has much material on the strained A.I.A.-L.G.S. relations from 1907–1909. Several reconstitutions of the A.I.A. were symptoms of decline. Eventually the A.I.A. evolved into or paralleled the creation of the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* or Fédération Internationale Révolutionnaire in 1909. A.P.P., Ba/1511, *A.I.A.-1901–1909*. This packet includes two notes by agent "Foureur" dated September 19 and October 12, 1907. Foureur believed the A.I.A. declined due to an absence of leadership. Hervé saw its problems, but he became especially concerned with *La Guerre Sociale* and his own legal career. According to Foureur, Almereyda lacked the tact and the time to lead such an organization. The Janvion-Almereyda rivalry has been documented above.
40. Almosnino, op.cit., 50. In February 1909 the militants of the A.I.A. began to think about organizing a broader based organization which would be formed in April 1909 as the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, which Almereyda would assist when he left prison. The F.R. had a program that was not limited to antimilitarism and appealed to all leftist forces which were favorable to insurrection, but it never attained membership generated by the S.F.I.O. or the C.G.T. Throughout this era the Hervéists sought unsuccessfully to create a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. Still, at the beginning of the summer of 1910, Almereyda applied himself with organizing the F.R. in association with the abstentionist campaign, the rather mysterious (or largely imaginary) *organisation de combat*, and efforts to prevent the infiltration of the revolutionary milieu. Such efforts reached their fruition separately from the F.R. which soon evolved into the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire*, a group that existed until the war. However, the political evolutions of both Hervé and Almereyda kept them and *La Guerre Sociale* at odds with the F.C.R. Almosnino, op.cit., 78–81.
41. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 102.
42. A.N., F7 13323 II, *Principaux actes d'antimilitarisme*; *Le Petit Parisien*, October 1, 1906. On September 30, 1906 Hervé and fifteen demonstrators including Émile Coulais and Anton Bruckère were arrested, taken to the Chaillot police post, and released around midnight. Hervé claimed that 150 demonstrators had accompanied him to the Trocadero. This arrest led to an appearance at a simple police court on October 24, 1906 by Hervé and eleven of the others arrested. They were given fines of five francs each for *tapage* (disturbing the peace). *L'Humanité*, October 5, 1908, "14 Morts, 148 Ans de Prison," André Morizet. General André, not Clemenceau, initiated antimilitarist crimes according to Morizet. The systematic persecutions of antimilitarists supposedly only began around May 1, 1907.

43. A.N., F7 13323, I, #4, *Principaux Actes—l'Antimilitarisme 1900–1909*, 9–10.
44. *Le Petit Parisien*, November 16, 1906. The gérant Vrigneaud, the cartoonist Jules Grandjouan, as well as Paul Delesalle, Charles Desplanques, and Georges Yvetot were indicted.
45. Drachkovitch, *Les Socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit., 88–89.
46. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 74.
47. Trempé, op.cit., 368–369.
48. Ibid., 369.
49. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, 74.
50. Ibid., 74–75. Heure cited, Third National Congress of the S.F.I.O., *Compte Rendu sténographique*, Limoges, 1906, 140; A.N., F7 12524.
51. Ibid., 115; Almosnino, op.cit. The social backgrounds of the Hervéists and many on the political extremes often seem to reflect a cross-class population.
52. Maxime Leroy, *La Coutume ouvrière-syndicats, bourses du travail, fédérations professionnelles, coopératives*, Volume 2, (Paris: Girard et Brière, 1913), 801; Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *De Karl Marx à Léon Blum—La crise de la social démocratie*, (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), 18–43; J. Delevsky, *Les Antinomies socialistes et l'évolution du socialisme-français*, (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1930), 424–425; L. Gravereaux, *Les Discussions sur le patriotisme et le militarisme dans les congrès socialistes*, Thèse-Université de Paris-Faculté de Droit, (Paris: G. Dussardier et P. Frank, 1913), 78–80.
53. Meyer-Spiegler, op.cit., Vol. I, 27; Maitron, 1975, Vol. I, op.cit., 368–379, *passim*; Scher, op.cit., 27, 215–219; Rabaut, op.cit., 71.
54. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit., 89–90. The first method was preferred by Hervé and it was this method that was intensified after 1910 in Hervé's ideas for *militarisme révolutionnaire* and the "conquest of the army." When these accentuated ideas were rejected by the Left that signaled a shift that was to initiate an apparently total transformation of Hervé's ideas.
55. This fatalistic Guesdist view of Marxism was reflected in the motion of the Nord at Limoges and in the motion of the Dordogne at the Nancy Congress.
56. This least advanced country was no mystery to French socialists.
57. Gustave Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Guerre Sociale*, 1910 [1905]), 223. Both men were, of course, partly correct if social revolutions have their greatest chances of success after defeat in war.
58. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 75.
59. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit., 90–93.
60. Ibid., 93–96; Hervé, *Leur Patrie*, op cit., 169–172; Gravereaux, op.cit., 77–80.
61. Trempé, op.cit., 369–370.
62. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand*, op.cit, 93–96.
63. J. Delevsky, op.cit., 424–425.
64. From 1881 until World War I, one third of Parisian dailies sold for one sou or five centimes, one third (including *La Guerre Sociale*) for two sous, and one third for three sous. Until World War I most papers were four pages, but many changes occurred between the wars in page numbers except for the small papers like *La Victoire* which stayed between 4 and 6 pages. The great dailies increased steadily in size depending on the day, season, publicity, events, etc. Before World War I the receipts came largely from sales and subscriptions. However, many papers depended on grants and subsidies by governments, economic interests, sympathetic parties or sympathizers, and foreign sources. Advertizing was initially less important than today; the great Parisian and provincial dailies received 45–55% of total receipts by that means in 1962. Kayser, op.cit., 57–90.
65. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #2, January 5, 1926, 112.
66. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 108.
67. L.G.S., #44, October 30-November 5, 1912.

68. L.G.S., #1, December 19, 1906. "Ce qu'elle veut être, Ce qu'elle sera."
69. Ibid.
70. Peyronnet, op.cit., 166. By 1907 *L'Humanité* had been placed under the control of the party and gradually became the official organ of the S.F.I.O.
71. Heuré, *Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 108.
72. *La Guerre Sociale* generally defined *libertaires* or *communists libertaires* as anarchists who favored workers' entrance into syndicalism.
73. *La Guerre Sociale* #1, December 19, 1906. «Ce qu'elle veut être, ce qu'elle sera."
74. Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 62; Rebérioux, *La république radicale?, passim.*
75. Newhall, op.cit., 35–37.
76. *L'Action Directe*, April 23, 1908. Griffuelhes denounced the "revolutionary romanticism" of *La Guerre Sociale.*
77. L.G.S., May 6, 1908, "Toujours le beau procès," Un Braillard.
78. Almosnino, op.cit., 50. Almosnino cited Jean Grave, *Le mouvement libertaire sous la troisième république (souvenirs d'un revolté)*, (Paris: Les oeuvres réprésentatives, 1930).
79. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968², 25337, Extract from a Prefecture of Police Report dated June 15, 1909. In the lull between postal strikes, Hervé told an audience of largely insurrectional socialists that he was against using corrosive substances to damage letters since that just made ordinary people angry. He also rejected the sabotage of telegraph lines, especially those connected to railway signals, since that just threatened a useless loss of life. During the Great War he certainly supported French military efforts, but almost no one else responded any differently, at least initially.
80. Albert, op.cit., 3:377.
81. Ibid., 3:369–380.
82. Heuré *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 107.
83. Ibid., 106–107; A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968², 25337, *Préfecture de Police*, Note of February 13, 1909. Hervé got rid of a shipper with a criminal record who failed to disclose problems with false money orders since that could have hurt the paper's reputation.
84. Ibid., 117–118.
85. A.P.P., Ba/1601, Agent "Achard," Note of April 22, 1907.
86. A.N., F7 13324, Note M/2251, December 14, 1906; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 116–119.
87. A.N., F7 13326, *Préfecture de Police*, Note of December 2, 1909. This note provides information showing Hervé's caution in accepting money that he believed might have been provided by the German government to increase French antimilitarism. A.P.P., Ba/1511, Agent "Loti," Note of January 6, 1909 and an unsigned note dated January 10, 1909. Other possible financial sources for the enterprise were mentioned including the monarchists. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 118–119; A.N., "Pantheon," F7 15968² 25337/45. In June 1911 *Les Guêpes* reporter Lacotte subtly alleged that Hervé's anti-colonial articles were connected to secret funds from a Franco-Spanish banking consortium opposed to the French presence in Morocco.
88. A.N. F7 12936; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 119, 306; Mazgaj, op.cit., 162–5; L.G.S.; #15, April 12–19, 1911, "Une Lettre de Pataud" and "Hervé repond." G.H.
89. A.N., F7 13324, Note M/2251, December 14, 1906; Peyronnet, op.cit., 72–80. 89. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Note dated September 19, 1907; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 119.
90. Heuré *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 119.
91. Ibid., 118.
92. A.N., F7 13323, II, October 30, 1907. See the information on visitors and prisoners to Clairvaux in *Enquête générale-antimilitarisme – 1907*; A.P.P., Ba/1511, Agent "Grossier," Note of December 22, 1908; A.N., F7 13965, *Préfecture de Police*, Note of March 28, 1909.

93. *La Guerre Sociale*, #13, March 13–19, 1907; *La Guerre Sociale*, #14, March 20–26, 1907.
94. *La Guerre Sociale*, #11, February 27–March 5, 1907; Peyronnet, op.cit., 79–81.
95. L.G.S., #26, June 26–July 2, 1912, "La Chanson du Peuple." This service initially was a questionable financial venture because police repression and anarchist disruptions in 1912 of the *tournée* of the singer Gaston Montéhus involved a serious financial loss for *La Guerre Sociale*.
96. Peyronnet, op.cit., 77.
97. A.N., F7 12843, This *carton* includes newspaper circulation data. Peyronnet, op.cit., 72–80. The creation of the C.G.T. daily, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, in April 1911 was bound to be a threat. Yet, Hervé's shift was not caused by a decline in circulation. If anything, it led to a decline in circulation. The *rectification* arose out of a constellation of events and trends central to which were the relations of *La Guerre Sociale* to the C.G.T. The appearance of a daily paper, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, though a long-standing C.G.T. objective, was symbolic of those relations and a catalyst in Hervé's shift, but it was not "the" cause.
98. L.G.S., #37, September 11–17, 1912, "La Poussée de la 'Guerre Sociale.'"; L.G.S., #46, Novembre 13–19, 1912, "Transformez-vous en quotidien! Oui, mais le moyen, camarade?" G.H.
99. Heuré *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 116–117; *L'Humanité*, November 11, 1907, "Réponse à Hervé," Jean Jaurès.
100. Jean Grave, *Quarante Ans de propagande anarchiste*, presented and annotated by M. Delfau, preface by Jean Maitron, (Paris: Flammarion, 1973), 521.
101. Heuré *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 120–121.
102. Alexandre François Vivien, "Études administratives: La Préfecture de police," *Revue de deux mondes*, 4ème série, tome 32, December 1842, 804–806. Cited by Berlière, "A Republican Political Police …," op.cit.
103. Louis Lépine, *Mes souvenirs*, (Paris: Payot, 1929), 170. Cited in Berlière, 41.
104. A.N., F7 13568, Dossier: "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs*'" September 1911, 35.
105. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 115.
106. L.-O. Frossard, *De Jaurès à Léon Blum* …, op.cit., 155.
107. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 116; A.N., F7 13346.
108. Peyronnet, op.cit., 19.
109. Ibid., 14–19.
110. Gilles Heuré, "Itinéraire d'un propagandiste: Gustave Hervé, de l'antipatriotisme au pétainisme (1871–1944)," *Revue Vingtième Siècle,* Presses de Sciences Politiques, No. 55, July–September 1997, 16–28.
111. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 115.
112. Peyronnet, op.cit., 17–19, 36; L.G.S. #6, January 23–29, 1907; L.G.S. #22, May 13–20, 1908.
113. Nicholas Christopher Papayanis, "Alphonse Merrheim and Revolutionary Syndicalism, 1871–1917," University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. dissertation, 1969, 127.
114. L.G.S., #6, 23–29 1907, "Manifestation du 20 Janvier," A. Bruckère.
115. The A.I.A. evolved or was incorporated into the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* (F.R.), which eventually blended into or was superceded by the *Fédération Révolutionnaire Communiste* (F.R.C.) in November 1910, rebaptized the *Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire* (F.C.R.) in July 1912, and renamed *Fédération Communiste Anarchiste Révolutionnaire* (F.C.A.R.) in August 1913. That organization was dismembered at the start of the war.
116. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968[2], 25337, *Préfecture de Police*, Note of December 22, 1908. As late as late 1908 the A.I.A. wanted L.G.S. to take over its direction and debts, but Hervé pointed out that his paper wanted no ties to sects and had no money for such assistance. After stressing his own legal expenses, he delegated Anton Bruckère to deal

with the A.I.A. The police reported that Hervé wanted to get rid of Bruckère who was only tolerated for his financial support.

117. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, (New York: Collier Books 1962 [1915]), passim; Peyronnet, op.cit., 23.
118. A.N., F7 12723, Note of December 28, 1907.
119. L.G.S., February 22–28, 1911; A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly Reports of the Prefecture of Police. A.P.P., Ba/1715; A.N., F7 1284; F7 12843; A.N., F7 13325, M/5121, note of January 20, 1911; L.G.S., March 8–14, 1911. A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly Reports of the Prefecture of Police; A.P.P., Ba/1491, Ba/1601, Ba/1604.
120. A.P.P., Ba/1715; A.N., F7 12842; A.N., F7 12843. Peyronnet, op.cit., 40. In Peyronnet's study the addresses for the paper and the dates at those locations were as follows: 25 Rue Polonceau—December 6, 1906; 12 Rue de Picardie—March 20, 1907; 121 Rue de Montmartre—July 10, 1907; 116 Rue de Montmartre—April 15, 1909; 8 Rue Saint Joseph—January 18, 1911; and 56 Rue du Faubourg Saint Denis—October 15, 1913 until it became *La Victoire* in 1916.
121. A.N., F7 13325, M/5121, note of January 20, 1911; L.G.S., March 8–14, 1911; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 110.
122. Discrepancies regarding circulation are not unusual for any newspaper in that era. Jacques Kayser noted that, "Before the First World War, each newspaper wanted to protect that which it considered to be a secret and refused to disclose its circulation figures. Nevertheless, it became customary to leak out or to print pointed, often exaggerated, indiscretions [on circulation] so that they could be used as arguments in discussions with publicity agents." Kayser urged caution when seeking circulation statistics published by a paper, the *Annuaire de la presse*, and even prefect reports, since the latter are often motivated by ministerial zeal. One hopes that multiple sources can help cancel the biases since the newspaper and its printer's archives, which Kayser generally tended to trust, are unavailable or only partial for *La Guerre Sociale*. Kayser, op.cit., 55–56.
123. L.G.S., February 22–28, 1911.
124. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 124.
125. Ibid., 121–122.
126. Peyronnet, op.cit., *passim*.
127. Ibid., 68–69.
128. L.G.S., #29, July 19–25, 1911, "La Manifestation du 14 Juillet à La Santé"; Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, trans. Peter Sedgwick, (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, Incorporated, 1984, [1951]). For the blood clot reference see Serge, op.cit., 62.
129. Peyronnet, 63–67; L.G.S., #26, June 9–15, 1909.
130. Ibid., 36–44, 58–59.
131. Ibid., 82.
132. Ibid., 82–83.
133. Ibid., 92–93.
134. Ibid., 93–94.
135. Ibid., 83–92.
136. Ibid., 83–87.
137. Almosnino, op.cit., 98–103. The idea of a counter-espionage service or counter-secret police to enable militants associated with *La Guerre Sociale* to uncover *mouchards* in their midst probably arose in 1909 according to Almosnino. The *Service de Sûreté Révolutionnaire*, or S.S.R, and other insurrectional organizations are discussed more thoroughly in chapter 14 and elsewhere in the text.
138. Poggioli, op.cit., *passim*.
139. *Les Hommes du Jour* #180, July 1, 1911.

140. L.G.S., #21, May 5–11, 1909; L.G.S., #22, May 12–18, 1909; Méric, Séries II, op.cit., 92–103; Méric, *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #10, October 15–November 15, 1926, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histoires—souvenirs d'un militant," 278–283.
141. Shattuck, op.cit., 3–42. Shattuck ties four characteristics to the avant-garde: humor, childishness, dreams, and ambiguity.
142. Poggioli, op.cit., 25–40, 61–77. Hervéism and *La Guerre Sociale* certainly exhibited such qualities to an amazing degree. Hervé's neo-Blanquism, like fascism, could easily be characterized as a nearly pure activism. Agonism is a characteristic closely related to a martyrdom in which one proves oneself by suffering for the cause one believes in. Hervé's socialist martyr experience certainly fit that avant-garde trait. Hervé's agonistic experiences for his ideals were always coupled with his antagonism toward governments, classes, and abuses which needed change, reform, or destruction. Antipatriotism, antimilitarism, antiparliamentarianism, and antibourgeois themes certainly place Hervé in a highly antagonistic position in relationship to the established order. He can hardly be accused of nihilism because as a socialist, nationalist, or Christian he always had a kind of idealist vision which his political formations sought to promote. Such contrasting avenues toward his ideals might be regarded as a kind of nihilism, however. The description of the cultural avant-garde given by Poggioli helps uncover common traits of the various political avant-gardes. Common characteristics may help to explain that phenomenon. If political and cultural avant-gardes are seldom identical, some individuals fit both types of avant-garde, even simultaneously, and certain members of political avant-gardes all too easily find a home in supposedly opposing ideological milieus. Artists, poets, and writers like Filippo Tomasso Marinetti, William Butler Yeats, T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Salvador Dali, and Drieu la Rochelle obviously straddled the multiple avant-gardes, even if political extremists like Hitler, Mussolini, Sorel, Hervé, Déat, Doriot, and Valois generally had mostly antimodern, philistine, or rather traditional aesthetic sensibilities. In the post-war era *La Victoire* occasionally attacked Futurism, Dadaism, and Cubism as rotten symptoms arising from the effects of war. *La Victoire*, #2069, September 1, 1921.

Chapter 6

1. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 108; F7 13568.
2. Peyronnet, op.cit., 23.
3. Grave, op.cit., 444.
4. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 123.
5. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 154.
6. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 123.
7. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 223–225; Peyronnet, op.cit., 63–67.
8. Lavignette, op.cit., 28.
9. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 123–124.
10. Peyronnet, op.cit., 63–67; Robert Manévy, *Histoire de la presse, 1914 à 1939*, (Paris: Éditions Corrêa et Cie, 1945), 52. Other sources indicate, however, that Dulac had been a journalist prior to meeting Hervé!
11. Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé et Charles Péguy," *Bulletin de l'Amitié Charles Péguy*, No. 78, April–June 1997, 58–73; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 126; Peyronnet, op.cit., 64.
12. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 105–106.
13. Ibid., 144–145.
14. Ibid., 144–148; A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Commissariat Central de Police, Bourges, Note of October 3, 1909. His speech at Bourges was described as "not brilliant," less than fiery, and unpolished but more of an ironic chat with a smile on his lips. A

socialist named Laudier argued that Hervé was not as extreme as he claimed or as most people thought. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Commissaire de Police, Decazeville, Note of November 29, 1909. The police described his speech as violent with flowery language yet which provoked much hilarity.

15. Ibid., 147.
16. Ibid., 149–150. Heuré cited: Archives Départmentales de l'Yonne-ADY, 3 M1/316 and A.N., F7 15968², "Panthéon," 25337/45.
17. Manévy, op.cit., 52.
18. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 125–126.
19. Jacques Julliard, *Clemenceau—Briseur de Grèves: L'Affaire de Villeneuve-Saint-Georges*, (Paris: Collections Archives, 1965), 67.
20. Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français*, Vol. XIII, op.cit., 50, 47–53.
21. Rebérioux, *La République Radicale?*, op.cit., 174.
22. Jean-Jacques Becker, 1 "Antimilitarisme et antipatriotisme en France avant 1914: Le cas de Gustave Hervé," *Enjeux et puissances: Pour une histoire des relations internationales au xxe siècle, Mélanges en l'honneur de J.-B. Duroselle*, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986), 101–102, 106, 101–113.
23. Albert, op.cit., 3:378.
24. L.G.S., #7, January 30–February 5, 1907, "Démocrates ou Aristocrates," Brenn.
25. Peyronnet, op.cit., 57–60, passim.
26. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 127–128.
27. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "En entrant au monastère," G.H.; A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Chaumont, March 13, 1909. Hervé used language comparing his anti-militarist preaching to the treatment of the early Christians who also got a hostile reception. He also repeated his longstanding contrast of patriotic and religious faiths based on myths, legends, and blood.
28. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, letter dated February 20, 1911 from a former Yonne associate from Champs to Hervé at La Santé in Paris. The writer's name was illegible for the police scribe who recopied the letter. The writer commented on the recent *Pioupiou* trial and acquittal and described Herve as a Christ-like figure and martyr. The trial had as a witness the mother of Aernoult who could not stop asking for her departed son. (See chapter 12)
29. Heuré, op.cit., 127.
30. Hubert-Rouget, *La France Socialiste*, Volume 1, 153, in Compère-Morel, ed., *Encyclopédie socialiste, syndicale et coopérative de l'internationale ouvrière*, 12 volumes, (Paris: Quillet, 1912–1921). Between 1905 and 1912 Hervé was sentenced to 138 months in prison, which amounted to eleven and half years. In fact, due to various amnesties he only served 40 months. See Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 129 for the details of his crimes and punishments.
31. *La Liberté*, February 27, 1923. Cited by Heuré, op.cit., 133.
32. A.N., F7 12910, Special Commissioner to Minister of Interior, Clairvaux, February 9, 1906.
33. Méric, 1st Séries, op.cit., 204–205. The name Silvio Pelliculo was a play on words, literally Silvio Dandruff, but also a reference to an Italian poet and member of the Carbonari imprisoned in the early 19th century, Silvio Pellico.
34. *La Victoire*, December 9, 1937; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 140.
35. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 140–141; A.N., F7 15968², "Fonds Pantheon," 25337/45.
36. Ibid., 141.
37. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Note of February 20, 1908, and Note M. 101.U, Paris, February 27, 1908. Police kept lists of requested visitors and their visits to the prison. It was surprising that so many reformist socialists were requested by Hervé. They included

Pierre Renaudel, René Marx Dormoy, Louis Dubreuilh, Variot, and someone named Pijoult? Among the visitors included Madame Dijonneau, described as the widow of a naval officer, and her daughter. Police were especially concerned with the political activities and views of the visitors and their prison records, obviously in an effort at keeping tabs on the antimilitarists. The police also kept many letters to and from the prisoners.

38. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #6, June 15, 1926, 261–263.
39. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 141.
40. Peyronnet, op.cit., 57–60. In L.G.S. #18, April 17–23, 1907, Almereyda's headline "A BAS LA RÉPUBLIQUE!" introduced a standard anti-Radical and anti-Clemenceau article by Hervé. In L.G.S. #29, July 17–24, 1912 upon Herve's release from prison, he put the headline, "Et Je vous dit Merde" above Herve's lead editorial. Actually, Peyronnet's examples were not always as out of touch with the intent of Hervé's articles as he implied. *Les Hommes du jour*, #180, July 1, 1911, op.cit.; Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 217–222.
41. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 110.
42. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 218.
43. *La Guerre Sociale*, #49, December 4–10, 1912, "Pourquoi nous entrons au Parti Socialiste," Miguel Almereyda, René Dolié, Jean Goldsky, Eugène Merle, Albert Riguadie, Emile Tissier.
44. Almosnino, op.cit., 104–112.
45. Mitchell, op.cit. Fanny Clar also wrote for the weekly and later monthly, *Demain: Efforts de pensée et de vie meilleures—Organe d'hygiène intégrale, pour la conduit de la vie intellectuelle, morale et physique*, produced in Paris until 1912.
46. Victor Méric, "Vieilles Choses, Vieilles Histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #9, October 15, 1926, 154–155; Felicia Gordon, *The Integral Feminist: Madeleine Pelletier, 1874–1939*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 173–174.
47. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 109–114. Among the writers whose work was especially important, besides Hervé, Almereyda, Merle, and Méric, were: Fanny Clar, Francis Delaisi, Fernand Desprès, Georges Émile Dulac, Jean Goldschild, called Goldsky, Aristide Jobert, Émile Meo, called Tissier, Madeleine Pelletier, Louis Perceau, Émile Pouget, Albert-Pierre Rigaudie, Frédéric Stackelberg (an authentic Russian Baron and one of the most enigmatic people at the paper according to Heuré), Marc Stéphane, and Paul Vigné, called Vigné d'Octon (who was a former doctor-major in the navy, a novelist, and writer). Syndicalists like Émile Janvion and Georges Yvetot wrote important articles as well. There were many cartoonists including: Jules Grandjouan and Aristide Delannoy. Much can be found on them and the writers cited below in: A.N., F7 13053 and Maitron, ed., *Le Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement Ouvrier*. Also see Hubert-Rouger, *La France Socialiste*, op.cit., 131–135 for a photo of Merle, Almereyda, Méric, Perceau, and Tissier. Heuré also has additional biographical information in his thesis, Heuré, "Gustave Hervé. Un propagandiste ..." op.cit., 393–409.
48. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 29.
49. Police files as well as biographical data in *La Guerre Sociale* show that the leadership of French antimilitarism often originated among families characterized as upper class, immigrant, artisan, military, or police. Such origins may mean little or be too vague to be helpful. Certainly proletarian elements existed among the forces of antimilitarism. Yet such a characterization of the leadership of the most extreme political organizations in pre-war France might be a factor in explaining the many later shifts among militants who went from one extremist position to another.
50. Almereyda's father's family never accepted their son Eugène's marriage to Aimée Sallès, a commoner. When Eugène died of tuberculosis, his mother remarried a young photographer named Gabriel Aubès and her son, the young Almereyda, went to live with her parents before joining Aimée and Gabriel later in Paris, but the situation was apparently quite oppressive. Though his stepfather got Almereyda interested in photography and helped him to a certain

extent, he was soon largely on his own in the capital. His mother was described as an irritable and unstable woman, who eventually became insane. Sallès-Gomes, op.cit., 8–9; Almosnino, op.cit., 16.

51. Almosnino, op.cit., 15–22; Francis Jourdain, op.cit., 29–35.
52. Sallès-Gomes, op.cit., 8–11; Méric, "Almereyda," *Les Hommes du Jour*, #180, op.cit.; Jean Galtier-Boissière, *Mémoires d'un Parisien*, Tome 2, (Paris: La Table ronde, 1960), 63; Charles Maurras, *Quand les français ne s'aimient pas*, (Paris: Librairie d'Action française, 1927), Preface, xi; A.N., F7 16026², "Fonds Panthéon," 103/25395; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 110. In a second version of the origins of his pseudonyin, the police reported that Almereyda told them he got the idea from a romantic adventure story. Almosnino, op.cit., 18–24. Even though the anarchist wave of violent actions was over, there was ready access to bomb-making information and advice if one looked for it.
53. Jourdain, op.cit., 29–35; Almosnino, op.cit., 21–22. Though Jourdain later considered himself a close friend of Almereyda, at this time he was more an acquaintance. The young artist even used his father's connections to lobby the French President. When that failed, he contacted Séverine, an old friend of his father. At that time Almereyda would probably have rejected any appeals to either the authorities or the bourgeoisie had he known about them in advance.
54. *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 111. Heuré cited *Le Libertaire*, May 13, 1903.
55. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 197–230. That description came from Victor Méric. Almosnino, op.cit., 23. See also Peyronnet, op.cit.
56. Almosnino, op.cit., 102.
57. Méric, 2nd Séries, op.cit., 181.
58. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, Vieilles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #1, December 5, 1925, 98; A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968², 25337. One undated police report claimed that Hervé was strongly influenced by both Yvetot and Almereyda while they were at Clairvaux in 1906. This particular *mouchard* thought that Hervé was just a publicity hound who had come to believe much of his own rhetoric.
59. Manévy, op.cit., 26.
60. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 208.
61. Méric, *Les Hommes du jour*, #2, 1908, op.cit.
62. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 203.
63. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Auxerre, Note of November 24, 1908. Hervé took Madame Dijonneau along on a trip to Yonne where the police described her as a woman dressed in black and known to be his longtime mistress. Upon arrival they went straight to the home of his pharmacist friend Hinglais. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², F 2740 Paris, Note of July 5, 1916.
64. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 110–13; *Les Hommes du Jour*, #180, July 1, 1911, op.cit.; A.N., F7 16026², "Fonds Panthéon." See especially Notes of September 27, 1907 and M. 1904. U Paris Note of July 7, 1910, F. 5300 "Arras"; Paris, Note of September 23, 1910, and Note of August 1917. Police periodically made many accusations of extravagance, counterfeiting, and possible other illegal and suspicious actions by the "crafty *arriviste*" Almereyda who was said to be using his mistress to funnel gossip to anti-revolutionary publications in order to gain funds. In one of the last reports on him, charges were enumerated concerning his entire adult life including: homosexuality, robbery, possible murder or a strange suicide by an accomplice more than a decade earlier, and living with a prostitute, namely Emilie, who supposedly had seven to eight children and two ex-husbands. One report claimed Almereyda eventually wanted to get rid of Émilie but could not.
65. Almosnino, op.cit., 27.
66. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocatcur*, op.cit., 110–111. See Alfred Rosmer, *Le Mouvement ouvrier pendant la guerre, de l'Union sacrée à Zimmerwald*, (Paris: Librairie du Travail, 1936), 44.

67. *Les Hommes du Jour*, #180, July 1, 1911, op.cit., 4.
68. Serge, *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire, 1901–1904*, op.cit., 36.
69. Almosnino, op.cit., 28, 113–120.
70. A.N., F7 13053; F7 16026[2] "Fonds Panthéon." This *carton* includes a large police file on Almereyda, including photos, postcards, police reports, measurements. See Note, *Préfecture de Police*, Paris, February 25, 1913 on Merle and Almereyda separating from Hervé and looking for work and other newspaper jobs. A.N., F7 12910, July 27, 1907, police noted that Almereyda's increasingly coquettish mistress was surrounded by six other "young and elegant women." Sallès-Gomes, op.cit., 9–31; Maitron, ed., *Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement Ouvrier*, op.cit.; *Les Hommes du Jour*, #180, July 1, 1911, op.cit; Albert, op.cit., 3:378, 439, 441, 522; A.N., F7 12847 and F7 13,969 on Almereyda's role at *Le Bonnet Rouge* in World War I. Almosnino, op.cit., 127–143.
71. At the outbreak of war Malvy resisted calls for the round-up of so-called subversives whose names were listed in the *Carnet B*. He soon subsidized several newspapers including *Le Bonnet Rouge* which later was discovered to have received money from German sources who sought to spread pacifist propaganda. When the paper's administrator, Duval, was arrested with a cheque on his person from a German banker, Clemenceau, during a secret session of the Senate in July 1917, accused Malvy of "betraying the interests of France." When Almereyda, the paper's director, was also arrested as a result of the subsequent investigation (which revealed the sale of the paper to a shadowy intermediary, Bolo Pasha, formerly Paul Bolo, a confidence man and underworld figure originally from Réunion), the paper was closed and Almereyda soon died "mysteriously" in prison. The paper's new owner, Bolo Pasha, had developed a scheme to get Germany to fund a pacifist movement to be promoted in France. Added to the civilian unrest of 1917 and the French Army mutinies, the discovery of French military documents in the offices of *Le Bonnet Rouge* meant the end for both Almereyda and Malvy, the Minister of the Interior, who was blamed for not suppressing defeatist and pacifist agitators and publications with sufficient energy, and was forced to resign on August 31, 1917. In October he was charged with treason and tried by a special commission of the Senate the following year. Although acquitted of treason, he was found guilty of culpable negligence in the performance of his duties and banished for five years. Malvy's *directeur du cabinet* was imprisoned, however, and Bolo and Duval received death sentences. Despite this close association with men found guilty of serious crimes, Malvy returned to the Chamber of Deputies after the war and again became Minister of the Interior, briefly, in 1926.
72. Maitron, ed., *Le Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier*, "Victor Méric," by J.R.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 113.
73. Lavignette, op.cit., 20–23.
74. Friguglietti, "Victor Méric: The Evolution of a Pacifist," op.cit., 103.
75. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 113; Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 81.
76. Ibid., 113; Friguglietti, op.cit., 102–103.
77. A.P.P., Ba/1511, Note of December 2, 1904; Note of September 7, 1904; Note of July 12, 1904 by Police Agent "Giroflé"; Note of October 16, 1904; Note of October 28, 1904; Note of October 19, 1904; Victor Méric, *Lettre à un conscrit*, (Paris: Publication de l'A.I.A., No Date.). Found in A.P.P., Ba/1511 The same carton includes a note of November 18, 1906 by *Commissaire de Police* Vincent which referred to a note of October 29, 1904 by Police Agent "Giroflé" citing *Lettre à un soldat* by Méric; A.N., BB^{18} 2373. A report of March 24, 1908 on Victor Méric; A.N., F7 13324. A note of January 28, 1908 and a note labeled M/1195 dated February 17, 1908. The latter is a four-page dossier on Méric. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Note of May 9, 1905; Note of September 26, 1906.
78. Christophe Prochasson, op.cit., 78, 80, 84, 87, 96, 285, 342. Jourdain was a graphic artist who was also involved in many pre-war avant-garde literary, political, and artistic revues

and circles. He used such venues to promote a modest furniture business called *Les Ateliers modernes*.

79. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histories," *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #1, December 5, 1925, 98–100; A.N., F7 12564, note of August 19, 1905, Agent "B.T."; A.N., F7 13324, note M/1195, Paris, February 17, 1908; A.N., BB[18] 2373, note of March 13, 1908 on Victor Méric which claimed that *L'Internationale* began around June 1904; A.N., F7 13053, brochure entitled "L'Anarchie" dated April 1913; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of November 18, 1906 and passim.
80. A.N., BB[18] 2372. Report on Victor Méric dated March 24, 1908; A.P.P., Ba/1511, note of July 31, 1905 which discussed a meeting at the Maison Commune the previous day where Almereyda proposed a poster utilizing Hervé's theories to be signed by all the members of the National Committee. A.N., F7 13324, note labeled M/1195 and dated February 17, 1908; Méric, "Vieilles choses, vieilles histories," *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #1, December 5, 1925, 107–111; A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory, *Juge D'Instruction*, on November 1, 1905. Victor Méric was not included in the files given to M. Flory, but his role in the creation of *L'Affiche Rouge* was well documented by the police.
81. A.N., F7 16026[2], "Fonds Panthéon," F. 5300, "Arras," Paris, Note of September 23, 1910.
82. Ibid.
83. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 113.
84. Maitron, ed., *Le Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier*. "Victor Méric," by J.R.; Albert, op.cit., 3: 248, 443, 522–523, 579–580; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 113–114. After the war he reactivated *La Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix* which his father had organized earlier.
85. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory, *Juge D'Instruction*, on November 1, 1905. See Appendix A.
86. A.N., F7 16026[2], "Fonds Panthéon," F. 5300, "Arras," Paris, Note of September 23, 1910.
87. Ibid., Note of August 1917.
88. Albert, op.cit., 3:260, 378, 522–523, 564, 580, 599; A.N., F7 16026[2], "Fonds Panthéon," see the Note of August 1917; F7 25337/45; F7 13061; F7 13332; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 114.
89. In France, the *concours général* is a national competition held every year among students of *Première* (11th grade) and *Terminale* (12th and final grade) in almost all subjects taught in various types of *lycées*.
90. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 173–174.
91. Gordon, op.cit., 105–133; Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 173–174.
92. Ibid., 111, 114. Before joining *La Guerre Sociale* staff, she disagreed with the insurrectional position on female suffrage at Limoges and would do so again at Nancy, where she presented the text on women's suffrage.
93. Victor Méric, "Vieilles choses, Vieilles histories," *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #9, October 15, 1926, 153–157.
94. Gordon, op.cit., 115–116.
95. Ibid., 3.
96. Ibid., 239–240.
97. Ibid., 120–121. Pelletier kept writing on the subject of women's rights, favored and practiced abortions, joined the French Communist Party after the war, and traveled to the Soviet Union before espousing anarchism. Poor health did not stop her from practicing abortion, but her ensuing arrest in 1939 was followed by increasing mental deterioration and incarceration in an asylum, where she died that year.
98. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 209–211.
99. Peyronnet, op.cit., 57–60; Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 197–200. Jean Goldsky's postwar attack on Hervé was the major exception.

Chapter 7

1. *L'Echo de Paris*, January 15, 1907, "Les Progrès Antimilitariste," Georges Doutremont; *L'Echo de Paris*, January 16, 1907, "Insulte Au Drapeau."
2. Miller, op.cit., 121.
3. A.N., F7 12565, (Notes de Police, 1907–1909), Note M/183, January 30, 1907.
4. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 151–152.
5. Ibid., 151–153. See Masson's letter to André Spire May 16, 1907.
6. A.N., F7 13323, Antimilitarism until the war of 1914, II, Section 2, Antimilitarisme until October 10, 1907, 10. This report was one of those general Ministry of the Interior reports compiled by officials well above the level of the agents and *mouchards* whose own individual reports often seemed more nuanced and personal but could just as easily become contradictory and even preposterous.
7. Miller, op.cit., 52.
8. A.P.P., Ba/1495; A.N., F7 13323, Antimilitarism until the war of 1914, II, Section 3, Antimilitarism, notes 1907, M/689 and M/731, June–July 1907?. One of the reservists at Nancy caught singing antimilitarist songs threatened to write to Jaurès. A.N., F7 13323, Antimilitarism until the war of 1914, II, Section 2, Antimilitarisme until October 10, 1907, 14; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 76.
9. Miller, op.cit., 76–77; *Le Matin*, April 4, 1907. Even though that poster was fairly mild compared to *L'Affiche Rouge*, twelve of the signers were indicted and tried, but they were acquitted on June 26, 1907.
10. L.G.S., #3, January 2–8, 1907, "Beautés Coloniales," Carol; L.G.S., #16, April 2–9, 1907, "L'Engrenage Marocain," G.H.
11. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 102.
12. A.N., BB^{18} 2372, concerned the antimilitarist article "Aux Soldats de l'Est" from an L.G.S. special? issue dated June 19–25, 1907 reprinted in *Le Cri Populaire* on June 22, 1907 in Nancy.
13. *Mercure de France*, Tome 72, March–April 1908, "Questions juridiques," José Théry, 332–336.
14. A.N., F7 13326, *"L'Antimilitarisme et L'Antipatriotisme* (situation on December 1, 1912)."
15. L.G.S., #29, July 3–9, 1907, "Tous à Longchamp!"; L.G.S., #30, July 10–16, 1907, "Manifestons," G.H.
16. A.N., F7 12910. Notes of September 14, 15, 16, 1907; *L'Humanité*, September 14, 1907, "Encore Une Fournée: Dix antilmilitariste ont comparu hier en Cour des assises."; *L'Humanité*, September 15, 1907. What especially irked the antimilitarists was the severity of the verdicts and the placement of the two men among common criminals.
17. *La Patrie*, "Un instituteur insulte le drapeau," September 3, 1907.
18. A.P.P., Ba/1511, Note of October 2, 1907.
19. *Le Petit Parisien*, "Le Procès Des Antimilitaristes Lyonnais," November 30, 1907; *La Petite République*, November 30, 1907; *L'Humanité*, November 30, 1907, "Vingt-deux Antimilitaristes Poursuivis"; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 103.
20. *L'Humanité*, December 15, 1907.
21. In A.N., F7 13326, *"L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France,"* situation on December 1, 1912, 66; L.G.S., May 8, 1908, "Les Progrès de la Désertion."
22. F7 12910, report dated July 26 on an antimilitarist meeting at the Café Jules, July 7, 1907.
23. A.P.P., Ba/1511; A.N., F7 13324.
24. A.N., F7 12910, Notes of June 5 and 6, 1907; Notes of September 14, 15, and 16, 1907, Notes of December 26 and December 30, 1907.
25. A.N., F7 12723, Note 11–10146, July 24, 1907; *La Patrie*, July 14, 1907; L.G.S. #30, July 10–16, 1907, "Manifestons," G.H.

26. A.N., F7 12910, Note M/564, July 11, 1907.
27. *Le Matin*, "Le torchon brule," Octobre 20, 1907; *Le Temps*, "Declaration du Parti Socialiste," October 25, 1907; A.N., F7 13070, M/889, Note of October 25, 1907; A.P.P., Ba/1495, Note of October 3, 1907. One police agent thought that all socialists were collectivists, hence revolutionaries and antipatriots, who moderated their views only to the point of allowing them to deal with Radical *arrivistes*. "G. Hervé, who would have been necessary to invent if he did not exist, has rendered an immense service to society by forcing these guys to show their true colors openly and to make any confusion impossible, for those who are willingly the most blind."
28. *Le Petit Parisien*, October 2, 1907. In fact, at least one incident occurred outside the Gare de l'Est which led to an arrest on October 7, a trial in December, and a six month sentence for a young bronze worker and "disciple of Hervé," who shouted antimilitarist slogans, some of which referred to the revolt of the 17th regiment at Narbonne, as he distributed manifestos. *Le Petit République*, December 14, 1910.
29. Miller, op.cit., 118. Miller cited Douglas Porch, *March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871–1914*, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 115–116.
30. Ibid., 116–122.
31. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Nantes, Note dated May 19, 1907.
32. A.N., F7 13324, note of January 1, 1908.
33. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 97–103.
34. Miller, op.cit., 122.
35. René Nelli, *Histoire du Languedoc*, (Paris: Hachette Littérature, 1974), 287.
36. Guy Bechtel, *1907: La Grande Révolte du Midi*, (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1976), op.cit., 12–13; *L'Éclair*, January 4, 1907. Railroads also meant competition and the decline of local cloth industries.
37. Agulhon, op.cit., 129–130.
38. Mollier and George, op.cit., 383–384.
39. Trempé, op.cit., 319.
40. Trempé, op.cit., 330–331; Bechtel, op.cit, 9–13; Nelli, op.cit., 287–288. Even when the Midi vintners spoke French, it was largely undecipherable by northerners. Bechtel contrasted the academic idea of history with the experiences, attitudes, assumptions, and feelings of those who actually lived it!
41. Trempé, op.cit., 331. In the Chamber Jaurès was particularly upset about Clemenceau's discrediting of Albert. *L'Humanité*, June 29, 1907, "Les assassins de Narbonne acquittés par le Chambre."
42. Trempé, op.cit., 331–332.
43. Newhall, op.cit., 269–270. Lucien Métivier was later unmasked as an *agent provocateur* who had met with Clemenceau and was active in fomenting violence and disorder at Draveil and Villeneuve-Sainte-Georges in 1908.
44. Nelli, op.cit., 289–290.
45. Peyronnet, op.cit., 102–103.
46. L.G.S., #24, May 29–June 4, 1907.
47. L.G.S., #25, June 5–11, 1907.
48. Almosnino, op.cit., 53.
49. L.G.S., #26, June 12–18, 1907, "Bravo les soldats," Miguel Almereyda; *L'Humanité*, June 16, 1907, "Le Procès de Nantes: Condamnés," Jules Uhry. Hervé had been one of the attorneys for the two syndicalist leaders. A.N., F7, 12910, Note of June 6, 1907 and note of June 3, 1907.
50. This issue did not exist at the B.N. when consullted but there is a summary of its contents in L.G.S., #27. *Deuxième Édition*, June 19–25, 1907.
51. *L'Action*, "Cour D'Assises de la Seine—Acquittement des Douze," June 26, 1907; *L'Humanité*, June 26 1907, "Acquittes," Jules Uhry.

52. L.G.S., #27. *Deuxième Édition*, June 19–25, 1907, "Au secours du Midi," G.H.; "En grève!," Miguel Almereyda.
53. A.N., F7 16026[2], Fonds Panthéon.
54. A.N., F7 13323, II, Section 3, Note of June 29, 1907.
55. Almosnino, op.cit., 54.
56. *L'Humanité*, June 29, 1907; *L'Humanité*, June 30, 1907, "La Crise du Midi a la Chambre: Lendemain De Bataille: Le Discours de Jaurès."; Bechtel, op.cit., 7.
57. Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au Pouvoir: L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 280–281.
58. Peyronnet, op.cit., 104.
59. L.G.S., #28, June 26–July 2, 1907, "La leçon des événements," G.H.
60. Ibid., "Immobilité funeste," Henri Fabre.
61. Newhall, op.cit., 262; Nelli, op.cit., 290–291. The *Bats d'Af* would soon be the site of another set of events which would present the paper and the entire Left with a galvanizing cause, temporarily forcing at least modicum of Leftist unity; however that impending affair involving the unfairness of military justice would eventually provide clear evidence that unity on the Left for almost anything was impossible.
62. Rebérioux, op.cit., 96–98; Peyronnet, op.cit., 105; Agulhon, *The French Republic*, op.cit., 131.
63. Mollier and George, op.cit., 282, 383–384. Besides ending chaptalization (the process of adding sugar to unfermented grape must) and fraud in wine production as well as remitting back taxes for the most destitute, the government also increased the troops' wine ration, making the state the privileged purchaser of the country's wines.
64. A.N., F7 12723, Notes from Paris, June 22 and 23, 1907.
65. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 102–106.
66. L.G.S., #28, June 26-July 2, 1907.
67. L.G.S., #29, July 3–9, 1907, "Pour la revue du 14 juillet," G.H.; A.N., F7 12910. Ministry of the Interior, Note of July 6, 1907. This note reports how *L'Action Française* and the *Ligue des Patriotes* were happy about Hervé's attacks on the government, but they could not join any attacks on the French army. Hervé could approve royalist, nationalist, or Bonapartist anti-Republican actions during times of severe governmental repression against the Left.
68. Almosnino, op.cit., 54–55.
69. L.G.S., #30, July 10–16, 1907, "Manifestons," G.H.
70. A.N., F7 13326, M 324, Note of May 6, 1907 on the new antimilitarist poster *Aux Soldats*. M 344. Note of May 10, 1907, "Some details on the antimilitarist poster."
71. A.N., F7 13326, M 568, Note of July 12, 1907, "The antimilitarists and the review at Longchamps."
72. A.N., F7 13323 II, Section 3, M 790, Note of September 28, 1907.
73. Ibid., Section 3, M902, October 1907 and "Les bourses du travail et l'antimilitarisme," situation on October 10, 1907, 20–21.
74. L.G.S., #28, June 26–July 2, 1907, "La leçon des événements," G.H.
75. L.G.S., #29, July 3–9, 1907, "Pour la revue du 14 juillet," G.H.
76. L.G.S., #29, July 10–16, 1907. "Manifestons," G.H.
77. L.G.S., #29, July 3–9, 1907, "La C.G.T. et la grève générale" by Henri Fabre. In this article Fabre debated Émile Pouget's recent *anarchisant* position in *La Voix du Peuple* perhaps echoing Georges Sorel over two contrasting versions of revolutionary tactics. The debate arose over the failure of a general strike in the Midi. Pouget assumed that a general strike would arise more from the living and vibrant "mass" of workers than from any organizing committee. Fabre accused Pouget of anarchist prejudice. It was obvious to Fabre that the role of the C.G.T. was to act as a director of the definitive liberation of the proletariat. While Pouget rejected such a role for the C.G.T. as authoritarian, Fabre called for even more extensive power for the C.G.T. Hervé might have found this debate amusing. Hervéism was above all a call for a revolutionary elite to prepare for revolution, yet Hervé realized that theoretical

discussions did little to create an actual revolution. In theory, Hervé should have been able to choose between a revolutionary elite and the spontaneous "masses," between Fabre and Pouget, and between Lenin and Luxemburg. In practice Hervé's choice was tied to the needs of the moment. When Pouget later came to *La Guerre Sociale* in 1910 as the resident expert on syndicalism, the essential eclecticism of Hervéism was apparently confirmed.

78. L.G.S. #31, July 17–23, 1907, "La Manfestation de Longchamps," unsigned; *La Petite République*, July 19, 1907.
79. A.N., F7 12723, Note #11–10146, July 24, 1907 and M/10084, Paris, June 13. 1907.
80. Almosnino, op.cit., 54–55.
81. L.G.S., #31, July 17–23, 1907, "Sous la botte des flics," G.H.
82. The decade before World War I was a time of confrontation by workers and the extreme Left against the bourgeois Republic. Strikes and demonstrations led to violence and death; police actions and surveillance were constant concerns for the revolutionaries. Yet a very different perspective is possible. The existence of a newspaper like *La Guerre Sociale* could be evidence of a highly polarized social and economic situation. Yet, the "relative" toleration by the government of a paper that apparently advocated insurrection, general strike, revolution, assassination, sabotage, antimilitarism, and antipatriotism is more likely the sign of a fairly secure and stable social order. The ritualistic forms of confrontation exhibited by both the revolutionary Left and the French police lead one to wonder whether an intricate role playing had evolved out of the revolutionary heritage which World War I would abbreviate. Still, a country with a heritage of the Terror and Commune might be expected to assume that revolutionary rhetoric was always a dress rehearsal for something all too real.
83. A.N., F7 13571, Note on the Nancy Congress of the P.S.U., August 8, 1907; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 77.
84. *4e Congrès national du parti socialiste, section français de l'internationale ouvrière, tenu à Nancy le 11, 12, 13, et 14 août 1907*, (*Compte rendu*, Paris, n.d.)
85. Goldberg, op.cit., 380–381.
86. Gilles Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," *Jean Jaurès, Cahiers Trimestriels*, No. 145, 18.
87. Ibid.
88. Gordon, op.cit., 111, 114; Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 173–174.
89. A.N., F7 13571, Note of August 8, 1907. The Nancy Congress also considered the always important question of S.F.I.O. relations with the C.G.T. Goldberg, op.cit., 380.
90. L.G.S., #33, July 31–August 6, 1907, "Eunuques du socialisme," G.H.
91. Drachkovitch, *Les Socialismes français et allemand …*, op.cit., 94.
92. Ibid., 95.
93. Ibid., 90.
94. Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et …," op.cit., 18–19; *Le Matin*, August 14, 1907; *Parti socialiste, S.F.I.O., 4e congrès national, Nancy*, (Paris; compte rendu sténographique, 1907), 261–262.
95. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 80.
96. One year later Hervé was less positive about the Nancy Congress. He then stressed how the Nancy motion was a typical *nègre-blanc*. It was "a motion which in its first part said that it was necessary to defend France and in its second part that it was necessary to oppose all wars by a general strike and insurrection." L.G.S., #36, August 19–25, 1908, "Le nègre-blanc," G.H.
97. A.M. Simons, "The Stuttgart Congress," *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. VIII, September 1907, No. 3, 130, 129–143.
98. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 81–82.
99. Drachkovitch, op.cit., 92; James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966 [1955]), 133.
100. A.M. Simons, op.cit., 132.

101. Trempé, op.cit., 369–371. Rolande Trempé analyzed the complexities and implications of socialist and syndicalist relations before and after the Stuttgart Conference, and he concluded that the Guesdists got a "temporary" satisfaction at Stuttgart because the International believed that "'close relations' must be established between the two organizations in order to be able, when the time comes, together to decide on the actions to take. The Stuttgart motion encouraged the Guesdists, who endeavored to control the actions of the C.G.T., and severely criticized the methods used by its [syndicalist] leadership, especially between 1905 and 1910." The Guesdists believed that Hervéist and revolutionary syndicalist direct action methods gave the bourgeois government the perfect excuse for repression and should not be taken seriously. Trempé cited Hubert Lagardelle as a revolutionary syndicalist voice in the S.F.I.O. at Stuttgart in 1907 who commented on the very distinct conceptions of workers and their interests taken by the S.F.I.O. and C.G.T. For Lagardelle, "the party takes the worker, 'only so far as an elector', as an 'abstract citizen', like any other, in whatever class he belongs, while the union addresses itself to him as a 'producer'. It touches him, therefore, in his essential quality, 'he who makes his life' and who permits the birth of a moral unity among members of society." For Trempé, "Gustave Hervé did not think differently when he took a position in favor of the C.G.T. against the party judged 'too parliamentary'. He called for violence and insurrection, and considered the socialist deputies as only being 'some modest auxiliaries of the C.G.T.'"
102. Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1955), 81–82.
103. Ibid., 82.
104. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 85.
105. Ibid., 85; Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 20.
106. Schorske, op.cit., 82.
107. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 85.
108. Ibid., 85.
109. Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme," op.cit., 20.
110. Schorske, op.cit., 82. Schorske cited Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, (New York: the author, 1948), 599.
111. Ibid., 82–83. Schorske cited Wolfe, op.cit., 600.
112. Goldberg, op.cit., 382.
113. Maxine Leroy, *La coutume ouvrière-syndicats, bourses du travail, fédérations, professionnelles, coopératives*, Volume 2, (Paris: Girard et Brière, 1913), 801; Gustave Hervé, *L'antimilitarisme,* (Paris: *Les Documents du Progrès*, July 1908). Hervé said that he softened his antiwar ideas at Stuttgart; Drachovitch, op.cit., *passim*.
114. Goldberg, op.cit., 382.
115. Joll, op.cit., 136–139.
116. Ibid., 138–139; Goldberg, op.cit., 383.
117. Ibid., 139; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 86; Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'Antimilitarisme," op.cit., 20.
118. L.G.S., #37, August 28–September 3, 1907, "Notre victoire," G.H.
119. Scher, op.cit., 561–562. See V. Lénine, *Oeuvres*, Tome 13, June 1907–April 1908, (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1967), 80.
120. L.G.S., #37, August 28–September 3, 1907, "Notre victoire," G.H.
121. Almosnino, op.cit., 81.
122. Joll, op.cit., 134. The word pacifist is not an accurate appraisal of any of Hervé's stances even though peace was always his fundamental concern. Hervé, of course, did not become chauvinistic suddenly in 1914.
123. *Le Temps*, September 8, 1907. "Le congrès antimilitariste d'Amsterdam."
124. Joll, op.cit., 134.
125. Hervé, *Le congrès de Stuttgart et l'antipatriotisme*, ..., op.cit., 4–7.

126. Joll, op.cit., 134.
127. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 85.
128. Ibid., 84.
129. L.G.S., #37, August 28–September 3, 1907, "Notre victoire," G.H. On his return to France, Hervé praised German workers and their bravery, but he still characterized Germans as "less combative, less rebellious, and less revolutionary than the French people."
130. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 86–87.
131. Ibid., 87.
132. Ibid., 87–88.
133. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 155–156.
134. L.G.S., #37, August 28–September 3, 1907, "Notre victoire," G.H.; L.G.S., September 4–10, 1907, "Après Stuttgart," G.H.
135. L.G.S., #38, September 4–10, 1907, "Après Stuttgart," G.H.; A.P.P., Ba/1512. Note of March 21, 1907. At an A.I.A. meeting on March 20, 1907, Almereyda had proposed the creation of secret antimilitarist groups in France. Hervé's earliest known use of the phrase seems to have been in 1905 when he described the A.I.A. as an "*organisation de combat*" at the Saint-Étienne Congress.
136. L.G.S., #38, September 4–10, 1907, "Après Stuttgart," G.H.; A.P.P., Ba/1512. Note of March 21, 1907.
137. *L'Humanité*, September 8, 1907, "La Conférence de Jaurès,"; *L'Humanité*, September 9, 1907; *Le Petit Parisien*, September 9, 1907, "Le Discours de M. Jaurès"; Goldberg, op.cit., 383–384; Jaurès, *Oeuvres*, V, 123–142; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 88–89.
138. A.N., F7 12910, Note of September 15, 1907.
139. *L'Humanité*, September 9, 1907; Goldberg, op.cit., 383–384; Jaurès, *Oeuvres*, V, op.cit., 123–142; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 88–89.
140. Gustave Hervé, *Le congrès de Stuttgart …*, op.cit., 1–10; Gustave Hervé, *Mes Crimes*, op.cit., 117–145, "Discours prononcé à Paris, aux Sociétés Savantes, le 12 Septembre 1907."
141. Ibid., 2; A.N., Fonds Panthéon, F7 15968[2], 25337/45. Police sources call the gathering successful as spectacle and as a financial venture. The police spotted workers, bourgeois, timid reactionaries and royalists, associates of Jaurès, the team from *La Guerre Sociale*, and numerous Russians, who were generally assumed to be potentially dangerous by the authorities.
142. Ibid., 12–31.
143. Ibid., 25–26; Hervé, *Mes Crimes*, op.cit., 141–145.
144. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 90; A.N., F7 13323 and F7 13571.
145. Ibid., 85; A.N., F7 13070 and F7 13071.
146. *Le Echo de Paris*, October 1, 1907, "Antimilitarisme et les conscrits."
147. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 90–92; A.N., BB[18] 2349/2.
148. *Le Temps*, October 29, 1907, "Chronique Électorale: Conseils Généraux."
149. L.G.S., #41, September 25–October 1, 1907, "Leur dernière saleté," G.H.
150. A.N., BB[18] 2373. This *carton* has much information on the manifesto and the trial of its signers. A future editor of *La Guerre Sociale*, Jean Goldsky, also signed the manifesto. The 16 year-old Goldsky said that he was 19 so that he would be tried and imprisoned! He got his wish. A.N., F7 12910, Notes of September 14, 15, 16, 1907; *L'Humanité*, September 14, 1907, "Encore Une Fournée: Dix antilmilitariste ont comparu hier en Cour des assises."; *L'Humanité*, September 15, 1907. What especially irked the antimilitarists was the severity of the verdicts and the placement of the two men among common criminals. *La Petite République*, "On en poursuit treize," December 14, 1907.
151. A.N., F7 12723, Note of August 31, 1907. Young *anarchisant* Hervéist Jean Goldsky was said to be their sponsor and advisor.
152. A.N., F7 12910. Notes of September 14, 15, 16, 1907; *La Petite République*, September 14, 1907; *L'Humanité*, September 14, 1907, "Encore Une Fournée: Dix antilmilitariste ont com-

paru hier en Cour des assises."; *L'Humanité*, September 15, 1907; Almosnino, op.cit., 52–53; A.N., F7 13324.

153. Almosnino, op.cit., 52–53; A.N., F7 13324; *La Petite République*, September 14, 1907; *L'Humanité*, September 14, 1907, "Encore Une Fournée: Dix antimilitarists ont comparé hier en cour d'assises." The front page of *L'Humanité* on September 14, 1907 included a photo of one of the defendants, Henriette Roussel, with Hervé seated directly behind her on the bench for the defense attorneys.
154. A.N., F7 12723, Notes from Paris, August 31, 1907, December 7, 1907, February 8, 1908, February 18, 1908; *Le Socialiste*, October 28, 1907, "Mise au Point," by Adolphe Chasteau.
155. A.N., F7 12723, Notes from Paris, February 8, 1908, February 18, 1908, April 11, 1908, Prefecture of Police—July 23, 1908, two notes from July 25, 1907, notes from Paris, August 5, 1908, August 22, 1907, October 6, 1907, October 10, 1907. Other meetings in this era show that the individualist anarchists at *L'Anarchie* were involved directly or indirectly in common or parallel pursuits with writers and supporters of *La Guerre Sociale* and *Le Libertaire*. However, even former associates Paraf Javal and Libertad experienced a rift by 1908 and each had his own circles of militants. Among the anarchists there was a constant concern about a lack of energy, purpose, and strength during these years.
156. A.N., F7 12723, Notes from Paris, August 5, 1908. At a gathering in the Salle Jules upon the arrest of Marcel Rimbault and following the events at Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Méric was quoted as saying that "revolutionaries who are being massacred and imprisoned will not let themselves become inoffensive sheep, and that, from now on hostages have been designated; that's the only way to make the assassins think." In the same note an anarchist named Roussel was said to be considering the use of dynamite against the bourgeoisie, the magistrates, and various bureaucrats all over Paris at the same time. At a meeting at the Causeries Populaires on September 4, 1907, Libertad mocked Durupt's discussion of a secret action group being created by anarchists tied to *Le Libertaire* because such a group cannot be secret when it has been mentioned on the pages of the latter newspaper. A.N., F7 12723, Note from Paris, September 5, 1907.
157. Almosnino, op.cit., 54–55.
158. L.G.S., #30, July 10–16, 1907, "Correspondance," M.A.
159. Almosnino, op.cit., 54–56; L.G.S., June 26, 1907, "Le procès des douze," M.A.; L.G.S., February 26 1908, "4 ans de Prison pour 2 Braillards"; L.G.S., March 4, 1908. "Ohe! Les Braillards," M.A.
160. Ibid., 56.
161. Ibid., 57.
162. A.N., F7 12190. This *carton* has countless reports of meetings which voiced concern over the fate of Mahé and Picardat. Most anarchist groups were active in agitation over this episode.
163. A.N., BB[18]/2373. This source claimed that even a fearless militant like Almereyda was troubled by the violence of the manifesto, yet some agents reported that Almereyda had helped draft it.
164. L.G.S., #39, September 11–17, 1907, "Contre le brigandage Marocain." G.H.
165. L.G.S., #50, November 27–December 3, 1907, "Ceux d'Étampes et ceux du Maroc." G.H.
166. L.G.S., #51, December 4–10, 1907, "Hardi! les Marocains," G.H. Hervé concluded by saying that a government that put children like Mahé and Picardat in wretched prisons could hardly speak of going to "civilize" Morocco.
167. A.N., F7 13070. Packet on the Broussists. Hervé's anticolonialism clearly troubled moderate socialists. Many reports show that socialist Deputies were very upset by Hervé's ideas. There was a reaction against Hervé's influence in the S.F.I.O. after the Congresses of Nancy and Stuttgart. By October 1907 the "Hervé Question" had become an important matter in the S.F.I.O. On October 19, 1907 Paul Brousse convoked a meeting of moderate socialist Deputies and Municipal Councillors at a café at the Place du Châtelet. At this meeting Hervé and Jaurès were cited as equally responsible for pernicious antipatriotic ideas, especially the ideas for a general strike and insurrection to prevent war. A Broussist Manifesto was drawn up in

late October stressing patriotic, internationalist, and Republican themes, but it did not specifically attack Hervé. Also see A.N., F7 13070. Packet on the Hervéists. Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police for November 1907; *Le Temps*, October 25, 1907; *Le Matin*, October 20, 1907, "Le torchon brûle contre Hervé-Jaurès."

168. L.G.S., #52, December 11–17, 1907.
169. A.N., F7 13323 II, Section 4, *Prinicpaux Actes D'Antimiltarisme—1900–1909*, 25.
170. Gustave Hervé, *Contre le brigandage marocain, déclaration en cour d'assises-décombre 1907.* (Paris: Éditions de *La Guerre Sociale*, December 1907); L.G.S., #52 December 11–17, 1907; L.G.S., #1, December 18–24, 1907 "Contre le brigandage marocain," G.H.; L.G.S., #2, December 25–31, 1907, *Compte Rendu* of the trial; *L'Humanité*, December 25, 1907. The government wanted several cases against *La Guerre Sociale* to be tried together. Hervé and his staff believed that the cases against Merle, Almereyda, and Galhauban ought to have been considered separately. The government was not only trying to put *La Guerre Sociale* out of operation, it was trying to save time and money. The other staff members did not appear in court and were sentenced in their absence for non-appearance. The government claimed the other men did not present themselves at court because their crimes of antipatriotism and antimilitarism for articles on the Midi Crises would have prevented Hervé's defense of his anti-Moroccan articles on the basis of "patriotism"! Hervé was found guilty and he received 1 year in prison as well as a fine of 3000 francs. Almereyda and Merle each received sentences of 5 years in prison and fines of 30,000 francs for non-appearance. A.N., F7 13323 II, *Principaux actes d'antimilitarisme—1900–1909*, 29; L.G.S., #10, February 19–25, 1908; L.G.S., #11, February 26–March 3, 1908; Gustave Hervé, *Mes Crimes* ..., op.cit., 158–211, "Déclaration de Gustave Hervé—December 24, 1907." Gaulhauban was too sick to be tried so his trial was dismissed. *Le Petit Parisien*, February 25, 1908.
171. Madeleine Rebérioux, "La gauche socialiste française: *La Guerre Sociale* et *Le Mouvement Socialiste* face au problème coloniale," *Le Mouvement sociale*, No. 46, (January–March 1964), 91–103. Rebérioux noted the contradiction of an antipatriot whose anticolonial views called on the Arab tribes and states to defend their independence. She thought it was quite telling that Hervé displayed such scorn for the ignorance and laziness of ordinary French citizens because they rejected his advice and appeals. Later on, when Moroccan tribes failed to rise up everywhere and when French workers failed to act against either colonialism or bourgeois exploitation in France, Hervé began to discourage the most ardent tribes from continuing to fight. "The circle was closed: in the name of civilization Hervé approved the partition of Africa [to settle Alsace-Lorraine with Germany] which a year earlier he had condemned in the name of civilization." Compared to all other newspapers on the French Left, Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* may have led the most sustained, vehement, and fact-filled campaign against colonialism, but, according to Rebérioux, he was able to reverse himself by 1912 due to his very weak theoretical analysis of colonialism and its popular roots. 98. Several students of Rebérioux explained Hervé's shift in terms of an ongoing blend of republican and socialist ideas. They stressed his weak economic analysis and distrust of doctrine at a time when international questions came to have greater consequences for him after 1911. Hervé's statement that the conclusion of the Second Moroccan Crisis temporarily decreased the threat of war, and his explanation of his shift as due to the internal threat posed by clerical, reactionary, and Caesarian elements within France are either not considered or dismissed. Of course, domestic politics and the so-called "national revival" cannot be separated from the international arena. Generally, Hervé's about-face on the colonial issue was seen in terms of a lack of theoretical depth and a conjunctural analysis as opposed to a "more serious" Marxian analysis of such factors as imperialism, capitalist production, the state, the economic cycle, the national question, the relations of socialism to the unions, etc. In order to avoid sectarianism, Hervé was supposedly led to eclecticism and empiricism because there was no theoretical support. Anticolonialism had an internal function for the domestic policy of *La Guerre Sociale* and was not an external analysis of colonialism itself.

172. Heure, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 93; A.N., BB[18]/2349/2.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., 93–94. On December 7, 1907 Hervé had published an article in the T.S.Y. which also had potentially incriminatory passages that some officials wished to indict.
175. Ibid., 93–94.
176. Ibid., 94–95; *Le Petit Parisien*, December 25, 1907, "M. Gustave Hervé condamné au maximum"; *L'Echo de Paris*, December 24, 1907, "M. Gustave Hervé aux Assises"; *L'Echo de Paris*, December 25, 1907, "Echos," and "Gustave Hervé condamné," Edgard Troimaux; *L'Humanité*, December 24, 1907 "Hervé aux Assises," Jules Uhry; *L'Humanité*, December 25, 1907 "Hervé Condamné au Maximum," Jules Uhry.
177. Ibid., 95.
178. L.G.S., December 25–31, 1907, Compte Rendu of the trial; L.G.S., January 1–7, 1908.
179. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 95–96.
180. Gustave Hervé, *Mes crimes* …, op.cit., 221, 159–221; L.G.S., December 25–31, 1907, *Compte Rendu* of the trial; Gustave Hervé, *Contre le brigandage marocain* …, op.cit.
181. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 96; *L' Echo de Paris*, December 25, 1907, "Gustave Hervé condamné," Edgard Troimaux.
182. *Le Petit Parisien*, December 25, 1907, "M.Gustave Hervé condamné au maximum;" A.N., F7 13323 II, Principaux actes d'antimilitarisme—1900–1909, 29; L.G.S., #10, February 19–25, 1908; L.G.S., #11, February 26–March 3, 1908; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 25, 1908; L.G.S., #26, June 10–16, 1908. When Merle and Almereyda did go to court in late February 1908, their sentences were reduced to prison terms of two years and fines of 500 francs. After months of evasion and appeals, Merle and Almereyda finally went to prison in early June 1908. *L'Humanité*, February 24, 1908, "Le process de la 'Guerre Sociale,'" Jules Uhry; *L'Humanité*, February 25, 1908, "Merle et Almereyda condamnés," Jules Uhry. On June 17, 1908 Méric and Aristide Delannoy issued an article and drawing in *Les Hommes du Jour*, on General d'Amade, a leader of the French Moroccan expedition. That exposé got these two associates of *La Guerre Sociale* a trial of their own on August 26, 1908. L.G.S., #36, August 19–25, 1908; Goldberg, op.cit., 374, *passim*. Goldberg includes valuable accounts of the situation in Morocco.
183. *Le Petit Parisien*, December 25, 1907, "M.Gustave Hervé condamné au maximum"; *L' Echo de Paris*, December 25, 1907, "Gustave Hervé condamné," Edgard Troimaux.
184. *L'Humanité*, December 25, 1907, "Hervé condamné au maximum," Jules Uhry
185. *L'Humanité*, February 14, 1908, "Pour avoir serré la main d'Hervé, Un Officier est envoyé en disgrâce"; *La Petite République*, February 14, 1908; A.N., F7 13323 II, Prinicpaux Actes D'Antimiltarisme—1900–1910, 25.
186. A.N., F7 13323; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 96.
187. J.Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 161–162. See Masson's letter to André Spire, March 28, 1908.
188. L.G.S., #3, January 1–7, 1908; *Les Temps*, "Au Palais—Une Protestation de M. Hervé," November 7, 1907. Hervé protested the previous day's disbarment decision by the *Conseil de l'ordre des avocats*. *Le Radical*, "M. Gustave Hervé et le Conseil de l'ordre," August 25, 1907; *L'Humanité*, August 25, 1907, "L'Inquisition Moderne."
189. L.G.S., #6, January 22–28, 1908; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, 97–105.
190. *L'Humanité*, January 23, 1908, "Liebknecht n'est pas rayé par les Allemands; Hervé est rayé du barreau de Paris," Jules Uhry; "Une lettre d'Hervé," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, 105. Briand, as the current Minister of Justice, had only been enrolled in the Bar Association of Pontoise until then.
191. *La Petite République*, February 14, 1908, "La Radiation de M. Hervé"; *L'Action*, February 15, 1908, "La Radiation de M. Gustave Hervé."
192. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 105; L.G.S., #21, May 6–12, 1908. Such were the last events of an affair which was played out largely in the press, though in February

1910 the Socialist Federation of the Yonne did urge an energetic parliamentary demonstration to get him reinstated on the Parisian bar.

193. Ibid., 131.
194. L.G.S., #10, February 19–25, 1908.
195. Scher, op.cit., 564; A.N., F7 13323. II, Packet #3, *Antimilitarisme*, Note of October 22, 1907; A.N., F7 13571, M 850, October 15, 1907, "Le Parti Socialiste Unifié et l'Antimilitarisme."
196. L.G.S., #15, March 25–31, 1908; L.G.S., #19, April 22–28, 1908; L.G.S., #24, May 27–June 3, 1908. Other reports on *La Guerra Sociale* were included in issues #29, 31, 34, and 42 of 1908. In 1910 *La Guerra Sociale* was republished in Milan. L.G.S., #45, October 22, 1910, *Édition Spéciale*.
197. Luigi Berta was also a contributor to the Italian *La Guerra Sociale*.
198. Peyronnet, op.cit., 46–48.
199. A.P.P., Ba/1499. Agent "Finot," Notes of May 20, 1908, January 4, 1908, December 7, 1908, and September 15, 1908. Police agent "Finot" had long expressed fears that legalistic methods by the S.F.I.O. would push socialist workers into the C.G.T. which would then fail to act on its revolutionary rhetoric. "Finot" believed this would lead to a new wave of individual anarchist terrorist acts probably in 1910 after the failure of reforms. The existence of *La Guerre Sociale* was proof to Finot that his predictions were correct.
200. L.G.S., #21, May 6–12, 1908. Hervé here included an anomalous yet typical call to socialists to act bravely and violently because this would help socialism win elections! His admission of the illusion of such gains does not negate the existence of this contradictory appeal.
201. L.G.S., #22, May 13–19, 1908, "Propos d'un votard," Anton Bruckère; L.G.S., #23, May 20–26, 1908. "L'esprit insurrectionel disparaît-il?" Anton Bruckère.
202. Frossard, op.cit., 157–158. Frossard gives a very picturesque portrait of this iconoclastic Hervéist.
203. L.G.S., #26, June 10–16, 1908, "L'appel à la haine," Dr. Madeleine Pelletier.
204. Prochasson, op.cit., 32–35, note 58 on page 274. See also *Les Hommes du Jour*, #40, October 24, 1908, "Leur reconnaissance," Flax (Victor Méric), 5; *La Guerre Sociale*, #5, January 31–February 5, 1912. "La Carrière d'un intellectuel : Pour Jean Molosse," Victor Méric; Also see *Les Hommes du Jour*, #111, March 5, 1910 in a homage to Léon Bloy and *Les Hommes du Jour*, "L'antisémite malgre lui au royaliste qui s'ignore," #220, Avril 6, 1912; Shlomo Sand, "Sorel, les Juifs et l'antisemitisme," *Cahiers Georges Sorel*, II, 1984, 7–36. For Sorel, the term Jew was described as another name for an intellectual.
205. *La Guerre Sociale*, #26, June 10–16, 1908, "Bibliographie—*Réflexions sur la violence*—Georges Sorel," reviewed by *Un Sans Patrie*.
206. L.G.S., Numbers 35–37, 1908, "En cas de mobilization," M.A.
207. Almosnino, op.cit., 62.
208. L.G.S., Numbers 27–32, 1908; Peyronnet, op.cit., 134. Peyronnet explained this series of articles as directly inspired by Almereyda. Peyronnet believed this was the beginning of a systematic rejection of desertion by *La Guerre Sociale*. It was said to have begun a coherent program of action for young revolutionary soldiers. Actually, unity was probably the overriding goal, not coherence or clarity.
209. Almosnino, op.cit, 62.
210. Ibid., 62–65. A few days after his arrival at La Santé, Almereyda along with Merle were incriminated for another article appearing in *La Guerre Sociale*. That article was an anonymous antimilitarist article dated April 28, 1908 under an ongoing rubric titled "*Le Brigandage Marocain*" which resurrected some of Almereyda's earlier language at the time of the Midi uprising calling soldiers murderers, labeling their actions in Morocco criminal, favoring the Moroccans over the French, and generally promoting "defeatism" among the French armed forces. After continued delaying tactics, the trial was again used to assail French policies and promote antimilitarist ideas. Arguing as he had previously, Almeryeda claimed that bourgeois

society created revolutionaries by instigating actions like the current colonial expedition to Morocco. On December 7, 1908 each man got another year in prison which now meant thirty-six months in total. Though all their judicial appeals went unanswered, they were able to remain at La Santé. Still, the continuing campaign to free the journalists by the *Comité de Defense Sociale,* using large meetings and important speakers, failed to obtain their release. Not even the usual Bastille Day clemency worked this time, though Merle applied for and received a conditional release in August 1909. Almereyda did not follow the latter's example because he felt that such an appeal was too humiliating to be considered. But when the Clemenceau Ministry was replaced by Briand a few weeks later, Almereyda along with the remaining antimilitarists at La Santé were freed. A.P.P., Ba/1486, police report dated June 10, 1909.

211. Winock, *La Belle Époque: La France de 1900 à 1914*, op.cit., 21.

Chapter 8

1. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 31.
2. Wincock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 147.
3. Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 68.
4. Trempé, op.cit., 365.
5. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 135.
6. Ibid., 138.
7. Ibid., 146.
8. Almosnino, op.cit., 51.
9. Jacques Julliard, "Théorie syndicaliste révolutionnaire et pratique gréviste," *Le Mouvement social,* No. 65 (October–December 1968). 65, 55–69.
10. Julliard. *Clemenceau—Briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 132–133.
11. Mazgaj, op.cit., 82–83.
12. Papayanis, op.cit., *passim*; Michael Sabatino De Lucia, "The Remaking of French Sydnicalism, 1911–1918: The Growth of the Reformist Philosophy," Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1971, *passim.*
13. A. Fryar Calhoun, "The Politics of Internal Order: French Government and Revolutionary Labor, 1898–1914," Volumes One and Two, Princeton University, Ph.D., 1973, 351–352.
14. Shorter and Tilly, op.cit., 32–43. The long-term trend in French strikes toward increasing government interventions especially after World War I helped workers to avoid strike failures and allowed them greater chances to obtain compromises from employers. "Strikes had the very immediate political objective of compelling government intervention on behalf of strikers, and against the employers. If the intercession of the state was of such importance in day-to-day militancy, how much more urgent would the acquisition of membership in the national polity become to workers, permitting them to enlist routinely the resources of the state in their struggle against the employers. Yet precisely this drive for control meant the rhetoric of class struggle and the ardor of 'revolutionary' political activity. Hence working-class militants were able to curse the state from one side of their mouth, and plead for its intervention in their affairs from the other." 33.
15. Calhoun, op.cit., 352–354. Is it possible to arrive at an objective assessment of such events? One can certainly understand how either side could draw diametrically opposite conclusions about the meaning of the events. Can one conclude that the *gendarmes* were provoked, but that they overreacted and shot at a group of possibly or probably unarmed strikers at Draveil on June 2, 1908? Or could splitting the difference simply be another form of distortion?
16. L.G.S., #26, June 10–16, 1908. "La leçon de Draveil," Un Sans Patrie; Mazgaj, op.cit., 67–68; Rebérioux, op.cit., 113; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* …, op.cit., 66–69.

17. L.G.S., #34, August 5–11, 1908, "Dans la bonne voie," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #39, September 9–15, 1908, "Éloge de la violence," Un Sans Patrie; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves ...*, op.cit., passim.
18. Ironically, the budget of the Sûreté Générale for public security, from which a major portion went to pay informers and agents provocateurs, actually decreased by more than two-thirds between 1871 and 1907. Martin, op.cit., 83.
19. Brunet, op.cit., 115; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 154; A.N., F 7 12914, rapport M/1874.
20. Ibid., 117–118.
21. Ibid., 118–119.
22. Newhall, op.cit., 270.
23. Ibid., 270–271.
24. Ibid., 271.
25. Brunet, op.cit., 115–116; René de Marmande, *L'Intrigue Florentine*, (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1922), 2nd Ed., 186–190; Julliard, *Clemenceau briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 161–162.
26. Mollier and George, op.cit., 385.
27. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 149–150.
28. Mollier and George, op.cit., 385–386.
29. Calhoun, op.cit., 351.
30. Rebérioux, *La République radicale?*, op.cit., 114.
31. L.G.S., #30, July 8–14, 1908. "La France s'ennuye," *Un Sans Patrie*; Raoul Vilette, ed., *La Guerre Sociale : Un Journal « Contre » : La Période Héroique, 1906–1911*, (Paris: Les Nuits Rouges, 1999), 247–250.
32. L.G.S., #33, July 29–August 4, 1908. "Politique positive," Un Sans Patrie.
33. L.G.S., #31, July 15–21, 1908. "14 juillet 1908," Un Sans Patrie.
34. Julliard, *Clemenceau briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 133. Julliard gives a good account of the causes of this crisis in syndicalism.
35. Mazgaj, op.cit., 84–85.
36. A.N., F7 12910, note of December 26, 1907; A.P.P., Ba/1499. Many reports by police agent "Finot" from 1907 to 1912 show rivalries and divisions of incredible complexity as well as changeability.
37. Julliard, *Clemenceau briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 68. Another scholar described Griffuelhes as the embodiment of the revolutionary tradition and a symbol of an anachronistic view of syndicalism in contrast to the new *dirigiste* reformism of Alphonse Merrheim and Léon Jouhaux after 1911. Yet at the time of Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Griffuelhes clearly was one of those revolutionaries who favored prudence and moderation. See De Lucia, op.cit., 1–9.
38. A.P.P., Ba/1602. Agent "Finot," note of May 4, 1908 and Agent "Lyon," note of June 4, 1908.
39. Julliard, *Clemenceau briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 68. Julliard described Griffuelhes as a personal enemy of Yvetot, yet the latter man had great respect for Griffuelhes. Mazgaj, op.cit., 68–69, 82–85, 135–136; F.F. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France—the Direct Action of its-Time*, (Cambridge, The University Press, 1970), 84–85. Ridley described Griffuelhes and Pouget as almost reformists by 1908. Ridley's account offers clear substantiation for the existence of contradictory evolutionary-revolutionary ideas within the same syndicalist leaders. In view of Pouget's acceptance of a position at *La Guerre Sociale* in 1910, it seems erroneous to call him a "new reformist" in 1908. Yet, the existence of contradictions within the *politiques* does much to clarify the nature of the "crisis in syndicalism." Pouget's later move to *La Guerre Sociale* clearly illustrates the fluidity of these factions and rivalries.
40. F.F. Ridley, op.cit., 178–180.
41. Papayanis, op.cit., 187–189; De Lucia, op.cit., 1–9, *passim.*
42. Mazgaj, op.cit., 84.

43. Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves*, op.cit., 144–165.
44. Mazgaj, op.cit., 68–71, 82–85, 135–136; *L'Humanité*, July 29, 1908, *L'Humanité*, July 30, 1908, "La manifestation d'aujourd'hui"; *L'Humanité*, July 28, 1908, "L'Armée au service des patrons."
45. *L'Humanité*, August 1, 1908.
46. Mazgaj, op.cit., 73–74; L.G.S., #34, August 5–11, 1908, "Dans la bonne voie," Un Sans Patrie.
47. A.N., F7 13075. Note of November 26, 1908. Hervé's speech at Tivoli-Vaux-Hall.
48. L.G.S., #34, August 5–11, 1908. "Dans la bonne voie," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #35, August 11–17, 1908, "Lendemain de Défaite," Un Sans Patrie.
49. L.G.S., #32, August 26–September 1, 1908, "Au parterre," Flax (Victor Méric). At the Gare Montparnasse on Sunday, August 23, 1908, leftist travellers, returning home from the yearly outing to Sebastien Faure's communist-utopian school La Ruche near Rambouillet, displayed death heads of Clemenceau on the ends of sticks as the train pulled into the station. These death heads came from drawings taken from *La Guerre Sociale*.
50. L.G.S., #40, September 16–22, 1908. "La mort du dreyfusisme," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, September 10, 1908, "Le Procès Gregori," E. Poisson.
51. L.G.S., #24, May 27–June 3, 1908 and all the issues of *La Guerre Sociale* up to #33, July 29–August 4, 1908 included Émile Janvion's series of articles entitled "Du péril maçonnique dans le syndicalisme." By mid-September 1908 Janvion was secretly getting money from *L'Action Française*. Mazgaj, op.cit., 76–95.
52. L.G.S., #34, August 5–11, 1908, "Au Parterre," Flax (Victor Méric); L.G.S., #8, February 3–9, 1909. "Defendrons-nous la République?" Madeleine Pelletier.
53. L.G.S., #40, September 16–22, 1908. "La mort du dreyfusisme," Un Sans Patrie. Sternhell saw this brief campaign as proof of Hervé's anti-Semitism. This episode illustrates the danger of supplying a clever thesis with selected evidence.
54. L.G.S., #3, December 30, 1908–January 5, 1909, "Souhaits du nouvel an," G.H.; Mazgaj, op.cit., 92–95.
55. Julliard, "Théorie syndicaliste révolutionnaire et pratique gréviste," op.cit., 65; idem., "La C.G.T. devant la guerre 1900–1914," op.cit., 47–48, 51. Julliard saw the era from 1906–1909 as the era of "total antimilitarisme" in the C.G.T. when anarchists led syndicalism. After 1909 there was a progressive return to prudence and realism.
56. Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* ..., op.cit., 196.
57. Ibid., 124.
58. Mazgaj, op.cit., 82.
59. Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* ..., op.cit., 187–188.
60. L.G.S., #43, October 7–13, 1908, "Au congrès de Marseilles," Un Sans Patrie. The continued failure of Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* to speak directly about nuances among syndicalist revolutionaries may imply that syndicalist factionalism was considered to be a matter of cliques and personalities. *La Guerre Sociale* simply spoke of reformists and revolutionaries. Hervé continued to reject the general syndicalist attack on intellectuals as *déclassé* elements because he believed that such elements were useful in preparing a revolution and because he considered himself and his staff intellectuals.
61. Mazgaj, op.cit., 90; *L'Humanité*, October 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1908. Each union got one vote, but that meant that unions with the highest memberships, which were often reformist, were underrepresented.
62. Julliard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre ...," op.cit., 3; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* ..., 130–131.
63. L.G.S., #48, November 11–17, 1908, "Considérations sur le congrès de Marseilles," Émile Janvion; L.G.S., #49, November 18–24, 1908, "Considérations sur le congrès de Marseilles," Émile Janvion; *L'Humanité*, October 21, 1908. "Pour l'Avenir du Syndicalisme français," Jean Latapie; *L'Humanité*, October 25, 1908, "Sur le Congrès de Marseille," A. Luquet. Luquet disagreed with Latapie by saying that the motions of the Marseilles Congress of the

C.G.T. were not inspired by *La Guerre Sociale*. He felt that Marseilles fulfilled Amiens. Both men agreed on the need to keep the C.G.T. for workers and to exclude bourgeois and intellectuals. The presence of these two critiques of Hervéism among the syndicalist leaders may indicate that the Hervéist ascendancy over the C.G.T. was mostly illusory.

64. L.G.S., #44, October 14–20, 1908, "Le congrès de Marseilles," Louis Perceau; Mazgaj, op.cit., 90–91.
65. Julliard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre …," op.cit., 51–52; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* …, op.cit., 130–131.
66. Mazgaj, op.cit., 91–92; Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* …, op.cit., 133–140. Jacques Juillard discovered three separate revolutionary factions.
67. Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* …, op.cit., 133–140. Julliard has a good account of personality conflicts involved in C.G.T. factional disputes even though he does not stress the petty origins of syndicalist division. He also includes an enlightening account of the *Maison des Fédérations* Affair where casual financial methods and personal rivalries combined to impugn the hypersensitive Griffuelhes for impropriety. The Affair developed before and after Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, was exacerbated by it, and unfolded amidst ideological as well as personality differences accentuated by the recent bloody events. The Treasurer of the C.G.T., Albert Lévy, after an imprisonment of 18 months, accused the C.G.T. Secretary-General Griffuelhes, of financial improprieties. That led Griffuelhes eventually to resign which was soon followed by charges that Lévy had been in the pay of Briand, then Minister of Justice in the Clemenceau ministry.
68. L.G.S., #12, March 3–9, 1909, "La leçon d'une défaite," G.H.
69. Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur de grèves* …, op.cit., 140; Mazgaj, op.cit., 110–111.
70. L.G.S., #45, October 21–27, 1908, "Les unanimes," Un Sans Patrie. Harvey Goldberg described Jaurès's formula at Toulouse as "the creed of the pre-war S.F.I.O." The resolution of Toulouse pleased neither the Insurrectionals nor the *Blocards* because Jaurès hoped reformism could peacefully fulfill the revolutionary vision. Goldberg, op.cit., 403.
71. *Le Temps*, October 20, 1908; *L'Humanité*, October 17 and 18, 1908. Another tendency involved the revolutionary syndicalists surrounding Hubert Lagardelle.
72. L.G.S., #46, October 28–November 3, 1908, "Résponse à M. Viviani, Ministre," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, October 19, 1908; *L'Humanité*, October 5, 1910.
73. L.G.S., #45, October 21–27, 1908, "Les unanimes," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #50, November 25–December 2, 1908, "En sortant de prison," G.H.; Peyronnet, op.cit., 91–91.
74. L.G.S., #49, November 18–24, 1908, "La gaffe d'un renégat," Un Sans Patrie. Four days before leaving prison Hervé was notified of an order from Minister of Justice Briand threatening continued imprisonment if he refused to pay the fines he owed. Before he could leave prison, he had to pay his 3000 franc fine and legal fees, a final total of 3853.65 francs, or he would not be released. Hervé called this an unprecedented measure for press violations and political prisoners. The situation certainly could have gravely affected *La Guerre Sociale* which then had five staff members at La Santé. Apparently, the government relented because Hervé was out of prison that same week.
75. L.G.S., #48, November 11–17, 1908. "Après l'alerte," Un Sans Patrie.
76. L.G.S., #46, October 28–November 3, 1908, "Résponse à M. Viviani, Ministre," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #48. November 11–17, 1908, "Après l'alerte," Un Sans Patrie; Julliard, *Clemenceau* …, op.cit., 176–182.
77. L.G.S., #46, October 28–November 3, 1908, "Résponse à M. Viviani, Ministre," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité,* November 17, 1908, "Le Cas Hervé: Le crime de n'avoir pas l'argent," Jean Jaurès. Even before their imminent joust, Jaurès protested Hervé's treatment in *L'Humanité.* Other papers, from the moderate Left to the monarchist and clerical Right, including *L'Action, L'Intransigeant, Le Gaulois,* and *La Croix*, followed suit for their incarcerated press colleague, even if they disapproved or despised his ideas. Hervé was especially resentful about a recent article in *L'Humanité* by J. Latapie which had called the team at *La Guerre Sociale*

"intellectuals" and the "sons of rich parents." Hervé's description of his staff as "mostly poor workers" did not negate all of Latapie's evidence, however.

78. L.G.S., #46, October 28–November 3, 1908, "Résponse à M. Viviani, Ministre," Un Sans Patrie.
79. *L'Humanité*, November 19, 1908, "Hervé est sorti hier matin de prison," André Morizet.
80. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 142–143; A.N., F7 15968², "Pantheon," 25337/45.
81. L.G.S., #51, December 2–8, 1908, "Le socialisme antiparlementaire," G.H.
82. *L'Humanité*, November 26, 1908, "Le Meeting de Tivoli."
83. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, note Paris, January 8, 1909; *L'Humanité*, January 9, 1909, "Le 'Huit' sont libérés, 6000 Camarades les acclament," A.-M. Maurel, and "Le Meeting."

Chapter 9

1. Almosnino, op.cit., 87–88.
2. Ibid., 87. After his attempt to create his own revolutionary newspaper, *La Revolution*, had failed in 1909, Émile Pouget found a home at *La Guerre Sociale*. In 1910 it was Pouget who drafted a celebrated brochure which advocated systematic use of sabotage in the class struggle and he cited the increased use of sabotage then taking place. *Émile Pouget, Le sabotage*, (Paris: M. Rivière, [1911]).
3. Miquel, op.cit., 489. Since French governments and most of the established political groups questioned the necessity and advisability of the organizing state workers, whether postal workers, railway men, or teachers, strike activities by state employees were anathema. "Teachers wanted to unionize as did postal workers. The … Radicals were enraged to hear the revolutionary language coming from teachers' groups and militants in the secular schools. Clemenceau refused to allow the *Federation Nationale des syndicats d'instituteurs*, founded in 1906, to enter the *Bourses du Travail*. When a teacher lost his job, that was too much. Jaurès proclaimed the rupture between Socialists and Radicals in the Chamber of Deputies."
4. Norman Stone, op.cit., 212–213.
5. *L'Humanité*, March 13, 1909, "L'Exaspération dans les postes: Manifestation contre M. Simyan"; *L'Humanité*, March 14, 1909, "Le Régime Simyan," Raymond Figeac; *L'Humanité*, March 15, 1909, "Conflit Aggravé: M. Simyan Responsable," Louis Dubrieulh; *Le Temps*, March 14, 1909; *L'Humanité*, March 16, 1909, "C'est La Grève! M. Simyan, Allez-vous en!" Gustave Rouanet, and "Le meeting du Tivoli." Although Simyan reintegrated all the postal workers fired after an April 1906 postal strike, he soon antagonized most postal workers. His new policies were associated with the "tiercement" circular of 1907 which cut promotion by thirty percent. In the spring of 1909 two postal strikes broke out. Georges Clemenceau intervened personally to bring them to an end with considerable severity. Despite successfully ending the strikes, his ministry fell on July 20, 1909 and with it the career of Simyan. Simyan was said to have used indelicate language to the female telegraph workers. Clemenceau promised to fire Simyan, but never did it. Once Clemenceau fell, no one ever gave the controversial Simyan another portfolio.
6. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 148.
7. *L'Humanité*, March 22, 1909, "Présage de victoire," Pierre Renaudel; *L'Humanité*, March 23, 1909, "Vaincus par la Grève," Pierre Renaudel.
8. L.G.S., #14, March 17–23, 1909, "La Politique de la Cravache," G.H.
9. Peyronnet, op.cit., 105–106; *L'Humanité*, March 13 & 14, 1909.
10. *La Guerre Sociale*'s competition with the syndicalist press must have been an undercurrent in the disappearance of the ephemeral syndicalist paper *La Révolution* at the end of March 1909. In the years 1908 and 1909 Émile Pouget was trying to create a new daily paper to be

called first *Le Cri du Peuple* and then *La Révolution.* A police note dated January 11, 1909 claimed that Pouget was not particularly upset at seeing the infighting at the C.G.T. since he hoped to create a new party like the British Labour Party uniting the entire working class. In trying to put together a staff, he was rejected by Yvetot apparently due to the perceived lack of funds. Pouget also wanted Hervé to join him at some level. After much hesitation by Hervé, his worried staff at L.G.S. convinced him that Pouget's daily would draw away support from L.G.S., so Hervé declined the offer. Pouget rejected Janvion's offer since he wanted to stay clear of him. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968², 25337, extract from a police report, Note of January 11, 1909. In its March 31–April 6 issue in 1909, *La Guerre Sociale* claimed that it was saddened by the demise of *La Revolution* due to a lack of funds. Peyronnet, op.cit., 105–106; *L'Humanité*, March 13 & 14, 1909.

11. L.G.S., #15, March 24–30, 1909, "Une victoire de l'action directe," G.H.
12. L.G.S., #15, March 24–30, 1909, "Comment on saboté une ligne télégraphique."; Benoît Frachon, *Pour La CGT: Mémoires de Lutte, 1902–1939*, (Paris: Messidor-Éditions Sociales, 1981), 35–36. Frachon hawked *La Guerre Sociale* at the time of the postal strikes and the strike of the *cheminots*. He discussed the pride that he had when a couple of the acts of sabotage which he and his friends had instigated were reported. The mature Frachon doubted that such actions had helped the postal strikers. He was also involved in abstentionism in 1910.
13. L.G.S., #16, March 31–April 6, 1909, "Grèves violentes," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, March 20, 1909; *L'Humanité*, March 23, 1909; *L'Humanité*, March 24, 1909.
14. L.G.S., #17, April 7–13, 1909, "Marianne a la goutte," G.H.
15. L.G.S., #21, May 5–11, 1909, "Les deux côtés de la barricade," G.H.
16. *L'Humanité*, May 4, 1909, "Les Provocations du Gouvernement," Jean Varenne; "Un Communiqué official"; *L'Humanité*, May 5, 1909, "Orage qui couve," Jean Jaurès, and "La Grève Décidée En Principe," Jean Varenne; *L'Humanité*, May 6, 1909, "Les Postiers Chez Clemenceau," Pierre Renaudel, and "Le Gouvernement Contre Les Postiers," Jean Varenne. *L'Humanité*, May 7, 1909, "Dansez, mes amis," Jean Jaurès, "Dans le attente," Pierre Renaudel, "M. Clemenceau ne reçoit pas la Délégation des Postiers," and "Le Ministère désavoué par la Presse Radicale."; *L'Humanité*, May 8, 1909, "Le Gouvernement et les postiers," Alexandre Bracke-Desrousseaux.; *L'Humanité*, May 11, 1909, "Combat," Jean Jaurès, and "Un Rapport de Police." *L'Humanité* obtained a police report on a meeting in Saint-Étienne involving revoked P.T.T. workers.
17. L.G.S., #22, May 12–18, 1909, "Sommes-Nous Prêts?" G.H.
18. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 169–174, Plate XII; A.N., Fonds Panthéon, F7 15968², Note of May 17, 1909 from the Sous Préfet of Morbihan at Pontivy.
19. A.N., Fonds Panthéon, F7 15968², Note dated August 6, 1909 from Brest, the Commissariat Spécial.
20. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 165–166.
21. A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'"* op.cit., 46.
22. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 166. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13324.
23. Ibid., 166. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13070 and F7 13071. Certainly many more *cartons* could be cited showing this belief in a vast conspiracy centered on *La Guerre Sociale*.
24. A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'"* 45.
25. L.G.S., #21, May 5–11, 1909, "Les deux côtés de la barricade," G.H.; L.G.S., #22, May 12–18, 1909, "Sommes-nous prêts?" G.H.; L.G.S., #22 B, May 13, 1909. This issue was located at the *Musée Social*. The four other special editions were not at either the B.N. or the *Musée Social*; Peyronnet, op.cit., 108. *L'Humanité*, issues from May 2–24, 1909.
26. L.G.S., #23, May 19–25, 1909, "Le Bâtiment Donne L'Exemple," G.H.
27. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 148; *L'Humanité*, May 12, 1909, "A Jeudi," Jean Jaurès, "C'est la Grève!: La Grève Déclarée," "Le Ministre de Méline fait un Discours de Provocation," Daniel

Renoult; "Premier Meeting De Grève: Grandiose Manifestation á Hippodrome," "Fédération Nationale des P.T.T.: Grève Générale," "La Réunion de Tivoli," and "Les Radicaux Anglais et M. Clemenceau"; *L'Humanité,* May 19, 1909, "La Grève des Postiers," "Pour Les Postiers"; *L'Humanité,* May 20, 1909, "L'Unité Ouvrière," Jean Jaurès, and "La Solidarité Ouvrière." The Terrassiers de la Seine assailed all syndicalist leaders such as Niel, Eugène Guérard, etc. who could be labeled reformists. *L'Humanité,* May 21, 1909, "Au Manège Saint Paul."

28. *L'Humanité,* May 22, 1909," Les Questions demeurent," Jean Jaurès, "Les Postiers décident la Reprise du Travail: Les Organisations Confédéral en prennent acte," and "Au Tivoli Vaux-Hall."; *L'Humanité,* May 23, 1909, "Libre Carrière," Jean Jaurès, "Ça se décolle," Jean Allemane.
29. Almosnino, op.cit., 88–89.
30. A.N., F7 14829 is cited by Almosnino but dozens of other *cartons* are pertinent.
31. Almosnino, op.cit, 88; *La Guerre Sociale,* January 5, 1910, "Action Pratique," M.A.; A.N., F7 14829, etc.
32. Trempé, op.cit., 343.
33. Frachon, op.cit., 35–36, passim.
34. Almosnino, op.cit., 65.
35. L.G.S., #24, May 26–June 1, 1909, "La leçon d'un défaite," G.H.
36. L.G.S., #25, June 2–8, 1909, "La démission de Niel," René de Marmande.
37. L.G.S., #25, June 2–8, 1909, "La maladie du referendum," G.H.
38. L.G.S., #26, June 9–15, 1909, ""De la menace aux actes," G.H. Here Hervé talked about 600 postal workers who had been dismissed. The number of workers who lost their jobs was usually said to have been 800.
39. L.G.S., #27, June 16–22, 1909, "Les cheminots et les quinze-mille," G.H.; L.G.S., #28, June 23–29, 1909, "La Bonne Méthode," G.H.
40. L.G.S., #29, June 30–July 6, 1909, "Le tsar en France," G.H.
41. L.G.S., #31, July 14–20, 1909, "Les sociétés secrètes et la police," G.H.
42. Peyronnet, op.cit., 118–122.
43. Ibid., 114, 125.
44. L.G.S., #46, October 28–November 3, 1908, "Réponse à M. Viviani, Ministre," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #38, September 4–10, 1907, "Après Stuttgart," G.H. As early as 1907 Hervé's calls for an *organisation de combat* prefigured later Hervéist creations such as the S.S.R. and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*. A *Parti Révolutionnaire* would have been a logical visible creation above these clandestine or specialized formations.
45. Peyronnet, op.cit., 122–126; L.G.S., #17, April 7–13, 1909, "Une victoire des insurrectionales," Louis Perceau. The Hervéists obtained approval for both proportional representation and the maintenance of socialists on the second round of voting. Both measures aimed to curtail electoral deals with bourgeois parties. A.P.P., Ba/767. Notes on meetings. The Hervéist minority of the *Federation de la Seine* met often in 1909 at the Salle Swoboda. Its aims were to fight parliamentarianism in the heart of the S.F.I.O. as well as reformism in the C.G.T. where workers were tempted by economic ameliorations away from revolutionary ideals.
46. A.N., F7 13070. M 749. U. March 13, 1909; Peyronnet, op.cit., 132–133; L.G.S., #12, March 4–10, 1909, "Chez les socialistes peu parlementaires," Louis Perceau. Some of the Hervéist formations then coming into existence outside the S.F.I.O. contained socialist as well as non-socialist elements.
47. Ibid., P.P., Note on *Socialistes-Insurrectionnels*, March 9, 1909 and M 743. U., March 11, 1909.
48. *La Révolution*, March 10, 1909, "Le socialisme insurrectionnel"; L.S.G., #13, March 10–16, 1909, "Le socialisme insurrectionnel." This is the "Manifesto of the insurrectional minority of the *Fédération de la Seine*."
49. Peyronnet, op.cit., 131–132; L.G.S., #13, March 10–16, 1909; A.N., F7 13070, M 610. U., Note of January 12, 1909 and M 616. U., Note of January 15, 1909.
50. A.N., F7 13070, M 867.U., Note of June 8, 1909.

51. Ibid., M 610. U., Note of January 12, 1909. Many other notes in this *carton* refer to the same fears.
52. L.G.S., #18, April 14–20, 1909, "Au congrès de Saint-Etienne," G.H.; A.N., F7 13070, P.P., Note of April 2, 1909. This note discusses a pre-Congress meeting by Hervéists on April 1, 1909 at the Restaurant Coopératif, 49 rue de Bretagne; L. Gravereaux, op.cit., 107. Gravereaux stressed that an attack on parliamentarianism was Hervé's chief goal at Sainte-Étienne.
53. L.S.G., #18, April 14–20, 909, "Au congrès socialiste de Saint-Etienne-*La Guerre Sociale* sur la sellette"; A.N., F7 13966, M 811. U., Note of April 20, 1909 and M 815. U., Note of April 22, 1909. There are some references to Guesde trying to move closer to Hervé and Lagardelle's positions at Saint-Étienne in order for Guesde to increase his influence on the C.G.T. If the Ministry of the Interior reports were accurate, it was the electoral concerns of Guesde's associates that vetoed this maneuver. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 157–160. Frossard's recollections show the hilarity which Hervé's speeches evoked at Saint-Étienne, but Guesde did not seem to share the mood. After Guesde was ridiculed by Hervé, he gave Hervé an oratorical lesson which temporarily silenced the intrepid "General." A.N., F7 13070, M 837. U., Note of May 25, 1909. This note spoke of efforts by some Guesdists after the Congress to incite Hervéists as well as the moderates against Jaurès in order to seize control of *L'Humanité*. See *L'Humanité*, April 12–17, 1909. Jaurès called Insurrectional tactics childish, but he did not see any danger in keeping the Hervéists in the party. He believed that positive actions and plans not exclusions were the best means to deal with left wing or right wing deviations in the party. (There were 326 *mandats* and 66 federations.)
54. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 156–160.
55. Hervé, Aristide Jobert, and Zéphirin Rémy Camélinat were the three Hervéist members on the C.A.P. When Hervé entered prison in March 1910, his position on the C.A.P. was filled by Madeleine Pelletier.
56. L.G.S., #19, April 21–27, 1909, "Impressions de congrès," G.H.
57. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 160.
58. *L'Humanité*, April 15, 1909.
59. L.G.S., #32, July 21–27, 1909. "Radicaux et socialistes," G.H.
60. L.G.S., #32, *Édition Spéciale*, July 22, 1909; L.G.S., #33, July 28–August 3, 1909, "Le sabotage des fils est suspendu." Evidently *La Guerre Sociale* was uncertain about the number of postal workers suspended. Goldberg, op.cit., 401–403. Goldberg called Briand's "national party" "a blanket thrown across a hopelessly divided society." 403.
61. L.G.S., #33, July 28–August 3, 1909. "Azew-Briand, premier ministre," G.H.
62. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968^2, 25337, Brest, July 23, 1909.
63. Ibid., Commissariat Spécial des Chemins de fer et du Port, Brest, note of August 6, 1909.
64. Peyronnet, op.cit., 123–124.
65. A.N., F7 12723, Prefecture of Police, Note of July 29, 1909. It was also a time when *L'Action Française* was moving toward a *politique de pire* in an effort to gain support from anti-parliamentary workers and militants in an assault on the hated Republic.
66. Almosnino, op.cit., 67.
67. Ibid., 67.
68. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 128–129. For example: Paul Robin's efforts at the orphanage in Cempuis until 1894, Sebastien Faure's school La Ruche from 1905 until the war, and the Ruskin-School-Home on the East coast of England created around 1900.
69. A.N., F7 13321, Prefecture of Var, Commissariat Spécial, Note from Marseilles on October 1, 1909; Note F/3535, Paris, September 13, 1909; Note of the Prefecture of Police, Paris, September 16, 1909; Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974 [1943]), 34–35; *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1909. Jaurès connected the revolt in Barcelona to the immorality of French colonial actions in Morocco which triggered the response by the Spanish colonial interests.

70. L.G.S., #37, August 25–31, 1909, "La repression en Espagne"; L.G.S., #41, September 22–28, 1909, "L'insurrection espagnole"; A.N., F7 12723, Agent "Espagne," Note from Paris dated May 17, 1904; Brenan, op.cit., 35; V.S. Pritchett, *The Spanish Temper*, (New York: Harper Colophon 1965 [1954]), 263–264.; Jean Grave, *Le mouvement libertaire sous la 3e république (souvenirs d'un revolté)*, (Paris: Les oeuvres réprésentatives, 1930), 234–235. One account claimed that Ferrer was in France just when Barcelona erupted. In fact, French police in their monitoring of foreign anarchists and revolutionaries had reports mentioning Ferrer in Paris as early as 1904. For some writers Ferrer's personal character was hardly deserving of his apotheosis by the French Left. His current mistress, Soledad Villafranca, whom he could not marry due to Spanish laws against divorce, was the unrequited love of the 1906 failed anarchist assassin, Mateo Morral. Ferrer had nothing to do with that assassination attempt but Spanish authorities saw him as a threat due to his progressive ideas and pedagogical enterprises. For the Left, Ferrer was a useful symbol whose martyrdom validated a polarized political view. L.G.S., #27, June 20–26, 1907, "Le Procès de Madrid," K.
71. L.G.S., #34, August 4–10, 1909. "Ce que nous enseigne la révolte des catalans," *un insurrectionnel* (This may have been Hervé) and "La révolution en Espagne," Charles Malato.
72. L.G.S., #35, August 11–17, 1909, "La leçon de Barcelone," G.H.; Peyronnet, 95; *Les Hommes du Jour*. September 18, 1909 and October 1909, Spécial Edition, "Francisco Ferrer," by Victor Méric.
73. *Francisco Ferrer: Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre: Une Martyr des Prêtres*, Published by *Le Comité de Defense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole*, (Paris: Schleicher Frères, N.D. [1910]), 80 pages; Auguste Bertrand, *La Vérité sur l'Affaire Ferrer*, Publications des Temps Nouveaux #40, Published by *Le Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole*, (Paris: Au Bureau des Temps Nouveaux, 1910). Found in A.N., F7 13321.
74. Almosnino, op.cit., 67.
75. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Paris, Note of October 16, 1909. Ferrer was reported to be one of the sources to fund Pouget's *Le Cri Populaire* as well as syndicalist schools in Paris.
76. A.N., F7 12723, Agent "Espagne," May 17, 1904.
77. L.G.S., #39, September 8–14, 1909, "S'ils touchent à Ferrer!"; L.G.S., #41, "L'insurrection espagnole," September 22–28, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "Ce qu'était Ferrer," André Morizet. Morizet described Ferrer as an apolitical individual who hoped that social-political change could come through intellectual liberty. For Victor Serge, who claimed to have written the first article on Ferrer at that time even before his arrest, the Spanish educational reformer was transparently innocent and the reactions to his arrest and execution were part of a growing international consciousness. Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, translated by Peter Sedgwick, (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, Ltd., 1984), 27.
78. Almosnino, op.cit, 68–69.
79. Peyronnet, op.cit., 96. Peyronnet noted how the Ferrer campaign rekindled an anticlericalism in Hervé that had been largely absent from *La Guerre Sociale*. Hervé believed that the clerical menace had been used by the Radicals in order to avoid social reform, but he was not above using anticlericalism for his own purposes. He also knew that Christianity had a potentially revolutionary social message.
80. It did not necessarily bring wealth because special editions often led the paper into debt. Hervé's sincerity cannot be questioned but often his movement and newspaper seemed to become at least as important as the causes they championed.
81. *L'Humanité*, October 13, 1909.
82. A.N., F7 13321, Draguignan, Note of October 2, 1909. In the meeting reported here, Sebastien Faure was less than charitable to his listeners from Sillon saying that you could not be Catholic and socialist at the same time. See also A.N., F7 13321, Note #1094, October 18, 1909. The same *carton* included "Les Exécutions Sommaires en Espagne: A L'Europe Consciente," by the

C.D.S. and the *Comité de Défense des Victimes de la Répression Espagnole* and the poster "Les Curés ont menti!" by the former *Comité.*

83. A.N., F7 13321, Note M/3553, Paris, October 4, 1909, Note M/3557, October 5, 1909, *Préfecture de Police*, note from Paris on October 8, 1909; Almosnino, op.cit., 68; *L'Humanité*, September 10, 1909, "Une Manifestation à Paris" reported that there were thirty-five cars used.
84. A.N., F7 13321, Note M/1084, October 12, 1909. The potential kidnapping was probably a mere rumor.
85. *L'Humanité*, September 18, 1909, "La Police Espagnole," Mario Antonio
86. A.N., F7 13321, Note #1094, October 18, 1909; Note August 19, 1910; Note M/1042, Paris, September 8, 1909; Note M/1047, Paris, September 11, 1909.
87. Ibid., Note F/3535, Paris, September 13, 1909.
88. Ibid., Note M/3490, Paris, September 11, 1909.
89. L.G.S., #40, September 15–21, 1909, "Sus aux fusilleurs!" Alfred Naquet; *L'Humanité*, October 10, 1909, "Vent de folie," Jean Jaurès; *L'Humanité*, October 8, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 12, 1909. On October 11, 1909, the *Federation de la Seine* held a meeting at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall where 6000 people heard protest speeches against the actions of the Spanish government.
90. Almosnino, op.cit., 68.
91. A.N., F7 13321, Note of September 18, 1909; Note M/3522, Paris, September 23, 1909; Note October 1, 1909.
92. Ibid., Note M/3561, October 7, 1909; M/3563, October 8, 1909; M/3567, October 9, 1909.
93. *L'Humanité*, October 7, 1909. Hervé signed the Socialist Manifesto of solidarity which sought to arouse French workers to the plight of the 2000 Spaniards arrested and the 10,000 others in exile or flight. *L'Humanité*, October 12, 1909. Of the 2,000 arrested, only 100 had been tried by October 7.
94. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 27.
95. L.G.S., #44, October 13–19, 1909, "L'assassinat de Ferrer," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, October 13, 1909.
96. Serge, op.cit., 27.
97. L.G.S., #44, *1st Édition Spéciale*, (Wednesday October 13, 1909); *L'Humanité*, October 13, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1909; Almosnino, op.cit., 69; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 170.
98. Almosnino, op.cit., 71.
99. L.G.S., October 13, 1909, Special Edition.
100. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 174.
101. Almosnino, op.cit. 69. Hervé was not in prison as Almosnino seems to assume. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 173; *Journal Des Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer."
102. *Journal Des Débats: Politiques Et Littéraires*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer."
103. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 28.
104. *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin."
105. *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "La protestation de Paris," Jean Jaurès. The entire front page was covered with stories and reports on the events in Paris and Barcelona. *L'Humanité* reported a savage police charge already at 8:15 near the Villiers metro station and the Boulevard de Courcelles which created havoc and raised the level of anger even among the onlookers and mere sympathizers. Newspapers disagreed slightly regarding the timing of events. Accounts differed markedly on other matters undoubtedly due the nature of the events as well as the vantage point of the reporters.
106. *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin"; L.G.S., #44, 2nd *Edition Spéciale*, (Thursday, October 14, 1909), "Premier Avertissement … Avec Frais," G.H. Hervé described

the two columns as attack groups yet he argued that they only responded to police violence despite their obvious preparation and readiness to act.

107. *Journal Des Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer."
108. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 172; Lépine, *Mes Souvenirs*, (Paris: Payot, 1929); Almosnino, op.cit., 70.
109. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 28. Two anarchists were charged with attempted murder but they were eventually acquitted for lack of proof. Serge wrote about overturned omnibuses with unharnessed horses and police on cycles weaving their machines at random just before Lépine was hit.
110. *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin"; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "La protestation de Paris," Jean Jaurès; L.G.S., #44, 2nd *Edition Spéciale*, (Thursday October 14, 1909), "Premier Avertissement … Avec Frais," G.H.; Almosnino, op.cit., 70; *Journal Les Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer."
111. *Journal Les Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer." Agent Dufresne died some hours after being shot in the kidney.
112. *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin"; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "La protestation de Paris," Jean Jaurès; L.G.S., #44, 2nd *Edition Spécial*, (Thursday October 14, 1909), "Premier Avertissement … Avec Frais," G.H.; Almosnino, op.cit., 70.
113. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 28.
114. Almosnino, op.cit., 70.
115. *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "La protestation de Paris," Jean Jaurès. Agent Dufresne died some hours after being shot in the kidney.
116. *Journal des Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "L'Exécution de Ferrer."
117. L.G.S., #44, 2nd *Édition Spéciale*, (Thursday October 14, 1909), "Premier Avertissement … Avec Frais," G.H.
118. L.G.S. October 14, 1909, "La Vérité," M.A.
119. A.N., F7 12723, Paris, Note of June 8, 1910. In 1910 such bragging troubled police officials who thought that other non-anarchist and non-socialist groups would think that such actions were justifiable and even admirable. The police described the revolutionaries as doing all they could to take advantage of the turmoil. L.G.S. staffers Perceau, Almereyda, and Méric argued that the current era was increasingly parallel to the era before the French Revolution!
120. *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin;" October 14, 1909.
121. *Le Matin*, October 14, 1909, "Ferrer a été fusillé," "Sanglante manifestation à Paris."; *Le Petit Journal*, "La Manifestation: Récit d'un témoin;" October 14, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "La protestation de Paris," Jean Jaurès. "*L'Humanité* put the timing of these events at least a quarter of an hour earlier. *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909, "Lendemain de manifestation"; *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1909, "Hâtez-vous," Jean Jaurès; L.G.S., 4th Special Edition, (Saturday October 16, 1909), "La Manifestation de Dimanche," G.H. On Saturday, October 16 in trying to get 100,000 marchers for Sunday, Hervé lamented the small turnout of 20,000 Wednesday night, but he explained the numbers as due to the very late announcements by the socialist press.
122. Almosnino, op.cit., 71. That coherence of that comment depends on when the J.G.R. was created. Almereyda, Méric, and other *Jeunes Gardes* would soon fight duels with French royalists who supported the Spanish king.
123. A.P.P., Ba/1499, Police agent "Finot," note of October 18, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 14,1909; Louis Lecoin, *De prison en prison*, (Artory-Seine: Édité par l'auteur, 1947), 42–44. See also: A.P.P., Ba/1642 and A.N., F7 13321, cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 170.
124. A.N., F7 13321, Note M/1090.U, Paris, October 14, 1909. Jaurès eventually decided merely to protest Spanish actions in Morocco but other Socialist Deputies decided to go ahead and

ask for the recall of the Spanish ambassador. A.N., F7 13321, Note M/1097.U, Paris, October 19, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1909, "Hâtez-vous," Jean Jaurès.

125. *Journal Des Débats: Politiques Et Littéraire*, October 15, 1909, "Manifestations Anarchistes" and "L'Exécution de Ferrer."

126. A.P.P., Ba/1499, Police agent "Finot," note of October 18, 1909; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1909. Finot reported that the only anarchists who joined the Sunday demonstration were those of *La Guerre Sociale* and the *Comité de Défense Sociale*. The other anarchists present had come out of curiosity. Most anarchists distrusted anyone who worked with the S.F.I.O., so Hervé's cooperation with socialists was seen by many anarchists as grotesque. Anarchist individualists who could tolerate neither organization nor control found the planned peaceful demonstration of Sunday ridiculous. *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1909; L.G.S., #47, November 3–9, 1909, "Pour des Salauds," M.A. After the second Ferrer demonstration was over and done with, Almereyda responded to attacks by *L'Anarchie* regarding the motives of *La Guerre Sociale* during the Ferrer Affair.

127. L.G.S., 2nd *Édition Spéciale*, (Thursday, October 14, 1909), "Bravo Paris," "Premier Avertissement … Avec Frais," and "À la assassin," all three articles by G.H.; "La vérité," M.A. This article gives details of the October 14 demonstration. See also some details from L.G.S., #11, February 23–March 1, 1910, "Une journée d'assises"; *L'Humanité*, October 16, 1909. The right wing press wanted both *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* prosecuted for the bloody demonstration.

128. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 172; L.G.S., 3rd *Édition Spéciale*, October 15, 1909.

129. L.G.S., #44, 1st *Édition Spéciale*, (October 15, 1909), "poursuivront! Poursuivront pas!" G.H. and "*La Guerre Sociale* les emm … !"; *L'Humanité*, October 16, 1909.

130. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968², 25337, Prefecture of Police, Paris, Note of October 16, 1909.

131. Almosnino, op.cit., 71–72.

132. L.G.S., #44, 4th *Édition Spéciale*, October 16, 1909, "La manifestation de dimanche," G.H. and "Aux révolutionnaires de Paris," "Nous voulons la rue," M.A.; *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1909, "Confiance." The Ferrer Affair saw the emergence of Almereyda's organizational skills, thus rectifying a glaring weakness that he had long encountered within anarchist circles.

133. *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1909, "Confiance"; L.G.S., #44, 4th *Édition Spéciale*, (Saturday October 16, 1909), "La manifestation de dimanche," G.H.; L.G.S., #44, 5th *Édition Spéciale*, (Sunday October 17, 1909).

134. Hervé, *Mes Crimes …*, op.cit., 322; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 172–173.

135. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 28. Earlier that year Serge had helped Almereyda hide out in Brussels, where Hervé's lieutenant had ridiculed the Russian's flirtation with Tolstoyan ideals. Even though they were friends, Serge called Almereyda an opportunist whose Parisian friends had started their revolutionary program too fixated on material concerns, whereupon Almereyda called Serge an ignoramus who needed to get his head out of the clouds and back to material reality. For Almereyda it was obvious that in Paris "the revolution needs cash."

136. *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1909, "Confiance"; L.G.S., #44, 4th *Édition Spéciale*, (Saturday October 16, 1909), "La manifestation de dimanche," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 173; Almosnino, op.cit., 71.

137. Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le Monde des polices en France*, (Brussels: Complèxe, 1996), 126; Olivier Fillieule, *Stratégies de la rue: Les manifestations en France*, (Paris: PFNSP, 1997), 101, note; P. Rosanvallon, *La Démocratie inachevée: Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France*, (Paris: Gallimard-Bibliothèque des Histoires, 2000); Claude Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France, 1789–1924*, (Paris: Tel Gallimard n° 251, 2001); Cédric Quertier, "1827–1934: de « journées » « en manifs », les Français protestent dans la rue," *Tracés: Revue des Sciences Humaines*, 5/2004, 45–60.

138. L.G.S., #44, 5th *Édition Spéciale*, October 17, 1909, "Un dernier mot," G.H. There were no dates on these Special Editions so the chronology was made to fit with the events. *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1909. *L'Humanité* printed an appeal by *La Guerre Sociale* for calm, patience, and peace during the demonstration. L.G.S., 6th *Édition Spéciale*, October 18, 1909. This was mentioned in *L'Humanité*.
139. *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1909, "Merci Paris! Nous Étions Plus De Cent Mille." *L'Humanité* stressed that a majority were workers but the crowd was a mixture of classes. Still, for the socialist daily, the demonstration was essentially socialist since almost all the republican and Radical papers except *La Lanterne* advised against going or vacillated. That morning the C.G.T. organized a meeting at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall in support of Ferrer and Spanish syndicalists.
140. A.N., F7 12900. Report of October 19, 1909. Assuming that *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité's* estimates of 100,000 protesters was an exaggeration and that several police reports of only 15,000 demonstrators were standard underestimates, the Sunday demonstration must, nonetheless, have been massive. A.P.P., Ba/767. Daily Reports from 1909.
141. Serge, op.cit., 28.
142. L.G.S., #45, October 20–26, 1909, "Les points sur les i," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1909. The socialist daily mentioned 150,000 spectators along the route as well as a crowd of 100,000.
143. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 173.
144. A.N., F7 12373, Prefecture of Police, Note of June 8, 1910 on the acquittal of two anarchist revolutionaries named de la Torre and de Petit accused of violence during the initial Ferrer demonstration. The police lamented the lack of punishment and the cocky attitudes of leaders like Almereyda, Méric, and Perceau who thought that all the signs were pointing toward another 1789.
145. A.N., F7 13321, Note M. 1482.U, Paris, January 6, 1910. Soledad Villafranco visited *La Guerre Sociale* in early December 1909 and described it as a "Spanish Colony." L.G.S., December 8–14, 1909, "La campagne de Ferrer à la '*Guerre Sociale*.'"
146. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968^2, 25337, Commissariat de Auxerre, Note of October 25, 1909. His comments came at a meeting in Avallon where police reported that Hervé's appearance followed an earlier Ferrer demonstration at Auxerre.
147. L.G.S., #46, October 27–November 2, 1909, "Nicolas-le-tapeur," G.H.
148. L.G.S., #47, November 3–9, 1909, "La calotte contre l'école laique," G.H.; L.G.S., #49, November 17–23, 1909, "Éloge de la laïque," G.H.
149. L.G.S., #49, November 17–23, 1909, "Insurrectionnels et R.P.," G.H.; L.G.S., #1, December 15–21, 1909, "Leur R.P.," G.H.
150. L.G.S., #51, December 1–7, 1909, "Pour notre 1er trombone," G.H.
151. A.N., F7 12558 and F7 12559. These were daily and monthly reports of the Prefecture of Police for 1909 and 1910; Peyronnet, op.cit., 118.
152. On Wednesday, December 29, 1909, Hervé gave a major address at the Tivoli-Vaux-Hall entitled "*La Défense de al Laïque*." Many anarchists and syndicalists believed such concerns were hardly revolutionary. The Sans Patrie justified his actions by saying that public schools were the arena of critical thought which created antipatriotic, antimilitarist, internationalist, and collectivist ideas. He would consistently defend public schools until after World War I when they became the chief source of French decadence and division. His views on workers' pensions would shift by the time of the Socialist Congress of Nîmes in February 1910.
153. L.G.S., #3, December 29, 1909–January 4, 1910, "Voeux de nouvel an," G.H.
154. A.N., F7 12723, Notes of November 1, 12, 13, 1909.
155. Ibid., Prefecture of Police, Paris, Note of June 25, 1909; Prefecture of Police, Note of June 10, 1909.
156. L.G.S., #5, January 12–18, 1910, "L'exemple de l'apache," G.H.; February 2, 1910, "Ce qu'a dit Hervé," Jean Varenne;
157. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 177.

158. Almosnino, op.cit., 73.
159. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale*, July 27–August 2, 1910, "Le Triumph du Flic," "L'Assassin de Liabeuf Gracie l'Assassin de Madame Gouin," "Liabeuf-Graby," and "Aux Ordres de la Police," Un Sans Patrie.
160. Jean-Marc Berlière, *La police des moeurs sous la IIIe république*, (Paris: Seuil, 1992), 19, 7–35.
161. Lavignette, op.cit., 20, 126, 166, 277, 286 (note 144); L.G.S., June 30, 1910. On the eve of the execution the woman with whom Liabeuf was accused of procuring denied that he had ever been anything more than her lover.
162. Ibid., 279; *Le Petit Journal*, January 10, 1910.
163. *Les Amis De Gaston Couté*, "L'Affaire Liabeuf," Year 35, No. 41, 1982, 3–5. This source cites Gaston Faralicq's memoirs. Gaston Faralicq, *Trente ans dans les rues de Paris*, (Paris: E. Grevin, 1934), 182–183. See also Lavignette, op.cit., 46–47; *L'Humanité*, May 5, 1910, "Le Meurtrier Liabeuf est condamné à mort: Mais Les Ignobles 'Mœurs' Dont Il Fut La Victime?" Jules Uhry.
164. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 29; Faralicq, op.cit., 183; Lavignette, op.cit., 47–50.
165. Ibid., 29. Serge incorrectly assumed that Liabeuf had grown up on the Boulevard de Sébastopol.
166. This is a crime in which a person aids, assists, or protects someone in the solicitation for prostitution in order to make a profit.
167. Hervé later reported that Liabeuf had been accused to vice-squad agent "*La Puce*" Maugras by a jealous former lover of the prostitute Alexandrine. L.G.S., #27, June 15–21, 1910, Hervé's letter to President Fallières. It is clear that all of Hervé's accounts on Liabeuf neglected much of his criminal past. *Crapouillot*, #50, October 1960, Special Edition, "Aux XXe siècle–8 visages de l'erreur," Michel Perrin, 53–54; Almosnino, op.cit., 73.
168. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 29; Lavignette, op.cit., 64.
169. The two agents, Vors and Maugras, had testified against Liabeuf. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 176–177. Lavignette argued that Liabeuf may have been the first Parisian criminal to have crafted such nefarious protective gear, an idea he got from supposedly reading English crime novels according to several newspapers. Lavignette, op.cit., 43.
170. Lavignette, op.cit., 9, 30.
171. Ibid., 48–50. In the aftermath of the deadly episode "La Grande Marcelle" was sought by agents Maugras, Vors, and others as an accessory to the crime since she may have helped Liabeud attach his arms bands with a leather cord.
172. Ibid., 64–65.
173. *Le Petit Journal, Supplément Illustre*, #1001, January 23, 1910; *La Guillotine*, "La Veuve: Les condamnés à mort." http://guillotine.cultureforum.net/t1340-jean-jacques-liabeuf-1910; Faralicq, op.cit., 182–184; J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 74; L.G.S., #5, January 12–18, 1910, "L'exemple de l'apache," G.H.; L.G.S., #6, January 19–25, 1910, "Une infamie policière"; L.G.S., #11, February 23–March 1, 1910, "Une journée d'assises"; *Crapouillot*, #50, October 1960; Almosnino, op.cit., 72; Lavignette, op.cit., 30–34; *Le Petit Parisien: Supplement Littéraire Illustré*, #1094, January 23, 1910. If the police took out their anger on the murderer, they may have also suffered more injuries in trying to protect him from an angry crowd. All the seriously wounded including Liabeuf were taken to the Hôtel-Dieu.
174. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 176–177.
175. Lavignette, op.cit., 13, 17.
176. Ibid., 13, 17, 63–66. *La gueuse* or the slut was a right-wing sobriquet for the Republic.
177. L.G.S., #6, January 19–25, 1910, "Remerciement à la presse," G.H. See also issues #'s 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 1910; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 177.
178. Joseph Caillaux, *Mes mémoires*, (Paris: Plon, 1943), Tome 2, 83. Cited by Heuré.
179. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 176.
180. Ibid., 177.

181. L.G.S., #11, February 23–March 1, 1910. The headline read "Le Procès de la Police" and an article "Une journée d'assises" made very clear the defense plans to turn the trial into an indictment of the police. L.G.S., #33, August 14–20, 1912, "Réponse de Gustave Hervé," G.H. In August 1912 Hervé claimed that the Liabeuf Affair including his own trial had doubled the circulation of *La Guerre Sociale*.
182. Georges Clarétie, *Drames et comédies judiciares, Chroniques du Palais*, (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1910), 89–90. Cited by Heuré, 178.
183. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 176–179; Hervé, *Mes Crimes*, op.cit., 277–278.
184. Rochefort was a former Blanquist, who had been condemned twenty-two times for press crimes. Also testifying were Léon Bailby, the editor of the right wing *Intransigeant*, and Claris, the Editor-in-Chief of *Le Radical*. Another witness was a militant named Bled who would eventually be falsely? accused in 1911 by *La Guerre Sociale* for being a police informant. Jacques Bonzon was the chief attorney. Lavignette, op.cit., 16.
185. Almosnino, op.cit., 73.
186. L.G.S., #11, February 23–March 1, 1910.
187. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 179.
188. L.G.S., #11, *Numéro Spéciale*, February 23–March 1, 1910, "Réflexions d'un condamné," G.H.
189. L.G.S., #12, March 2–8, 1910, "La liberté de la presse," G.H.
190. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 179.
191. Ibid., 179. Heuré cited: A.N., F7 12723; F7 13061; F7 13070, A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968^2, 25338/45.
192. *L'Humanité*, February 25, 1910, "Après le verdict haineux," Jean Varenne; "*L'Humanité*, February 26, 1910, "Révoltant!," Jean Jaurès, "L'opinion publique se soulève," Jean Varenne, and "Pour la liberté de la presse"; *L'Humanité*, February 27, 1910, "Les voix qui s'élèvent"; *L'Humanite*, February 24, 1910, "Un Verdict Monstrueux: Hervé Condamné A Quatre Ans de Prison," Jules Uhry. A meeting organized the Saturday after the verdict by the revolutionary socialist students at the Société des Salle Savantes talked about the class verdict and the threat to freedom of opinion. The police were there in force to monitor the event and apparently sought to provoke confrontations which they managed to do.
193. A.N., F7 13331, M/4302, Note of May 26, 1910; L.G.S., #30, July 6–12, 1910, "Après l'assassinat," M.A. The Radical press and perhaps Liabeuf's own brother accused the French Left and especially *La Guerre Sociale* of causing the death of Liabeuf by mixing politics with the case.
194. L.G.S., #21, May 4–10, 1910, "Encore les apaches des moeurs," G.H.
195. L.G.S., #22, May 11–17, 1910, "Grace pour Liabeuf!" G.H.
196. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "En entrant au monastère," G.H.
197. L.G.S., #27, June 15–21, 1910, Hervé's letter to President Fallières.
198. *L'Humanité*, July 1, 1910, "On a assassiné Liabeuf," Raymond Figeac; Lavignette, op.cit., 13–14. Wiih his political agenda in potential jeopardy, Prime Minister Briand was purportedly coerced to pressure the President to apply the extreme verdict. *L'Humanité*, July 2, 1910, "Crime D'État," Daniel Renoult.
199. Almosnino, op.cit., 73–74.
200. L.G.S., #28, June 22–28, 1910, "Encore Biribi," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #29, June 29–July 5, 1910, "Légitime défense," Un Sans Patrie.
201. A.N., F7 12723, Ministry of the Interior, Note of June 18, 1910, and Note M/1903.U. on July 7, 1910.
202. Almosnino, op.cit., 74.
203. A.N., F7 13568 and F7 12723, Note, translated? by Cyrano or Ciprano in New York, July 1, 1910.
204. Almosnino, op.cit., 74–75.
205. Serge, op.cit., 29–30. Serge was there with his mistress Rirette Maitrejean, René the Angry, and old Ferral, who was fanatical despite being severely ill. Serge described a battle or series

of brawls lasting for hours in which the police forced the militants into the side streets only to see them return soon after to renew the confrontations.

206. Almosnino, op.cit., 74–75.
207. *L'Humanité*, July 2, 1910, "Victime des ignoble 'Moeurs' Liabeuf est sacrifie a la Police."
208. A.N., F7 13568 and A.N., F7 12723, Note, translated? by Cyrano or Ciprano in New York, July 1, 1910.
209. *L'Humanité*, July 2, 1910.
210. Faralicq, op.cit., 186.
211. L.G.S., #29, *Édition Spéciale*, June 29–July 5, 1910. At least two special editions probably dated June 30 and July 1 followed regular edition #29; L.G.S., July 1, 1910, "La république conservatrice," Un Sans Patrie.
212. Almosnino, op.cit., 74–75.
213. Faralicq, op.cit., 188–189.
214. *Les Amis De Gaston Couté*, "L'Affaire Liabeuf," Year 35, No. 41, 1982, 5; Faralicq, op.cit., 188. The other Anatole was Anatole France.
215. L.G.S., #29, *Édition Spéciale*, June 29–July 5, 1910; L.G.S., July 1, 1910, "La république conservatrice," Un Sans Patrie.
216. L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "Gustave Hervé aux assises," and "Hervé parle." This testimony has evidence on the events surrounding Liabeuf's execution. A.N., F7 12559. Daily Report of the Prefecture of Police. Note of July 1, 1910; A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly Report of the Prefecture of Police, June 1910, and Daily Report of July 1, 1910; Maitron, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France, 1880–1914*, op.cit., 234–235; *L'Humanité*, July 2 and July 3, 1910.
217. A.N., F7 13568 and F7 12723, Note, translated? by correspondent Cyrano or Ciprano in New York, July 1, 1910.
218. *L'Humanité*, July 2, 1910, "Des Fleurs sur la Tombe."
219. Almosnino, op.cit., 74–75.
220. A.N., BB^{18} 2427 2 (No. 128-A10); BB^{18} 2430 (No. 302-A10); BB^{18} 2443; BB^{18} 2452 (No. 128-A1910 and (No. 128-A1911). Most French Ministries as well as President Fallières believed that the best way to deal with Hervé's recurrent provocations, especially when he was in prison, was to ignore them. The Briand Ministry felt that it was customary in France for the press to attack Presidents and Ministers so such attacks generally were disregarded. Calls for violence were so common in the French press that many Ministry reports often described some truly provocative articles in *La Guerre Sociale* from 1910–1912 as "relatively moderate!" Hervé was sentenced again on November 10, 1911 to two additional years in prison. On January 12, 1912 he received a three-month sentence. Nevertheless, almost any of his articles in 1910 and 1911 could easily have been subject to legal proceedings, but they were not.
221. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale*, July 27–August 2, 1910, "Le Triumph du Flic," "L'Assassin de Liabeuf Gracie l'Assassin de Madame Gouin," "Liabeuf-Graby," and "Aux Ordres de la Police," Un Sans Patrie.
222. L.G.S., #34, August 3–9, 1910, "Remerciement à Fallières," Un Sans Patrie; Goldberg, op.cit., 449–450.
223. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, op.cit., 30–31. Serge later described the sense of futility and doom infecting the revolutionary Left in the three or four years before the war, and he claimed to have premonitions of an impending war arising out of the seething violence generated by the growing social and economic contradictions and injustices which themselves helped to generate an international scramble for spoils which was the obvious symptom of the impending cataclysm. 32–44.
224. Almosnino, op.cit., 76–77. "The desire for revolutionary action was all the greater for Almereyda as injustices were becoming all the more striking and society increasingly entered the dead end of nationalism and militarism. Also, we cannot separate this new strategy from the passion of a rebel, which still animated the anarchist and continued to affect his first steps within the revolutionary milieu." 76. "After having sounded out his associates regarding their intentions,

especially in launching inquiries at the beginning of 1910 in *La Guerre Sociale* to learn the desires of the militants regarding what their future organizations should be, Almereyda set out to work." 77.

225. L.G.S., #7, January 26 –February 1, 1910, "Impossible neutralité," G.H.
226. L.G.S., #9, 9–15 February 1910, "Le congrès de Nîmes," Louis Perceau; Gravereaux, op.cit., 107.
227. Denise Rossignol, "Le mouvement socialiste en France de 1906 à 1914," D.E.S., Paris, under the direction of Professor Labrousse, no date, 43.
228. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Note M/1550-U, Paris, February 10, 1910, and Note M. 155.U, Paris, February 11, 1910.
229. Goldberg, op.cit., 404.
230. Ibid., 404.
231. A.N., F7 13070. Many notes spoke of an attempted *rapprochement* between Guesde and Hervé in the spring of 1910. Goldberg, op.cit., 404–407; *La Guerre Sociale*, #4, January 5–11, 1910. Hervé outlined his opposition to the government's pension plan.
232. Goldberg, op.cit., 405. Goldberg believed that much of Hervé's venom arose from his envy of and a sense of inferiority with the greater man, Jaurès. Yet Goldberg admitted that Hervé had a point. Unless reforms led to socialism, little separated the Socialist domestic program from that of the Radicals.
233. L.G.S., #25, June 21–27, 1911, "Nouvelles réflexions sur les retraites," G.H. Over one year after the Nîmes Congress, Hervé claimed that he had been trying to bring the C.G.T. and S.F.I.O. closer together.
234. Peyronnet, op.cit., 137–138. Peyronnet believed that Hervé waited to promote his *Parti Révolutionnaire* until after Nîmes because until that time he had been searching for a new course, one that could include even the Guesdists. L.G.S., #10, February 16–22, 1910, "Après le congrès de Nîmes," G.H. and "Le congrès de Nîmes," G.H. Hervé had much sympathy for at least one Guesdist, Paul Lafargue, the son-in-law of Marx. It was Lafargue who urged the vacillating Guesde to reject the pension proposal. Goldberg, op.cit., 404. At Nîmes, Lafargue invited Hervé to lunch with the Guesdist delegation which generally ate together. As he ate, Hervé found himself sitting next to Délory, who had been trying to exclude him for years. Guesde himself, being ill, attended neither the luncheon nor the Congress.
235. Goldberg, op.cit., 406.
236. Ibid., 407.
237. Frachon, op.cit., 32.
238. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337. In 1910, while he was in prison, Hervé received a letter from a worker in Yonne who said that his stance on *retraites ouvrières* was out of touch with the realities of ordinary people. The writer wondered whether prison was seriously affecting the generally stellar insurrectional leader.
239. Goldberg, op.cit., 405; *Le Congrès national de Parti Socialiste, Section française de l'internationale ouvrière, tenu à Nîmes les 6, 7, 8, et 9 février 1910*, Compte rendu sténographique (Paris, 1910), 141, 132.
240. L.G.S. #10, February 16–22, 1910, "Après le congrès de Nîmes," G.H. and "Le congrès de Nîmes," G.H.
241. L.G.S., #10, 16–22 February 1910, "Après le congrès de Nîmes," G.H.
242. A.N., F7 12723, Prefecture of Police, Paris, Note on June 10, 1910.
243. L.G.S., #32, July 20–26, 1910, "Le congrès socialiste," Louis Perceau; Drachkovitch, *Les Socialismes française et allemand*, op.cit., 98.
244. L.G.S., #38, August 31–September 6, 1910, "Le congrès de Copenhague," Un Sans Patrie.
245. Joll, op.cit., 140–2.
246. Ibid., 142.
247. Ibid., 140–1. According to Harvey Goldberg the Copenhagen Congress was no different than the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 or the Basle Congress of 1912 because "the leaders of the

Second International hid their doctrinal doubts and their tactical weaknesses behind a cloud of good intentions." Goldberg, op.cit., 434.

248. Ibid., 140–1; L.G.S., #39, September 7–13, 1910, "Les socialistes allemands au pied du mur," Un Sans Patrie.
249. L.G.S., #41, September 21–27, 1910, "Chez les socialistes allemands," Un Sans Patrie.
250. L.G.S., 5–11 October 1910, "Bravo les berlinois," Un Sans Patrie.

Chapter 10

1. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 161–162.
2. Ibid., 167.
3. Almosnino, op.cit., 79.
4. Ibid., 78–79; *La Guerre Sociale*, #24, May 25–31, 1910, "A propos du Parti Révolutionnaire," M.A.
5. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 161–162.
6. Ibid., 161–167.
7. A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'*" 4.
8. Ibid., 37–40.
9. La Ruche existed from 1905 until 1909.
10. A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'*" 37–41.
11. Jean-Jacques Becker, *Le Carnet B—Les pouvoirs publics et l'antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914*, (Paris: Klincksieck, 1973), 62, note 55. Becker cited a program written by the group on April 16, 1911 which mentioned four general goals: (1) The immediate and complete destruction of the Eastern Railway Line infrastructure by dynamite, (2) The sabotage of other lines where this was possible, (3) The kidnapping of government and pólice officials, and (4) Knocking out the radio signals coming via the Eiffel Tower. The problem with such evidence is that it seems pretty clear that Hervé had long since backed off on the extreme tactics mentioned in the April 1911 program.
12. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 162.
13. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Extract from a Prefecture of Police Report, February 27, 1909. In early February 1909 Hervé told militants that revolution could only succeed with the army on its side. "To create the dreamed of revolution, it was necessary to have the army with us, not against us." A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Trelazé, Note of February 5, 1909.
14. *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 163. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13568; A.N., F7 13070; A.N., F7 13071.
15. Ibid., 163.
16. L.G.S., #10, February 16–22, 1909, "Après le Congrès de Nîmes," G.H.; *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 161–162. In fact, this editorial already called for a *Parti Révolutionnaire* made up of *communist libertaires* who admit the need for a minimum of organization, insurrectional socialists, and revolutionary syndicalists.
17. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "En avant pour le Parti Révolutionnaire," G.H.
18. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 162–163.
19. A.N., F7 13324, P.P. Note, Paris, March 9, 1909.
20. *L'Humanité*, March 18, 1910, "Attitude impossible," Bracke.
21. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 162–163.
22. A.P.P., BA/1499. Police agent "Finot." Note of February 15, 1910. Agent "Finot" realized that a *Parti Révolutionnaire* had no chance of success.
23. Almosnino, op.cit., 81.

24. Ibid., 80.
25. A.N., F7 13071, M/938. U. Note of July 2, 1909; Peyronnet, op.cit., 135–136.
26. L.G.S., #28, June 23–29, 1909. "La bonne méthode," G.H. Hervé explained his own increased attacks on *L'Humanité* as due to months of that paper's attacks against those who extol violence and direct action because such methods hurt electoral alliances with Radicals.
27. Almosnino, op.cit., 78; L.G.S., May 25, 1910, "A propos du Parti Révolutionnaire," M.A.
28. Peyronnet, op.cit., 132–136; A.N., F7 13326, Note of March 25, 1912. "Les associations de malfaiteurs"; A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," op.cit., 19; A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs.'*" Many general Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice reports seemed to consider the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* a very dangerous conspiratorial group. Yet even the general reports sometimes admitted it lacked strength, numbers, and leadership. Certainly individual or daily police accounts were puzzled or equivocal about this new creation. It was said to have been made up of the former sections of the A.I.A. which may not yet have disintegrated. Reports of A.I.A. meetings or parallel A.I.A.–*Fédération Révolutionnaire* organizations are found as late as January 1910. The *Fédération Révolutionnaire* was described as having at most five hundred members and not being taken seriously by either the S.F.I.O. or the C.G.T. yet having behind it the "Hervé band" at *La Guerre Sociale*. A.N., F7 13324, P.P., April 17, 1909; P.P., April 20, 1909; P.P., June 15, 1909; P.P., November 24, 1909. Peyronnet, op.cit., 135–136. Peyronnet claimed that a letter to *La Guerre Sociale* by Vaillant in the summer of 1909 cautioning against further divisions had a crucial effect on Hervé.
29. L.G.S., #17, April 7–13, 1909. This issue used the date of April 4, 1909 as the birth of the *Fédération Révolutionnaire*, while some later police sources used a date of January 31, 1909. Miller uses the year 1908. In truth, the confusion probably is indicative of the very flimsy nature of the organization. L.G.S., #26, June 9–15, 1909, "La 'guerre sociale' en province," Congress of the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* of Valenciennes; A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France …, op.cit.; A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'*" op.cit.; Miller, op.cit., 70.
30. Almosnino, op.cit., 78–79., op.cit.
31. Ibid., 79. The Hervéists were closer to the anarchists than they were to mainstream socialists, and, like the anarchists, they tended to favor direct action. They spoke about revolution and had little faith in bourgeois institutions. For Almosnino, there was a clear radicalization in Hervéist words and deeds by late 1909. "Citizen Browning" and "Mam'zelle Cisaille" had become watchwords at *La Guerre Sociale* along with violent action by active minorities and sabotage.
32. A.N., F7 13324, *Préfecture de Police*, "L'association internationale antimilitariste," February 3, 1909; *L'Eclair*, January 4, 1911, "Enquête sur l'antimilitarisme," Georges Bonnamour. In the minds of the police and much of the French press, the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* and the *Parti Révolutionnaire* were often confused with Hervé's much publicized *organisation de combat*. On February 3, 1909 the police reported that the A.I.A. had given way to the *Fédération Internationale Révolutionnaire*. This group was thought to have been made up of two levels of organization. One level included a national committee, representing Parisian and provincial groups, an executive committee, and an international organization, which was planning to hold a congress in the near future. The police called this level a facade because another more ominous level of organization existed with groups for propaganda, revolutionary action, and a revolutionary secret police. Despite the potentially sinister nature of this hidden level, the Parisian police agents were not overly concerned because the members of this organization had not yet decided to commit illegal acts. Apparently, the same leaders formally created the *Fédération Révolutionnaire* only on April 4, 1909. A.N., F7 13324, *Préfecture de Police*, two notes dated January 6, 1909 and M 2594, February 6, 1909. The leaders of this reconstitution of the A.I.A. were Violette, Sarthez, Lutier, and Lucien Belin. The police described them as

not serious, neurotic, and concerned with bomb-making. However, these men seem to have had easy access to Hervé in late 1908 and early 1909. Peyronnet, op.cit., 135.

33. A.N., F7 13324. This *carton* covers the A.I.A. and its reconstitutions culminating in the *Fédération Révolutionnaire.*
34. L.G.S., #34, August 4 –10, 1909, "Leur allié à Cherbourg," G.H.
35. A.N., F7 13324, Note from October 1910, "Parti Révolutionnaire"; Almosnino, op.cit., 81–82.
36. Peyronnet, op.cit., 135–136. Peyronnet claimed that a letter to *La Guerre Sociale* by Vaillant in the summer of 1909 cautioning against further divisions had a crucial effect on Hervé.
37. A.N., F7 13324, "Société secrète révolutionnaire," 1910. The writer of the report was uncertain about the validity of his specific evidence.
38. A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'*" op.cit., 37–38.
39. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 165.
40. L.G.S., #33, August 14–20, 1912, "Réponse de Gustave Hervé," G.H. In 1912 Hervé claimed the *organisation de combat* was created in 1909 and 1910 during the P.T.T. and railway strikes. Hervé's own account is itself so vague that it fails to solve the problem.
41. A.N., F7 13568, "*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs'*" op.cit.; A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," op.cit. There is a similar report dated November 1, 1912 in the same *carton*. This *carton* also contains a note dated March 25, 1912, entitiled "Les Associations de Malfaiteurs"; A.N., F7 13323 II, "Les bourses du travail et l'antimilitarisme," situation on October 10, 1908. This report has a similar method of analyzing Hervé, the A.I.A., *La Guerre Sociale*, and the C.G.T. but at an earlier date. A.N., BB^{18} 2443, "La lutte contre le sabotage." This is an 18 page Ministry of Justice report written after June 1911. There are several discrepancies or anomalies to be found in the various files of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the Paris Prefecture of Police. There were separate police organizations as well as differing mentalities within the French administration and certainly a clear rivalry between the *Sûreté Générale* of the Ministry of the Interior and the Paris Prefecture of Police commented on above. The Ministries of the Interior and Justice may have either created or exaggerated conspiracies and subversive threats in the interest of judicial prosecutions. Many permanent bureaucrats within these ministries were at odds with "lenient" political leaders and judicial officials. Perhaps the most important discrepancy concerns the variations between daily or individual reports and large general police reports. As a rule, the closer a report was to the events reported, the more chaos and disorder were seen. The more general reports, which were compiled from daily and individual agent and informer reports, were, thus, further removed from the events themselves and described greater pattern, order, clarity, and evidence of Hervéist conspiracy.
42. Almosnino, op.cit., 79; Jourdain, *Sans Remords Ni Rancune*, op.cit., 15. Commenting on the abstentionism of the anarchists, Jourdain called it one of their sacred precepts on which no compromise was to be tolerated by the "pure."
43. If he had tried to form an alliance with the Guesdists at Nîmes, such a failure could have affected his new actions.
44. L.G.S., #4, January 5–11, 1910, "Action pratique," M.A.; L.G.S., #5, January 12–18, 1910, "L'œuvre urgente à réaliser," Miguel Almereyda.
45. L.G.S., #6, January 19–25, 1910, "Un parti révolutionnaire," M.A.
46. L.G.S., #12, March 2–8, 1910, "Merci!"; Peyronnet, op.cit., 130–142. Many of these dissident groups may have been sincere Hervéists. Others undoubtedly were seeking financial support from *La Guerre Sociale.*
47. A.N., F7 13070, P.P., Note of January 19, 1910; M 1617. U., Note of March 10, 1910, M 1602, and Note of March 5, 1910; A.P.P., Ba/1499, Police agent "Finot," Note of February 15, 1910.

48. A.N., F7 12559, P.P., Note of January 15, 1910; A.N., F7 13070, M 1513. U., Note of January 21, 1910 and M 1638. U., Note of March 17, 1910. Madeleine Pelletier and Roger Sadrin wanted to leave the S.F.I.O. Perceau vacillated. Méric was reluctant to leave the S.F.I.O. He and Goldsky wanted to wait for any general decision until after the Nîmes Congress. L.G.S., #7, January 26–February 1, 1910, "L'opinion des unifiés," Louis Perceau; L.G.S., #8, February 2–8, 1910, "Un parti révolutionnaire," Verdier; L.G.S., #9, February 9–15, 1910, "Un parti révolutionnaire?" Anton Jobert.
49. A.N., "Fonds Pantheon," F7 15968^2, 25337, *Préfecture de Police*, Note of March 5, 1910. Dossier Sébastien Faure. The police were dubious about the stated attendance.
50. A.N., F7 13070. M 1568. U. Note of February 16, 1910.
51. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "Bravo les pruscos," G.H. In the same issue Hervé praised a massive S.P.D. street demonstration in favor of universal suffrage in Prussia. This praise was a condescending "pat on the back" to the Germans since it was based on Hervé's typical ethnic explanations. Hervé called S.P.D. actions a virtual revolution because "the docility of Prussian crowds when they faced the representatives … of authority … had made them the laughingstock not only of the Latins and Slavs, with their combative temperaments, but even of the Anglo-Saxons, known as a disciplined race."
52. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "En avant pour le parti révolutionnaire," G.H.
53. Ibid.; Peyronnet, op.cit., 136–140.
54. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "En avant pour le parti révolutionnaire," G.H.; L.G.S., #10, February 16–22, 1910, "Un parti révolutionnaire?" Sebastien Faure.
55. Ibid.
56. Jobert eventually left the S.F.I.O. along with the Insurrectionals of the 13th *arrondissement*, but this was not a coherent group. Many socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists of the area remained opposed. A few anarchists in the Somme, the anarchist paper *Germinal* of Amiens, and Sébastien Faure were virtually the sole anarchists to support the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. Peyronnet, op.cit., 140–2.
57. L.G.S., #15, March 22–29, 1910, "Où en est le P.R.," G.H. Hervé must have sensed the futility of his appeals when he implied that his expulsion from the S.F.I.O. might be the sole means to get the Yonne Federation to join the new formation.
58. A.N., F7 13071, note of March 8, 1910.
59. *La Guerre Sociale*, #15, April 10–16, 1912, "Manuels et intellectuels," Émile Pouget; *La Guerre Sociale*, #7, February 14–20, 1912; *La Guerre Sociale*, #16, April 17–23, 1912. "On ne vit pas que de pain."
60. Christophe Prochasson, *Les Intellectuels, Le Socialisme, Et La Guerre, 1900–1938*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1993), 37, 43. For socialist intellectuals the failure of the *universités populaires* with their appeal to ordinary workers was at least as serious as the political reconversions of former Dreyfusards as they attained power and influence during the Radical Republic.
61. A.N., F7 12723, Note M/1638.U., March 17, 1910; A.N., F7 13321, Insurrectionals, Note of March 17, 1910.
62. L.G.S., #16, March 30–April 5, 1910, "Le parti révolutionnaire." Émile Tissier. Hervé continued to defend the *Parti Révolutionnaire* against anarchist attacks. L.G.S., #19, April 20–26, 1910, "A propos du P.R." Response to Jean Grave by G.H.
63. That meant either a torn ballot or writing the name of an unregistered candidate as a protest vote.
64. Almosnino, op.cit., 82–83.
65. L.G.S., #12, March 2–8, 1910, "Comité révolutionnaire antiparlementaire"; L.G.S., #14, March 16–22, 1910, "Ne votons plus," Jules Grandjouan; A.N., F7 13568, P.P., February 22, 1910.
66. Almosnino, op.cit., 83–84.
67. Méric, 2nd séries, op.cit., …, 1931, op.cit., 190–1.
68. L.G.S., #6, January 19–25, 1910, "L'attitude des insurrectionnels," Dr. Madeleine Pelletier; L.G.S., #7, January 26–February 1, 1910, "L'opinion des libertaires," M.A. and Jules Grand-

jouan; L.G.S., #8, February 2–8, 1910, "L'opinion des libertaires," M.A. and Jules Grandjouan; A.P.P., Ba/1499, Note of January 27, 1910. This report stated that anarchists at *Le Libertaire* and *Les Temps Nouveaux* were tired of competition from *La Guerre Sociale*, and they wanted an anti-electoral campaign of their own. This seems difficult to accept because the leadership of the C.R.A. included not only Hervéists Grandjouan, Almereyda, and Silvaire, but also Louis Matha, the administrator of *Le Libertaire*.

69. Almosnino, op.cit., 82.
70. L.G.S., April 20, 1910, "Notes d'un parlementaire."
71. L.G.S., #12, March 2–8, 1910, "Comité révolutionnaire antiparlementaire"; L.G.S., #14, March 16–22, 1910, "Ne votons plus," Jules Grandjouan; A.N., F7 13568, P.P., February 22, 1910.
72. Almosnino, op.cit., 83; A.N., F7 13568, Prefecture of Police, February 22, 1910.
73. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "Comité révolutionnaire antiparlementaire."
74. L.G.S., #14, March 16–22, 1910, "Ne votons plus!" Jules Grandjouan.
75. Almosnino, op.cit., 83.
76. L.G.S., #12, March 2–8, 1910, "Comité révolutionnaire antiparlementaire"; L.G.S., #14, March 16–22, 1910, "Ne votons plus," Jules Grandjouan; AN, F7 13568, P.P., February 22, 1910. Initial donations came from such diverse sources as Jean Grave, Pierre Monatte, and Charles-Albert.
77. Ibid.; A.N., F7 13568, Prefecture of Police, February 22, 1910. The latter police report described Meo, the nickname for Émile Tissier, as an abstentionist candidate at Clignancourt. Almosnino, op.cit., 83–84.
78. Almosnino, op.cit., 85–86; L.G.S., #19, April 20–26, 1910, "Notes d'un antiparlementaire," M.A.
79. Agents of *La Guerre Sociale* launched a raid on the offices of *L'Humanité* after the socialist daily on March 20 and 22 had accused *La Guerre Sociale* of working with the royalists in an effort to prevent the election of a socialist candidate. The refusal of *L'Humanité* to print a "courteous response" by the Hervéists was the proximate justification for the raid. Almereyda was compelled to apologize because the raid accidentally occurred when the staff of *L'Humanité* was absent, thereby violating some sort of unwritten "rules of engagement" or revolutionary *machismo*. Thus, this Hervéist vandalism had appeared to be both cowardly and childish. L.G.S., #20, April 27–May 3, 1910, "Un canard," M.A.
80. L.G.S., #19, April 20–26, 1910, "Notes d'un antiparlementaire," M.A.
81. L.G.S., #19, *Édition Spéciale*, April 20–26, 1910, "Le dégout universel," G.H.
82. L.G.S., #19, *Édition Spéciale*, April 20–26, 1910, "Électeur socialiste, mon frère ...," M.A.
83. Almosnino, op.cit., 86.
84. L.G.S., #20, April 27–May 3, 1910, "La véritable vainqueur," G.H.
85. L.G.S., #20, April 27–May 3, 1910, "A quand la revanche?" G.H.; L.G.S., #21, May 4–10, 1910, "Après la défaite," G.H.
86. L.G.S., #20, April 27–May 3, 1910, "Notes d'un antiparlementaire," M.A. and "Contre l'abstentionnisme," G.H.
87. L.G.S., #22, May 11–17, 1910, "Le succès socialiste," G.H.
88. L.G.S., #22, May 11–17, 1910, "Réponse à Gustave Hervé," M.A.
89. L.G.S., #23, May 18–24, 1910, "Le linge sale électorale," G.H.
90. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "En entrant au monastère," G.H.
91. L.G.S., #21, May 4–10, 1910, "Après la défaite," G.H.
92. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "Tous au mur!" Un Sans Patrie.
93. L.G.S., June 1–7, 1910, "Une bonne journée," Un Sans Patrie.
94. L.G.S., #28, June 22–28, 1910, "Encore Biribi," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #30, July 6–12, 1910. "Le procès de Biribi," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., *Numéro Spécial*, July 6–12, 1910, "A Biribi, c'est en Afrique," Un Sans Patrie.

95. Heuré and Peyronnet were incorrect about Hervé ending all talk of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* once the elections were over. The rhetoric continued intermittently until 1912.
96. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "En entrant au monastère," G.H.
97. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 164.
98. Peyronnet, op.cit., 142–3; A.P.P., Ba/1499, Police agent "Finot," Note of March 11, 1911. "Finot" spoke of Hervé's continued concern for a *Parti Révolutionnaire*. The reasons the *Parti* failed had not changed after more than one year of effort. Goldberg, op.cit., 409. After the 1910 elections Hervé had evidence that a *Parti Révolutionnaire* was an impossible venture given the divisions among the French revolutionary Left. According to Peyronnet, Hervéists hoped that *La Guerre Sociale* could evolve from a newspaper of systematic opposition to the newspaper of the *Parti Révolutionnaire*. For a paper that hoped to become the voice of the C.G.T., the idea of becoming the newspaper of the *Parti Révolutionnaire* was a much more modest aspiration. The failure of this venture must have been frustrating for Hervé and his staff, but the failure of *La Guerre Sociale* to become the voice of a *Parti Révolutionnaire* was hardly the finish of Hervéism as Peyronnet asserted. In Peyronnet's account the railway strike of October 1910 was simply the "swan song" of *La Guerre Sociale*. By Hervé's account it was the railway strike which led to disillusionment with Hervéist tactics and to a new perception of the problems of creating a revolution. In fact, the peak of Hervéist activism lay in the future. If Hervé's *rectification* began in earnest in late 1910 after the failure of the railroad strike, perhaps it is safe to assume that glimpses of it could be seen in the reactions to the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and perhaps the abstentionist campaign as well in the spring of 1910. It is probably inaccurate to single out any one failure as pivotal. It is significant that Hervé's new tactics in late 1910 and early 1911 were in some ways his most extreme expressions. Only their rejection would force Hervé in an opposite direction. If the history of Hervéism is quixotic at best, that is because his goals were anachronistic, thus impossible to achieve.
99. Victor Serge, *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire, 1901–1941*, op.cit., 37.
100. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 163–164.
101. A.N., F7 13568,"*Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs.'*"
102. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 164.
103. Ibid., 165.
104. A.N., F7 13568.
105. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 166.
106. L.G.S., #44F, Monday, October 17, 1910, "La grrrand complot," Un Sans Patrie.
107. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 166.
108. L.G.S., #42, Septembre 28–October 4, 1910, "Le départ des bleus," Un Sans Patrie.
109. A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police, September 1910.
110. L.G.S., #43, *Edition Spéciale*, October 5–11, 1910, "A qui le tour?" Un Sans Patrie.
111. Georges Yvetot, who would be one of the first critics of Hervé's "new course," had himself once told soldiers to become officers in order to be able to create an insurrection or a revolution.
112. Peyronnet, op.cit., 114–126.
113. The origins of Bolshevism in Russia present an interesting comparison. Lenin adapted to serious opposition within the Russian Left, but his ideas fit political, social, and economic realities in Russia. Hervéism was maladaptive in France because there "some things could be done" to reform existing conditions. Although the *Parti Révolutionnaire* and the tenets of Hervéism shared some traits with Lenin's Russian version of neo-Blanquism, Hervé's insurrectional version has generally been described as a rather naïve and romantic response to France's far different conditions. Hervé's personality and the movement he created were a contrast rather than a parallel to Lenin's severe realism. However, Lenin and Hervé each looked to intellectuals to play a central role. Both men sought to unite workers, peasants, and lower middle class elements. The two men also shared a similar equivocal view of the "masses." Hervé's *Parti*

Révolutionnaire was an attempt to go beyond the reformism of the S.F.I.O. and the *ouvrièrisme* of the C.G.T. There was at least a superficial similarity to Lenin's revolutionary vanguard which rejected reformist "economism" as well as dogmatic Marxist trends to determinism. Since Czarist Russia did not allow reformism a chance to succeed, Lenin's conspiratorial activism was a realistic solution in a consistently repressive society. Hervéism existed in a society where social, economic, and political conditions made a conspiratorial method an unrealistic approach. Hervéism was romantic and utopian, in part, because it existed in France not Russia; Lenin did not have the luxury of employing his ideas on a revolutionary vanguard to sell newspapers. Since most French leftists were in fact already accommodating to realities, they had a stake in the existing order. For most avowed French revolutionaries, like Hervé, their call to revolution was or became largely rhetorical. Lenin, though flexible and calculating, proved to be far more consistent than Hervé. Leninism eventually proved quite adaptable for service in the defense of *la patrie russe*.

114. Almosnino, op.cit., 80–81.
115. Ibid., 80–81. Almosnino reported that the F.C.R. was directed by Lucien Belin until World War I and only numbered anarchist collectivists among its members. By then, the F.C.R. was far removed from the original objectives of the A.I.A. founders.
116. A.N., F7 13568, "Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—*'Association de Malfaiteurs,'*" 9–10, 6–14.
117. A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," op.cit., 19–23 and Note of March 25, 1912. "Les associations de malfaiteurs."
118. Almosnino, op.cit., 80–81.
119. During the municipal elections of May 1912 *La Guerre Sociale* would include a manifesto by a group calling itself the *Comité Antiparlementaire Révolutionnaire*, but by then the newspaper's entire staff was fully anti-abstentionist. L.G.S., #19, May 8–14, 1912, "A propos des elections municipals," Unsigned.

Chapter 11

1. See Maurice Agulhon, "Working class and sociability in France before 1848," translated by Suzanne Jones, in Pat Thane, Geoffrey Crossick and Roderick Floud (eds.), *The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 37–66.
2. Ibid., 38–39, 59.
3. H.S. Jones, *The French State in Question: Public Law and Political Argument in the Third Republic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2–5.
4. Christian Chevandier, *Cheminots en grève ou la construction d'une identité 1848–2001*, (Paris: Maison Neuve et Larose, 2002), 47.
5. Ibid., 48–53. Railways would later be a key instrument to spread the lessons of Hervéism.
6. Jones, op.cit., 2–5. For Jones, "The problem of *syndicats de fonctionnaires* is best seen not as an aspect of labour history but as an aspect of administrative history and the history of conceptions of the state." In this view the political culture of France focuses on the state as a source of meaning, identity, and unity, while in the Anglo-American experience, civil society provides such keys, and the state is viewed pragmatically and instrumentally. Because French public institutions are agents of unity, they must embody a distinct logic which differentiates them from the institutions of civil society. Jones contrasts the French/Continental state as a corporation with rights and duties towards its subjects with the Anglo-American experience of "stateless societies" and government as a trust with a reluctance to use the word state. Jones, 6–9.
7. F.C. Watts, "The French Strike. Impressions of a man on the spot (1910)" *Socialist Standard*, November 1910.
8. Elie Fruit, *Les Syndicats dans le Chemins de Fer en France (1890–1910)*, (Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1976), 18; François Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910: Une tentative

d'approche," 201–219, In *Conjoncture économique, structures sociales: Hommage à Ernest Labrousse.* (Paris: Mouton, 1975). The S.N.C.F. was the *Société nationale des chemins de fer français* or the French National Railway Company).

9. Fruit, op.cit., 22.
10. Ibid., 23–24. Though private companies certainly profited and more than held their own for decades to come, the repurchase of the network of the Ouest passed the Senate in 1908. "The intervention of the state was not limited to the judicial and financial sectors alone. It was also operative in the technical domain." State employees of the *Ponts et Chaussées et des Mines* formed the upper echelons of the companies' personnel. State engineers monitored railway operations, the surveillance of rates, the state of the tracks, the makeup and conditions of the train circulation, and the financial management. The Consultative Committee for the Railway, created in 1878 and composed of a dozen members chosen from among high state officials, gave advice on actions of the concession, cargo rates, train movement, and rate equivalence. Reasons of safety rather than justice led to workload restrictions. Motivated by police concerns, a decree of March 27, 1852 put railway personnel under the surveillance of the administration. Fruit, op.cit., 28–29.
11. Ibid., 133.
12. Ibid., 141.
13. Ibid., 29–44.
14. Ibid., 48–49.
15. Norman Stone, op.cit., 212.
16. Chevandier, op.cit., 54. However, perhaps due to education opportunities, railway work proved to be a privileged position for social advancement over the course of several generations.
17. Ibid., 64–65.
18. Watts, op.cit.; Almosnino, op.cit., 89. See also Chevandier, op.cit.
19. Georges Ribeill, "La police et les syndicats cheminots (1890–1914)," *Société d'Histoire de la Révolution de 1848 et des Révolutions du xix[e] siècle*, In Philippe Vigier, Ed. *Maintien de l'Ordre et Polices en France et en Europe au xixe Siècle*, (Paris: Créaphis, 1987), 392, 383–395.
20. Ibid., 392, 394, 383–395; *idem, Le personnel des Compagnies de chemins de fer, matériau pour une contribution à la sociologie historique des professions*, 3 Volumes, (Paris: Developpement et aménagement, 1980); Robert Brécy, *La grève générale en France*, (Paris: EDI, 1969), 67–70; Maurice Dommanget, *La Chevalerie du travail française*, (Lausanne: Rencontre, 1967), 100–101; Jean Gacon (dir.), *Bataille du rail*, (Paris: Messidor, 1986).
21. "Like the majority of the Radical elected officials whom he joined, Clemenceau considered society to be threatened by the collectivist danger and that the exercise of democracy did not extend to the liberty of allowing the opposition to have its ideas triumph. Since one could not touch the political system itself, one acted behind the scenes, in striking forcefully those whom one hoped to discourage or intimidate. Suddenly, potential allies were yesterday's enemies, and contemptible monopolies and inhumane capitalists found themselves adorned with virtues that were formerly ignored." Mollier and George, op.cit., 386.
22. Ibid., 386. "After 1900, the [railway union] members reconstituted themselves, and in 1909 included 17.1% of the railway personnel; some 56,000 railway employees belonged to the C.G.T. … Once again [in 1910], the police tactic was going to be to have a strike voted on, which would help the companies' arguments on dismissing the bulk of leaders … The conscription of railway workers would permit the intervention of the authorities, and, in 1910, for 43,000 strikers, 2421 would be dismissed, provoking a new hemorrhaging of union members, 14,000 in 1911 … In the two cases, in 1898 and 1910, with different but complementary tactics, … [the state] became an actor in the social movement, not in the interest of the workers but in the service of the companies." 386. The authors point out that Jean-Paul Brunet criticized the analysis of Ribeill on the role of the police, but Brunet gave no real documentation in dismissing the notion of an active role by police in the 19th and even more so the 20th centuries. See the note #74 on page 789 in Mollier and George.

23. Chevandier, op.cit., 58–62.
24. Miquel, op.cit., 489–490.
25. Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Recollections of the Third Republic*, Vol. I, Translated by George Marion, (New York: Speller & Sons, 1957), 177–178.
26. François Caron, *Histoire De France, Vol. 5, La France des patriotes de 1851 à 1918*, under the direction of Jean Favier, (Paris: Fayard, 1985), 524.
27. François Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910: Une tentative d'approche," 201–219, In *Conjoncture économique, structures sociales: Hommage à Ernest Labrousse*, (Paris: Mouton, [1974] 1975), "With regard to demands, at the national level, the union obtained, above all, a 1909 vote by the Senate on a law over retirement, which the second chamber had dragged its feet on for ten years. Nevertheless, it refused to make it retroactive. This stance was especially unpopular with the engine drivers of the Northern line, almost all being affiliated to the 1892 pension fund, whose system was very disadvantageous in terms of the [new pension] law. At the level of the [Northern] network, the syndicalists managed to impose a veritable dialogue between the [company] leaders and themselves. Nevertheless its efficacy was quite variable from one region to another, one service to another." 202–203. Historian Elie Fruit argued that Éugène Guérard had begun to modify his positions in a more realistic and constructive fashion beginning in 1902 at Montpellier. As time passed, the young Turks among the railway leadership saw Guérard as a reformist who was part of the old guard, and they spoke of his recantations. Guérard still thought of himself as a revolutionary, but he believed that success could only come from organizational strength, preparation, and democratic means not through active, aggressive, and unrealistic minorities. Fruit, 71–73, 85–100; 180–187; A.N. F7 13933, "Confidential information on the general strike," cited by Fruit. 98. After 1901 Guérard increasingly opposed the violent methods being proposed by syndicalist revolutionaries, rejecting the antipatriotic ideas proposed at Amiens in 1906 and Merrheim's proposal of a revolutionary general strike in case of war at Marseilles in 1908. Chevandier, op.cit., 64–65.
28. Chevandier, op.cit., 64–67.
29. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 203. "The [Northern] network's exploitation in the autumn, especially, amounted to walking a tightrope. The non-retroactivity of the new pension law furnished the ultimate element to the discontent, to which even the non-unionized workers reacted more and more strongly."
30. Ibid., 203–204. The *mécaniciens* and *chauffeurs* received up to half their revenue in bonuses which made them more dependent on the companies, therefore potentially more docile. The new pension law, which passed the Senate on July 9, 1909, was named after Radical Socialist deputy Maurice Berteaux. The new pension law would be reduced further in value once it was coupled to the more general law on workers and peasants' pensions voted on in 1910. Chevandier, op.cit., 55–56, 69–70.
31. *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1911, "La Déclaration de Grève," "La Journée de hier," "Colly interpellera," "Au bout de patience—Les Cheminots du Nord déclarent la Grève immédiate," Jean Jaurès.
32. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 204.
33. Chevandier, op.cit, 70–71.
34. Ibid., 70–71. Chevandier admits that the chronology of the movement differs among various authors. He employs the one set by Atsushi Fukasawa which best fits his own ideas, agrees with the documents he has seen, and stresses what he thinks is most important. For a more concise synopsis see Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 148–149. The strike itself is usually said to have taken place between October 8 and 18. Michel Winock tersely described the events in the following manner: "The causes were the low salaries and the poor working conditions. The companies having refused to negotiate, the movement began brusquely on the 8th of October when 200 workers at the Depot of La Chapelle in Paris stopped work. They were soon followed all over France. The government of Aristide Briand reacted by

calling up the workers for military service. Resistance by railway workers provoked arrests, perquisitions, and firings. Altogether, the strike, which lasted ten days, was a failure; the companies engaged in their own repression … and revolutionary syndicalism was in crisis." Such a summary hardly exhausts scholarly interpretations; it certainly fails to place the role and reactions Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* into the larger context.

35. Caron, La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 206. The national leaders of the revolutionary movement came from the Western network, especially Renault, who was prosecuted for publishing a pamphlet on sabotage on the railways which the bourgeois press widely cited in order to incite fear among the people.
36. Chevandier, op.cit., 71–76.
37. A.N., F7 13923.
38. Chevandier, op.cit., 71–76; *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1911, "La Déclaration de Grève," "La Journée de hier," "Colly interpellera," and "Au bout de patience—Les Cheminots du Nord déclarent la Grève immédiate," Jean Jaurès.
39. A.P.P., Ba/1360, Packet-October 1910 Strike, Ouest-État, Note October 12, 1910. During an October 11, 1910 meeting organized by the *Syndicat National* at 67 Rue Pouchy [sic] with 3000 people in attendance. Some of the speakers were happy about the actions on the Northern line but wondered why the *mécaniciens* were hesitant.
40. *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1911, "La Déclaration de Grève," "La Journée de hier," "Colly interpellera," and "Au bout de patience—Les Cheminots du Nord déclarent la Grève immédiate," Jean Jaurès.
41. Fruit, 194–198; L.G.S., #52, December 8–14, 1909, "Guérard sur la sellette," Louis Perceau; L.G.S., #1, December 15–21, 1909, "Guérard s'en va," Louis Perceau; Chevandier, op.cit., 66–68, 86.
42. 1849. Ibid., 73.
43. L.G.S., #15, March 22–29, 1910, "La liberté de la rue," G.H.; L.G.S., #49, November 16–22, 1910, "Après la grève," unsigned.
44. Peyronnet, op.cit., 109, 119–120.
45. *L'Humanité*, October 12, 1910.
46. L.G.S., #26, June 8–14, 1910, "Une leçon de sabotage," Un Sans Patrie.
47. L.G.S., #30, July 6–12, 1910, "Briand-la-Jaunisse veut mobiliser les cheminots"; F.C. Watts, op.cit. Watts reported that on the 6th of July the Briand ministry issued a decree to provide for a special mobilization in case of need, under which the men could be called to present themselves at their usual place of work on the day following the issuance of the order to secure the running of the normal traffic of their area. Watts assumed that the *cheminots* were legally exempt from ordinary short term mobilization calls except in time of war. He also incorrectly assumed that such an order would be useless in a railway strike: firstly, because railway workers were legally and specially exempted; secondly, because it allowed for a delay of 15 days before submission; and thirdly, because it instructed the men to join their corps, possibly at a great distance, at a time when transport would be unobtainable, and when they were required to be, not with their corps, but at their usual place on the railway!
48. L.G.S., #37, August 24–30, 1910. Cited by Peyronnet, op.cit., 110.
49. F.C. Watts, op.cit.
50. Peyronnet, op.cit., 119–121; L.G.S., #36, August 17–23, 1910, "Une grève admirable et qui ne doit pas durer." The author was unnamed. The next issue included an announcement that Émile Pouget, the syndicalist "apostle" of sabotage, would become a regular contributor to *La Guerre Sociale*. See L.G.S., #'s 49–55, 1910. These issues gave a retrospective analysis of the railway strike and the role of *La Guerre Sociale* in it.
51. Peyronnet, op.cit., 110.
52. L.G.S., #40, September 14–20, 1910, "La dernière d'Aristide," Flax (Victor Méric).
53. L.G.S., #41. September 21–27, 1910, "L'apaisement," Un Sans Patrie.

54. L.G.S., #42, September 28–October 4, 1910," Sabotage maladroit." This article was unsigned but Hervé usually was the author of articles which discussed sabotage. Of course, Pouget was now on the staff. The railway strike occurred just after the C.G.T. Congress of Toulouse. Hervéist optimism was reflected in an article by Pouget on the eve of the Congress which discovered a general trend of increased membership and militancy by the entire C.G.T. not just among the railway workers. L.G.S., #40, September 14–20, 1910, "Avant le congrès de Toulouse-la poussée confédérale," Émile Pouget. Actually, the long-term trends in the C.G.T. included a stagnating membership by 1908 and a growth of reformism. Hervéist wishful thinking continued until just before the railway strike when *La Guerre Sociale* characterized the Toulouse gathering as a triumph of revolutionary antimilitarism and antipatriotism. L.G.S., #43, October 5–11, 1910, "A Toulouse-le congrès de la C.G.T.," Émile Pouget and Miguel Almereyda. It ought to be recalled that optimistic assessments by *La Guerre Sociale* often functioned to promote or maintain revolutionary activism. Rebérioux, *La République radicale? 1898–1914*, op.cit., 170.
55. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 166.
56. Ibid., 166–167. Cited by Heuré, A.N., F7 13568.
57. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 178.
58. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 167. Cited by Heuré, A.N., F7 12723.
59. A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police, October 1910; A.P.P., Ba/1499. The reports by Police agent "Finot" are of interest. *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1910. The telephones of the socialist daily were found to be tapped by the police.
60. Chevandier, op.cit, 58.
61. Almosnino, op.cit., 89–90; L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, October 14, 1910, "En Avant."
62. Ibid., 89–90; L.G.S., #44 D, *Édition Spéciale*, October 15, 1910. "Communiqué de l'organisation de combat;" A.N., F7 14829; A.N., F7 14089.
63. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 210.
64. Caron, *Histoire De France, Vol. 5, La France des patriotes de 1851 à 1918*, op.cit., 525.
65. *Le Journal*, October 18, 1910. Cited by the *Socialist Standard*, November 1910. Yet the strike also had its ridiculous side. One judge released a strike supporter named Paul Boible after he had been arrested for carrying a corkscrew during a railway strike action.
66. A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police, October 1910; A.P.P., Ba/1499.
67. Peyronnet, op.cit., 110–111; L.G.S., #43B, Tuesday October 11, 1910; L.G.S., #44, (Wednesday) October 12–18, 1910, "Et les autres réseaux?" Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Thursday) October 12–18, 1910, "Lettre familière à Briand-la-Gaffe," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Friday) October 14, 1910, "Briand-la-Jaune contre *La Guerre Sociale*," Un Sans Patrie, "La deuxième à Briand-la-Gaffe," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #44 D, *Édition Spéciale*, (Saturday) October 15, 1910, Letter from Jacques Bonzon to Briand, "Vers l'apaisement," unsigned; *L'Humanité*, October 5, 1910; L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale* F, (Monday) October 17, 1910, "Le grrrand complot," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, October 6, 1910; *L'Humanité*, October 7, 1910; *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1910.
68. Hervé soon found it necessary to reprimand Francis Delaisi for his anti-Semitic themes against the Rothschild family, which had important interests in the Northern System. Mazgaj, op.cit., 128–149. For Hervé's efforts to keep *La Guerre Sociale* free of anti-Semitism, the paper was eventually accused of being in the pay of the Péreire family by the anti-Semitic Left. A.P.P., Ba/769, note of April 4, 1911.
69. L.G.S., #43, Tuesday, October 11, 1910, "Hardi! Le Réseau Nord!" Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1910.
70. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Ministry of the Interior Note dated October 19, 1910 with Hervé at La Santé in the section of common criminals and in solitary confinement.
71. L.G.S., #44, (Wednesday), October 12–18, 1910, "Et les autres réseaux?," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, October 12, 1910; *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1910. The EST, P.-L.-M., P.O., Midi, and Centre railway lines joined the strike in some manner.

72. L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Friday), October 14, 1910, "La deuxième à Aristide-la-Gaffe," Un Sans Patrie.
73. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 132.
74. Ibid., 132–133.
75. *L'Humanité*, October 19, 1910, "M. Briand ment: Une Lettre d'Hervé."
76. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale*-F, (Monday), October 17, 1910, "Aristide s'amuse."
77. Peyronnet, op.cit., 110–112; L.G.S., #43B, Tuesday, October 11, 1910, "Deux Conseils de la G.S."; *L'Humanité*, October 21, 1910. After the strike the *Syndicat National des Travailleurs des Chemins de Fer* refused all responsibility for the sabotage which occurred during the strike.
78. *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1910.
79. *L'Humanité*, October 12, 1910. Caron claimed that the law in question dated from 1832. Caron, op.cit., 205.
80. *L'Humanité*, October 13, 1910; *L'Humanité*, October 19, 1910, "Après la Grève," Marcel Sembat; "Le Lendemain," Jean Jaurès; and "Les Rentrées—Elles Furent Partout Simples et Dignes."
81. A.P.P., Ba/1360, report of October 11, 1910. Cited by Caron, op.cit., 205.
82. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 205.
83. Ibid., 205.
84. Chevandier, op.cit., 71–76; *L'Humanité*, October 11, 1911, "La Déclaration de Grève," "La Journée de hier," "Colly interpellera," and "Au bout de patience—Les Cheminots du Nord déclarent la Grève immédiate," Jean Jaurès.
85. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 205–206.
86. A.P.P., Ba/1360, report of October 18, 1910; A.P.P., Ba/1362 report of October 14, 1910. Both cited by Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit. 206.
87. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 206. At the time of *L'Humanité*'s headlines, Renault sat in Briand's old seat at the newspaper's office.
88. Rather than being Émile Pouget and Émile Pataud's *le grand soir*, the railway strike was simply the opportune moment for other industries to join in. F.C. Watts, op.cit.; Émile Pataud and Émile Pouget, *Comment nous ferons la révolution*, (Paris: 1909); Emile Pouget, "Comment Le Syndicaliste Emile Pouget Voyait En 1909 La Fin De L'État," 435–449, found in Guy Thuillier, ed., *La Bureaucratie En France Aux XIXe et XXe Siècles*, Preface by Jean Tulard. (Paris: Economica, 1987).
89. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 206–207.
90. *L'Humanité*, October 13 and 14, 1910.
91. Victor Méric, "Vieilles Choses, Vieilles Histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, #6, May 15–June 15, 1926, 261–263.
92. L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Thursday), October 12–18, 1910, "Lettre familière à Briand-la-Gaffe," Un Sans Patrie. When Briand's government threatened to mobilize the strikers, a wave of sabotage began, largely because *La Guerre Sociale* called for it according to Peyronnet. Peyronnet, op.cit., 119–121.
93. Almosnino, op.cit., 90–91.
94. L.G.S., #44, Friday October 14, 1910, "Briand-Le-Jaune contre 'La Guerre Sociale.'"
95. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 16026[2], MI/25395, Note on Almereyda covering his associations, domiciles, conferences, publications, and arrests. The last date included was November 13, 1911. See the notes labeled extract of a Prefect of Police Report, October 15, 1910 and Ministry of the Interior, Note from Paris, November 26, 1910; L.G.S., #44, Friday October 14, 1910, "On veut nous étrangler! 'Bon Bougres' Nous Comptons sur vous," Louis Perceau.
96. L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Friday), October 14, 1910, "Briand-le-Jaune contre *La Guerre Sociale*," unsigned; "On veut nous étrangler! 'Bon Bougres' Nous Comptons sur vous," Louis Perceau. Almost the entire French press including Bonapartist and anti-Semitic publications protested the imprisonment of the journalists of *La Guerre Sociale* for strike activities and articles. See also L.G.S., #44 D, *Édition Spéciale*, (Saturday), October 15, 1910. A letter

from Hervé's attorney, Jacques Bonzon, to Briand and "Vers l'apaisement" unsigned. These articles have information on Hervé as well as the arrests and searches. L.G.S., #50, November 23–29, 1910, "*La Barricade*." This article discussed the cessation of the publication of Victor Méric's *La Barricade* at the time of the strike so that Méric could increase his duties at the besieged *La Guerre Sociale*. *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1910, "Les Violences Gouvernementales: Arrestations, Perquisitions, Condamnations" and "Au Manège Saint Paul: Plus de huit mille Auditeurs affirment leur entire Solidarité avec les Cheminots"; *L'Humanité*, October 20, 1910, "Hennion-Rocambole," André Morizet.

97. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 16026[2], MI/25395. Notes on Almereyda. One note labeled extract of a Prefect of Police Report, October 15, 1910 discussed how throughout the railway strike and probably during most of the heyday of Hervéism most militants at *La Guerre Sociale* did not receive their mail at their residences but had it sent to the homes of friends or relatives who had never taken part in such political activities. If the police sometimes had a difficult time keeping fully informed about subversive activities, antimilitarists were apparently fully cognizant of constantly being watched, tracked, infiltrated, and hounded by the police. In the same note the police claimed that Almereyda and René de Marmande had collaborated on a manual for sabotage which was to be published and sent to all the unions and the militants. When Almereyda was interrogated on November 14 in court by M. Drioux, the examining judge, concerning his arrest for articles that appeared during the railway strike, Hervé's lieutenant claimed that he did not write any of the incriminating articles. The judge then reminded him that as the editorial secretary (rather than editorial manager?), he was still responsible for what had been printed. There followed a transcript of Almereyda's testimony which amounted to an address directed at Briand personally, protesting the exceptional nature of such an arrest of an editorial secretary, his preventive arrest, his month long detention under the status of a common criminal, and the refusal to grant his provisional liberty.
98. Almosnino, op.cit., 91–92; L.G.S., October 16, 1910, "Justice bourgeoise," Un Sans Patrie.
99. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 207.
100. L.G.S., #44, *Édition Spéciale*, (Friday), October 14, 1910, "Briand-la-Jaune contre *La Guerre Sociale*," Un Sans Patrie and "La deuxième à Briand-la-Gaffe," Un Sans Patrie. The same day that Hervé's second letter to Briand appeared in *La Guerre Sociale*.
101. *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1910, "Au Manège Saint Paul: Plus de huit mille Auditeurs affirment leur entire Solidarité avec les Cheminots." Twelve years earlier Briand, Millerand, and Viviani supported a smaller railway strike. *L'Humanité*, October 16, 1910.
102. L.G.S., #44D, *Édition Spéciale*, (Saturday), October 15, 1910.
103. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 207; *L'Humanité*, October 16, 1910, Second Edition; *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1910. The socialist daily thought it had evidence that Briand was worried that the strike was not over, so all the railway workers were told to go to their locales and then to the *Bourse du Travail*.
104. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale*-F, (Monday), October 17, 1910, "Le grrrand complot," Un Sans Patrie.
105. *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1910. On Tuesday *L'Humanité* announced the decision by the Strike Committee to end the strike.
106. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit. 207–208.
107. Ibid., 213–214. For F.C. Watts, the syndicalist demands were economic in nature, none of which arose from any defined political motive, despite the absurdities published by the French press. F.C. Watts, op.cit.
108. Ibid., 214. When the strike was over *L'Humanité* reported that there were more than 15,000 *cheminots* on the Northern line who had refused to report for work. *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1910, "Les Résultats De La Mobilisation—15,000 Insoumis."
109. Ibid., 218. British socialist F.C. Watts had similar views regarding sabotage and violent direct action, assuming they were anachronistic, counterproductive, and a sign of a lack of

organization. Sabotage also provided an excellent excuse for governmental repression. In fact, by frightening people, they stayed away from the railways which lightened the traffic and lessened the difficulties for the company. "As a means of securing a standstill upon the railway systems, it is obviously an utterly ineffective substitute for sound organization among railway workers." Sabotage was a sign of French backwardness, rudimentary organization, and tumult. For Watts, in France labor organization lagged behind most Western countries, and its primitive organization inevitably brought on sabotage and street fights which only the foolish considered to be necessary and progressive. F.C. Watts, op.cit.

110. Ibid., 218–219. Such means were called the "grands moyens" by *Le Soleil* and *La Guerre Sociale* on October 19, 1910 based on captured government documents or a company campaign. Among the thousand examples, Caron cited the following episode. "The day of the meeting at the Manège Saint-Paul [Friday October 14], a press agency published a note 'saying that purchases of revolvers and clubs have been made by the strikers.' 'It is hardly useful to add,' commented the official at the prefecture, 'that this information was completely made up …' The purchases were in fact destined for the Bank of France! Now the goal was not so much to scare the bourgeoisie as to divide the railway workers themselves. The praise of sabotage [by Hervéists and the revolutionary syndicalists] was without any doubt an error … Let's not say that the *cheminots* were exceptional: those among them who were the least tempted by violent and direct action were precisely those who were the closest to working class conditions and the workers' milieu. In fact, revolutionary syndicalism did not gather the syndical masses, but it dared to mobilize them for the fight."
111. Ibid., 214–215. An example of such arguments might be a letter from a repentant worker which persuaded another worker. One may delve into this analysis more deeply in examining the vocabulary used by the directors in their company orders and strike reports. The non-striking agents were "faithful" agents. While, the strikers were "misguided" or "led astray" by "bad advice" from which it was necessary to "bring them back to do their duty."
112. Ibid., 219; Miller, op.cit.; Lehning, op.cit. A similar argument was made at the time of the strike by F.C. Watts. "The French proletariat have had another sad lesson in the supreme need for organisation. An active minority cannot be depended upon to carry the mass with it. Moreover, it is again made evident that control of the political machinery and forces, and their use (legally or not) by the capitalists, is the enemy's strong position which must be captured at all costs." F.C. Watts, op.cit.
113. Ibid., 216. "These two elements would be found in the project of law presented by the Briand government a few weeks later (the Briand-Puech plan). It was in fact the origin of the law of 1920 … The establishment of negotiating structures collided with much stronger prejudices and opposition."
114. Ibid., 218.
115. Paul-Boncour, op.cit., Vol. I, 177–178.
116. Ibid., 178.
117. F.C. Watts, op.cit.
118. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 201; *L'Humanité*, October 16, 1910, "Par La Solidarité," Jean Jaurès.
119. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'éventualité, un jour ou l'autre, d'une révolution syndicaliste," *L'Économiste français*, October 22, 1910. Cited by Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 …," op.cit., 201. Beaulieu was a professor of finance at the Collège de France, a journalist for *Le Temps*, and a proponent of French imperialism, who may be regarded as the leading representative in France of orthodox political economy as well as the most pronounced opponent of protectionist and collectivist doctrines.
120. A.N., F7 13660, report on the Syndicat National; cited by Élie Fruit, op.cit., 202.
121. Fruit, op.cit., 201–202.

122. Caron, "La Grève des cheminots de 1910 ...," op.cit., 201–202. He cites *L'Humanité*, October 18, 1910 and an ironic cartoon titled "Les conspirateurs" which depicted Briand, Clemenceau, and an unknown other government plotter.
123. Ibid., 202–203. See Caron for detailed social, economic, and political analysis of the railway workers and strikers. Most striking workers came from the *ateliers* (84.8%) and *traction* (75.4%), the engine and driver section. Such workers were permanent agents, especially the *mecaniciens* and *chauffeurs* from the *ateliers* (workshops) and the *depots* (sheds or depots), whose work conditions and social origins were most like workers from large scale industry. They were also those who worked most closely together. Only a quarter of the strikers (24.3%) came from *exploitation,* that is—those involved in running and operating the trains. The weakest percentages (15.7%) were the line or roadway workers with different working conditions than workers in the *depots* or *ateliers de la traction.* The line or roadway workers also received the lowest pay in the salary hierarchy. The workers on the tracks were often, either by origins or living conditions, much nearer to the rural milieu than other workers. What's more, even their work, whether in surveillance or maintenance, isolated them in some ways from the other *cheminots* and put them much more directly under the control of their bosses. On the other hand, the relations between the agents in operations in the stations or on the trains and those in the engine and drivers sections were much closer. There were no strikers in the most rural areas. Strikers were numerous where larger numbers of workers were grouped. That meant the industrial stations, characterized by an intense merchandise traffic, and in the *depots* of these same zones. "In fact, the fired *cheminot* was a disciplined syndicalist rather than a dangerous revolutionary." Caron, 208–212.
124. Ibid., 201. He cited L. De Seilhac, "Revuc des questions sociales et de prévoyance," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, 67 (200), February 1911, 379. "In fact, it did not end the day that work began again, on October 18, 1910. For several more months a 'slowdown strike' or 'an Italian strike' as they said then, continued, accompanied among all the workers with a characteristic 'professional indifference'."
125. Almosnino, op.cit., 90.
126. Chevandier, op.cit., 80. Chevandier argued that the companies may have sought to profit from the isolation of the minority of strikers and feared the reactions in those areas which had mobilized most strongly.
127. Ibid., 79–88.
128. Ibid., 76–77.
129. Ibid., 83.
130. Ibid., 86–90. Many *cheminots* were reintegrated at the start of the war, but not the majority.
131. L.G.S., #46, October 26–November 1, 1910, "Où l'on voit reparaître Gustave Hervé"; *L'Humanité*, October 19, 1910, "M. Briand ment; Une Lettre D'Hervé"; *L'Humanité*, October 20, 1910, "Hennion-Rocamble," Andre Morizet; *L'Humanité*, October 21, 1910, "Mise Au Tombeau," Jean Varenne.
132. L.G.S., #45, *Édition Spéciale*, October 22, 1910, "Le règne de la frousse," Un Sans Patrie. The opinion of *L'Humanité* was similar even if the socialist daily did not stress revolution as the ultimate goal.
133. The Midi line.
134. L.G.S., #46, October 26–November 1, 1910, "Après la bataille," Un Sans Patrie.
135. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 178.
136. A.N., F7 12559. Daily reports of the Prefecture of Police, November 11–19, 1910; *Le Petit Journal,* November 11–22, 1910.
137. Peyronnet claimed that "Miss Scissors" was created in 1909 by *La Guerre Sociale* during the postal strikes. Nevertheless, this mischievously nefarious "lady" made her appearance in almost every issue in late 1910.

138. L.G.S., #48, November 9–15, 1910, "Où les bons bougres continuent à se rejouir," Mam'zelle Cisaille.
139. L.G.S., #49, November 16–22, 1910, "Après la grève" I, not signed. Critics of *La Guerre Sociale* like Niel wrote in *Le Matin*, while Griffuelhes, Monatte, and Crates (Francis Delaisi) wrote in *La Vie Ouvrière*.
140. Clearly *L'Humanité* mentioned little about the sabotage that had occurred. The Socialist deputies felt that sabotage could not be attributed to the striking unions and its importance was exaggerated. During the railway strike *L'Humanité*'s actions fit the minimum parameters of Hervéism. *L'Humanité* even theorized that the government may have created the sabotage to get popular feeling against the strikers. *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1910.
141. L.G.S., #50, November 23–29, 1910, "Après la grève," II, *Un Sans Patrie*. In the aftermath of the Railway Strike several Ministers of the Interior sent notices to the Prefecture of Police to get its agents and informers to take the most detailed notes possible in order to facilitate prosecutions under the law of 1881. This had been done prior to the 1910 strike but police note taking methods since then apparently had become less and less helpful to the authorities who sought prosecutions of flagrant language. A.N., F7 12723, Note from Paris, December 14, 1910 and Note "Police Générale" *Préfect de Police*, February 1911.
142. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 179.
143. L.G.S., #51, November 30–December 6, 1910, "Oeil pour oeil, dent pour dent," *Un Sans Patrie*.
144. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 179.
145. L.G.S., #51, November 30–December 6, 1910, "Après la grève," III, Un Sans Patrie. Since being forced to resign as Secretary-General of the C.G.T., Niel acted as the Administrative Secretary of the National Railway Union. L.G.S., #54, December 21–27, 1910, "Après la grève," VI, Un Sans Patrie.
146. L.G.S., #52, December 7–13, 1910, "Après la grève" IV, Un Sans Patrie.
147. L.G.S., #53, December 14–20, 1910, "Après la grève," V, Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #54, December 21–27, 1910, "Après la grève," VI, *Un Sans Patrie*.
148. L.G.S., #54, December 21–27, 1910, "Après la grève," VI, Un Sans Patrie.
149. L.G.S., #54, December 21–27, 1910, "Au ban de l'humanité," Un Sans Patrie. Large avenues, the capitalist press, alcohol, and horse races were Hervé's chosen examples of French decay in this instance.
150. L.G.S., #53, December 14–20, 1910, "Oraison funèbre du Colonel Moll," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #54, December 21–27, 1910, "Le brigandage officiel dans l'Afrique du Nord," Paul Vigné d'Octon.
151. L.G.S., #3, January 18–24, 1911, "Leur politique extérieure," Un Sans Patrie.
152. Peyronnet, op.cit., 151; Madeleine Rebérioux, "La gauche socialste française: La *Guerre Sociale* et *Le Mouvement Socialiste* face au problème coloniale," *Le Mouvement sociale*, No. 46, (January–March 1964), 91–103.
153. Ibid., 193–194.
154. L.G.S., #10, March 8–14, 1911; L.G.S., #13, March 29–April 4, 1911; L.G.S., #8, February 22–28, 1911, "La poussée de *La Guerre Sociale*"; A.N., F7 13325, M/5121, note of January 20, 1911; A.P.P., Ba/752, Monthly Reports of the Prefecture of Police. Reports of October and November 1910. According to the police, the railway strike led to the greatest increase in circulation by *La Guerre Sociale* up until that time.
155. L.G.S., #7, February 15–21, 1911, "Vers la guerre anglo-allemande," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #13, March 29–April 4, 1911, "La cas Bissolati," *Un Sans Patrie*; L.G.S., #14, April 5–11, 1911, "Jaurès et la grève des cheminots," *Un Sans Patrie*.
156. L.G.S., #8, February 22–28, 1911, "Le crime d'un jaune," Un Sans Patrie.
157. L.G.S., #4, January 25–31, 1911, "La Champagne en état de siège," Un Sans Patrie; Trempé, op.cit., 331–332, 319–378.

158. Trempé, op. cit., 331–332, 319–378.
159. L.G.S., #12, March 22–28, 1911, "La jacquerie champenoise," Un Sans Patrie.
160. L.G.S., #6, February 8–14, 1911, "La réponse des Rothschilds," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #10, March 8–14, 1911, "Le Ministère Rothschild," *Un Sans Patrie*; L.G.S., #11, March 15–21, 1911, "La matraque antisémite," *Un Sans Patrie*; L.G.S., #14, April 5–11, 1911, "Ni antisémite ni antifranc-maçon," Un Sans Patrie.
161. A.P.P., Ba/1604, Police agent "Lyon," Note of March 3, 1911; Police agent "Finot," Note of March 11, 1911. Finot believed the creation of a C.G.T. daily was a bluff to show syndicalist strength in an era of declining membership. The C.G.T., which habitually ridiculed politicians, here tried to influence them to make union membership mandatory. A.P.P., Ba/1601, Police agent "Finot," Note of September 6, 1912; Police agent "Lyon," Note of September 29, 1912; Michael Sabatino De Lucia. "The Remaking of French Syndicalism, 1911–1918: The Growth of the Reformist Philosophy," Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1971. 25–26; Peyronnet, op.cit., 168–169.
162. De Lucia, op.cit., 11; Papayanis, op.cit., *passim*. The C.G.T., did possess an organizational weekly (and sometimes monthly) *La Voix du Peuple* which began publication on December 10, 1900. The pre-war series ended on August 3, 1914, when hostilities broke out. Émile Pouget (1860–1931), who had been behind the old *Père Peinard* newspaper, was its chief editor until 1909. His place was taken by Yvetot (1909–1912), who was in turn succeeded until 1914 by Dumoulin. Why *La Voix du Peuple* was insufficient to battle the Hervéists in 1911 is not discussed by Dominique Bertinotti in her thesis, "L'antimilitarisme à travers *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, avril 1911–décembre 1912," *Maîtrise*, Paris I, Droz-Maitron, 1975.
163. L.G.S., #10, September 14–20, 1910, "Avant le congrès de Toulouse—la poussée confédérale," Émile Pouget.
164. L.G.S., #35, August 28–September 3, 1912, "Avant le congrès du Havre," Émile Pouget.
165. Caron, *Histoire De France, Vol. 5, La France des patriotes de 1851 à 1918*, op.cit., 525.
166. De Lucia, op.cit., 11.
167. Bertinotti, op.cit., 50–52, 68, 90.
168. De Lucia, op.cit., 5.
169. Ibid., 33; L.G.S., #1, December 31, 1913–January 6, 1914, "L'armée syndicale," Émile Pouget. There had always been a reformist versus revolutionary split in the C.G.T. What was new after 1911 according to De Lucia was an obvious division among revolutionary syndicalists into several approaches. Alphonse Merrheim was a believer in centralization and control from above. Griffuelhes was in the Communard or the anarchist tradition which favored a federation of autonomous independent unions. Georges Yvetot represented an even more extreme and violent Proudhonian approach but he acted as an isolated individual. For Jacques Julliard and Paul Mazgaj, two schools of thought, the *politiques* and the *ultras*, divided revolutionary syndicalism before 1914 but the division among revolutionaries was far more complex than this simple dichotomy would suggest. Merrheim was allied to the *politiques* for a time but he evolved beyond them. The *École Merrheim* and the related *dirigiste* philosophy of Merrheim and Jouhaux was a synthesis of both reformist and revolutionary traditions. Merrheim and Jouhaux's approach sought a more practical and less romantic syndicalism. It rejected violence as well as political institutions and parliamentary socialism as either unproductive or fraudulent. It placed its highest value upon large-scale workers' organizations in order to offset the influence of capitalist and governmental organizations. It was to be a third course for syndicalism, different from the visceral Communard approach of Griffuelhes and the positivism of the reformist Auguste Keufer. By 1914 the ideas of Merrheim had gained ground. When World War I broke out, Merrheim may have "used" the French peace movement to try to get control of the C.G.T. which had eluded him before 1914. Griffuelhes reacted to the war much like Hervé did. The former Secretary-General shared the deep anti-German feelings common among the C.G.T. hierarchy. He was a revolutionary in the

tradition of Blanqui, while Merrheim was a pacifist who worked persistently for an immediate negotiated settlement of the war. Despite Griffuelhes's support of the French war effort, he maintained his revolutionary idealism. Despite Merrheim's antiwar activism, he evolved to a rather conservative reformism. During the war, Jouhaux succeeded in fusing patriotism and social reformism. At least in the birthplace of the revolutionary tradition on the eve of World War I, it seems impossible to place the men and the movements of the Left easily into Arno J. Mayer's convenient paradigm. Paul Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 136; De Lucia, op.cit., 5–6, 33–46. 116, 137.

170. Bertinotti, op.cit., 202–210, 215.
171. De Lucia, op.cit., 4–5.
172. Peyronnet, op.cit., 168–169.
173. L.G.S., #11, March 15–21, 1911, "Un quotidien syndicaliste."
174. L.G.S., #37, September 13–20, 1911. Merle, then in exile in Brussels, asked a writer from *La Bataille Syndicaliste* to meet Rousset in Marseilles if the prisoner were released.
175. A.P.P., Ba/1604, Police agent "Hermann." Note of September 21, 1911; L.G.S., #37, September 13–20, 1911, "Pourquoi il faut soutenir *La Bataille Syndicaliste*."
176. L.G.S., #8, February 22–28, 1911, "La poussée de *La Guerre Sociale*." Their conflict over workers' pensions probably had arisen in large part out of their rivalry for the leadership on the extreme Left.
177. They were Yvetot and Harmel, the latter was formerly known as M. Thomas. For a time Vigné d'Octon wrote for both papers until Hervé asked for his resignation due to a "conflict of interest" and for financial considerations. Francis Delaisi also wrote for the two papers and for several others. He was asked to resign only when he rejected Hervé's new ideas. Peyronnet, *passim*. *La Guerre Sociale* is the best source in these matters, however.
178. A.P.P., Ba/1604, Police agent "L" (Letrig?). Note of June 15, 1911.
179. A.P.P., Ba/1604, Police agent "Finot," Notes of July 17 and 27, 1911. The demonstration was to march to La Santé where Hervé already had been held prisoner for 14 months.
180. Julliard, *Clemenceau* ..., op.cit., *passim*.
181. A.P.P., Ba/1604, Police agent "Finot," Note of July 25, 1911.
182. Ibid., "Finot," Note of October 4, 1911.
183. Papayanis, op.cit., 227–228. The defensive and arbitrary nature of the syndicalist attacks on Hervé is shown by the fact that many of the syndicalists who united by attacking *La Guerre Sociale* would later employ Hervé's own arguments to attack their former syndicalist allies. In 1913 Griffuelhes attacked Alphonse Merrheim's emphasis on organization and union recruitment because these policies led to syndicalist inaction and weakened workers' faith and enthusiasm.

Chapter 12

1. *Le Journal*, March 7–8, 1906, Jacques Dhur reports.
2. Georges Darien, *Biribi*, (Paris: Jérôme Martineau Éditeur, 1966).
3. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 56–57. Cerullo described Biribi as composed of three main parts: 1) disciplinary companies or *companies de discipline*, attached to particular African Battalion ("Bat d'Af") units, 2) *sections d'exclus* for men against whom civilian legal actions were pending at the point of conscription, 3) *sections des mutilés* for self-mutilators and chronic malingerers. John Cerullo initially argued that the Aernoult-Rousset case did not reach the status of an "Affair" because it was not able to gain and sustain the interest of the public even though the issues raised were important, the proceedings were often lengthy, and sometimes the events were titillating. Idem., "The Aernoult-Rousset Agitation, 1909–1912: A Proletarian Dreyfus Affair?" *The Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*. Vol. 24. 1997.

120–129; Idem., "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair: Military Justice on Trial in Belle Époque France." *Historical Reflections*. Vol. 34, No. 2, 4–24. 2008.

4. Claude Liauzu, "Biribi et l'opinion française," *Politique Aujourd'hui*, Janvier-Fevrier, 1976, 31 41.
5. L.G.S., #16, March 30–April 5, 1910, "Histoire d'Aernoult, de Rousset, et des bagnes militaires," René de Marmande; L.G.S., #17, April 6–12, 1910, "L'accusateur," René de Marmande; *L'Humanité*, November 18, 1909; *L'Humanité*, March 3, 1910; *Le Matin*, July 24, 1909; A.N. F7 12908, M/4991, "L'Affaire Aernoult-Rousset," Note of December 8, 1910; *L'Humanité*, July 4, 1910; July 6, 1910; L.G.S., #30, July 6–12, 1910, "L'Enfer militaire." Much of this article used information from Dhur's articles in *Le Journal* from 1907.
6. Cerullo, op.cit., "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …" op.cit., 13.
7. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 4.
8. Ibid., 55, 161–162. The *Bataillons d'Infanterie Légère d'Afrique* or *Bats d'Af* dated from the 1830s to serve as "military halfway house" for "men who had enlisted after having incurred felony convictions in civilian life as well as soldiers who had incurred repeated disciplinary infractions after enlistment." "By 1910 there were five of these units, where civilian felons were joined by soldiers who, convicted of military offenses, had served their sentences but not completed their term of military service." "Over time the range of civilian offenses that triggered an automatic *Bat d'Af* experience was steadily increased, while the scale of penalties that qualified a conscript for one was steadily lowered." In 1910 politicians, who had misguidedly (in the army's view) created the system of sending *apaches* into the military, changed their minds and excluded incorrigibles from regular units. However, they bent to the demands of humanitarians by relocating disciplinary companies to metropolitan France. One advocate for the military argued that earlier reforms in 1897, 1901, and 1904 had "'softened discipline without bringing true justice'" because enlisted men seemed to lose their fear of the *conseils de guerre*, especially "in the special sections, the public works units, and the various *compagnies de discipline*."
9. Ibid., 108–110; Michael B. Loughlin, "The Disillusionment of a Revolutionary Socialist: Gustave Hervé and the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, 1909–1912," Vol. 22, 97–108. Published in the 1994–5 *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*.
10. Cerullo, op.cit., "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …" 10. The camp, which was 400 kilometers south of Oran and close to the Moroccan border, was described by Jacques Dhur as one of the worst and most dangerous in Algeria. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 108–109.
11. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 110–114. The commanding officer at the camp denied ever advising his men "to skirt regulations precluding the use of physical force on recalcitrant prisoners."
12. The *crapaudine* involved tying prisoners' hands and feet behind their backs as tightly as was deemed necessary, and then leaving them exposed to the daytime sun and heat or often frigid nights, helpless, only able to eat or drink like an animal, and forced to relieve themselves in their prison garb. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 61.
13. Ibid., 114–116.
14. Ibid., 118–119.
15. Ibid., 113.
16. Ibid., 119–120.
17. Ibid., 119–122.
18. Ibid., 123.
19. L.G.S., #11, February 23–March 1, 1910, "L'assassinat d'Aernoult," Anton Jobert; L.G.S., #15, March 22–29, 1910, the poster "A Bas Biribi" was printed in this issue.
20. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 126.
21. Ibid., 123. Even though the officers denied the charges and depicted Rousset as a ringleader of "the little revolt" in the camp "for which Aernoult's death served as a pretext," the fact was that judicial proceedings were moving forward, testimony was being taken, and evidence was being gathered. Even when Rousset's fate seemed sealed, other forces in the larger society were now

in play which would strongly affect his case, much to the chagrin of the military establishment. These short-term problems for the military justice system did not bring reform any closer.

22. Ibid., 125–126; René de Marmande, *Emile Rousset et l'enquête du lieutenant Pan Lacroix: Étude d'après le correspondance d'Emile Rousset*, (Paris: Librairie Schleicher Frères, 1912), 12–16.
23. Ibid., 123–128.
24. L.G.S., #16, March 30–April 5, 1910, "Histoire d'Aernoult, de Rousset, et des bagnes militaires," René de Marmande; L.G.S., #17, April 6–12, 1910, "L'accusateur," René de Marmande; L.G.S., #29, June 29–July 5, 1910, "Conseil de guerre, Conseil de brutes—L'Affaire Aernoult-Rousset," René de Marmande; A.N., F7 12908, M/4991. "L'Affaire Aernoult-Rousset." Note of December 8, 1910 and Note of the Prefect of Gard to the Ministry of the Interior. Poster of René de Marmande's meeting in Nîmes. June 15, 1910; *L'Humanité*, July 4, 1910; *L'Humanité*, July 6, 1910; *L'Humanité*, July 9, 1910. Allemane had interpellated the Minister of War in August 1909 just after accusations by *La Guerre Sociale* and *L'Humanité* of irregular deaths in the Algerian prison camps. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 123, 125.
25. Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair ...," op.cit., 14; Miller, *From Revolutionaries*, op.cit., 162.; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 135–136; Cerullo cited *Bulletin officiel de la Ligue française pour la défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, April 30, 1910, 500–501.
26. L.G.S., #9, February 9–15, 1910, "Le congrès de Nîmes," Louis Perceau; L.G.S., #10, February 16–22, 1910, "Après le congrès de Nîmes," G.H.; L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "A Biribi-Sauvons Rousset," Anton Jobert; *L'Humanité*, February 11, 1910, "Aernoult et Rousset."
27. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 134.
28. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "A Biribi-Sauvons Rousset," Anton Jobert; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 124–128.
29. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 136.
30. L.G.S., #13, March 9–15, 1910, "A Biribi: Sauvons Rousset," Anton Jobert; L.G.S., #16, March 30–April 5, 1910, "Histoire d'Aernoult, de Rousset, et des bagnes militaires," R. de Marmande; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 136–137.
31. L.G.S., #28, June 22–28, 1910, "Encore Biribi," Un Sans Patrie.
32. A.N., F7 13326, "L'Antimilitarisme et L'Antpatriotisme en France," (Situation on December 1, 1912), 57–58; Miller, op.cit., 163.
33. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 130–131.
34. Marie Constant Emmanuel Gilbert, vicomte de Rorthays de Saint-Hilaire, better known under his pseudonym *René de Marmande*, has been called the founder of the anarchist inspired *La Liberté d'Opinion* before 1905. After World War I he wrote scathingly against Hervé, but during the Occupation he wrote for the collaborationist press and had an association with Marcel Déat. Miller, op.cit., 149; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 141; Simon Epstein, *Les Dreyfusards sous l'Occupation*, (Paris: éd. Albin Michel, 2001).
35. Emma Goldman, *A Documentary History of the American Years – vol 2 : Making speech free (1902–1909)*, Candace Falk, et al., eds., (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 235.
36. A.N., F7 13325, M/5212. Note of February 23, 1911.
37. A.N., F7 12908. M/6285. Note of December 12, 1911 and M/4991, Note of December 8, 1910.
38. A.N., F7 13326. M/6589. Note of March 19, 1912. The Ministry of the Interior often dated the origins of the C.D.S. as 1905. *La Guerre Sociale* reported that the *Comité* was founded in 1908 after Clemenceau's repressive action. A.N., F7 12908, M/6285. Note of December 12, 1911. At this time 31 provincial sections of the C.D.S. were reported to exist.
39. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 132–133. Rather than crippling the efficacy of the movement for reform, Cerullo argues that "the competition between radicals and reformists ... actually had

the opposite effect," by generating "new energies," opening "new fronts in the struggle," and forcing "the government into defensive postures."

40. Ibid., 144.
41. Ibid., 140–142. Despite Rousset's physical pain from an inguinal hernia and being surrounded by violence, sadism, and sexual deviance at Douéra, de Marmande described the prisoner as becoming nearly stoic there.
42. A.N., F7 12908. M/4302. Note of May 26, 1910.
43. L.G.S., #40, September 14–20, 1910. The lyrics were by Gaston Couté.
44. Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au Pouvoir: L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 282. Symbols for the Republic could be used in positive, negative, and fairly neutral manners. Symbols for the republic and for France itself, such as Marianne, went back to the revolution and much earlier with obvious roots in the Virgin Mary, but the possible meanings and significations evolved over time. 271–301. "The same Marianne, [can be] the name of a 'girl' or the name of a goddess; the Republic, [can be] the name for the ideal or the name for the reality; the Phrygian bonnet, [can be] the sign for Revolt or the sign for France … But if the language, written or plastic, sets polyvalent traps for us, it does not any less reveal, beyond this same complexity, ideological contradictions which we must envisage as such from now on." 289.
45. A.N., F7 12908. M/4892. Note of November 10, 1910.
46. L.G.S., #15, March 22–29, 1910, "A bas Biribi!" *Comité de Défense Sociale*; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 137.
47. *Chaouchs* or *chaouches* were slang terms for underlings or henchmen.
48. *L'Humanité*, March 23, 1910, "A Bas Biribi!"; A.N., F7 13326, "L'Antimilitarisme et L'Antpatriotisme en France," op.cit., 58–59.
49. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 137–138; Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …," op.cit., 14; Avner Ben Amos, *Funerals, Politics, and Memory in Modern France, 1789–1996*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). This volume presents a fascinating account of the public use of funerary rites to promote political agendas and values over the course of two centuries.
50. L.G.S., #36, July 6–12, 1910, "Le procès de Biribi," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, July 4, 1910, *L'Humanité*, July 5, 1910, *L'Humanité*, July 6, 1910. The 16 signers of the poster were tried and acquitted with only 20 minutes of jury deliberation.
51. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 138–140.
52. Ibid., 140, 214.
53. L.G.S., #16, March 30–April 5, 1910, "Rabatteurs pour Biribi," Anton Jobert; L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "Une visite au vaillant Rousset," René de Marmande. In June 1910 after the elections, *L'Humanité* sent its own delegate to try to obtain the return of Aernoult's remains.
54. L.G.S., #28, June 22–28, 1910; A.N., F7 12723, Note M/1865. U, Paris, June 23, 1910; A.N., F7 13568, Note M/1865.U. June 25, 1910 (sic). L.G.S., #36, August 17–23, 1910, "La fin de Biribi"; L.G.S., #37, August 24–30, 1910.
55. L.G.S., #30, *Édition Spéciale*, July 6–12 1910, "À Biribi, c'est en Afrique," Un Sans Patrie.
56. L.G.S., #31, July 13–20, 1910; A.N., F7 13568, Note M/1865.U., June 25, 1910.
57. L.G.S., #36, August 17–23, 1910, "La fin de Biribi"; L.G.S., #37, August 24–30, 1910.
58. A.N., F7 12908, Prefecture of Police, M/1853/U, Paris, June 16, 1910; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 143–145. However, the initial proposal for a mixed commission occurred before the trial, and it was not formed until September 1910.
59. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 145. See *La Voix du Peuple*, June 26–July 3, 1910.
60. A.N., F7 13326, "L'Antimilitarisme et L'Antpatriotisme en France," situation on December 1, 1912, op.cit., 59.
61. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 146–150.
62. Ibid., 152.

63. Ibid., 151. Cerullo stresses the ability of the *enragés* to generate intense popular pressure against governmental actions, but he seems to vacillate a bit about the limits and narrowness of such pressure.
64. A.P.P., Ba/927, Police agent "Fauvette," note of September 29, 1910; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 146–156.
65. A.P.P., Ba/927, Police agent "Fauvette," note of September 29, 1910.
66. *L'Humanité*, January 14, 1911, "L'Affaire Aernoult-Le Capitaine Alix dessaisi."
67. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 146–156. General Rabier was sent to Algeria in October 1910 by the Minister of War, General Brun, in order to re-interview officers, various prisoners, and auxiliaries previously deposed by the military investigator Captain Alix. It was assumed that Captain Alix may have slighted some of the witnesses' testimony. The General's investigation was to be "informational" and "without judicial meaning," but the Minister of War's take on the report would have a marked effect on the divisional general in Algeria who had ultimate jurisdiction and whose attitude would be swayed by the Minister.
68. *L'Eclair*, Feburary 9, 1912, "Un nouveau bluff de la C.G.T."; A.N., F7 12909. Note of February 5, 1912.
69. L.G.S., #24, May 25–31, 1910, "Une visite au vaillant Rousset," René de Marmande.
70. *L'Humanité*, October 1, 1910; *L'Humanité*, October 5, 1910. The campaign was based on the realization that the French bourgeoisie had flocked to save Dreyfus yet they had done nothing to save the proletarian Rousset from injustice.
71. Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …," op.cit., 5.
72. Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Agitation, 1909–1912 …," op.cit., 123–125. Whether Rousset, the hero, became some sort of a "model of proletarian 'intellectuality,'" parallel to the intellectual Zola for "militant journalists and activists" in the Aernoult and Rousset Campaign is another matter. Still, one wonders, like Cerullo, whether Dreyfusards thought that their "civic courage" was superior to the "physical courage" of a "hero" like Rousset.
73. L.G.S., #39, September 7–13, 1910, "Sous les plis du torchon," Un Sans Patrie.
74. L.G.S., #41, September 21–27, 1910, "L'apaisement," Un Sans Patrie.
75. L.G.S., #41, September 21–27, 1910, "Les conscrits vont partir," Jean Goldsky; A.N., F7 13326, "L'antimilitarisme et l'antipatriotisme en France," situation on December 1, 1912, op.cit., 62–65; Miller, op.cit., 164, 240, note 80.
76. L.G.S., #29, June 29–July 5, 1910, "Conseil de guerre—conseil de brutes," René de Marmande; A.N., F7 12908. M/1853. Note of June 16, 1910; M/1858.U. Note of June 20, 1910.
77. A.N., F7 12908, P.P., Note of August 26, 1910; P.P., Note of September 22, 1910; M/4689. Note of September 26, 1910; M/4991. Note of December 8, 1910; P.P., Note of December 10, 1910; M/2660.U. Note of May 31, 1911; A.N., F7 13571. M/6927. Note of August 26, 1912. "La C.G.T., le P.S.U. et *La Guerre Sociale*."
78. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 144–145, 151.
79. A.N., F7 13331. M/4689. Note of September 26, 1910 (duplicate in A.N., F7 12908); A.N., F7 12908. M/4695. Note of September 29, 1910. Note on "La Manifestation Aernoult"; Julliard, *Clemenceau …*, *passim*. Ricordeau was another possible police spy in the Commission delegation of the *Union des Syndicats* but this has not been proven. Also see L.G.S. issues in the summer and the fall of 1911 on S.S.R. revelations concerning Métivier and rumors about Ricordeau.
80. A.N., F7 12908. M/4912. Note of November 17, 1910; A.N., F7 13053. Note on Thuillier.
81. A.N., F7 13331. M/4963. Note of December 1, 1910. The C.D.S. continued to work for the release of Rousset so that he would arrive with the body of Aernoult. Such a concurrence could potentially increase the impact of the proposed demonstration. A.N., F7 12908. Note of November 30, 1910; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 151–152. Besides arguing over where the money should come from to pay for Kurz's later trips of Algeria, the members of the Commission hassled over naming someone to represent the Aernoult family, whether Aernoult

ought to be reinterred in Romainville or cremated at Père-Lachaise, whether or not everything possible should be done to minimize demonstration violence, and who should be sent to Algeria.

82. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 191.
83. A.N., F7 13325. M/5212. Note of February 23, 1911.
84. A.N., F7 13331 and A.N., F7 12908 each include M/5633. Note of June 1, 1911.
85. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, January 19, 1912.
86. A.N. F7 13571, P.P., Note of March 19, 1912.
87. A.N., F7 12908. M/5301. Note of March 16, 1911.
88. A.N., F7 12908. Report on the poster which was copied on March 21, 1911 by the Commissariat Central de Police of Amiens. A.P.P., Ba/927 has a copy of the poster and a police report dated March 15, 1911 on its recovery. Two weeks before the C.D.S. had issued a poster entitled *Bagnes Militaires: L'Assassinat d'Aernoult: L'Héroisme de Rousset.* P.P., Ba/927, M. Forgeront, Officier de Paix, Note of December 4, 1910.
89. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 158–159; *L'Humanité*, April 26, 1911, "L'Affaire Aernoult-Rousset." The Commission was also troubled by the continuing presence of Captain Alix as *rapporteur* in the second *conseil de guerre* of Oran because the Left questioned the Captain's prior judgments and apparent bias against Rousset.
90. A.P.P., Ba/927, Prefect of Police to the Maire de Romainville, June 17, 1911. In a note from the Governor General of Algeria to Prefect of Police Lépine, the former official admitted to having erroneously given the Maire de Romainville on June 19 a positive response for the requested exhumation. A.P.P., Ba/927, Algiers, notes of June 19 and July 2, 1911. Also police agent "Fauvette," Note of June 1, 1911; *L'Humanité*, June 2, 1911. When the corpse of their son finally was returned to Paris, the parents of Aernoult were featured witnesses at the demonstration as they had been throughout the campaign. But the personal toll must have been great because Aernoult's father and mother died of natural causes in December 1913 and April 1914. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, December 25, 1913, "Le pére d'Aernoult est mort."; A.P.P., Ba/927, "Dumas," 20th *arrondissement*, note of April 16, 1914.
91. A.N., F7 12908. M/5336. Note of March 24, 1911.
92. A.N., F7 12908. Note of the Commissariat Spécial at Marseilles to the Minister of the Interior, April 9, 1911; Commissaire Central of Grenoble to the Prefect of the Isère, December 12, 1910.
93. René de Marmande, *Emile Rousset et l'Enquête du Lieutenant Pan-Lacroix ...*, (Paris: Librairie Schleicher Frères, 1912), 22–30; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 156–160. The pardon was reported to have been given on either April 13 or April 27, 1911.
94. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 156–157.
95. De Marmande, op.cit., 24–27; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 156–170.
96. *L'Humanité*, June 4, 1911; A.N., F7 12908. Commissariat Spécial of Marseilles. Report of June 12, 1911.
97. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 57–59, 164–170, 236–237. Although Dubois-Desaulle was less than sympathetic toward the homosexual subculture in Biribi, Georges Darien's original text of *Biribi* described that subculture as potentially healthy, adaptive, and even therapeutic, allowing some prisoners to "maintain some faint sense of worth and agency." 64. The details of the crime and murder charge are outside the scope of this study, but it should be noted that the camp commander assigned Lieutenant Pan-Lacroix to conduct a preliminary inquiry which soon became the crucial focus of the so-called Second Rousset Affair. Ultimately, the various strands of the inquiry would lead to Rousset, who was viewed by the lieutenant as a "cunning, manipulative, [and] unscrupulous" ringleader of a criminal gang that extended into several camps. The lieutenant would find that his investigation led him to delve into the complexities of criminality, prison sexuality, the cutthroat world of the Bats d'Af where "the weak were ordinarily used and discarded by the strong," and the "soldier's code" privileged personal vengeance above legal recourse. The military had long assumed that soldiers like

Rousset, as former criminals, were incorrigible, and that was something politicians could neither understand nor accept.

98. Comité de Défense Sociale, *L'Affaire Rousset*, (Paris: Imprimerie L'Espérance, n.d.), 1–24; René de Marmande, *Emile Rousset et l'enquête du Lieutenant Pan-Lacroix …*, op.cit.
99. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, September 5, 1911, "Un traquenard," Harmel; L.G.S., #39, September 27–October 4, 1911, "Rousset est innocent!," Charles-Albert; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, October 5, 1911.
100. L.G.S., September 27–October 4, 1911. "Rousset est Innocent!," Charles-Albert.
101. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, September 5, 1911, "Un traquenard," Harmel; L.G.S., #39, September 27–October 4, 1911, "Rousset est innocent!," Charles-Albert; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, October 5, 1911.
102. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 176, 188–189. Rousset would later explain his reticence to speak out as due to his attempt to preserve the "soldiers' code" of silence which meant that he did not wish to incriminate any of his fellow prisoners. The other prisoners' testimony against him was due to Pan Lacroix's ability to manipulate witnesses by saying that Rousset was a collaborator who had accused other prisoners to save himself.
103. A.N., F7 12908. M/6285. Note of December 12, 1911; L.G.S., #50, December 13–19, 1911, "20 ans de bagne pour Rousset."
104. *L'Éclair*, February 9, 1912, "Un nouveau bluff de la C.G.T." Not only had Rousset been convicted of theft four times, his mother was apparently guilty of nine infractions with sentences ranging from six days to eight months. Three of his brothers had also been found guilty of crimes including theft and murder. One was still serving a sentence of eight years at hard labor; another was in the midst of a five year term. A.N., F7 12909. Note of February 5, 1912.
105. A.N., F7 12908, A.P.P., Note of December 12, 1911; A.P.P., Note of December 13, 1911; A.N., F7 13331. M/3075. Note of December 20, 1911; M/1494. Note of December 15, 1911; M/3065.U. Note of December 16, 1911; P.P., Note of December 21, 1911; A.N., F7 12909, A.P.P., Note of February 15, 1912 and other notes of February 1912; Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 182.
106. A.N., F7 13331, M/3164.U. Note of February 6, 1912; A.N., F7 12908. M/6449. Note of February 3, 1912; A.P.P., Ba/927, Police agent "Vitry," Note of December 21, 1911.
107. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 184–187.
108. Ibid., 184–191; A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of February 28, 1912; Grave, op.cit., 236–238; *Les Temps Nouveaux*, August 24, 1912.
109. Ibid., 184–193; A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of February 28, 1912; Grave, op.cit., 236–238.
110. A.P.P., Ba/927, note by the Prefect of Police probably dated November 1, 1911 referring to the authorization by the Minister of the Interior.
111. A.P.P., Ba 927, Police agent "Chardin," Notes of December 8 and 22, 1911.
112. A.P.P., Ba/927, Police agent "Vitry," Notes of January 17 and 24, February 1 and 7, 1912; Police agent "Aelard," note of February 8, 1912; Police agent "Lyon," note of February 10, 1912; *Le Rappel*, February 11, 1912; *La Patrie*, February 12, 1912.
113. *L'Humanité*, February 4, 1912, "Les obsèques d'Aernoult."
114. A.N., F7 12908, Prefecture of Police, Note of December 12, 1911 and Note of December 13, 1911; A.N., F7 13331. M/3075. Note of December 20, 1911; M/1494. Note of December 15, 1911; M/3065.U. Note of December 16, 1911; Prefecture of Police, Note of December 21, 1911; A.N., F7 12909, Prefecture of Police, Note of February 15, 1912 and other notes of February 1912; Prefecture of Police, Note of February 7, 1912; A.P.P., Ba/927 has copies of this poster as well as posters by other groups participating in the funeral demonstration. A.P.P., Ba/927, Police agent "Giroflé," note of January 27, 1912.
115. L.G.S., #1, February 14–20, 1912. German antimilitarism was also applauded by Hervé.
116. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 193.

117. *Le Matin*, February 12, 1912, "Cent mille manifestants conduisent le corps d'Aernoult au cimetière."
118. A.N., F7 12908. M/6463. February 8, 1912 and M/6466. February 9, 1912. The Ministry of Interior had predicted 20,000 people at the rally. A.N., F7 12908, Prefecture of Police, February 12, 1912. Here the police spoke of 150,000–200,000 people at the rally. A.P.P., Ba/513. Note of February 11, 1912. On the day of the funeral, police predicted 25,000 people would attend. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912. The socialist daily spoke of 120,000 people. L.G.S., #7, February 14–20, 1912. The Hervéist weekly believed 150–200,000 people had participated. An *Édition Spéciale* of *La Guerre Sociale* on February 11, 1912, the day of the rally, included a letter by Dreyfus in favor of a new trial for Rousset.
119. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912.
120. *La Libre Parole*, "Billet du Matin," and "Ce n'est pas le moment!"
121. L.G.S., #7, February 14–20, 1912; A.N., F7 12908, Algiers, January 30, 1912. Note of the Governor-General of Algeria to Minister of the Interior; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, February 3, 1912, February 6, 1912, and February 7, 1912; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 6 1912; *L'Humanité*, February 7, 1912; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 12, 1912; A.N., F7 12908. Note of February 8, 1912. Commissariat Special to the Director of the *Sûreté Générale* and Note of February 9, 1912. Prefect of the Pyrénées-Orientales to Ministry of Interior. Thuillier, as a delegate of the C.D.S., accompanied the body on the trip along with a man named Hayer, a Parisian funeral director who represented the Aernoult family (and perhaps *La Guerre Sociale*?).
122. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, "Funérailles Grandioses," February 12, 1912.
123. *Le Petit Parisien*, "Les obsèques du disciplinaire Aernoult," February 12, 1912.
124. Ibid.; *Le Matin*, February 12, 1912, "Cent mille manifestants conduisent le corps d'Aernoult au cimetière."
125. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912, "Paris Ouvrier Contre Les Bagnes Militaires"; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, "Funérailles Grandioses," February 12, 1912.
126. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912.
127. *Gil Blas*, February 12, 1912, "Les bagarres et les charges," Verneuil.
128. *Le Matin*, February 12, 1912.
129. *Le Petit Parisien*, February 12, 1912.
130. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912.
131. A.N., F7 12908. Paris. Prefecture of Police. Note of February 12, 1912. Socialists believed that the sad and resigned attitude of the omnipresent Prefect of Police verified police blame in earlier disturbances.
132. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, "Funérailles Grandioses," February 12, 1912.
133. *L'Echo de Paris*, February 12, 1912, "La Retraite," Franc-Nohain.
134. *L'Autorité*, February 12, 1912.
135. *L'Humanité*, February 12, 1912; *L'Echo de Paris*, February 12, 1912, "La Retraite," Franc-Nohain. Discrepancies occurred regarding the numbers of arrested and wounded; undoubtedly the information was gathered at different times.
136. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 196. "By the end of the day roughly twenty demonstrators had been arrested and fifteen policemen wounded, some 'rather seriously.'" A.N., F7 12908, (supplementary report, Prefect of Police, February 11, 1912).
137. A.P.P., Ba/927, note of February 13, 1912.
138. An *Édition Spéciale* of *La Guerre Sociale* on February 11, 1912, the day of the obsequies included a letter by Dreyfus in favor of a new trial for Rousset. Merle's letter had appeared in an *Édition Spéciale* of February 10?, 1912. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and *L'Humanité* on February 12, 1912 carried Dreyfus's letter as well as the Manifesto he signed for the *Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*. Other signers of the Manifesto included members of the latter *Comité* such as Anatole France, Pierre Laval, Charles Seignebos, and Alfred Naquet.
139. *La Guerre Sociale*, "*Manifesto of the Comité de l'Affaire Rousset*," February 11, 1912.

140. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 193–194. Certainly, timing the arrival of Aernoult's remains to coincide with a decision over Rousset had been a longstanding goal among militants. Despite their animosity, presumably both Thuillier and de Marmande shared a concern for the fate of Rousset, whatever their motives.
141. A.N., F7 13330. Various notes show cooperation by the two papers at meetings and demonstrations against the new military law. Miller, op.cit., 133.
142. A.N., F7 13326. Note of February 22, 1912 written by Eugène Merle at *La Guerre Sociale* to Miguel Almereyda at the Villa Eucalyptus in Cagnes-sur-Mer(?).
143. A.P.P., Ba/1499. Police agent "Finot." Note of March 22, 1912.
144. Miller, op.cit., 168.
145. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 181.
146. Miller, op.cit., 133, 168, 181. Many on the Left were hostile because they perceived the law "as a direct attack on the purported influence of antimilitarism in the military." This law made it easier to immediately send soldiers as well as civilians to the African battalions, the *Bats d'Af*, because it applied to: "1) individuals sentenced to at least three months in prison for provocation to desertion or insubordination; 2) individuals sentenced two or more times (total duration of at least two months) for defamation or harm toward the army and navy, and for provocations toward servicemen aimed at deterring them from their military duties and obedience toward superiors." Some among the press called it a "new *loi scélérate*," and it certainly aroused widespread protests on the Left.
147. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 196–197; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, February 12, 1912.
148. *Le Temps*, February 12, 1912, "Les retraites militaries en musique," and February 13, 1912, "Le Manifestation D'Hier Et L'Antimilitarisme."
149. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 197–201.
150. Ibid., 201–210.
151. Ibid., 210–213.
152. L.G.S., #40, October 5–11, 1911, "La C.G.T. et le Parti Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie; "'Le désarmement des haines: la réponse des guesdistes du Nord," Un Sans Patrie.
153. A.P.P., Ba/1470. Police agent "Lyon." Number 62910. Note dated September 10, 1912.
154. A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of February 28, 1912; Grave, op.cit., 236–238.
155. A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of October 2, 1912; October 6, 1912 and P.P., Note of October 23, 1912; L.G.S., #39, September 25–October 1, 1912, "Enfin libre." The C.D.S. accused de Marmande of unnecessarily spending 5,000 francs of its money while he was in Algeria; A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of October 24, 1912. Griffuelhes accused de Marmande of being a police spy.
156. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 186–187.
157. Ibid., 227.
158. A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of July 28, 1912. The brawl signaled the termination of Hervéist membership on the C.D.S. Almereyda, Tissier, Merle, and René Dolié fought and then exited together. Almereyda was accused of seeking to gain control of the C.D.S. publication. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, an article sometime between October 10–15, 1912, "Réponse à *La Guerre Sociale*."
159. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912.
160. A.N., F7 12909, P.P., Note of August 30, 1912.
161. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 161–239; Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair ...," op.cit., 14–18.
162. A.N., F7 12909. Handwritten notes from Rousset to Merle dated September 24 and 26, 1912.
163. L.G.S., #39, September 25–October 1, 1912, "Enfin libre"; A.P.P., Ba/513. Note of July 21, 1912. Merle had attacked de Marmande for being too indulgent to Minister of War Millerand.
164. L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "Pourquoi Rousset n'est pas venu à Paris."
165. A.N., F7 12909. Préfecture du Rhone. Agent "Lyon," Note of October 3, 1912. In early October 1912 de Marmande and Rousset were guests of the C.D.S. of Marseilles even though

the C.D.S. leadership in Paris had threatened the Marseilles affiliate. A.N., F7 12909. Commissariat Spécial to the Minister of the Interior. Number 10501. October 4, 1912; L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912. "Pourquoi Rousset n'est pas venu à Paris." The great rally planned for Rousset at the Cirque de Paris in early October 1912 was not a great success. *La Guerre Sociale* connected government cancellations of other rallies for Rousset to the divisions and rivalries among the former partners in the campaign.

166. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 227–231.
167. *La Bataille Syndicaliste* and the C.D.S. accused Merle of deliberately withholding information from a visit to Algeria funded by the C.D.S. They stressed their efforts to avoid secessions from the C.D.S.
168. L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "Pourquoi Rousset n'est pas venu à Paris"; L.G.S., #42, October 16–22, 1912, "Réponse à une réponse."; L.G.S., October 10–15?, 1912, "Réponse à *La Guerre Sociale*" by the C.D.S.; A.N. F7 12909; A.N., F7 13571. M/6927. Note of August 26, 1912. "La C.G.T., le P.S.U. et *La Guerre Sociale*." According to the Ministry of Interior, the syndicalists saw a virtual conspiracy of the S.F.I.O. and *La Guerre Sociale* against them. "In this *affaire* it was *La Guerre Sociale* that had been the sneakiest. Hervé was fairly sincere in his opinions but he was surrounded by a band of unscrupulous *arrivistes* ..." After their promotion of a *Parti Révolutionnaire*, violence, and sabotage, "Hervé and his band today see that their project has failed. After having created a prosperous newspaper with the help of all types of anarchists, the Hervéists now believe it is time for them to obtain some spoils to compensate themselves for their troubles. Thus they have all moved toward the P.S.U., that nursery of well-rewarded politicians." The syndicalists apparently believed *La Guerre Sociale*, before it failed, would soon become a weekly version of *L'Humanité* and Hervé, though not anyone else on his staff, would become a Deputy.
169. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 217–218.
170. Ibid., 217–220.
171. Ibid., 225.
172. Ibid., 217–227. Cerullo cites A.N., F7 12909 and the C.D.S. Bulletin #7 dated sometime in November or December 1912 and A.N., F7 12909, report of October 3, 1912, report, Prefecture of Police, Paris, October 3, 1912; L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "Pourquoi Rousset n'est pas venu à Paris."
173. *L'Humanité*, October 15, 1912, "Nous entendons rester à l'écart."
174. A.N., F7 13571. M/3369.U. Note of September 24, 1912.
175. L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "Pourquoi Rousset n'est pas venu à Paris."
176. L.G.S., #41, October 16–22, 1912, "Réponse à une réponse."
177. The ultimate fate of Rousset is interesting and perhaps worthy of note, given his release after the death of Brancoli. The former military prisoner remained involved in the antimilitarist movement, and so he was monitored by French police. He became enraged when the army tried to reactivate him in 1913 and managed to get that reactivation suspended for a year due to ill health. In the summer of 1914 (but before the war?) he expressed hopes that a social revolution could arise which would suppress military service completely. When the war came, he was reactivated, stationed in Tunisia, had no further dealings with military justice, and left the army in March 1919. Managing to abandon his criminal career, he found work as a mechanic at a precision-instruments factory and "lived conjugally" with a woman named Jeanne Beury who was obviously pregnant by December 1913. She may have been that "little working girl" he met after his return from Algeria for whom de Marmande was unwilling or unable to help fund in Paris. Living in and around Paris, supplementing his income by selling perfume and other products, including his memoirs, he finally got a house by 1913, already having a daughter. He remained affiliated with the C.D.S., thus fulfilling another promise to de Marmande to not only give up a life of crime but to work for the cause of antimilitarism. Though he still loathed the military, he was a temperate critic for

the soldiers and men who worked in the *bagnes militaries*. He supported the mutineers in 1917, called for the destruction of the Ministry of War at a gathering at the Salle Wagram on February 13, 1920, and later that year charged young men with cowardice if they failed to refuse to join a mobilization in another war. He identified with political prisoners and was active on their behalf. In 1930 he abandoned the anarchist and syndicalist groups that he had been aligned with and joined the P.C.F. due to its attention to political prisoners. He eventually married a certain Marie-Louise Mollion and had an apparently normal, uneventful private life. Occasionally, the old Rousset made an appearance. Once, when he thought he recognized a sergeant from the North African disciplinary companies, he had to be dragged off him. In addition, he was ready to confront anyone who tarnished his reputation. Eventually he came to conform to the image that the *enragés* had made of him throughout the Affair: a man with a passion for justice and willing to fight for it. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 238–239.

178. Ibid., 228.
179. Miller, op.cit., 192.
180. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 228. I could not find Cerullo's reference in Miller on page 181 regarding that Yvetot article.
181. John Cerullo, "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …," op.cit., 5. For John Cerullo, this Affair "raises questions about the nature of military justice in any democratic civic culture." Instead of indicting the military for its atavistic and anti-democratic culture as the Left seemed (and often seems) destined to do, Cerullo looks to deeper, broader, and more universal issues about the benefits and dangers of insulating the military from political interference. The defenders of military law and institutions during *la belle époque* often argued "that this 'exceptional jurisdiction' served something higher and more precious than the mundane, largely commercial interests advanced in conventional law courts." The military believed that the virtues of discipline, duty, and self-sacrifice were so vital to the nation that political actors ought never to be able to inject narrow partisan interests into this nearly sacred realm. From the military perspective their courts and procedures needed to be "more scrupulously insulated from contamination by 'politics' than civilian courts were … Yet, in the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, those walls were successfully breached by political leaders who were able to represent this exceptional jurisdiction as an affront to the core principle of democracy: the accountability of all forms of power, including the military's internal legal system, to representatives of the sovereign people. The issue in the Aernoult-Rousset Affair, then, was timeless: the insularity of a judicial realm expressing 'higher' values versus basic democratic accountability." Cerullo, op.cit., "The Aernoult-Rousset Affair …," 5. Yet for Cerullo, the real irony "of the Aernoult-Rousset Affair as a historical phenomenon [was]—its apparent lack, or at least dearth, of direct, demonstrable consequences." Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 231. Except perhaps for the relocation of the *bagnes militaries* to metropolitan France, the Aernoult–Rousset Affair had virtually no real effect on the basic institutions of military justice, despite revelations in the strictly military sphere that "were arguably more damaging to the [military] jurisdiction than those of the Dreyfus case …" The reason for the lack of long-term consequences was "the increasingly nationalistic climate of the time." Whatever momentum the affair had created simply dissipated amidst the disarray of the tragicomic dispute between the C.D.S. and de Marmande. The military justice system itself remained substantially unreformed on the eve of World War I, but the Aernoult-Rousset Affair did reveal that the military jurisdiction was vulnerable to political pressure. After Aernoult's funeral and Rousset's return, the increasing force of nationalism would protect the military justice system, but sustained political action in the future could still make it accountable. Before the war, ironically, politics had saved it from itself. Cerullo, *Minotaur*, op.cit., 231–233.
182. Miller, op.cit., 212.

Chapter 13

1. Peyronnet, op.cit., 166. Peyronnet saw these secret organizations as parallel to Hervéist efforts to win over the military yet he called the new secret Hervéist groups "transformed and reduced" compared to earlier secret organizations. In view of the nebulous nature of the earlier organizations, Peyronnet's explanation seems faulty. As contradictory as it might appear, Hervé's shift grew out of his most extreme expressions.
2. A.N., F7 13326, Note of March 25, 1912, "Les associations de malfaiteurs"; A.N., F7 13053. This *carton* has individual files on many leading revolutionaries as well as some less well-known militants, many of whom were members of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires.* A.N., F7 13325. This *carton* has some information on the names and addresses of several dozen members of the J.G.R. Many of these *Jeunes Gardes* were young and previously unknown.
3. Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, Chapter 1, "World Without Escape, 1902–1912," Part Two, translated by Peter Sedgwick, (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, Ltd. 1984 [1951]), 37.
4. A.N., F7 13326. Note of March 25, 1912, op.cit.
5. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 165, 167. The police had an assortment of sometimes contradictory ideas and explanations about such organizations. In the space of three pages Heuré repeated the same seemingly contradictory police reports. "They were split into groups of ten men armed with handguns, commanded by a leader who was the only one in contact with the executive committee." Heuré, op.cit., 168.
6. Ibid., 168.
7. Almosnino, op.cit., 93. A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'"* 51–56.
8. Méric, op.cit., Séries II, 1931, 165.
9. L.G.S., #15, April 12–18, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes" and "Communiqué des Jeunes"; Peyronnet, op.cit., 156–157; Almosnino, op.cit, 93.
10. L.G.S., #20, May 17–23, 1911, "A l'anarchie"; Méric, op.cit., Séries II, 1931, 165.
11. Almosnino, op.cit., 93–94. One of Victor Méric's issues of *Les Hommes du Jour* was dedicated to Almereyda. *Les Hommes du Jour*, No. 180, July 1, 1911, "Miguel Almereyda," Victor Méric.
12. L.G.S., #15, April 12–18, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes," "Communiqué des Jeunes"; Peyronnet, op.cit., 156–159; Méric, op.cit., Séries I, 1930, 30–79; Almosnino, op.cit., 93–94, 102. Almosnino described Tissier and Goldsky as anarchists who were among the most prominent members of the J.G.R. Tissier would eventually follow Hervé in all his permutations while Goldsky came to despise Hervé and his new ideas. René Dolié was another prominent young member who went on a hunger strike after his incarceration following the S.S.R. disclosure trials.
13. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 1930, 30–79; idem., op.cit., Séries II, 1931, op.cit., 165–171, 181–182; Almosnino, op.cit., 93–94, 102.
14. L.G.S., #17, April 26–May 2, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes et le Premier Mai," M.A.
15. Peyronnet, op.cit., 156–159.
16. In mid-May 1911, four hundred people attended a "punch" given upon the release of one of the J.G.R. members who had been arrested on May Day. L.G.S., #20, May 17–23, 1911, "Confiance." On June 23, 1911 Almereyda addressed two hundred members of the formation with a violent diatribe against the *Camelots du Roi*. A.P.P., Ba/769. Note of June 25, 1911. The police estimated the numbers of the J.G.R. as somewhere between 300 and 400, while *La Guerre Sociale* claimed 600. Almosnino argued that there were around 400 members in the Parisian region. Almosnino, op.cit., 94.
17. Almosnino, op.cit., 94. See Almosnino's annex, 166. See Appendix B. "*Le Chant des Jeunes Gardes*" by Gaston Montéhus.

"Prenez garde! Prenez garde!
Vous les bourgeois, les repus, les gavés!
V'la la jeun'garde, V'la la jeun'garde,
Qui descend sur le pavé …,"

"Watch out! Watch out!
You bourgeois, you satiated, you stuffed!
Here come the *Jeunes Gardes*, Here come the *Jeunes Gardes*,
Who stride down the street …"

18. A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'"* 51–56; *La Guerre Sociale*, July 17, 1907.
19. Almosnino, op.cit., 93.
20. A.N., F7 13568, *"Travail-Spécial-Septembre, 1911-C.G.T.—'Association de Malfaiteurs,'"* 54.
21. Almosnino, op.cit., 93. Almosnino, Heuré, and Peyronnet cite the same, sometimes contradictory, police sources.
22. Ibid.
23. L.G.S., #14, 5–11 April 1911, "Ni Antisemite Ni Antifranc-maçon," Un Sans Patrie; A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2]. 5337, Note from Préfet de police, Paris, April 20, 1911; Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 96–102; Peyronnet, op.cit., 58, 156–159.
24. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2]. 25337/45. Be that as it may, Almosnino argued that the royalists were the first to attack. Almosnino, op.cit., 96.
25. L.G.S., June 7, 1911, "*L'Action Française* veut-elle la bataille?" M.A.
26. L.G.S., #23, June 7–13, 1911, "La perfidie de M. Pujo," M.A.; "Des Témoins" M.A.; *L'Action Française*, June 3, 1911, "Jeunes Gardes Ministériels?" Maurice Pujo. Pujo claimed that *Président du Conseil* Monis was angry with the *Camelots du Roi* due to their success in the Bernstein Affair (in which a supposedly anti-patriotic play by a Jewish writer was forced to close) which made the government and its police look weak and ineffective in the face of royalist antics. While the C.G.T., after the Dreyfus Affair, would not let itself become the dupe of the Jews and Radicals a second time, according to Pujo, the Hervéists were supposedly less fastidious about the sources of their funding.
27. Méric, op.cit., Séries I, 1930, 30–79; idem., op.cit., 1931, Séries II, 165–171, 181–182; Rebérioux, *La république radical?*, op.cit., 231; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un Provocateur* … op.cit., 123; Manévy, op.cit., 26. For a time after the war the three papers may have shared some of the same offices. In 1910 *L'Action Française* had offices some distance away at 10 rue Croix-des-Petits-Champs, east of the Palais Royal near the Rue Montesquieu.
28. Méric, op.cit., Séries II, 1931, 167–169; Peyronnet, op.cit., 58, 156–159; L.G.S., #13, March 29–April 4, 1911; L.G.S., #14, April 5–11, 1911; L.G.S., #15, April 12–18, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes."
29. Méric, op.cit., Series II, 1931, 181–183; idem., op.cit., Series I, 1930, 30–79.
30. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 169–170. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13071.
31. Ibid., 170.
32. L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Avant d'être bâillonné," G.H.
33. During the Postal Strikes of 1909, Hervé had shown little reticence in supporting sabotage. In response to the Railway Strike of October 1910, he still praised sabotage and other illegal actions "as long as no one was injured." L.G.S., #46 October 26–November 1, 1910, "Après la bataille," Un Sans Patrie.
34. Gaston Faralicq, *Trente ans dans les rues de Paris*, (Paris: E. Grevin, 1934), 182–189.
35. Almosnino, op.cit., 95.

36. L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes et le Premier Mai," M.A.; "Simple Récit—Le guet-apens du Manège Saint-Paul, les brutalités policières et ce qui s'ensuivit," Un Témoin; *L'Humanité*, November 11, 1911, "Encore 2 Ans de Prison pour Gustave Hervé," Jean Jaurès and Jules Uhry. Goldsky cited these events when he was a witness for Hervé at his November trial.
37. L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Vers la conquête de la rue," Un Sans Patrie. Almosnino, apparently using this article, argued that at the Manège Saint Paul the J.G.R. for the first time used its new combat techniques—employing disciplined forces, armed with rattan canes, unafraid to confront the police. Several police were injured, and in the ensuing weeks the Hervéists would not hesitate to claim victory in their initial public demonstration. Almosnino, op.cit., 95.
38. L.G.S., #19, May 10–16, 1911, "Avertissement avec frais," Un Sans Patrie.
39. Emily Clero may have been the common law wife of Almereyda because she was apparently occasionally referred to as Madame Almereyda and was the mother of Almereyda's son, Jean Vigo.
40. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale* of May 31, 1911, "La première aux lépiniens."
41. A.P.P., Ba/769. Note of May 31, 1911; L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "A la correctionelle!" On July 25, 1911 about 150 *Jeunes Gardes* went to the Place Vendôme to protest the Minister of Justice Cruppi's judicial measures against the J.G.R., the C.G.T., the *cheminots,* and even the *Camelots du Roi*! This demonstration, too, did not fail to produce casualties on both sides. L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Contre les bourreaux." Although he was later pursued by the authorities for the violence that day, Almereyda did not appear at this trial because he was convalescing for several weeks (from illness or injuries suffered at the hands of the police?). He was eventually sentenced to six months *par defaut* (non-appearance in court). July 1911 was the era of the most sensational S.S.R. disclosures and "inquests," so Almereyda's injuries sustained at the end of May and his other possible physical problems must not have affected him earlier in July. After the Métivier Affair and the threat of imminent arrest, he went to Belgium, but eventually returned to face the charges against him. When he went before the tribunal on November 13, 1911 for the charges arising from the events of late May (and late July?), he claimed self defense against a police attack as his excuse for the violence. However, an anti-Dreyfusard judge still sentenced him to two months in jail, but he never had to serve those two months in prison due to a pardon. Almosnino, op.cit., 95–96.
42. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 168; L.G.S., #22, *Edition Spécial*, June 6, 1911.
43. Almosnino, op.cit., 96.
44. L.G.S., #23, June 7–13, 1911, "La perfidie de M. Pujo," M.A.
45. Méric, op.cit., Séries II, 1931, 171. "Long live the King! Down with the slut!" The slut was, of course, the Third Republic.
46. Almosnino, op.cit,. 97.
47. Méric, op.cit., Series II, 1931, 174, *passim*; L.G.S., #27, July 5–11, 1911, "Camelote royale," and "Face aux barbares"; A.P.P., Ba/769. Notes of June 25, July 1, July 6, and July 9, 1911. Evidence of preferential treatment to the royalists by the police is not readily apparent in police files. Peyronnet, op.cit., 159; *L'Action Française*, May 29, 1911, "La Manifestation," Maurice Pujo. Pujo blamed police brutality against the *Camelots du Roi* at the time of the Feast of Joan of Arc for the police wish to appear objective because the same day they would have to deal harshly with the revolutionaries at Père Lachaise celebrating the Commune.
48. Almosnino, op.cit., 97; *Les Hommes du Jour*, No. 80, July 1911, "Miguel Almereyda," Victor Méric.
49. Méric, op.cit., Séries I, 1930, 52.
50. In the 1920's and 1930's Hervé's *La Victoire* created a proto-fascist league called the *Jeunes Gardes* with some of the same leaders as the pre-war group. The *Jeunes Gardes* of the post-war era wore tricolor armbands and they supported a set of ideas almost diametrically opposite

those of the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires.* Nevertheless, many of the activities of the two formations were the same.

51. Méric, op.cit., Séries II, 1931, 181–183; idem., op.cit., Séries I, 1930, 30–79; Almosnino, op.cit., 97.
52. Almosnino, op.cit, 97. These two shifts are certainly connected but they led in very different directions and were undoubtedly differently motivated.
53. Ibid., 98.
54. Jean-Paul Brunet, *La Police de l' Ombre*, op.cit.; Berlière, "The Professionalisation of the Police Under the Third Republic in France, 1875–1914," op cit., 36–54; idem, *La Police des mœurs sous la IIIe République*, (Paris: Seuil, 1992); idem, *Le Préfet Lépine: Vers la naissance de la police moderne,* (Paris: Denoël, 1993); idem, *Le Monde des Polices en France*, (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1996); Léon Ameline, op.cit.; Miller, op cit.; Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State*, op.cit.
55. Almosnino, op.cit., 98.
56. Julliard, *Clemenceau...*, op.cit., 148.
57. L.G.S., #24, June 14–20, 1911, "Le S.S.R." G.H.
58. Almosnino, op.cit., 98–99.
59. Ibid., 99.
60. Guichard was also the head of the Parisian *Sûreté.*
61. L.G.S., #24, June 14–20, 1911, "Le S.S.R." G.H. Hervé said the S.S.R. was independent of both *La Guerre Sociale* and the *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, and he appealed for financial support for the "*contre-police secrèté*." His assessment of S.S.R. independence was ridiculous and his appeal for funds went largely unanswered.
62. A.P.P., BA/1604. Note by police agent "Finot," July 27, 1911. Agent "Finot" believed that S.S.R. antics during the summer of 1911, especially during the Métivier Affair, had created a general mood of suspicion within the revolutionary milieus. He believed that the entire revolutionary movement, the C.G.T. in particular, was seriously damaged. Hervé was aware of this according to "Finot," but he had difficulties calling off his own S.S.R.
63. L.G.S., #28, July 12–18, 1911, "Échec au flic!"; L.G.S., #29, July 19–25, 1911, "Second raté"; L.G.S., #24, June 14–20, 1911, "Le S.S.R.," G.H.; L.G.S., #47, November 22–28, 1911, "Le Service de Sureté Révolutionnaire," Un Sans Patrie; Also see numbers 30 and 30A of 1911.
64. See Faralicq, op.cit., 190–209 for an interesting account of the *anarchisant* Bonnot-Garnier gang of 1912 which the police assumed had some tie to Serge and others at *L'Anarchie.*
65. L.G.S., #24, June 14–20, 1911, "Policiers pris au piège"; *Le Matin*, June 10, 1911; *L'Humanite*, June 10, 1911, "Un Nid de Policiers et de Provocateurs est decouverte par la 'Guerre Sociale,'" Barthélemy Mayeras; *L'Humanité*, June 13, 1911; L.G.S., #47, November 22–28, 1911, "Le Service de Sureté Révolutionnaire," Un Sans Patrie; Almosnino, op.cit., 99–100.
66. Newhall, op.cit., 269–270.
67. L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Les leçons de l'Affaire Métivier," and "L'Affaire Métivier"; L.G.S., 30A, *Edition Spéciale*, July 28, 1911, "Les vengeurs de Métivier," Un Sans Patrie; Julliard, *Clemenceau ...*, op.cit., 144–174; Brunet, op.cit., 111–123, 216, 249; René de Marmande, *L'Intrigue Florentine*, (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1922), op.cit.; Idem, *Dans la fourmilière politique*, preface de Joseph Caillaux, (Paris: Flammarion, 1928); Almosnino, op.cit., 100–101.
68. Brunet, op.cit., 115–116; de Marmande, *L'Intrigue Florentine*, op.cit., 186–190; Julliard, *Clemenceau ...*, op.cit., 161–162.
69. Almosnino, op.cit., 101.
70. Brunet, op.cit., 111–123, 216, 249; Julliard, *Clemenceau ...*, op.cit., 144–174; Almosnino, op.cit., 101; René de Marmande, *L'Intrigue Florentine*, op.cit.; L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Les leçons de l'Affaire Métivier," and "L'Affaire Métivier"; L.G.S., 30A, *Edition Spéciale*, July 28, 1911, "Les vengeurs de Métivier," Un Sans Patrie; Julliard, op.cit., *Clemenceau*

…, 143–174; L.G.S., #32, August 9–15, 1911, "Chez les exilé—une journée à Bruxelles," Victor Méric; L.G.S., #40A, *Numéro Spéciale*, October 8, 1911; L.G.S., #40B, *Numéro Spéciale*, October 8, 1911; L.G.S., #41, October 11–17, 1911; A.N., F7 14785. Packet E in this *carton* has much information on the perquisitions of *La Guerre Sociale* and the arrest of Hervéists of the S.S.R.

71. L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Les leçons de l'Affaire Métivier," and "L'Affaire Métivier"; L.G.S., 30A, *Edition Spéciale*, July 28, 1911, "Les vengeurs de Métivier," Un Sans Patrie; Julliard, *Clemenceau* …, op.cit., 143–174. In the late spring Almereyda may have been in hiding in southern France when he was in a convalescent state after wounds from May 31. L.G.S., #32, August 9–15, 1911, "Chez les exilé—une journée à Bruxelles," Victor Méric; L.G.S., #40A, *Numéro Spéciale*, October 8, 1911; A.N., F7 14785; Almosnino, op.cit., 101–102.
72. Serge, *Mémoires d'un Révolutionnaire, 1901–1941*, (Paris: Seuil, 1951), op.cit, 36.
73. Almosnino, op.cit., 102.
74. L.G.S., #40B, *Numéro Spéciale*, October 8, 1911; L.G.S., #41, October 11–17, 1911; Almosnino, op.cit., 102. Almereyda thus gained not only an acquittal for himself but for the other indicted Hervéists.
75. Almosnino, op.cit., 103.
76. The deployment of French troops into the interior of Morocco was counter to the terms of the Act of Algeciras (that ended the first Moroccan crisis) and the Franco-German Accord of 1909. Germany then sent the gunboat *Panther* to the Moroccan port of Agadir on July 1, 1911 under the pretext of protecting German trade interests. This attempt to break the Anglo-French entente failed but it led France to give Germany compensation in the French Equatorial African colony of Middle Congo which was too much for chauvinists and political operators like Clemenceau, who saw in the episode an opening in which to discredit a rival.
77. René de Marmande, *Dans la fourmilière politique*, op.cit.; Brunet, op.cit., 120–121; Julliard, *Clemenceau* …, op.cit., 144–174.
78. Brunet, op.cit., 115–116; De Marmande, *L'Intrigue Florentine*, op.cit., 186–190; Julliard, *Clemenceau* …, op.cit., 161–162.
79. Julliard, *Clemenceau*, op.cit., 143–174. Julliard argued that Caillaux introduced police agents into the C.G.T. to increase syndicalist problems which helped precipitate the "crisis in syndicalism." 172.
80. Almosnino, op.cit., 103.
81. As in many other sensational revelations, even accurate ones, the motivations of the revolutionary watchdogs were apt to be more diverse than what they were willing to share.
82. Almosnino, op.cit., 146.
83. L.G.S., #21, May 22–28, 1912, "Aux Jeunes Gardes," *Le Comité*; L.G.S., #32, August 7–13, 1912, "Aux Jeunes Gardes."; L.G.S., #43, October 23–29, 1912.
84. A.P.P., Ba/752. Report of June 21–28, 1913 and Report of July 12–19, 1913.
85. Méric, op.cit., Series II, 1931, 181–183. In L.G.S., #32 and 33 on August 6 and 7, 1914 there was an announcement for all *Jeunes Gardes Révolutionnaires*, *Jeunesses Socialistes*, *Syndicalistes*, *Laïques*, or *Républicaines* who could not go to the front to come to the office of *La Guerre Sociale* for assistance to speed their inductions.
86. A.P.P., Ba/752. Report of June 21–28, 1913 and Report of July 12–19, 1913; Almosnino, op.cit., 113.
87. L.G.S., #11, March 12–18, 1913, "Contre la vague nationaliste," G.H.; A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly report of the *Préfecture de Police*. March 1913 and weekly reports of the *Préfecture de Police*, July 12–19, 1913; L.G.S., #11A, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, March 16, 1913; L.G.S., #12, March 19–25, 1913, "Le réveil de popolo," G.H.; Almosnino, op.cit., 116. As late as April 1914 he talked about reconstituting the J.G.R. L.G.S., #15, April 8–14, 1914, "La manifestation contre Briand," G.H.
88. L.G.S., #11A, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, March 16, 1913.
89. *L'Humanité*, March 17, 1913, "Bagarres & Incidents; La police commence."

90. A.P.P., Ba/752. Weekly reports of the *Préfecture de Police*, July 12–19, 1913. *L'Humanité*, July 12, 1913, "Pour La Démonstration de Démain Au Pré-Saint-Gervais"; "Dispositions prises par les organisateurs," "Instructions De L'Union," and "Les rendez-vous des Organisations"; *L'Humanité*, July 13, 1913, "Contre les 3 ans, Contre l'Arbitraire: Au Pré-Saint-Gervais." *L'Humanité*, July 14, 1913, "Nouvelle Affirmat Du Peuple De Paris"; "La Participation du Parti à la Manifestation de la C.G.T."
91. This clash led to several arrests and property damage amounting to 2500 francs. The *retraites militaries* were weekly military marches by soldiers into the streets of Paris where they were expected to generate patriotic feeling and national unity. These patriotic parades generally took place on Saturday evenings and were associated with the so-called "nationalist revival." They were less than favorably received by the extreme Left. Miller, op.cit., 181.
92. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 199.
93. Almosnino, op.cit., 116–117. Almosnino cites A.N., F7 13969. Charles-Albert, Pierre Laval, and Léon Jouhaux were described as Almereyda's "former companions" who marched with him in 1913.
94. L.G.S., #15, April 8–14, 1914, "La manifestation contre Briand," G.H. That statement again implies that the J.G.R. were dormant or decommissioned by then.
95. Chassé, *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 11, 12, 1935.

Chapter 14

1. The disarmament of hatreds became a general approach in late 1910 following the railway strike but revolutionary concentration had always implied that idea at least on the extreme Left. Peyronnet, op.cit., 167–168.
2. Peyronnet, op.cit., 179–180.
3. Goldberg, op.cit., 414. The fall of Briand's Second Ministry due to the rise of anti-Briand Radicals led by Caillaux saw Ernest Monis, a colorless senator from the Gironde, form a ministry from March 2, 1911 until June 27, 1911 which included all the *vedettes* of Radical-Socialism. The abstention of the socialists from a ministry that mirrored the spirit of the *Bloc* must be ascribed to mixed feelings and reactions among socialists.
4. L.G.S., #17, April 26–May 2, 1911, "Le Congrès de St. Quentin – L'Agonie du Guesdisme," Un Sans Patrie.
5. L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Le livre de Jaurès," Un Sans Patrie.
6. L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911 "Le livre de Jaurès," Un Sans Patrie.
7. L.G.S., #20, May 17–23, 1911, "Attila au Maroc," Un Sans Patrie.
8. L.G.S., #25, June 21–27, 1911, "A Berlin, quand même." G.H. Hervé argued that air travel would make war obsolete!
9. L.G.S., #26, June 28–July 4, 1911, "La crise du régime," G.H.
10. A pun for *caillot de sang* (blood clot).
11. L.G.S., #29, July 19–25, 1911, "Caillaux de sang," G.H.; L.G.S., #38, September 21–27, 1911; Goldberg, op.cit., 415. The socialists voted against the new ministry. Vyacheslav Plehve was assassinated in 1904 by member of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party. Ironically, Stolypin was rumored to have been assassinated by those who wanted to stop his reform program. Agulhon, op.cit., 123–124. See Agulhon for a brief account of the rise of Caillaux.
12. L.G.S., #31, August 2–8, 1911, "Le voyage à Berlin," Un Sans Patrie.
13. L.G.S., #27, July 5–11, 1911, "Où les bons bougres ne trouvent pas matière à se réjouir" and "Une note de l'organisation de combat"; L.G.S., #28, July 12–18, 1911, "Pour le sabotage, quand même!" G.H.; *Le Matin*, July 5, 1911; *La Petite République*, July 5, 1911.
14. L.G.S., #27, July 5–11, 1911, "Plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre," G.H.
15. L.G.S., #28, July 12–18, 1911, "Le Parti Socialiste et les retraites ouvrières" G.H.

16. L.G.S., #31, August 2–8, 1911, "Le voyage à Berlin," Un Sans Patrie.
17. L.G.S., #32, August 9–15, 1911, "Après l'alerte marocaine," Un Sans Patrie.
18. L.G.S., #27, July 5–11, 1911, "A la moderne Bastille"; L.G.S., #28A, *Numéro Spécial*, July 14, 1911, "La manifestation se fera," "De la Bastille à la Santé," and "14 Juillet 1911," G.H.
19. L.G.S., #29, July 19–25, 1911, "La manifestation du 14 juillet à La Santé." *Bâtiment* met with special censure because it had always been the most militant federation and it then had three of its leaders, Augustin Baritaud, Ferdinand Dumont, and Pierre Viau, in prison.
20. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 134.
21. L.G.S., #23, June 7–13, 1911. Cited in Gaston Coutant, "IL Y A CENT ANS NAISSAIT GASTON COUTÉ," extract from No. 23 of *Le Journal de la Sologne*, 1978, Internet source: http://gastoncoute.free.fr/il_y_a_cent_ans.htm. *Les Amis de Gaston Couté*, 35th Year, No. 41, 1982, 1. Siege Sociale, Musée Gaston Couté, Hotel-de-Ville, Meung-sur-Loire (Loiret). See L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Vers la conquête de la rue," Un Sans Patrie. And "Tête de Bois" by Gaston Couté; Gaston Faralicq, *Trente ans dans les rues de Paris*, (Paris: E. Grevin, 1934), 182–189.
22. L.G.S., #30, July 26–August 1, 1911, "Avant d'être bâilloné," G.H. and "En route pour Clairvaux."
23. The Conciergerie was the oldest remaining part of the Palais de la Cité, the first royal palace in the French capital and a locale used as a prison during the French Revolution.
24. L.G.S., #34, August 23–29, 1911, "Dernière heure" and "Les nôtres."
25. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 180; L.G.S., #38, September 21–27, 1911, "A la Concièrgerie"; L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Vers la conquête de la rue," Un Sans Patrie.
26. L.G.S., #36, September 6–12, 1911, "Nos procès" and letter of Gustave Hervé to the *Président des Assises*, Prison de la Concièrgerie, September 5, 1911. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 134.
27. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 134. Heuré's citation appears to be inaccurate here for *L'Humanité*, September 2, 1911.
28. L.G.S., #37, September 13–20, 1911, "*La Guerre Sociale* aux Assises"; *L'Humanité*, September 6, 1911, "Hervé fera défaut," Pierre Renaudel.
29. L.G.S., #39, September 27–October 4, 1911, "Gustave Hervé à Clairvaux."
30. L.G.S., #44, November 1–7, 1911, "Nos procès" and "Les prisoniers politiques sous Caillaux-de-Sang."
31. Ibid.; *Les Temps Nouveaux*, December 2, 1911, "Les opinions de *La Guerre Sociale*," M. Pierrot. One can still view a similar though larger area for female prisoners at the Concièrgerie Museum today, but apparently the area where Hervé was allowed to walk was destroyed for remodeling decades ago.
32. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 180.
33. L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "Gustave Hervé aux Assises—Le Réquisitoire Contre la Police"; L.G.S., #18, May 3–9, 1911, "Les Jeunes Gardes et le Premier Mai," M.A.; "Simple Récit—Le guet-apens du Manège Saint-Paul, les brutalités policières et ce qui s'ensuivit," Un Témoin; *L'Humanité*, November 11, 1911, "Encore 2 Ans de Prison pour Gustave Hervé," Jean Jaurès and Jules Uhry; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 180–181; Almosnino, op.cit., 95.
34. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 180.
35. L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "Gustave Hervé aux Assises—Le Réquisitoire Contre la Police."
36. He did not fail to point out how democratic and proletarian France was not without artisans and some bourgeois elements.
37. L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "Gustave Hervé aux Assises—Le Réquisitoire Contre la Police."
38. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 180–181.

39. L.G.S., #46, November 15–21, 1911, "Après la condamnation," Un Sans Patrie. On January 10, 1912 Hervé lost an appeal concerning part of the sentence which involved an anticolonial article. L.G.S., #3, January 17–23, 1912.
40. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 181; *L'Humanité*, November 11, 1911, "Encore 2 Ans de Prison pour Gustave Hervé," Jean Jaurès and Jules Uhry.
41. L.G.S., May 17, 1911, "Attila au Maroc," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 181–184.
42. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 182–183; *L'Humanité*, January 12, 1912, "Herve va comparaitre une fois de plus devant le jury," Jules Uhry; *L'Humanité*, January 13, 1912, "*La Guerre Sociale* Aux Assises: Les Injustices S'Accumulent," Jules Uhry
43. Almosnino, op.cit., 104. Without specifically giving a formal date to the commencement of this policy, Almosnino tied it to Hervé's realization in 1910 that mainstream socialist leaders were themselves militants of value and they would have to be accommodated.
44. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 184–185.
45. L.G.S., #40, October 5–11, 1911, "La C.G.T. et le Parti Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #42, October 18–24, 1911, "La C.G.T. et le Parti Unifié," Un Sans Patrie; "P.S.U., Libertaires, et C.G.T.," Un Sans Patrie; "Aux communistes-libertaires," M.A.; L.G.S., #43 October 25–31, 1911, "Pour le desarmement des haines," Un Sans Patrie.
46. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 185–186; A.N., F7 13071, Notes of August 1, 1911, October 28, 1912, and October 28, 1912; A.N., F7 13571, Note of September 24, 1912; A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," 25337/45.
47. Ibid., 198.
48. L.G.S., #34, August 23–29, 1911, "Toujours les menaces de guerre," Un Sans Patrie.
49. L.G.S., #36, September 6–12, 1911, "Comparaison," Un Sans Patrie.
50. L.G.S., #37, September 13–20, 1911, "Les socialistes allemands contre la guerre," Un Sans Patrie.
51. L.G.S., #39, 27 September–October 4, 1911, "Paris contre la guerre," Un Sans Patrie; *L'Humanité*, September 25, 1911.
52. L.G.S., #40, October 5–11, 1911, "Plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre," Uns Sans Patrie.
53. L.G.S., #45, November 8–14, 1911, "Pour le désarmement des haines," Sébastien Faure and Un Sans Patrie.
54. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 192; Émile Masson, *Les Bretons et le socialisme*, presentation and notes by Jean-Yves Guiomar, (Paris: Maspero, 1972), 108.
55. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 186.
56. Ibid., 186–187.
57. Ibid., 187; *Le Libertaire*, January 14, 1912.
58. Ibid., 189. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13071, note of January 18, 1912.
59. Peyronnet, op.cit., 193–194. Peyronnet's evidence of economic troubles does not negate the fact that increased expenses derived from costly new offices, circulation expansion, and journalistic success.
60. L.G.S., #26, June 26–July 2, 1912, "La Chanson du Peuple."
61. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 185.
62. L.G.S., #41, October 11–17, 1911, "République de Salauds," Un Sans Patrie; "Avant le Congrès du Parti Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie; "La C.G.T. et le Parti Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie.
63. L.G.S., #44, November 1–7, 1911, "Idistes-Espérantistes."
64. L.G.S., #42, October 18–24, 1911, "Lâches le Congo" Un Sans Patrie; Peyronnet, op.cit., 179–181.
65. L.G.S., #20, May 15–21, 1912, "L'Accord Anglo-Allemand," Un Sans Patrie.
66. L.G.S., #23, May 29–June 4, 1912, "Le massacre des Marocains," Un Sans Patrie.
67. L.G.S., #47, November 22–28, 1911; Julliard, *Clemenceau* …, op.cit., *passim.* Julliard's attack on *La Guerre Sociale* seems to mirror the syndicalist arguments presented in *La Bataille Syndicaliste*.
68. L.G.S., #48, November 29–December 5, 1911, "Assez."

69. L.G.S., #49, December 6–12, 1911, "A deux doigts de la guerre," Un Sans Patrie.
70. Ibid.; L.G.S., #49, December 6–12, 1911, "Deux socialistes réformistes contre le syndicalisme révolutionnaire," Un Sans Patrie.
71. L.G.S., #50, December 13–19, 1911, "Pour le désarmement des haines—quand même!" Un Sans Patrie.
72. L.G.S., #52, December 27, 1911–January 2, 1912, "Propos de fin d'année," Un Sans Patrie.
73. L.G.S., August 2–8, 1911, "Le Voyage a Berlin," Un Sans Patrie; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 184–185.
74. L.G.S., #3, January 17–23, 1912, "Vive l'Allemagne socialiste," Un Sans Patrie and "Les élections allemandes," Un Sans Patrie; *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 185.
75. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Note M. 2392.U. Paris, February 16, 1911.
76. L.G.S., #52, December 27, 1911–January 2, 1912, "Hommage à Gustave Hervé," M.A.; *L'Humanité*, December 28, 1911, "Hommage à Hervé."
77. Faure was a French art historian, essayist and humanitarian socialist.
78. L.G.S., #52, December 27, 1911–January 2, 1912, "Hommage à Gustave Hervé," M.A.; *L'Humanité*, December 28, 1911, "Hommage à Hervé." Most comments claimed Hervé was as calm and fit as ever. The appeals for an amnesty continued in the early issues of 1912; A.P.P., Ba/1470. Note #62910, July 10, 1911; *L'Humanité*, July 10, 1911; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 182. Francis de Pressensé, the President of the League of the Rights of Man, described Hervé as a "new Blanqui."
79. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 190.
80. Ibid., 190–193.
81. *L'Humanité*, February 1, 1912. Among the other prisoners of concern to the *Comité* were the three leaders of *bâtiment:* Baritaud, Dumont, and Viau.
82. L.G.S., #4, January 24–30, 1912, "A propos de leur amnistie," Un Sans Patrie; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 183.
83. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 181–183. Heuré reported that Hervé had attended Basch's class at Rennes toward the end of 1890. Heuré cited *Le Pays*, July 1, 1917; Françoise Basch, *Victor Basch, de l'affaire Dreyfus au crime de la milice*, (Paris: Plon, 1994), 58; A.N., F7 13326 has information on the petition. L.G.S., May 17, 1911, "Attila au Maroc," G.H.
84. L.G.S., #10, March 6–12, 1912, "Le nouveau livre d'Hervé," Eugène Merle. Merle characterized Hervé as having always been a conciliator, a Republican, and a *Blocard*. Gustave Hervé, *Mes Crimes, ou onze ans de prison pour délits de presse, modeste contribution à l'histoire de la liberté de la presse sous la 3e République*. (Paris: Éditions de *La Guerre Sociale*, 1912).
85. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 190–191.
86. Gustave Herve, *Mes Crimes*, op.cit., 13–16.
87. Ibid., 17–19.
88. L.G.S., *Édition Spéciale*, January 1, 1912, "Monsieur Vautour," Un Sans Patrie.
89. L.G.S., #1, January 3–9, 1912, "Vers le Parti Révolutionnaire," Charles-Albert and Jean Duchène. The rest of the series continued almost weekly until October 1912, many months after Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* had clearly rejected a *Parti Révolutionnaire*.
90. L.G.S., #2, January 10–16, 1912, "Les menées bonapartistes," Un Sans Patrie.
91. L.G.S., #3, January 17–23, 1912, "Les nouveau ministère," unsigned.
92. L.G.S., #5, January 31–February 5, 1912, "Vers le Parti Révolutionnaire," Charles-Albert and Jean Duchène; L.G.S., #9, February 27–March 5, 1912, "Aeros de la guerre … et de l'Empereur," Un Sans Patrie.
93. L.G.S., #7, February 14–20, 1912, "Le parti Socialiste et les bistros," Uns Sans Patrie.
94. In early 1912 Émile Pouget wrote a series of articles attacking C.G.T. *ouvrièrisme* and demanding intellectual and bourgeois entrance into that organization. Charles-Albert and Jean Duchène also stressed the same theme.
95. L.G.S., #8, February 21–26, 1912, "Au Congrès de Lyon," Un Sans Patrie.

96. L.G.S., #9, February 27–March 5, 1912, "Le Congrès de Lyon," Uns Sans Patrie and "Après le Congrès du Patrie Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie. A long ovation for Hervé (then at the Concièrgerie) occurred at the Congress when Sembat discussed Hervé's conditions for an amnesty. L.G.S., #12, March 20–26, 1912, "Comment on envenime les haines," Un Sans Patrie.
97. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 185. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13072.
98. L.G.S., #9, February 27–March 5, 1912, "Le Congrès de Lyon," Uns Sans Patrie and "Après le Congrès du Patrie Socialiste," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #12, March 20–26, 1912, "Comment on envenime les haines," Un Sans Patrie.
99. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 203.
100. L.G.S., #10, March 6–12, 1912, "Les gueules noires d'Angleterre," Un Sans Patrie.
101. L.G.S, #12, March 20–26, 1912, "Comment on envenime les haines," Un Sans Patrie.
102. L.G.S, #12, March 20–26, 1912, "500.000!" Eugène Merle.
103. L.G.S., #14, April 3–9, 1912, "Un Parti Révolutionnaire? Réponse d'Un Sans Patrie à Charles-Albert."
104. A.P.P., BA/1499. Police agent "Antoine." Note of May 19, 1912.
105. L.G.S., #19, May 8–14, 1912, "Vers l'Entente Révolutionnaire," Un Sans Patrie and C.A. Laisant.
106. The Bonnot-Garnier Gang was a French criminal group with ties to anarchism that operated in France and Belgium during *La Belle Époque*, from 1911 to 1912. The gang utilized cutting-edge technology, including automobiles and repeating rifles, not yet available to the French police. The Bonnot-Garnier Gang originally consisted of a group of French anarchists centered around the individualist anarchist newspaper *L'Anarchie*. The group was founded by Octave Garnier, Raymond Callemin, and René Valet. It was Garnier's idea to use autos in the service of a daring criminal act. Jules Bonnot joined them in December 1911.
107. L.G.S., #14, April 3–9, 1912, "Les bandits et nous," Un Sans Patrie; Maitron, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France*, op.cit., 400–411; Victor Méric, *Les Bandits Tragiques*, (Paris: Simon Kra, Éditeur, 1926); Faralicq, *Trente Ans Dans Les Rues De Paris* ..., op.cit., 190–209.
108. L.G.S., #18, May 1–7, 1912, "Le mort de Bonnot," Un Sans Patrie and Bonnot et l'illégalisme," unsigned; Significantly, syndicalist attacks on Hervéism had often stressed its bourgeois individualism.
109. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 170; L.G.S., #14, April 3–9, 1912; L.G.S., #18, May 1–7, 1912. "In the face of 500 revolutionaries like Bonnot ... what would be the weight of the Parisian police ... Lépine and Guichard ... However, that's the trouble, you can no longer find such courageous guys and fellows in top form except among bandits. As for decent workers, they are too cowardly, too awkward, or too thick-headed."
110. L.G.S., #15, April 10–16, 1912, "Contre le césarisme," Alfred Naquet; L.G.S., #16, April 17–23, 1912, "Oraison funèbre du Père Brisson," Un Sans Patrie.
111. L.G.S., #19, May 8–14, 1912, "Soignez-vous!" Un sans Patrie and "Un fiasco."
112. L.G.S., #19, May 8–14, 1912, "A propos des élections municipales."
113. L.G.S., #20, May 15–21, 1912, "Le danger bonapartiste."
114. L.G.S., #21, May 22–28, 1912, "La politique de *La Guerre Sociale*."
115. Eugen Weber, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905–1914*, op.cit., 39.
116. Gilles Heuré, "Jean Jaurès, Gustave Hervé et l'antimilitarisme." *Jean Jaurès: Cahiers Trimestriels*, No. 145, 11–26; Idem, "Gustave Herve, le tournant d'avant-guerre," *Mil Neuf Cent. Revue D'Histoire Intellectuelle*, 2001/1 (no. 19), 85–95. Heuré saw definite stages and developments during the course of Herve's transformation that are often belied by clear ambiguities and continuities. It is also important to realize that there was a diverse, loosely structured, yet important French peace movement at this time that was sometimes associated or intentionally confused with Hervéism by French nationalists. Even though the dozens of French peace societies made up of an estimated 300,000 men and women in 1907 who considered themselves patriotic, believed that wars in the national defense were acceptable

and even noble, and firmly rejected Hervéist antimilitarism, there was sufficient diversity and ambiguity among the bourgeois pacifists that French nationalists managed to associate those French peace groups with Hervéism during the national revival, thereby helping to create a "crisis in pacifism" in the decade before World War I. Michael G. Clinton, "'*La Crise du Pacifisme*:' The French Peace Movement & Antimilitarism during the Nationalist Revival," Paper delivered to the Ohio Academy of History, Annual Conference, Denison University, April 8, 2011; Miller, op.cit., 4, 9–10, 13–14, 116.

117. Jourdain, *Sans Remords ni Rancune* ...," op.cit., 91.

Chapter 15

1. L.G.S., #22, May 29–June 4, 1912, "Le Bat d'Af pour nos militants," M.A.
2. L.G.S, #30, July 24–30, 1912, "Un peu de bonne foi et de probité, s.v.p.," M.A.
3. L.G.S., #22, May 29–June 4, 1912, "Vers la dictature militaire," Victor Méric.
4. L.G.S., #22, May 29–June 4 1912, "La leçon de la semaine sanglante," Un Sans Patrie.
5. L.G.S., #25, June 19–25, 1912, "Pour les officiers républicaines," Sergent G.
6. *Le Figaro*, September 26, 1912, "Un Conférence de M. Gustave Hervé," Maxime Gérard.
7. L.G.S., #24, June 12–18, 1912, "Les révolutionnaires et la R.P.," Un Sans Patrie.
8. L.G.S., #29, July 16–23, 1912, "En rev'nant de la revue," G.H.
9. L.G.S., #29, July 16–23, 1912, "La grève générale contre la guerre," G.H.
10. L.G.S., #29, July 16–23, 1912, "Le retour de Gustave Hervé"; L.G.S., #32, 7–13 August 1912. Note to Hervé's editorial; Méric, op.cit., Séries I, 1930, 217–222; Peyronnet, op.cit, 57–60, 170.
11. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 200–201.
12. This was one of the many pseudonyms of Masson; others were Brenn, Yves Madec, Iwan Gwesnou, Prigent, etc.
13. L.G.S., August 28–September 3, 1912, G.H.; *Rappel du Morbihan*, August 31–September 7, 1912.
14. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 200–201. See L.G.S., August 28–September 3, 1912 and *Le Rappel du Morbihan*, August 31–September 7, 1912.
15. Ibid., 209, 212–218.
16. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "En sortant de la Concièrgerie," G.H.
17. Just a few weeks after Hervé left prison news came that *Le Pioupiou de l'Yonne* issue #16 had been found guilty of antimilitarist crimes for the first time in its eleven-year history. Here was another sign of a change in French opinion. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "Le Pioupiou condamné."; Weber, *The Nationalist Revival* ... passim; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé. Un propagandiste sous la IIIe République (1871–1944)," op.cit., 163.
18. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "La voix de l'Internationale—Plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre," G.H.
19. Despite its growth in circulation in 1910 and 1911, a decline in circulation occurred from mid-1912 into 1913 along with Hervé's *rectification*. A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly Reports of the Prefecture of Police. *La Guerre Sociale* was still quite successful but it often overextended itself. Hervé would soon find it necessary to cut all salaries. Rivalry with *La Bataille Syndicaliste* had never ended and writers who tried to work for both papers clearly placed themselves in jeopardy. Peyronnet, op.cit., 187.
20. L.G.S., #27, July 3–9, 1912, "Après la fête de Rousseau," Un Sans Patrie.
21. L.G.S., #25, June 18–24, 1913, "Le jubilée du Kaiser," G.H.
22. L.G.S., #28, July 10–16, 1912, "L'Entre'aide et la Caisse des Bon-Bougres." Since the fund of *La Guerre Sociale* gave money to militants and their families even if they disagreed with

Hervé, the accusations against the syndicalist daily were not without plausibility. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "Réponse à une ânerie" and "Pour Bonnafous," Eugène Merle; L.G.S., #32, August 7–13, 1912, "Et Pan-Lacroix?" Émile Tissier; L.G.S., #33, August 14–20, 1912, "Autour de la G.S."

23. L.G.S., #36, September 4–10, 1912, "La Sûreté fournit des armes aux Camelots du Roi," unsigned, and "Liberté pour Rousset," Émile Tissier.
24. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "Rectifions quelques 'erreurs,'" G.H. This article quoted Delaisi's charges in *Les Temps Nouveaux*. L.G.S., #31, July 31–August 6, 1912, "La nouvelle politique de *La Guerre Sociale*," Letter of Francis Delaisi to Hervé and the latter's response which assailed Delaisi's methods and integrity. Hervé said he corrected some errors he found in an article by Delaisi for *Le Temps Nouveaux*.
25. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 185. Heuré cites *La Guerre Sociale* for these quotes from Delaisi.
26. L.G.S., #30, July 24–30, 1912, "Rectifions quelques 'erreurs'," G.H.; L.G.S., #31, July 31–August 6, 1912, "La nouvelle politique de *La Guerre Sociale*"; Mazgaj, op.cit., 140–143. Delaisi was in the pay of *L'Action Française* at the time.
27. *Le Temps*, August 29, 1912, "Hervé et l'antipatriotisme,"; L.G.S., #37, September 11–17, 1912, "*Mea culpa*," G.H.
28. L.G.S., #38, September 18–24, 1912, "Au Congrès de la C.G.T." G.H.; L.G.S., #39, September 25–October 1, 1912, "Le reniement de Saint Pierre," G.H.
29. L.G.S., #38, September 18–24, 1912, "Le geste de Pan-Lacroix," G.H.
30. L.G.S., #42, October 16–22, 1912, "Lâcheté Morale," "Précisez Donc," "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H., and "La 'Guerre Sociale' voilà l'ennemi!"
31. L.G.S., #38, September 18–24, 1912, "Pour nos bleus," Sergent G.
32. L.G.S., #39, September 25–October 1, 1912, "Pour nos bleus," Sergent G.
33. A.P.P., Ba/1499. Police agent "Chaumont." Note of September 22, 1912 and Police agent "Finot." Note of October 18, 1912. Pure anarchists or individualist anarchists generally refrained from attacking *La Guerre Sociale* because to them the C.G.T. and the F.C.A. both appeared to be just as organized, authoritarian, and dangerous as *La Guerre Sociale* and just as much in contradiction with "pure" anarchist ideals.
34. The numerous sources were in general agreement regarding the events of the evening except for attendance which was estimated to be anywhere from 2000 to 3500 people.
35. *Le Temps*, "M. Gustave Hervé et les 'bons bougres,'" September 27, 1912.
36. Peyronnet, op.cit., 172–173.
37. *La Victoire*, #661, October 22, 1917.
38. *Le Figaro*, September 26, 1912, "Un Conférence de M. Gustave Hervé," Maxime Gérard.
39. *Le Petit Journal*, September 26, 1912, "Réunion sanglante à la Salle Wagram."
40. L.G.S., #40, October 2–8, 1912, "Notre patrie-la conquête de l'armée"; A.N., F7 13326, P.P. Two notes of September 26, 1912 and M/7006. Note of September 26, 1912; A.P.P., Ba/1499. Police agent "Amdellier," Note of September 27, 1912. *Le Temps*, September 27, 1912, "La Conversion de M. Hervé."
41. *Le Petit Journal*, September 26, 1912, "Réunion sanglante à la Salle Wagram." In general, the syndicalists did not come to cause trouble, just to disagree. The anarchists had other intentions according to *Le Petit Journal*.
42. Louis Lecoin, a member of the F.C.A. who had become famous in 1910 after an editorial by Hervé praised his valiant refusal to be mobilized during the railway strike, found it necessary to deflect the aim of one of his fellow anarchists. Lecoin in 1917 would not be so charitable when he tried to assassinate Hervé at his apartment on the Rue de Vaugirard. Louis Lecoin, *De prison en prison*, (Artory, Seine: Édité par l'auteur, 1947), 59–60, 81; Louis Lecoin, *Le cours d'une vie*, (Paris: chez l'auteur, 1965); *La Victoire*, #661, October 22, 1917. After Lecoin failed to find Hervé at home, he tried to shoot the armed Hervé near his office, but agents of

the *Sûreté* stopped him before the intended victim knew of this particular attempt. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 199.

43. *Le Temps*. September 27, 1912, "La Conversion de M. Hervé."
44. Frossard, op.cit., 160–162.
45. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 199.
46. L.G.S., #40, October 2–8, 1912, "Pour le désarmement des haines—le banquet de Sens," Louis Perceau.
47. Almosnino, op.cit., 108–112.
48. L.G.S., #49, Décembre 4–10, 1912, "Pourquoi nous entrons au parti socialiste"; Almosnino, op.cit., 112.
49. Henri Massis and Gabriel de la Tarde created an important, if less than objective, survey of student opinion on the eve of World War I called *Les Jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui*. It saluted the supposed taste for action, patriotic faith, Catholic resurgence, and growing political realism of students during the *avant-guerre*.
50. Prochasson, op.cit., 87–97. See L.G.S. #50, December 11–17, 1912. "Adhésions au Parti socialiste." For Prochasson such a trend did not signal the search for an "aesthetization of politics" which had characterized previous years, but rather a "politicization of art" as a new generation of young intellectuals became disillusioned with their isolated and rather cloistered attempts to merge with the people and to make a difference.
51. Some anarchists and syndicalists spread the rumor that Hervé wanted to become a Deputy or possibly the Minister of War! A.P.P., BA/1470. Police agent "Dram." Number 62910. Note of November 15, 1912.
52. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968², 25337, Lille, Note dated October 7, 1912.
53. A.N., F7 13326. M/7008. Note dated September 27, 1912; P.P., note of October 10, 1912; A.P.P., Ba/543, Note of October 10, 1912; Ba/752. Monthly Report of the Prefecture of Police. October 1912; A.N., F7 13330. Ministry of Interior. Note of September 29, 1912 and P.P., Note of September 30, 1912; A.N., F7 13328. P.P., Note of November 15, 1912; L.G.S., #40, October 2–8, 1912, "Du sang-froid," unsigned; L.G.S., #42, October 16–22 1912.
54. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 196.
55. L.G.S., #45, November 6–12, 1912, "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H.; L.G.S., #44, October 30–November 5, 1912, "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H.; A.N., F7 13327. M/3747.U. Note of October 30, 1912.
56. L.G.S., #44, October 30–November 5, 1912, "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 196. Tom Mann was a critic of the Labour Party's excessive reformism and had been imprisoned for antimilitarism. Guy Bowman had translated *Leur Patrie*, so Hervé said he could not refuse their invitation. Bowman translated Hervé's speech at the meeting. The other main speaker was M.P. Landsbury who provoked antiparliamentary attacks by some anarchists. The popular anarchist Errico Malatesta, a good friend of Bakunin, was present to attack Hervé's *rectification*. A few days later Hervé spoke to Italian and French anarchist groups at the French (Anarchist?) Club of London on "the conquest of the army." In his meeting with anarchists Hervé admitted that he had a habit of voting in parliamentary elections even before he had altered his course!
57. L.G.S., #49, December 4–10, 1912, "Interdit en Belgique," G.H.
58. L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "La guerre," G.H.; A.P.P., Ba/752. monthly reports of the Prefecture of Police. October and November 1912.
59. L.G.S., #46, November 13–19, 1912, "Hervé à Rome." The same situation also saw Jaurès head to Berlin, Compère-Morel go to Milan, and other prominent socialists travel elsewhere.
60. L.G.S., #47, November 20–26, 1912, "Comment j'ai été traité à Rome," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 196–197; Heuré cited A.N., F7 15968², "Fonds Panthéon," 25337/45; A.P.P., Ba/514, Note of November 17, 1912. A century later this Italian prison is still operating on the banks of the Tiber not far from the Vatican and the Roman Forum.

61. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 197. Heuré cited A.N., F7 15968[2], "Fonds Panthéon," 25337/45.
62. Ibid., 196–197 *Le Matin*, November 17, 1912, "M. Gustave Hervé Arrêté En Italie"; *Le Matin*, November 19, 1912, "Les Voyages Forment La Jeunesse—M. Hervé découvre en Italie que la République a du bon."; *L'Humanité*, November 19, 1912, "Explulsé d'Italia: Gustave Hervé rentre à Paris: Il nous raconte ses impressions."
63. L.G.S., #41, October 9–15, 1912, "La guerre," G.H.
64. L.G.S., #14, April 2–8, 1913, "La question d'Alsace-Lorraine reste posée," G.H. Soon Hervé would stress Alsace-Lorraine as the only major difference between France and Germany. This was clearly a simplification of the dynamics of Franco-German relations.
65. L.G.S., #42, October 16–22, 1912, "La guerre," G.H.
66. L.G.S., #43, October 23–29, 1912, "La croisade international contre la guerre," G.H.
67. L.G.S., #44, October 30–November 5, 1912, "La débâcle turque," G.H.
68. L.G.S., #50 A, December 11–17, 1912, "L'homme malade de Vienne," G.H.
69. L.G.S., #42, October 16–22, 1912, "La guerre," G.H.
70. L.G.S., #44, October 30–November 5, 1912, "Le débâcle turque," G.H. and "Avant le Congrès Internationale Extraordinaire—En cas de guerre européenne," G.H. He was still jeered by moderate socialists as a romantic extremist because *militarisme révolutionnaire* was increasingly being promoted as an international program even though its failure internationally could lead to its abandonment for France.
71. A.N., F7 13327, P.P., Note of November 7, 1912.
72. L.G.S., #45, November 6–12, 1912, "A deux-doigts de la guerre," G.H. and "L'insurrection contre la guerre—En cas de mobilisation"; *Le Matin*, November 22, 1912; A.N., F7 13327, M/3822.U. Note of November 22, 1912 and M/7164. Note of November 21, 1912; *Le Temps*, November 22, 1912.
73. Gravereaux, op.cit.
74. *L'Humanité*, November 17, 1912; *L'Humanité*, November 18, 1912; L.G.S., #47, November 20–26, 1912, "Avertissement."
75. Goldberg, op.cit., 433–434; *L'Humanité*, November 24, 1912, "Le Congrès International De Bâle: Premières Impressions: Séance de la Commission Préparatoire."; *L'Humanité*, November 25, 1912, "Le Congrès Socialiste International."; *L'Humanité*, November 26, 1912, "Le Congrès Socialiste de Bâle Contre La Guerre: L'International Est Unanime," and "Le Manifeste."
76. Ibid., 434.
77. *L'Humanité*, November 24, 1912, "Le Congrès International de Bâle"; *L'Humanité*, November 25, 1912, "Le Congrès Socialiste International"; *L'Humanité*, November 26, 1912, "L'Internationale Est Unanime."
78. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 198–199.
79. L.G.S., #48, November 27–December 3, 1912, "D'accord avec les allemands," G.H.; Goldberg, op.cit., 433–434.
80. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 198–199.
81. L.G.S., #49, December 4–10, 1912, "La grève de 24 heures"; A.N., F7 13328, P.P., December 5, 1912. Almereyda was characterized as hoping for a syndicalist failure due to increasing authoritarianism by the C.G.T.
82. L.G.S., #50A, *Édition Spéciale*, December 11–17, 1912, "Les socialistes et la grève." G.H.
83. Miller, op.cit., 187, 244; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, December 17, 1912.
84. *L'Humanité*, December 18, 1912, "Le Chœur unanime," Marcel Sembat.
85. L.G.S., #51, December 18–24, 1912, "L'avertissement sans frais," G.H.; A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police, December 1912.
86. Susan Milner, "The International Labour Movement and the Limits of Internationalism: the International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres, 1901–1913," *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 33, Issue 1, April 1988, 1–24.

87. Miller, op.cit., 183–184.
88. Ibid., 185.
89. Ibid., 188; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, December 17, 1912; A.N., F7 13328, Report of December 19, 1912.
90. Ibid., 189–190; Dominique Bertinotti, "L'Antimilitarisme à travers *La Bataille Syndicaliste*," Thèse de troisième cycle, Paris I, 1975, 167–171, 192–195.
91. L.G.S., #1, January 1–7, 1913. "En entrant dans la 7e année." This was an unsigned general L.G.S. editorial but it entailed Hervé's latest ideas.
92. A.N., "Fonds Panthéon," F7 15968[2], 25337, Commissariat Spécial de la Gare de Saint-Etienne, Saint-Etienne, Note dated February 16, 1913; L.G.S., #7, February 12–18 1913, "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H.
93. L.G.S., #2, January 8–14, 1913, "La jeunesse des écoles, est-elle réactionnaire?"; Jean Texcier. Ironically, in 1914 on the eve of the war, Texcier thought he detected a growth of Republican and socialist ideas among students. He attributed this phenomenon to student fears concerning the Three Year Law. L.G.S., #19, May 6–12, 1914, "La jeunesse des écoles et l'assaut de la réaction," Jean Texcier.
94. L.G.S., #4, January 21–27, 1913, "La réaction au 'caf conc,'" Victor Méric.
95. A.N., F7 13326. Note of Minister of the Interior Steeg to all Prefects. February 29, 1912.
96. L.G.S., #4, January 21–27, 1913, "*L'Humanité* à six pages," unsigned; L.G.S., #5, January 28–February 3, 1913, "*L'Humanité* à six pages," unsigned.
97. Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 43, 45, 34–49, 163, 196.
98. L.G. S., #4, January 21–27, 1913, "Vilains cafards!" G.H.
99. L.G.S., #25, June 17–23, 1913, "Faut-il laisser mourir la France? L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme." G.H.; L.G.S., #26, June 24–30, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—La France qui meurt," G.H.; L.G.S., #27, July 1–7, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—natalités comparées," G.H.; L.G.S., #28, July 8–14, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—natalités comparées de demain," G.H.; L.G.S., #29, July 15–21, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—ni la qualité … ni la quantité," G.H.; L.G.S., #30, July 22–28, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—Les conséquences économiques de la dépopulation," G.H.; L.G.S., #31, July 28–August 4, 1914, "L'autre face du néo-malthusianisme—Les conséquences économiques de la dépopulation," G.H.
100. L.G.S., #27, July 1–7, 1914, "Le coin de lecteurs," G.H. Here he responded to the letters from his readers. Experts then and later would look to the legal system, inheritance laws, location, religion, income, social status, education, women's changing status, and social expectations to help explain depopulation in France. There was no single key and many contradictions existed. Throughout Hervé's career, there were voices who spoke in terms of French decadence and degeneracy to explain depopulation, and during the interwar he came to echo them. In fact, France was simply the most extreme case of a trend which pointed toward the future. Michel Winock explained France's apparent uniqueness in this way. "It was, therefore, the combination of economic, social, and cultural factors which can explain French precocity. If there was a French exception, it would be found in the precocity of Malthusian behavior—precursory habits, announcing increasingly general changes. Statistics from other European countries prove it; they simply had not yet attained the same scope." Winock, *La Belle Époque*, op.cit., 49.
101. L.G.S., #8, February 19–25, 1913, "Les poings carrés," G.H.
102. Stone, op.cit., 226.
103. L.G.S., #9, February 26–March 4, 1913, "Entre socialistes—français et allemands," G.H.; L.G.S., #9, March 5–11, 1913, "Pour l'entente franco-allemande," G.H. Hervé originally wanted to propose this *entente* at Basel in November 1912.
104. L.G.S., #9, February 26–March 4, 1913, "A propos des socialistes allemands," G.H.
105. L.G.S., #11, March 12–18, 1913, "Les milices nationales," Un officier de l'active (perhaps Hervé himself).

106. A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police. January 1913.
107. L.G.S., #12, March 12–18, 1913, "A propos du 18 mars." This was a chapter on the Commune from his new book.
108. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 220, 269. See Masson's letter to Pierre Monatte, December 25, 1915; See *Prolétaire Breton*, April 1914.
109. Ibid., 227–230. See *Brug*, March 1914; *Prolétaire Breton*, February—March 1914; *Les Temps Nouveaux*, June 7, 1913.
110. L.G.S., #11, March 12–18, 1913, "Contre la vague nationaliste," G.H.
111. Roger Martin du Gard, *Journal I : Textes Autobiographiques, 1892–1919*, presented and annotated by Claude Sicard, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 838. Note, Charles Péguy, 6e *Cahier*, February 16, 1913, "L'Argent."
112. Of the three great reform measures attempted by the Radical republic, the income tax (sic—in fact, the income tax came in 1917) and the Three Year Law were passed in 1913, "but proportional representation, the centre's weapon against shady local notables, failed, in part because of its proponents' disagreements as to how it could be realized. But, now, the centre-left coalition on which the Republic had been based was ending: its dissolution was marked in the kaleidoscope of governments since Clemenceau, as they wrestled with combinations of the three main issues, or with specious postponements of them. The French Right now successfully claimed the nationalist cause for its own. After 1911 came the *réveil national*, an era of parades and trumpeting." Stone, op.cit., 226.
113. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 199.
114. Miller, op.cit., 194.
115. Ibid., 194–195; A.P.P., Ba/752. Monthly report of the Prefecture of Police. March 1913; A.N., F7 13335.
116. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 199–200.
117. L.G.S., #11A, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, March 16, 1913.
118. Miller, op.cit., 195; *L'Humanité*, March 17, 1913, "Le Manifestation du Pré-Saint-Gervais," Louis Dubrieulh, and "Les Discours"; L.G.S., #11A, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, March 16, 1913; L.G.S., #12, March 19–25, 1913, "Le réveil de popolo," G.H.
119. L.G.S., #12, March 19–25, 1913, "Le réveil de popolo," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, March 17, 1913, "Le Manifestation du Pré-Saint-Gervais," Louis Dubrieulh, and "Les Discours."
120. Miller, op.cit., 195. Miller cited A.N., F7 13335, Paris, Note of May 26, 1913. See also *L'Humanité*, May 25, 1913. Only Jaurès's speech was cited in any length the next day in the Socialist daily and Hervé was not even mentioned as speaking the day of the rally.
121. A.P.P., Ba/752. Weekly reports of the Prefecture of Police, July 12–19, 1913; *L'Humanité*, July 12, 1913; *L'Humanité*, July 13, 1913, "Contre les 3 ans, Contre l'Arbitraire: Au Pré-Saint-Gervais."; *L'Humanité*, July 14, 1913, "Nouvelle Affirmat Du Peuple De Paris"; "La Participation du Parti à la Manifestation de la C.G.T." This rally apparently included harmony among the F.C.A., the J.G.R., and other generally rival groups.
122. On June 2, 1913 *La Bataille Syndicaliste* created a *Comité de Défense des Soldats* to aid soldiers prosecuted for protesting the new law. Some editors at *La Guerre Sociale* joined this *Comité*. A.N., F7 13332. M/3297. Note of October 1, 1913; A.P.P., Ba/752. Report over June 1–7, 1913. Amidst police reports of agitation and cooperation by the Left against the Three Year Law, there was a growing realization that antimilitarism was declining. A.P.P., Ba/752.
123. An earlier Three Year Law enacted in 1889 had replaced a Five Year Law and it had ended certain exemptions. Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879–1992*, op.cit., 49.
124. Miller, op.cit., 195.
125. Ibid., 195–196, 210–212. Paul B. Miller cites Gerd Krumreich who argued that revolutionary syndicalists hoped to use the Three-Year Law to resurrect their cause, but they found that the tables were turned on them by the more powerful S.F.I.O. That was illustrated by the relatively weak showing by C.G.T. members at various protests against the new law. For Miller the diminished prestige of syndicalism was "only one aspect of the transformation taking

place on the antimilitarist Left, and not the most important one." Historians such as Becker, Lefranc, Krumreich, and Julliard had long stressed the weakening of syndicalism and its failure to create a clear plan to deal with war, but they failed to fully decipher just what antimilitarists were saying in 1913. "… there were already perceptible changes in the language of these protests, which now seemed more bent on disproving the government's military policy than simply on disproving the government." Only a handful of utopians actually believed that the Left could stop a war with an insurrection. But the zealotry and magnitude of the rallies against the Three-Year Law demonstrate that antimilitarism maintained a strong voice in the struggle for improving social justice and diminishing the chances for war. For Miller, antimilitarists ought not to be judged simply on the basis of their failure to prevent war and to sabotage the mobilization in 1914. Their actions against war helped to turn revolutionaries into citizens because it made them aware that other tangible reforms were possible by working within the system.

126. Ibid., 208.
127. Sowerwine, op.cit., 87; Goldberg, op.cit., 433; Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879–1992*, op.cit., 151.
128. Miller, op.cit., 196–198; *L'Humanité*, May 27, 1913; A.N., F7 13335; F7 13336; F7 13346; F7 13332, Note, Paris, December 11, 1913.
129. Ibid., 198–200.
130. Hervé, Almereyda, the other elements of the extreme Left may have believed their own words, but one suspects they simply justified their instincts and interests like almost everybody else. For almost everyone to the right of Lenin, nation trumped class and humanity whether you were named Mussolini, Hitler, Hervé, or even Jaurès. And that lesson must limit the significance of most notions of altruistic citizenship. Miller, however, seems to accept the rhetoric of France as fighting for peace, civilization, and democracy while Germany fought in the name of militarism, conquest, and reactionary power.
131. L.G.S., #12, March 19–25, 1913, "Carnet d'un commis-voyageur en socialisme," G.H.
132. L.G.S., #30, July 23–29, 1913, "La C.G.T. rectifie son tir," G.H.
133. L.G.S., #34, August 20–26, 1913, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.; L.G.S., #37, September 10–16, 1913, "L'erreur de la C.G.T.," G.H.; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, July 29, 1913; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, August 10, 1913. Jouhaux's response to Hervé was either duplicitous or a reflex response of organizational defense. In the years before the war, Jouhaux evolved away from class conflict and direct action in order to stress not only higher wages but increased production. He wanted modernized equipment and a rationalized economy, not class war. Jouhaux's concern with productivity, first introduced in 1913, went beyond the École Merrheim, and it was related to Jouhaux's fears that Germany was dominating the French economically. His opposition to the Three Year Law was not due to pacifism or internationalism. He was worried that the law weakened France economically by hurting production. Thus Jouhaux evolved a *dirigiste* philosophy based on authority, discipline, and statistical analysis directly at odds with the original anarcho-syndicalism of the C.G.T. De Lucia, op.cit., 104–113, 145–146; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, June 16, 1913, "Les trois ans mèneraient à un affaiblissement économique," Léon Jouhaux.
134. L.G.S., #34, August 20–26, 1913, "Les anarchistes rectifient leur tir," unsigned.
135. Miller, op.cit., 181–182; Becker, *1914: Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre*, op.cit., 28; A.N., F7 13347, Notes of August 1, 8, 11, 1913.
136. L.G.S., August 27–September 2, 1913.
137. Miller, op.cit., 182, 185.
138. Miller, op.cit., 183–184; Madeleine Rebérioux, "Les tendances hostiles à l'état dans la S.F.I.O. (1905–1914)." *Le Mouvement social.* No. 65, (October–December 1968), 36, 37, 21–37. For these insights and those below see, Miller, op.cit., 183–184. Susan Milner, *Dilemmas of Internationalism: French Syndicalism and the International Labour Movement, 1900–1914*, (New York: Berg, 1991), 172, 191. Milner argued that declining C.G.T. insurrectionalism

in 1911 was masked by a stress on antimilitarism which was actually an elaborate bluff to disguise C.G.T. troubles. Nicholas Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim: The Emergence of Reformism in Revolutionary Syndicalism, 1871–1925*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). Papayanis argued that Merrheim's "public posture" displayed "an uncompromising antimilitarism and an apparent commitment to the general strike to prevent war," yet "in private he was increasingly pessimistic about such action." If Merrheim appeared to be a radical antimilitarist who worried about the dangers of war, his "antimilitarism was less an ideological issue" for the proletariat and more a question of "economics and, at times, just good politics." Becker and Julliard "emphasized the ambiguous intentions of CGT leaders such as Merrheim and the lack of a definitive plan to prevent war as anticipating the 'failure' of 1914." Miller, op.cit., 184.

139. Almosnino, op.cit., 113–115.
140. L.G.S., #12, March 19–25, 1913, "Miguel Almereyda et Eugène Merle nous quittent," G.H.; Pierre Albert, et al., *Histoire générale de la presse française*, Vol. 3, De 1871 à 1940 … 378, 386.
141. Peyronnet, op.cit., 188.
142. A.N., F7 13332. M/8286. Note of September 27, 1913.
143. Miller, op.cit., 192.
144. Almosnino, op.cit., 118–119. The fact that Caillaux helped fund and promote *Le Bonnet Rouge* in order to use Almeryeda's skills and contacts to counter the former Ministre de Conseil's political enemies would come to have dangerous consequences for Hervé's former lieutenant.
145. Ibid., 113–126. Initially Almereyda brought along many of his associates from the days of anarchism and Hervéism, including Francis Jourdain, the writer Leon Werth, Fanny Clar, who wrote the feminist articles at *La Guerre Sociale*, the *Jeune Garde* Leon Goldsky (Goldschild), and Amédée Dunois, the editor at *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. As time went on, Almereyda's lifestyle became more and more luxurious, and the composition of the staff during the war became shadier and shadier. Clearly, Almereyda had left his romantic idealism well behind him as the war advanced.
146. Ibid., 113–119. Apparently, the editor-in-chief of *Le Courrier Européen*, the free thinking, pacifist and socialist *universitaire*, Gabriel Paix-Séailles, wanted new blood at his newspaper.
147. Ibid., 145–147.
148. L.G.S., #4, January 21–29, 1914, "Perceau va quitter *La Guerre Sociale*," G.H. Many Hervéist editors at *La Guerre Sociale* evolved with Hervé and continued to mirror his *revirement* for some time. At least one editor may have left the paper because of ideas that had become absolutely *revanchard*. The young firebrand Jean Goldsky, after a term in the army, was reported to have changed his name to Jacques Guerrier and began writing for *Le Rappel* as a patriot, militarist, and potential political candidate. A.N., F7 13332. M/8285. Note of September 27, 1913 and M/8272. Note of September 24, 1913. This information from police sources seems questionable since Goldsky was later the author of the most severe critique of Hervé by any of his former supporters. See Jean Goldsky, *La trahison de Judas ou les trente deniers de Gustave Hervé—Histoire d'une trahison*, (Paris: Éditions de *Tranchée Républicaine*, n.d. [1917]).
149. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the chief problems within the S.F.I.O. in early 1913 were the continuing rivalry between the forces of Jaurès and those of Guesde for control of the party as well as the growth of oligarchical tendencies within the party much as Robert Michels had observed long ago. A.N., F7 13053, Packet on the Guesdists, M/4131.U. Note of March 26, 1913.
150. Miller, op.cit., 191.
151. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 200.
152. L.G.S., #13, March 26–April 1, 1913, "Au Congrès de Brest," G.H. At a gathering of Brest socialists on the eve of the Congress, Hervé presented a history of Brest over the previous fifty years. He recalled his grandfather's career in the marines to illustrate that military life was just as honorable as civilian life. Other personal anecdotes illustrated his theme regarding tender-

ness for one's native soil not being dead even among internationalists. "À Brest-Impressions de Congrès," G.H.

153. L.G.S., #13, March 26–April 1, 1913, "À Brest-Impressions de Congrès," G.H.
154. L.G.S., #15, April 9–15, 1913, "Le discours du Chancelier," G.H. and "Les socialistes française et l'Alsace-Lorraine," G.H.; L.G.S., #16, April 16–22, 1913, "L'Alsace-Lorraine-seul obstacle à l'entente," G.H.
155. L.G.S., #18, April 30–May 6, 1913; Gustave Hervé, *L'Alsace-Lorraine* (Paris: Éditions de *La Guerre Sociale*, 1913).
156. L.G.S., #28, July 9–15, 1913, "Un livre de Marcel Sembat," Louis Perceau.
157. L.G.S., #29, July 16–22, 1913, "Faites un roi, sinon faites la paix," G.H.
158. L.G.S., #25, June 18–24, 1913, "Le Jubilé du Kaiser," G.H.
159. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 200. Heuré cited Charles Péguy, *L'Argent* (suite), *Œuvres complètes*, op.cit., 3, 940, 942.
160. L.G.S., #20, May 14–20, 1913, "Le 'nouveau bloc' à Berne," G.H.
161. L.G.S., #21, May 21–27, 1913, "les socialistes et le nouveau bloc," G.H.
162. Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Recollections of the Third Republic*, Volume I, translated by George Marion Jr. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), 216–217.
163. L.G.S., #19, May 7–13, 1913, "Le nouveau bloc," G.H.; L.G.S., #43, October 22–28, 1913, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.; Rebérioux, *La République Radicale?*, op.cit., 42–116.
164. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 200–201.
165. Ibid., 201.
166. Miller, op.cit., 192–194.
167. L.G.S., #20, May 14–20, 1913, "Après le voyage d'Alphonse," unsigned.
168. Hervé did not completely give up his credentials as a revolutionary until the war but he was less and less a concern to French police agencies after 1912. But revolutionary tactics sometimes were mentioned on the pages of *La Guerre Sociale* on the eve of the war. As late as February 11, 1913 Hervé and *La Guerre Sociale* were included in a dossier concerning serious threats to sabotage the mobilization, nor was his name ever removed from the *Carnet B*. A.N., F7 13332. Dossier of February 11, 1913 titled "La campagne en vue du sabotage de la mobilisation."
169. L.G.S., #21, May 21–27, 1913, "Le socialistes et le nouveau bloc," G.H.
170. L.G.S., #22, May 28–June 3, 1912, "Le bloc ou l'empire," G.H.; L.G.S., #24, June 11–17, 1913, "Boniments d'état major," G.H.; Peyronnet, op.cit., 182.
171. L.G.S., #22, May 28–June 3, 1913, "Clemenceau," G.H. Clemenceau eventually voted for the law after an invitation to meet with his old enemy Poincaré. Paul-Boncour, op.cit., 214–215.
172. L.G.S., #22, May 28–June 3, 1913, "Les socialistes et le nouveau bloc," G.H. Former or current Hervéists, Merle, Tissier, and Almereyda, were being attacked by nationalists when they spoke in favor a new *Bloc* in mid-May 1913.
173. L.G.S., #23, June 4–10, 1913, "Le nouveau bloc et les socialistes," G.H.
174. L.G.S., #24, June 11–17, 1913, "Le nouveau bloc—la peur des mots," G.H.; L.G.S., #4, January 21–27, 1914, "Chut-ça ne s'appellera pas le bloc," G.H.
175. L.G.S., #27, July 9–15, 1913, "Encore le coup du complot!" G.H.
176. L.G.S., #27, July 9–15, 1913, "14 Juillet 1913," G.H.
177. L.G.S., #28, July 2–8, 1913, "Vers un nouveau bloc—la rupture de l'ancien bloc," G.H.
178. L.G.S., #30, July 23–29, 1913, "Vers un nouveau bloc—les éléments du nouveau bloc," G.H.
179. L.G.S., #27, July 2–8, 1913, "Vers un nouveau bloc—la rupture de l'ancien bloc," G.H.
180. L.G.S., #29, July 16–22, 1913, "Le programme d'un nouveau bloc," G.H.
181. L.G.S., #33, August 13–19, 1913, "Un socialiste hollandais peut-il être ministre?" G.H.
182. L.G.S., #30, July 23–29, 1913, "Vers un nouveau bloc—les éléments du nouveau bloc," G.H.; L.G.S., #38, September 17–23, 1913, "Notre C.G.T. et la politique," G.H.

183. L.G.S., #36, September 3–9, 1913, "Autour du bloc—Le socialisme et le pouvoir ministériel," G.H.
184. L.G.S., #42, October 15–21, 1913, "L'élection de Nîmes," G.H. and "Leurs opinions et les Nôtres—Le bloc et les socialistes," G.H.; L.G.S., #43, October 22–28, 1913, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.
185. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 203.
186. L.G.S., #37, September 10–16, 1913, "Campagne césarienne," G.H.
187. L.G.S., #40, October 1–7, 1913, "L'entente franco-allemand," unsigned and "Le Congrès des Jeunesses Laïques," G.H.; *L'Anarchie*, October 2, 1913.
188. L.G.S., #41, October 8–14, 1913, "Avant le Congrès de Pau," G.H.
189. L.G.S., #43, October 22–28, 1913, "Le Congrès de Pau," G.H. Hervé would eventually reverse himself on Clemenceau, Briand, and Millerand.
190. L.G.S., #3, January 14–20, 1914, "L'assaut contre Caillaux," unsigned; Michael S. Neiberg, *Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I*, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 26–27.
191. L.G.S., #44, October 29–November 4, 1913, "Guesde contre le bloc," G.H.
192. L.G.S., #45, November 5–11, 1913, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.
193. L.G.S., #44, October 29–November 4, 1913, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.
194. L.G.S., #46, November 12–18, 1913, "Ma réponse aux socialistes allemands," G.H. and "L'Alsace-Lorraine et l'entente franco-allemande," translated from *Vorwaerts* by *La Guerre Sociale.*
195. L.G.S., #51, December 17–23, 1913, "Blocard quand même," G.H.
196. L.G.S., #1, December 31, 1913–January 6, 1914, "Prophétie pour 1914," G.H.
197. L.G.S., #1, December 31, 1913–January 6, 1914, "Le pacte de Boulogne," IV, G.H.
198. L.G.S., #2, January 7–13, 1914, "Voici venir l'emprunt russe," unsigned.
199. L.G.S., #11, March 11–17, 1914, "Germains et Slaves," G.H.
200. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 202.
201. L.G.S., #3, January 14–20, 1914, "La crise de la 'B.S.'," G.H.
202. L.G.S., #5, January 28–February 3, 1914, "Au Congrès d'Amiens," G.H. and "Compte-rendu non officiel," Louis Florens.
203. The Ministry of the Interior reported that Hervé's speech produced some lively exchanges but not much beyond that. A few of Hervé's outbursts received applause, but most delegates rejected his *Blocard* ideas. A.N., F7 13571. Note of January 27, 1914. Second Day of the Congress. The Fourth Meeting.
204. After years of treating the *Parti Socialiste Independant* as a collection of renegades, Hervé now advocated a *Bloc* with them after their recent separation from Briand. L.G.S., #5, January 28–February 3, 1914, "*Faut-il faire 'pomme de terre' avec Augagneur?*" G.H. The police did not believe Hervé was clever enough to succeed as an opportunist. A.P.P., Ba/1470, #62910, Note of December 20, 1913. After 1910 the Independent Socialists were also known as the *Parti Républicain Socialiste*, a reformist and patriotic party which included Radicals and Republicans as well as Independent Socialists. Its vague leftist program, coupled with patriotism and anti-Germanism, would evolve into a *Parti Socialiste National* in December 1917. Some of its leading members would join Hervé's National Socialist Party in July 1919 as equal partners. Alexandre Zévaès and Jacques Prolo, *Une Campagne Politique: Le Parti Républicain Socialiste 1910–1917*, (Paris: Éditions du Comité de Propagande Française Républicaine et Réformiste, 1918); *La Victoire*, #1311, August 3, 1919, "Un bon noyau pour le P.S.N.," G.H.; Alexandre Zévaès, *Le socialisme en 1912, conclusions et annexes.* (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1912), 40–56. See Goldberg, op.cit.
205. L.G.S., #6, February 4–10, 1914, "Le discours de Gustave Hervé." The Left-wing Radical press as sampled by *La Guerre Sociale* was anxious for a *Bloc* with the S.F.I.O. *La Lanterne* had high praise for Hervé's ideas and efforts.

206. L.G.S., #7, February 11–17, 1914, "À la gloire du Maréchal Leboeuf," G.H.
207. L.G.S., #24, June 10–16, 1914, "Le cri d'alarme d'un colonel." This was Hervé's review of a book by Lt. Col. Debon.
208. L.G.S., #28, July 8–14, 1914 "Le gouffre marocain," G.H.
209. L.G.S., #7, February 11–27, 1914, "Ferdinand Buisson," unsigned.
210. A.N., F7 13571. M/2474. Note of March 16, 1914.
211. L.G.S., #8, February 18–24, 1914, "La dernière au lieutenant," G.H.
212. L.G.S., #9, February 25–March 3, 1914, "Une grève attristante," G.H.; L.G.S., #10, March 4–10, 1914, "Détournement de mineurs," G.H.; *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, February 26, 1914; *La Loire Républicaine*, February 27, 1914.
213. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 203; L.G.S., #6, February 4–10, 1914, "Déroulède," G.H.
214. Agulhon, op.cit., 136; Mollier and George, op.cit., 393–396.
215. L.G.S., #12, March 18–24, 1914, "La défense de Mme. Caillaux," G.H.; "Conseils à Doumergue," "Simples questions," and "Le rôle de Poincaré." The latter three articles were unsigned but Hervé may well have been their author. Edward Berenson's *The Trial of Madame Caillaux*, cited above, is a fascinating study of the larger ramifications of the sensational events associated with the trial of Madame Caillaux.
216. L.G.S., #13, March 25–31, 1914, "Vive Caillaux," G.H. and "La verité toute nue," G.H. See David E. Sumler, "Domestic Influences on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909–1914," *French Historical Studies*, (Fall, 1966), 317–337. Hervé's analysis of domestic politics in 1914 clearly foreshadowed the argument of Sumler who believed the growth of French nationalism arose out of an effort by the moderate-center to postpone social reforms. Some aspects of Hervé's transformation fit Weber's analysis of the sources of the nationalist revival. The present study has concentrated on the metapolitical as well as the political solutions which nationalism provided for men on the Left like Hervé. For details on the Rochette Affair see Goldberg, op.cit., 449–453; Benjamin F. Martin, *France and the Après Guerre, 1918–1924: Illusions and Disillusionment*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1999), 60–63. The intricate relations of the politicians are tersely but insightfully elucidated.
217. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 201–202.
218. L.G.S., #14, April 1–7, 1914, "La manifestation du degoût," G.H. Briand's last pre-war ministry had ended in late March 1913.
219. L.G.S., #15, April 8–14, 1914, "La manifestation contre Briand," G.H. Of course this implies that the J.G.R. had been disbanded.
220. L.G.S., #18, April 29–May 5, 1914, "Que sera le ler mai?" Émile Pouget.
221. L.G.S., #19, May 6–12, 1914, "Le bloc reconstitué," G.H.
222. L.G.S., #19, May 6–12, 1914, "La chasse aux mal-élus," G.H.
223. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 202.
224. L.G.S., #20, May 13–19, 1914, "Àprès la victoire," G.H.
225. L.G.S., #21, May 20–26, 1914, "Au pied du mur," G.H.
226. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 202.
227. Ibid., 202.
228. A.P.P., Ba/1470; A.N., F7 13074.
229. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 202; Lénine, *Œuvres*, op.cit, 202–205.
230. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 231–232. See Masson's Letter of June 14, 1914.
231. L.G.S., #21, May 20–26, 1914, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres," G.H.
232. L.G.S., #21, May 20–26, 1914, "Deux mots au *Rappel*," G.H.
233. It had taken Hervé over a decade to realize that Guesdism was equally adept at rejecting insurrectionalism and the *Bloc*.
234. L.G.S., #23, June 3–9, 1914, "Crise présidentielle," G.H.
235. L.G.S., #24, June 10–16, 1914, "Sur la route de Versailles," G.H.

236. They were often called Independent Socialists by Hervé.
237. L.G.S., #25, June 17–23, 1914, "La revanche de Poincaré," G.H.
238. L.G.S., #23, June 3–9, 1914, "La Conférence de Bâle," G.H. In July in the Vosges, Hervé failed to realize that a favorable reception to his ideas on Alsace-Lorraine may not have been a sign of peace. L.G.S., #28, July 8–14, 1914, "Mon carnet," G.H.
239. L.G.S., #23, June 3–9, 1914, "Les socialistes et le pouvoir," G.H.; L.G.S., #25, June 17–23, 1914, "Les socialistes françaises et l'Alsace-Lorraine," G.H.
240. L.G.S., #26, June 24–30, 1914, "Avant les congrès socialistes," G.H.
241. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 205.
242. L.G.S., #27, July 1–7, 1914, "Oraison funèbre de l'archduc," G.H.
243. As late as July 1914 Hervé was still being refused the use of municipal halls for his provincial meetings due to his subversive reputation. Sometimes he forgot that he was no longer *Un Sans Patrie*. L.G.S., #28, July 8–14, 1914, "Mon carnet," G.H.
244. The Hardie-Vaillant Motion of 1910 called for a general strike in the event of war.
245. L.G.S., #28, July 8–14, 1914, "Moutarde après dîner," G.H.
246. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 203; Annie Kriegel, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier français, 1914–1920: Aux origines du communisme français*, Thesis, (Paris, 1964), tome 1, 50. Cited in Heuré, 203, note 93.
247. Jean-Jacques Becker and Annie Kriegel, *1914—La guerre et le mouvement ouvrier française*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), 219.
248. The Vaillant-Jaurès Motion was an attempt to force European governments into arbitration. Hervé believed the motion would confuse the French by its revolutionary rhetoric. Jaurès probably only wanted to use the threat of a general strike, not its actuality, to pressure the government and to win over the C.G.T., the fears of the police notwithstanding. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 207; A.N., F7 13571. Note of July 18, 1914.
249. L.G.S., #30, July 22–28, 1914, "Les socialistes et la guerre," G.H., and "Au congrès socialiste-Déclaration de Gustave Hervé"; *L'Humanité*, July 17, 1914. After the war the reactionary Hervé changed his tune and called both socialists and communists Marxist revolutionaries.
250. Michel Baumont, "Gustave Hervé et *La Guerre Sociale* pendant l'été 1914 (1er juillet-1er novembre)," *L'Information historique*, No. 4, 1968, 155–163. Baumont described the complex and contradictory aspects of Hervé's socialism in the summer of 1914 which included remnants of anarcho-syndicalism. This multivalent message did not prevent him from becoming a scapegoat for the French Left. Baumont noted that Hervé was not alone among socialists in his manner of reacting to the war.
251. Peyronnet, op.cit., 195; Becker and Kriegel, *1914*, op.cit., 100–143.
252. L.G.S., #31, July 28–August 4, 1914; *La Victoire*, #943, July 31, 1918, "Ma déposition pour M. Malvy," G.H. Hervé said he changed his address often in the summer of 1914 due to police surveillance of those on the *Carnet B*.
253. L.G.S., #31A, *Edition Spéciale*, Wednesday, July 29, 1914.
254. Ibid.
255. If the government acted stupidly and implemented the *Carnet B*, Hervé wanted to be among the arrested.
256. L.G.S., #31 B, *Édition Spéciale*, Thursday, July 30, 1914.
257. *La Patrie en Danger* was the name of Blanqui's newspaper published in Paris under German siege in 1870. Gustave Hervé, *La Patrie en Danger*, (Paris: Bibliothèque des Ouvrages Documentaires, 1915), 7.
258. L.G.S., #31C, *Édition Spéciale*, Friday, July 31, 1914; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208.
259. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208–209; *La Victoire*, #3133, July 31, 1924, "31 Juillet 1914," G.H.
260. Goldberg, op.cit., 471–473. Goldberg cited *Le Procès de l'assassin de Jaurès*, (Paris: Éditions de L'Humanité, 1920), 391. Goldberg was also cited in Sowerwine, op.cit., 87.

261. Almosnino, op.cit., 123.
262. Ibid., 123–124; *Le Bonnet Rouge*, August 2, 1914, "L'assassinat de Jaurès," M.A.; *Le Bonnet Rouge*, August 3, 1914, "Notre Guerre," M.A.
263. L.G.S., #31D, *Édition Spéciale*, Saturday, August 1, 1914, "Jaurès est mort!" G.H. Apparently, the assassin of Jaurès, Raoul Villain, intended to kill Joseph Caillaux as well, undoubtedly for the latter's efforts to prevent war in 1911 and the recent nationalist anger generated by the trial and acquittal of Madame Caillaux. Berenson, op.cit., 242.
264. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208–209.
265. L.G.S., #31E, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, August 2, 1914, "À Monsieur le Ministre de la Guerre," G.H.; Zévaès, *Le socialisme en 1912 …*, op.cit., 40.
266. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 220.
267. L.G.S., #31E, *Édition Spéciale*, Sunday, August 2, 1914, "L'âme de la patrie," G.H. In acknowledgment of Hervé's efforts on behalf of the Republic, he was soon reinstated to the bar. *Le Bonnet Rouge*, August 8, 1914; Miller, op.cit., 246; Rotstein, op.cit., 126.
268. Almosnino, op.cit., 124–125. Initially, with the German advance to the Marne, Almereyda had thought about creating a group of paramilitary ex-anarchists to fight under the orders of the military authorities in defense of the capital. Needless to say, the authorities were not thrilled about arming ex-revolutionaries, and the outcome of the Battle of the Marne made the idea unnecessary.
269. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 210. Heuré cited Péguy, *Notre Jeunesse, Œuvres complète*, op.cit., Tome 3, 113.
270. Ibid., 219. Heuré cited Jean-Bernard Passerieu, *La Vie de Paris en 1912*, (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1913), 419.
271. Ferry, *Les Carnets secrets*, op.cit, 27.
272. L.G.S., #31F, *Édition Spéciale*, Tuesday, August 4, 1914, "Adieu à Jaurès, G.H.
273. Goldberg, op.cit., 471–473. Goldberg cited *Le Procès de l'assassin de Jaurès*, (Paris: Éditions de *L'Humanité*, 1920), 391.
274. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208; Becker and Kriegel, *1914*, op.cit., 389; Becker, *Le Carnet B*, (Paris: Klincksieck, 1973); Almosnino, op.cit., 120–123; Jourdain, op.cit., 94–96; Miguel Almereyda, *Les Naufrageurs de la Patrie: Le Bonnet Rouge contre L'Action Française*, (Paris: Editions du Bonnet Rouge, N.D.,), 53–54; A.N., Panthéon.
275. Almosnino, op.cit., 121.
276. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13574 notes of July 29 and 31, 1914; A.N., F7 13348.
277. Ferry, *Les Carnet Secrets (1914–1918)*, op.cit., 27, note 2.
278. Jean-Yves Le Naour, *L'Affaire Malvy: Le Dreyfus de la Grande Guerre*, (Paris, Hachette Littératures, 2007), 66–68. Once the C.G.T. met later that evening and definitively rejected a general strike, Malvy made his ambiguous instructions to Hennion much more precise at 1:00 a.m. August 1, 1914.
279. Léon Daudet, *L'Hécatombe: Récits et souvenirs politiques, 1914–1918*, (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1923), 44–45.
280. Le Naour, op.cit., 68–69. Since Hervé always stressed that he had stayed in Paris in August 1914, the idea that he met Malvy in Bordeaux seems unlikely.
281. Almosnino, op.cit., 122–123; Jourdain, *Sans remord ni rancune*, op.cit., 95–96. Léon Jouhaux was another working class leader who probably met with Malvy at about the same time.
282. Michael S. Neiberg, *Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I*, (Cambridge, Masss.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 139; Almosnino, op.cit., 121.
283. Méric, Séries I, op.cit., 203.
284. Hervé was never a pacifist in any sense that this writer can think of.
285. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 160–162.
286. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 220.
287. Ibid., 221.

288. Léon Trotski, *La Guerre et la révolution: archives et documents*, Vol. 1, (Paris : Éditions Tête de feuilles, 1974), 220.
289. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 221. Heuré cited Jean Maitron and Colette Chambelland, eds., *Syndicalisme révolutionnaire et communisme: Les archives de Pierre Monatte*, (Paris: Maspero, 1968), 83.
290. Ibid., 221. Heuré cited A.N., Panthéon, 25337/45, Note of November 3, 1915.
291. Méric, Series I, op.cit., 227.
292. Serge, *Mémoires d'un Révolutionnaire*, op.cit., 57. Serge was in prison because he had been indirectly implicated in the Bonnot-Garnier Affair.

Chapter 16

1. Becker *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre*, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977), 224–231. Becker took issue with the pessimism depicted by Goldberg's account of Jaurès in Brussels. The article drafted in Brussels on July 29 illustrates Jaurès's hope that Austria-Hungary had begun to realize the consequences of its actions. When he arrived at the Gare du Nord on the afternoon of July 30, Jean Longuet showed him a report that Russia had mobilized, but he still did not lose hope that war could be averted. Becker describes the "moment of panic" on the Left in the evening of July 30.
2. Ferry, op.cit., 25–27; *L'Humanité*, July 30, 1914, "L'Action," Jean Jaurès; Becker, op.cit., 221–224. Jaurès also expressed his usual confidence in German workers and the S.P.D., and he promised that French workers would not march if Russia took a belligerent action.
3. Becker, *1914*, op.cit., 226–234; Neiberg, op.cit., 112.
4. Jean-Yves Le Naour, *L'Affaire Malvy: Le Dreyfus de la Grande Guerre*, (Paris, Hachette Littératures, 2007), 69–70.
5. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau*, (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 317. "One is unable to discover any act of real provocation in the policies of Raymond Poincaré and his successors. But everything was tinged with precautions which let it be understood that one dreaded the impending war."
6. Mollier and George, op.cit., 400–401.
7. L.G.S., August 17, 1914, "Lettre à ma mère," G.H. As we have seen, Hervé had multiple contacts with French national security officials including the Minister of the Interior, Louis-Jean Malvy, in order to avoid the implementation of the *Carnet B* even though he was still included on it. Not everyone agreed with Malvy's decision. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 208. For Le Naour: "In the end in 1914, no country truly defended the cause of peace." Le Naour, op.cit., 71.
8. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "Hello to All That!," *The New York Review of Books*, June 23, 2011, vol. LVIII, No. 11, 30–32; Neiberg, op.cit., 4–5, 232, 234. Wheatcroft agrees with Neiberg whose "account doesn't challenge the view of most serious historians that, if there was a culprit, Germany was it, or rather the cabal around the Kaiser." Both scholars seem to have excluded Niall Ferguson's iconoclastic study, *The Pity of War*, assuming that Ferguson was serious in blaming the Brits for a "world" war if not the European war.
9. Leonard V. Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker, *France and the Great War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27.
10. A person who favored war "to the limit" or "to the bitter end."
11. L.G.S., November 11, 1914, "Jusqu'au bout!" G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 224.
12. L.G.S., December 8, 1914, "Les pot aux roses autrichien," G.H.
13. Tardieu, op.cit., 13–14.

14. Robert Burac, *Charles Péguy, La révolution et la grâce*, (Paris : Robert Laffont, 1994), 302, 304, 284. Burac cited Geneviève Favre, "Souvenirs sur Péguy (1903–1914)," *Europe*, April 15, 1938, 494. In fact, Péguy himself had predicted Hervé's future stance in 1913 or even before.
15. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 222.
16. Daudet, *L'Hécatombe*, op.cit., 44–45.
17. *L'Action Française*, August 22, 1914, "Patriotisme spécial," Maurice Pujo.
18. *L'Action Française*, October 4, 1915, "La Politique—Hervé ou la mouche du Boche," Charles Maurras.
19. *L'Action Française*, December 24, 1915, "La Politique," Charles Maurras.
20. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 223.
21. Ibid., 223. Heuré cited A.P.P., Ba/1470, note of October 10, 1914.
22. Ibid., 236.
23. *La Lanterne*, October 4, 1915, "Gustave Hervé ou l'homme heureux."
24. Léon Trotski, *La Guerre et la révolution: Le Naufrage de la IIe Internationale: Les Débuts de la IIIe Internationale*, translated from the Russian by André Oak, (Paris: Éditions Tête de Feuilles, 1974), tome 1, 17.
25. *Naché Slovo*, August 4, 1916, "Deux Ans: L'Europe entre en sa troisième année de Guerre," Léon Trotski, in Trotski, *La Guerre et la révolution*, op.cit., tome 2, 87. Throughout the war, despite his general optimism, Hervé gave a realistic assessment comparing French and German manpower reserves which, in Trotsky's view, were especially pertinent at the time of the Somme fiasco in 1916 and the talk about English and Russian manpower reserves.
26. Serge, *Mémoires*, op.cit., 56.
27. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 223. Heuré cited Urbain Gohier, *Menaces du Sans-Patrie: Le camarade de Caserio exagère*, (Paris: 11, boulevard du Palais, August 1916). Gohier made similar accusations in an earlier brochure titled *Le Spectre du quatre septembre*, which had come out in August 1915. Dagobert I was the last Merovingian King to wield any real power. Brunehaut or Brunhilda was an unscrupulous Frankish queen of the sixth century who met a horrible death at the hands of a royal rival's son.
28. *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 220. Heuré cited Roger Martin du Gard, *Les Thibault*, Vol. 2, (Paris: Gallimard "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade," 1955), 461–463.
29. *Heuré, GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, 219.
30. Poincaré, *The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré …*, op.cit., 150.
31. Literally, in the context of World War I, this meant eyewash, brainwashing, or "to cram a head" full of French pro-war propaganda. However, as Jean-Jacques Becker notes, the term "is misleading because there was not always a deliberate intention of falsifying the facts …" Becker, *The Great War and the French People*, op.cit., 40. "Henri Barbusse was, reportedly, the first French writer to use the term *bourrage de crâne*, or brainwashing." Catharine Savage Brosman, *Visions of War in France: Fiction, Art, Ideology*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 153.
32. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 437.
33. Marie and François Mayoux, *Instituteurs pacifistes et syndicalistes*, (Chamalières: Éditions Canopes, 1992), op.cit., 91.
34. Charles Fraval, *Histoire de l'Arrière*, (Paris: Jidéher Éditeur, s.d.), 43–46. "'Let the sheep piss or pray to God that it freezes.'" ('Laisser pisser le mérinos, ou prier le bon Dieu que ça gèle.')
35. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 235. On October 15, 1913 *La Guerre Sociale* moved from the offices at 8, Rue Saint Joseph to those on the Rue du Faubourg Saint Denis. The newspaper apparently stayed there until sometime in 1916. The motive for the move may have been to cut costs.
36. L.G.S., September 4, 1914, "Branle-bas de combat," G.H.
37. Alistair Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916*, (New York: Penguin, 1993 [1962]), 11. This philosophy "was also well matched to the philosophy of [Henri] Bergson that was now all the

rage in France, with its emphasis on 'élan vital'." Robert Tombs, *France: 1814–1914*, (New York: Longman, 1996), 58–59; Douglas Porch, *The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871–1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 [1981]), 215.

38. Robert Tombs, op.cit., 58–59; Porch, op.cit., 215; Baumont, op.cit.; *La Guerre Sociale*, August 7–8, 1914. In the first days of the war, Hervé predicted something like the Schlieffen Plan simply by looking at the map of the German railroad lines heading toward Belgium and the Netherlands.
39. Paul Fussell, *The Great War and the Modern Memory*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
40. L.G.S., September 18, 1914, "Gars de Bretagne," G.H. Of course, even Hervé admitted that his apparently naïve belief that this was the last of wars was simply an optimistic and rhetorical hope rather than a realistic prediction of the future course of events. L.G.S., October 5, 1914, "Le plus chrétien des deux," G.H.
41. Baumont, op.cit., 162.
42. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *À Travers Les Journaux: 14–18—Les Combattants Des Tranchées*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986), 124–125, Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, op.cit., 111.
43. Brosman, op.cit., 148–153; Fussell, op.cit.; Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, op.cit.
44. Ibid., 154. Brosman argues that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era led to insights and reactions which foreshadowed the undermining of traditional ideas about the comprehensibility of war and the limits to its depiction.
45. Fussell, op.cit., 3–35, *passim*.
46. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 427.
47. Becker, *The Great War and the French People*, op.cit., 41–42.
48. Audoin-Rouzeau, op.cit., 160–164.
49. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 235. Heuré cited A.N., « Panthéon », 25337/45. In late 1915 Daudet continued to "uncover" German spies in France, associating Vigo (Almereyda) with Malvy, Caillaux, and all manner of traitorous and criminal elements, including various spies, swindlers, trouble-makers, draft dodgers, and police informants. Almereyda's pre-war association with Hervé was all the evidence needed to imply the latter's ongoing guilt. See *L'Action Française* in late December 1915, especially *L'Action Française*, December 30, 1915, "Vigo: Voleur, Indicateur et Munitionnaire—Le Complice de Lombard et Garfunkel," Léon Daudet.
50. L.G.S., September 28, 1914, "A une lectrice," G.H.
51. L.G.S., August 17, 1914, "Lettre à ma mère," G.H.
52. L.G.S., April 5, 1915, "Les orphelins de la guerre," G.H.
53. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 211; Baumont, op.cit., 159, 155–163.
54. Ibid., 210–211; Baumont, op.cit., 158.
55. Baumont, op.cit., 159. Of course, that word was *merde*. In fact, the headline was composed, unbeknownst to Hervé, by Almereyda in order to create a sensation.
56. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 210–211; Baumont, op.cit., 159; L.G.S., #43, August 17, 1914, "Lettre à ma mère," G.H.; L.G.S., #44, August 18, 1914, "Ma réconciliation avec Briand," G.H.; L.G.S., #54, August 28, 1914, "Le ministère de la victoire," G.H.
57. *L'Action Française*, July 12, 1914, cited by Maurice Rotstein, op.cit., 129. I could not find this reference in the royalist paper.
58. Baumont, op.cit., 159; L.G.S., September 10, 1914, "A un catholique," G.H.; L.G.S., September 15, 1914, "Réponse à l'abbé Colin," G.H.
59. L.G.S., September 30, 1914, "Jusqu'à la braguette," G.H.; L.G.S., October 3, 1914, "Leurs opinions et les nôtres—Simple dialogue entre Maurice Barrès et Gustave Hervé à propos des bonnes sœurs," G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 160; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., ..., 218.
60. L.G.S., April 15, 1915, "La dernière du Saint-Père," G.H.; L.G.S., June 22, 1915, "La voix du Saint-Père," G.H.

61. Becker, *The Great War* ..., op.cit., 182–191. The Holy See had diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary but not with France or Italy due to the problems with the Separation and the complexities of the *Risorgimento.*
62. L.G.S., February 23, 1915, "Au dessus des haines nationales," G.H.; L.G.S., October 12, 1914, "Le pacifisme-simple dialogue entre M. Paul Bourget et Gustave Hervé," G.H.; Almosnino, op.cit., 124–125.
63. L.G.S., September 14, 1914, "Un nouveau Valmy," G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 160.
64. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 211–212. He claimed to believe that French socialists had developed an inferiority complex after the defeat in 1870 due to the achievements of the industrious and disciplined colossus of Germany. *La Victoire*, #92, April 1, 1916, "Aurons-nous notre scission?" G.H.
65. L.G.S., August 9, 1914, "La revanche," G.H. With that image Hervé's thoughts turned to Paul Déroulède, the symbol of *revanche* and the former leader of the *Ligue des Patriotes* who died six months previously. The former *Sans Patrie* reminded the soul of Déroulède that the Flag of Valmy now floated above Mulhouse.
66. L.G.S., August 24, 1914, "Lettre à ma mère," G.H.
67. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 212.
68. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 408–412. Due to a restricted wartime paper supply, almost all dailies, even recent *hebdomadaires* like Hervé's, were reduced to two pages. In 1917 an increase in the price of paper caused all French newspapers to increase their prices under a governmental order. This led to a decline in sales which eventually hurt the circulations of such papers as *La Victoire*, *L'Action Française*, and *Le Journal du Peuple*. After a decline in circulation after 1912, *La Guerre Sociale* vastly increased its sales once the war began. Yet fund raising drives were still necessary and future increases in price were on the horizon.
69. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 425; Peyronnet, op.cit., 193. "The rapid changes which evolved in the French press after 1905, such as the increase in the number of pages, the progressive use of photographs, the growth of content, the renewal of presentation formulas as well as journalistic styles all came to a brutal stoppage in 1914. While the war stimulated the development of the press and accelerated its evolution in Anglo-Saxon countries due to the curiosity provoked by such formidable events, in France newspapers were reduced to a mediocre existence. This regression in the French press was accentuated by the slow development in French journalism after 1919 so that the French press never completely recovered its position *vis-à-vis* the foreign press." Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 407.
70. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 409. Censorship was established in early August with the creation of a *Bureau de la Presse* at the Ministry of War in conformance with the law of August 9, 1849.
71. L.G.S., June 7, 1915, "La droite à la vérité," G.H.
72. L.G.S., September 22, 1914, "Le râle des blessés," G.H.
73. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 236.
74. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 407. The discussion of the censor and the press during the war is most illuminating.
75. Becker, *The Great War* ..., op.cit., 63.
76. Ibid., 47–52.
77. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 239.
78. Ibid., 237–238.
79. *L'Action Française*, July 28, 1915, "La Politique," Charles Maurras.
80. L.G.S., October 31, 1915, "La tête de Anastasie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #27, January 27, 1916, "Éloge de la censure," G.H.
81. Albert, Tome III, op.cit., 407. The discussion of the censor and the press during the war is most illuminating.
82. Ibid., 425–427.
83. Fussell, op.cit., 316.

84. L.G.S., July 1, 1915, "Réflexions d'un simple pékin," G.H.; L.G.S., July 12, 1915, "Permissionnaires," G.H.; L.G.S., July 24, 1915, "Une journée des 'poilus,'" G.H. He also appealed to his readers to help war orphans.
85. L.G.S., November 17, 1914, "Le don de soi-même," G.H.
86. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 215; L.G.S., September 1, 1915, "Chiens errants," G.H.; L.G.S., September 15, 1915, "Encore les chiens errants," G.H.
87. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 215.
88. L.G.S., August 6, 9, 12, 16, 1914; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 215–216; Baumont, op.cit, 157; Becker, *1914* …, op.cit., 499–503.
89. L.G.S., #39, August 13, 1914, "Respectons nos hôtes étrangers," G.H.
90. Baumont, op.cit., 157; André Maurel, *Les Écrivains De La Guerre*, (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1917), 78. See *La Guerre Sociale*, #32–46, August 6–20, 1914.
91. *La Victoire*, #1623, June 11, 1920, "Souvenir," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8193, June 19, 1940, "Quand l'Allemagne était par terre," G.H. Of course, such a disclosure at that time seems self-serving and even obsequious in the face of the invader.
92. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 216–217.
93. Ibid., 216; L.G.S., August 19, 1914. In November 1917 Maurras and Daudet would charge Hervé with protecting the Maggi Dairies for financial reasons. For Hervé, such charges simply verified the silliness and nastiness of the writers at *L'Action Française*.
94. Ibid., 217.
95. *Naché Slovo*, December 3, 1915, "Nous sommes les rouge … Nous le resterons," Léon Trotski. From Léon Trotski, *La Guerre Et La Révolution*: Tome 2, op.cit., 216.
96. L.G.S., November 26, 1915, "Les Juifs russes de Paris," G.H.; *Syndicalisme Révolutionnaire et Communisme: Les Archives de Pierre Monatte, 1914–1924*, eds. Colette Chambelland and Jean Maitron, (Paris: François Maspero, 1968), Letter dated November 27, 1915 from Marcel Martinet to Pierre Monatte, 225–226 and note 1, 226.
97. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 217.
98. Ibid., 232–233.
99. Roger Martin du Gard, "Letter to Helène," March 3, 1915, *Journal: I, textes autobiographiques 1892–1919*, edited and annotated by Claude Sicard, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 605–606.
100. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 234.
101. Roger Martin du Gard, "Letter to Pierre Margaritis," October 27, 1916, *Journal: I*, op.cit., 730.
102. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 234, 220. Heuré cited Roger Martin du Gard, *Les Thibault*, (Paris: Gallimard, « Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, » 1955), Vol. 2, 461–463, 512.
103. Maurel, op.cit., vi.
104. Ibid., 73.
105. Ibid., 75.
106. Ibid., 81–82.
107. Trotski, *La Guerre et la révolution*, Tome 2, op.cit., 179. Trotsky recounted how Hervé did not abandon all his oppositional attitudes, such as his protest of the confiscation of several anti-German brochures because they originated in Germany. The brochures, apparently meant for Trotsky and others, came to France by way of Zurich, and the Bolshevik leader eventually got some of his expected brochures. Thus, some of Trotsky's reading material might have arrived in Paris with Hervé's help, unbeknownst to him. Tome 1, 39.
108. Aristide Jobert, *Souvenirs d'un ex-parlementaire, 1914–1919*, (Paris: Eugène Figuière, 1933), 224.
109. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 237–242, 248–250. See Masson's letter to Romain Rolland dated February 21, 1915. J.-Y. Guiomar, presentation and notes for Émile Masson, *Antée: Les Bretons et le Socialisme*, (Paris : Maspero, 1972), 137.

110. Ibid., 63. See Masson's Letter to Pierre Monatte, October 25, 1915.
111. Ibid., 242. See Masson's letter to Louis Bouët, February 18, 1915.
112. Ibid., 248–250. See Masson's letter to Romain Rolland, February 21, 1915.
113. Ibid., 253–254. See Masson's letter to André Spire, April 9, 1915.
114. Almosnino, op.cit., 114.
115. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 63. See Masson's Letter to Pierre Monatte, October 25, 1915.
116. Ibid., 269. A Beotian was someone who was considered slow-witted and coarse in the ancient Greek world, in other words a dullard, rube, or Philistine. See Masson's letter to Monatte, December 25, 1915. The Girauds ended their biography of Masson with a brief account of Hervé's later evolution about which Masson was one of the few to divine. When Masson entered a Parisian clinic at the Rue de Picpus on March 28, 1922, Hervé was apparently not in attendance. Whether Hervé visited him before he died there on May 24, 1922, was not mentioned. 364, 351–352.
117. CQFD: Ce Qu'il Fallait Démontrer (French: which was to be demonstrated) also a song title.
118. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 234. Heuré cited A.P.P., Ba/1470, note of October 10, 1914.
119. Rotstein, op.cit., 128, note 3. Beveridge was also an advocate of Manifest Destiny and standard American exceptionalism. James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 204.
120. L.G.S., September 27, 1914, "L'évangile selon M. de Mun," G.H.
121. Baumont, op.cit., 162; Becker, *The Great War* ..., op.cit., 175. *Bourrage de Crâne* literally meant "head torture" but was usually translated as "eye wash" or "balderdash." Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, op.cit., 105. Le Canard Enchaîné "actively criticized the most excessive examples [of balderdash] found in the press." *L'Homme Enchaîné, La Victoire* and *L'Œuvre* were the leading opinion papers read by the troops according to Joelle Beurier, "Press/Journalism(France)", *International Encyclopedia of the First World War (1914–1918).* Translator: Jocelyne Serveau. http://encyclopedia.1914–1918-oline.net/article/pressjournalism_france.
122. Audoin-Rouzeau, op.cit., 107–143.
123. Ibid., 163.
124. Maurel, op.cit., 94.
125. Ibid., 95–96.
126. Ibid., 73–83.
127. Ibid., 74.
128. Méric, Series I, 197–200, 214–217; idem., "Vieilles choses, vieilles histoires," *La Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, No. 8, July 15–August 15, 1926, 592–593.
129. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, op.cit., 84.
130. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 212.
131. Jean Ajalbert, *Dans Paris la grand' ville: Sensations de guerre*, (Paris : Éditions Georges Crès et Cie, 1916), 286. Ajalbert's long and varied career included writing in fascist and Collaboration publications during Vichy period.
132. L.G.S., #32, August 6, 1914, "Jemappes 1792–1914," G.H.; L.G.S., #33, August 7, 1914, "Sur la route de Jemappes," G.H.
133. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 212–213.
134. L.G.S., September 12, 1914, "Vive le Tsar," G.H.
135. LG.S., #52, August 26, 1914, "Après le premier choc," G.H.
136. L.G.S., #57, September 1, 1914, "La vérité toute nue," G.H.
137. L.G.S., September 6, 1914, "Courage, Général Joffre," G.H.; L.G.S., September 8, 1914, "La campagne de France," G.H.

138. See issues for August 23, 30, 31 and September 1, 2, 3, 4, 1914; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 213.
139. Baumont, op.cit., 159.
140. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 213. Heure cited L.G.S., September 4, 1914. Also see *Les Carnets de Gallieni*, annotated by P.-B. Gheusi, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1932), 77, 98, and 114.
141. Ibid., 213. Heuré cited *Gallieni parle ... Entretiens du ministre de la Guerre avec ses secrétaires Marius-Ary et Leblond*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1920), 170.
142. Ibid., *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 213–214;
143. L.G.S., June 7, 1915, "La Droit a la vérité," G.H.; L.G.S., June 8, 1915, "Malaise," G.H.
144. Baumont, op.cit., 158; L.G.S., August 10, 20, 21, 23, 1914.
145. Becker, *The Great War* ..., op.cit., 41.
146. Baumont, op.cit., 158; L.G.S., August 10, 20, 21, and 23, 1914.
147. L.G.S., December 8, 1914, "Éloge de Gambetta." G.H.
148. L.G.S., September 22, 1914, "Le râle des blessés," G.H.; L.G.S., September 23, 1914, "Faut-il soigner nos blessés?" G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 161.
149. L.G.S., September 28, 1914, "À une lectrice," G.H.
150. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 215; L.G.S., April 29, 1915.
151. L.G.S., October 28, 1914, "Lettre à mon cadet," G.H.; L.G.S., October 9, 1914, "Faut-il employer les territoriaux?" G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 161.
152. L.G.S., February 28, 1915, "Réflexions d'un simple pékin," G.H.; L.G.S., March 10, 1915, "La quatrième front," G.H.; Abel Ferry, op.cit., 34–37. Some of his criticisms were actually shared by Abel Ferry, who had a firsthand view of both the front and the machinery of government. As a sitting Undersecretary, Ferry actually served at the front and became an unofficial liaison with the Ministry and then an official one with the parliament. It did not take either man long to realize that offensives were often disasters even though Hervé periodically forgot the lesson.
153. A.J.P. Taylor, *A History of the First World War*, (New York: Berkley Publishing Comp., 1966 [1963]), 16–25; John Keegan, *The First World War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 22–47, 195–196, 200.
154. L.G.S., October 10, 1914, "Pépinière d'officiers," G.H.
155. L.G.S., February 28, 1915, G.H.
156. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 240. Heuré cited SHAT, 5/N/380.
157. L.G.S., August 24, 1914, "Lettre à ma mère," G.H.
158. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 215.
159. L.G.S., May 11, 1915, "A un neurasthénique du front," G.H.
160. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., [2]15.
161. L.G.S., April 29, 1915, "Bombes asphyxiantes," G.H. Lest we be too harsh on Herve's acceptance of gas as a legitimate weapon, it seems that its use was only banned after war once the military assailed its effectiveness.
162. L.G.S., June 20, 1915, "Karlsruhe," G.H.
163. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 214.
164. Ibid., 241.
165. Ibid., 242; *La Victoire*, April 17, 1917.
166. Fussell, op.cit., 243–254.
167. Heure, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 242. Heuré cited Lucien Juventy, *Souvenirs et Lettres, 1914–1918,* letter of January 11, 1918, 116.
168. Ibid., 243. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13372.
169. Ibid., 243. Heuré cited Lucien Juventy, *Souvenirs et Lettres, 1914–1918*, letter of October 4, 1918, 132–133.
170. L.G.S., October 29, 1914, "Ronds-de-cuir," G.H.
171. Ferry, op.cit., 41, 34–51.

172. L.G.S., November 24, 1914, "L'embuscomanie," G.H.
173. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 217–218.
174. L.G.S., #41, August 15, 1914, "Fusillés par mesure provisoire," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 217.
175. L.G.S., #46, August 20, 1914, "Pas des carottes," G.H.
176. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 206.
177. L.G.S., February 23, 1915, "Au dessus des haines nationales," G.H.; L.G.S., October 12, 1914, "Le pacifisme-simple dialogue entre M. Paul Bourget et Gustave Hervé," G.H.
178. L.G.S., #39, August 13, 1914, "Les socialistes allemands," G.H.
179. L.G.S., September 13, 1914, "Sur la mort d'un ami allemand," G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 157–158.
180. L.G.S., February 11, 1915, "L'International et les problèmes nationaux," G.H.
181. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 234; A.P.P., Ba/1470, note of 10 October 1914; A.N., F7 12842; F7 12843.
182. L.G.S., August 8, 1914, "Résurrection," G.H.
183. L.G.S., October 21, 1914, "Le troisième à mon cadet," G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 162.
184. Sowerwine, op.cit., 103–104.
185. L.G.S., April 24, 1915, "Et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme," G.H. Of course, Hervé's ascetic vision did not entail an assault on wine consumption.
186. L.G.S., April 27, 1915, "La France qui se meurt," G.H.
187. L.G.S., July 26, 1915, "Un gouvernement qui gouverne," G.H.; L.G.S., July 29, 1915, "Éloge du Parlement," G.H.
188. L.G.S., October 27, 1915, "Une crise, pourquoi?" G.H.; Baumont, op.cit., 160.
189. L.G.S., October 27, 1915, "Une crise, pourquoi?" G.H.; L.G.S., October 28, 1915, "Le ministère de demain," G.H.; L.G.S., October 29, 1915, "Le Serbie et le ministère," G.H.; L.G.S., October 30, 1915, "Le ministère de la victoire," G.H.
190. L.G.S., July 20, 1915, "Parlement et Bureaucratie," G.H. Initially, Hervé found it difficult to realize or admit that his call for a more competent bureaucracy would culminate in a rejection of socialism as *Le Temps* seemed to think after reading Hervé's criticisms of the various governmental agencies.
191. L.G.S., October 29, 1914, "Ronds-de-cuir," G.H.
192. L.G.S., January 29, 1916, "Des représentants du peuple aux armées?" G.H.
193. *Heuré, GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, 218; Raymond Poincaré, *Au Service de la France*, (Paris: Plon, 1932), 56.
194. Baumont, op.cit., 160.
195. "Peter Viereck and Conservatism. Sole author." In Peter Viereck and Claes G. Ryn, "Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt against Ideology," two monographs in the same volume *Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler,* expanded ed., (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2005 [2003]).
196. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, Revised Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992 [1957]).
197. *La Victoire*, #730, December 30, 1917, "Sermon d'un frère mendicant," G.H.
198. L.G.S., September 27, 1914, "L'évangile selon M. de Mun," G.H.
199. Baumont, op.cit., 162; L.G.S., September 20, 1914, "Vaines alarmes," G.H. Here Hervé described Déroulède's nationalism as basically "the legitimate revolt of French and human conscience against the attack committed against Alsace-Lorraine forty-three years ago."
200. Prochasson, op.cit., 116; L.G.S., October 13, 1914, "Leurs intellectuels," G.H.
201. L.G.S., October 17, 1914, "Réponse au *Vörwaerts*," G.H.
202. L.G.S., October 19, 1914, "Le première à mon cadet," G.H.
203. L.G.S., October 23, 1914, "La guillotine ou la corde," G.H.
204. L.G.S., October 31, 1914, "A un socialiste allemand," G.H.

205. L.G.S., August 9, 1915, "Réflexions d'un simple pékin," G.H.
206. L.G.S., November 22, 1915, "En attendant Grouchy," G.H.
207. L.G.S., February 5, 1915, "Encore l'épine bulgare," G.H.; L.G.S., February 22, 1915, "Les Dardanelles," G.H.; L.G.S., March 8, 1915, "La Grèce," G.H.; L.G.S., March 14, 1915, "La partage de la Turquie," G.H.; L.G.S., March 16, 1915, "A qui Constantinople?" G.H.; L.G.S., March 5, 1915, "La plaie austro-hongroise," G.H.
208. L.G.S., November 4, 1914, "Guerre de délivrance," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 225.
209. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 225. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13571.
210. L.G.S., September 24, 1914, "A Ponce-Pilate, socialiste italien," G.H.; L.G.S., October 1, 1914 "La deuxième à Ponce-Pilate," G.H.; L.G.S., October 6, 1914, "La troisième à Ponce-Pilate," G.H.
211. L.G.S., October 4, 1914, "Silence aux eunuques!," G.H.
212. L.G.S., February 20, 1915, "La rentrée du parlement italien," G.H.
213. Marc Ferro, *The Great War, 1914–1918*, translated by Nicole Stone, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 [1969]), 69.
214. L.G.S., May 23, 1915, "Gloire à Italie," G.H.
215. L.G.S., May 26, 1915, "Nos Cousins roumains," G.H.; L.G.S., May 27, 1915, "Les Roumains et a Russie," G.H.; L.G.S., May 28, 1915, "Les hésitations de la Roumanie," G.H.
216. L.G.S., June 25, 1915, "La perte de Lemberg," G.H.; L.G.S., July 4, 1915, "Espérances," G.H.
217. L.G.S., April 22, 1915, "Un dernier mot à Turati," G.H.
218. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 221.
219. Goldsky, op.cit., 3–7. There is one reference to the journalistic military authority at *La Guerre Sociale*, Sergent G, as having been Jean Goldsky at some point but was generally Gustave Hervé himself.
220. *La Victoire*, #1, January 1, 1916, "Pourquoi *La Victoire*," G.H.
221. *La Victoire*, #93, April 2, 1916, "La crise du socialisme français," G.H.
222. *La Victoire*, #94, April 3, 1916, "Le socialisme national," G.H. The same pattern of viewing the war was common to the C.G.T. during much of the war. *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, which became *La Bataille* at the onset of the war, extensively quoted the patriotic writings of Blanqui and Bakunin. The syndicalists compared 1914 to 1870 since the C.G.T., like Hervé, saw the war as a conflict of rival civilizations. German militarism, scientific prowess, and authoritarianism challenged French liberty and culture. Some of the stories in *La Bataille* described World War I in terms of a race war. "The anti-German current within the C.G.T. was so deeply rooted that syndicalism attacked not only the German political leadership, but it also broadened its anti-German attitude to include a repudiation of Karl Marx and German socialism." Idealism and hatred of Germany were twin themes in the syndicalist support of the French war effort. *La Bataille* seldom criticized the government, and it may have been censored even less than Hervé's publications. DeLucia, op.cit., 147–151, 162, 164–171.
223. *La Victoire*, #95, April 4, 1916, "L'inévitable scission," G.H.
224. *La Victoire*, #258, September 14, 1916, "Le bon dieu de Zimmerwald," G.H.
225. *La Victoire*, #122, May 1, 1916, "Lendemain de premier mai," G.H.
226. *La Victoire*, #307, November 2, 1916, "Le jour des morts," G.H.
227. *La Victoire*, #315, November 10, 1916, "L'heure des privations," G.H.
228. *La Victoire*, #319, November 14, 1916, "Malaise," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #320, November 15, 1916, "La levée en masse en Allemagne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #321, November 16, 1916, "La mobilisation civile," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #322, November 17, 1916, "La peur des mots," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #323, November 18, 1916, "La peur du mécontentement," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #325, November 20, 1916, "Une dictature nécessaire," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #326, November 21, 1916, "Un comité de salut public," G.H.

229. *La Victoire*, #26, January 26, 1916, "Pour être vainqueur," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #42, February 11, 1916, "Par où attaqueront-ils?" G.H.
230. *La Victoire*, #56, February 25, 1916, "Heures d'angoisse," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #169, June 17, 1916, "Âme de vainqueurs," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #172, June 20, 1916, "L'esprit d'offensive," G.H.
231. *La Victoire*, #57, February 26, 1916, "Anxiété," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #60, February 29, 1916, "Si Verdun tombait!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #188, July 6, 1916, "La mort de mon cadet," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #189, July 7, 1916, "De Verdun à la Somme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #190, July 8, 1916, "Aux portes de la Hongrie," G.H.
232. After two years of war there were rumors of deterioration and widespread pessimism, but such trends were neither pronounced nor ubiquitous. In fact, Becker stressed how "rural France had settled down stolidly to the war." Becker, *The Great War* ..., op.cit., 131. In the Charente "in 1915 and 1916, confidence remained the rule. People adapted themselves 'with extraordinary flexibility' to being at war, and this was reflected in 'dogged effort' in an unshakeable faith in a favorable outcome. The word 'confidence' keeps recurring in the reports: 'firm' confidence in the final result, 'unshakeable' confidence, 'ever-growing' confidence." 130. By late summer 1915, Parisians were primarily concerned with the high cost of living. People there worried especially about "the rise in food prices; relatively few complaints were made about unemployment, and in many *arrondissements* people even congratulated themselves on 'the recovery of business' ..." 135.
233. *La Victoire*, #310, November 5, 1916, "Contre le cafard," G.H.
234. *La Victoire*, #343, December 8, 1916 and #344, December 9, 1916, G.H.; *La Victoire*, #15, January 15, 1916, "Après l'écrasement du Montenegro," G.H. Hervé wanted Roumania to join the allies but he hoped they would not attack Transylvania. Roumania, in Hervé's view, should join Russia and General Sarrail in order to knock out Bulgaria. Such a move would cut off German and Austrian supplies to Turkey. Once Roumania joined the Allies in late August 1916, Hervé assailed the French press for excessive hostility toward Bulgaria because he now hoped for a separate peace with the Bulgars. Yet Hervé told the Allies to threaten Greece to pressure it to enter the war. One reason for Hervé's sympathies to Bulgaria was its betrayal by former allies in the Second Balkan War in 1913. Hervé wanted all the other Balkan states to give Bulgaria concessions so that it would join the Allies, and once that possibility ended, to get it to agree to a separate peace. It was no coincidence that Hervé saw nothing wrong with ideas of a separate peace as long as it did not involve Germany. *La Victoire*, #234, August 21, 1916, "Si les Roumains marchent ...," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #246, September 2, 1916, "L'épine bulgare," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #262, September 18, 1916, "L'épine bulgare," G.H.
235. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 227–228. Heuré cited A.N., F7 13072 and A.N., F7 13073, Notes of the Minister of the Interior on April 10, 1916; *La Victoire*, April 10, 1916.
236. *La Victoire*, #220, August 7, 1916, "Les saintes icônes," G.H.
237. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., 228.
238. *La Victoire*, #314, November 9, 1916, "L'élection américaine," G.H.
239. *La Victoire*, #380, January 14, 1917, "Eh bien, Monsieur Wilson?" G.H.
240. *La Victoire*, #393, January 27, 1917, "Be! Be!" G.H.
241. *La Victoire*, #460, April 4, 1917, "Hurrah pour l'Amérique !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #461, April 5, 1917, "La charte de l'humanité," G.H.
242. Audoin-Rouzeau, op.cit., 181–188.
243. *La Victoire*, #442, March 17, 1917, "La Russie est libre!," G.H.
244. *Naché Slovo*, February 5, 1915, "Catastrophe Militaire et Perspectives Politiques," Léon Trotski, and March, 9–22, 1916, "Auto-Défense," Léon Trotski, in Trotski, *La Guerre et la Révolution*, op.cit., tome 1, 165, 220.
245. *La Victoire*, #455, March 30, 1917, "La révolution russe et l'Allemagne," G.H.

246. *La Victoire*, #126, May 5, 1916, "La République irlandaise," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #457, April 1, 1917, "La grande secousse," G.H.
247. *La Victoire*, #332, November 27, 1916, "Les parlementaires à leur place," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #335, November 30, 1916, "Si j'étais le Président de la République," G.H.
248. *La Victoire*, #337, December 2, 1916, "Et nous parlons toujours," G.H.
249. *La Victoire*, #355, December 20, 1916, "Encore les flots d'éloquence," G.H.
250. *La Victoire*, #386, January 20, 1917, "Querelles de parlementaires," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #395, January 29, 1917, "Après le comité secret," G.H.
251. *La Victoire*, #473, April 17, 1917 "Le jour de gloire," G.H.
252. *La Victoire*, #527, June 10, 1917, "Pour le moral des poilus," G.H.
253. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 242.
254. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 12, 1935, Hervé Interview with Charles Chassé; *La Victoire*, April 21, 1939; *La Victoire*, June 2, 1917, "A un poilu socialiste," G.H.
255. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 242–243; *La Victoire*, July 11 and 15, 1917.
256. *La Victoire*, #760, January 29, 1918, "Encore le procès Malvy," G.H.
257. Jean-Jacques Becker, *La France en Guerre, 1914–1918: La Grande Mutation*, (Brussels: Complexe, 1988), 112–116.
258. Maurice Barrès, *Mes Cahiers*, (Paris : Plon, 1938), Tome 11, 250.
259. *La Victoire*, #541, June 24, 1917, "Hygiène morale," G.H.
260. *La Victoire*, #571, July 24, 1917, "Après le duel Clemenceau-Malvy," G.H.
261. Le Naour, op.cit., 71–72.
262. *La Victoire*, #680, November 10, 1917, "Après le triomphe de Lénine," G.H.
263. Le Naour, op.cit., 341–342.
264. Sowerwine, op.cit., 109; Almosnino, op.cit., 137–143.
265. Almosnino, op.cit., 139. Duval had replaced Merle, then serving at the front.
266. These two characters dominate the *Comédie Humaine*. Both are talented but poor youths from the provinces, and both attempt to achieve greatness through the intercession of women. Even though each meets the seductive and ruthless criminal Vautrin, only Rastignac succeeds while Lucien de Rubempré ends his life by his own hand in a jail in Paris.
267. Almosnino, op.cit., 128–138. Besides funds coming from Malvy and Caillaux during the war, *Le Bonnet Rouge* was surrounded by collaborators from the center of the S.F.I.O. and the left wing of the Radical Socialists. If Almereyda supported the *Union Sacrée* from the beginning, he did not hesitate to defend the Left from assaults by nationalist and clerical elements such as *L'Action Française*. By 1915 he even went on the offensive against the royalists, blaming them for the assassination of Jaurès. Eventually *Le Bonnet Rouge* became critical of militarism even though it did not become revolutionary or antimilitarist. By 1916 Almereyda was becoming increasingly impatient with the war and espoused contradictory ideas. Hervé's former chief lieutenant came to typify that part of the Left which moved away from the idea that war had to be fought "to the bitter end." He still wanted Germany defeated, and initially did not want to negotiate with Germany. However, by the beginning of 1917, he mirrored the evolution of his benefactor Caillaux toward a more pacifist and internationalist position including the idea of negotiations and a separate peace. In the end, it is impossible to know where his political evolution might have led him, though his final articles included praise for both German socialist pacifists and even Lenin. By then, *Le Bonnet Rouge* included articles by the pacifist writer Romain Rolland.
268. Ibid., 140.
269. Ibid., 137–143. Given his addiction and the painful physical condition that may have led to that addiction, Almereyda was in agony at La Santé and at Fresnes before he died.
270. Ibid., 140–142. Almereyda's attorneys pointed out that he was too weak to commit suicide in the manner assumed by the state, and they surmised that a fellow prisoner named Bernard, in charge of surveillance of the journalist, might have acted on orders from someone in a position to repay a favor: Malvy and Caillaux for starters. They could hardly have afforded to

see a trial of Almereyda which was bound to have disclosed their own level of involvement. Certainly, the death of Almereyda followed these two politicians until the ends of their own careers. Marquis de Roux, *Le défaitisme et les manoeuvres proallemandes, 1914–1917,* (Paris, Nouvelle librairie nationale), 1918), 117–122.

271. Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* …, op.cit., 62–63.
272. Almosnino, op.cit., 130.
273. *La Victoire,* #943, July 1, 1918, "Ma déposition pour M. Malvy," G.H.; *La Victoire,* #604, August 26, 1917, "L'affaire du chèque," G.H.; *La Victoire,* #608, August 30, 1917, "Tout le pot aux roses," G.H.; *La Victoire,* #609, August 31, 1917. There were several articles on the suicide of Almereyda. Georges Lhermitte began a long series entitled "Les mystères du *Bonnet Rouge.*" The date for Almereyda's death is sometimes erroneously given as August 20, as it was listed in *La Victoire.*
274. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 244.
275. Ibid., 244. Heuré cited A.N., « Panthéon », 25337/45; A.N., BB[18] 2599/1/1620/A/17
276. *La Victoire,* #610, September 1, 1917, "Démission de M. Malvy," G.H.
277. Sowerwine, op.cit., 109. David S. Newhall is certainly generous in his assessment of Clemenceau motives in this assault on his former rivals and enemies. Newhall, op.cit., 328–337; 349–374.
278. *La Victoire,* #685, November 15, 1917, "Qui?" G.H.; *La Victoire,* #686, November 16, 1917, "Clemenceau," G.H. One could argue that Hervé's version of "'fascism" was no more than his wartime program and his search for a strong leader applied to the problems of France between the wars. For some, that may be sufficient.
279. *La Victoire,* #691, November 21, 1917, "Le Tigre," G.H.
280. Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, op.cit., 107, 138–145.
281. Louis Lecoin, *De prison en prison,* (Artory, Seine: Édité par l'auteur, 1947), 59–60, 81; Louis Lecoin, *Le cours d'une vie,* (Paris: chez l'auteur, 1965); *La Victoire,* #661, October 22, 1917; J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 300.
282. *La Victoire,* #661, October 22, 1917.
283. Louis Lecoin, *De prison en prison,* op.cit., 81. Ironically, Lecoin would later be known as a pacifist as well as an anarchist who spent more than ten years in French prisons. As an aging militant, he led a successful campaign, including a hunger strike, to obtain a law for French conscientious objectors by striking a deal with none other than Charles de Gaulle. Jean Toulot, *Les grévistes de la guerre,* (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 41–56.
284. *La Victoire,* #494, May 8, 1917, "En route pour Stockholm," G.H.
285. *La Victoire,* #495, May 9, 1917, "La crise socialiste en France," G.H.
286. *La Victoire,* #680, November 10, 1917, "Après le triomphe de Lénine," G.H.
287. *La Victoire,* #704, December 4, 1917, "A un admirateur de Lénine," G.H.
288. *La Victoire,* #711, December 11, 1917, "Les danger du Léninisme," G.H.
289. *La Victoire,* #818, March 28, 1918, "Le grand choc," G.H.
290. *La Victoire,* #821, March 31, 1918, "Foch!," G.H.
291. *La Victoire,* #839, April 18, 1918, "L'exécution de Bolo," G.H.
292. *La Victoire,* #842, April 21, 1918, "Situation nette," G.H.
293. *La Victoire,* #843, April 22, 1918, "Après un mois de bataille," G.H.; Taylor, op.cit., 135–165; Keegan, op.cit. 372–427.
294. A.N., F7 13369. Cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur,* op.cit., 231.
295. A.N., F7 15968[2], « Pantheon », 25337/45. Report of the Special Commissaire of Auxerre, #6596, September 30, 1918. Cited by Heuré, "Gustave Hervé, Un propagandiste sous la Troisième République (1871–1944)," *thèse,* Paris-II, 1995, 867; *La Victoire,* #1000, September 26, 1918, "Excommunié," G.H.
296. *La Victoire,* #1045, November 10, 1918, "L'abdication," G.H.; *La Victoire,* #1046, November 11, 1918, "Dans l'attente," G.H.; *La Victoire,* #1047, November 12, 1918, "Vive la France!" G.H.; *La Victoire,* #1048, November 13, 1918, "La grande joie," G.H.

297. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 245. Heuré cited Lucien Juventy, *Souvenirs et Lettres*, 1914–1918, Letter of August 11, 1917, op.cit., 109–110.
298. Ibid., 246.

Chapter 17

1. *La Victoire*, #1060, November 25, 1918. "Le Bloc National et la paix religieuse," G.H. For Hervé, religion in Alsace-Lorraine had to remain unharmed. The material position of the Church was not to be attacked in order to promote the return of religious congregations. Official relations with the Vatican also needed to be re-established.
2. *La Victoire*, #1057, November 22, 1918, "Le Bloc National," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1309, August 1, 1919, "Les Bolsheviks de *l'Action Française*," G.H. Several wartime writers for *La Victoire* such as Lysis, André Chéradame, and Paul-Hyacinthe Loyson were relieved of their duties or left the paper when Hervé supported the *Bloc National*. Other wartime contributors such as Montéhus, Séverine, and Victor Basch left the paper after the war due to Hervé's new brand of socialism. Grünblatt, op.cit., 9–10.
3. *La Victoire*, #1218, May 1–2, 1919, "Le triste 1er mai," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1262, June 15, 1919, "La dictature du prolétariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1297, July 20, 1919, "Le fiasco de la C.G.T.," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1302, July 25, 1919, "Vers une scission socialiste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1391, October 22, 1919, "Tous au Bloc National," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 32.
4. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 278.
5. *La Victoire*, January 26, 1919.
6. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 256–257.
7. *La Victoire*, #1262, June 15, 1919, "La Dictature du Proletariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1297, July 20, 1919, "Le Fiasco de la C.G.T.," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7154, June 10, 1936, "Journées révolutionnaires," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7155, June 11, 1936, "La triste nuit du 7 juin," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7169, June 25, 1936, "A bas les grèves politiques," G.H.
8. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 256–257. Heuré did not mention Hervé's vacillation over the forty-hour work week during the Popular Front.
9. *La Victoire*, #1282, July 5, 1919, "A deux pages!" G.H. Grünblatt noted how the number of pages of *La Victoire* varied according to the financial situation of the paper. She has carefully enumerated the variability in pages of *La Victoire* from 1916 to 1940. Grünblatt, op.cit., 10–11.
10. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 321. Other accounts say that the C.G.T. had something less than 700,000 members in August 1914 and one million in 1919. Philippe Bernard, *La fin d'un monde, 1914–1929*, (Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 1975), 121; Annie Kriegel, *La Croissance des effectifs de la CGT, 1918–1921*, (Paris: Mouton, 1967).
11. Bernard, op.cit., 212–214.
12. Sowerwine, op.cit., 118. Sowerwine cited Shorter and Tilly, *Strikes in France*, op.cit., 127.
13. Bernard, op.cit., 120–125; Jeremy D. Popkin, *A History of Modern France*, 3rd Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994) 221–222; Sowerwine, op.cit., 118.
14. Sowerwine, op.cit., 118–119; Agulhon, op.cit., 181–183; Bernard, op.cit., 121–122.
15. Bernard, op.cit., 120–125; Popkin, op.cit., 221–222.
16. Millerand replaced Clemenceau as the *Président du Conseil* after the latter lost a Presidential election to Paul Deschanel in January 1920. Millerand would later replace Deschanel as France's President on September 24, 1920 when Deschanel displayed severe psychological symptoms by late May, and was finally persuaded to resign. Clemenceau was blamed for too many concessions on the Treaty of Versailles, had made too many enemies, was too abrasive, and had a longstanding reputation as an anticlerical, which did not fit the changing attitudes in the immediate post-war era. He was also reported to have often quipped that the Presidency "was a useless organ, like the prostate." Agulhon, op.cit., 184, 504–505.

17. Bernard, op.cit., 212–213; Mollier and George, op.cit, 462.
18. Agulhon, op.cit., 182, 192–193; Mollier and George, op.cit, 462–466.
19. Bernard, op.cit., 212–214.
20. Sowerwine, op.cit., 125.
21. Mollier and George, op.cit, 463.
22. Sowerwine, op.cit., 124–128; Agulhon, op.cit., 182, 192–193; Mollier and George, op.cit, 462–466; Bernard, op.cit., 212–214.
23. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, op.cit., 66.
24. Ibid., 52–53.
25. Grünblatt, op.cit., 34.
26. *La Victoire*, #1581, April 29, 1920, "Les cheminots exagèrent," G.H.; René Mouriaux, *La C.G.T.*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982), 57–58.
27. Bernard, op.cit., 212.
28. Ibid., 121–125, 212.
29. Ibid. 214–220.
30. *La Victoire*, #1826, December 31, 1920, "La scission socialiste," G.H.
31. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 269–270.
32. Yvan Craipeau, *Le mouvement Trotskyiste en France*, (Paris: Syros, 1971), 35. Cited by Heuré.
33. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 269–270.
34. Gustave Hervé, *La C.G.T. contre la Nation*, (Paris: Éditions de propagande du journal *La Victoire*, 1920).
35. *La Victoire*, #1583, May 2, 1920, "Le bec de gaz," G.H.
36. *La Victoire*, #1584, May 3, 1920, "La tyrannie syndicaliste," G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #1585, May 4, 1920, "La fin d'une dictature," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1586, May 5, 1920, "Un état dans l'état," G.H.
38. *La Victoire*, #1587, May 6, 1920, "La vraie question," G.H.
39. *La Victoire*, #1737, October 3, 1920, "Un syndicalisme national," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #1588, May 7, 1920, "Les chefs de la C.G.T.," G.H.
41. *La Victoire*, #1592, May 11, 1920, "Les derniers réserves," G.H.
42. *La Victoire*, #1596, May 15, 1920, "La crise salutaire," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1599, May 18, 1920, "Le dégonflement," G.H.
43. *La Victoire*, #1603, May 22, 1920, "La défaite des cheminots," G.H.
44. Gustave Hervé, *Un nouveau socialisme-Le Productivisme*, (Brussels: Imprimerie Scientifique et Littéraire, 1920). This was a collection of several articles by Hervé written in January and June 1920 based on the ideas of the Belgian scientist/entrepreneur Ernest Solvay. Samuel Kalman, *The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 9–10, 67. The other references were to the ideas of Frederick Winslow Taylor and Henry Ford.
45. *La Victoire*, #1731, September 27, 1920, "Avant le congrès de la C.G.T.," G.H.
46. Gustave Hervé, *Lettre aux Socialistes*, (Paris: Éditions de Propagande du journal *La Victoire*, 1920).
47. In the course of the 1920's Hervé hoped that sports could create both physical and spiritual health. Sports could not only alleviate vile pleasure seeking, it might also halt the march of decay, end depopulation, prevent anarchy, and stop Bolshevism. *La Victoire*, #4266, September 9, 1927.
48. *La Victoire*, #1673, July 31, 1920; Grünblatt, op.cit., 8; See also *La Victoire*, #2404, August 3, 1922, "Un fléau à détruire: La Syphilis," André Lichtenberger.
49. Grünblatt, op.cit., 33; *La Victoire*, #1404, November 8, 1919, "Le Programme électoral du Bloc National," G.H.
50. Gustave Hervé, *Millerand De-Strasbourg à l'Elysée*, (Paris: Éditions de propagande du journal *La Victoire*, 1920), *passim; La Victoire*, #1534, March 13, 1920, "L'ambassade au Vatican," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1725, September 21, 1920, "L'acceptation de Millerand," G.H.

51. *La Victoire*, #'s 1722, 1724, 1725, 1726, 1728, and 1730, September 18–26, 1920.
52. *La Victoire*, #1708, September 4, 1920, "La cinquantaine de Marianne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1797, December 2, 1920, "Vers la pacification religieuse," G.H.
53. *La Victoire*, #1950, May 4, 1921, "Napoleon," G.H.
54. Grünblatt, op.cit., 38.

Chapter 18

1. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 254.
2. Among the more persistent clichés in the history of ideas is the notion that belief systems of all types are similar to religion and the concomitant idea that faiths are sometimes interchangeable. It was often remarked, after Eric Hoffer wrote his brief yet cogent volume *The True Believer*, that "true believers" were rather hard to find. Hervé seems to fit Hoffer's simple sketch. Christianity, socialism, and France separately or in combination served as ideals and became vehicles in his search for meaning and order. Though they functioned for Hervé at a kind of metapolitical level, they failed at a practical political level as they were bound to. Not only does the material realm often prove to be less than amenable to visionary quests, Hervé's vision never achieved enough supporters to be seriously implemented. The substitution or merging of often contrary belief systems seems to indicate the functional equivalence of such systems. Common values and ideals throughout a transformation seem to indicate structural similarities among several belief systems.
3. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 254.
4. Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879–1992*, op.cit., 183.
5. Ibid., 152; Becker *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre*, op.cit.
6. *La Victoire*, #1283, July 6, 1919, "Appel aux socialistes français," G.H.
7. Ibid.; *La Victoire*, #1284, July 7, 1919, "Pour la revanche d'Amsterdam," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1285, July 8, 1919, "Le socialisme national est réformiste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1289, July 12, 1919, "Formons le Parti Socialiste National," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 31; Zeev Sternhell, *Ni droite ni gauche—L'idéologie fasciste en France*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983), 33. The official archival record on the P.S.N., its various mutations, and Gustave Hervé in the interwar period is not extensive. Hervé and his formations were marginal after the war and they, quite accurately, may not have been considered security threats. At the Archives Nationales some indications are available. The "Fonds Panthéon" at the Archives Nationales offer some tantalizing details but nothing to indicate that Hervé was seen as a major threat or was considered particularly important for the police. A.N., F7 12951, *Notes Jean*, 1918–1922, has some indications on *La Victoire*. A.N., F7 12952, *Notes Jean*, 1923–1924, has some evidence on P.S.N. meetings. A.N., F7, 12962, Daily notes of the *Préfecture de Police*, for 1930 and 1933 include some information on *La Milice Socialiste Nationale*. A.N., F7, 12963, Daily police notes, 1934, also includes some information on meetings of the P.S.N. In A.N., F7, 13246 for 1927 there are some accounts from *La Victoire*. A.N., F7, 13245, F7, 13247, F7, 12964, and F7, 13241, which had much information on French fascism, had little on the P.S.N., which may indicate that the police did not consider Hervé and the P.S.N. as either security threats or examples of French fascism.
8. Ibid.; *La Victoire*, #1310, August 2, "Le P.S.N. et L'Adhesion Allemane"; *La Victoire*, #1312, August 4, 1919, "Zévaès et le Parti Socialiste National," G.H.
9. *La Victoire*, #1285, July 8, 1919, "Le socialisme national est réformiste," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 33.
10. *La Victoire*, #1286, July 9, 1919, "Notre socialisme est national," G.H.
11. *La Victoire*, #1308, July 31, 1919, "Au-dessus de la politique," G.H.

12. *La Victoire*, #1288, July 11, 1919, "Parti Socialiste National et Bloc National," G.H.
13. Ibid.
14. In 1913 Allemane had become the figurehead of a Parisian based patriotic and socialist party which most of the French Left including *La Guerre Sociale* had attacked as opportunistic and demagogic.
15. Yves Billard, "Un parti républicain-socialiste a vraiment existé," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, 1996, Vol. 51, 43–55.
16. Hervé continued to hope that Independent Socialists as well as the Republican Socialists led by Augagneur, who split with Zévaès in 1913 at a Congress in Grenoble, could be persuaded to join the expanded P.S.N.
17. *La Victoire*, #1311, August 3, 1919, "Un bon noyau pour le P.S.N.," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1312, August 4, 1919, "Zévaès et le Parti Socialiste National," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 7; Alexandre Zévaès and Jacques Prolo, *Une Campagne Politique: Le Parti Républicain Socialiste (1910–1917)*, (Paris: Éditions du Comité de Propagande Française Républicaine et Réformiste, 1918), *passim*. In a report in *La Victoire* on the Federation of the P.S.N. in the Isère, a stronghold of Zévaès, the party officials gave three reasons to join the P.S.N.: (1) to end factionalism, (2) for economic recovery, (3) to counter the threat of Bolshevism.
18. *La Victoire*, #1313, August 5, 1919, "Vive Le Parti Socialiste National!" G.H.
19. *La Victoire*, #1315, August 7, 1919, "Notre tradition," Alexandre Zévaès. In the summer of 1919 Hervé took his first holiday since 1914 and Zévaès's lead editorials replaced those of Hervé during most of August and into September. From September 1919 to January 1920 Zévaès wrote one lead editorial a week for *La Victoire*.
20. *La Victoire*, #1311, August 3, 1919, "Un bon noyau pour le P.S.N.," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1313, August 5, 1919, "Vive le Parti Socialiste National!" G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #1196, April 10, 1919, "A propos de la journée de 8 heures!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2258, March 9, 1922, "Le fétiche de huit heures," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 32–33.
22. *La Victoire*, #1327, August 19, 1919, "De l'action syndicale," Alexandre Zévaès.
23. *La Victoire*, #1391, October 22, 1919, "Tous au Bloc National," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 31–32. On the eve of the elections, Hervé may have rejected Millerand's urging that he become a candidate. Georges Émile Dulac and Lucien Leclerc, *La vérité sur Gustave Hervé*, (Paris: Éditions de la Société Nouvelle de *La Victoire*, 1946), 6.
24. Agulhon, op.cit., 209–210.
25. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 67–68. For Sean Kennedy, "The dramatic changes wrought by the First World War led in some respects to an evolution of the far right. The experience of the trenches created a cadre of men radicalized in their nationalist commitment and willingness to resort to violence. Fierce hatred of the political left was fundamental to ultra-nationalist discourse, but the Russian Revolution had given birth to a Communist state and an international revolutionary movement that provided new targets for French authoritarianism." Sean Kennedy, *Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français, 1927–1945*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 19–20.

Chapter 19

1. *La Victoire*, #7139, May 21, 1936, "Mon retour à la foi," G.H; Hervé, *La France Qui Meurt*, (Paris: Éditions de propagande de *La Victoire*, 1924), 2.
2. Marie-Monique Huss, "Pronatalism in the Inter-war Period in France," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (1990), 39–68; Samuel Kalman, *The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing

Company, 2008), 112, 122, 129, 135–136. Hervé's arguments were moralistic rather than eugenicist unless we consider the separation made by William H. Schneider between positive and negative eugenics, the former being tied to social hygiene, disease prevention, and improved pre-natal care, which Hervé and many others in interwar France favored, rather than the perfection of the race associated with negative eugenics. William H. Schneider, *Quality and Quantity: The Quest for Biological Regeneration in Twentieth-Century France*, (Cambridge: 1990), 284. Cited by Kalman, 132.

3. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 258–259.
4. Hervé, *La France qui meurt*, op.cit., 7.
5. *La Victoire*, #2768, August 2, 1923, "A une institutrice laïque," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 34.
6. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 12, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé. Georges Rossignol, *Un pays de célibataires et de fils unique*, (Paris, 1898). Apparently, the book was originally signed Roger Debury. The author also wrote a brochure with the same title signed Roger Rossignol, *Un pays de célibataires et de fils unique*, (Paris: Comité Dupleix, 1901). See *Bulletin de la Société de géographie de Rochefort*, Volume 24, 1902, 74. Société de géographie de Rochefort. Apparently, Hervé read a later edition of one of those volumes. Georges Rossignol's *Un pays de fils unique et de célibataires*, (Paris: Charles Delagrave, 1913). In an editorial written in August 1923, Hervé claimed that his view of depopulation as a crucial element in French decay began in 1913 with his reading of Georges Rossignol's volume in 1913. *La Victoire*, #2768, August 2, 1923, "A une institutrice laïque," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 34. Jacques Bertillon was the son of pathbreaking demographer and anthropologist Adolphe-Louis Bertillon and the brother of French police official and criminologist Alphonse Bertillon, who together with his brother developed the science of anthropometry.
7. Hervé, *La France qui meurt*, op.cit., 26–31, 32–42, 50–57.
8. Norman Stone, op.cit., 204–207.
9. *La Victoire*, #1287, July 10, 1919, "Notre socialisme est morale," G.H.
10. Magali Della Sudda, "Right-Wing Feminism and Conservative Women's Militancy in Interwar France," 97–111. In Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy, Eds., *The French Right Between the Wars: Political and Intellectual Movements from Conservatism to Fascism*, (New York: Berghahn, 2014).
11. *La Victoire*, #2899, December 11, 1923, "Le vote familial," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2909, December 23, 1923, G.H.
12. Agulhon, op.cit., 184.
13. Sowerwine, op.cit., 119–124. However, a libertarian feminist like Nelly Roussel on May 6, 1920 called on women to wage a "*grève des ventres*" because she sensed that repopulation would simply escalate the chances for another war.
14. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 185.
15. After the funeral of an artist friend of Hervé's named Émile Boggio in June 1920, Hervé noted that "one goes to church more often after the *Union Sacrée* even if one doesn't believe." After the war Hervé spent almost two decades seeking to believe again. *La Victoire*, #1623, June 11, 1920, "Souvenir," G.H.
16. *La Victoire*, #2228, February 7, 1922.
17. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 260.
18. Grünblatt, op.cit., 34.
19. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 179–182.
20. *La Victoire*, #1468, January 7, 1920, "La Présidence de Poincaré," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1474, January 13, 1920, "Le premier écueil," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1475, January 14, 1920, "Deschanel contre Clemenceau," G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #1477, January 16, 1920, "La bataille pour l'Elysée," G.H.
22. *La Victoire*, #1478, January 17, 1920, "Alors ... vive Poincaré," G.H.
23. Philippe Bernard, *La fin d'un monde, 1914–1929*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975), 124–125.

24. *La Victoire*, #1481, January 20, 1920, "Le Ministère Millerand," G.H.
25. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 257.
26. *La Victoire* had an increasing Catholic composition among its readers. But among the ten great financial contributors to the paper during the interwar era, Hervé's so-called *brigade de fer*, was one Jew and several Protestants. Among the staff André Lichtenberger was a Protestant. Hervé himself did not reconvert to Roman Catholicism until 1935–1937.
27. Gustave Hervé, *Propos d'après-guerre: la paix religieuse*, (Paris: Éditions de propagande de *La Victoire*, 1924); Hervé, *La France qui meurt*, op.cit., 10–12, 34, 39, 45; Grünblatt, op.cit., 34.
28. Cheryl A. Koos, "Gender, the Family, and the Fascist Temptation: Visions of Masculinity in the Natalist-Familialist Movement, 1922–1940," 112–126; Geoff Read, "Was There A Fascist Femininity: Gender and French Fascism in Political Context," 127–140; and Daniella Sarnoff, "An Overview of Women and Gender in French Fascism," 141–159. In Kalman and Kennedy, Eds., op.cit.
29. Irvine, "Beyond Left and Right: Rethinking Political Boundaries in 1930s France," op.cit., 231. Irving points out that during the Third Republic parties on the Right, for their own interests and based on unexamined assumptions, supported women's political rights more than did parties on the Left which generally postponed and tergiversated on the issue.
30. Read, op.cit., 137.
31. Kevin Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 178.
32. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 258; Hervé, *Propos d' après-guerre …*, op.cit., 18, 5–9, 20.
33. *La Victoire*, March 12, 1924 and September 4, 1924.
34. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 260.
35. Ibid., 260; *La Victoire*, #4269, September 12, 1927, "A propos de Gustave l'Ermite," G.H.
36. Ibid., 259.
37. *La Victoire*, #5047, October 29, 1929, "Une nouvelle histoire de Hervé," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5750, October 2, 1931, "Une nouvelle histoire de l'Europe," G.H.; Gustave Hervé, *Nouvelle histoire de France*, (Paris: A. Fayard et Cie, 1930); Gustave Hervé, *Nouvelle histoire de l'Europe*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1931). In 1930 and 1931 he sent free copies of the two books to his shareholders and to some twenty-five thousand teachers. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 278.
38. K. Steven Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism: Benoît Malon and French Reformist Socialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 4, 3–6.
39. *La Victoire*, #2612, February 27, 1923, "M. Painlevé et la laïcité," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #2702, May 28, 1923, "Le centenaire de Pasteur," G.H.
41. *La Victoire*, #2613, February 28, 1923, "Autre réponse à M. Painlevé," G.H. See also *La Victoire*, #'s 2704, 2719, 2778, 2785, 2788, 2790, 2796.
42. *La Victoire* #2614, March 1, 1923, "Le centenaire de Renan," G.H.

Chapter 20

1. Peyronnet, op.cit., 84–185.
2. Grünblatt, op.cit., 26.
3. *La Victoire*, #2579, January 25, 1923, "Entre deux feux," G.H. Of course the Director of *La Victoire* knew that the main offices of *L'Action Francaise* were located at 14, Rue de Rome, but the royalists did have printing offices on the rez-de-chaussée at the Rue Montmartre address while *La Victoire* occupied the second floor and *L'Humanite* the third. Grünblatt, op.cit., 7.
4. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 309–310.
5. Ibid., 270–271.

6. Ibid., 310.
7. *La Victoire*, #2897, December 9, 1923, "Les injures de M. Herriot," G.H.
8. *La Victoire*, #4468, March 29, 1928, "En revenant de Courbevoie," G.H.
9. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé.
10. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 308.
11. Méric, op.cit., Séries I, 198–200; idem., *Nouvelle Revue socialiste*, July 15–August 15, 1926; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé.
12. Ibid., op.cit., 229–230.
13. Ibid., 198–200.
14. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé.
15. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 308; Hervé, *Propos d'après-guerre* ..., op.cit., 95.
16. *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with Gustave Hervé.
17. Ibid.
18. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 309; Lucien Leclerc and Georges Émile Dulac, *La vérité sur Gustave Hervé*, (Paris: Éditions de la société nouvelle *La Victoire*, 1946), 7.
19. Ibid., 309; Carine Roucan, "Huysmans & le chemin de la conversion," *Fabula: La Recherche en Littérature*, internet site, review of Jérôme Solal, *Huysmans avant Dieu: Tableaux de l'exposition, morale de l'élimination*, (Paris: Éditions Classiques Garnier, coll. "Études romantiques et dix-neuvièmistes," 2010).
20. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 309. See *L'Ère* Nouvelle, November 24, 1925 and *Le Quotidien*, December 8, 1923 cited by Heure.
21. *La Victoire*, #2897, December 9, 1923, "Les injures de M. Herriot," G.H.
22. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 309. See *Le Libertaire*, November 28, 1925.
23. Ibid., 310. See Pascal Maurel, *Les Bandes armées du fascisme et leurs véritable chefs*, (Paris: Éditions du Front Mondial, 1934).
24. Jean Quéval, *Première Page, Cinquième Colonne*, (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1945), 12–13.
25. Quéval, op.cit., 14–15.

Chapter 21

1. *La Victoire*, #4542, June 11, 1928.
2. *La Victoire*, #4324, November 3, 1927, "A six pages," G.H.
3. Grünblatt, op.cit., 26–27.
4. Kayser, op.cit., 46.
5. *La Victoire*, #7190, July 16, 1936, "Leur retour à la Patrie," G.H. Hervé claimed that at one time he lost half his readers in one week. Whether this was in 1912 or 1928 is unclear.
6. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 273.
7. Grünblatt, op.cit., passim; *La Victoire*, #3807, June 7, 1926, "Le dernier effort," G.H.
8. *La Victoire*, #1611, May 30, 1920, "A quatre pages," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1797, December 2, 1920, "Vers la pacification religieuse," G.H.
9. *La Victoire*, #2252, March 3, 1923. Cited by Grünblatt, op.cit., 15.
10. Albert, op.cit., Tome III, 493.
11. *La Victoire*, #3251, November 27, 1924, "La Caisse Billiet," G.H.
12. Grünblatt, op.cit., 14–16; *La Victoire*, #4062, February 17, 1927, "Ceci n'est pas confidentiel," G.H.
13. *La Victoire*, #3652, January 2, 1926, lead article, G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3666, January 16, 1926, "Notre nouveau-né," G.H.

14. *La Victoire*, #4198, July 3, 1927, "La 'Victoire' à 6 pages," G.H; Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 274; Grünblatt, op.cit., 11, 16–17. Hervé hoped the paper could have six pages by October 1, 1927 because industrial and financial support only went to papers with six pages or more. See *La Victoire* from November 3, 1927 until August 1, 1928.
15. Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 274.
16. *La Victoire*, #3567, October 9, 1925, "*La Victoire* du dimanche," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3666, January 16, 1926, "Notre nouveau-né," G.H. According to the latter issue, the first workers' edition of *La Victoire du Dimanche* appeared on January 17, 1926. See also, Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 276–277. Heuré said the Sunday paper was launched in December 1925. Hervé reprinted a suspicious unsigned letter from a small factory owner who employed 124 workers. The owner claimed that he purchased 100 subscriptions of *La Victoire du Dimanche* designed for the peasantry so that his workers would see an alternative to the duperies of the *Cartel*. The anonymous factory owner claimed that the subscriptions made his workers more reflective, agreeable, and conciliatory; he even claimed that *La Victoire du Dimanche* had helped to avert a strike! Hervé certainly never failed to make such claims for all his interwar publications. The Sunday editions were 10 francs per yearly subscription in contrast to the 60 franc per year price of *La Victoire* daily. See also *La Victoire*, #5268, June 7, 1930, "De canons! des munitions!" G.H.
17. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 276. Heuré cited A.N., "Pantheon" 25337/45, Note of November 18, 1925.
18. *La Victoire*, #3807, June 7, 1926, "Le dernier effort," G.H.
19. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 276–277.
20. *La Victoire*, #7700, October 2, 1938, "France-Allemagne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7054, February 26, 1936, "Pour l'alliance russe," G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #8193, June 19, 1940, "Quand l'Allemagne était par terre," G.H.
22. Grünblatt, op.cit., 17.
23. A.N., Archives Havas, 5/AR/404, cited by Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 275.
24. *La Victoire*, #5268, June 7, 1930, "De canons! Des munitions!" G.H.
25. Grünblatt, op.cit., 46.
26. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 274.
27. Ibid., 274–275; *La Victoire*, January 23, 1924. Heuré noted that this statement was nearly duplicated by Léon Daudet in his *Bréviaire du journalisme*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), 80.
28. *La Victoire*, #6559, May 8, 1934, "Notre journal, va-t-il mourir?" G.H.
29. *La Victoire*, #6342, October 2, 1933, "Après une belle bourrasque," G.H.
30. *La Victoire*, #7130, May 12, 1936, "Notre journal en danger," G.H.
31. *La Victoire*, #7206, October 1, 1936, "Pour combien de temps?" G.H.
32. *La Victoire*, #7179, July 5, 1936, "L'union sur le nom de Pétain," G.H.
33. *La Victoire*, #7296, December 30, 1936, "Tenir … comme à Verdun!" G.H.
34. *La Victoire*, #7198, July 24, 1936, "Qui a commencé en Espagne?" G.H.
35. *La Victoire*, #7204, July 30, 1936, "Notre Parti Socialiste National," G.H.
36. *La Victoire*, #7324, January 27, 1937, "Heures difficiles," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7327, January 30, 1937, "Heures difficiles," G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #7699, October 1, 1938, "Voilà un beau jour!" G.H.
38. *La Victoire*, #7750, November 29, 1938, "Tous derrière Daladier!" G.H.
39. Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 274.
40. *La Victoire*, #7940, September 2, May 1939, "Bandits! Assassins!" G.H.
41. Jean Quéval, *Première Page: Cinquième colonne*, (Paris: Fayard, 1945), 13.
42. Jacques Isorni, *Mémoires, 1911–1945*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1984), 90–91; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 274.

43. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 275–6; A.P.P., Ba/1715, note of August 21, 1930. According to the latter source, *La Victoire* did get German funds for a special edition of *La Victoire* in German put out for Strasbourg.

Chapter 22

1. *La Victoire*, #2687, May 13, 1923, "Sur l'incident Caillaux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2707, June 2, 1923, "Encore les Camelots du roi," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2719, June 14, 1923, "Ni Daudet, ni Herriot," G.H.
2. *La Victoire*, #2704, May 30, 1923, "Avec Poincaré," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2719, June 14, 1923, "Ni Daudet, ni Herriot," G.H.
3. *La Victoire*, May 13, 1924, "La débâcle," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3194, October 1, 1924, "A nos lecteurs, à nos amis," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3251, November 27, 1924, "La Caisse Billiet," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4062, February 17, 1927, "Ceci n'est pas confidentiel," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 13–19, 38–39. According to Grünblatt, *La Victoire* may have given less than a complete effort in the 1924 elections due to political and financial differences with the French Right. Grünblatt included a detailed account of Hervé's financial support. In essence, Hervé was willing to receive support from anyone because *La Victoire* was almost always on the verge of extinction. Despite some charges, Grünblatt found no evidence of funding from René Coty, Mussolini, or Hitler. The police certainly had their suspicions about funding from Mussolini's Italy, but Heuré only uncovered a few indications of Italian fascist support.
4. *La Victoire*, #3042, May 2, 1924; Grünblatt, op.cit., 36.
5. *La Victoire*, #2848, October 21, 1923, "Les fossoyeurs du pays," G.H.
6. Agulhon, op.cit., 201. Later Hervé would admit that the Cartel offered a better chance for postwar reconciliation with Germany and peace than did men like Poincaré.
7. *La Victoire*, #2987, March 8, 1924.
8. *La Victoire*, #3053, May 13, 1924, "Le débâcle," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3564, October 6, 1925, "La cartel, c'est … la guerre," G.H.
9. Agulhon, op.cit., 211.
10. Sowerwine, op.cit., 129–130; Popkin, op.cit., 228.
11. Popkin, op.cit., 227.
12. Agulhon, op.cit., 201.
13. Sowerwine, op.cit., 130.
14. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, op.cit., 68.
15. Soucy, *French Fascism, The First Wave, 1924–1933*, op.cit.
16. Popkin, op.cit. 228.
17. Soucy, *French Fascism, The First Wave, 1924–1933*, op.cit.; idem, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 27, 35–36, 108, 313.
18. Soucy, *French Fascism: The First Wave*, op.cit., xvii, 10–86, especially 68–69; idem, *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, op.cit., 17, 20, 104–203, 272–273. Though Soucy makes a plausible case supporting the traditional explanations of fascism, the fact that Hitler and Mussolini courted conservatives and sometimes spoke moderately does not prove that fascism was a form of "extremist conservatism."
19. Gustave Hervé, *La République Autoritaire*, (Paris: Éditions de propagande de *La Victoire*, November 1925), 1–34. This is a collection of *La Victoire*, #'s 3501–3510 from August 4–13, 1925; Grünblatt, op.cit., 40–42.
20. *La Victoire*, #2968, February 18, 1924, "A la recherche d'un chef," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2935, January 16, 1924, "Une dictature de salut public," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2952, February 2, 1924, "Etat d'âme bonapartiste," G.H.

21. *La Victoire*, #2968, February 18, 1924, "A la recherche d'un chef," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2961, February 11, 1924, "Pour la dictature sans phrase," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3239, November 15, 1924, "Une République avec un chef," G.H.; Grünblatt, 38–39. Some of Hervé's reformist notions paralleled the Center-Right ideas of the National Association for the Organization of Democracy (ANOD), the League for a New Democracy, the Republican Party of National Reorganization or IVth Republic Movement. "It is often suggested that the mood of politics after 1919 was nostalgic for the golden age of the *belle époque*. But in many circles the war had fuelled the call for reform." Jackson, op.cit., 51.
22. André Tardieu, *L'Heure de la Décision*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1934), 36.
23. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 169–174.
24. *La Victoire*, October 27, 1925, #3585, "Qui m'aime, me suive," G.H.
25. *La Victoire*, #3510, August 13, 1925, "Avec ou Sans Fascism." Heuré claimed that Hervé used the term *République Autoritaire* as early as 1922. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 255.
26. *La Victoire*, #1352, September 13, 1919.
27. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 256; Gustave Hervé, *Un Nouveau Socialisme: Le Productivisme*, (Brussels: Imprimerie Scientifique Et Littéraire, 1920). By current American standards, Hervé's ideas in 1920 almost seem radical. Although he assailed the ability of the state to manage the economy, stressed the reality of egoism over altruism and cooperation, and extolled the virtues of individual entrepreneurs, he wanted a guaranteed share of company profits (50% or some fixed rate) for all employees and he favored a tax on inheritance. 6–7, 26–27.
28. Ibid., 255; Gustave Hervé, *Lettre aux Ouvriers*, (Paris: Édition de Propagande du Parti Socialiste National, 1923). This brochure had membership applications for the P.S.N. and discussed that party, so it preceded the formal creation of the *Parti de la République Autoritaire*.
29. Ibid., 255–256; Hervé, *Lettre aux Ouvriers*, op.cit.; Hervé, *Un Nouveau Socialisme: Le Productivisme*, op.cit.
30. Julian Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France, 1932–1936*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 222.
31. *La Victoire*, #7006, January 9, 1936, "L'expérience Roosevelt," G.H.
32. Hervé, *La République Autoritaire*, op.cit.; *La Victoire*, #3585, October 27, 1925, "Qui m'aime, me suive!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3602, November 13, 1925, "Bolchevisme ou Fascisme?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3603, November 14, 1925, "Sans fascisme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3604, November 15, 1925, "La Ligue Millerand ... et nous," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3605, November 16, 1925, "Les Jeunesses Patriotes et nous," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3620, December 1, 1925, "Illusions de jeunesses," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3651, January 1, 1926, "Nouvel An," "Illusions de jeunesses," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3653, January 3, 1926, "La vraie question," "Illusions de jeunesses," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3654, January 4, 1926, "Éloge du 'Pouvoir Personnel'," "Illusions de jeunesses," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3655, January 5, 1926, "Chautemps et l'union nationale," "Illusions de jeunesses," G.H.; Robert J. Soucy, "Centrist Fascism: The Jeunesses Patriotes," *Journal of Contemporary History*, (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 16 (1981), 349–368; Grünblatt, op.cit., 39–40.
33. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 276.
34. *La Victoire*, #3606, November 17, 1925, "Trop d'organisations," G.H.
35. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 271–272.
36. *La Victoire*, #3651, January 1, 1926, "Nouvel An," G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #3603, November 14, 1925, "Sans fascisme," G.H.
38. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 276. Heuré cited A.N., "Panthéon" 25337/45, Note of November 18, 1925.
39. *La Victoire*, #3296, January 11, 1925, "La République Autoritaire," G.H.
40. Hervé, *La République Autoritaire*, op.cit., 1–34; Grünblatt, op.cit., 40–42.
41. Ibid.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 38–44.

42. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 263; André Chéradame, *La Crise française: Faits, causes, solutions*, (Paris: Plon, 1912).
43. Ibid., 262.
44. Hervé, *La République Autoritaire*, op.cit., 19–20.
45. Ibid., 8–13; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 265.
46. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 262.
47. Hervé, *La République Autoritaire*, op.cit., 33.
48. Kalman, op.cit.
49. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 264.
50. Agulhon, op.cit., 202–203. The Center oriented government of Briand-Caillaux was overturned when the Right and the Socialists acted against it simultaneously in July 1926. When Herriot acted to recreate a new *Cartel*, the franc sank in value. On July 23, 1926 Poincaré formed a Center-Right government replacing Herriot. That led the monied interests, Herriot's *mur d'argent*, again to show confidence when Poincaré created a self-governing fund for paying the public debt, and he had the Banque de France purchase foreign currencies which secured the stabilization. By means of a tax increase and decreased government spending, Poincaré reduced the deficit and stabilized the franc at the foreign market level which was 20% of the prewar level. That meant that French savers through the resulting devaluation at last seemed reconciled to bearing much of the war's cost. Popkin, op.cit., 229.
51. *La Victoire*, #'s 3391–3393, 3461–3464, April 16–18 and June 25–28, 1925. #'s 3816–24, June 16–24, 1926. Hervé's "providential man" had the same magical and curative powers of the King of the *Action Française* but not the same connotations.
52. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 265–266.
53. David Carroll, *French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 36.
54. *La Victoire*, #1950, May 4, 1921, "Napoléon," G.H.
55. *La Victoire*, #3741, April 1, 1926, "Conseils aux jeunes," G.H. Hervé told the youthful zealots to observe legality, be patient, and protect order. *La Victoire*, #3958, November 5, 1928, "Romantique politique," G.H.
56. Grünblatt, op.cit., 43; *La Victoire*, #3953, October 31, 1926, "Qui doit venir avec nous," G.H. In the 1920s and 1930s there were many attempts on the extreme Right to create some sort of United or National Front, but the tendency to division and discord, so marked on the Left, especially before World War I, was now just as rampant on the Right. In the words of Sean Kennedy, "Thus the Croix de Feu depicted itself as sharing concerns of patriotic governments, nationalist leagues, and right-wing parties, but it fought to preserve its freedom of maneuver and never hesitated to criticize them. While scarcely alone in their fierce hatred of the Popular Front, its leaders were convinced that the Croix de Feu provided the only route to true national salvation and should thus dominate the nationalist cause." Sean Kennedy, *Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais, 1927–1945*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 57–58. Organizational defense characterized the extreme Left before 1914 and it certainly affected the extreme Right during the interwar era. Thus, Hervé was part of such trends at either end of the political spectrum.
57. If we recall Hervé's suspicion of the masses as well as his disappointment and anger that neither they nor French elites chose to follow him, we might question whether he could be described as fascist. Perhaps his formations could best be described in terms of what Kevin Passmore called the "authoritarian-elitist right" or as failed versions of an "authoritarian-populist right and fascism". The descriptions of these two types of arguably "conservative" movements seem to overlap if we use Hervé as an example. It remains questionable whether greater appeal would have pushed him in a more populist/fascist direction. Passmore, *From Liberalism to Fascism* ..., op.cit., 13–19.

Chapter 23

1. *La Victoire*, #3636, December 17, 1925, "Une dictature de salut public," G.H.
2. *La Victoire*, #3663, January 13, 1926, "Le ministère et l'opposition," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3664, January 14, 1926, "Le devoir de l'opposition," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3812, June 12, 1926, "Comment nous en sortirons," G.H.
3. *La Victoire*, #3816, June 16, 1926, "L'heure de Caillaux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3823, June 23, 1926, "On cherche un homme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3824, June 24, 1926, "La vrai rentrée de Caillaux," G.H.
4. *La Victoire*, #3830, June 30, 1926, "Un début navrant," G.H.
5. Berenson, op.cit.
6. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 68.
7. Berenson, op.cit.; La *Victoire*, #'s 3852–3854. July 22–24, 1926.
8. Sowerwine, op.cit., 132. The war had generated growing inflation in France which its citizens had not been accustomed to since the age of Napoleon. Various post-war financial ministers assumed that war debts could be paid without any decline in the franc. They argued that any extraordinary expenses could come from reparations while the government paid ordinary debts from regular revenues. Such assumptions proved illusory. To prevent a decline in the franc, France had to borrow abroad, but that meant that the nation was subject to outside forces. The *Cartel des Gauches* proved unable to satisfy both its usual clientele of small businessmen and peasants as well as the demands of its Socialist allies. That, coupled with an anachronistic religious policy by the Radicals, led to a failure to resolve financial problems which gave openings to conservatives to resist fiscal reform and to anti-democratic forces to promote authoritarian or fascist-like "solutions" to French problems. Popkin, op.cit., 227–228.
9. *La Victoire*, #4015, January 1, 1927, "Souhaits pour 1927," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4059, February 14, 1927, "Pour que la France vive," G.H.
10. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 68.
11. *La Victoire*, #4319, November 1, 1927.
12. *La Victoire*, #'s 4266–4269, September 9–12, 1927; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 277.
13. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 277; A.N., "Pantheon," 25337/45, Note of November 7, 1927.
14. Albert Willm (1868–1944) was a native of Brest where he may have been a fellow student there for a time. He also acted as Hervé's defense attorney at times until 1912. Willm died in 1944 just a few months before Hervé.
15. *La Victoire*, #4326, November 8, 1927, "Ce soir, Salle Wagram !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4327, November 9, 1927, "La première sortie," G.H.;
16. *L'Humanité*, November 9, 1927, "Le réunion du pitre Hervé se termine au chant de *'L'Internationale'*."
17. *La Victoire*, #4360, December 12, 1927, "A Belleville, jeudi!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4363, December 15, 1927, "Ce soir, à Belleville!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4364, December 16, 1927, "La dictature du prolétariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4365, December 17, 1927, "En revenant de Belleville," G.H. The meeting was presided over by Robert Fleurier who had left the S.F.I.O. in order to form the *Parti Socialiste Française*. In an attempt to calm the crowd, Fleurier told the audience that Tissier, who was calling for order, had grabbed Raoul Villain on July 31, 1914. This only put the crowd in a greater frenzy. Hervé described the *Jeunes Gardes* at Belleville as workers, and he praised the *Camelots du Roi*, who aided the *Jeune Gardes* at the meeting, by calling their action a *front unique*. The inability to control the meeting was tied to the inability of the *Jeunesses Patriotes* of the 20th *arrondissement* to be present due to their own meeting.

18. *L'Humanité*, December 16, 1927, "Hervé en fuite à Belleville: La Foule Ouvrière Conspue Le Traître Et Le Force À Déguerpir" and "… Tandis qu'à la Bellevilloise des milliers de travailleurs acclament notre Parti."
19. *La Victoire*, #4366, December 18, 1927, "De l'eau au moulin communiste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4367, December 19, 1927, "Je cherche des hommes," G.H.
20. *La Victoire*, #4371, December 23, 1927, "Gustave Hervé à la parole …" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4372, December 24, 1927, "Au Club du Faubourg," G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #4375, December 27, 1927, "Socialisme nationale … pratique," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 11.
22. *La Victoire*, #4406, January 27, 1928, "En revenant de Bois-Colombes," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4407, January 28, 1928, "Les yeux qui s'entr'ouvrent," G.H.
23. *L'Humanité*, January 29, 1928, "Aujourd'hui: Deux recrues pout Hervé."
24. *La Victoire*, #4412, February 2, 1928, "En partant pour Bordeaux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4413, February 3, 1928, "Merci à Hervé," André Lichtenberger and "Gustave Hervé à Bordeaux"; *La Victoire*, #4414, February 4, 1928, "En revenant de Bordeaux," G.H.
25. *L'Humanité*, February 3, 1928, "Le prolétariat bordelais met en fuite le renégat Hervé," Leo Pichon.
26. *La Victoire*, #4447, March 8, 1928, "Gustave Hervé expose à Billancourt la doctrine du socialisme national," and "A Billancourt," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4448, March 9, 1928, "Le manière évangélique … et l'autre," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4449, March 10, 1928, "Comment ils écrivent l'histoire," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, March 9, 1928, "De même qu'à Belleville et Bordeaux: Hervé n'a pu parler à Billancourt."
27. *L'Humanité*, March 29, 1928, "A Courbevoie hier soir: Hervé a tenté vainement d'imposer aux ouvriers son socialisme mussolinien."
28. *La Victoire*, #4468, March 29, 1928, "En revenant de Courbevoie," G.H. and "Gustave Hervé parle à Courbevoie."
29. *La Victoire*, #4469, March 30, 1928, "Notre P.S.N. et les élections," G.H. and "Après Courbevoie," unsigned; Grünblatt, op.cit., 45; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 277.
30. Ibid.
31. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 277.
32. Grünblatt, 44–45, and annex I.; *La Victoire*, #'s 4478–4502, April 8–May 2, 1928.
33. *La Victoire*, #4491, April 21, 1928, "Derniers mots d'ordre," G.H.
34. Grünblatt, op.cit., 45. *La Victoire* may have talked about forty-one candidates.
35. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 260–261. Heuré cited A.N., F7 15968^{2}, "Panthéon," 25337/45, Note of November 7, 1927.
36. *La Victoire*, #4819, March 15, 1929, "A Montrouge," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4839, April 4, 1929; *La Victoire*, #'s 4892–4900, May 27–June 4, 1929.
37. *La Victoire*, #'s 5149, 5184, 5197.
38. Grünblatt, op.cit., 45; *La Victoire*, #4717, December 3, 1928; *La Victoire*, #5382, September 29, 1930; *La Victoire*, #5383, September 30, 1930.
39. *La Victoire*, #5553, March 19, 1931.
40. Grünblatt, op.cit., 46.

Chapter 24

1. Popkin, op.cit., 220–221.
2. Kalman, op.cit., 221.
3. Louis Begley, "The Good Place in Vicious France," *New York Review of Books*, December 18, 2014.

4. *La Victoire*, #5094, December 15, 1929, "L'exemple des communistes," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5112, January 2, 1930, "Autre souhait," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5123, January 13, 1930; *La Victoire*, #5253, January 23, 1930, "La France aux français," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 47–48.
5. *La Victoire*, #5178, March 9, 1930.
6. *La Victoire*, #5470, December 26, 1930. This issue included a poster by *La Confédération Des Syndicats Unionistes* entitled "*Les Travailleurs Français D'Abord!*"; *La Victoire*, #5253, May 23, 1930, "*La France aux français,*" G.H.
7. *Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire*
8. Grünblatt, op.cit., 47–48; *La Victoire*, December 15, 1929; *La Victoire*, January 13, 1930; *La Victoire*, May 23, 1930; A.N., "Pantheon," 25337/45, note of July 21, 1930; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 278–280.
9. Sowerwine, op.cit., 134.
10. Kevin Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 186.
11. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years,* op.cit., 71.
12. Hoover's put a one-year moratorium on payments of World War I war debts and reparations, postponing the initial payments, as well as interest. Many were outraged by this idea because reparations seemed poised to be cancelled but not war debts. There was a roaring disapproval from France, as well as many unenthusiastic U.S. citizens. In the end it did little to ease the crisis in Europe.
13. Sowerwine, op.cit., 134–135; Agulhon, op.cit., 208–213.
14. Grünblatt, op.cit., 48; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 263–264.
15. *La Victoire*, #6027, July 5, 1932.
16. *La Victoire*, #6298, June 2, 1933.
17. Grünblatt, op.cit., 48.
18. *La Victoire*, #6586, June 4, 1934, "Corporatisme ou bolchevisme?," G.H.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.; *La Victoire du Dimanche*, August 27, 1933; Grünblatt, op.cit., 47–49.
21. Grünblatt, op.cit., 49.
22. *La Victoire*, #5899, February 28, 1932, "L'heure de Tardieu," G.H.; Henri Dubief, *Le déclin de la IIIe République—1929–1938*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976), 15–18; Agulhon, op.cit., 208.
23. Grünblatt, op.cit., 50–51.
24. *La Victoire*, #6083, October 30, 1932, "Bravo le Jeune Garde," G.H.
25. Ibid.; *La Victoire*, #6090, November 6, 1932, "Leur congrès," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6091, November 7, 1932, "Amende honorable à l'Italie," G.H.
26. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 281.
27. Alain Deniel, *Bucard et le Francisme—les seuls fascistes français*, (Paris: Éditions Jean Picollec, 1979), 10–25.
28. Popkin, op.cit., 220.
29. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 281.
30. Deniel, op.cit., 10–25; *La Victoire*, #6095, November 11, 1932, "Un beau jour pour *La Victoire*," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4949, June 23, 1929, "L'erreur des combattants," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 50–51; A. Jacomet, "Les chefs du Francisme: Marcel Bucard et Paul Guiraud," *Revue d'Histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1975, No. 97, 45–65.
31. *La Victoire*, #6095, November 11, 1932.
32. *La Victoire*, #6296, May 31, 1933, "Nous démarrons," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6101, November 17, 1932; *La Victoire*, #6134, December 20, 1932; *La Victoire*, #6121, December 7, 1932, "Manifeste des Socialistes Nationaux."
33. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 281.
34. *La Victoire*, #6228, March 24, 1933.

35. Deniel, op.cit., 21–25. According to Deniel, Bucard was greatly influenced by Hervé, especially in foreign affairs.
36. *La Victoire*, #6132, December 18, 1932, "Les Jeunesses Patriotes et nous," G.H.; Robert J. Soucy, "The Nature of Fascism in France," *Journal of Contemporary History*, #1, 1966, 30.
37. *La Victoire*, #6135, December 21, 1932, "Sans fiel et sans haine," G.H.
38. Burrin, op.cit., 460; idem, "La France dans le champ magnétique des fascismes," *Le Débat*, Vol. 32 (November 1984): 52–72.
39. *La Victoire*, #6176, January 31, 1933, "Heureuse Allemagne," G.H. and "Heures graves," Marcel Bucard.
40. *La Victoire*, #6096, November 12, 1932, "Par delà les croix du 11 novembre," Marcel Bucard; *La Victoire*, #6101, November 17, 1932, "Crise moral," Marcel Bucard; *La Victoire*, #6133, December 19, 1932, "Le gâchis continue," Marcel Bucard; *La Victoire*, #6135, December 21, 1932, "Sans fiel et sans haine," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6146, January 1, 1933, "Bonne et heureuse," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 58.
41. *La Victoire*, #6132, December 18, 1932, "Les Jeunesses Patriotes et nous," G.H.
42. *La Victoire*, #6114, November 30, 1932, "A nos nouvelles recrues," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6161, January 16, 1933, "Encore des nouvelles recrues," G.H.
43. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 280–281.
44. There was already a French group that had begun to utilize the name *Francisme*. *La Victoire du Dimanche*, August 20, 1933. Bucard included a manifesto on *Francisme*.
45. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 281.
46. *La Victoire*, #6342, October 2, 1933, "Marcel Bucard nous quitte," and "Après une belle bourrasque," G.H.; Deniel, op.cit., 21–26; Grünblatt, op.cit., 52. *La Victoire*'s ties to *Francisme* are unknown but Jacques Ditte, a member of Bucard's group, regularly published articles in Hervé's newspaper beginning in 1934.
47. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 281.
48. *La Victoire*, #7204, July 30, 1936, "Notre Parti Socialiste National," G.H.

Chapter 25

1. Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between the Two Wars-Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World War II*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1966 [1940]), 5–6.
2. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 267–268. Heuré cited Yves-Marie Hilaire, "L'ancrage des idéologies," in *Histoire des droites en France*, ed. Jean-François Sirinelli, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), Vol. 1, 526–527.
3. *La Victoire*, January 1, 1918; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 253.
4. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 250–251.
5. Ibid., op.cit., 251; *La Victoire*, May 18, 1917.
6. Ibid., 251–252.
7. Ibid., 250–252.
8. *La Victoire*, #1087, December 22, 1918, "Le danger bolcheviste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1088, December 23, 1918, "La gendarmerie internationale et le Bolchevisme," G.H.
9. *La Victoire*, #1182, March 27, 1919, "La vérité sur l'intervention," G.H.
10. *La Victoire*, October 11, 1920.
11. *La Victoire*, July 22 and 24, 1921.
12. *La Victoire*, #1076, December 11, 1918, "Le gâchis allemand," G.H.
13. *La Victoire*, #1114, January 18, 1919, "La mort de Liebknecht," G.H. From his standpoint in January 1919, Hervé considered his pre-war socialist antimilitarism and antipatriotism as devices to prevent war and to protect France.

14. *La Victoire*, #2179, December 20, 1921, "Propos d'un Frère quêteur," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2190, December 31, 1921, "Fin D'Année," G.H.
15. *La Victoire*, #'s 1217 and 1218, May 1–2, 1919, "Le triste 1er mai," G.H.
16. *La Victoire*, #1096, December 31, 1918, "La victoire Clemenceau," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1224, May 8, 1919, "Nos conditions de paix," G.H.
17. *La Victoire*, #1115, January 19, 1919, "L'ouverture de la conférence," G.H.
18. *La Victoire*, #1221, May 5, 1919.
19. Grünblatt, op.cit., 62.
20. *La Victoire*, #1250, June 3, 1919, "La République Rhénane," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1221, May 5, 1919; *La Victoire*, #2165, December 6, 1921, "Vers Une Rêpublique rhénane?" G.H.
21. Grünblatt, op.cit., 60.
22. *La Victoire*, #1215, April 29, 1919, "Vive la Société des Nations!" G.H.
23. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 267.
24. *La Victoire*, #1536, March 15, 1920, "Contre l'intervention," G.H.
25. *La Victoire*, #1541, March 20, 1920, "La orale de cette histoire," G.H.
26. *La Victoire*, #1546, March 25, 1920, "Notre politique à l'égard de l'Allemagne," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 60–62.
27. *La Victoire*, #1673, July 31, 1920, "Le Bloc National derrière Millerand," G.H.
28. *La Victoire*, #1829, January 3, 1921, "Faut-il les désarmer?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1830, January 4, 1921, "En face des réalités," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #1831, January 5, 1921, "Le moindre risque," G.H.
29. Grünblatt, op.cit., 62.
30. *La Victoire*, #1842, January 16, 1921; *La Victoire*, #2125, October 27, 1921, "La victoire de Briand," G.H.
31. *La Victoire*, #1959, May 13, 1921, "L'Allemagne dans la bonne voie," G.H.
32. *La Victoire*, #2069, September 1, 1921, "La République Allemand," G.H.
33. *La Victoire*, June 25–July 3, 1922. #'s 2365, 2366, 2369, 2370, and 2373.
34. *La Victoire*, #2162, December 3, 1921, "Le retour de Briand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2225, February 4, 1922, "Après la Conférence de Washington," G.H.
35. *La Victoire*, #2390, July 20, 1922, "L'unique moyen d'en sortir," G.H.
36. Ibid.; *La Victoire*, #2392, July 22, 1922, "Sacrifices nécessaires," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2388, July 18, 1922, "Pour sortir de l'impasse," G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #2555, January 1, 1923, "1923," G.H.
38. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 267.
39. *La Victoire*, #2565, January 11, 1923, "Les communistes contre la nation," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3095, June 24, 1924, "L'évacuation de la Ruhr," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 64.
40. Popkin, op.cit., 224.
41. Sowerwine, op.cit., 129.
42. Popkin, op.cit., 224.
43. Agulhon, op.cit., 200.
44. Ibid., 201. Austen Chamberlain of Great Britain had received a share of the Peace Prize a year earlier for his part in the Locarno Accords. In 1926 Germany was admitted to the League of Nations with Briand's assistance. With that, Briand "became the most popular statesman of his era. He continued a search for peace, which culminated in his audacious plan for a European federation, officially proposed in a memorandum to 26 nations in May 1930, which made some headway before Britain rejected it. When Briand lost the foreign ministry after Prime Minister Laval's resignation in January 1932, the proposal died." Sowerwine, op.cit., 129–130 Agulhon, op.cit., 201.
45. *La Victoire*, #3544, September 16, 1925, "Après les palabres de Genève," G.H.
46. *La Victoire*, #3166, September 3, 1924, "Avec la permission de l'Angleterre," G.H.
47. *La Victoire*, #3527, August 30, 1925.

48. *La Victoire*, #3847, July 17, 1926.
49. *La Victoire*, #4216, July 21, 1927.
50. *La Victoire*, #4287, September 30, 1927.
51. *La Victoire*, #'s 4347, 4351, 4352, November 29 and December 3–4, 1927.
52. *La Victoire*, #4384, January 5, 1928, "Un mauvais plaisant," G.H.
53. *La Victoire*, #4578, July 17, 1928, "Un bêlement pacifiste de plus," G.H.
54. *La Victoire*, #4522, May 22, 1928, "La République allemand est faite," G.H.
55. *La Victoire*, #4569, July 8, 1928, "Vers la réconciliation franco-allemande," G.H. That was one of the points made by S. William Halperin in his volume *Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946).
56. *La Victoire*, #4571, July 10, 1928.
57. Grünblatt, op.cit., 66.
58. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 81–85. When Pierre Laval met with Hitler at Montoire-sur-le-Loire near Tours on October 22, 1940, two days before Pétain got there, "Laval certainly did not see himself as a traitor. He was respecting one of the guiding principles of his life: the pursuit of peace. If Laval had any precedent in mind, it might well have been the meeting fourteen years earlier, on 17 September 1926, between his mentor Aristide Briand and the German Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, at another out-of-the-way location, the village of Thoiry in the Jura." 81.
59. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 174.
60. *La Victoire*, #5398, October 16, 1930, "Jusqu'où il faut réviser," G.H.
61. *La Victoire*, #5414, October 31, 1930, "Nous trahirons les tchécoslovaques?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5398, October 16, 1930, "Jusqu'où il faut réviser," G.H.
62. Gustave Hervé, *France-Allemagne-La réconciliation ou la guerre*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1931), 16.
63. Ibid., 16–17.
64. Ibid., 23–30.
65. Ibid., 219–220.
66. *La Victoire*, #5427, November 13, 1930, "C'est l'intérêt des partis nationaux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5576, April 5, 1931, "Propos de Pâques," G.H.
67. *La Victoire*, #5428, November 14, 1930, "Au dessus des partis politiques," G.H.
68. *La Victoire*, #5607, May 12, 1931, "Dans l'intérêt de la France," G.H.
69. *La Victoire*, #5369, September 16, 1930, "Ils veulent remettre ça," G.H.
70. *La Victoire*, #5370, September 17, 1930, "L'exemple d'Hitler," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5410, October 27, 1930, "La réponse du *Casque d'Acier*," G.H.
71. *La Victoire*, #5371, September 18, 1930, "A la française," G.H. Hervé was a bit more accurate in calling Hitler's expropriationist ideas demagogic.

Chapter 26

1. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 305–7.
2. Floris Daniel Knegt, "Frans Socialisme? Het Politieke Denken van Gustave Hervé (1919–1944)," Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2010. Personal and electronic exchanges with Daniel Knegt in 2011 and 2012 have also confirmed this point.
3. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: L'Enseignement Pacifique par l'Histoire*, op.cit., 418. Most references to Jews and anti-Semitism in his editorials in *La Guerre Sociale* and *La Victoire* from 1906 until 1940 rejected and assailed anti-Semitism.
4. Around 1996–1997 George Kassel, then an instructor and grader for the English Department of UC Berkeley, suggested that this was possibly a political "dirty trick."

5. Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 155. Mazgaj cited *La Guerre Sociale*, February 8–14, 1911, "La Réponse des Rothschild," Un Sans Patrie.
6. Sternhell, *Ni droite ni gauche*, op.cit., 60.
7. See Richard Millman, *La Question juive entre les deux guerres: Ligues de droite et antisémitisme en France.* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), 165.
8. Pierre Birnbaum, « *La France aux Français* » *: Histoire des haines nationalistes,* (Paris : Le Seuil, 1993), 237–258.
9. Orlow, op.cit., 70–71, see note 54 on 192. See Charles Bloch, *Le IIIe Reich et le monde,* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale « Notre Siècle », 1986), 219. Goebbels ordered the German press to praise *Le Matin*'s positive comments on the German plebiscite that "legitimized" Hitler's assumption of the president's powers. According to Bloch, cooperation with Britain, more than with the Soviet Union, Italy, or Japan, was instrumental in helping Nazi Germany increase its power and Britain would have been willing to allow Germany preponderance in Europe but not exclusive domination (Presseanw., II: 310 [14 Aug. 1934]). See the review of Bloch by Patrick Moreau, in *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 1988, Vol. 43, No. 3, 686–687. Many Nazis realized "that the French anti-Semitic scene was riddled with poseurs and charlatans. Moreover, most French anti-Semites were still not racial anti-Semites. They attacked the supposedly excessive power of Jews in France, not the 'evils' of the 'Jewish race.'" "Especially the foreign policy amateurs among the Nazis tended to exaggerate the influence of extreme-Right publications and writers. They regarded them as important molders of public opinion, who would be useful in shaping the image of the Third Reich in France." Orlow, 70.
10. Gérard Noiriel, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France (XIXe-XXe siècle): Discours publics, humiliations privées,* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 436–438.
11. Eugen Weber, "Reflections on the Jews in France," in *The Jews in Modern France*, Frances Malino and Bernard Wasserstein, eds., (Hanover, New Hampshire 1985), 8–27.
12. William B. Cohen and Irwin M. Wall, "French Communism and the Jews," in Malino and Wasserstein, eds., 81–102; Nancy Fitch, "Mass Culture, Mass Parliamentary Politics and Modern Antisemitism," *American Historical Review*, 97, no. 1 (February 1992), 55–95.
13. Stephen A. Schuker, "Origins of the 'Jewish Problem' in the Later Third Republic," in Malino and Wasserstein, eds., 135–80, 146–148.
14. Cohen and Irwin, op.cit., 81–102. Racial or biological arguments also affected anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century but there is little evidence of that in any of Hervé's writings or publications.
15. Mazgaj, op.cit., 155–6, 162–5. In a letter to Hervé dated March 15, 1911, Jean Longuet, Marx's son-in-law, described the anti-Semitic writings of Méric and Janvion respectively as "eccentric" and "dangerous insanities." Significantly, Méric's whimsical *chronique* continued to appear in *La Guerre Sociale* until World War I. Fitch, "Mass Culture, Mass Parliamentary Politics and Modern Antisemitism," op.cit., 55–95.
16. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 306; Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, op.cit., 162–5; L.G.S., #14, April 5–11, 1911, "Ni Antisémite ni Antifranc-maçon," Un Sans Patrie; L.G.S., #15, April 12–18, 1911, "Une Lettre de Pataud," Émile Pataud and "Hervé répond," G.H.
17. L.G.S., November 4, 1914, February 12, April 9, and November 15, 1915; *La Victoire*, December 1, 1916; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 306–7; Catherine Nicault, *La France et le sionisme, 1897–1948*, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1992), 54.
18. Sternhell, "The Roots of Popular Antisemitism in the Third Republic," in Malino and Wasserstein, eds., 103–34.
19. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 303.
20. L.G.S., November 4, 1914, February 12, April 9, and November 15, 1915; *La Victoire*, December 1, 1916; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 306–7; Nicault, op.cit.

21. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 306–307. See Yohanon Manor, *Naissance du sionisme politique.* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard « Collections Archives », 1981), 205. Heuré also rejected the notion that somehow Hervé's pro-Zionist position was an offshoot of the idea of French exclusivity (*La France aux Français*), which was Pierre Birnbaum's thesis cited above.
22. Nicault, op.cit., 54.
23. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 307.
24. A.N., F7 12936.
25. *La Victoire*, #5522, February 16, 1931, "Dans mon courrier," G.H.
26. *La Victoire*, #6234, March 30, 1933, "Mauvais début, Hitler !" G.H.
27. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 304.
28. *La Victoire du Dimanche*, August 6, 1933; Heuré, "Gustave Hervé. Un propagandiste sous la IIIe République (1871–1944)," Thèse. Paris-II, 1995, 1042.
29. *La Victoire*, #6347, October 7, 1933, "Relents d'antisémitisme," G.H.
30. *La Victoire*, #6162, January 17, 1933, "L'indice juif," A.L.
31. *La Victoire*, #5995, June 3, 1932, "Lettre ouverte à M. Coty," G.H.
32. *La Victoire*, #7042, February 14, 1936, "Celui qui se sert de l'épée …," G.H.
33. *La Victoire*, #7909, June 3, 1939, "Au large de Cuba," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7915, June 10, 1939, "Au secours des juifs persécutés," G.H.
34. *La Victoire*, #6220, March 16, 1933, "Éloge de la dictature," G.H.
35. *La Victoire*, #6241, April 6, 1933, "Juif? non, israélite," Roberesse.
36. *La Victoire*, #6101, November 17, 1932, "Crise morale," Marcel Bucard.
37. *La Victoire*, #6435, January 3, 1934, "Derrière Stavisky," G.H.
38. *La Victoire*, #6347, October 7, 1933, "Relents d'antisemitisme," G.H.
39. *La Victoire*, #6938, November 2, 1935, "En face de l'Allemagne," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #6987, December 21, 1935, "Impossible, chers amis anglais!" G.H.
41. *La Victoire*, #6488, February 26, 1934, "Est-Ce Un Crime Maçonnique? Oui !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6489, February 27, 1934, "Crime Maçonnique," G.H. Hervé did admit that there were good, honest, and intelligent Masons.
42. *La Victoire*, #6970, December 4, 1935, "Les Croix de Feu sur la sellette," G.H.
43. *La Victoire*, #7211, October 6, 1936, "La France – Maçonnerie manœuvre," G.H.
44. *La Victoire*, #7378, March 31, 1937, "Une erreur diagnostic," G.H.
45. *La Victoire*, #7182, July 8, 1936, "Le Sénat se fâche," G.H.; L.G.S., #15, April 12–19, 1911, "Une Lettre de Pataud" and "Hervé répond," G.H. Hervé was inducted into the Masons in 1900 at the Lodge in Sens. After he was excluded in 1905, he was eventually admitted by a Parisian Lodge which was soon? excommunicated from the Grand Orient. Hervé stopped attending in 1906, and the imprisoned *Sans Patrie* considered himself no longer a member in 1911.
46. *La Victoire*, #6867, May 30, 1935, "Les spéculateurs, au bagne!" During the depths of the Depression, Hervé called for all speculators to be sent to prison if they spread false rumors. He found it necessary to say that "not all speculators were Jews."
47. *La Victoire*, #5622, May 27, 1931, "Le galimatias de Tours," G.H.
48. Lazare Landau, *Léon Blum, 1872–1950, Extrait de l'Almanach du KKL*-Strasbourg, 5753–1993.
49. *La Victoire*, #7336, February 10, 1937, "La révolte de l'Alsace," G.H.
50. *La Victoire*, #7110, April 22, 1936, "vers un ministère Blum," G.H.
51. *La Victoire*, #7174, June 30, 1936, "La révolution larvée," G.H.
52. *La Victoire*, #7133, May 15, 1936 "La racisme est-il juif ?," A.L. Kossuth.
53. *La Victoire*, #7299, January 2, 1937, "Blum se moque-t-il du monde ?" G.H.
54. Schuker, op.cit., 135–80.
55. Eugen Weber, *The Hollow Years: France in the 1930's*, (New York 1994). The P.S.N. anti-Semitic poster depicted in Weber's book was undoubtedly simply a large, separate, pasted flyer which read "A Bas les Juifs!" purposely or randomly placed on the P.S.N. poster during the

1935 municipal elections. Weber apparently erred in thinking that his photo-documentation came from the firm of Roger-Viollet which was unable to provide additional information in 1999.

56. Email letter from Daniel Knegt in 2011. "Like you, I was puzzled by the picture in Eugen Weber's book *The Hollow Years*, which seems to be showing a blatantly antisemitic poster of Hervé's P.S.N. Like you, I tried in vain to get any more information on the picture at the Roger Viollet photo agency that was mentioned as the source of the illustration. As I was harassing Roger Viollet on the phone, they told me the picture doesn't come from their archives, so I started to look elsewhere. In the end I found out the picture actually comes from the David Seymour photo collection at Magnum Photos (www.magnumphotos.com). The picture is not from the time of the Popular Front, but it is part of a series of pictures Seymour made during the Paris municipal elections of May 1935. The series features a few other pictures of comparable antisemitic posters, but everywhere it looks like several posters have been glued one over another. The featured address of the PSN on the Rue des Petits Champs has never been the seat of any of Hervé's organizations. Considering the fact that there is no sign of any party activity during the whole of 1935 from the part of Hervé, I think it is very unlikely that these posters come from Hervé's organization. Of course, that doesn't answer the question where the posters do come from. I must admit that I have no idea. In my thesis I propose the hypothesis that political opponents of Hervé created the poster to defame him. It could have been the *Jeunesses Patriotes* who, during that period, were actually concerned about Hervé's Pétain campaign, which he had launched a short time before the 1935 elections. An eventual success of Hervé's initiative might have led to mass membership loss for the JP. The organisation might have wanted to present Hervé as an antisemitic extremist. At the end of 1932, the JP had used a comparable strategy by claiming Hervé had accepted funds from Hitler. But I have nothing to prove this hypothesis …" Also Email letter of August 5, 2014.
57. One so far unasked question might ponder the very existence of any P.S.N. poster in May 1935 when *La Victoire* was in such dire financial straits yet somehow was able to launch its campaign for Pétain and place party posters.
58. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 305.
59. *La Victoire*, #7737, November 13–14, 1938, "L'immonde antisémitisme," G.H.
60. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 305–307. Heuré cited Michel Winock, *Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France*, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1982), 284.
61. Ibid., 305–306.
62. *La Victoire*, #7575, February 12, 1938, "Coup de théâtre à Bucharest," G.H. In assailing anti-Semitism in Rumania and elsewhere in Europe, Hervé admitted that some of his friends were anti-Semites.
63. *La Victoire*, #7741, November 18, 1938, "Autre réponse à Daladier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7750, November 29, 1938, "Tous derrière Daladier!" G.H.
64. La Victoire, July 6, 1930, "Pour la culture des syndicats unionistes," Albert Cremieux.
65. *La Victoire*, November 17 and 29, 1931; April 11, May 17, June 15, November 20, 1932; January 1, 1933, and April 10, 28, and 30, 1933.
66. Kalman, op.cit., 187–188, 221.
67. Vicki Caron, "The Antisemitic Revival in France in the 1930s: The Socioeconomic Dimension Reconsidered," *Journal of Modern History*, 70 (March 1998), 24–73; idem. *Uneasy Aylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942*, (Stanford, Cailifornia: Stanford University Press, 1999).
68. Ralph Schor, *L'Antisémitisme en France pendant les années trente: Prélude à Vichy*, (Paris 1992).
69. Daniel Knegt, email correspondence dated October 20, 2011 from Florence, Italy to Ada, Ohio. Similar reflections arose in other personal and electronic exchanges.
70. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 305.
71. Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999 [1998]), 64–69.

Chapter 27

1. *La Victoire*, #6165, "Quand le Cartel gouverne," G.H.
2. Miquel, op.cit., 668.
3. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, op.cit., 71.
4. Miquel, op.cit., 668.
5. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis in Interwar France," op.cit., 187; Kalman, op.cit., 40.
6. Agulhon, op.cit., 216.
7. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis …," op.cit., 152–153. Passmore actually argued that the "stalemate society thesis" itself, which arose during the interwar era, "was a major cause of the instability of republican politics in the 1930s." 154.
8. Miquel, op.cit., 677–680.
9. Ibid., 677–680. "The resignation of the Chautemps government was the first time in the political history of the Republic when power ceded to a street demonstration." 677.
10. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139.
11. Ibid., 138–139; *L'Humanité*, February 6, 1934; Agulhon, op.cit., 216–221; Popkin, op.cit., 240–241; Mollier and George, op.cit., 617; Martin, op.cit., 99.
12. *La Victoire*, #6347, October 7, 1933, "Relents d'antisémitisme," G.H.
13. *La Victoire*, #6435, January 3, 1934, "Derrière Stavisky," G.H.
14. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis …," op.cit., 194.
15. Miquel, op.cit., 669–670. The papal condemnation of 1926, the return of prosperity in the late 1920s, and the success that the Right had in power reduced much of the extreme Right to silence until the Stavisky Affair began to resuscitate its forces according to Miquel. Other scandals and events which had serious anti-Semitic overtones and implications preceded the Stavisky Affair and helped forge concerted activism by the extreme Right. Such developments included: the Oustric scandal, the performance of the translated German play "L'Ambigu" dealing with the Dreyfus Affair, and the demonstrations by the *ligues* after the victory of Herriot and his renewed *Cartel* in 1932.
16. *La Victoire*, #7042, February 14, 1936, "Celui qui se sert de l'épée …," G.H.
17. Agulhon, op.cit., 216–217.
18. Léon Daudet, *Bréviaire de Journalisme*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), 189–204.
19. Miquel, op.cit., 670–673.
20. *La Victoire*, #6164, January 19, 1933, "Avons, commerçants, industriels!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6166, January 21, 1933, "L'erreur des modérés!" G.H. Of course, in the same articles, Hervé could stress how "no one wanted a dictator, just as no one wanted a surgeon, until they need one." *La Victoire*, #6169, January 24, 1933, "Et nous les avons jusqu'en 1936!" G.H. "I do not wish to prevent those who believe that we cannot save France by legal means from attempting a *coup d'état* if they have a man who will risk the adventure. I believe that the adventure is destined to fail. In peacetime one can only make a *coup de force* if one is already a master of the government, or if one has powerful accomplices." What could be more cautiously provocative? *La Victoire*, #6171, January 26, 1933, "C'est ça leur République," G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #6465, February 2, 1934, "L'idée plébiscitaire," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6466, February 3, 1934, "Quelques points sur les i," G.H.
22. Jackson, op.cit., 68. "Tardieu … was the [French] politician most associated with the idea of absorbing social conflict through economic modernization."
23. Popkin, op.cit., 237–238; Jean-Louis Loubet Del Bayle, *Les non-conformistes des années 30—une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969).
24. *L'Humanité*, February 6, 1934.
25. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139. *Coriolanus* was a play set during the Early Roman Republic and based on a character from *Plutarch's Lives*.

26. Serge Berstein, *Le 6 février 1934*, (Paris: Collection Archives, 1975), 148–149; *L'Humanité*, February 6, 1934; William Fortescue, *The Third Republic in France, 1870–1940: Conflicts and Continuities*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 186–188.
27. Mollier and George, op.cit., 617; Martin, op.cit., 116–119.
28. Miquel, op.cit., 678; *Le Temps*, February 7, 1934, "Les décisions gouvernementales et leurs répercussions"; Martin, op.cit., 97–102.
29. Ibid., 678.
30. Ibid.; Sowerwine, op.cit., 139; Agulhon, op.cit., 217.
31. *Le Temps*, February 7, 1934, "Les décisions gouvernementales et leurs répercussions."
32. Miquel. op.cit., 678. "Eugen Weber noted that the claimant to the throne, the Duke de Guise, had not foreseen the situation any more than the leaders of *L'Action Française*."
33. Brian Jenkins, "Historiographical Essay–The Paris Riots of February 1934: The Crisis of the French Third Republic," *French History*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2006, 333–351. Jenkins argues that neither Mussolini nor Hitler came to power through a violent coup or "seizure of power", so that February 6 should not be judged by that non-existent precedent or by focusing on what happened immediately after the events but concerning the assumptions, goals, and attitudes of those involved, which for Jenkins could be interpreted as a "missed opportunity" by a divided Right. Mussolini and Hitler had employed "dual-track" strategies to gain power and the French situation was still highly fluid on the eve of the war. The survival of the republican regime until 1940 occurred due to different conditions present in France and alternate reactions by political actors there.
34. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis …," op.cit., 194, 189–190.
35. Ibid., op.cit., 188; *Journal des Débats*, January 5 and 13, 1934.
36. *Le Temps*, February 6, 1934, "Tribune Libre: L'impasse parlementaire," Lucien Romier.
37. Miquel, op.cit., 667–673.
38. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139.
39. *La Victoire*, #6443, January 11, 1934, "La doigt sur la plaie," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #6446, January 14, 1934, "Constatations," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6484, February 22, 1934, "Une vraie forêt de Bondy," G.H.; Martin, op.cit., 101. Albert Prince was a councilor at the Paris Court of Appeal. As head of the financial section of the Parquet de Paris, he investigated Stavisky.
41. *La Victoire*, #6468, February 5, 1934, "Ministre de mufles!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6469, February 6, 1934, "Atmosphère révolutionnaire," G.H.
42. *Le Petit Parisien*, February 7, 1934.
43. *Le Temps*, February 7, 1934, "Les décisions gouvernementales et leurs répercussions."
44. *L'Humanité*, February 7, 1934.
45. *Le Petit Journal*, February 7, 1934.
46. Ibid.; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 7, 1934.
47. *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
48. *Le Petit Parisien*, February 7, 1934; *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
49. Miquel, op.cit., 678; Popkin, op.cit., 241; Sowerwine, op.cit., 140.
50. *Le Petit Journal*, February 7, 1934; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 7, 1934.
51. *Le Petit Journal*, February 7, 1934; Agulhon, op.cit., 218.
52. Ibid.; *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes"; *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang !" G.H.
53. *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
54. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139–140; Miquel, op.cit., 678. In fact, Daladier received three parliamentary votes of confidence on February 6, 1934. Jenkins, "Historiographical Essay …", op.cit., 334.
55. Agulhon, op.cit., 218–219; *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
56. *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes." According to the leading authority on that night of violence, 13 people were killed that night, 2 more died of their wounds

soon afterward, while 4 later deaths occurred due to injuries stemming from that night's violence. Jenkins, "Historiographical Essay …", op.cit., 335. Jenkins cited Pierre Pelissier, *6 Février 1934: La République en flammes*, (Paris: Perrin, 2000), 320.

57. *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang !" G.H.
58. *Le Petit Journal*, February 7, 1934; Agulhon, op.cit., 218.
59. *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
60. *Le Petit Journal*, February 7, 1934.
61. *La Victoire*, #6468, February 5, 1934, "Ministre de mufles!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6469, February 6, 1934, "Atmosphère révolutionnaire," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang!" G.H.
62. *La Victoire*, #6468, February 5, 1934, "Ministre de mufles!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6469, February 6, 1934, "Atmosphère révolutionnaire," G.H.
63. *Le Temps*, February 6, 1934, "Tribune Libre—L'impasse parlementaire," Lucien Romier and "Le gouvernement et la paix publique."
64. *Le Temps*, February 8, 1934, "Soirée des troubles sanglantes."
65. Miquel, op.cit., 678.
66. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139–140. Sowerwine cited Noiriel, op.cit., 375.
67. Jenkins, "Historiographical Essay …", op.cit., 351.
68. *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang," G.H.
69. *La Victoire*, #6471, February 8, 1934, "Notre grande espérance," G.H.
70. *La Victoire*, #6483, February 21, 1934, "La verité aux provinciaux," G.H.
71. *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang," G.H.
72. Sean Kennedy, *Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français, 1927–1945*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 48–52. Despite La Rocque's malleability, Kennedy does not hesitate to see fascist traits in the *Croix-de-Feu*. In a revealing internal circular in late 1935, La Rocque "weighed the pros and cons of electoral participation." He "noted that the Italian Fascists and German Nazis had long realized that violence alone could not win them power; participation in elections was also necessary." At this point La Rocque chose not to participate especially so as not to appear like an ordinary political party with narrow sectional interests and due to time constraints. 75–76. Such a characterization fits the description of "republican fascism" given by Robert J. Soucy, a description which could be employed to describe Hervé's formations.
73. René Rémond in *Les Droites en France* made the standard argument against calling the *Croix-de-Feu* fascist. Many other scholars have disagreed. Robert J. Soucy "French Fascism and the Croix de Feu: A Dissenting Interpretation, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 26 (1991), 159–188; William Irvine, "Fascism in France: The Strange Case of the Croix de Feu," *Journal of Modern History*, 63 (1991), 271–295; Kevin Passmore, "'Boyscouting for Grown-Ups?' Paramilitarism in the Croix de Feu and PSF," *French Historical Studies*, 19 (1995), 527–557; idem, "The Croix de Feu: Bonapartism, National Populism or Fascism," *French History* 9/1 (1995), 93–123; idem, *From Liberalism to Fascism: The Right in a French Province* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1997]). See the cogent views of Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, op.cit., 72–74.
74. Sowerwine, op.cit., 140–142; Fortescue, op.cit., 187.
75. Agulhon, op.cit., 219.
76. Miquel, op.cit., 680–681.
77. *La Victoire*, #6474, February 11, 1934, "La grève imbécile," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6475, February 13, 1934, "Moralité," G.H.
78. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*, op.cit., 65.
79. Popkin, op.cit., 237–239.
80. Sowerwine, op.cit., 142; Jackson, op.cit., 72.

81. Jackson, op.cit., 72.
82. *Le Temps*, February 9, 1934, "Discipline Nationale." "… qu'on voit maintenant en lui l'homme dont la nation a besoin."
83. *La Victoire*, #6474, February 11, 1934, "Nos blessés," and "Avis." The name Brochet could not be found on the partial list of the dead and injured found in *Le Temps* on February 8, 1934. *La Victoire*, #6483, February 21, 1934, "La verité aux provinciaux," G.H. and "MSN—Point d'actions sans directives," André Chaumet.
84. *La Victoire*, #6468, February 5, 1934, "Ministère de mufles," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6469, February 6, 1934, "Atmosphère révolutionnaire!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6470, February 7, 1934, "Après la boue, le sang!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6471, February 8, 1934, "Notre grande espérance," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6472, February 9, 1934, "Vive Doumergue," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6473, February 10, 1934, "Au chevet de la malade," G.H.
85. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 272.
86. *La Victoire*, #6472, February 9, 1934, "Vive Doumergue," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6473, February 10, 1934, "Au chevet de la malade," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6478, February 16, 1934, "La dernière carte," G.H.; Henri Dubief, *Le déclin de la IIIe république, 1929–1938*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976), 153; Grünblatt, op.cit., 52.
87. Potkin, op.cit., 241; Jackson, op.cit., 72–73.
88. Passmore, "The Construction of Crisis …," op.cit., 190.
89. *La Victoire*, #6607, June 25, 1934, "Mêmes les *Croix de Feu*," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6648, October 23, 1934, "Ça, un néo-socialisme?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6678, November 22, 1934, "A l'opposé de l'*Action Française*," G.H.
90. *La Victoire*, #6574, February 6, 1935, "Le anniversaire du 6 février," G.H.; Gustave Hervé, *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1935), 5.
91. *La Victoire*, #7034, February 6, 1936, "Le 6 février," G.H.
92. Sowerwine, op.cit., 139.
93. *La Victoire*, #6465, February 2, 1934, "L'idée plébiscitaire," G.H.
94. Agulhon, op.cit., 218.
95. Sowerwine, op.cit., 142; Alexander Werth, *The Destiny of France*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1937), 63.
96. Agulhon, op.cit., 219.
97. Jenkins, "Historiographical Essay …", op.cit., 336–337.
98. Sowerwine, op.cit., 142.
99. *La Victoire*, #7122, May 4, 1936, "Le raz de marée," G.H.

Chapter 28

1. *La Victoire*, #6550, April 29, 1934, "Le cas Doriot," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6553, May 2, 1934; *La Victoire*, #6573, May 22, 1934, "Heureuse fermentation," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6574, May 23, 1934, "Bravo Marquet!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6581, May 30, 1934, "De Marquet à Marin," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6648, October 23, 1934, "Ça, un néo-socialisme," G.H.
2. Gilbert Allardyce, "Jacques Doriot et l'esprit fasciste en France," *Revue d'Histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1975, No. 97, 31–44; Gilbert Allardyce, "The Political Transition of Jacques Doriot," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1966, Vol. 1, 56–74; S. Grossman, "L'évolution de Marcel Déat," *Revue d'Histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1975, No. 97, 3–29; John T. Marcus, *French Socialism in the Crisis Years, 1933–1936, Fascism and the French Left*, (New York: Praeger, 1958); J.P. Cointet, "Marcel Déat et le Parti Unique, (Été 1940)," *Revue d'Histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1973, No. 91, 1–22; Dieter Wolf, *Doriot-Du communisme à la collaboration*, translated from the German by Georgette Chatenet, (Paris:

Fayard, 1969 [1967]); Jean-Paul Brunet, *Jacques Doriot: Du communisme au fascisme*, (Paris: Balland, 1986); Philippe Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste*, op.cit.

3. Agulhon, op.cit., 224–225.
4. Grünblatt, op.cit., 52–53.
5. William Fortescue, *The Third Republic in France, 1870–1940*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 237.
6. *Le Petit Journal*, January 11, 1935, "Une Dictateur? Mais Qui ? Et voici les premiers résultats de notre grand Referendum," Alfred Mallet.
7. Fortescue, op.cit., 226–227.
8. *La Victoire*, #7119, May 1, 1936, "Deux mystiques s'affrontent," G.H.
9. *La Victoire*, #6762, February 14, 1935, "C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 311–312; *La Victoire*, #6759, February 11, 1935, "Voulez-vous sauver la France?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6760, February 12, 1935, "Un chef ? Pétain ou Weygand," G.H. There were earlier mentions of Pétain after February 6, 1934, but these were the first editorials that saw him as a potential national savior.
10. *La Victoire*, #7074, March 17, 1936, "Le réveil de l'union sacrée," G.H.
11. Jean-Jacques Becker, "La Première Guerre mondiale dans la mémoire des droites," 540, in *Histoire des droites en France*, Ed. Jean-François Sirinelli, Vol. 2, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992).
12. *Le Petit Journal*, January 11, 1935, "Avec le Maréchale Pétain," Philippe Boegner.
13. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 312. See Herbert R. Lottman, *Pétain*, (Paris: Seuil, 1984), 184.
14. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 314.
15. Ibid., 320. Heuré cited Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération*, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1979), 84. Azéma referred to Pétain as largely a spectator at that time.
16. Ibid.; *Le Télégramme de Brest*, March 7, 1945; Charles Chassé; *La Dépêche de Brest*, July 10, 11, and 12, 1935, Charles Chassé interview with G.H.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 320–321; *Le Procès du maréchal Pétain, comte rendu sténographique*, op.cit., tome 1, 77; *Paul Reynaud: La France a sauvé l'Europe*, (Paris : Flammarion, 1947), tome 2, 421.
19. Gustave Hervé, *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut*! (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1935); Gustave Hervé, *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut* ! (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1936). The title was based on an old Boulangist song of 1887 "*C'est la boulange qu'il nous faut*" and may have alluded to the wartime song of *la grande guerre* called "C*'est l'Alsace-Lorraine qu'il nous faut*!" See Grünblatt, op.cit., 53 and *La Victoire*, #791, March 1, 1918, "47 ans après," G.H.
20. *La Victoire*, #6838, May 1, 1935, "Notre brochure 'Pétain,'" G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #6842, May 5, 1935, "Et le pacte franco-allemand?" G.H.
22. Hervé, *C'est Pétain* … 1935, op.cit., 3–4.
23. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 313–314.
24. Hervé, *C'est Pétain* …, 1935, op.cit., 4–10, 81.
25. *La Victoire*, #6901, July 3, 1935, "La défense de la république," G.H.
26. *La Victoire*, #7282, December 16, 1936, "Notre campagne révisionniste," G.H.
27. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 313–314.
28. Ibid., 313.
29. Ibid.
30. *La Victoire*, #7282, December 16, 1936, "Notre campagne révisionniste," G.H.
31. Hervé, *C'est Pétain* …, op.cit., 1935, 11–17; *La Victoire*, #'s 6762 and 6780.
32. Ibid., 19–39; *La Victoire*, #'s 6782 and 6784.
33. Ibid., 49. Hervé's acceptance of female suffrage for his plebiscitary system may show both desperation as well as a realization of stronger female support for traditional faiths. 68–70.

34. *La Victoire*, #7012, January 15, 1936, "Pas encore trop tard, la Rocque!" G.H.
35. Grünblatt, op.cit., 53–54; Sowerwine, op.cit., 144; *La Victoire*, #7042, February 14, 1936, "Celui qui se sert de l'épée …," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6894, June 26, 1935, "Casse-cou, les Croix de Feu!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6948, November 12, 1935, "Les deux cortèges," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7011, January 14, 1936, "Casse cou, Colonel de La Rocque!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7043, February 15, 1936, "Qui a vu clair?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7073, March 16, 1936, "Sous la cravache!" G.H.
36. *La Victoire*, #7204, July 30, 1936, "Notre Parti Socialiste National," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 54–55.
37. Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 314; Gustave Hervé, *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1936), 23.
38. Gustave Hervé, *C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1935), 16; *La Victoire*, March 4, 1935, #6780, "De Doumerge à Pétain," G.H.
39. Ibid., 29.
40. *La Victoire*, #7282, December 16, 1936, "Notre campagne révisionniste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7296, December 30, 1936, "Tenir … comme à Verdun !" G.H. In the months ahead *La Victoire* sent out copies of the brochure to individual Parisian *arrondissements* which were then asked to help finance distributions to other *arrondissements*. A flyer signed by Hervé was sent out on June 11, 1937 explaining how a distribution of 18,000 brochures to the 19th *arrondissment* had helped to fund the latest distribution to the 11th.
41. Hervé, *C'est Pétain …*, 1936, op.cit., 22–29; Grünblatt, op.cit., 56–57; *La Victoire*, #7285, December 19, 1936, "Un parti révisionniste? Oui," G.H.
42. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 314–315; *La Victoire*, #6842, May 5, 1935, "Et le pacte franco-allemand?" G.H.
43. Hervé, *C'est Pétain …*, 1936, op.cit., 54–58.
44. Heuré, op.cit., 314–315.
45. Hervé, *C'est Pétain …*, 1936, op.cit., 45–68; Grünblatt, op.cit., 56–57.
46. André Schwob, *L'Affaire Pétain: Faits et Documents*, (New York: Éditions De La Maison Française, Inc., 1944), 9–11, 39, 46–47, 50–51, 201.
47. Schwob, op.cit., 47–49.
48. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 321.
49. Marc Ferro, *Pétain*, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), op.cit., 686.
50. It should be recalled that the police were once certain that he had been the center of a vast insurrectional plot on the extreme Left from 1909 until around 1912.
51. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 321.
52. Ibid., 322.
53. Ibid.
54. Georges Émile Dulac and Lucien Leclerc, *La vérité sur Gustave Hervé*, (Paris: Éditions de la Société de *La Victoire*, 1946), 24.
55. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 322–323.
56. Ibid., 323–324.
57. Schwob, op.cit.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 3; *Une Vieille conspiration—Une conspiration de vieux*, (Toulouse: Délégation Régionale de l'Information, 1944); Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit.
58. *La Victoire*, #6762, February 14, 1935, "C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut," G.H.
59. Jean Quéval, *Première Page, Cinquième Colonne*, (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1945), 16–18.
60. André Truchard, "Matricule 58, souvenirs de dix ans de francisme," *Le Franciste*, October 2, 1943. Since *La Victoire* did not publish during much of the summer in the 1930s, Truchard must have been talking about *La Victoire du Dimanche*. In fact, as a daily *La Victoire* did not publish from July 16 until October 2, 1933.
61. Quéval, op.cit., 16–18.

Chapter 29

1. Robert O. Paxton, "A Surprising Prime Minister", *New York Review of Books*, August 13, 2015, Vol. LXII, No. 13, 76–78.
2. Sowerwine, op.cit., 143; Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 74–75.
3. Agulhon, op.cit., 225–228; Jackson, op.cit., 75.
4. Fortescue, op.cit., 189.
5. Jackson, op.cit., 74.
6. Sowerwine, op.cit., 143–144.
7. *La Victoire*, #6835, April 28, 1935, "Pour qui voter demain?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6900, July 2, 1935, "Ohé! Les radicaux nationaux!" G.H. Hervé assumed that Nationalist Radicals would soon fear losing their seats to Socialists and Communists which he hoped would lead to a nationalist wave for Pétain. Much earlier, the *Alliance Démocratique* had supported the Republic and the anticlericals during the Dreyfus Affair. During the interwar with the disappearance of the *Action Libérale Populaire*, the *Fédération Républicaine* saw its Catholic identity become more pronounced which made it harder to create a durable *entente* between the two moderate conservative groups. The *Alliance Démocratique* often wanted to ally with the Radicals, but the latter preferred the Socialists at the time of elections only to return to the *Alliance Démocratique* at the first sign of a financial crisis. The resulting political instability was offset by the relatively painless manner in which the Right could return to power. Jackson, op.cit., 67.
8. *La Victoire*, #6845, May 8, 1935, "Pour qui voter au deuxième tour?" G.H.
9. *La Victoire*, #7384, April 7, 1937, "Les poursuites contre La Rocque," G.H.
10. *La Victoire*, #6895, June 27, 1935, "Ou le cartel renforcé, ou Pétain," G.H.
11. *La Victoire*, #6896, June 28, 1935, "Quelques points sur les i," G.H.
12. *La Victoire*, #6896, June 29, 1935, "Casse-cou, le Cartel ! …," G.H.
13. *La Victoire*, #6899, July 1, 1935, "Le rassemblement du 14 juillet," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6950, November 14, 1935, "La leçon de ce 1 novembre," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6958, November 22, 1935, "Pour la réconciliation française," G.H.
14. *La Victoire*, #6902, July 4, 1935, "Par la fraternité française," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6903, July 5, 1935, "Ni Daladier, ni Herriot: Pétain!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6904, July 6, 1935, "Le danger c'est Daladier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6905, July 7, 1935, "Et pourtant, on 'les' aura," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6926, October 21, 1935, "Au Senat, rien de changé," G.H.
15. *La Victoire*, #6971, December 5, 1935, "Conseils aux Croix de Feu," G.H.
16. *La Victoire*, #6927, October 22, 1935, "Feront-ils sauter Laval?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6929, October 24, 1935, "Quand les factions gouvernent …," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6930, October 25, 1935, "Les décrets contre les Croix de Feu," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6931, October 26, 1935, "C'est là le but des Croix de Feu?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6932, October 27, 1935, "Le ministère menacé," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6933, October 28, 1935, "La nouvelle vague rouge," G.H.
17. *La Victoire*, #6940, November 4, 1935, "La glissade continue," G.H.
18. *La Victoire*, #6943, November 7, 1935, "La véritable Herriot," G.H.
19. *La Victoire*, #6960, November 24, 1935, "Le saut dans l'inconnu," G.H.
20. *La Victoire*, #6961, November 25, 1935, "Casse-cou ! Colonel de la Rocque !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7010, January 13, 1936, "L'unique chance des nationaux," G.H.
21. *La Victoire*, #6964, November 28, 1935, "Ils se réhabiteraient si …," G.H.
22. *La Victoire*, #6998, January 1, 1936, "La nouvelle année," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7008, January 11, 1936, "Le rassemblement national," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7009, January 12, 1936, "L'erreur de colonel de la Rocque," G.H.
23. *La Victoire*, #7062, March 5, 1936, "Le pacte franco-russe—c'est la paix!" G.H.

24. *La Victoire*, #7012, January 15, 1936, "Pas encore trop tard, la Rocque!" G.H.
25. *La Victoire*, #7032, February 4, 1936, "Un bon mouvement la Rocque!" G.H.
26. *La Victoire*, #7101, April 13, 1936, "Boniments électoraux!" G.H.
27. *La Victoire*, #7042, February 14, 1936, "Celui qui se sert de l'épée …," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7043, February 15, 1936, "Qui a vu clair ?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7044, February 16, 1936, "Devant la vague rouge," G.H.
28. *La Victoire*, #7045, February 17, 1936, "Inquiétudes," G.H.
29. *La Victoire*, #7073, March 16, 1936, "Sous la cravache," G.H.
30. *La Victoire*, #7079, March 22, 1936, "Ecoute, bon électeur !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7080, March 23, 1936, "Sur la voie de la revanche," G.H.
31. *La Victoire*, #7102, April 14, 1936, "A ceux du Front 'populaire'," G.H.
32. Fortescue, op.cit., 188–191. He cited a radio broadcast by Maurice Thorez on April 17, 1936 and L. Bodin and J. Touchard, *Front Populaire, 1936*, (Paris: Colin, 1961), 52–53; *La Victoire*, #7106, April 18, 1936, "Nos communistes, évoluent-ils? G.H.
33. *La Victoire*, #7094, April 6, 1936, "Votez National," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7108, April 20, 1936, "Quand on sème la haine," G.H.
34. *La Victoire*, #7146, May 28, 1936, "Le chambardement commence," G.H.
35. *La Victoire*, #7095, April 7, 1936, "Réponse au communiste Thorez," G.H.
36. *La Victoire*, #7107, April 19, 1936, "L'exemple de l'Espagne," G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #7112, April 24, 1936, "Contre le Front 'populaire'," G.H.
38. *La Victoire*, #7110, April 22, 1936, "Vers un ministère Blum," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7112, April 24, 1936, "Contre le Front 'populaire'," G.H.
39. *La Victoire*, #7113, April 25, 1936, "C'est l'heure de voter national," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #7114, April 26, 1936, "Vous êtes aveugle, Monsieur Sarraut !" G.H.
41. *La Victoire*, #7115, April 27, 1936, "Gare au deuxième tour," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7116, April 28, 1936, "Mauvaises élections," G.H.
42. *La Victoire*, #7117, April 29, 1936, "Le combat n'est pas fini," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7123, May 5, 1936, "… Mais ne nous frappons pas!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7124, May 6, 1936, "Avertissements aux nationaux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7126, May 8, 1936, "Quand la panique commence," G.H.
43. *La Victoire*, #7128, May 10, 1936, "La fête de Jeanne d'Arc," G.H.
44. *La Victoire*, #7132, May 14, 1936, "Le Pape et les communistes," G.H.
45. *La Victoire*, #7137, May 19, 1936, "L'aventure Blum," G.H.
46. *La Victoire*, #7155, June 11, 1936, "La triste nuit du 7 juin," G.H.
47. *La Victoire*, #7157, June 13, 1936, "En pleine anarchie," G.H.
48. *La Victoire*, #7207, October 2, 1936, "Qu'il s'en aille!" G.H.
49. *La Victoire*, #7138, May 20, 1936, "Ce pauvre président Le Brun !" G.H.
50. *La Victoire*, #7140, May 22, 1936, "Optimisme difficile," G.H.
51. *La Victoire*, #7141, May 23, 1936, "Devant le mur des réalités," G.H.
52. *La Victoire*, #7211, October 6, 1936, "La France—Maçonnerie manœuvre," G.H.
53. *La Victoire*, #7142, May 24, 1936, "Pour qu'on ne renvoi plus ça !" G.H.
54. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 75.
55. Sowerwine, op.cit., 143–145.
56. *La Victoire*, #7146, May 28, 1936, "Le chambardement commence," G.H.
57. *La Victoire*, #7148, May 30, 1936, "La dictature du prolétariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7149, May 31, 1936, "Pentecôte révolutionnaire," G.H.
58. Sowerwine, op.cit., 145; Shorter and Tilly, op.cit., 362, 344–5.
59. Kalman, op.cit., 95.
60. Sowerwine, op.cit., 144–146. He cites Simone Weil, *La Condition ouvrière*, (Paris: 1972), 219–237 and Alexander Werth, *The Destiny of France*, (London: 1937), 305.
61. Ibid., 146–147.

62. *La Victoire*, #7148, May 30, 1936, "La dictature du prolétariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7149, May 31, 1936, "Pentecôte révolutionnaire," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7150, June 1, 1936, "Les illusions de Blum," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7151, June 2, 1936, "La Chambre rouge," G.H.
63. *La Victoire*, #7152, June 3, 1936, "Questions aux ouvriers," G.H.
64. *La Victoire*, #7153, June 4, 1936, "Les freins ne fonctionnent plus," G.H.
65. *La Victoire*, #7154, June 10, 1936, "Journées révolutionnaires," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7155, June 11, 1936, "La triste nuit du 7 juin," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7169, June 25, 1936, "A bas les grèves politiques," G.H.
66. *La Victoire*, #7156, June 12, 1936, "Comment briser la vague rouge?" G.H.
67. Orlow, op.cit., 65–66; *Samuel Osgood, "The Front Populaire: Views from the Right," International Review of Social History, 9* (*1964*): *189* and *194*.
68. Agulhon, op.cit., 227–28.
69. Sowerwine, op.cit., 148–151.
70. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 76.
71. Fortescue, op.cit., 191–193. He cites L.T. Mowrer, *Journalist's Wife*, (London: William Heinemann, 1938), 314–317, 339.
72. Sowerwine, op.cit., 148–151.
73. Ibid.
74. *La Victoire*, #7193, July 19, 1936, "Cette pauvre Espagne!" G.H.
75. *La Victoire*, #7195, July 23, 1936, "A bas la guerre civile," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7196, July 24, 1936, "Qui a commencé en Espagne?" G.H.
76. *L'Humanité*, July 23, 1936, "Lu Dans La Presse: Les fascistes français au secours des fascistes espagnols."
77. *La Victoire*, #7202, July 29, 1936, "Non ! Pas fascistes !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7204, July 30, 1936, "Notre Parti Socialiste National," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7205, July 31, 1936, "En nous mettent en vieillesse," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 54. Much as Hervé claimed to have wanted a coalition of nationalist parties, he could not combine with leaders like La Rocque and Doriot because of the former's vagueness and the latter's biased hatreds as a renegade Communist. Maurras and *L'Action Française* remained too out of touch with reality to be a viable alternative. Hervé's vision for France assumed that men of the Left and extreme Left would eventually see the errors of their ways and join a national socialist crusade to save the nation. The foreign policy of the P.S.N. also supported the alliance with the Soviet Union, but did not yet exclude some sort of reconciliation with Nazi Germany. For Hervé only someone like Pétain could hope to rally all Frenchmen.
78. *La Victoire*, #7208, October 3, 1936, "Courage ! On 'les' aura!" G.H.
79. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 273.
80. *La Victoire*, #7255, October 14, 1936, "Ce pauvre Salengro !" G.H. Salengro's suicide came after his exoneration in the Chamber.
81. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 273. We should recall Philip Seymour's photo of the P.S.N. poster in the May 1935 municipal elections which implies that the P.S.N. had not been completely dormant in 1935.
82. *La Victoire*, #7154, June 10, 1936, "Journées révolutionnaires," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7147, May 29, 1936, "L'anarchie spontanée," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7148, May 30, 1936, "La dictature du prolétariat," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7164, June 20, 1936, "Dans la voie des coups d'état," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7180, July 6, 1936, "Contre les mouvements du rue," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7203, July 29, 1936, "Non! Pas fascistes," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 54.
83. *La Victoire*, #7158, June 14, 1936, "Devant cette débâcle," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7159, June 15, 1936, "Discours aux grévistes," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7160, June 16, 1936, "Vous faudra-t-il une autre vague?" G.H.
84. *La Victoire*, #7163, June 19, 1936, "Par ici, Colonel de la Rocque !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7167, June 23, 1936, "Lettre aux élites françaises," G.H.

85. *La Victoire*, #7195, July 21, 1936, "Démission ! Démission !" G.H.
86. *La Victoire*, #7171, June 27, 1936, "Tant que Blum sera là ...," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7177, July 4, 1936, "Un seul parti national," G.H.
87. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 79–80.
88. Michel Winock, "Retour sur le fascisme française: La Rocque et les Croix-de-Feu," *Vingtième siècle*, Vol. 90, (avril-juin 2006), 2, 3–27, 23; Serge Berstein, *Histoire du parti radical*, (Paris: Presses de Science Po., 1982), Vol. II, 486.
89. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 78–80; Knegt, op.cit., 117–118; *La Victoire*, #7502, November 19, 1937, "Les Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7503, November 20, 1937, "Défense des Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7504, November 21–22, 1937; *La Victoire*, #7505, November 23, 1937, "Sans Cagoule," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7507, November 25, 1937, "L'exemple des Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7547, January 11, 1938, "Une histoire des brigands," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7548, January 12, 1938, "Le coup de théâtre policier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7546, January 9–10, 1938.
90. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 78–80; William Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 98–158. "The *Parti Social Français* [of La Rocque] greatly benefitted from this malaise incited by the *ouvièrisme* of the Popular Front." Winock, "Retour sur le fascisme française: ..." op.cit., 23; See Berstein, *Histoire du parti radical*, op.cit., Vol. II, 486.
91. Agulhon, op.cit., 229–231; Sowerwine, op.cit., 152–154. The suicide of Minister of the Interior Roger Salengro on November 18, 1936 at his home in Lille after he was accused of desertion during World War I, did nothing to raise governmental spirits.
92. Sowerwine, op.cit., 152–3; *La Victoire*, #7367, March 18, 1937, "La tempête a déjà repris," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7368, March 19, 1937, "La petite terreur rouge," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7369, March 20, 1937, "Les vraies responsables," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7371, March 23, 1937, "Vers la guerre civile," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, March 17, 1937, "Complot Contre Le Peuple !" and "Désarmement ! Dissolution des ligues fascistes !" P. Vaillant-Couturier. The Communist newspaper blamed the "fascist leagues" led by the likes of La Rocque and Doriot who had somehow managed to get the Popular Front police to launch a fusillade against the counter-demonstration of the unarmed workers.
93. Sowerwine, op.cit., 152–154; Agulhon, op.cit., 234–235.
94. Ibid.
95. *La Victoire*, #7219, October 14, 1936, "Ah ! Si les radicaux voulaient !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7227, October 22, 1936, "Questions au congrès radical," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7228, October 23, 1936, "Ceux de Biarritz," G.H.
96. Agulhon, op.cit., 246–247.
97. Sowerwine, op.cit., 152–154; Agulhon, op.cit., 234.
98. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 75–76.
99. Joel Colton, *Léon Blum: Humanist in politics*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 285.
100. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 79–80.
101. *La Victoire*, #7039, February 11, 1936, "Vive l'alliance russe," G.H.
102. *La Victoire*, #7360, March 10, 1937, "Blum est sauvé, pas la France," G.H.
103. Ibid.
104. *La Victoire*, #7384, April 7, 1937, "Les poursuites contre La Rocque," G.H.
105. *La Victoire*, #7241, November 5, 1936, "La victoire de Roosevelt," G.H.
106. *La Victoire*, #7367, March 18, 1937, "La tempête a déjà repris," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7368, March 19, 1937, "La petite terreur rouge," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7369, March 20, 1937, "Les vraies responsables," G.H. *La Victoire*, #7371, March 23, 1937, "Vers la guerre civile," G.H.
107. *La Victoire*, #7228, October 23, 1936, "Ceux de Biarritz," G.H.

108. *La Victoire*, #7320, January 23, 1937, "Le marasme des partis nationaux," G.H.
109. *La Victoire*, #7321, January 24, 1937, "Question mal posée," G.H.
110. *La Victoire*, #7286, December 20, 1936, "La course à l'abîme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7294, December 28, 1936, "Le Sénat accroît la pagaille," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7295, December 29, 1936, "Aucun esprit de boutique," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7296, December 30, 1936, "Tenir … comme à Verdun !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7297, December 31, 1936, "Bilan 1936," G.H.
111. *La Victoire*, #7360, March 10, 1937, "Blum est sauvé, pas le France," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7569, February 5, 1938, "Le dernier obstacle," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7683, June 19–20, 1938, "Aucune confiance en Daladier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7690, June 28, 1938, "Lettre familière à Thorez," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7745, November 23, 1938, "Nouvelle lettre à Thorez," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7750, November 29, 1938, "Tous derrière Daladier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7769, December 22, 1938, "Le réveil nationaliste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7774, December 28, 1938, "Dans une meilleure voie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7775, December 29, 1938, "L'unique danger: Hitler!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7783, January 7, 1939, "Et maintenant, l'union sacrée," G.H.
112. Frederick Brown, *The Embrace of Unreason: France, 1914–1940*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 45. Brown cited Gustave Le Bon, *La Psychologie des Foules*, (Paris: Alcan, 1895), 63.
113. *La Victoire*, #6828, April 21, 1935, "Pâques 1935," G.H.
114. *La Victoire*, #6936, October 31, 1935, "Propos de Toussaint," G.H.
115. *La Victoire*, #6983, December 17, 1935, "La troisième aux communistes," G.H.; *L'Humanité*, December 16, 1935, "Lu Dans La Presse: Le fascisme au service de la finance."
116. Kalman, op.cit., 146. Kalman cited John Hellman, *The Knights-Monks of Vichy France*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1993), 7–9.
117. *La Victoire*, #7100, April 12, 1936, "Pâques 1936," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7139, May 21, 1936, "Mon retour à la foi," G.H.
118. *La Victoire*, #7089, April 1, 1936, "L'Ascension 1936," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7376, March 28–29, 1937, "Pâques 1937," G.H.
119. *La Victoire*, #7139, May 21, 1936, "Mon retour à la foi," G.H.
120. Ibid.
121. *La Victoire*, #7237, November 1, 1936, "La Toussaint 1936," G.H.
122. *La Victoire*, #7376, March 28–29, 1937, "Pâques 1937," G.H.
123. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 261.

Chapter 30

1. *La Victoire*, #2338, May 29, 1922, "Pour une vraie paix franco-allemande," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3544, September 16, 1925, "Après les palabres de Genève," G.H.
2. *La Victoire*, #2370, June 30, 1922, "Les deux Allemagnes," G.H.
3. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 287.
4. *La Victoire*, #2490, October 28, 1922, "Les Fascistes," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2494, November 1, 1922, "La Leçon du Fascisme," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 287–288.
5. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 287–288.
6. Gilles Heuré, "Gustave Hervé, le tournant d'avant-guerre," *Mil Neuf Cent. Revue D'Histoire Intellectuelle*, 2001/1 (no. 19). 90, 85–95.
7. *La Victoire*, #3093, June 22, 1924, "L'Épreuve du Fascisme," G.H.
8. *La Victoire*, #3261, December 7, 1924, "Vers le Fascisme," G.H.

9. *La Victoire*, #3281, December 27, 1924, "Éloge du Fascisme," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 288.
10. Pierre Milza, *L'Italie Fasciste devant l'opinion française, 1920–1940*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), 39–40, 70–71, 90–161; *La Victoire*, #2496, November 3, 1922, "L'amitié Franco-italienne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2803, "Rien au tragique," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3093, June 22, 1924, "L'épreuve du fascisme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3281, December 27, 1924, "Éloge du fascisme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #3602, November 13, 1925, "Bolchevisme ou fascisme?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #4724, December 10, 1928, "Le triomphe de Mussolini," G.H.
11. *La Victoire*, #3979, November 26, 1926; *La Victoire*, #4471, April 1, 1928, "Mussolini et l'Église," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5627, June 2, 1931, "Pianissimo !" G.H.
12. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 289.
13. *La Victoire*, #3281, December 27, 1924, "Éloge du Fascisme," G.H.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 288–289.
14. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 289.
15. *La Victoire*, #6907, October 2, 1935, "Qu'est-ce que nous ferions, si ... ?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, October 7, 1935, #6912, "Plutôt liquider la S.D.N!" G.H.
16. *La Victoire*, #6578, May 27, 1934, "L'amitié franco-italienne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6599, June 17, 1934, "Les deux dictateurs," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6600, June 18, 1934, "Les yeux qui s'entr'ouvrent," G.H.
17. *La Victoire*, #7653, May 15–16, 1938, "Bravo, Mussolini !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6599, June 17, 1934, "Les deux dictateurs," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6600, June 18, 1934, "Les yeux qui s'entr'ouvrent," G.H; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 289–290.
18. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 290; *La Victoire*, #2314, May 5, 1922, "La démolition de l'Europe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2317, May 8, 1922, "L'agonie de la conférence," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2329, May 20, 1922, "Le désastre de Gênes," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2335, May 26, 1922, "Un rapprochement franco-allemand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2337, May 28, 1922, "Pour un rapprochement franco-allemand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2338, May 29, 1922, "Pour un vraie paix franco-allemand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2340, May 30, 1922, "Objections françaises," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2341, May 31, 1922, "Autres objections françaises," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #2365, June 25, 1922, "La république allemand en danger," G.H. In reading his editorials in May and June 1922 from the time of the Genoa Conference until the assassination of Walter Rathenau, one gets an idea on how the mercurial Hervé could go full circle several times on an issue like Franco-German relations.
19. *La Victoire*, #2839, October 12, 1923, "Stresemann ou le Thiers allemand," G.H.
20. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 290–291; *La Victoire*, #2868, November 10, 1923, "La république allemand est sauvé," G.H.
21. Ibid., 291. That idea cost him half his readers according to an editorial on October 2, 1938. The disapproval of the Ruhr occupation and the promotion of a Franco-German reconciliation, were, according to Raymond Aron, Left-wing ideas—not quite what Hervé's readers might have expected.
22. Ibid., 292; Ernst Hanfstaengl, *Hitler des années obscures*, (Paris : J'ai Lu, 1972).
23. Ibid.; *La Victoire*, #4586, July 25, 1928, "La politique de réconciliation," G.H.
24. *La Victoire*, #7700, October 2, 1938 "France-Allemagne," G.H.
25. *La Victoire*, #4747, January 2, 1929 "Autre Souhait,"; G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5438, November 24, 1930, "A dix-huit mois des elections," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5468, December 24, 1930, "Notre Parti Socialiste National," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5688, August 1, 1931, "En partant en vacances," G.H.
26. *La Victoire*, #5407, October 24, 1930, "Croix de Feu et Croix de Fer," G.H.
27. Pascal Ory, *Les Collaborateurs, 1940–1945*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976), 12.
28. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ...*, op.cit., 292.
29. *La Victoire*, #5286, June 25, 1930, "L'arbre malade," G.H.

30. *La Victoire*, #5297, July 6, 1930, "La terreur en Rhénanie," G.H. Pan-Germans assailed Rhenish separatists, threw rotten apples at the departing French troops, and threatened German women who had been friendly with the French occupiers.
31. *La Victoire*, #5309, July 18, 1930, "Vers le retour des Hohenzollern," G.H.
32. *La Victoire*, #5286, June 25, 1930, "L'arbre malade," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5293, July 2, 1930, "Ce qui nous attend après," G.H.
33. *La Victoire*, #5272, June 11, 1930, "Pour l'alliance franco-allemande," Arnold Rechberg.
34. *La Victoire*, #5388, October 5, 1930, "Leurs *Casque d'Acier*," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5410, October 27, 1930, "La réponse du '*Casque d'Acier*,'" G.H.
35. *La Victoire*, #5413, October 30, 1930, "Ils vont dire que nous avons peur?" G.H.
36. *La Victoire*, #5414, October 31, 1930, "Nous trahirons les Tchécoslovaques?" G.H.
37. *La Victoire*, #5369, September 16, 1930, "Ils veulent 'remettre ça'!" G.H.
38. *La Victoire*, #5370, September 17, 1930, "L'exemple d'Hitler," G.H.
39. *La Victoire*, #5371, September 18, 1930, "À la française," G.H.
40. *La Victoire*, #5369, September 16, 1930, "Ils veulent remettre ça," G.H.
41. *La Victoire*, #5370, September 17, 1930, "L'exemple d'Hitler," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5410, October 27, 1930, "La réponse du *Casque d'Acier*," G.H.
42. *La Victoire*, #5371, September 18, 1930, "À la française," G.H.
43. Ernst Hanfstaengl, *Hitler: The Memoir of a Nazi Insider Who Turned against the Führer*, translation and Introduction by John Willard Toland, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011 [1957, 1994]), 156.
44. *La Victoire*, #5404, October 21, 1930, "Qu'en pense Hitler?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5409, October 26, 1930, "Ce que me répond Hitler," G.H.; Gustave Hervé, *France-Allemagne* …, op.cit., 117–129.
45. Heuré, *Gustave Hervé: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 292–293.
46. *La Victoire*, #5808, November 29, 1931, "Entre nationalistes," G.H.
47. *La Victoire*, #5402, October 19, 1930, "Tristesse et inquiétude," G.H.
48. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* …, op.cit., 294; *La Victoire*, #5403, October 20, 1930, "Qu'en pensent les Casques d'Acier ?" G.H.
49. *La Victoire*, #5403, October 20, 1930, "Qu'en pensent les Casques d'Acier ?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5404, October 21, 1930, "Qu'en pense Hitler?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5760, October 12, 1931, "Le boulangisme allemand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5766, October 18, 1931, "Qui faisons le point?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5426, November 12, 1930, "Entre nationalistes des deux pays," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5796, November 17, 1931, "Et le flot hitlérien montait," G.H.
50. *La Victoire*, #5796, November 17, 1931, "Et le flot hitlérien montait," G.H.
51. Gustave Hervé, *France-Allemagne: La réconciliation ou la guerre*, (Paris: Éditions de *La Victoire*, 1931). In 1931 Rechberg translated Hervé's *Franco-Allemagne* … into German under the title *Versöhnung oder Krieg*, (Berlin: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1931). A German-French Association, promoted by Germans under the Weimar Republic, already existed in Paris when Hitler came to power but it was too pro-Weimar for the Nazis to be able to take advantage of it. A more manageable group (*Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft*) was created in Germany by the Nazis and soon a French equivalent (*Comité France-Allemagne*) was created in November 1935. On the 22nd of that month the French-German Committee met at the salons of George V and its honorary committee included celebrities such as Pierre Benoît, Jules Romains, Florent Schmitt, and Henri Lichtenberger (no relation to André Lichtenberger), while its executive committee included veterans Commandant L'Hôpital, the former aide de camp of Foch, Georges Scapini, Jean Goy, and Henri Pichot as well as the journalist Fernand de Brinon and Professor Ernest Forneau of the Pasteur Institute. The German Otto Abetz argued after the war that the *Comité France-Allemagne* did little more than arrange receptions for German guests. Ory, op.cit., 12–19; Orlow, op.cit., 74–75.

52. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 294–295.
53. Orlow, op.cit., 71. American Ambassador Bullitt reported that from May to November 1938 Germany spent 350 million [francs?] to influence the French press, but there is no evidence that any of that money reached *La Victoire. Le Matin* did obtain German funds and it was allowed to publish along with *La Victoire*, however briefly, after the fall of France. Ory, op.cit., 17.
54. *La Victoire*, #5683, July 27, 1931, "Leur seule planche de salut," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5769, October 21, 1931, "Le boulangisme allemand," G.H.
55. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 295; *La Victoire*, #5760, October 12, 1931, "Le boulangisme allemand," G.H.
56. Ibid., 296–297.
57. *La Victoire*, #5942, April 11, 1932, "Oui, mais l'avenir est à Hitler," G.H.
58. *La Victoire*, #5851, January 11, 1932, "Heures graves," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5946, April 15, 1932, "La République Autoritaire à Berlin," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6092, November 8, 1932, "Le redressement allemand compromis," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #5942, April 11, 1932, "Oui, mais l'avenir est à Hitler," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 69–70.
59. Grünblatt, op.cit., 69.
60. *La Victoire*, #6176, January 31, 1933, "Heureuse Allemagne," G.H.
61. *La Victoire*, #6179, February 3, 1933, "En attendant le Kaiser," G.H.
62. *La Victoire*, #6218, March 14, 1933, "Hitler chancelier," G.H.
63. *La Victoire*, #6235, March 31, 1933, "Casse-cou! Chancelier Hitler!" G.H.
64. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur* ..., op.cit., 296–297; *La Victoire*, #6240, April 5, 1933, "Malgré l'antisémitisme d'Hitler," G.H. and "Deux poids, deux mesures," Marcel Bucard; *La Victoire*, #6245, April 10, 1933, "La révolution allemand," G.H. For Marcel Bucard Nazi anti-Semitism was no more deplorable than France's treatment of Catholics.
65. Gustave Hervé, *Une voix de France*, (Paris: Éditions Batschari, 1934); Gustave Hervé, *Eine Stimme aus Frankreich*, translated by Hans K.E.L. Keller, (Paris: Verlag Dr. E. Batschari, 1934). Even though he was skeptical about the League of Nations, Hervé was not the only Frenchman in these years to contemplate a united federal Europe as a means to peace. Anglophobe journalist and future collaborationist Jean Luchaire epitomized one strain of French opinion that sought peace through many channels, including the League of Nations, European unity, and the policies of Aristide Briand. Blaming Britain for French problems was never a major theme at *La Victoire*. The patriotism of Hervé precluded the blatant collaborationism of someone like Luchaire, who was friendly with Pierre Laval and Otto Abetz, became involved with Abetz's *Comité France-Allemagne* after 1940, created the collaborationist *Corporation Nationale de la Presse Française* in June 1941, and directed the *Office des Papiers de Presse*, which controlled the distribution of French newspapers. Fortescue, op.cit., 243–246; Jean Luchaire, *Les Anglais et nous: l'action britannique contre la France jusqu'au 13 décembre 1940*, (Paris: Éditions du Livre Moderne, 1941).
66. Hervé, *Une voix de France*, ..., op.cit., 8–11.
67. Ibid., 13–17; *La Victoire*, #6294, May 29, 1933, "La Russie patriote et la France," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6338, July 12, 1933, "France et Russie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6356, October 16, 1933, "Hitler nous tend la main," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6358, October 18, 1933, "Il faut causer avec Hitler," G.H.; Grünblatt, op.cit., 70–71.
68. Ibid., 17–43; *La Victoire*, #6381, November 10, 1933, À La réconciliation ou la guerre," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6384, November 13, 1933, "L'Allemagne une et indivisible," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6418, December 17, 1933, "Le double jeu allemand," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6419, December 18, 1933, "Ce qu'on n'a pas dit à M. Beneš," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6429, December 28, 1933, "Dans une impasse," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6457, January 25, 1934, "Non! Chers amis anglais!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6464, February 1, 1934, "Le vrai visage d'Hitler," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7330, February 3, 1937, "Tous pour la défense nationale," G.H.
69. Heure, GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur ..., op.cit., 297.

70. *La Victoire*, #6776, February 28, 1935, "Pétain réclame 'les deux ans'," G.H.
71. *La Victoire*, #6610, June 28, 1934, "Le retour de M. Barthou," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6624, July 24, 1934, "Le retour de Londres," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6681, November 25, 1934, "L'entente franco-russe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6840, May 3, 1935, "Casse-cou, Hitler!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6841, May 4, 1935, "La nouvelle alliance russe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6859, May 22, 1935, "Staline, socialiste nationale," G.H.
72. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 297; *La Victoire*, #6841, May 4, 1935, "La Nouvelle alliance russe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6842, May 5, 1935, "Et le pacte franco-allemand ?" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7062, March 5, 1936, "Le pacte franco-russe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7316, January 19, 1937, "L'alliance avec le diable? Oui !" G.H.
73. *La Victoire du Dimanche*, #509, August 4, 1935, "Vers la guerre d'Ethiopie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6908, October 3, 1935, "Vive l'Italie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6912, October 7, 1935, "Plutôt liquider la S.D.N.!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6993, December 27, 1935, "Le ministère en danger," G.H.
74. *La Victoire*, #6966, November 30, 1935, "Autre raison de garder Laval," G.H.
75. *La Victoire*, #6914, October 9, 1935, "Pour notre sœur l'Italie," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6917, October 12, 1935, "Dans l'engrenage genevois," G.H.
76. *La Victoire*, #6921, October 16, 1935, "Un avertissement anglais," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6923, October 18, 1935, "Le tragique imbroglio," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6924, October 19, 1935, "La réponse de l'Amirauté," G.H.
77. *La Victoire*, #6822, April 15, 1935, "La Saint-Alliance des peuples," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #6825, April 18, 1935, "L'Europe inquiète," G.H.
78. Grünblatt, op.cit., 72.
79. *La Victoire*, #6938, November 2, 1935, "En face de l'Allemagne," G.H.
80. Agulhon, op.cit., 223–224.
81. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 89–90.
82. *La Victoire*, #7058, March 1, 1936, "Au pied du mur," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7059, March 2, 1936, "La splendide occasion," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7061, March 4, 1936, "Comment causer avec Hitler," G.H.
83. Orlow, op.cit., 82–83.
84. Sowerwine, op.cit., 167.
85. *La Victoire*, #7038, February 10, 1936, "Pour le pacte franco-russe," G.H.
86. *La Victoire*, #7041, February 13, 1936, "Pauvre Russe soviétique!" G.H.
87. *La Victoire*, #7057, February 29, 1936, "Lettre à Adolf Hitler," G.H.
88. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 297.
89. *La Victoire*, #7058, March 1, 1936, "Au pied du mur," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7059, March 2, 1936, "La splendide occasion," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7066, March 4, 1936, "Comment causer avec Hitler," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7328, January 31–February 1, 1937, "Si Hitler disait vrai," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7329, February 2, 1937, "Rendons-leur colonies!" G.H.
90. *La Victoire*, #7065, March 8, 1936, "C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7066, March 9, 1936, "Adieu, Hitler!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7067, March 10, 1936, "Réjouissantes perspectives," G.H.
91. *La Victoire*, #7068, March 11, 1936, "Les sanctions," G.H.
92. *La Victoire*, #7071, March 14, 1936, "L'évacuation ou le blocus," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7072, March 15, 1936, "Des sanctions ! Des sanctions !" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7073, March 16, 1936, "Sous la cravache," G.H.
93. *La Victoire*, #7069, March 12, 1936, "L'honneur de l'Angleterre," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7070, March 13, 1936, "Cela commence bien," G.H.
94. *La Victoire*, #7074, March 17, 1936, "Le réveil de l'union sacrée," G.H.
95. *La Victoire*, #7076, March 19, 1936, "Jours d'amertume," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7077, March 20, 1936, "Une victoire pour Hitler," G.H.

96. *La Victoire*, #7078, March 21, 1936, "La garantie britannique?" G.H.
97. *La Victoire*, #7098, April 10, 1936, "L'écroulement d'un beau rêve," G.H.
98. *La Victoire*, #7103, April 15, 1936, "La pagaille européenne," G.H.
99. *La Victoire*, #7105, April 17, 1936, "Les boniments des radicaux," G.H.
100. Sowerwine, op.cit., 148–151.
101. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 89.
102. *La Victoire*, #7145, May 27, 1936, "L'étoile rouge," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7234, October 29, 1936, "Réconciliation quand même!," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7253, November 17, 1936, "Casse-cou, les Russes!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7303, January 6, 1937, "Avec l'Espagne nationaliste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7304, January 7, 1937, "Les plus gros danger des deux," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7312, January 15, 1937, "Le jeu dangereux de Moscou," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7316, January 19, 1937, "L'alliance avec le diable? Oui," G.H.
103. *La Victoire*, #7303, January 6, 1937, "Avec l'Espagne nationaliste," G.H.
104. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur …*, op.cit., 299; *La Victoire*, #7374, March 26, 1937, "Cette pauvre Europe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7303, January 6, 1937, "Avec l'Espagne nationaliste," G.H.
105. Agulhon, op.cit., 240.
106. *La Victoire*, #7262, November 26, 1936, "Le bombe japonais," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7263, November 27, 1936, "Le danger de guerre diminue," G.H.
107. *L'Humanité*, November 27, 1936, "Lu Dans La Presse: Aux côtés de Hitler."
108. *La Victoire*, #7325, January 28, 1937, "La tragédie de Moscou," G.H.
109. Agulhon, op.cit., 245.
110. *La Victoire*, #7104, April 16, 1936, "En écoutant Sarraut," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7309, January 12, 1937, "Gare aux fausses nouvelles," G.H.
111. *La Victoire*, #7223, October 18, 1936, "La méthode de Ponce-Pilate," G.H.
112. *La Victoire*, #7303, January 12, 1937, "Gare aux fausses nouvelles," G.H.
113. Ory, op.cit., 21. The end of the Popular Front did not seem to affect Herve's foreign policy perspectives, but it did have an impact on the P.S.F. of Colonel de La Rocque, which, unlike much of the Right, "gradually adopted a tougher line, stressing the need to stand up to Germany, though it continued to hope that war could be avoided." Sean Kennedy, "Defending Christian Civilization: The Evolving Message of the Parti social français, 1936–1939," 189, 180–194. In Kalman and Kennedy, eds., *The French Right Between the Wars*, op.cit.
114. *La Victoire*, #7234, October 29, 1936, "Réconciliation quand même!" G.H.
115. *La Victoire*, #7252, November 16, 1936, "Le traité qui s'écroule," G.H.
116. *La Victoire*, #7382, April 4–5, 1937, "La France et la Petite Entente," G.H.
117. *La Victoire*, #7348, February 24, 1937, "L'Anschluss inévitable," G.H.
118. *La Victoire*, #7308, January 11, 1937, "France et Allemagne en 1937," G.H.
119. *La Victoire*, #7180, July 6, 1936, "Toujours Dantzig!" G.H.
120. Just before the March 11, 1938 *Anschluss*, Chautemps resigned when he failed to get Communist and Socialist support for his austerity program. That resignation was then blamed on the Prime Minister's reluctance to get involved with the foreign crisis. France had no government in place the day the Germans marched into Austria. Blum could not put together a national union ministry in time to deal with the *Anschluss* because key people on the Right, who were appeasers, opposed Blum until it was too late to act. Blum's Ministry was in place by March 13 but Hitler entered Vienna in triumph four days later. This ministry appeared to be a renewed Popular Front, but when the Senate blocked Blum's ambitious economic plan on April 8, Blum resigned. A new ministry headed by Édouard Daladier was made up of Radicals almost exclusively, and that meant that the Popular Front was virtually dead. Sowerwine, op.cit., 169–170.
121. *La Victoire*, #7248, May 29, 1937, "France-Allemagne," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7602, March 16, 1938, "Il n'y a plus d'Autriche," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7634, April 22, 1938, "La poudrière

tchécoslovaque," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7635, April 23, 1938, "Lâcher les Tchèques? Gare!" G.H.; *La Victoire du Dimanche*, #665, July 31, 1938, "Vers la paix avec Hitler," G.H.

122. *La Victoire*, #7699, October 1, 1938, "Voila un beau jour!" G.H. and "'Peace is saved' Vive la paix !" G.H.
123. *La Victoire*, #7718, October 22, 1938, "Après Munich faisons le point," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7729, November 4, 1938, "Après le désastre de Munich," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7841, March 16, 1939, "L'assassinat d'une nation," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7856, April 2–3, 1939, "Plus d'illusion sur Hitler," G.H.; Agulhon, op.cit. 249–250. When the forty hour week was shelved in November 1938 in the interests of the economy and national defense under the impulse of Daladier's new Finance Minister, Paul Reynaud, a C.G.T. 24 hour general strike failed on November 30 and workers were dismissed. Why the failure? Had workers bought into the arguments about the international crisis? Were they disenchanted by the dissention among the political forces that supposedly championed them? Or were they disheartened by the end of the Popular Front era of euphoria?
124. Ory, op.cit., 20.
125. Sowerwine, op.cit., 172–173. The shock of Munich meant the death of the Popular Front since the P.C.F. voted against Munich which the Radicals interpreted as a vote against peace and against the government. When Daladier named Paul Reynaud Minister of Finance a few weeks after Munich, the new minister presented a pro-business program which rejected much of the Popular Front reforms. Forceful government reaction led to an overall failure of the general strike supported by the C.G.T., S.F.I.O., and P.C.F.
126. *La Victoire*, #7874, April 23–24, 1939, "Plus vite, l'alliance russe!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7876, April 26, 1939, "Amadouer Hitler!!!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7880, April 30–May 1, 1939, "Aucune confiance en Hitler!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7900, May 24, 1939, "La trahison de l'Italie," G.H.
127. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 92.

Chapter 31

1. Kennedy, "Defending Christian Civilization.", op.cit., 190. In Kalman and Kennedy, eds., *The French Right Between the Warst.*
2. *La Victoire du Dimanche*, #718, August 6, 1939, "Pourquoi l'alliance russe est certain," G.H.; *La Victoire du Dimanche*, #721, August 27, 1939, "Les russes se sont dégonflés!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7953, September 15, 1939, "Le remaniement ministériel," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7973, October 5, 1939, "L'appel à la lâcheté," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8023, December 1, 1939, "Revoir le parlement de 1914," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8036, December 16, 1939, "Peur des nos communistes? Oh!" G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8057, January 10, 1940, "Une faute à ne pas commettre," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8060, January 13, 1940; *La Victoire*, #8094, February 22, 1940; *La Victoire*, #8095, February 23, 1940, "La trahison communiste," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8118, March 21, 1940, "Une crise stupide," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8128, April 2, 1940, "Cela va mieux du côté russe," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8129, April 3, 1940, "Que les antirusse se taisent!" G.H. Twenty-one Communist deputies out of seventy three left the party in protest as did many Communist intellectuals upset by Moscow's new line about the war being imperialistic. The government banned the party before its altered stance became public, so the P.C.F. could later more easily forget this inglorious past and vilify those who left the party. Sowerwine, op.cit., 176.
3. Agulhon, op.cit., 254.
4. *La Victoire*, #8118, March 21, 1940, "Une crise stupide," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #8192, June 18, 1940, "Oui Pétain, Il est bien temps!" and "C'est Pétain qu'il nous fallait!" G.H. On March 19, 1940 Daladier lost a vote of confidence, and he resigned, but the new Prime Minister,

Paul Reynaud, could not create a government of National Union because he had little standing, the Left hated him for destroying Popular Front reforms, and the Right would not join a ministry which included Blum. Reynaud brought Charles de Gaulle into the government on June 5 as Under-Secretary of State for National Defense, and sent him to London on June 9 to discuss continuing the war from the south and from overseas. When de Gaulle got back to Bordeaux on June 16, he faced inertia and defeatism. Reynaud resigned that same day and was immediately replaced by the 84 year old Pétain, who quickly proposed an armistice. By June 17 de Gaulle was in the air to London. Historians now agree that the incapacity of the French High Command led to the defeat since "the French and British together outnumbered and outgunned the Germans in every area except tanks," and that difference was minimal. On July 10, 1940, with the government installed at Vichy, "the deputies and senators together, sitting as a National Assembly (as they did for the election of presidents)" revised the constitution and "voted 'full powers to the government of the Republic under the authority and signature of Marshal Pétain," thus creating a veritable new Constitution which … "must guarantee the rights of work, family and fatherland. It will be ratified by the nation and by the Assemblies that it creates." Nearly complete authority was thus given to Pétain by an assembly elected in 1936 at the commencement of the Popular Front. That was the third time in the Third Republic's history that French citizens voted one way while its deputies voted another. Sowerwine, op.cit., 176–181.

5. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 315.
6. *La Victoire*, #7944, September 6, 1939, "Dans les caves de Paris," G.H.
7. *La Victoire*, #8101, March 1, 1940, "L'Italie inquiétante?" G.H.
8. *La Victoire*, #8178, May 30, 1940, "La fraternité franco-belge," G.H.
9. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 316; *La Victoire*, #8182, June 4, 1940, "Avant la bataille de France," G.H.; "La mort d'Émile Tissier," G.H.
10. Ibid., 316.
11. Jean Quéval, *Première Page, Cinquième Colonne*, (Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1945), 12.
12. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 316.
13. Quéval, op.cit., 12–15.
14. Ibid., 14–16.
15. *La Victoire*, #8189, June 12, 1940, "Pourquoi nous restons à Paris," G.H. The date on this paper and the next may have been the dates that the paper had been meant to circulate because the next issue commented on the disappearance of the printer.
16. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 317.
17. *La Victoire*, #8190, June 13, 1940, "A ceux qui restent !" G.H.
18. Scher, op.cit., 589–590. *La Victoire* was apparently the only paper to remain in Paris on June 11, 1940. "Lettre de Gustave Hervé au General De Gaulle," September 21, 1944. See Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 33.
19. Quéval, op.cit., 14–15. Tartarin was the quixotic, self-proclaimed swashbuckler and braggart from the novel by Alphonse Daudet.
20. *La Victoire*, #8191, June 17, 1940, "La vérité aux Parisiens," G.H.; "La France va-t-elle demander l'armistice?" undoubtedly by Hervé; "Les devoirs des Parisiens," G.H.
21. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 317; *La Victoire*, #8192, June 18, 1940, "C'est Pétain qu'il nous fallait!" G.H.
22. *La Victoire*, #8193, June 19, 1940, "Quand l'Allemagne était par terre," G.H.
23. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 318.
24. Ibid. In December 1949 Georges Émile Dulac, Hervé's faithful associate, gave the final proof to the old B.N. At one time this censored issue could be found in B.N., Res. Fol. Lc26327.
25. *La Victoire*, #8194, June 20, 1940, "Les trois obstacles à la paix," G.H. Hervé believed that French domination of the seas (in tandem with the English navy one assumes) would make

continuation of the war from an impregnable Africa base possible and appropriate if his conditions were not met.

26. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 319.
27. Robert Paxton, *La France de Vichy, 1940–1944*, translated by Claude Bertrand, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973 [1972]), 59.
28. Sowerwine, op.cit., 186–188. Sowerwine cited Sternhell, *Neither Left Nor Right*, op.cit., 29.
29. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 324–325.
30. Ory, op.cit., 128–145.
31. *La France socialiste*, November 22, 1941, cited by Ory, op.cit., 145.
32. Jackson, op.cit., 13.
33. Claude Lévy, "La Propagande," 47–64, in Jean-Pierre Azéma and François Bédarida, *La France des Années Noires*, Tome 2, *De l'Occupation à la Libération*, (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 58. The first volume also included only one mention of Hervé, a brief comment on Pétain's disinterest in getting involved in Hervé's efforts for him to head a *République Autoritaire* in 1935–1936. Jean-Pierre Azéma, "Le Régime De Vichy," 151–179, Azéma and Bédarida, *La France des Années Noires*, Tome 1, *De la Défaite à Vichy*, op.cit., 156.
34. L.-O. Frossard, op.cit., 163.
35. Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 27. To my knowledge, no one has seen those clandestine letters since Maurice Rotstein uncovered copies during research for his Ph.D. thesis completed in 1956.
36. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 327.
37. *Je suis partout* was a pro-Nazi weekly review staffed by former Maurrassian intellectuals Pierre Gaxotte, Robert Brasillach, Lucien Rebatet, and others. It never had a circulation of more than 100,000. Two other papers with a similar tone and similar themes were *Gringoire* and *Candide*, which had circulations in May 1936 of 640,000 and 460,000 respectively. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 79.
38. Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 27; Rotstein, op.cit., 213–215; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 326–327.
39. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 326. The location 36, Quai des Orfèvres was the Regional Headquarters for France's Judicial and Criminal Police on the Ile de la Cite where the Paris *Préfecture de Police* and the Palais de Justice were also located.
40. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 327.
41. Rotstein, op.cit., 212–215; Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 27–29; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 326–327.
42. Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 27.
43. Rotstein, op.cit., 210–214; Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 27–29; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 326.
44. Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 24; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 326.
45. Agulhon, op.cit., 286, 293. "In the summer of 1941, an almost triumphal German advance into Russian territory had been halted before Moscow." Stalingrad would follow by late 1942.
46. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 324.
47. "La lettre au maréchal," Gustave Hervé letter to Marshal Pétain, May 26, 1941. Found in Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 30–33. The Catholic playwright Paul Claudel had a similar reaction but Claudel joined the Resistance after an initial enchantment with Pétain. Sowerwine, op.cit., 185.
48. Ibid.; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 328.
49. Sowerwine, op.cit, 190–191.
50. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 328; Rotstein, op.cit., 209–210.
51. Rotstein, op.cit., 210.
52. "La lettre au maréchal," op.cit., Gustave Hervé letter to Marshal Pétain, May 26, 1941.
53. *La Victoire*, #8102, March 2–3, 1940; Grünblatt, op.cit., 78.

54. An atheist like Hitler consciously imitated religious liturgy and pageantry hoping to affect people through his political spectacles and formations. However, Nazism not only attacked Jews, it targeted Christian churches, either seeking to eliminate, co-opt, or convert them. The Nazis may even have expected to eliminate all the churches in German society. A comment by Goebbels in his diary substantiates that possibility: "Hitting the churches hard. We want to become a church ourselves." French fascist writer Alphonse de Chateaubriant, who stressed the spirit of self sacrifice and spiritual harmony of life under Nazism, "came close to seeing in Hitler a second Christ." Hervé's national socialism sought to employ religion as well as patriotism as instruments for unity and harmony, but such devices were also ardently held faiths and beliefs. Apparently, religion and religious metaphors function at many levels. Orlow, op.cit., 72, 81.
55. Gustave Hervé, *Les Epîtres de Gustave Hervé aux Incroyants et aux Croyants: le testament politique d'un grande journaliste*, (Paris: Éditions de la société nouvelle *La Victoire*, 1949).
56. Jackson J. Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History*, 5th Edition, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2005), 233.
57. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 330–331.
58. Sowerwine, op.cit., 201.
59. Hervé, *Les Epîtres* ..., op.cit., 78; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 330–331.
60. In fact, De Gaulle had quickly perceived the triple-headed danger to France posed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. Agulhon, op.cit., 245.
61. "Lettre de Gustave Hervé au General De Gaulle," Paris, September 21, 1944. This letter is included in Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 33–35, also see Lucien Leclerc's introduction VII–XI; Grünblatt, op.cit., 75–78; Scher, op.cit., 590; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 327–328.
62. Dulac and Leclerc, op.cit., 33.
63. *La Victoire*, #5270, June 9, 1930, "Puisqu'on reparle de l'hervéisme," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7047, February 19, 1936, "Pour le pacte, quand même!" G.H.
64. *La Victoire*, #7340, February 14–15, 1937, "Les propos du docteur Goebbels," G.H. Sometimes Hervé could be a bit more modest because here in response to Goebbels' intemperate speech, the former *Sans Patrie* called the French Revolution the origins of Bolshevism and Bonapartism, the first form of Nazism.
65. Hervé, *Les Epîtres* ..., op.cit., 60; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 330.
66. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 324–325.
67. A death certificate at the Cimetière de Levallois-Perret gives the date of his death as 26 October 1944.
68. In the early 1950s Georges-Émile Dulac tried to resurrect *La Victoire* as a weekly with the sub-title of "*Hebdomadaire de la République Autoritaire, Socialiste, et Plébiscitaire*." It did not last long with its original creator already long-gone.
69. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 364; Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 331.
70. Heuré, *GH: Itinéraire d'un provocateur*, op.cit., 331.
71. Archives du Cimetière de Montrouge; Archives du Cimetière de Levallois-Perret.
72. Knegt, op.cit., 117–118; Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, op.cit., 78–80; *La Victoire*, #7502, November 19, 1937, "Les Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7503, November 20, 1937, "Défense des Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7504, November 21–22, 1937; *La Victoire*, #7505, November 23, 1937, "Sans Cagoule," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7507, November 25, 1937, "L'exemple des Cagoulards," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7547, January 11, 1938, "Une histoire des brigands," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7548, January 12, 1938, "Le coup de théâtre policier," G.H.; *La Victoire*, #7546, January 9–10, 1938.
73. J. Didier and Marielle Giraud, op.cit., 327.
74. Adam Kirsch, "The Ironic Wisdom of Reinhold Niebuhr," *New York Review of Books*, August 13, 2015, Vol. LXII, No. 13, 74–75.

Appendix A

1. Weber, Eugen. "The Right Between the Wars," 10–18. *France and North America—L'Entre deux guerres*—in *Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium of French-American Studies*, April 7–11, 1975, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, edited by Vaughan Baker and Amos E. Simpson. Published/Created: [Lafayette, La.]: Center for Louisiana Studies, The University, c1980.
2. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory, *Juge D'Instruction*, on November 1, 1905.
3. Ibid.
4. Zeev Sternhell, "Correspondance," *Esprit*, No. 12, December 1983, 190.
5. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory, *Juge D'Instruction*, on November 1, 1905.
6. A.N., F7 12910. Note M/2021. December 29, 1905. Agent "Louis." According to the Ministry of the Interior, Sadrin was apparently a suspect in a theft, had no regular means of income, and was suspected as a police spy by some of his fellow defendants due to overzealotry in court. The Prefecture of Police called him a carpenter with little work.
7. Revolutionary and antimilitarist ideas were far from alien to the Méric family despite the respectability of Méric's father. Friguglietti, op.cit., 99–110; Victor Méric, *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, (December 5, 1925) ..., 107–111. Méric was much embarrassed by his failure to sign the poster once his identity as an author of the *Affiche Rouge* became known.
8. Eugen Weber makes this point in "The Right Between the Wars," 13. op.cit.
9. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Note of February 9, 1906. Police Agent "Finot"; *Le Petit Parisien*, February 8, 1906.
10. A.P.P., Ba/1512. Information sent to M. Flory. Four of the five chief members of the future staff of *La Guerre Sociale*, Hervé, Almereyda, Merle, and Perceau had signed the poster. The fifth, Méric, played a central role in the drafting of the poster.

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
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Gustave Hervé (1871–1944) seemed to have traditional Breton roots and a typical republican education. As a young socialist journalist and professor, he gained notoriety following a 1901 article which appeared to plant the tricolor in a dung pile. When French socialists unified in 1905, the *Hervéistes* were an influential minority. The antimilitarist movement called Hervéism gradually emerged as a quixotic crusade to unite revolutionaries against war and for socialism. Hervé soon founded a weekly newspaper, *La Guerre Sociale*. Over the next six years, press campaigns, trials, prison, demonstrations, strikes, and conspiratorial organizations maintained Hervé's profile and sold newspapers. Ironically, Hervé advertised conspiracies, which suggests revolutionary theater more than practical politics. Among Hervé's rivals, such theatrics often generated resentment. While Hervé's movement succeeded as a media experience, his leftist competitors became jealous and skeptical. As revolutionary theater Hervéism might have been entertaining, but the actors and some of the audience often confused revolutionary art with political reality. By 1911 the ingenuous Hervé felt betrayed. His failure to unite revolutionaries began an evolution toward the nation and its traditional Catholic faith. Besides the international situation, one crucial determinant in Hervé's evolution toward French national socialism sympathetic to fascism involved ongoing rivalries within the French Left. Hervé's marginal interwar national socialist parties sought to employ patriotism and religion to solve French problems. By 1935 he attempted to draft Pétain to lead an authoritarian republic. Gradually losing hope in Pétain after the fall of France, the aging Hervé put his faith in Christian socialism.



Michael B. Loughlin has taught history and political science at Ohio Northern University for the past 27 years. At ONU Loughlin represented the university on the World Affairs Council of Greater Cincinnati until 2007 and since 1996 as coordinator for Phi Beta Delta, whose ONU chapter has won several regional and national awards in the past decade. During that time he has continued his research on Gustave Hervé and published several articles in *The Journal of Contemporary History*, *European Review of History/Revue Européenne D'Histoire*, the *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*, and *Beregynia. 777. Owl: The Journal*. Loughlin's research has been constantly expanded since his Ph.D. dissertation "The Political Transformation of Gustave Hervé, 1871–1944," completed at Indiana University in 1987 under the direction of William B. Cohen.

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